________________
II]
MATI-INĀNA
31
(sensuous direct cognition) they counted only five types of knowledge born of one or other of the five senses. The knowledge born of manas (mind) does not find place under indriya-pratyakşa (sensuous direct cognition). This fact points to the truth that the Jaina Āgamas contain a faithful record of the ancient views as recorded in the Vaisesikal and the NyāyaSūtra that there are only five senses. Furthermore, the Jainas themselves recognize manas (mind) as only a quasi-sense (anindriya or no-indriya). It is only Vātsyāyanat who contended that the fact of mind being a sense-organ naturally follows from the lack of repudiation as well as enumeration of it as a sense-organ in the works of other schools (tantrāntara). Perhaps the Buddhist thinkers were the first to recognize mind as a sense-organ. Vātsyāyana seems to be indebted to the Buddhists for his awareness of this. Iśvarakrsna, in the Sānkhyakārikā,5 clearly states mind as a sense-organ. And it may be that Vātsyāyana refers to this Kārikā as tantrāntara. The Carakasamhitā which is undoubtedly older than the Sankhyakārikā, however, does not recognize mind as a sense-organ though it recognizes it as one of the karanas instruments).? In the Mahābhārata also we find manas as separately enumerated from the ten sense-organs in connection with the evolution theory of the Samkhya system. It is difficult to ascertain whether mind was designated as a sense-organ by the authors of the Yogadarśana and its Bhāsya.' The Gitā also enumerates mind separately from the other sense-organs. 10 Sankarācārya'l says that mind also is included under sense-organs on the authority of Smrti (text embodying tradition). The Jainas, as we have already mentioned, regarded mind as only a quasisense (anindriya or no-indriya). It seems that when the problem whether mind should be designated as a sense-organ presented itself before the non-Buddhist thinkers, they tried to clarify their position by deducing its status of a sense-organ from the implication of their own ancient texts. The Jainas, however, adhered to their old position of regarding mind as anindriya or no-indriya i.e. quasi-sense. Thus whereas Vätsyāyana referred to tantrāntara and Sankarācārya to some Smrti-text, the Jaina thinkers thought it proper to admit it as an anindriya (quasi-sense). This investigation helps us to ascertain the chronological order of the development of philosophical thought. The Sāṁkhya as presented by Isvarakrsna is found to be a development of the Sāṁkhya found in the Carakasarhitā and the Mahābhārata. Isvarakrsna perhaps profited by Buddhist criticism of counting mind as
1 VS, III. 2. 4.
2 NS, I. 1. 12. 3 TSū, J. 14, 19 and Bhāsya.
4 NBh, I. I. 4. 5 SK, 24, 27. 6 Caraka, Särirasthāna, I. 17, 64. 7 Ibid., I. 56. & Säntiparva, 204. 10; 210. 29. 9 Vide YD. II. 19 and 54 with Bhāsya. 10 BhG7, III. 42 ; XV. 7.
11 SBh on BS, II. 4. 17.
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
