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Studies in Indian Philosophy
(3) The future regularity of causal laws-nonformal logical, nonfield restricted assumption which can only be justified by more inductive reasoning; that is, one must use parārthanumāna in a tarka prediction, which implicitly presupposes that future vyāptis will resemble the past ones and thus will confirm the degree of confidence one has in the exhaustiveness of NCE To assume that there is no counter example, and that, that assumption will hold long enough for one to jump from the višesa to the sāmānya to get the universal dụsļānta-warrant for the future, is to presuppose the general vyāpti theory. This will be made explicit in the following four arguments
5. Circularity and levels of implicit theories and rules
Argument No. 1 : General Justification of General Vyāpti Theory19 pratijñā ; Conclusion : Therefore, the next x will be
This constitutes followed by y. a general inductive
prediction. drstānta : First PREMISE : (x) all x (sāmānya) in past have
"vyāpti” (ed) with a subsequent
y and will do so in the future. hetu : Second PREMISE ; (2x) this particular x (visesa)
bas occurred so in the past and it is of the general type (sāmānya), or, (x) will have
"vyāpti' so in the future. This argument presupposes that the degree of confidence in the conclusion is greater than chance and that the future will resemble in the past; that is, the use of such inductive inferences about the future will be at least as “predictively succe. ssful,” or accurate” as they have been in the past. Notice that one must presuppose such an implicit inductive argument in order to argue that the vyāpti jump from visesa to sāmānya
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