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Studies in Indian Philosophy
and we conclude our examination of the claim that Bhartrhari held that thesis and asserted Bl as an instance of it
III
Enough has been said to indicate the complexity of the exegetical problems surronding the question of the strength of Bhartshari's commitment to the unpameability thesis. His statement of the paradox is perhaps somewhat less problematic, atleast to the extent that he presents it unmistakably and without qualifications. Several consecutive passages in our text clearly testify to Bbartshari's awareness of the paradoxical character of instances of the unnameability thesis. Following his statement that inherence "cannot be understood through words”, Bhartịhari writes. 18
That which is signified as unsignifiable, if determined to hava been signified through that unsignifiability, would then be signifiable.
(SS 20) If (the word) 'unsignifiable' is being understood as not signifying anything, then its intended state has not been achieved.
(SS 21) Of something which is being declared unsignifiable that condition (of being signifiable) cannot really be denied by those words, in that piace, in that way, nor in another way nor in any way.
(SS 22) These verses address themselves to some statement like :
B3. The inherence relation is unsignifiable. and treat of the mode of signification of the predicate of that sentence avācyam'='unsigpifiable'). We take them as offering an explanation of the paradoxical character of state. ments like B3.
To obtain a somewhat sharper view of the paradox, attention must also be paid to the subject terms of such statements. B3 is self-refuting on account of an opposition between its subject and predicate terms. In order for B3 to
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