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110
PROBLEM OF AVIDYA
[CH.
both the schools coalesced, and consequently developed a common theory. But let us collect together the relevant materials that are in the Vaiseșikasūtra, and see their implication. The Padārtha-dharmasangraha (also known as Prasastapādabhāsya) of Acārya Prasastapäda. is an excellent rearrangement and interpretation of the topics of the Vaiseșikasūtra, and is of great value for the understanding of the original Sutra. Our enquiry accordingly will be based on these two works. The enquiry of the whole chapter has limited itself to the most original sources, and as such it is proposed to withstand the influence of the later developments and innovations as much as possible.
The Vaišeşi kasūtra recognizes two kinds of cognition viz. vidya (right cognition) and avidyā (wrong cognition). Of these, the right cognition is divided into four sub-classes viz. perceptual (pratyakşa), 2 inferential (laingika),3 recollection (smrti) and supernormal spiritual intuition (ārşa-jñāna). The wrong cognition, on the other hand, is subdivided into fourfold species viz. doubt (samsaya), perverted cognition (viparyaya or avidyā), indecision (anadhyavasāya) and dream-cognition (svapna). We shall not discuss the conceptions of all these topics, our main interest being limited to the conception of wrong cognition (avidyā). The Vaiseșikasūtra says that avidyā is due to the defects of sense-organs and the perverted influence of the memoryimpressions.? Prasastapāda refers to avidyā by the term viparyaya which he recognizes to be of two kinds viz. perceptual and inferential. He defines viparyaya as cognition of the form 'It is A' with regard to what is other than A', and enumerates the following as the conditions of such erroneous cognition: (1) blurred vision of two objects possessed of many well-known distinctive features by one whose sense-organs are overpowered by the bodily humours in disorder, (2) conjunction of soul and mind accompanied with the awakened) memory-impression produced in the past) by the past cognition of an object not present at the time), and (3) religious demerit (adharma).10 For instance, the
1. VS, IX, 2. 10-12. We are treating the subject on the basis of Prasastapādabhāsya, although we have referred to the original Sūtra as far as possible.
2 Cf. VS, VIII. I. 4-11; about yogi-pratyakşa see IX. I. 11-15. For the terms pratyakṣa and laingika see X. I. 3.
3 Gf. IX. 2. 1-5; III. I. 7-17. 4 IX. 2. 6.
5 IX. 2. 13. 6 See PB, P. 520 ; see VS, II. 2. 17-20 (samsaya) : IX. 2. 10 (avidyā); IX. 2. 7 (svapna).
7 indriyadoşāt samskāradosāc cã 'vidya--VS, IX. 2. 10. 8 viparyayo 'pi pratyakşånumāna-visayi eva bhavati--PB, p. 538.'
atasmims tad iti pratyayo viparyayah--PB, p. 538. 10 prasiddhäneka-visesayoh pitta-kaphānilopahatendriyasya ayathārthalocanād asannihita-visayajñānaja-samskārāpeksad åtmamanasoh samyogad adharmāc ca-PB, P. 538.
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