Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 14

INTRODUCTION
a species of valid cognition since a valid cognition cannot be erroneous and an erroneous cognition cannot be valid, as has been observed by Siddhasena."
Vinitadeva and Santabhadra have explained "abhrānta' in their commentaries on the Nyayabindu as standing for non-discrepant (avisamvādi). But Dharmottara criticises this interpretation as wrong explanation. Pratyakşa being a species of valid cognition (samyag jñāna) must necessarily be free from discrepancy with the fact envisaged by it. Valid cognition is defined as one which is non-discrepant, i.e., consistent with its object. So the meaning of the adjective abhrănta cannot be non-discrepancy. It would involve useless tautology since it would be reduced to the proposition: A non-discrepant cognition is nondiscrepant.' So the meaning of abhrānta must be different. It means that perceptual cognition is one which is not contrary to the real individual. But this also involves tautology. A valid cognition cannot be wrong, that is contrary to the real envisaged by it. Dharmottara suggests that this additional adjective is significant and advisedly incorporated in the definition to combat a prevalent misconception. There are certain erroneous perceptions, namely, the perception of the moving tree by a person seated in a fast-running boat which is confirmed by verification. A curious person will alight from the vehicle and go forward and get hold of a tree. Of course the tree that is reached is stationary and not moving. But barring this deviation the attainment of the tree should be regarded as veridical perception. It has been counted as valid cognition by some. This conception of partial verification as the test of truth was prevalent among a section of philosophers and Dharmakirti felt the necessity of combating this view. According to Dharmakirti error is total error and truth is total truth. A cognition cannot be partially true and partially false. So a partial error is only a misconception. If it is error it must be so from end to end. It cannot be analysed into a true part and a false part. Further light has been shed on this problem by Santarakṣita and Kamalasila. The observation of Siddhasena that perception being a valid cognition can not be erroneous is not to be interpreted as refutation of Dharmakirti's position. In fact Dharmakirti also endorses the truth of the contention. Siddhasena does not seem to refute Dharmakirti but only the Vijñānavādin, the Buddhist idealist, who regards all cognitions,
1. na pratyakşam api bhrāntam pramāṇatvaviniscayāt/ bhrāntam pramāņam ity etad viruddham vacanam yataḥ||
-Nyāyāvatāra, 6. 2. Dharmottarapradipa (edited by D. Malvania), p. 47.