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164
[CH.
inevitable contingency of regressus ad infinitum). Nor can the difference (between one inherence and another) be only a metaphorical one. There is, moreover, contradiction of the popular usages (such as "There are threads in a cloth' and the like which do not recognize inherence).' This doctrine of inherence furthermore leads the NyāyaVaiseṣika to a number of other absurd conceptions. A universal (sāmānya) cannot inhere in another universal, nor can it inhere in the ultimate particulars (viseṣas) nor again in an inherence. Accordingly, the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika holds that existence (sattā), being a universal, does not belong to the categories of universal, particulars, and inherence. It exclusively belongs to the other categories of substance (dravya), qualities (guna) and actions (karman). Besides this, it is held that knowledge and pleasure, being as much the qualities inhering in a soul as wrong cognition (ajñāna), pain (duḥkha) and the like do not belong to the soul on the attainment of emancipation. How can the transient qualities which are quite distinct and separate from the soul belong to it when it is free from all defiling attributes? Knowledge and joy do not arise in the emancipated soul because there is no soulmind contact. Vātsyāyana maintains that even as the poisoned sweets are unacceptable, exactly so the joy, invariably being mixed up with pain, is unacceptable. He has to condemn all joy as mixed with pain perhaps in order to explain away the impossibility of the existence of joy in emancipation. Acarya Hemacandra sums up these defects when he says: 'Even of the existents, only some have existence. Consciousness is only adventitious and absolutely different from the soul. Emancipation is not attended with knowledge and bliss. The heretics have composed excellent system indeed!' The main objection of the Jainas is against the absolutistic attitude. Knowledge, joy etc. cannot be absolutely distinct from the soul. They constitute the nature of the J na dharma-dharmitvam atīva bhede vṛttyä 'sti cen na tritayam cakāsti
ihe 'dam ity asti matiś ca vṛttau
na gaunabhedo 'pi ca lokabadhaḥ.-AYV, 7.
See also Syadvādamañjarī on it. For detailed criticism of samavāya see PKM, pp. 609-623; SVR, pp. 965-970.
2 Cf. sad anityam dravyavat karyaṁ kāraṇam samanya-viseṣavad iti dravyaguna-karmaṇām aviseṣah-VS, I. 1. 8. Also cf. VS, I. 2. 7. See also PB, p. 121 dravyādinām trayāṇām api sattasambandhaḥ.
3 Cf. santaḥ khalv ayam sarva-viprayogaḥ, sarvoparamo 'pavargaḥ. bahu ca kṛcchram ghoram papakam lupyata iti katham buddhiman sarvaduḥkhocchedam sarva-duḥkhāsamvidam apavargam na rocayed iti. tad yatha, madhuvisasampṛktannam anādeyam iti, evam sukham duḥkhānuṣaktam anadeyam iti -Bhasya, NS, I. 1. 2. See also Bhāṣya, NS, I. 1. 22.
4 satām api syat kvacid eva sattā
caitanyam aupadhikam ātmano 'anyat
na samvidanandamayi ca muktiḥ susūtram äsütritam atvadīyaiḥ-AYV, 8.
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