Book Title: Studies in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society

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Page 71
________________ 34 EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE AGAMAS [CH. upalabdhi (perception), and refers to others by using the term et cetera (ādi). Vidyānandi in his Tattvārthaślokavārttika, however, adds buddhi (intellect), medhā (retentiveness), prajñā (reasoning), pratibhā (grasp), abhāva (non-perception), sambhava (probability) and upamiti (analogy) to the synonyms given by Umāsvāti. In this connection the view of Bhatta Akalanka deserves special attention. Akalanka, in his Laghīyastraya, divides pramāna (valid knowledge) into pratyakşa (direct) and paroksa (indirect) and recognizes pratyakşa (direct knowledge) as twofold viz. mukhya (transcendental) and sämuyavahārika (empirical) also called atîndriya-pratyakşa (super-sensuous intuition) and indriyanindriya-pratyaksa (sensuous and quasi-sensuous perception) respectively. Avagraha (perception), īhā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraṇā (retention) are subsumed under indriya-pratyaksa (sensuous perception), while smrti (memory), sañjñā (recognition), cinta (discursive thought) and abhinibodha (perceptual cognition) are put under anindriya-pratyakşa (quasi-sensuous or mental perception). Śruta (scriptural knowledge), arthāpatti (presupposition), anumāna (inference), upamāna (analogy) etc. are put under parokşa (indirect knowledge). Mati-jñāna thus is recognized as pratyakşa. Memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. are cases of mati-jñāna so long as they are not associated with language. They come under śruta (scriptural knowledge) as soon as they are associated with words, and as such they become parokşa. No other Jaina thinker has tried to subsume memory, recognition, discursive thought etc. under pratyaksa. Akalanka stands alone in this respect. He has not even a single supporter among his successors who admired him so much. On the contrary some of his successors have attempted to find a different meaning of the statements of Akalanka in this connection.. We shall now state in brief the nature of the subdivisions of matijñāna' viz. avagraha (perception), ihā (speculation), avāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraņā (retention) which are nothing but so many stages of the development of mati-jñāna. (a) Avagraha (Perception) The Nandi Sūtra gives these as the synonyms of avagrahaavagrahanatä (receiving), upadhāranatā (holding), sravanatā (hearing), 1 matih smrtih sañjñā cinta 'bhinibodhādaya ityarthah. ke punas te? pratibhā-buddhy-upalabdhyādayaḥ.—TRĀ on TSü, 1. 13. 2 Sloka 3 on Tsu, I. 13. 3 LT, 3 and 4 (also see Vivyti on it composed by Akalanka himself). 4 LT, 61 (with Vivyti). 5 See LT, 10-11 (with Vivyti). 6 Cf. NKC on kärikā io and the first half of kärikä 11 (pp. 403 et seq.). 7 For Acārya Kundakunda's classification see Pañcāstikāyasūra, 41. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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