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76
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE AGAMAS
[CH.
on the authority of the scriptures, maintain that the emancipated one (jina) does not know and intuit simultaneously make no scruple to flout their tirthankara. In other words, he finds logical difficulties in the position and asks those who stand by the old position to reinterpret the Agamic statement and thus remove the inconsistencies. If kevalajñāna dawns on the complete destruction of the relevant obscuring karman it stands to reason that kevala-darśana also should dawn immediately upon the destruction of the relevant obscuring karman. And as both the destructions are simultaneous, it logically follows that the dawnings of kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana also synchronize.2
As it is said that there can be no mati-jñāna in the omniscient jina who has completely destroyed the veil, so (should it be admitted that) there can be no separate darśana in one who has completely destroyed the veil.'3 "Moreover,' says Siddhasena Divākara, in the scriptures, kevala has been said to have beginning but no end, and those afraid of going against the scriptures should take note of this fact.'4 Admission of succession in the occurrence of jñāna and darśana means admission of break of continuity of both of them, and this obviously goes against the scriptures which prescribe non-break (aparyavasitatua), that is, continuity of both jñāna and darśana." The jñānāvarana and darśanāvarana are destroyed simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana, should arise first? Logically we cannot give priority to anyone of them. Nor is it possible to admit the synchronous emergence of both, because two conscious activities cannot occur simultaneously. If an omniscient soul knows all in one instant, he should continue to know all for ever, or otherwise, he does not know all.? The contention that jñāna (knowledge) is distinct and determinate while darśana (intuition) is indistinct and indeterminate has no scope in the case of one who has destroyed all karmic veils. The distinction of 'determinate and indeterminate', 'distinct and indistinct', applies to the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not to that of the perfect ones. And hence there can be no distinction between jñāna and darśana of the omniscient. There are other difficulties as well. Supposing that even in a kevalin the jñāna and the darśana are quite distinct from one another, they must occur either in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, the kevalin could not be held to speak out complete reality, because his statement, being
i Ibid., II. 4.
2 Ibid., II. 5. 3 bhaņņai khīņāvaraṇe jaha maiņāņam jise na sambhavai
taha khīņāvaranijje visesao damsaņam natthi.--Ibid., II. 6. 4 Ibid., II. 7.
5 Cf. ibid., II. 8. 6 Cf. damsaņa-ņāņā-'varana-kkhae samānammi kassa pūvvaaram
hojja saman uppão hamdi duve natthi uvaogā.-Ibid., II. 9. Cf. ibid., II. IO.
8 Cf. ibid., II. II.
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