Book Title: Studies in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Jain Cultural Research Society

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Page 64
________________ CHAPTER II THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE AGAMAS INTRODUCTORY In the preceding chapter we have shown the difference of attitude of Mahāvīra with that of the Buddha and the Upanişads and have stressed his credence in the testimony of experience. He did not fall in the trap of abstract logic because he did not deprecate commonsense interpretation of experience. The logical attitude of Mahavira was intimately bound up with his empiricism. It is essential for the understanding of Jaina thought that the epistemology of experience as built up by the Jaina thinkers in consonance with the position of the first systematizer of Jaina thought and religion should be thoroughly understood. Realizing this necessity we now address ourselves to undertake an evaluation and exposition of Jaina theory of knowledge with special reference to experience. It is by no means a simple structure and the complexity of the theory shows that the evolution of the study was spread over a long period. The theory of knowledge of the Agamas is very old and perhaps originated in the pre-Mahāvīra period. It is said that Jñāna-pravāda forined a part of the Pūruaśrutal which was regarded as very old and had been lost long ago. Karma-pravāda also formed a part of the same Purvaśruta. The jñāna-theory is closely related to the karma-theory which forms the very basis of Jaina ethics. The karma-theory is as old as Jainism itself, and so we can regard the Jaina theory of knowledge as of great antiquity. There seems to have been no controversy between the followers of Pārsva and Mahāvira regarding this theory of knowledge, though they differed, and later on compromised, on certain other topics. In the Rāyapasenaiya Sūtta, Kesi-Kumāra, a follower of Pārsva, is described as giving the same five divisions of knowledge as are found elsewhere in the Agamas. This theory, in its basic form, is presupposed by the Jaina doctrine of karman which, in its fundamentals, is beyond doubt pre-Mahāvira. The Āgamas are unanimous as regards the fivefold division of knowledge, and there is no controversy between the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras regarding it. For a long time this theory passed more as an article of faith than as a logical doctrine. Samyag-jñāna or the knowledge of a person of right attitude was considered as valid knowledge (pramāna). If the 1 Jinabhadra, in his Vibh, quotes a Purva-gatha on jñana. (Vibh, 128). 2 Vide Bhsi, 1. 9. 76; Utsu, XXIII. 3 RĀP, 165 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org


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