Source Book in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Devendramuni
Publisher: Tarak Guru Jain Granthalay
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001263/1

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JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Devendra Muni Shastri

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Tito
[An Exhaustive and Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy]
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By Devendra Muni Shastri subschine
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Translated into English by ns subtie Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, M.A., Ph.D. 1.10 Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Jainology & Prakrits University of Mysore slentriailpna E
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nojaiva A 2009 3 22103 English Translation Edited by Subtitle Dr. T. S. Devodoss,
M.A., B.L., Ph.D., D.P. & P.A.
Reader in Philosophys The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advance Study in Philosophy University of Madras sve
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Published by sb bride bisa SRI TARAK GURU JAIN GRANTHALAYA
SHASTRI CIRCLE a swipA 212 UDAIPUR (Raj.)

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O A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
(An Exhaustive & Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy)
D
Author Devendra Muni Shastri
Foreword sübritenuM sibroved Dr. G. R. Damodaran Vice-Chancellor, University of Madras
English Translator on a betul Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi joustol
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English Translation Editor televin Dr. T. S. Devodoss
Eng. Mss. & Proof Revision Solhe Dr. Brij Mohan Jain noisette
olavad .7.10 First Edition Soltitte AM Vir Nirvana Samvat 2509 Akshaya Tritiya, Vikram Samvat 2040 May. 1983 A.D.
Printing & Designing Supervision subtie Srichand Surana 'Saras'ladig Printed by sublinieAL URUSANAT 182 S. S. Agarwal, Dinesh Printers, Agra
[Price : Rs. As. Sono anly

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VIIT
AGAVAMSA
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3-15 Darśana : a Synoptic Study
16-34 Jaina Canonical Literature and its Development
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Part II b lood sona DISCUSSION OF PRAMEYA
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o zoid 27.63 Lokavāda (Cosmology)
noitsioneertio 64-72 Jaina Metaphysics
73-124 Ātmayada : An Analysis Ajivatattva : A Study
125-148 Pudgala (Matter): A Study
149-182 Principle of Punya (Merit) & Päpa (Demerit) : A Study
183-188 Principle of Asrava (Influx) : A Study
189-193 Principle of Samvara & Nirjarā : A Study
194-216 Principle of Bandha & Mokșa : A Discussion
217-236
Part III
237-408
PRAMAŅAVĀDA
Syādvāda : The Basis of Jaina Philosophy Saptabhangi : A Discussion Niksepavāda : A Study Nayavāda : A Study Jñanavāda : A Study
Pramāņa : A Study

237-258 259-290 291-299 300-334 335-378 379-408

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Part IV KARMAVĀDA
409-500 Karmavāda : A Synopsis
411-500 Part V JAINA DARŠANA & THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD
501-544 Philosophies of the world : A Study
503-518 Jaina & Buddhist Philosophy
519-524 Jaina & Sānkhya Philosophies : A Comparison
525-529 Jaina & Vedānta Philosophies C
S
5 30-535 Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought 536-541
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Part VI APPENDICES
545-567 Reference Books Index
545-551 Index of Technical Terms
AKAOA190 552 559 Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors
560-567 Scheme of Pronunciation
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BENEDICTION-BLESSINGS
Human mind can be compared to a vast ocean. As the ocean never becomes calm, so is the condition of human mind. In it the waves of inquisitiveness always remain in existence. The different questionnaires regarding life and universe, mundane soul and living and non-living substances, either the universe is a chaos or a cosmos, how the activities of the world are going on, etc., perturbs human mind.
The Philosophy reconciles all the queries of human mind by logic, by intelligence and with the medium of insight. The philosophy removes all such doubts of human mind. So the philosophy can be recognised as 'Divine Eye'.
Philosophy is divided into numerous currents. But all those currents can be classified into two distinctions, viz., (1) Materialism and (2) Spiritualism. Jaina philosophy is spiritualistic by its nature.
Jaina philosophy maintains its unique and magnificent position, not only among Indian philosophies but also among the world philosophies.
The vast canvas of Jaina philosophy is woven by four elements, viz., (i) Non-violence in conduct, (ii) Many-sidedness in views, thinking and mind, (iii) stand-point-based speech, and (iv) Nonpossessiveness in social life. These are the four strong pillars upon which the magnificent building is standing of Jaina metaphysics and philosophy. It is neither a fool's paradise, nor irrelevent imagination, but based on sound footings and solid ground of life and that is why it gives due force to right conduct in the light of holy thinking.
I wished that at the auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, two books should be prepared, one should be biography of Bhagavana Mahavira and the other should be about his Philosophy and Metaphysics. I desired that the style may be comparative but the language should be easy

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and simple ; so every man can be benefitted and know ins and outs about Jainism by this one and single volume.
I expressed the wish to my worthy disciple Devendra Muni. He prepared both the precious volumes with full zeal, enthusiasm and hardship.
The present volume discusses the Jaina Philosophy. The typical and rough subjects, like-theory of karman, theory of knowledge, intuition, many-sided approach to the reality, noumenal and phenomenal points of view, conception of soul, consciousnessunconsciousness, theory of valid knowledge, the objects of knowledge, theory of auspicious and inauspicious activities, inflow and bondage, checking the inflow and annihilation of karmans, state of liberation of soul bave been discussed with openmindedness and giving the views of other philosophies--Eastern and Western. So it became a complete book of philosophy.
Due to the rare qualities of this work, I liked it much and am sure that every and any inquisitive, who wishes to know about Jaina philosophy can quench his thirst by this one single volume.
Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi has rendered English translation of the book with keen interest and due labour. So he fulfilled a great gap in the field of philosophy. I am hopeful that this English version will also be cordially welcomed.
It is my hearty desire that my favourite and worthy pupil Devendra Muni may enrich the treasure of literature by deep creative intelligence and knowledge and with his ever-flowing pen. He may create new mile-stones in the field of literature and serve the Jainology and flag it. These are my heartiest blessings !
Adinath Jayanti April 5, 1983.
- Upadhyaya Pushkar Muni
000

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE Subtitle
It would be apt to say that without understanding Jaina Philosophy, the study of Indian philosophy and metaphysics would remain incomplete; not only this, but the philosophic and metaphysical background of Indian thinking would remain unclear and un-understood.
Not only among Indian philosophies, but among the philosophies of the world, only the Jaina philosophy darefully advocates the limitless power and energy of human soul and its independency; and bestows full responsibility upon the man and man himself to attain the highest goal of his life--the infinite bliss, without the help of any God or supreme being.
The non-violence (ahimsa) is the back-bone of Jaina Philosophy. Non-violence is the base of Jaina religion and philosophy. It is all and all of Jainism. Complete thinking and conduct of Jainas are spread on the vast canvas of non-violence. So the Jainas presented deep and vivid study of non-violence.
For this purpose, the exhaustive study of non-violence, Jaina thinkers pierced sufficiently deep into the material sciences like-Physics, Chemistry, and specially Zoology, Botany and Biology. By the deep study of these sciences, the minutest details which were presented by the Jaina thinkers, proved true to such a high degree, that even the greatest scientists of to-day are astonished. They highly esteem those consequences, by saying that it is wonderful how such consequences obtained milleniums ago while there were no laboratories, etc.
These results proved very much beneficial to Jainas. On the one side, they could follow the path of non-violence, in their thought and behaviour; and on the other Jainism is standing upright in the modern science-effected world. While other orthodox religions and isms are either in clash or they slink away and hesitate to face the new researches of the modern science; the Jaina metaphy.

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sics, philosophy and religion are proved true. The scientificality of Jainism is coming into light as the scientific researches are enhancing. This is the open proof of highest thinking of Jainas.
Though there are many books to get through the Jaina religion and philosophy. An inquisitive can understand the subject with the help of those books, yet the necessity of such a single volume, by which the authoritative knowledge can be got, is keenly felt by the scholars and general inquisitives alike. The present volume will fulfil the need. On the one hand, it will prove an authentic book regarding Jaina philosophy and on the other it will be a reference book to the scholars.
This book came out from the pen of Sri Devendra Muniji Shastri. Munisri is a great scholar of Jaina religion, philosophy and agam literature. He is a learned man. Many ancient and modern languages, like-Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Gujrati, Marathi, Hindi etc. are at hand to him. He has been devoting his precious time since thirty years in the comparative study of the different currents of Indian culture and literature, like-religions, philosophies, yoga etc. He had gone through thousands of works of reputed authors-ancient and modern and himself have written hundreds of books. Because of his extra-ordinary genius Munisri now gained the fame as the 'Vizard of comparative study' of different philosophies, religions and literature.
The present volume is the result of Munisri's three years' continuous study. In this volume Munisri has impartially presented the exhaustive study of Jaina philosophy.
This volume (Hindi) was published at the auspicious occasion of 25th centenary of Vir Nirvana. It got appraisal from every corner. Everyone liked it and gave warm welcome.
The year 1977 proved lucky to Madras citizens. His Holiness, Reverend Gurudeva, Rajasthan Kesari, Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj stayed there for four rainy months. At that time the intelligentia, mainly the Gujrati speaking inquisitives earnestly requested to the Maharaj Sahib, for the English version of the book. Those people pleaded that the English version would be more beneficial for the English speaking people and also those persons whose mother tongue is not Hindi. Non-Hindi areas would also be able to know about Jaina religion and philosophy.

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The members of Gujrati Swetambara Sthanakvasi Jaina Association of Madras, were so enthusiastic to see the book in English, that they became pre-publication customers and gave financial cooperation in this way.
This enthusiasm instigated Dr. Kalghatgi and he accepted happily the burden of English translation. Dr. Kalghatgi is a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy and specially Jainology. He has translated the book in English with full zeal and great effort.
Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, The University of Madras, took great pains to edit the English translation. Honourable Dr. G. R. Damodaran, Vice Chancellor, The University of Madras, has encouraged us by giving 'Foreword' to the book.
Our affectionate companion and renowned literary man Sriyut Srichand Surana 'Saras' took the responsibility of printing of the book with due intimacy.
Dr. Brij Mohan Jain, has very keenly and carefully carried out the tough work of Mss. & proof-revision exerting his full zeal.
We are grateful to all our aforesaid companions for the heartjest co-operation which they have rendered us.
We planned to give the book, three years before, in the hands of the readers; but due to unavoidable circumstances--the difficulty of press, the printing of book become undesirably late. Consequently, our inquisitive readers and financial co-operators have to wait long. We apologise for the inconvenience. But, lastly, we have a satisfaction, that we could give this long awaited precious work in he hands of our readers.
-Secretary Sri Taruk Guru Granthalaya, Udaipur.

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FOREWORD
The cultural heritage of India is pre-eminently represented by the Brahmanic and Sramanic traditions. Jainism and Buddhism are the chief representatives of the latter tradition. Lord Mahavira is the greatest exponent of Jaina thought.
Among the path-finders to the Supreme Reality, Bhagavan Mahavira stands pre-eminent. Vardhamana, universally known as Mahavira, the last of the twenty four Tirthar karas of the Jainas, represents the ancient Jaina tradition of India, that of ahimsa, renunciation, sacrifice and asceticism. Though Mahavira's teachings are primarily followed by the Jainas, they are in fact applicable mutatis mutandis to the followers of other religious faiths. In essence, Lord Mahavira is a Jagadguru-a World Teacher whose teachings are meant for the entire mankind. Far from being a recluse concerned only with an inner spiritual experience, Lo'd Mahavira also associated himself closely in uplifting the social life of the people. He was instrumental for codifying all unsystematic mass of beliefs into a set of rigid rules of conduct for munis, i. e., monks and shravakas i. e., house-holders. The essence of Lord's teaching is embodied in the three-fold code known as ratna-traya. By following the three-fold path of Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, as ordained by the Jainas, the soul is released from the cycles of birth and rebirth and attains the pure and blissful abode of the liberated souls.
Jainism is uniqe in the history of religious philosophy. Jainism, although usually referred to as a religion, is basically a way of life. The Jainas have always stood for the dignity of man and equality of all, and have preached the elevated ideal of ahimsa which is considered central to the Jaina ethical thought. As rightly observed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "The Jainas were first to make ahimsa, non-violence, into a rule of life.
The present book is a classical work on Jaina Philosophy, rendered into English by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi from the original

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text-Jaina Darshana : Swaroo? aur Visleshana written by the venerated monk Devendra Muni who belongs to the Svetambara Sthankawasi order. The author of the book is a renowned scholar and outstanding exponent of Jaina Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's scholarship is astounding and deeply penetrating as is evident in his numerous writings and books written in Hindi, Gujarati and Rajasthani languages. As the author of more than hundred books, Devendra Muni ranks among the world's greatest exponents of Jaina thought.
The present work shows great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine he is expounding but also the realm of Indian thought. The book though primarly concerned with Jaina Darshana, Logic and Metaphysics, allude in the course of explaining its distinctive features to nearly all the other systems of Indian Philosophy. The book contains frequent references to Contemporary Western Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's exposition is throughout admirable.
The book is divided into six parts dealiog with discussions of Pameya, Pramana and a synoptic study of Jaina Darshana. The Introductory chapter will serve as an excellent aid to the study of the book.
Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrits in the University of Mysore has done a great job by translating into English, Devendra Muni's classical book-Jaina Darshana : Swaroop aur Visleshana written in Hindi, thereby drawing the attention of scholars over the globe to the fascinating domain of Jaina thought.
It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here in this book by Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Reader in Philosophy at University of Madras.
Devendra Muni's admiration for Lord Mahavira and his teachings and for the civilization which embodied it makes this not only a learned but also a stimulating book. The world of scholars owe a debt of gratitude to Devendra Muni's monumental contribution to Jaina philosophical thought. 25th January, 1979
G. R. DAMODARAN
Vice-Chancellor The University of Madras

