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38
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE AGAMAS
[CH.
of avagraha. He is not prepared to allow the least reference even to a relative particular in avagraha, because even relative particularity is enough to put it into the category of apāya (perceptual judgment). If relative particularity is the criterion of the status of avagraha, then the possibility of apāya (perceptual judgment) will be ruled out inasmuch as in that case any cognition of a particular characteristic will be a case of avagraha, there being always available a cognition of a still more particular characteristic. It is not possible to ascertain all the particulars of an entity even in the course of a very long time. An entity reveals more and more specific characteristics along with the advancement of our knowledge. It is therefore more logical to concede the status of avagraha only to those cognitions which are totally free from even negligible reference to some particular characteristic. The cognition that contains the least particular as its content is apāya (perceptual judgment), and not avagraha. Jinabhadra quotes the view of some thinkers who held that the avagraha of a new-born child cognizes only the general features while that of a person sufficiently familiar with the objects cognizes the particular characteristics even in one single instant. But he refutes the view on the ground that it will entail the postulation of an indefinite number of avagrahas each varying according to the richness of the knowledge of the cognizer. The richer the knowledge of a person the more will be the number of particular characteristics cognized in his avagraha.? But this is certainly a fantastic position. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which regarded avgraha as bringing up the rear of alocana (intuitional cognition) which cognizes the general feature (sāmānya) and as cognizing its object as excluded from everything else. He criticizes the theory on the grounds already given and says that this ālocana (intuitional cognition) cannot be identified with vyañjanāvagraha (contact-awareness) inasmuch as the latter has none as its object while the former has 'general feature' as its object. It can, therefore, be nothing but our arthāvagraha (object-perception) under different nomenclature.3
Now avagraha-like ihä (speculation), apāya (perceptual judgment) and dhāraṇā (retention)-has been characterized as 'cognizing quickly', 'cognizing slowly', 'cognizing many', 'cognizing some' etc. and this is not possible unless avagraha is regarded as lasting for more than one instant and as cognizing the particular characteristics. Jinabhadra gets over this difficulty by stating that these are called cases of avagraha only by transference of epithet (upacarena). A genuine (naiscayika) arthāvagraha (object-perception) lasts only for a
1 Cf. ViBh, 255-6.
2 Cf. ibid., 268-9. 3 See ViBh, 273-7 with the Brhadurtti. * See ibid., 280 with the Byhadurtti; also see TSū, I. 16.
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