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Studies in Indian Philosophy
hetu : Because the general theory of vyāpti is applicable
to the alleged vyāpti in the specific claims “I see
smoke" and "smoke fire.” dịşļānta : Where the general theory of vyāpti (Argument No.
1) has been used, specific vyāpti claims have been
correct. Argument No. 4: A specific Argument of which the Necessary
Vyāpti has been Justified Both by Arguments No. 2 and 3. pratijña : x has fire. hetu : Because x bas smoke, drsantā : Where there is smoke (5") there is fire. These four arguments generate the following two (normative) rules based on and justified by the above four arguments. (A) A General Rule :
One should use the above inference schemas, Arguments No. 2 and 3, as good grounds for claiming a specific vyāpti if and only if NCE, since NCE yields conclusions
of more than chance probability. (B) Specific Rule :
If a specific argument such as the viśesas claimed in Argument No. 4 are legitimate members of the general class of Arguments Nos. 1, 2, and 3, then one should use Argument No. 3 as a model to authorize a specific vyāpti claim, for example, of smoke/fire as in Argument No. 4.
Here in Rule A you are using the general vyāpti theory; however, in Argument No. 4, the specific vyāpti of smoke and fire does presuppose Rules A plus B and Arguments 1, 2, and 3; the use of the Specific Rule B” presupposes the General theory of Rule A. In other words, one presupposes the legitimacy of the general vyāpti theory of concomitance in the general warrant-drsļānta of Arguments 1-3 to justify a speci. fic vyāpti claim in Argument No. 4. Argument No. 3 appeals to the drsļānta-warrant in Argument No. 2; and that in turn
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