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PREFACE
Philosophy is the 'Divine Eye' of man. What man cannot see by his physical eyes, can see by the eye of philosophy. So, the philosophy is the vision of insight. In other words, philosophy is the medium to get into the inner core of reality.
The aim of philosophy is to discuss the nature of life and world. It also reconciles the problems, like-.what are living and non-living realities, the elements constituting the world and how many are they, what are the effects of living and non-living substances on the different activities of the universe.
As these and such other questions are eternal and had disturbed the human brain since his invent, and the human mind remain always active to solve these problems, so it would be apt to say that the current of philosophy is as old as man itself or prehistoric.
When we come to historic period, we find that the systematic knowledge of philosophy came into existence. The first such country is India and the second is Greece. All the Eastern philosophies are effected by Indian philosophy and the Western by Greek philosophy.
All the Indian philosophies aim at the quest of soul and its nature. Indian philosophers are found crazy to know the nature of soul and God, in detail. Such tendency we do not find in Greek philosophers. Though they also have tried to know about the soul but could not go so deep as Indian philosophers. Though their style is charming, yet the outlook was mainly material. And because the European and American, i. e., all the Western philosophers are influenced by Greek philosophy so the western philosophy became material in outlook. But the trend of Indian thinkers always remained towards the soul, so Indian philosophy became spiritualistic by nature. Though Indian thinkers also discussed the pature and material reality, but to the extent it was pertaining to

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soul. The complete treatise of matter was to understand the nature of soul more clearly. Being the main aim the quest of the soul Indian philosophers never neglected the life and activities of the physical world. In true sense, Indian philosophers have posited their faith in life and enhanced their continued steady foot-steps toward the attainment of ultimate truth.
Philosophy has logic and cogitation as its bases. It tries to understand the nature of reality and ultimate reality by reason and then induces to believe the accuracy and legitimacy of them. In this way, the faith and reason are in harmony in Indian philosophy.
Western philosophy is based on free thinking. It is theoretical in nature and its main characteristic is intelligence. It avoids authoritative valid knowledge.
The demarcation line between the Eastern and Western philosophy is the conception of salvation. All the main currents of Indian thinking merge in the ocean of salvation while western philosophy neglects this subject.
The various happenings and changes in nature leave man in astonishment. He desires to search and know the causes of these happenings ; and so is the aim of western philosophy to investigate and understand the real nature of this visible physical world. Hence it can be said that the western philosophy is the mental exercise. It does not do much to remove the miseries of mankind It suggests no pathway to the ultimate good of man.
But according to Indian philosophers, misery is responsible for the origination of philosophy and they posit its aim the removal of misery. The prominency of Indian philosophy resides in the fact that it is helpful to us to attain the highest goal, i.e., salvation. The nature of elements is considered only due to the cause that such knowledge helps to remove misery.
Indian philosophy is not only a method of thinking but also a method of life. It has a specific view-point regarding the life and visible world. It is not only the science of reasoning, but an art of life. Indian philosophy does not satisfy itself by the search and

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knowledge of Truth ; but it induces everyone to lead truthful life. Because of this, the philosophy and religion remained hand-in-band in India. There is neither variance nor separation between the two.
Philosophy thoroughly examines the reality and then accepts it by logic and reasoning so that soul can get salvation ; and the religion is the practical way to obtain the spiritual truth. Thus philosophy ascertains our highest goal and religion is the way to attain it. Philosopby purifies the method of thinking while religion is the purification of living-method. Philosophy demonstrates the fundamental principles and religion brings them into action. It gives up the forbidable and follows the beneficial. Hence philosophy and religion are complement to one-another. . In Indian philosophy conduct also found its valuable position along with cogitation. Thinking and reasoning find its culmination in conduct-right conduct.
Jaina philosophy bears in itself some salient features which place it at the foremost position among the world philosophies. On the one hand, Jaina philosophy dipped in the fathomless depth of ocean of spiritual science and solved the unriddle problems of spiritualism by the medium of different view-points and deep piercing reasoning; and on the other hand it demonstrates some specially astonishing maxims and principles in the science of matter long before modern scientific world. It had very minutely considered the conscious powers and energies ; and also a thorough analysis of the sciences, like-Zoology, Botany, Biology etc. It gave the unique theory of many-sided approach to understand from all directions the reality and the fundamental principles. Its style of truth-demonstration by the theory of relativity (syadvad) is a greatest acquisition. The maxims ascertained by Jaina philosophy about 'atom', 'sound' fulcrum of motion etc., are proved true by the modern science.
Really Jaina philosophy is unique and holds an out-topping place in the philosophic sphere of the world. In present volume light have been thrown on the special characteristics of this pbilosophy.
Vast literature has been published in Sanskrit, Prakrit and other languages pertaining to Jainology. This literature is of both types--simple and complex. It is a matter of bạppiness that the

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different branches of Jaina literature are being published in National language-Hindi as well. Many important volumes also have been published dealing with Jainology. The present volume is also an attempt in the same direction. The vigilant readers would be the true judge of this work and they will estimate that how much I am successful in my this attempt. But I have no hesitation to say that religion, philosophy, literature, culture, agam, purana are my favourite subjects. Wbile I wrote on these subjects, I get the indescribable joy, therefore, I am confident that readers will also obtain the same joy at the occasion of perusal of the book.
I got the commandment of reverend Gurudeva, an spiritual ascetic of highest order, Rajasthan Kasari, Upadhyaya Pushkar Muniji Maharaja that at the great auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, such type of unique and original literature should be prepared which must be of ever-lasting value and by the perusal of that literature the vigilant readers should get instigation towards their spiritual upliftment beside increasing their knowledge. According to the desire of reverend gurudeva, I determined to prepare two books : one-comparative study of life of Bhagvana Mahavira. I devoted ten precious years in the perusal of pertaining literature and consequently a volume came into light entitled Bhagavana Mhavira : Ek Anushilana'. In this voluminous research work the critical study of the life history of Bhagavana Mahavira has been described in the light of literature from the period of agamas i. e., 6th century B. C. to the modern times. The other volume I prepared pertaining to philosopby. For this I studied more than bundred books and invested many years. The book was published in 1975.
In the year 1975 we stayed for four rainy months in Poona (Maharashtra). At the inauguration occasion of the book entitled 'Jaina Darshana : Svaroopa aur Vishleshana' (Hipdi) the dignitaries, like-Dr. S. Barlingay (Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona), Dr. Anand Prasad Dixit (Head of the Deptt. of Hindi), Dr. A. D. Batra etc. etc., were present and they appraised the book with full zeal.
Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi (Head of the department of Philosophy and Jainology, University of Mysore, Mysore) expressed his earnest feclings that this book should be translated into Epglish so that the

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readers and scholars of Eastern and Western philosopbies by English medium may also be benefitted and English speaking world would become aware of Jaina Philosophy. Dr. Kalghatgi expressed his desire to translate the book in English to the renowned citizen of Mysore Rikhaba Chand Ji Chhallani and Sri Chhallani informed me accordingly I consented joyfully.
Dr. Kalghatgi is regarded as an authority in Jaina philosophy. He has good command on English language. Many merit works came out of his pen. He had fulfilled the job with due labour and vigilence. Dr. T. S. Derodoss (Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Madras) has edited the manuscript (English translation) taking full pains. I am grateful to both the learned persons. Words cannot express the pains they took.
Manuscript was given in the press for printing in 1978. It was estimated that two to three months would be sufficient time for printing the whole book ; but since then a chain of difficulties enveloped the fate of book. Unavoidable and ultra wire circumstances regarding the printing press continually hindered the publication of the book, even to say that due to the negligence and hostility of press management some pages of the manuscript were missed. A tedious problem aroused to face.
Dr. Brij Mohan Jain (Agra) solved this problem. He also took the burden of tedious work of proof-c. rrection. Inspite of hillarious efforts of Dr. Kalghatgi and Dr. Devodoss to give the manuscript quite correct, the description at some places could not be clear, due to the ignorance and negligence of typist, as the typist was unaware of philosophy and philospbic words and technical terms, so mistakes have been created. This was a hard nut to crack. Dr. Brij Mohan Jain also did this work with ability and to my satisfaction.
The cordial co-operation of Srichand Surana Saras' to get the book printed eye soothing and beautiful, will also be remembered.
The tremendous efforts of Sri Surendrabhai President of Sthanakvasi Jaina Gujrati Association, Madras, and Sri Balwantbhai, ease the path of publication of this book, as due to their attempts some of the main members of the association became the pre-publica

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tion customers of this volume and so created financial co-operation. Renowned social worker C.L, Mehta, Indrachandji Mehta, Madhukarbhai Mehta etc., also rendered valuable co-operation
Whatever good is in this volume, it is due to the kind mercy of my Gurudeva Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj, who is always like a light house to me. Words cannot express his mercy,
Respected mother Mahasati Prabhavatiji Maharaj is the greatest energy to me. Alas ! she has gone to the father's abode on 27th January, 1982. It would be a matter of more joy if she could see this book printed by her own eyes ; but nothing can be done. Which cannot be cured must be endured. It is my solemn wish that in the rememberance of Holy mother I may enrich the treasure of literature.
It would not be proper at this occasion to forget my elder sister Mahasati Pushpavatiji Maharaj ; because she is a perenneal source of instigation to me to step forward in the field of knowledge.
The serviceful co-operation of my sramana companionsRamesh Mun, Rajendra Muni, Naresh Muri is of great importance in my writing work. It would be negligence on my part, if I donot remember their polite behaviour and co-operation.
Lastly, I am grateful to all the writers, whose books are referred in preparing the present volume.
Devendra Muni Shastri
Rishabh Janma Jayanti 5th April, 1983 Harakhachanda Kothari Bhavan 2 Chopasni Road Jodhpur.
000

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

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Part 1 Nature of Darsana and H-1
Darsanika Literature
1. DARŠANA: A SYNOPTIC STUDY H.2 2. JAINA CANONICAL LITERATURE
AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

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1.2
Darsana :
A Synoptic
Study
Darsana is an expression of man's inherent capacity for intellectual discrimination. The word darśana is derived from the root term drs, to see. Drsyate anena iti darsanam, signifies the meaning that it is perception. Perception may be of different types like senseperception, logical enquiry or insight of the nature of soul. However, darsana in its true sense would refer to the intuitive experience. aided by intellectual discrimination. Dargana would mean the perception of Atman and not merely knowledge of the physical world. It enables one to gain the inner meaning of life and the world. Dardana means direct knowledge'. "intuitive experience'. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan holds the view that “dargana is not an intuition, however much it may be allied to it. Perhaps the word is advisedly used, to indicate a thought system acquired by intuitive experience and sustained by logical argument." The seer who has darśana gains a wider perspective of the view of the life and the world than the scientist and the poet. The scientist looks at reality from a particular aspect and from agalytical point of view, although he draws certain conclusions guided by flashes of intuitive knowledge. The poet has, as his subject, infinite beauty of the whole world in all its manifestations. But the seer, who is a philosopher, looks at life and the world from the synoptic point of view. His outlook is much wider in its scope and includes diverse points of view. He is not bound by the
1
Allen & Unwin Limited,
Indian Philosophy, (London: George 1966), Vol. I, p. 43.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
limitations of particular aspects of the subject as the scientist is. He views life steadily and sees it in all its comprehensiveness. As Plato observes, a philosopher (dārganika) is “the spectator of all time and existence”. Darsana is the whole-view as revealed to the soul-sense. Man is a rational animal and rationality is the chief differentia which distinguishes him from others. He thinks about the nature of the different things of the world. Darsana originated from the moment when man began to think and cogitate. The antiquity of darsana could be traced to man himself. There have been divergent approaches to the understanding of the origin of darśana, based on the prevailing circumstances. Some have laid emphasis upon the intellectual exercise, while others have given primary importance to the aspect of wisdom. Darsana stands for a philosophical perspective, a Wel. tanschauung. It means the view of the world. There are some thinkers who contend that darsana is the perception of the self. Thus, the varied viewpoints may be traced to the circumstances which prevailed during particular periods of time.
ORIGIN OF DARśANA H 3 Faithill
Some thinkers say that the origin of darśana lies in intellectual enquiry. It is believed that darsana begins from the exact moment, one asks the question : Why ?'. Before the commencement of the age of darśana, there was the age of faith (Sraddhā). Statements of an authority, like a prophet, were implicitly accepted as true in nature. For instance, we find in recorded history, utterances of great piophets like The Buddha and Mahāvira and the statements of Manu were accepted implicitly as ipso facto Truths. It may be noted in the context, that faith marks the starting-point of one's journey towards the ultimate goal. It also indicates the first vision of truth. It is considered as a great moral virtue and absolutely essential for a spiritual aspirant for his realisation of the Supreme, according to the Indian tradition. For instance, the Rgveda praises faith. The Gitā proclaims that only the faithful gains knowledge.
1 Rgveda, 10.151, 1-5. 2 Gitā, 4.39.

