Studies in Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 66

TAMAS AND CHĀYĀ IN THE JAINA VIEW (as discussed in the Syādvādaratnākara)
E. A. Solomon
According to the Nyāya - Vaišeşika, tamas (darkness) is not a distinct substance, but is of the nature of negation of light. To prove this, the thinkers of this school argue : Darkness is of the nature of negation because it is an effect different from substance, quality and action; just like the posterior negation (destruction) of jar'.. This is true of chāyā (shade, shadow) also according to these thinkers.
It may be argued against this, that if chāyā (shade, shadow ) is not accepted as a distinct substance, then there would not be the cognition of it as a positive entity different from umbrella, etc. Just as spront is different from seed so the shadow should be different from umbrella etc. To this the Vaišeșika replies : Chāyā cannot possibly be a separate substance because it is of the nature of absence of light; yet its cognition as something positive can be very well justified as due to a false conception. To wit, whatever region light does not come into contact with being obstructed by an umbrella or the like, in that place shadow or shade (chāyā) is cognised. But when the obstructing factor is removed, light is seen in its own nature, and therefore chāyā is but the absence of light. Had it been an independent substance, it would have been cognised along with light even if the umbrella or the like were removed, 2
Vädi-Devasūri, refuting this position makes a query here : Is it meant to be said that tamas (darkness) is of the nature of just negation or that it is also of the nature of negation ? If the former stand is taken, there would be contradiction