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58
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE AGAMAS
[CH.
words quâ concepts (knowledge the mati can be 'associated with' as well as 'bereft of' words but with reference to words quâ articulated symbols, the mati is, as a rule, bereft of words; the śruta, on the other hand, whether it is dravya-śruta or bhāva-śruta, can be both sāksara (associated with words) as well as anaksara (bereft of words). 1 Avagraha falls in the category of mati bereft of words while ihā etc. fall in the category of mati associated with words quâ concepts (knowledge). Articulated symbols are not concepts and thus a fortiori they are excluded from the category of mati-jñāna Dravya-śruta is sākşara when it consists of written or spoken words, and it is anaksara when it consists of physical gestures. The bhāva-śruta is called sāksara because it contains words quâ concepts and it is also called niraksara because it does not contain words quâ external symbols written or spoken. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which distinguished mati from śruta on the ground that the former, like a dumb person, can reveal its content to the cognizing self alone, while the latter, like a talking man, can reveal its contents to others as well. This reminds us of the position of Pūjyapāda Devanandi who maintains that, as distinguished from other pramānas (organs of knowledge), the śruta serves the twofold purpose of enlightening the cognizing self as well as others the former function being done on account of its self-revealing nature and the latter through the instrumentality of language. The Śruta quâ knowledge reveals its contents to the cognizing self alone while the śruta quâ verbal expression reveals its contents to others as well.But Jinabhadra says that both mati and śruta are essentially cases of knowledge, and as such cannot reveal their contents to others. Of course, śruta quâ words can convey its meaning to others. But Jinabhadra says that physical gestures, which can cause mati, also reveal their meaning to others. These physical gestures stand to matijñāna in the same relation as the words stand to śruta-jñāna, and as such can be compared to the latter. Thus the cause of mati can reveal its meaning to others exactly in the same way as the cause of śruta does. The above line of demarcation between mati and śruta thus is proved invalid.4 But finally Jinabhadra concedes that dravya-śruta is a unique instrument of conveying knowledge to others, that it is designated as śruta by established convention and that there is nothing known as dravya-mati.5 In view of these considerations it is advisable to accept the line of demarcation. Furthermore, he says that physical
I ubhayam bhāvakkharao, anakkharam hojja vamjanakkbarao
maināņam, suttar puņa ubhayam pi anakkhara-kkharao.---Vibh, 170. 2 See ViBh, 171.
3 tatra svārtham pramäņam śrutavarjyam. śrutam punaḥ svārtham bhavati parārtham ca, jñānātmakam svārtharn vacanātmakam parārtham.-SSi, on TSú, 1. 6. 4 See ViBh, 173.
5 Ibid., 174.
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