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Logic This gave way to the place of reason. In the process of intellectual enquiry, man began to get hold on the understanding of the phenomena of nature. The cardinal dictum in this age was the question : "What is the nature of Reality ?”. The criterion of the origin of philosophy lies in the inquiry into the nature of reality.
HL Wonder Some philosophers contend that philosophy had its origin in curiosity to understand Nature's phenomena which was baffling to the finite mind. The World of Nature thwarted the imaginations of the poet and the seer. The sublimity of nature's beauty, the grandeur and the fragrance of blooming flowers, the fierce wind blowing, the sunshine, the rapturous scenes of the flowing of rivers and the roaring of seas, the dazzling-twinkling stars in the sky amidst the encircling beauty of moon's light-all the aspects of nature's delight were the subjects of philosophical enquiry into the nature of its origin and creation. The Greek philosophers hold the view that the origin of philosophy lies in 'wonder'. To think and to wonder by looking at the vicissitudes of life is philosophy.
Hill Doubt The origin of modern philosophy is to be traced to this early tendency of doubting spirit and also to the questioning attitude, Francis Bacon, for instance, began to doubt the teachings of the Church. He aimed at bringing about a synthesis between science and philosophy on the basis of integration, and he ended with founding philosophy on the solid foundation of intuitive experience. It may be noted here that science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy alone gives us wisdom. Science is analytical description while philosophy is synthetic interpretation. “Men are not animals erect," said Francis Bacon, "but immortal gods." He contended that man must war only on the obstacles that nature offers to the triumph of man.
Descartes too stressed the need of 'methodic doubt' as the cobweb-clearing prerequisite of honest thought. He built his super-structure of mathematical philosophy based on the notion of 'doubt'. Immanuel Kant based his philosophy on the critique of

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knowledge and gave a formalistic philosophy of the 'Noumenon'. Similarly, the rationalistic pluralism was based on the methods used by Descartes. Thus, we find that Western philosophers adopted the method of "doubt in analysing the verities of life. Indian philosophers have based their development of philosopbical thought on the aspect of the innate curiosity' of man to comprehend the nature of Reality.
DARSANA AND PHILOSOPHY 7.3 Darsana and philosophy are often referred to as synonyms. However, there is a primary Distincuion in the connotation of the
me Darsana leads to the kuowledge of the seit. The ultimate end of darsana is to know oncself. The starung-point of Indian thought is its emphasis on man himself. If we take the utterances of the important philosophers of each tradition into consideration, Man know thyseli' may be said to be the chiet advice of all the four traditions. Socrates said it in so many words. The Upanisada did the same when they exported man: atmánam viddhi (know thyself). Philosophy is the intellectual pursuit on the understanding of the ultimate reality. It is, as a philosopher puts it, an unusually rigorous effort to think consistently. It is an intellectual gymnastic, a luxury of the mind. But darśana has a practical purpose-in one's efforts to free oneseli from the bondage of worldly existence. It aims at seeking solace in the eternal bliss free from the empirical adjuncts of this lite. lo ibis Sense, darśana expresses the lony grandeur of intuition. Dursund, according to the Indian tradition, has not remained restiicted to the acadernic pursuits of understaudin the nature of the ultimate reality to be sought in philosophy. It has uanscended the narrow empirical barriers and seeks to realise the highest truth. In the West, philosophy is considered merely as an academic pursuit of knowledge for knowledge sake. In India; the seers have gained the vision of reality. Hence, the term 'darśana' as applied to Indian thought becomes significant.
DARŠANA AND SCIENCE 3 In this scientific and materialistic age, we find that men are generally drawn towards gaining materialistic pleasures in life and seem to neglect the spiritual values of life. Perhaps the reason lies in this that men are caught in the web of sarhsära and fail to realize the deeper significance of life beyond this mundane world. Darśana

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enables one to seek Truth through meditation while science tries to understand the mysteries of the world through experimental investigation. Science is analytic, while philosophy and darsana are synthetic in approach. The conclusions of science are only intellectual shorthands and are provisional, Scientific hypothesis are liable to be rejected. In fact, science proceeds to develop on the basis of the rejection of earlier hypothesis in favour of more acceptable forms. The Newton's law is no longer accepted today. Einstein's Theory of Relativity may also be overshadowed by a more cogent bypothesis at a later date.
Dargana is centred round the understanding and realisation of the self, while the main task of science is to comprehend the mysteries of nature. Dargana meditates on the Atman and Parātman. Science analyses the intricacies of nature and discovers the uniformities of the laws of nature. Darsana looks at the universe as a integrated whole. Scienc: attempts to comprehend the diverse aspects of the universe. Science looks at reality piecemeal. Darsana gives prominence to reason, meditation and intuition. On the contrary, science lays emphasis on analytical experience, experimental observation and deductive analysis. The conclusions of science are tentative in nature because they are subject to further investigations. Darsana gives a synoptic picture of reality and, therefore, it discloses the aspects of truth and not mere probabilities. Yet modern thinkers in their enthusiasm for understanding the nature have given exclusive importance to scientific investigations and analyses.
Darjana can be said to be the vision. It is the higher intuition by which realisation of the supreme reality becomes true. A scientist looks at reality through the external eye, although he uses reason and intuition to understand the nature of reality. A seer (dāršanika) transcends the ordinary perceptions of the outer eye and sees the highest reality through the inner eye. Darsana really enables one to understand the world and life in its entirety. As Matthew Arnold said : “Dargana looks at life steadity and looks at it as a whole." Thus, we find, Darsana embraces in its fold the manifold aspects of scientific knowledge and investigations and philosophical pursuits as well. Bertrand Russell observes "the utility of science is twofold-one is that it understands everything that falls within the field of its experimentation ; the other is that whatever is under

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stood should be brought within the scope of rules." Russell's analysis shows that science can be understood from two angles--one is with reference to its methodology, and the other with reference to the subject-matter.
The methodological approaches of science and Darsana stand on different footings. While science uses empirical tools of observation and experimentation, darśana adopis the transcendental modes of meditation and vision.
Science studies the universe in its various aspects. It is therefore analytic. Each science studies a particular aspect of life. For instance, Biology studies life, Physics studies matter, wbie Psychology studies the mind. Each science has its own limited field of experience as its subject matter. The physical sciences study the physical matter and its modifications. Biological Sciences study life and its expressions. Behavioural Sciences like Psychology study mind and its states. The fundamental approach of all these sciences is empirical in nature. But darśana uses the synthetic method in which reason and intuition are synthesised and harmonised, in order to present a comprehensive picture of reality.
4.3 DARSANA AND RELIGION We have earlier noted that Darśana is one of the most character. istic and fundamental thoughts of Indian philosophy-the meditative and mystical attitude of mind towards an idealistic conception of the universe. Manu, the famous Hindu Law-giver, gives a clear perception of the notion of darsana thus : “He who is possessed of true insight
(darśanasampanna) is not bound by deeds, But the man destitute of insight (darśanenayihina) is
involved in the cycle of existence.” f. H. Bradley observes ; “Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being.” It is also contended by philosophers that religion is 'natural' because the ultimate realities must be a 'natural part of the universe of which man becomes conscious. Religion enables every man what he is, and helps him to say, 'Here is reality': As Stanley Cook
1 Manusmrti; VI. 74.

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observes : “Religion primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, v tally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, pbilosopbies, and scientific doctrines."1
Against this background, let us now compare and contrast the roles of darśana and religion in all spheres of human activity.
Darsana and religion are both essential for man to gain selfrealisation or God-realisation. Divergent views have been stated by scholars in regard to their mutual relationships. There are some who hold the view that they are identical. Some others say that they are entirely different, two poles set asunder. Whatever may be the opposing viewpoints, we cannot deny the fact that both are fundamentally essential for inan to reach higher heights of spiritual progress. Considered thus, they are supplementary to each oiher. Reason, as we know, is the differentia of man. It is the prerogative of man. When reason looks within itself, when man introspects, darśana is born : but when reason projects into the external world and translates thoughts into action, then religion arises. When religion and darsana have in common is the they are fundamental to the way of life of an individual or of a society, and it is not surprising that they should be closely connected. It is generally said that "religion is morality tinged with emotion.” Indeed, it has often been held that morality is wholly dependent on religion, that a man who has no religion cannot have any morality. Whatever may be the theories of the origin of religion, religion is born when the Truth arrived at by reason is translated into action in the form of moral codes. For instance, mere knowledge that it is good to tell the Truth' is not sufficient unless it is translated into action. Truth-speaking, would then have mere academic interest. Unless we practice speaking Truth, it will not have any meaning. However, philosophers like Socrates said, “Virtue is knowledge” and “to know virtue is to be virtuous.” According to Socrates, “Knowledge is not mere collection of informations nor academic facts, it is realisation. To know is to
1
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics edited by James Hastings. (New York! T & T Claik, 1956) Vol. 10, p. 693.

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realise." In this sense again, darsana and religion are two main aspects of the experience. Without religion, darsana would be merely delusive. Darsana becomes divine when it is strongly backed by religion. In other words, dargana and religion are two inseparable entities of life. Besides, they are complementary to each other. Religion without darśana is blind and darsana without religion is heretic. Bereft of darsana which gives the rational and intuitional basis for its belief and practice, religion would degenerate into mere blind belief and become only a collection of superstitious practices without any rational and intuitional basis. The early primitive forms of religion are blind and have no rational or intuitional basis. On the other hand, darśana without the fervour of religion would be empty as it would not flow with emotion and noble sentiments. The two are necessary for the realisation of the divine nature of man. Human life would be meaningless and devoid of the higher values of life, without the harmonious blending of darsana and religion in man's life and activity. A synthesis of the two would bring about a harmonious development in man's personality and endow him with a balanced view of life.
H.
DARSANA AND LIFE
It may be asked: What is the relation of darsana with life as such? The answer to it, is suggestive of the fact that man is given to thinking. Man continues to think and thinks constantly. As Aristotle said, "Man is a rational animal." Rationality is his chief characteristic. Reasoning is his prerogative and through it combined with his intuitive power, man seeks to build a structure of philosophy and darsana. Śankara sums up the unique nature of man thus: "Karma-jñānādhikarāt." He is one who is capable of both knowledge and moral freedom. When man ceases to think and to intuit, he falls down to the status of an animal. In short, it is impossible for a human being to live without darsana or faith. Man's life is a saga of constant and coherent thinking. First, the knowledge of the 'self' dawns on him and then of the 'other' as related to him. The knowledge, in fact, the realisation of the relation of the self with the other, is necessary for the realisation of one's highest goal of perfection. To meditate on the fundamental facts and values of life, to put them to the test of reason and to act up to the ideals and values of life, is the expression of the relation of darsana to life.

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Life compels man to live in society. He is gregarious, selfish and yet a rational and moral animal. Self-develoment is possible only through his active social participation which implies the observance of ethical codes of life. Man's true destiny is not the conquest of his external nature but the conquest of his own self because ātmanigraha or the suppression of the lower self alone indicates the greatness of the human spirit. Man is not a 'lost' creature. He is ever capable of self development. Self-development is possible only through gaining philosophical truths. This is made possible only through darsana. Thus, we find the inseparability of darśana to life.
DARSANA AND THE WORLD
+1.3
Having analysed the relation between darsana and life, let us now attempt to understand the significance of the relation of darsana to the external world. Knowledge of the relation between life and the external world would give us the idea of the extent to which darsana values the relation and the extent to which man understands his relation to the values of life as such.
The world is as much the subject-matter of darsana as life is. It studies life and the world alike. In the analysis of philosophical thought, there are two fundamental streams-the idealistic and the realistic. The two are opposed to each other in their thoughtstructure. The realist affirms the reality of the external world, independent of cognitive consciousness. The idealist affirins the priority of cognitive consciousness and the reality of idea independent of the external world. In other words, the realist posits the existence and reality of the external object independent of our knowledge of it. The idealist posits the reality of an idea because we know the external object and we considered it to be real. The different trends of idealistic thought are-Subjective Idealism, Objective Idealism and Absolute Idealism. Similarly, there are different types of realism, such as Naive Realism and Critical Realism. Materialism would claim its relation to realism. Some contend that realism leads to philosophy of matter and idealism leads to the philosophy of spirit. In Indian thought, Advaita of Sankara, Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu and Sunyavāda of Nagarjuna are forms of idealism. Advaita affirms the identity of Atman and Brahman, and the external world as an apVasubandhu states that the world and its modifications are pearance. the forms of vijñāna and the real can be described as the alayavijñāna

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(store-house of consciousness). Nāgärjuna goes further than the Vijñānavādins and Advaitvädins by affirming that everything including the external world, the self and God, is unreal. Even dharma and buddhi are unreal. The real is the sūnya. The philosophy of Nāgār. juna is intricate in nature and poses problems to understand it. It is difficult to understand the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. Some have interpreted the sünya in the absolutist sense of the term. Some others have interpreted the sünya in the nihilist sense as the 'void'.
Like the idealist tendencies, we have the realist schools of thought expressed in the Nyāya and Vaiseșika schools of thought. Śänkhya thought may be considered to be realistic in a sense, because it posits the reality of two fundamental principles ---Prakrti and Puruşa. In these philosopbies, the empirical as well as the transcendental spiritual reality have been accepted. The Jaina gives the anekānta point of view. It is realistic and empirical in approach to the understanding of reality.
A study of Western philosophy shows that in the Fifth century B. C., Parmenides affirmed that real is the Being and not becoming. Being is. In this sense, knowledge and the known are identical. This is the beginning of idealist thought in the West. Socrates was primary a moral philosopher. His main object was to make man good. Plato emphasised the primacy of the spirit. But, he built a structure of philosophy which may be more realistic than idealistic. Plato raised the ideas of Socrates to the metaphysical level and placed them in the world of ideas. Ideas are real, objective, eternal and perfect. They live in the world of ideas. Aristotle was more earthly than Plato. He affirmed that 'Form' and 'Matter' are the two ultimate principles and ultimate realities. Pure Form and pure Matter do not exist in the world, but they are real. The world consists of form and matter. In European philosophy, Descartes is considered to be the father of modern philosophy. He started with the method of doubt and built a philosophy on the soild foundation of mathematics: With him commenced the Rationalist School of Thought in modern pbilosophy.
SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN
PHILOSOPHY (DARŠANA) It has been alleged by Western thinkers that Indian philosophy

