Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 15

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
perceptual or non-perceptual, as wrong so far as their reference to external objects is taken into account. Furthermore Buddhist Vijñānavāda is much older than Dignaga and Dharmakirti. So the refutation of the proposition 'perception is wrong' does not determine the relative chronology of Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti. From internal evidence it may be safely inferred that Siddhasena was posterior to Dignaga and we leave the relative chronology of Dharmakirti and Divakara an open question.
I have discussed the logical value of the adjective 'unerring' (abhranta) in the definition of perceptual intuition in my work The Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux. Śantarakṣita and Kamalasila agree with Dharmottara that this amendment of Dignaga's definition of pratyaksa was made by Dharmakirti in order to rebut the contention of a section of Buddhist logicians who thought that partial verification was symptomatic of validity.' But this is regarded as a facile misconception as no verification is possible for error, partial or total. The verification is due to the previous or succeeding veridical knowledge of the stationary tree or the white conch and not to the false intuition of moving tree or yellow conch. We are not in a position to assess the logical value of the adjective abhranta incorporated by Asamga or Maitreyanatha. It is quite plausible that this qualifying clause might have been used for rebuttal of idealistic position. As for the contention that Siddhasena Divākara's criticism of the characterization of anumana (inference) as inherently erroneous by Dharmakirti it should be observed that it is only a deduction from Dignaga's position. Inference deals in concepts and concepts are unreal abstractions. But the probandum though a concept is necessarily bound up with and necessarily derived from and felt to be identical with the real individual. And so it leads to the attainment of a real individual as a matter of universal necessity which shows its objective affiliation. Accordingly inference is regarded as a valid cognition even by the Buddhist. Siddhasena's criticism of the coincidence of error and truth in inference endorsed by the Buddhist logicians need not have a pointed reference to Dharmakīrti.
What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to antarvyapti and the definition of hetu (probans) as anyathanupapanna in the verses 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing
1. Tathapyamsasamvadavādināmāhatya vipratipattiniräkaraṇārtham kartavyamevābhrāntagrahaṇamiti. Dharmottarapradipa, p. 45.
2. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, July 1927, p. 451.