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DOCTRINE OF THE JAINAS nature of the soul rests in its intellectual function (uvaoga), which by means of will and skill is put to use in all possibilities of intellectual cognition. The matters cause the souls to take possession (gahana) of the bodies and to enact bodily functions They own all qualities of colour (black, dark, red, yellow, white), of taste (bitter, sharp, astringent, sour, sweet), of smell (good, bad), and of palpability (heavy, light, soft, rough, cold, warm, sticky, dry, see also Thān 422a). The five fundamental facts (see also Thān 332b, Samav 10 a) are substances (davva). But the expression savva-davva also includes the time, (addhaa. samaya) according to Viy 873 a) 3 With the former it is connected by its eternity and singularity, whereas it is separated from them by being confined in space and by lacking space points. The difference in opinions manifests itself in the conception of T 5,38 where time (kāla)is being unconditionally acknowledged as matter by the Dig , whereas but conditionally by the Svet Just as space consists of units, so does time. One unit of time (samaya) forms the present. It then follows that the future owns as many samaya as does the past plus 1, and the latter again as many as the former minus 1, the total time comes to twice the amount of the past with a plus, and twice the amount of the future with a minus, and, consequently, the time that has passed makes up half its total with a plus, and the time to come half its total with a minus (Viy 889a) 5 Even the smallest calculable fraction of time, the āvaliyā, consists of as manye samaya as all
1 daviyadı, gacchadı, tāım sabbhāva-pajjayāim jam daviyam lam bhannante Pancatthik 9
2 Most certainly it goes back to adhvan, but the Sanskrit of the comm gives addhā—(fem ) Viy 532b, in Thân 201 a we find addha-kala, the eternal time as the fourth beside the civil time measure (pamāna-k ), the amount of life-time (ahāu-nival ti-k ), and the time of death (marana-k )
3 FK LALANA, The six Dravyas of the Jaina Philosophy. Bombay 1914
4 Vay 6, 4, 1 speaks of paesa as of time, the soul is kālāesenam sapaesa, because it has existed since times eternal -For the atomism of time with the Jains See MASSON-OURSEL, Archiv f Gesch d Philos 40, 173-176
5 Both past and future being without beginning and without end are equal in duration The "plus" and the 'minus" are the I samaya of the present
6 asamkhejja (2)=incomputable as against samkhezja (x)=computable, expressible by a definite figure; ananta (00 )=innumerable
