Samayasara

SR No.: 006764
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: A Chakravarti
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1989
Total Pages: 370
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Agam, & Canon
File Size: 20 MB

Page 127

INTRODUCTION
109
the underlying substance the mud-pots and jars will be identical in the same nature. They all belong to one class and similarly orna. ments may be said to be golden since they belong to one class. But if you emphasise the ornaments or the pots, they are many in number. Or take the case of a tree. It may be spoken of as one or many. It is one when taken in its complex as a whole and it will be many when you emphasise the number of branches in it.
"We point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only form the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to other; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahmin, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother-son-in-law, etc. etc."
This last passage from Sankara completely coincides with the Jaina point of view that any assertion about a thing would take different forms according to the relations of the thing to other things. A person is said to be father when he is taken in relation to his son, as the son when the same is taken in relation to his father. Therefore the question how can the same man be father and son would entirely be meaningless and it will only exhibit the ignorance of the logical theory of predication. The same principle is extended by the Jaina metaphysics to other relations, such as space, time, substance and modes. This obvious truth forms the basis of the Jaina logical doctrine of predicationAstināstivada. That you can have two assertions about a thing positive and negative according to the relation of the thing to other things. Strangely this principle thus accepted by Sarkara is forgotten by him when he goes to criticise the Satra relating to Jainism, that two contra. dictory things cannot exist in the same. This inconsistency is probably due to the fact that he was only a commentator of an already existing work.
Sankara commenting on the first sätra 'Atbato Brahma-jijñāsa.' Let us then enquire into the nature of the Brahma or the Self. "Where is the reason why such an enquiry should be taken up ? says, Since there are various erroneous things as to the nature of the self held by different schools of thought it is necessary to clear up the errors and to establish the correct notion of the self.” He enumerates various schools he considers to be erroneous as Buddha, Sankhya, Yoga, Vaišeşika and Pasupata etc., etc. It is strange that he does not mention the Jaina account of Self as one of the erroneous views. Probably the reason why he omits this is his own siddhanta is identical with the Jaina concept of self that the Jivātma and Paramātma are identical. This exactly is Sankara's considered view. Hence he cannot condemn this as one of