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PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
(CH.
which kept them suppressed. With the disappearance of these external forces, the self recovers its infinite capacity and bliss. The Jaina, however, does not assert that the limitations of bondage are illusory. They are real facts. But they can be overcome and transcended in emancipation. The changes are real changes. The apprehension of the Sankhya that the possibility of change of the self might spell total subversion of consciousness by unconsciousness is regarded by the Jainas as baseless. Change is always limited in scope. Even the Sankhya has to admit that although prakrti is subject to perpetual change it does not change from existence to non-existence because that would be tantamount to denial of change. Change is possible only if there be continuity behind it. So an existent is never found to be so changed as to become a non-existent fiction. Likewise, the self can never change into a totally unconscious entity because consciousness is as inalienable a characteristic of the self as existence is affirmed to be of matter. It is a question of fact as to what is to be regarded as the inalienable essence of an entity, and what is to be regarded as an evanescent character. So the self, though in perpetual change, can never become not-self. Change is integral to it no doubt, but so also are its existence and consciousness and bliss. It may be asked 'Does the self change after emancipation?' The Jaina will answer 'Yes, it does.' But as there is no external interfering agent the change is always homogeneous. It may be regarded as an incessant renewal of its perfected being. But as renewal presupposes continuity, there is no lapse from consciousness, existence, bliss and power.
Let us now consider the technical difficulties in the NyāyaVaiseșika conception of avidyā.
The Nyāya-Vaiseșika, like the Sankhya-Yoga, regards wrong cognition (ajñāna) as the cause of bondage. There is emancipation when the wrong cognition is destroyed. But how can the wrong cognition be destroyed in view of the infinitefoldness of the things to be known (jñeya)? Vätsyāyana himself admits the impossibility of knowing all the objects when he says: "The knowledge of truth (tattva-jñāna) does not arise with reference to all the objects severally, inasmuch as the objects are infinite. Nor does it arise with reference to some objects (at random), because then delusion (moha) would still exist with reference to those objects that have not been comprehended (by the knowledge) and so there will be the undesirable consequence of existence of the residuum of delusion; and also because it is not possible that the knowledge (tattua-jñāna) with reference to something should remove the delusion with reference to something else. Wrong cognition (mithyājñāna) indeed is delusion (moha). It is not simply the absence of the knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna). And that object, the wrong cognition about which is the seed of worldly existence, is to
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