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SRUTA-JÑANA
51
attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong (mithyā), his knowledge also becomes wrong. Similarly if the result of the knowledge of mithyāśruta (false scripture) by a mithyādysti (person of perverse attitude) turns out in the end to be the abandonment of the perversity (mithyādrsti), the mithyāśruta (false scripture) is to be considered as samyak śruta (right scripture).
The characteristics of sādika 'having beginning' and anādika 'having no beginning'-saparyavasita 'having end' and aparyavasita 'having no end' are considered variously. But the discussion is unimportant for our purpose and so we do not enter into it. It is, however, to be noticed in this connection that the Jaina thinkers held that a soul could never (except when it has attained perfect knowledge) be bereft of mati (sensuous) and śruta (verbal) knowledge. Even the one-sensed organisms are held to be possessed of these. To be bereft of these is to lose the nature of soul and become non-soul. Now, the one-sensed organism has the feeling of touch and so can have matijñāna (sensuous cognition), but how can it possess śruta-jñāna (verbal knowledge)? This is a difficult problem to answer. Jinabhadra says that although the one-sensed organisms do not possess dravya-śruta (symbols--written or spoken) they possess bhāva-śruta (potential verbal knowledge) which can be likened to the verbal knowledge of a sleeping ascetic (yati). But even bhāva-śruta is possible only with those who have the capacity to speak and to hear and with none else, and it is nothing but the mental disposition that precedes a speech or follows a hearing. 5 And as such how can it be possible for the one-sensed organisms who have neither the capacity to speak nor the capacity to hear? Jinabhadra answers this objection as follows; 'Even as subtle internal sensuous cognitions are possible in spite of the absence of the external physical sense-organ, so 'potential verbal knowledge' is possible even for (the one-sensed) such as the earth-bodied (beings) in spite of the absence of dravya-śruta.' It is admitted that the one-sensed
1 NSū, 41.
2 Cf. egindiyā niyayam duyannāņi, tam jahā-mai-annāņi ya suya-annāņi ya--quoted from Āgama in Byhadurtti, Vibh, IOI. Also see BhSū VIII. 2 (317). The mati and śruta of the one-sensed organisms are, as a rule, called ajñäna 'perverted knowledge' inasmuch as they are mithyādřşți and the jñāna of a mithyadrsţi is held to be ajñāna. See Prajñāpanāsūtra, pada 29.
3 Cf. savvajīvānam pi ya ņam akkharassa añantabhāgo niccugghädio citthai. jai puna so 'vi āvarijjā teņam jīvo ajīvattam pāvijā--NSü, 42.
4 davvasuyäņubhāvammi vi bhāvasuyam sutta-jaiņo vya-ViBh, IOI. 5 bhävasuyam bhāsā-soya-laddhiņo jujjae na iyarassa
bhāsābhimuhassa jayam soūna ya jam havejjāhi.-Vibh, 102. 6 jaha suhumam bhāvimdiyanāņam davvimdiyāvarohe vi
taha davvasuyābhāve bhävasuyam patthivāīņam.-Vibh, 103.
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