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13 is pessimistic and because of its emphasis on renunciation and selfdenial, it has lost the status of an academic pursuit and cannot be aptly called philosophy. The primary object of philosophy in India is practical. It aims at freeing man from the bondage of this world which is full of misery. In this, it may be argued that Indian thought is pessimistic. But pessimism in Indian thought is only used as a means and never as an end in itself. In this sense again, all philosophy is pessimistic. If we consider the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, we can say that it is not pessimistic at all, because the aim of Indian thought is to free one from the misery of this .ife and to lea: bim to transcend the misery and to attain the highest bliss. Misery is a fact of life. But the highest bliss is also the fact of experience which can be attained by every one who transcends the misery of this world. This can be achieved by jñāna-mārga (the path of know ledge), bhakti-mārga (the path of devotion), and Karma märga (the path of action). The Jainas affirm ibat the way to self-realisation is the synthesis of right intuition (samyag-darśana), right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) and right conduct (samyag-căritra). In this sense, Indian thought is not pessimistic but on the contrary, higbly optimistic. It is melioristic.
Indian philosopbers aimed at divination of man. Their main object was to impress upon the people that enjoyment of the pleasures of life should not be the primary end of life. They exhorted the people to give up indulgence in worldly or sensual pleasure and adopt an attitude of renunciation. Whether it was the Advaitavada of sankarācārya, Vigistadvaita of Rāmānujācārya, Sūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna, Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu or Ahimsa and Anekāntavāda of Mahāvira, all of them inspired the people of their age to give up enjoyment of pleasures and to adopt the spirit of renunciation and penance. The ultimate object of philosophy, as we have seen earlier, is the attainment of bliss. Bliss is not to be confused with sense-pleasure, nor with happiness of this world. It is pure bliss, which the soul in its pure state can enjoy without any obstruction from the empirical adjuncts of this world because the enjoyment of bliss is the pure state or characteristic of the soul. Pleasures of the world are fleeting and ephemeral ; they lead to misery. The ultimate state of bliss is the pure state which the Indian philosophers stressed. Freedom from misery was considered by some, like the Buddha, as the state of nirvana. Some others, like the Vedāntins and also the Jainas, gave a positive

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import to the state of perfection expressing pure bliss. They called this mokşa. Indian philosophers gave importance to the path of self-denial and rejection of the pleasures of this world not out of the sense of frustration but with the supreme object of the attainment of the highest state of peace and bliss.
The outlook of the ancient Indian thought was, therefore, practical and pragmatic. Its aim, as we have said earlier, is to lead men to the highest end of perfection, not of the worldly existence but of the pure nature of the soul. The Indian Weltanschauung' was, therefore, primarily spiritual and the translation of the spiritual attitude to the worldly activity. Thus, the stress in Indian thought is on 'inwardness' which has often been wrongly understood as an emphasis on 'other worldliness'. But it is unjust to regard the Indian attitude towards this world and its people as one of indifference or hatred. Some critics of Indian thought believe that the Indian pursuit of spirituality is a selfish quest and that the saint and the sage are concerned with their own salvation. "This criticism," observes Dr T.M P. Mahadevan, "is the result of a gross misunderstanding of the Indian ideal of spirituality...... God-realisation or self-realisation is a state of perfection where there can be no room for even the least trace of selfishness. For the man of wisdom there is not the distinction of 'mine' and 'not-mine'. He regards the whole world as his household."
Thus, in India, philosophy is to be lived and it is not merely an academic pursuit. In the West, philosophy was primarily an academic pursuit to be studied in class-room. Indian seers did not merely get to know the reality, but they experienced the reality and they lived the spirit of reality. Siddhasena Divākara, Dharmakirti, etc., did not toy with the idea of knowing the nature of Truth in the academic sense, but the realisation of the Truth permeated every fibre of their being. Theirs was the realisation of Truth. The Westerner remained in his ivory tower without any conscious effort to translate the truth in everyday life. It remained far from the madding crowd. But the supreme aim of Indian philosophical tradition was the kindly light that led men from untruth to truth, from darkness to
1 Ayam nijaḥ paroveti gaṇanā laghucetsām. Udāracaritānām tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam.

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light and from death to immortality. It has led us from indulgence in worldly pleasures to renunciation of pleasures. It is not merely a piece of antiquarian investigation that Indian thought deserves study. It is of immense value to the student of philosophy and the study of Indian philosophy alone can give a right perspective about the past of India. A study of Indian philosophy will enable us to adopt a balanced view of life and healthy perspective of the situations in life. It is the synthetic vision of India that has made philosophy comprehend several sciences which have become differentiated in modern time."
15
Swami Vivekananda describes India as "the blessed punya-bhūmi and as the land from where came the founders of religions from the ancient times, deluging the earth again and again with the pure and perennial waters of spiritual truth."3 Spiritual life is the true genius of India. She has stood like a 'Rock of Ages', and has survived the ravages of time because her civilization, which is inspired by the spiritual insight of holy men, is marked by a certain moral integrity, a fundamental loyalty, a fine balance of individual desires and social demands. It is the emphasis on spiritual freedom as the summum bonum that makes the message of Indian culture supremely significant. to the modern man who is afflicted with the malady of excessive outwardness.4 The men of God have felt that the salvation of India did not lie in imitating the West but in holding fast to Indian ideas and institutions and in purifying and elevating them. Their world-view had an undeniable influence as a practical guide to life, individual and collective national and transcendental." It should be noted that India did make the first attempt to solve the most vital problem, the problem of harmony between life and spirit, of which the vision came to her seers almost at the very dawn of her spiritual history. Besides, the application of moral truths to the facts of social life is the essence of Indian philosophical tradition.
1 Chandogya Upanisad.
2 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, (Allen & Unwin: London, 1961), Vol. I, p. 31.
3 Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekānanda, Part III, 1922, p. 105.
4 T.S. Devadoss, Sarvodaya and the Problem of Political Sovereignty, (University of Madras, 1974) p. 9,
5 Ibid., p. 30.

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Jaina Canonical Literature
And Its Development
The Jaina pbilosophical literature is classified into five broad divisions, and it is possible on the basis of this division to understand the nature of Jaina philosophical literature from the time of Bhagavān Mahāvira—the twenty-fourth Tirthahkara to the present day. The five divisions are as follows:
1. The Age of Āgamas." 2. The Age of the Anekānta view. 3. The Age of the establishment of Pramānaśastra. 4. The Age of the Neo Nyāya. 5 The Modern Age of collection and editing.
H3 THE AGE OF AGAMAS
The period of the Agamas may be considered to begin with the time of parinirvāņa of tīrthunkarı Mahavira (Vikrama-pūrva 470) and extended for thousand years. The teachings of Mabāvīra were collated by the Ganadharas. Mahāvīra gave the conceptual content of the Jain-śāstras (in the form of artharüpa) and the same has been presented in the form of literature expressed in language by Gaņadharas. These works are called "Sūtrāgama'. The Agama literature is, therefore, of two forms: 1. Arthāgama, and 2. Sūtrāgama. The Agama literature has been presented for the sake of the study by Acāryas, and therefore, it has also been called, 'Gaņipițakas'. The collection of the teachings of Bhagavān Mahāvira has been made into 12 works and has been called Dvādašākgi. They are 1 (1)

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Ācārānga, (2) Sūtrak rtārga, (3) Sthānānga, (4) Samavāyānga, (5) Bhagavatī, (6) Jñātādharmakathā, (7) Upāsakadaśā, (8) Antak rtdaśā, (9) Anuttaraupapātikadaśā, (10) Praśnavyākaraņa, (11) Vipāka, and (12) Drşțivāda.
From the point of view of structure, the Āgama literature has been divided into two types : (1) Anga-pravişğa and (2) Anangapravișța. The collection and systematic arrangements of the original teachings of Bhagvān Mahāvīra by the Ganadharas are considered as Anga-pravişta. The writings of the later elder munis are called Ananga-pravista. The entire canonical literature, except the twelve angas (Dvādaśanga), has been called Ananga-pravista. It has al been suggested that literature which comprised the dialogues between Tirthankara Mahāvīra and his disciples concerning the fundamental questions relating to the triple function of generation or origination,' 'destruction' and 'permanence' of a thing is called "Anga-pravişta'. It was on the basis of the teachings of Bhagavān Mahāvīra that the elder munis wrote works explaining his teachings. These works constitute
Ananga-pravişta'. The former is the Anga literature and the latter can be considered as sacred literature constituting the fringe of the Anga literature.
The twelvefold Dvādaśānga occupies the most prominent place in the Jain canonical literature. Dvādaśāngi is valid by its own inherent nature. It is self-valid. The validity of other canonical writings forming the Ananga-pravişta is determined to the extent of its consistency with the contents of the Dvādaśānga. Anangapravişta is also valid because its statements are consistent with the truths formulated in the Anga literature.
Ananga-pravişğa Āgama literature can again be divided into two types : (a) the writings of the Sthaviras (Elders) and (b) the writings which have come down from the original teachings and from tradition. It is called 'Niryūdha'. Niryūdha Āgamas are extracts from Dvādaśāngi or Pūrvas. They are classified as follows :
(1) Daśavaikālika (2) the Second Śrutaskandha of Ācāranga (3) Nisītha (4) Vyavahāra (5) Brhatkalpa, and (6) Daśāśruta-skandha. Daśavaikālika was preached by Arya Sayyambhava to his son Manaka. The other Āgamas were taught by Kevali Bhadrabāhu. 1 Sähitya Aur Samskrti, pp. 29-30.

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Syāmārya was the author of Prajñāpanā. Anuyogadvāra was of Ārvaraksita and Nandi was written by Devavāchak.
From the point of view of language, the canonical literature can be classified into two eras : the first era is from 400 B.c. to 100 A.D. The Agamas written during this period have been written in Ardhamāgadhī. The second era can be stated to be from 100 A.D. to 500 A.D. and the writings in this period are in Jaina Mahārāştri Prāk rt.
In Sthānānga and Nandīsūtra we get two types of division : 1, Anga-pravişta and 2. Anga-bāhya. We get similar distinctions in the Digambara literature also. Agama literature has been described on the basis of the analogy of puruşa, the human personality having different organs. Āgama literature has, therefore, been referred to as 'Agama puruşa'. Anga-pravişta literature was considered as Anga-sthāniya and the twelve sütras were given the status of Upānga (Upānga-sthānīya). As the human body has organs like, two legs, shoulders, neck and the head, similarly the Agama purusa can be considered on that analogy as having organs of this type. The twelve angas are considered to be the organs of the Śruta-puruşa and therefore they have been called “Angapravişta'. The ears and eyes etc., have been considered as upāngas. Similarly, the twelve upāngas are mentioned as 'Upangas'.
ANGA Ācārānga Sūtrakrtānga Sthānānga Samavāyānga Bhagavati Jñātādharmakatha Upāsakadašā Antak rtdašā Anuttaraupapātikadaśā Praśnavyākaraņa Vipāka Drstivāda
UPANGA Aupapātika Rājapraśniya Jivābhigama Prajnapana Jambūdvipaprajñapti Suryaprajñapti Candraprajñapti Kalpikā Kalpāvataṁsikā Puşpikā Puşpa-cūlika Vrsnidaśā

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The term 'Upānga' was first used by Acārya Umāsvāti in his Tattvārtha-bhāsya.1
The term 'Chedasūtra' was first used in the Avaśyakaniryukti? and later in the commentaries (Bhāşyas). There are four Chedasūtras : (i) Vyavahāra., (ii) Brhatkalpa, (iii) Niśītha and (iv) Daśāśrutaskandha.
The use of the term 'Müla' is of very later date. Daśavaikālika and Uttarādhyayana have been considered to be the ‘Mülasūtras'. Nandi and Anuyogadvāra are the Cülikā-sūtras.
In this way, the Angabāhya-śrūta literature has been classified in different ways from time to time. An elaborate discussion on this question has been given in the work entitled Sāhitya aur Saṁskrti which may be referred to for a detailed study.
The canonical literature available today has been scribed by Devardhigani Ksamāśramana. Agama literature was not in the written form before this time. In the second century after the Parinirvāṇa of Bhagavān Mahāvīra, a severe famine struck for over twelve years. Soon after the famine, a Council was organised in which the Āgamas were for the first time recited. The second attempt at crystallising the Agamas was made during the period between Vira Nirvana Samvat 827 to 840. Two recitations were held during this periodone at Mathura and the other at Vallabhi. The Council at Mathura was presided over by Arya Skandila and the second Council at Vallabhi was presided over by Acārya Nāgārjuna. These recitations have been referred to as Mathuri and Vallabhi recitations. But during all these three recitations the Āgamas were not put in writing. The work of writing the Āgamas was done in Vallabhi after Vira Nirvāna 980 under the guidance of Devardhigaại Kșamāśramaņa. The period upto this were full of obstacles due to effects of many severe famines. Much of the Śruta which had been handed down by oral tradition was forgotten ; but whatever was possible to be revived by memory was recited and written down. The Āgamas were collected in fragments. Whatever was available, was systematically organised and presented in the form of Āgamic works.
1 2
Tattvārtha-bhāşya, Țikā, p. 23. Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 777.

