Book Title: Studies in Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Previous | Next

Page 153
________________ 126 Studies in Indian Philosophy never l'egarded by any non-Jaina philosopher (a Naiyāyika or a Buddhist to consititute a piece of knowledge, a prama, a cognitive awareness which amounts to truth. Or, to put it in another way, while perception and inference were regarded as valid means or ways of knowing, memory was never considered such a means. The Jaina philosopher, on the other hand, contested this position and regarded memory as another source of non-perceptual knowledge by refuting the arguments of the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists. Pandit Sukhlalji argued, in his above-mentioned book, that this dispute was primarily due to the reluctance of the non-Jaina philosophers to extend the use of the term 'pramā' to memory-experience. All philosophers agree with the Jainas on the point that if a memory-experience happens to be a revival of a veridical past experience, perceptual or non-perceptual, then it is also veridical. But they apparently want to use the term pramā in a restricted sense such that a veridical experience would be called a pramā only if it is not the repeat or revival of a past experience. To quote Sukhlalji : " That mne mic cognition is true of facts is acceptable to all (Indian logicians), and so there is no material difference of opinion on this issue; the difference only arises when som: agree and others refuse to call memory a pramāņa.” (p. 46) Panditji, however, tried to give a historical explanation of this reluctance on the part of the Hindus, and a doctrinal explanation of the same on the part of the Buddhist. In the Hindu tradition, smsti, the term for memory-experience, was also used to denote tbe dharmaśāstras as opposed to śruti, the Vedas. Now, since it is the cardinal doctrine of the Hindus that the dharmaśāstras are dependent upon the Vedas for their authoritativeness on dharmas and are not independent sources of knowledge about dharma, smrti cannot be called a pramāņa To wit : There is a systematic ambiguity in the word pramā) pramāņa, for it can mean either a means of knowing or an authority, or a source for knowledge. There. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352