Studies in Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Studies in Indian Philosophy
a mind independent of body - the latter being the dualist hypothesis to which we turn our attention.
All the schools of Indian philosophy except the materi. alist, idealist and nihilist ones are dualist inasmuch as they all posit matter and mind as two co-eternal reals. To mention them by name, they are non-Vijñānavāda and non-Śūnyavāda Buddhism, Jainism, Sānkhya, Nyāya, Vajśesika and Mimāṁsā. In their capacity as so many dualist schools they of course criticised both materialism and idealism but certain improtant positive aspects of their performance are not little noteworthy. Thus even if they posited mind as an independent, real existing by the side of matter - a position which was doubtless untenable – they offered a more or less cogent account of the mental properties in the form they become an object of everyday experience. In this connection their discussion of the nature of cognition was their solid contribution to the science of epistemology while their discussion of the nature of emo. tion and volition was their solid contribution to the science of psychology. A parallel performance coming from the side of materialists and idealists is simply absent from the side of materialists because their texts have not come down to us, from the side of idealists because with their denial of the reality of the material world they were in no position to offer a cogent account of the mental world. A convincing example of the idealist's discomfiture on this count can be had in the works of the Buddhists who following in the footsteps of Dirināga and Dharmakirti argued in favour of both idealism and dualism but who made their deservedly famous contributions to the sciences of epistemology and psychology only when arguing from a dualist standpoint and not also when arguing from an idealist standpoint. Of course, the different dualist schools adopted different - and very often conflictingpositions as to the questions of epistemology and psychology but this was only to be expected inasmuch as these schools were patronised by scholars who had followed mutually diff: erent traditions. Be that as it may, the disciplines to be called