Book Title: Source Book in Jaina Philosophy
Author(s): Devendramuni
Publisher: Tarak Guru Jain Granthalay

View full book text
Previous | Next

Page 52
________________ A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 31 concept of niksepa signifying the methodology of use of the term has been discussed in the earliest canonical literature as also in the modern works on logic. In the literature other than the Agamic. there is a new approach to the understanding of this doctrine from the point of view of Neo-logic. Yaśovijayaji has given all elaborate discussion of the problem of niksepa along with the other problems of pramāṇa and naya. Āgama literature gives an exhaustive study of the concepts of dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva. They have been studied from the points of view of intrinsic four-fold distinctions (svacatuştaya) and the extrinsic four-fold distinctions (paracatuștaya). A thing in its inherent nature (svadravya), in its own place (sva-kşetra), in its own time (svakāla) and in its own inherent connotation (svabhāva) can be said to have been considered in its fourfold aspects (svacatuştaya). A thing can also be considered from the extrinsic points of view which would be described as from the points of view of para-dravya (extrinsic substance), parakşetra (extrinsic place), parakāla (extrinsic time) and parabhāva (accidental characteristics). We find that the same object can be looked at from different points of view. Consequently, we get different presentations of the nature of the same object. This is due to the differences arising out of the attitude of the person which may consider as subjective, the ability of the person, sources of knowledge of the object, the existing state of the object at a particular place and time. According to the extent of the influences of these factors, the cognition of the object differs. In fact, every moment there are fleeting changes in the subjective and objective factors influencing and determining the nature of the cognition of the object. It would be difficult to present exhaustively the entire canvas of the various factors operating at the time of the cognition of an object. That is the reason why we find enormous diversity in the presentation of the view of different individuals and schools of thought. Keeping this point in view, Bhagavān Mahāvīra presented the concept of nikşepa and emphasised that it is possible to view an object from different fourfold angles : dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva. CONCEPT OF PRAMĀŅA There is abundant discussion about the nature of pramāna and jñāna as epistemological problems. Pramāṇa and jñāna have been Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 ... 590