Book Title: Samayasara
Author(s): A Chakravarti
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

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Page 120
________________ 102 SAMAYASĀRA Lastly he indicates the true nature of the Self which should be discriminated from the Non-Cetana bodily attributes as free from all wants and raised above all social distinction as Brahmin and Kşatriya and so on, and entirely transcended the empirical samsarika existence to whom even Vedic injunctions will cease to be operative, because he is placed in a region from where he does not want to achieve anything more, because he is completely self-sufficient. This introduction of Sarkara may be taken to be an introduction to Śri Kundakunda's Samayasara also. The philosophical work of Samayasara deals with all these points and practically adopts indentically the same attitude. Śri Kundakunda begins his work with the distinction between the two points of view Vyavahārika and Niscaya, practical and real. He describes the empirical world where the individual identifies himself with the characteristics of the external objects as a result of the absence of true knowledge. The course of conduct prescribed by practical ethics is said to have only a secondary value as a probation for the higher class. Bodily characteristics, instincts, and emotions and the various psychic states of the individual Self are all dismissed to be the result of the operation of the erroneous identification of the Self or Paramātma. Thus without changing the words, Sankara's introduction may be considered to be a fitting introduction to Sri Kundakunda's Samayasāra. We shall later on point out the various points of similarity between the two, Sankara and Sri Kundakunda, which would constrain the reader to accept the suggestion that Sankara was well acquainted with Kundakunda's philosophy either in the original or in the Saṁsksta commentary by Amstacandra. SANKARA AND HIS POINTS OF VIEW The distinction between Vyavaharika and Paramarthika points of view which Sankara makes throughout his commentary is said to have been copied from the Buddhistic philosophy. A writer in the Journal called "Achata" referring to this says, that Sankara must have copied this from the Buddhistic metaphysics because the distinction is not found anywhere else. This writer evidently is not acquainted with Jaina philosophy. If he were acquainted with the Jaina philosophy, he would not have made such a sweeping statement that the distinction is not found anywhere else. In fact the doctrine of Naya or the points of view is peculiar to Jaina metaphysics, which maintains that knowledge is to be obtained from pramapas and nayas. Pramāpa-Nayadhigamaḥ-is the fundamental Jaina doctrine of knowledge. Following this Jaina tradition Kundakunda starts his work Samaya sära by mentioning this distinction between Vyavaharic and Paramärthic points of view in his study of the nature of the real Self or Samayasára. He justifies the adoption of the vyavaharic point of view even in the approach of a student towards the ultimate reality of the Self, as a Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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