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The present form of Āgamas is to be, therefore, traced to the work done by Devardhigaņī. He collected the Anga and the Angabāhya literature and edited them. He is, therefore, considered as the editor of the Agama literature in the present form. Philosophical Discussions in the Agamas +! 4
There is a good deal of philosophical discussion in the Agamas : (i) Sūtrakrtānga. (ii) Prajñāpanā, (iii) Bhagavati, (iv) Nandī, (v) Sthānānga, (vi) Samavāyānga and (vii) Anuyogadvāra.
Sūtrakrtānga refutes the prevailing philosophical schools of thought. In this work, Naturalistic Monism(Bhūtādvaitavāda) has been refuted, and the doctrine of separate and independent soul is established. The God and Soul Monism (Brahmādvaitvāda) is also refuted. In its place, the doctrine of the plurality of souls is established. The doctrine of karma and its effects have been proved. The theistic concept of God has been rejected. It is established that the world (saṁsāra) is beginningless (anādi) and endless (ananta). Several other theories of philosophy prevailing at that time, like Akriyāvāda, Vinayavāda, Ajñānavāda were refuted and the validity of Kriyāvāda (activism) was propounded.
In the Prajñāpanā we get a detailed discussion about the nature of the soul (jiva) from various points of view.
In the Rājapraśanīya, after an elaborate refutation of the atheistic thought, there is an exposition of the Atman and the other world with copious illustrations and expositions of different concepts.
In the Bhagavatî we get a beautiful study of the topics like, Naya, Pramāņa, Saptabhangi, and Anekāntavāda.
Nandīsūtra discusses the nature and types of knowledge.
1
Śri Devardhigaại Kşamāśramaņena śrivīrâd aśītyadhikanavasata (980) varṣe jātena dvādaśavarsīya durbhikṣavašād bahutarasādhuvyāpattau bahuśrutavicchittau ca jātāyā.....bhavyalokopakārāya śrutavyaktaye ca śrīsanghāgrahāt mộtāvaśişğatadakālīna sarvasādhun Vallabhyāmākārya tanmukhād vicchinnavašistān nyün dhikān trutitäătrutitān agamalapakan anukramena svamatya sarkalayya pustakārūdhah krtāh. Tato mülato Ganadharabhāsitānāmapi tatsaņkalānāntaram sarvesāmapi Agamānām karta Śrī Devardhigani Kșamāśramaņa eva jataḥ -Sāmācāri sataka.

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In the Stānānga, there is discussion of the important topics like, Ātman, Pudgala (matter), Jñāna and other topics, In the philosophical doctrines of Mahāvīra. there are references to Nihnavavāda which refers to the single point of approach or view of ekānta.
Samavāyānga contains discussions on topics like, Jñāna, Naya and Pramāņa etc., etc.
The Anuyogadvāra has a discussion of the connotation of the term and incidental references to pramāņa and naya and other principles.
In the commentaries (Tīkās) of these Āgamas we find vivid discussions on philosophical topics.
Among the commentators the names of Sanghadāsagani and Jinabhadragaņi are frequently mentioned. They lived in the 7th century of vikrama era. Jinabhadragaại has written an important commentary called Viśeşāvašyakabhāşya. Sanghadāsagaņi's Brhatkalpabhāşya is a classical work, which contains an exposition of the codes of conduct of śramaņa from the philosophical as well as argumentative points of view.
We cannot easily forget the name of Ācārya Haribhadra, a renowned Sanskệt commentator. He has written his commentary in Sanskst on the basis of the ancient cūrņis. In these commentaries he has made special use of philosophical discussions. We find the same feature in Malayagiri's commentary ; philosophical discourses have been employed in the work.
In the āgama literature, prominence has been accorded to epistemological and scientific discussions ; however the philosophical aspects has not received much attention as in religious literature other than the āgamas. The primary reason for this is that the āgama literature is mainly meant for sādhakas (seekers of truth). For the edification of the sādhakas, there are frequent repititions at many places. These āgamic works make special mention of the injunctions regarding the codes of conduct for the sādhakas. But in the later literature, importance has been been given to discussion of philosophical topics.
Tattvārthasūtra is the most important work of Ācārya Umāsvāti. It is a comprehensive philosophical work which discusses various

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subjects including philosophy and science. Here, we find most enlightened discussions of subjects like Philosophy, Ethics, Geography, Cosmology, Natural Philosophy and the karma theory. Acārya Umāsvāti has also written a commentary (Bhäsya) on his TattvārthaSūtra. In the 6th century A. D. Ācārya Pūjyapāda has written a commentary on Tattvārthasütra. It is called Sar vārthasiddhi. Akalarka and Vidyānandi have also written commentaries on this work. Akaļanka's Rājavārttika and Vidyānandi's Ślokavārttika are important works. These ācāryas belonged to the Digambara tradition. In these works, we get very thought-provoking discussions of the philosophical topics. In the Svetambara tradition, Acārya Siddhasena and Haribhadra have also written commentaries on the Tattvārthasūtra. This was in the 8th or 9th century A. D. We find in these works evidence of a distinct development of Jaina logic and philosophy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that just as Dharmakirti's commentary Pramāņavārttikā on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya became the centre of the development of Buddhist logic. so also the commentaries on Tattvārthasūtra became the central base for the development of Jaina logic. We get important commentaries on Tattvārthasūtra in the later period, as for instance, Malayagiri's commentary in the 12th century A. D., Cirantanamuni's in the 14th century A. D. and the commentary of the great logician Yaśovijayaji in the 18th century A. D. In addition to these, there are several other writers of the Digambara tradition who have written commentaries on Tattvārthasūtra. We have commentaries of Śrutasāgara and Vibudhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Lakşmideva and Abhayanki. In the 20th century also we have several commentaries on the Tattvārthasütra in Hindi and Gujarati languages.
The Tattvārthasūtra nearly marks the end of āgamayuga (age of āgamas).
ANEKĀNTA YUGA-AGE OF ANEKANTA In the Buddhist literature in India, the great scholar Nāgārjuna, by his intellectual discussions and writings, created a stir in the philosophical climate of his time and he gave impetus to the development of philosophical thought. Nāgārjuna's writings are to be found in all fields of Buddhist thought. But his special field was logic and metaphysics. He gave a new turn to the development of logic and metaphysics. Prior to him, philosophy was primarily based on faith
1.3

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and its elucidation. But with Nāgārjuna we find a new turn to philosophical development which gave emphasis on rational and critical studies. The Sünyavāda of Nāgārjuna was the turning point for philosophy; and philosophy was brought to a systematic level. This type of intellectual development was not merely restricted to the development of Buddhist thought, but it influenced the development of other systems of Indian philosophy. As a result of this, Jainism was also influenced to some extent with the Nāgārjuna's philosophical wave. The great logicians Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara and Samantabhadra gave a systematic turn to the development of Jaina Philosophy. This was during the 5th and 6th centuries A. D. These Acāryas brought about a systematic development of the Anekāntavāda, whose roots could be found in the teachings of Bhagavān Mahāvīra. On the basis of this study, we can call this age as the age of the establishment of Anekānta doctrine-Anekānta Sthāpanā Yuga. In this age, we find great scholars like Ācārya Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra, Mallavādi, Acārya Singhagani and Ācārya Pâtrakeśari who built up Jaina philosophy on rational and logical foundations. During this period of hectic intellectual activity, these Acāryas had triple duties to perform--(1) They had to present Jaina thought in a systematic way on sound logical basis ; (2) To answer effectively the objections and difficulties raised by the Buddhist scholars ; (3) To present the Jaina thought effectively and vigorously by answering the objections of the philosophers of the Vedic school of thought. This period is regarded as the golden age (Svarņima yuga) in the Jaina philosophical literature.
In this age, Indian philosophical thought had three prominent theories which were being frequently discussed. They are (i) Śünyavāda of Nāgārjuna, (ii) Vijñanavāda of Vasubandhu and (iii) Advaitavāda of Vedānta. Jaina ācāryas thought that exposition of Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda, in the face of the three theories prevailing in Indian thought at that time, would give both validity and strength to Jaina philosophy and that Jaina thought could be ably defended with the help of Anekāntavāda and Syädvāda. On this account, this age is considered to be the Anekānta Sthāpanā yuga or Anekāntavādi yuga. H3 PRAMAŅA ŚĀSTRA-VYAVASTHA YUGA
According to logic, knowledge of a thing could be established by means of valid sources of knowledge. In Sanskst literature the

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Pramāṇaśāstra became an important subject. In this age Jaina ācāryas turned their attention from discussion of anekanta to the pramāṇaśāstra. In Indian philosophy we find the influence of rigorous logical discussions of Dignaga on the pramāṇaśāstra and Nyāyaśāstra. Dignaga provided inspiration to the development of Indian logic. He was the interpreter of a very strong and systematic theory of logic and pramāṇaśāstra. Dignaga was the father of the pramāṇaśāstra and Dharmakirti is to be considered as the promoter of Indian logic. The intense and rapid development of logical thought due to the inspiration of Dignāga had its influence on the development of logic in other Darsanas also. In the Vedic tradition, eminent logicians like Vyomaśiva, Jayanta, Udyotakara and Kumārila helped the development of logic in a systematic way. During this period (i.e., 8th and 9th centuries A. D.) there were many Jaina ācāryas who were great logicians. Among them may be mentioned, the names of Haribhadra and Akalanka. Haribhadra did not write any independent work on Pramāṇaśāstra. However his works, Anekānta Jayapatākā, Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and Şaḍdarśanasamuccaya influenced the development of Jaina logic to a great extent. Akalanka has given an eloborate and critical discussion of Jaina logic and metaphysics in his works Pramāṇasangraha, Nyāya-viniścaya and Laghiyastraya. Vidyanandi wrote a commentary entitled Aṣṭasahasrī, on the work Aşṭašati of Akalanka which was a commentary on Aptamīmāṁsā of Samantabhadra. By this work Vidyanandi gave a firm status to the Jaina pramāṇaśāstra. During this period Prabhacandra wrote Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa and Nyāya-kumudacandra. These works give an elaborate and critical discussion of the Jaina pramāṇaśāstra. Vædidevasuri wrote a commentary on his own work Pramāṇatattvanayāloka. This commentary is called Syādvādaratnākara and it is really a crest jewel (ratnākara) of Jaina logic. It gives a comprehensive view of Jaina logic. Ratnaprabhasūri, disciple of Vadidevasūri, has written Ratnakarāvatārikā and in this work he has given the salient features of the problems discussed in Syādvādaratnākara. Acarya Hemacandra has made a unique contribution by his book Pramāṇamīmāṁsā. Similarly, Mallisena's Syādvādamanjarī is a significant contribution to Jaina logic of this age. All these ācāryas have given an able and logical refutation of the Dignaga's position concerning Jaina logic. The special feature of the writers of this age is to be found in their twofold object-(i) refutation of the rival schools of thought; and

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(ii) presentation of own school of thought in a systematic way. This dual function of refutation and presentation (Khaṇḍana-maṇḍana) of the logical discussion is the most important contribution of this age of pramāṇaśāstra.
AGE OF THE NEO-NYAYA (NAVYA-NYAYA) +3
In the development of the Indian logic, the appearance of the book Tattvacintamani gave a new turn to the development of logic which may be called Neo-logic. The credit for this revolutionary change from logic to Neo-logic goes to a brilliant writer of the 13th century, a Naiyāyika, named Gangeśa. In Tattvacintāmaṇi, the author has used new terminology of logic and written in a new style This work is the most prominent work in the Indian logic and meta physics of this age. Tattvacintamani discusses the naiyayika theory of pramāņas mentioning four pramāņas beginning with pratyakṣa. The language and the style used for discussing logical problems in this work by Gangeśa are entirely new. He has discussed the problems which are very terse and purely academic in a language which attracts and appeals even to the common man. Many scholars have written commentaries on Gangeśa's Tattvacintamani. Tattvacintāmaṇi brought about a new turn in the development of Indian logic. The Buddhist scholars were influenced by this new wave. The Jaina scholars also could not escape from the powerful trend of this thought. The style of navya-nyāya made a profound influence on the Jaina acāryas. The books on Jaina logic were, however, being written in the earlier style and tradition up to the end of the 17th century A. D. It was only in the beginning of the 18th century that Upadhyaya Yaśovijaya wrote his work on Nyaya in the navya-nyāya style. His work anekanta vyavastha written in the Neo-nyāya style helped the re-establishment of the Anekantavāda. Similarly, Jainatarkabhāṣya and Jñānabindu were two important contributions to the Jaina pramāṇaśāstra. Nayapradipa, Nayarahasya and Nayopadiṣṭa were important works on nayavāda. A commentary on Nayopadeśa called Nayamṛtatarangini is an important work. An explanatory work on Aṣṭasahasri was also written. Similarly, a commentary on Śāstravārtāsamuccaya of Haribhadra was written. It is called Syādvādakalpalată. Several other books like Bhāṣārahasya, Vādarahasya helped the dual function of refuting the naiyayika logic and presenting the Neo-logic of the Jainas. Apart from Yasovijayji, we find that Yaśasvatasāgara

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and Vimaladā sa wrote works on logic in the new style of navya пућуа.
MODERN AGE—THE AGE OF ECLECTICISM
The trend of thought and writing which was started by Yasovijayii continued to influence for over a century. Some scholars did write commentaries and notes on the classical texts on logic ; but there was no substantial change in the trend of thought. There was also no substantial contribution to the development of logic. During the British period, however, a fundamental change took place in the outlook in dealing with the problems of logic and philosophy. But the scientific outlook and the empirical approach towards looking at the philosophical problems became prominent. Very few works in Sanskst and Prākệt were written during this period. The study of western thought created a profound influence on looking at the problems of Indian philosophy. The ancient Indian literature began to be studied in a new perspective under the influence of western
ght. Three important characteristics of the change can be mentioned :-(1) Comparative study of the Indian thought in the light of the western thought ; (2) Collection of and editing ancient classics in the new perspective; and (3) Critical notings on the problems of ancient Indian thought. There was another trend that developed during this period, and that was, to give copious references while editing the works.
In the Jaina tradition of writing, the credit of giving new interpretation while editing the ancient texts goes to Pandit Sukhalālji Sanghavi. In his edited works, we find critical notes of these books, a new outlook and profound scholarship. Two more great scholars Paņdit Mahendrakumārjī Jain and Pandit Dalsukha Mālvaņiyā continued the tradition of Sukhaláljī Sanghvi. Professors A. N. Upādhye, Chakravarti and Hirālāl Jain have also contributed immensely to the development of Jaina thought by editing many ancient texts with critical notes.
At present, many scholars have been writing research articles on the problems of Jaina logic and philosophy. Everyday the work of editing the ancient texts and writing critical papers is fast progressing and it would be difficult to give an exhaustive assessment of the enormous work being turned out in the recent past. Editing and

