Studies in Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 72

Tamas aod Chāyā in the Jaina view
A
for it has already been refuted; and no other inference is noticed which could contradict chāyā's being a substance. On the contrary, there certainly is an inference establishing that chāyā is a substance,' 'Chāyā is a substance, because it has motion, like a jar'. We see with our eyes the chāyū (shade, shadow) moving; and its motion can be determined by inference also “Chāyā has motion, because it reaches from one place to another, like Maitra”.
Vyomaśiva says in respect of this argument, “This is not true, for shadow is of the nature of negation of light. To wit, where the presence of light is warded off by an obstructing substance, we say that there is chāyā (shade, shadow ). And superimposing the movement of the obstructing substance on the absence of light we say, 'Chāyā is moving'. Had it not heep so the movement of the chāyā would not have been dependent on the movement of the obstructing substace. 6 Vādi-Devasūri says in answer to this that this feat of Vyomaśiva's can be compared to the ambition of a lame man to gain a victory over the speed of a race-horse. For superimposition finds a place only when the primary meaning (of an expression) is contradicted. And we do not see the littlest thing that could contradict the fact of the shadow's movement, Perception evidences that a boy cannot be fire, and so when someone says · The boy is fire', it is meant te be a figurative or secondary usage. But perception does not go against the fact of chāyā's having movement, for it has been put forth as cogoising the movement of shadow.
It might be argued : "Perception dependent on the functioning of the sense-organ which cannot be otherwise established is a valid means of proof. Here the functioning of the senseorgans can be otherwise established as giving rise to the cognition of the movement present in the obstructing substance, and so it is not a cause in respect of the knowledge of the movement of the chāyā”.
But this is not a correct stand. For if the umbrella and its chāyā (shade, shadow) simultaneously become visible ( the