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II]
NON-DIFFERENCE OF MATI AND SRUTA
59
gestures also are words with meanings, because they too convey the intention and the agent also makes use of them for lack of words in order to convey his intention.”
NON-DIFFERENCE OF MATI AND ŚRUTA We have now drawn a line of demarcation between mati and śruta, which is more or less in accordance with the traditional way of thought. But let us now study the logical implications of the traditional conception. We have seen that ihā (speculation) etc., though they are associated with words, fall in the category of mati and not śruta. The ground given is that the scriptures recognize them to be so and, furthermore, that language does not play the determining role of a condition of mati as it does regarding śruta. In ihā etc. there is only the minimum possible association with words, which is rather the outcome than the generating condition. Words come in only in order to make the cognition determinate and firm'. The perceptual character still remains there. The background of cognizer's learning plays only a silent part. It does not actively influence the cognition like the senseorgan. But this position is not without its weakness. The difficulty can be put thus: Can our cognitions be associated with words, and at the same time remain free from the influence of our previous training in verbal usage? If not, why should not such cognitions as are associated with words be considered as śruta? It is perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that Akalanka held the view that our cognitions are mati so long as they are free from verbal association, and fall in the category of śruta as soon as they are associated with words.2 Pujyapada Devanandi says that all organs of valid knowledge excepting śruta are for one's own self and not for others, inasmuch as they cannot express themselves to others. This statement of Pūjyapāda does not mean to say that all cases of knowledge except śruta are devoid of words. It only means that they are not expressed in language to outsiders and that they fall in the category of śruta when they are So expressed. We can interpret the above statement of Akalanka in this light. It will then mean that all processes of knowledge, perceptual or otherwise, fall in the category of mati so long as they are not expressed in words, and that they are transformed into śruta as soon as they are so expressed. This meaning follows from the statement of Akalanka himself as well. Akalanka thus widens the scope of mati and at the same time distinguishes it from śruta on the ground that mati is confined to the knower himself while śruta reveals its contents to others as well. In one word, mati is subjective and private (svārtha) while śruta is
1 Ibid., 175. 3 Cf. tatra svārtham pramāņań 4 Cf. LT, 10-11 and Vivịti.
2 LT, 10-II. śrutavarjyam.-SSi on TSü, 1. 6.
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