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II]
JNANA AND DARSANA
in strict conformity with his awareness, would exclude the object of jarśana when it would synchronize with knowledge, and it would exclude the object of jñāna when synchronizing with intuition. And even in the case of simultaneity of jñāna and darśana, the difficulty of simultaneous statement of the contents of both would still remain.1 Omniscience would be only an ill-conceived notion if it were admitted that the omniscient arhat intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited.2 The conception of separate identity of jñāna and darsana implies that the object of darsana remains for ever untouched by jñāna and the object of jñāna remains for ever untouched by darśana and consequently it follows that the whole reality ever remains unknown even to the kevalin. The various scriptural statements contradicting our position, however, are to be interpreted with reference to various standpoints. The scriptures do not recognize darśana in the case of manaḥparyaya, inasmuch as the manaḥparyāya cognizes only particular features of the mind-substance of others, and not its universal forms. They further recognize only four classes of darśana viz. cakṣurdarśana, acakṣurdarśana, avadhi-darśana and kevala-darśana. Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized darśana as 'avagraha, simple and pure', and jñāna as 'determinate description' of the form 'This is a jar', and distinguished darsana from jñāna on the ground that the latter can be due to the former while the former can never be due to the latter.4 He refutes the opinion on the ground that avagraha has been recognized as a sub-type of mati-jñāna, and as such if darsana were held to be nothing but avagraha, it would follow that darśana is a type of mati-jñāna." Siddhasena then formulates his own definition of darśana which runs as follows: 'Darsana is jñāna (cognition) of external objects untouched by, or unamenable to the sense-organs, provided the cognition does not cognize the past and future events by means of a linga (probans).' The definition does not overextend to manaḥparyaya, because the external objects are not directly known by it.7 Mati and śruta have no corresponding darśana. But avadhi can have darsana inasmuch as avadhi intuits objects that are untouched by the sense-organs." The omniscient (kevalin) knows as well as intuits
addiṭṭham anṇāyam ca kevali eva bhāsai sayāvi
ega-samayammi hamdi vayana-vigappo na sambhavai.-Ibid., II. 12. 2 Cf. ibid., II. 13. 3 Cf. ibid., II. 18.
4 damsanam uggahamettam ghado tti nivvannaṇā havai nāņam, etc. -STP, II. 21-22; Yasovijaya, however, gives a quite different explanation of gāthā 22 (see his JBP, p. 43).
5 Ibid., II. 23.
77
6 nanam aputthe avisae ya aṭṭhammi damsaṇaṁ hoi
mottuna limgao jam anagayāīyavisaesu.-Ibid., II. 25. See also the commentary of Abhayadeva.
7 Cf. ibid., II. 26.
8 Cf. ibid., II. 27-28.
9 Cf. ibid., II. 29.
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