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interpretation are the special features of this age. In this way, we can classify Jaina literature into five divisions, and it is clear that the Jaina literature is most comprehensive in all its aspects-philosophical or otherwise.
Every age has something special to contribute to scholarship and literature. The school which absorbs the contributions of the age enhances itself regularly and without pause ; but which does not absorb these contributions becomes static and less prominent. The fundamental value of writing remains constant in all ages. It is only looked from new angles of thought every time. The inner core is the same, but the outer expressions may differ.]
JAINISM IN THE AGE OF AGAMAS y 3 The question how the Jaina philosophy was presented in the Agamas cannot be easily answered unless we develop a catholic outlook and a historical sense. As the Upanișadic philosophy developed in greater breadth and depth and more so through the Bhagavadgitā, we can say that the development of Jaina philosophy was from the Agamic age to the later stages of logical and critical development. The Agamic thought became broader and richer in depth during the age of Commentaries while the philosophic development became rich and varied at the time of Tattvārthasūtra. We have now to see what were the characteristics of Jaina philosophy at the Agama stage of thought.
Philosophical problems of the Āgamas can be studied under two heads :-(1) Prameya or Jñeya (object of knowledge), and (2) Pramāņa or Jñāna (valid sources of knowledge). The former is the ontological and the latter is epistemological in nature. The Jaina Agama literature gives prominence to the discussion of the following problems :
(i) Anekanta attitude, (ii) Saptabhangi, (iii) Naya, (iv) Niksepa, (v) Dravya, (vi) Guna, (vii) Paryāya, (viii) Padārtha, (ix) Kșetra, (x)
1
Jaina Dar sana (a) Jaina Dārśanika Sāhitya Kā Simhävalokana-Sri Dalsukha
Bhāi Mālavaniyā. (b) Visva Darśana Ki Rūparekha--Pandit Vijaya Muni (c) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha.
·

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Kāla and Bhāva, (xi) Niscaya and Vyavahāra, (xii) Nimitta and Upādāna, (xiii) Niyati and Puruşārtha, (xiv) Karma and its effects, (xv) Ācāra and Yoga and other subjects. The problems of Jñāna and pramāņa were discussed with reference to the nature and various forms of knowledge exhaustively. Similarly, in the Agama literature, we get a discussion of the various forms of pramāṇas and their characteristics. Pramāna has been classified into : pratyakşa (direct) and parokșa (indirect). Similarly, we find that there is a discussion of other pramānas like anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and sabda pramāna (testimony). In the early Āgamas we get the interpretation of the term naya as point of view (Adesa) and outlook or attitude (drsti). Similarly, we find the distinction between dravyārthika (substance point of view) and paryāyārthika naya (point of view of modifications). The word Pradeśārthika naya has also been used for Paryāyārthika naya. Discussions from the complete (sakalādeśa) and partial (vikalādeśa) points of view about the problems of pramāņa saptabhangi (sevenfold approach to the valid sources of knowledge) and naya saptabhangi (sevenfold points of view) are to be found in the early Āgamas. There are also descriptions of the four types of nik sepa. We find a beautiful description of the doctrines of Syādvāda and Anekāntvāda by the dream of a cuckoo. The eternal and the non-eternal nature of Jiva (soul) has been discussed. The problems of logic like, vitandā and jalpa found their way in the discussion in the Āgama literature. In this way, by the exhaustive discussion of epistemological and ontological problems the nature and the problems of validity of pramāṇa was presented in the Agama literature in a lucid way. Besides, we get a critical study of the nature of six substances (satdrayya) and nine padārthas (categories). It is clear from this that the Jaina philosophical practices was more developed and mature than the philosophical thought of the Vedic seers. THE PROBLEM OF PRAMEYA (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE
OR ONTOLOGY) The terms prameya and jñeya have been used as synonyms in sense in the Darśana literature. That which is the object of knowledge is called prameya. "Samyag jñāna' (right knowledge) is knowledge and it has for its object the highest reality. That which can be comprehended by knowledge is called jõeya. The object of knowledge (Jñeya or prameya) whatever it may be, can be known accord

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ing to Jainism from different points of view. Jainism affirms that we have to consider the nature of an object from the point of view of anekānta (many-sided approach to understanding of a thing).
According to the Jaina history, Bhagavān Mahāvīra carried on the tradition of Jaina thought from the earlier Tirthankaras without making any material modifications. In epistomological subjects Bhagayān Mahāvira taught the distinction between five kinds of knowledge as was taught by the earlier Tirthankaras. Similarly, the doctrines of four nik sepas, seven tattvas, nine padarthas, five astikāyas, karma, Gunasthāna, leśyā and dhyāna were taught by Mahāvira in the same way in which the previous Tīrthankaras like Pārsvanātha and all the Tirthankaras have taught. He did not deviate from the earlier path in these respects. But in the case of moral codes Bhagavān Mahāvīra did introduce some modification in the tradition of Tīrthankara Pärsvanātha, that he preached the vow of Brahmacarya separately to the four vows preached by Pārsvanatha. Though the vow of Brahmacarya, in the tradition of Bhagvān Pārsvanātha, was amalgmated in the fourth vow of Aparigraha. We get references about this in the dialogue between Kesi, a follower of Pārsvanātha, and Gautama, a disciple of Mahāvīra.
During the Chadmastha stage and soon after the harassment given to him by Śūlapāņi, Bhagvān Mahavīra had a dream in which he saw a male cuckoo with varieagated wings. This dream was interpreted to mean that Bhagavān Mahāvīra would preach the multivalued theory through the Dvādaśānga. Later on his disciples went about preaching the doctrine of Anekānta to the followers of Buddha and Nyāya-Vaiseșika. Mahāvīra preached the doctrine of anekānta and he eschewed dogmatic approach to the problems under discussions. In the Sūtrak rtānga we get a reference to Bhagavān Mahāvīra being asked in what terms the monks should talk to the people and to his telling them that they should teach Vibhajjavāda. The concept of Vibhajjavāda could be better understood, if we study the Jaina as well as the Buddhist literatures.
In the Majjhimanikāya we find a reference to Tathāgata Buddha answering the question of Subha-Māņavaka thus : 'Oh ! Māņavaka, I am vaibhajjavādī and not ekāṁsavādī'. From this, it appears that the Buddha accepted the Jaina concept of Anekāntavāda which may also be referred to as Vibhajjavāda. In fact, Vibhajjavāda expresses

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the spirit of anekānta in the discussion of the problems of things of the world. It would now be necessary to understand the implications of the doctrine of Syādvāda.
Syādvāda is the logical expression of the anekānta spirit in propositional forms. It expresses the possibility of predicating other aspects of the Truth. When one aspect is predicated, a full and comprehensive picture of reality would not be possible. And, therefore, the Syād is prefixed to all the seven predications. Anekānta and Syādvāda are the unique and significant contributions of Jainism to the Indian logic.
We get descriptions of the concept of dravya (substance) in the Agama literature. We often find three terms : dravya (substance), guņa (quality) and paryāya (modification) in these works. Dravya (substance) has qualities (gunas) and the expression of quality is paryāya (modification). The three are inherent, yet differe is primarily a dichotomous division of dravya (substance) into : Jiva (living) and ajīva (non-living) substance or the same can be classified as conscious substance and unconscious substance. There is the six-fold classification of dravya : (i) Jiva (living), (ii) Pudgala (matter), (ii) Dharma (fulcrum of motion), (iv) Adharma (fulcrum of rest), (v) Ākāśa (space) and (vi) Kala (time). Excepting Kāla (time), the other five dravyas are multi-dimensional. Therefore, they are called ‘astikaya', a technical word used by the Jainas for describing the substance with multi-dimensions. Kāla (time) is uni-dimensional and, therefore, it is not 'astikāya.' Every substance (dravya) has infinite qualities and every quality (guna) expresses itself in infinite modes.
We get the description of niksepa in Agama literature. There is detailed analysis of the concept of niksepa in Anuyogadvāra. It is not however the work of a Gañadhara. We find a reference in the Sthānāngasūtra regarding this concept (Sthānānga 4 : 299) and by the discussion of 'Sarva' in that work, it is clear that Bhagavan Mahīvīra himself taught the doctrine of nikșepa. This term nik sepa has been very often used but, if the exact connotation of the term is not understood, there would be confusion of thought. Nikşepa denotes the method of explaining the exact meaning of a term. Bhagavān Mahāvīra said that a term can be used in four contexts : (i) nāma (its name), (ii) sthāpanā (its context), (iii) dravya (the object connoting the name) and (iv) bhāva (its conceptual meaning). This

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concept of niksepa signifying the methodology of use of the term has been discussed in the earliest canonical literature as also in the modern works on logic. In the literature other than the Agamic. there is a new approach to the understanding of this doctrine from the point of view of Neo-logic. Yaśovijayaji has given all elaborate discussion of the problem of niksepa along with the other problems of pramāṇa and naya.
Āgama literature gives an exhaustive study of the concepts of dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva. They have been studied from the points of view of intrinsic four-fold distinctions (svacatuştaya) and the extrinsic four-fold distinctions (paracatuștaya). A thing in its inherent nature (svadravya), in its own place (sva-kşetra), in its own time (svakāla) and in its own inherent connotation (svabhāva) can be said to have been considered in its fourfold aspects (svacatuştaya). A thing can also be considered from the extrinsic points of view which would be described as from the points of view of para-dravya (extrinsic substance), parakşetra (extrinsic place), parakāla (extrinsic time) and parabhāva (accidental characteristics). We find that the same object can be looked at from different points of view. Consequently, we get different presentations of the nature of the same object. This is due to the differences arising out of the attitude of the person which may consider as subjective, the ability of the person, sources of knowledge of the object, the existing state of the object at a particular place and time. According to the extent of the influences of these factors, the cognition of the object differs. In fact, every moment there are fleeting changes in the subjective and objective factors influencing and determining the nature of the cognition of the object. It would be difficult to present exhaustively the entire canvas of the various factors operating at the time of the cognition of an object. That is the reason why we find enormous diversity in the presentation of the view of different individuals and schools of thought. Keeping this point in view, Bhagavān Mahāvīra presented the concept of nikşepa and emphasised that it is possible to view an object from different fourfold angles : dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva.
CONCEPT OF PRAMĀŅA There is abundant discussion about the nature of pramāna and jñāna as epistemological problems. Pramāṇa and jñāna have been

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considered as the sources of cognising objects. In the Agama literature, we find that there is greater emphasis on the discussion of the topic of jñāna than on pramāņa. We come to know from the Rājapraśnīya that the discussion about five-fold division of jñāna (knowledge) was there to be found much earlier than of Mahāvīra's time. În the Agama literature we get discussion of the divisions and subdivisions of knowledge. In the analysis of the doctrine of karma we find a critical study of the distinctions in the Jñānāvaraņiya karma (karma which obscures knowledge). Similarly, we also find description of the five-fold distinction in knowledge as also the distinctions of Jiva Mārgaņās (distinctions in the varying character of selves) in the Pūrva literature. Similarly, we have a separate part of the Pūrva literature called Jñāna-pravāda which gives an exhaustive discussion about the nature and the five-fold division of knowledge. It is clear from these evidences that the five-fold division of knowledge with their nature and sub-divisions was known to Jaina long before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the last of the Tirthankaras. On the basis of the study of Āgama literature, we can say that there were three basic divisions in the analysis of the nature of jñāna (knowledge)---(i) in the first division, knowledge has been divided into five types, (ii) the second division makes a distinction in knowledge into (a) separate direct (pratyakşa) and (b) indirect (parokşa). Mati and Śruta jñāna are considered as parokșa because the self gets the knowledge indirectly through the sense-organs. The sense-organs do not give us direct knowledge as they are impediments to the realisation of cognition by the pure nature of self. Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manaḥparyava (telepathy) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) are considered as pratyakşa jñāna, as the self gets direct knowledge. (iii) In the third division, the sense-knowledge is considered both as pratyakşa and parokşa.
Discussion of the nature and types of knowledge in the Agama literature has been so important and extensive that references to the pramānaśāstra and comparative study of the theory of knowledge in the light of the epistemological problems in other systems of Indian philosophy have been neglected. Writers of Āgamas have made a distinction between the samyaktva (right or valid) and mithyātvà (wrong or invalid knowledge) on the lines of the distinction between the pramāņa (valid knowledge) and apramāņa (invalid knowledge) in other schools of Indian thought. The first three types of knowledgemati (sense knowledge) śruta (indirect and knowledge through other

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sources) and avadhi (clairvoyant knowledge) have their valid and their invalid aspects (kumati, kuśruta and kuävadhi). But in the case of the next two types of knowledge, manaḥparyava (telepathic) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) there is no possibility of invalid form of knowledge. In this way, in describing the various types of knowledge, distinctions have been suggested without using the term invalid knowledge (apramāṇa).
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There is not much discussion on the concept of pramāņa in the Agamas, as we get abundant description of the nature and types of jñāna (knowledge). The Anuyogadvara and Nandisūtra have used the term pramäṇa in a wider sense and have made distinction between (i) indriya pratyaksa (direct cognition through the sense-organs) and (ii) no-indriya-pratyakşa (direct cognition by other sources than the sense-organs). Indriya-pratyakṣa has been distinguished into five types based on the five sense-organs. No-indriya-pratyakşa includes avadhi (clairvoyance), manaḥ paryava (telepathy) and kevala (omniscience). In this place the prefix 'no' denotes absence of 'sense-organs.' The three types of knowledge coming under the category of 'noindriya' are cognitions without the help of the sense-organs as directly obtained by the self. Jaina theory makes sense-knowledge as indirect (paroksa). But here it has been considered as pratyakṣa in order to correlate the discussion about this problem in the other schools of Indian thought. Anumāna (inference) has been distinguished into: (i) pūrvavat, (ii) seṣavat and (iii) dṛṣṭasādharmyavat, but the distinction of inference as svārtha (for one's sake) and parārtha) for the sake of others) has not been mentioned. In the Agama and its commentaries we find description of anumana (inference) and its divisions and sub-divisions. There is also a discussion of the constituent proposition of inference as expressed in the syllogism.
form of
CONCEPT OF NAYA
# 3
In the Agama literature we find that there is discussion about naya also which is an aspect of pramāņa. We get a description of the general nature of naya in Sthānāṁga, Bhagavatī and Anuyogadvāra. The terms like drşți and adesa have been used as synonyms of naya. The cognition of a particular aspect of an object out of the varied aspects may be called naya. Many schools of thought present their view-points from a specific point of view. They refuse the view-points of others.

