Book Title: Studies in Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 144
________________ Circularity in the inductive justification 1 17 appeals to Argument No. 1. But arguments 1 and 2 do not refer to any cases of specific (viśesa) vyāpti claims; they con. stitute the uses and justifications of the general theories in Arguments No. 1 and 2 and in General Rule A. Therefore, I claim that Arguments 1-4 plus Rules A and B constitue an analysis of what is logically implicit in the Jaina concept of tarka as a theory of justification of inductive argumentation. To briefly recapitulate the preceding let us ask the following question to which my analysis is the answer. What would be a sufficient condition for justifying the general vyāptiwarrant? The answer (a) is the absence of counter examples (NCE), the general pragmatic justification in Argument No. 1. But to show that NCE was sufficient to justify the general vyāpti theory as yielding an authorizing Rule in Argument No. 1, one presupposes : (a) the exhaustiveness of the search for counter examples, and (b) the concomitance of both NCE and legitimate inductive predictions in Argument No. 2, which (c) once again, presupposes the same general vyāpti theoryrule, that is, as found in Arguments No. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus to show that a general or a specific vyāpti is warranted you must use vyāpri to justify either the general (Rule A) or spe. cific (Rule B) vyāpti theory; this is circularity. 6. A tarka analogue with some contemporary justification of induction Is it reasonable to require additional independent justification of the general theory of vyāpti ? I think not. P. F. Strawson noted the confusion between (A) that inductive arguments have been successful in past and are so in the present, and (B) that inductive generalizations (here such as the legitimacy of vyāpti) copstitute "good reasons" for the general reliability of inductive argumentation 22 The former, (A), refers to facts; the latter, (B), refers to what constitutes 'good grounds" for adopting such a schema and practicing such basic methodological assumptions. To get "good grounds” one must first Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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