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134
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
In this connection, it will not be irrelevant to mention the Vijñānavādin's conception of twofold āvaranas (veils) viz. jñeyāvarana and kleśāvarana on the disappearance of which depends enlightenment. The word jñeya means 'knowable' i.e. the dharmas elements of existence' which are not substantial and thus have no reality. The avarana 'cover' in the form of jñeya is called iñeyāvarana. Sometimes the term jñeyāvarana is also explained as 'āvarana regarding the knowable'.? In this case the knowable (jñeya) is the reality or the things in their true nature. Similarly, klešāvarana means the avarana in the form of klesas. On the question of the purification of these āvaranas, the Lankāvatāra says: 'The jñeyāvarana, O Mahāmati, is purified due to a special kind of intuition of dharma-nairātmya or unsubstantiality of things as they appear. The kleśāvarana, on the other hand, is destroyed due to the practice of intuition of pudgalanairātmya 'the unreality of the individual ego'.4 These avaranas are also conceived to be as unreal and illusory as the abhūtaparikalpa (unreal imagination), because the consciousness is pure and luminous (prabhāsvara) by nature."
This is the nature of avidyā of the Vijñānavādins. Let us now study the conception of avidyā in the Tathatā philosophy of Aśvaghosa.
Aśvaghoşa held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished --the aspect as thatness (bhūtatathatā) and the aspect as the cycle of birth and death (samsāra). The soul as bhūtatathatā means the oneness of the totality of all things (dharmadhātu). Its essential nature is uncreate and eternal. All things simply on account of the beginningless traces of the incipient and unconscious memory of our past experiences of many previous lives (smrti) appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome this smrti the signs of individuation would disappear and there would be no trace of a world of objects. All things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be adequately expressed in any form of language. They possess absolute sameness (samatā). They are subject neither to
1 See AS, p. 210.
2 Cf. jñeyam cã "vrtir āvaranam ... jneyam eva samāropitarūpatvád āvītiḥ-BAP, p. 447. jñeyāvaranam api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapratibandhabhūtam akliştam ajñanam-Tk, p. 15.
3 kleśă evā "vștiḥ--BAP, p. 447.
4 jñeyāvaranam punar Mahămate dharma-nairātmya-darśana-višeşad visudhyate, kleśāvaraṇam tu pudgala-nairātmyadarśanākhyāsapūrvakam prahiyateLA, p. 241.
5 Cf. prakrti-prabhāsvarar cittam-LA, X. 750, 753, 754.
6 This study is based on Dr. Dasgupta's A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (First edition), pp. 129-138. Dr. Dasgupta's statements are based on Awakening of Faith, an English translation by Suzuki of the Chinese version of Sraddhotpadaśāstra of Ašvaghoşa.
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