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This means of refutation of other points of view is likely to lead to dogmatic and one sided approach to the understanding of the nature of reality. Bhagavān Mabāvīra said that such one-sided approach to problems is ekänta (one-sided) and perverse. He presented a synoptic approach to the understanding of the problem of reality and that is a many-sided view, anekānta. It is nayavāda. Nayavāda has also been considered as a drşțivāda, adegavāda and apekşāvāda. The essence of these concepts is one and the same. We have already discussed about the implications of the naya and its sub-divisions in the last chapter, Naya is a specific point of view, it is a specific method of approach. ing reality and it is the expression of anekānta view.
In the Agama sāhitya we get a description of the problems of logic according to the contexts. Basic problems of logic and epistemology have been discussed in the Agama literature.
Habe POST-AGAMIC JAINISM The Jaina philosophy that developed after the Agama literature and before the systematic preiod may be called post. Agamic Jainism, This presents a systematic development of the philosophical problems of Jainisin including epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. We get here the doctrine of karma, the ethics of Jainas, metaphysical problems, the concept of dravyas and the theory of yoga systematically formulated and discussed. Enormous literature has been written on these topics. Karma-doctrine has been discussed in a brilliant and systematic way in Gommațasāra-Karmakāndu of Nemicandra and Karmagrantha of Devendrasūri, A systematic study of ethical problems is to be found in Mülācāra, Bhagavatī Ārädhunā, Anagara Dharmāmrta, Dharmabindu Prakarana, Yogaśāstra, Ratnakaranda Śrāvakācāra, Śrāvakācāra of Vasunandi, and sāgāra-dharmam sta of Pandit Āsādhara. The philosophical concepts of Jainism have been ably and critically presented in Tattvārthasūtra of Umāsväti and the commentary thereon, as also in Dravyasangraha of Nemicandra. Kundakundācārya has presented philosophical problems in his famous works like Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra, Niyamsāra and Pañcāstikāya. sära. Yogavimśika, Yogašataka, Yagad rşțisamuccaya and Yogabindu Prakarana of Haribhadra are representative works of this age. The Ācāryas of this age concentrated on the study and discussion of the conceptual aspects of Jainisın.

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Part II
Discussion of Prameya
1. LOKAVADA-COSMOLOGY 2. TATTVAVĀDA (METAPHYSICS)
BACK BONE OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY ATMAVĀDA-AN ANALYSIS(CONCEPT OF ATMAN) AJT VATATTVA-A SURVEY OF
NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE 3. PUDGALA (MATTER): A STUDY 6. PUNYA AND PAPA--MERIT AND
DEMERIT-A STUDY 7. AŚRAVATATTVA --PRINCIPLE OF
INFLUX OF KARM 4-A STUDY S. SAMVARA ANO NIRJARA--PRIN
CIPLES OF STOPPAGE AND DES
TRUCTION OF KARMAS-A STUDY 9. BANDHA AND MOKŞA-BOND
AGE AND LIBERATION--A DISCUSSION

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Lokavāda (Cosmology)
We see the vast universe before us. Naturally some fundamental questions regarding the orgin and the nature of the universe arise. We ask ourselves the questions: When did the universe originate? Would there be the end of the universe? What are its ultimate principles? Many similar questions may be asked; and answers to these questions have varied according to the philosophical perdilections of different schools of thought. It would be necessary to study these questions in the light of modern researches in philosophy and science.
There were discussions on these questions during Mahāvira's period. Gautama, the Buddha, considered these questions un-answerable, (avyākṛta)1 but Śramaņa Bhagavan Mahāvira has attempted to answer these questions satisfactorily.
Bhagavan Mahāvīra had a disciple called Arya Roha. He asked Mahāvīra, "Bhagavān! Of the Loka and Aloka, is Aloka first and then came Loka?" Mahavira said to Arya Roha thus: Loka and Aloka were both there and will continue to be there. They are beginningless (anādi) and endless (ananta). Both of them are eternal (śāśvata) and none of them is later or earlier.2
1 Tathāgata Buddha said that the following ten questions are unanswerable--(1) Is the world eternal ? (2) Is it non-eternal ? (3) Has it an end? (4) Is it endless? (5) Are the soul and body one? (6) Are they different ? (7) Does the Tathāgata exist after death? (3) Does he not exist after death? (9) Does he exist and not exist after death? (10) Does he neither exist nor not-exist after death ?-Majjhimanikāya, cūlamāluňkya sutta-63; 2 Bhagavati i 1, 6.

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THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE ? We live in this world. The entire cosmus including our world is Loka. It is the stellar universe. Beyond this, is the vast un-limited. This is Aloko. It is beyond and infinite. Therefore, we have the Universe and the beyond, the limited and unlimited, the Loka and Aloka. In the vast unlimited bcyond, in the Aloka, the fundamental substances like Dharma, Adharma, Kāla, Pud gala and Jiva have no relevance. They have their relevance and they exist in the Loka, the limited universe. It is also said that the Loka is a cosmos which gives subsistence for the five Ástikāyas (multi-dimensional substances). In the Uttarädhyayana, the Loka is described as that which sustains jīva and ajiva. 2
The distinction between Loka and Aloka, the limited and the unlimited is an eternal distinction and it was not made at any particular time ; because it is not possible to divide the eternal and the non-eternal on some one principle. Substances (saddravya) are also eternal. Space can be divided but the division is only artificial and is meant for practical purposes. There is no fundamental division in space. Time is the basis of change and this can be considered from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view. time is the basis of the modifications of jiva and ajīva (living and the non-living substances). Time is the fundamental principle which is present in Loka and Aloka. From the phenomenal point of view, time is measured for practical purposes on the basis of the revolutions of the sun and the moon, and this measurement bas relevance only to the human world. Jiva and Pudgala (living substance and matter) are characterised by activity and have their madhyama-parināma (phenomenal activity). The distinction between Laka and Aloka and their limits are to be determined by the Ddarma and the Adharma astikāyas. They divide the space into two parts- the limited and the limitless. The limited sustains the universe ; the limitless is the beyond: It is Aloka. In the limitless Alokākāša, the principles of Dharma and Adhurma (motion and rest) do not operate. Therefore, Līva and Pudgala are located in the limited universe (Lokākāśa). 1 Bhagavati i 13, 4. 2 Uttarādhyayana : 36, 2.

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LOKA AND ALOKA (UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND) H. 3
The Universe (Loka) is bounded and limited, while Aloka, the limitless ākāśa, is unbounded. It has no boundaries. Lokākāśa (bounded space) has innumerable pradesas (asankhyeya pradesa) while the boundless space has infinite pradesas. The universe consists of 14 rajjus, but Aloka (limitless space) cannot be measured at all. In the Bhagavati we get a dialogue between Bhagavan Mahāvīra and Arya Skandaka. Bhagavan Mahāvīra said, "The universe is limited with reference to the aspect of matter and also with reference to the measurable space, because the universe occupies a limited portion of space. From the point of view of time, Kala, the universe is endless and eternal because there is no point of time in which the universe does not exist. From the point of view of essence (bhava) and modes (paryaya) the universe is endless, because the modes of substance are endless.1
The great scientist Albert Einstein has given a picture of the four dimensional reality of space and time which comes nearer to the Jaina description of space and time. He says that the universe is limited while the limitless space is unbounded. The universe is limited because matter and energy do not exist beyond the universe. They have no relevance beyond the universe:
THE LOCATION OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND 193 (LOKA AND ALOKA)
The universe is flat at the bottom (vist ṛta), narrow in the middle and globular on the top like the form of musical instrument 'mṛdanga'. Of the three parts one is curved, the second is straight and the third is placed on the top so as to give a shape of a 'mṛdanga'. It is said to be of the shape of trisarāva samputa'. In other words, It is difficult to give the the shape of the universe is well defined. shape of the Aloka although it is sometimes suggested that it is It is one. Lokākāśa has globular in shape. Aloka has no parts. been divided into three parts-(1) the Lower Universe (Adholoka), (2) the Middle Universe (madhyaloka) and (3) the Upper Universe (Urdhvaloka). The universe in all the three parts measures 14 rajjūs in length i. e., from the lowest point to the uppermost point. The
1 Bhagavati i 2. 1, 90. 2 Bhagavati 11, 10.

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upper universe measures little less than seven rajjus, the middle part of the universe measures 1800 yojanas and the lower part of the universe measures a little more than seven rajjus.
Akāśa is one and indivisibl’. Still, we make a distinction between the Lokākāśa and Alokāk īsa on the basis of the operation of the cosmic principles of Dharma and Adharma (motion and rest). On the basis of the operation of these principles, a division is further made between the lower, middle and the upper part of the universe. In some parts, the two principles are extended and in some others their extension is limited. In the upper part of the universe the two principles of motion and rest are extended and for this reason, the shape of the upper part of the universe is of the shape of the musical instrument 'mrdanga'. The shape of the middle part of the universe is narrow. Its shape is like a curtain without the borders. The lower part of the universe is again extended. Its shape is like the bow attuned. The limitless space (alokākāga) has no substance subsisting in it. Therefore, it has no form and is limitless. The thickness of the limited universe is of seven rajjus.
The vastness of the universe is so great that it cannot be easily measured. In order to explain the vastness of the universe, Bhagavān Mahāvīra made use of an analogical parable. Suppose a god (Deva) is standing on the top of the mount Meru, which is one lakh yojanas in height. Suppose again, that at the foot of the Mount Meru six goddes. ses of directions (dik-kumūrikās of East, West, North, South, Up and Down directions) are standing facing the opposite direction of the Mount. Granting that they throw balls of rice of oblation (balipinda). At this point of time, the god starts running, and he catches hold of the balls of rice in the mid air before they touch the ground. This is called fast running (Sighra-gati). The analogy is extended in order to explain the extent of the vastness of the Universe. Suppose again, at the same time a child is born in a merchant's house His span of life is one thousand years. He completes one thousand years of his age. And after him, a son is born with one thousand years of age as bis span of life. In this way, the cycle continues for seven generations i and memory of their family and the status etc., are obliterated from the minds. Still the god continues to run and he
1
Bhagavati , 11, 9.

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does not reach the end of the universe. It may be that he has covered the major portion of the distance of the universe, still the remaining part might measure innumerable' parts (asankhyeya bhāga).
Dr. Einstein says that the diameter of the universe can be measured as consisting of one crore and eighty lakhs of light-years. The distance of light year is measurable in terms of the movement of a light-ray in terms of time. A ray of light of the sun travels at a speed of 1,86,000 miles per second.
URDHVALOKA (THE UPPER UNIVERSE)
41
1.3
That part of the universe which is 900 yojanas above the world that we live in, is called the upper universe (Urdhvaloka). The gods live in this part of the world. It is therefore called 'Brahmaloka', 'Devaloka', 'Yakşaloka', and 'Svargaloka'.' The uppermost part of this world is called 'Sarvārtha-siddhi'. Siddha-gila is situated twelve yojanas above 'Sarvārtha-siddha'. It measures 45 lakh yojanas in length and breadth. The circumference of 'Siddhaśilā' measures a little more than the breadth by three times. In the centre it measures 8 yojanas. It gets narrowed down from all the four sides. It appears like an open umbrella. It is white and pure, like the conch, the pearl and, therefore it is called 'Sita'. Another name for it is Tşatprāgbhāra'. One yojana above this is end of the universe. In the uppermost one-sixth portion of this one yojana space, the liberated souls reside. 'Lokanta' has been called 'Lokāgra' in the Uttaradhyayanasütra.4
The gods are not born of wombs. They are born in a special form and a divine bed called upapāt saiyya. They do not suffer premature death. They are extremely brave. They could be classified into four categories on the basis of their residence: (i) 'Bhavanavāsī', (ii) 'Vyantara', (iii) ‘Jyotişka' and (iv) 'Vaimānika'. The svargas having the status of Indra etc., are considered to be named as Kalpa and the gods taking birth there are referred to as 'kalpotpanna'. Those who are above the Kalpa are called 'Kalpātīta'. In this part of the
1 Uttaradhyayana : 19, 8; 18, 29; 5, 24; 14, 41. 2 Uttaradhyayana ṭīkā : Ācārya Atmārāin, p. 1668.
3 Uttaradhyayana 1 36, 57-62.
4 Uttaradhyayana 1 36, 56.

