Studies in Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 46

A NOTE ON ATTĀ IN THE ALAGADDŪPAMA-SUTTA
K. R. Norman
So much has been written about the Buddhist view of attā that it may be thought unnecessary for anything further to be written about it. Nevertheless, although a number of scholars have commented upon the Alagaddū pama-sutta(=AS), it seems to have escaped the notice of them that in that sutta the Buddha makes certain comments about attā in the context of a refutation of particular non-Buddhist philosophical doctrine. It seems worthwhile discussing these comments in detail, and considering whether they are applicable to the other contexts in which attā occurs in the Päli canon. Such a discussion may be of help to those who still find difficulty with the Buddhist interpretation of attā.
In the AS the Buddha states that there are six diffhithānāni. The first of these is when an untrained person says when regarding rūpa : etum mama, eso 'ham asmi, eso me atta,
That is mine, I am that, that is my attā!.. The second is when he says the same thing about vedanā; the third, about saññā; the fourth, about samkhārā; the fifth, about whatever is dittha suta muta viññāta patta pariyesita anuvicarita manasa; the sixth is when he regards the view so loko so attā, so pecca bhavissāmi nicco dhuvo sassato avipariņāmadhammo sassatisamam tath' eva thassāmi, The world and the attā are the same; having passed away I shall be eternal, fixed, everlasting, of an unchangeable nature; I shall remain for ever exactly so as etam mama, eso ham asmi, esa me attā. . .
Here then we have six wrong views, this being the usual meaning of diffhi. It is wrong to look at material form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, sensor y perceptions (elsewhere