Book Title: Studies in Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 137
________________ 110 Study in Indian Philosophy instances of particular perceptions (višesa) of smoke to the inductive generalization in the dặsțānta-warrant. This, in turn, states that the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the two general (sāmānya) properties (dharmas) of smoke and fire is both accurate and explict, for example, as in the universalized drsțānta-warrant, "where there is smoke, there is fire”. Tarka is thus the necessary intermediary procedure which must authorize one to pass from the particular (višeşa) instance of perception (pratyakşa) to the universalizable (sāmānya) knowledge necessary for the general authorization of the desired specific vyāpti of smoke and fire; vyāpti thus concerns sāmānya not višeşa. Hence it is clear that there must be a general (metalanguage) theory of anumāna (inference) which presupposes the legitimacy of the general vyāpti relations which, in turn are used to legitimize specific disputed concomitances (vyāpti). We are concerned here with (at least) two theories. This tarka step is not possible through only a particular (višesa) perception ( pratyaksa) nor without presupposing a general theory of inference (anumana), that is, vyāpti, which uses a general drsļānta-warrant. Tarka is then a metatheory about the utility of the inference schemas as authorized by the general theory of vyāpti which, in turn, authorizes in the vyāpti of a general argument, the specific vyāpti questioned by the disputant (prativādin). The quickly summarize, tarka is second-order, higher-level theory, a metatheory, which uses and presupposes both (a) the general pragmatic evidence for the authorization of the general vyāpti theory presupposed in (b) the justification of a specific vyāpti relation so nccessary iu justifying a specific inference schema (parārthānumāna). The Jainas are the only Indian philosophers to posit tarka as a specific pramāņa. Epistemologically, they hold that every entity is cognized as both a particular-(višesa )-in-the-universal (sāmānya); that is, in questions of vyāpti cum-anumāna, the sāmānya is prominent; in pratyaksa (perception) the visesa is prominent. Since this epistemological theory of universals constitutes an independent argument for tarka, what is important Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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