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III. III]
AVIDYA IN THE SAMKHYA SCHOOL
97
does not criticize the Yoga doctrine anywhere, though he always differentiates it from the doctrine of aviveka of the Sankhya system. And as we have stated above he quotes the Yogasutra II. 5 in order to show that the Yoga system upholds the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. But there are passages in the Yogabhāsya which imply the doctrine of aviveka as well. On the other hand, there is a passage? quoted in the Yogabhäşya and ascribed to the great Sankhya exponent Pañcaśikha by Vācaspati, which can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of anyathākhyāti for the Sänkhya system. The truth seems to be that both the systems, the Yoga and the Sānkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of aviveka.
Both the systems regard viveka (discrimination) as the condition of emancipation. And there is no reason why both of them should not regard aviveka (non-discrimination) as the condition of bondage. Of course, had the doctrine of aviveka gone counter to the fundamental position of the Yoga, it would have been plausible to deduce a different doctrine of error. But when the fundamental position of both the systems is identical, we fail to understand why Vijñānabhikṣu is so keen on differentiating the Yoga doctrine from the Sankhya one. Vijñānabhiksu makes capital out of Patañjali's definition of avidyā. But from a consideration of the general philosophical position of the Yoga system as found in the Yogasutra and the Bhāsya, we can easily establish that the doctrine of aviveka is not inconsistent with the Yoga system. We can also easily interpret the Yoga definition of avidyā as implying the doctrine of aviveka, or at least as not against such interpretation. Let us briefly attempt to see what the Yoga system points to.
According to the Yoga system, as we have already stated, the evolution of the prakrti is for the enjoyment of the puruşa, and the enjoyment is possible only if the two absolutely separate and distinct principles of puruşa and prakyti become apparently identical. Now what this apparent identity is due to? It is certainly due to avidyā. The function of avidyā thus is found to be 'to make appear as identical what are not really identical'. And how can this function of avidyā be possible? Avidyā belongs to the buddhi, and so it cannot operate upon the external object. Therefore it follows that avidyā operates
For instance, the passages—(I) yā tu kaivalya-prāgbhārā vivekavişayanimnā sã kalyāņavaha, samsāra-prāg-bhārā 'vivekaviņaya-nimnā pāpavahā (Bhāsya, YD, I. 12); (2) buddhitah param puruşam ākāra-śīlam vidyādibhir vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatră 'tma-buddhim mohene 'ti (quoted in the Bhasya, YD, II. 6)--can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of aviveka.
2 vyaktam avyaktam vā sattvam ātmatvenā 'bhipratītya tasya sampadam anunandaty atmasam padam manvānaḥ... sa sarvo 'pratibuddhah-Bhasya, YD, II. 5.
3 See YD, II. 26; Skā, 2, 64-66. JP-13
kaivalya-pragua-nimnā Padibhir
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