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96
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
and not something absolutely non-existent. Accordingly, he defines aviveka as 'knowledge of two things with their difference uncomprehended.'? Thus the erroneous cognition of a piece of conch-shell as silver consists in the cognition of both the piece of conch-shell and the mind-transformation with their difference uncomprehended. The mind takes the shape of silver. This mental silver and the piece of conchshell lying in front are both the objects of the wrong cognition 'This is silver'. The non-comprehension of the difference between the silver as mental content and the external conch-shell is responsible for the error. This is Vijñänabhiksu's interpretation of aviveka. The doctrine of Yoga anyathākhyāti, on the other hand, as interpreted by Vijñānabhikṣu would hold that the erroneous cognition ‘This is silver' does not refer to two unrelated objects, but it refers to only one object, the related object--the objective substratum with mental content superimposed upon it as the predicate. The mind transformed into the shape of silver is the predicative content of the cognition 'This is silver' in which this stands for the real object and silver for the mental transformation or the idea. In other words, the judgment ‘This is silver' is a complex of an objective fact, which is the subject, and a subjective idea, which is the predicate. The judgment is false because the predicate is not an objective real and so does not belong to it. In the veridical perception, the subject and the predicate are both objective facts and are related by an objective relation. The false judgment or error is one in which the predicate is a mental content which has no true relation with the logical subject (this) but still is superimposed upon it. The predicate and its relation are both unreal. The doctrine of Vaiseșika anyathākhyāti, on the other hand, would hold that it is the piece of silver that exists elsewhere that is superimposed on the subject of the erroneous cognition 'This is silver'. Vijñānabhiksu seems to criticize this Vaiśesika doctrine when, commenting on the Sankhyasūtra viz. nanyathākhyātih svavacovyāghātāt (V. 55), he says: 'It is also not proper that one thing should be cognized in the form of another because that would involve contradiction of one's own statement .... Even the upholders of anyathakhyāti admit that the non-existent cannot be cognized. The meaning is this: the non-existence of a thing in front cannot condition the cognition of the existence of the thing elsewhere.'3 Vijñānabhiksu
Cf...... naraśțăgādinām abhānāt . . śukti-rajata-svapna-manorathādau ca manah-pariņāmarūpa evä 'rthaḥ pratīyate nā 'tyanta 'sann iti vaksyatiSPB, V. 52.
2.... aviveko 'gļhitāsamsarga kam ubhayajñānam-SPB, I. 55.
3 anyad vastv anyarūpeṇa bhāsata ity api na yuktam, svavaco-vyāghātāt ... asato bhānā-'sambhavasyā 'nyatha-khyāti-vādibhir api vacanād ity arthah. purovartiny asattve 'nyatra tatsattāyā bhānāprayojakatvam iti bhāvaḥ---SPB, V. 55
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