Book Title: Samayasara
Author(s): A Chakravarti
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

Previous | Next

Page 127
________________ INTRODUCTION 109 the underlying substance the mud-pots and jars will be identical in the same nature. They all belong to one class and similarly orna. ments may be said to be golden since they belong to one class. But if you emphasise the ornaments or the pots, they are many in number. Or take the case of a tree. It may be spoken of as one or many. It is one when taken in its complex as a whole and it will be many when you emphasise the number of branches in it. "We point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only form the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to other; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahmin, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother-son-in-law, etc. etc." This last passage from Sankara completely coincides with the Jaina point of view that any assertion about a thing would take different forms according to the relations of the thing to other things. A person is said to be father when he is taken in relation to his son, as the son when the same is taken in relation to his father. Therefore the question how can the same man be father and son would entirely be meaningless and it will only exhibit the ignorance of the logical theory of predication. The same principle is extended by the Jaina metaphysics to other relations, such as space, time, substance and modes. This obvious truth forms the basis of the Jaina logical doctrine of predicationAstināstivada. That you can have two assertions about a thing positive and negative according to the relation of the thing to other things. Strangely this principle thus accepted by Sarkara is forgotten by him when he goes to criticise the Satra relating to Jainism, that two contra. dictory things cannot exist in the same. This inconsistency is probably due to the fact that he was only a commentator of an already existing work. Sankara commenting on the first sätra 'Atbato Brahma-jijñāsa.' Let us then enquire into the nature of the Brahma or the Self. "Where is the reason why such an enquiry should be taken up ? says, Since there are various erroneous things as to the nature of the self held by different schools of thought it is necessary to clear up the errors and to establish the correct notion of the self.” He enumerates various schools he considers to be erroneous as Buddha, Sankhya, Yoga, Vaišeşika and Pasupata etc., etc. It is strange that he does not mention the Jaina account of Self as one of the erroneous views. Probably the reason why he omits this is his own siddhanta is identical with the Jaina concept of self that the Jivātma and Paramātma are identical. This exactly is Sankara's considered view. Hence he cannot condemn this as one of Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370