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heaven there are no distinctions between individual gods in status. They are all equal. They are called 'ahamindra' as they have the same status as Indra. If gods have to descend to the earth where human beings reside, it is only the gods born in the Kalpa who can come down to the earth. The gods residing above the Kalpa does not come to the earth. The 'Bhavanavāsi' and the gods residing upto the heaven Esāna Kalpa' experience erotic pleasures as human beings does. The gods of the "Sanatkumāra' and 'Māhendrakalpa' enjoy sex-pleasures merely by the touch of the bodies of the goddesses. The gods of the Brahma and Lantaka Kalpa get sense-pleasures by the sight of the beautiful bodies of the goddesses. The gods of Mahā sukra' and 'Sahasrarakalpa' experience the erotic pleasures by listening to the melodious music of the goddesses. And the gods residing in the •Anata', 'Pranata', 'Arana' and 'Acyuta Kalpa' get sensual satisfaction by the mere memory of their beloved goddesses. The other gods are free from sex-impulses. Lokāntika gods are also free from the bonds of sex-instinct. Therefore, they are called 'deva-rși' (the godsaints).
MADHYALOKA (THB MIDDLE UNIVERSE) His
The Madhyaloka (the middle universe) measures 1800 yojanas. In the Uttarādhyayana it is referred to as 'Tiryak loka'.' In this part of the universe, there are innumerable islands and seas surrounding each other. In the vast expanse of this part of the universe, it is only two and half islauds (dvīpa) where there is habitation of human beings. It is called 'samaya ksetra'.3 The structure of each of these two and half islands is similar in form with only this difference that each gets extended by double. There is the Mount Mānuşottara' in the centre of the island called "Puşkaradvipa', and therefore only half the portion of "Puşkaradvīpa', is inhabited by human beings. There are seven important divisions in the island called .Jambu-dvipa': (1) Bharata, (2) Haimavata, (3) Hari, (4) Videha, (5) Ramyaka, (6) Hairanyavata and (7) Airāvata, 4 Videha kşetra is further divided into two parts: (i) Devakuru and (ii) Uttarakuru i.e., 1 Uttarādhyayana : 36, 50; 36, 54. 2 Tattvārthasūtra : 3, 35. : Prāng Mānuşottarānmanuşyāk. 3 Uttarādhyayana : 36, 7. 4 Tattvärthasūtra 3, 10 Bharata-Haimavata-Hari-Videha-Ramyaka
Hairanyavata- Airāvata kşeträni.

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Purvavideha and Uttaravideha respectively. In the Dhātakīkhanda dvīpa and in Puskarardhadvīpa there are double than that of Jambūdvīpa. All these islands have been divided into three parts on the basis of the functional importance as : (i) Karmabhūmi, (ii) Akarmabhūmi, and (iii) Antaradvipa.'
Karmabhūmi' is that part of the "Madhyaloka' in which human beings are engaged in activities like agriculture, commerce, art, architecture etc. In this part, human beings are capable of earning the highest merit (punya) and the most intense demerit (pāpa). Bharata, Airavata and Mahavidela are karmabhūmis. It has been suggested that there is one each of Bharata, Airāvata and Mahāvideha and two each of the same in Jambūdvīpa and Dhätakikhanda respectively. Similarly, in Puşkarārdha Dvīpa, there are two Bharata, two Airāvata and two Mahāvideha countries. In this way there are fifteen Karma-bhūmis in the two and a half dvipas (islands).2 All the continents that we have today are covered by a small portion of the Bharataksetra in the Jambūdvīpa. From this, we can just imagine the vastness of the Madhyaloka and specially the three worlds of the universe.
That part of the universe in which there is no need to work for maintenance by following any occupation like agriculture etc., is called 'Akarmabhumi'. In this part, the enjoyment of life is possible without any work. It is also called "Bhoga-bhūmi' as there is predominence of enjoyment only. There is constant pleasure in that part, as the gods enjoy life without effort. There are six places of Bh (places of enjoyment) in the Jambūdvipa--(i) Haimavata, (ii) Hari, (iii) Ramyaka, (iv) Hairanyavata, (v) Devakuru and (vi) Uttarakuru. In this way, we find that there are double countries in Dhātakikhanda dvipa and Puşkarārdha dvīpa. There are twelve countries in each of the two dvipās i,e, in the Dhātakikhanda dvīpa and Puskarārdha. dvipa. So, in all, there are thirty Akarmabhūmis (lands of pleasure).
• Apart from the Karma and Akarma bhūmis, there are islands among the seas. They are called 'Antaradvīpa. There are twentyeight islands in the 'Lavana samudra', the sea that encircles the Jambu-dvipa alround, and at the fringe of the Himavāna Mountain. The islands in the sea are spread over in seven quadrangles (Catuşka).
1 Uttaradhyayana : 36, 195-196. 2 Uttarādhyayana i 36, 196.

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They can be mentioned in the following order 1-First Quadrangle : Ekoruk, Abhäşika, Längülika and Vaibhānika. Second: Hayakarṇa, Gajakarṇa, Gokarṇa and Śaşkulikarṇa. Third Adarśamukha, Meşamukha, Hayamukha, and Gajamukha. Fourth Asvamukha, Hastimukha, Simhamukha and Vyāghramukha. Fifth : Asvakarṇa, Siṁhakarṇa, Gajakarṇa and Karṇaprāvaraṇa. Sixth Ulkāmukha, Vidyunmukha, Jivhāmukha and Meghamukha. Seventh Ghanadanta, Gūḍhadanta, Śreṣṭhadanta and Śuddhadanta.
6
In this way, there are twenty eight 'Antaradvīpas' in relation to the 'Sikhari' mountains, and the total of fifty six Antard īpas' (islands) can be mentioned. These are considered to be the places of habitation of human beings. Thus we find the Mid-universe (Madhyaloka) is vast and extensive. Still, compared with the vastness and extensiveness of the Upper Universe, and of the lower, the extension of the Mid-universe amounts to a negligible portions of the two, almost amounting to zero.
1.3
ADHOLOKA (THE LOWER PART OF THE UNIVERSE)
The part of the universe which is below the mid-universe is called 'Adho-loka' (the lower Universe). There are seven worlds, one below the other. They are known as seven 'Narakas' (hells). Mostly, the hell-beings reside in these worlds. The measurements of these seven worlds are not uniform. The lower ones are more extensive than the But they immediately preceding upper world in order of succession. are not very close to each other. They are separated by the thick coating of liquid, air, and space.1 Each world has below it the quantity of thick liquid, dense air, thin air and space."
The seven worlds of the nether region universe have been named as : i. Ratnaprabhā, 2. Sarkaräprabhā, 3. Balukāprabhā, 4. Pankaprabha, 5. Dhūmaprabha, 6. Tamaḥprabhā and 7. Mahātamaḥprabha. The suffix ‘prabhās' to each of the name connotes the characteristic colour of the place. Ratnaprabha has three parts and the upper part has the colour of ratna (diamond). It measures 16,000 It is covered by mud, and yojanas. Just below, is the second part. measures 48,000 yojanas. The third part below, is covered by water, and it measures 80,000 yojanas. Thus the total measurement of the
1 Tattvarthasūtra : 3, 1-2.
2 Sarvārthasiddhi 1 3, 1.

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extension of Ratnaprabhā comes to about 1,80,000 yojanas. From the second to the seventh worlds in the nether universe, there are no parts as we get in the Ratnaprabhā. All the matter they have is of the same kind. The second nether world measures 1,32,000 yojanas. The third measures 1,28,000 yojanas. The fourth world extends for 1,20,000 yojanas. The fifth world measures 1,10,000 yojanas. The sixth and the seventh measures 1,16,000 and 1,08,000 yojanas respectively. The thick layer of liquid below the seven nether worlds also varies in quantity and measurements.
The beings in hell reside in the different nether worlds just in the middle of each part leaving one thousand yojanas on the upper and the lower parts. For instance, in the Ratnaprabhā measuring 1,80,000 yojanas in dimension, the hellish beings reside in the central part leaving aside 1,000 yojanas on the upper and 1,000 yojanas on the lower portions of the world. Similarly, in the other six nether worlds there is habitation of the hellish beings in the central parts leaving aside one thousand yojanas each on the upper and the lower parts of each world.
Beings living in these nether worlds are considered to be hellish beings (Näraki Jiva). The lower we go in the stages of the nether worlds, we find beings suffering and infected with ugliness, they are frightful in appearance and nature, and they suffer from various disabilities in increasing degrees. In these places, there are extremes of heat and cold. The residents of these hellish worlds suffer untold misery, though they seek to get some pleasure. Their lot is one of never-ending misery. They see others with extreme anger and with bloodshot eyes. They fight with each other like cats and dogs remembering their animosity in the previous lives. They cut each other mercilessly with their weapons and even with hands, feet and teeth. Their bodies become deformed and cut asunder into pieces. But like mercury, the parts of the body join again and form a whole. The hellish beings suffer indescribable pain when they are subjected to drink hot boiling lead. The devilish gods make them embrace the red-hot iron-bars and force them to climb the trees brimming with sharpest thorns. The devil-gods torturing them are most cruel. They are found to be going upto the first three nether worlds. They
1
Şarvārthasiddhi 1 3, 1.

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are technically named as Paramādhārmika and are also called 'asuras' (demons). They are very cruel and they get sadistic pleasure in torturing other inmates of hell. The hellish beings are constantly in the grip of suffering and they have no possibility of escape till the expiry the course of their alloted life in the nether world, as they have no possibility of premature death.1
There is the limitless space (Akāśa) beyond the boundaries of the universe. The expanse of this universe is so vast that it would not be possible to gauge even the smallest portion of the extensive vastness of this universe by the modern techniques of the modern science.2
LOKASTHITI (THE POSITION OF THE UNIVERSE)
н-з
Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad has a dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Gargeyi regarding the position the universe. Gārgeyi wanted to know the fundamental principle of the universe. She asked: What is the ultimate substance of the universe?
as
Yajnavalkya! It comes from air.
Gārgeyi: And where does the air come from?
Yajnavalkya: It is from space. And space is from Gandharvaloka; Gandharvaloka from Adityaloka (the sun); Adityaloka from Candraloka (the moon); Candraloka from Nakşatraloka (the stars); Nakṣatraloka from devaloka (the heavens); Devaloka from Indraloka (abode of Indra); Indraloka from Prajapati-loka (abode of Prajapati) and Prajapatiloka from Brahmaloka.
Gărgeyi: And where does the Brahma-loka come from?
Yajnavalkya Gārgi ! Do not ask such question, otherwise your head will fall down,s
In the Jaina philosophy, we do not reach such a situation where one reaches the dead end of intellectual curiosity. Bhagavan Mahavira never flinched from answering any question. He answered all questions and gave full intellectual satisfaction to his disciples. In the
1 Tattvärthasūtra: 2, 52; 3, 3-5.
2 Uttaradhyayanasūtra—ēka Parisilana : p. 61. 3 Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad: 3, 6, 1.

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Bhagayatīsūtra, Mahāvira has explained the problem of the nature and the ultimate substance of the universel. He said that the basis of the universe could be presented in eight forms :
1. Air is in Akāša. 2. The sea has its basis in the air. 3. The earth is in the sea. 4. The moving and the non-moving beings are on the earth. 5. Ajiva is based on Jīva. 6. Jīva encrusted with karman is dependent on karman. 7. Ajiva is comprehended with the help of Jiva. 8. Jiva comprehends the nature of karman and is covered by
kārmic particles.
The primary elements of the universe are earth, water, air and space. On the basis of these elements, the constitution of the universe is found. The fundamental substances of matter (ajīva) and life (jiva) are inter-related and inter-dependent on each other. Jiva is the support of ajīva, in a sense, and ajīva is dependent on jiva. Karman is the matrix of mundane souls (sarhsäri jīva) and jīva gets involved in the wheel of samsāra due to the influx of karman. Similarly, body is the abode of the soul. The soul when bound by karmic matter gets embodied and becomes involved in the wheel of life and death. Karman is responsible for the embodiinent of the soul and thereby all the physical activities arise.
.? THE THEORY OF CREATION (SRSTIVĀDA)
Considered from the point of view of the end, we can say that the universe is beginningless and endless froin the point of view of substance ; it has a beginning and an end from the point of view of its modes (Paryāya). There are two fundamental substances in the universe : the jīva (living substance) and ajīva (non-living substance) This is the dichotomous division of the substances. Both the sub. stances are beginningless and eternal. There is no relation between them as to the prior and posterior. From the point of view of modifications, the universe is constantly changing. The changes are of
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Bhagavati : 1, 6.

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two types i natural and artificial. There are constant changes taking place in the substances by their very nature. But the modification of a mundane being (sarhsāri jiva) is due to the encrustations of karman to the soul ; and this is not the natural condition of the soul.
In the Vedic philosophy, there are two prominent views of thought : Advaitavāda (Non-dualism or Monism) and Dvaitavāda (dualism).
Regarding the nature of the Universe, Advaita philosophy presents three views : (i) Jadādvaitavada (Naturalistic Monism), (ii) Caitanyadvaitavāda (Idealistic Monism) and (iii) Jada-caitanyādvaitavāda (Naturalistic and Spiritualistic Monism). The Jadādvaitavāda (Naturalistic Monism) maintains that consciousness is a product of matter. It is the by-product of the chemical changes in the body of an individual. It is an epiphenomenon. The Cārvāka-Materialism and the Materialism of the modern science hold this view.
According to Caitanyadvaitvāda, the Brahman is the ultimate reality and the fundamental principle of the universe. The Brahman is transcendent of the three worlds. In the Satupatha Brāhmaṇa, it ' has been said that the Brahman is beyond the three worlds. He thought : 'how can I express myself in the three worlds ?' Then He showed himself in the forms of nama and rüpa (name and form).
Jada-caitanyādvaitvāda maintains that the universe is a product of the synthesis of spirit and matter (cetana and acetana). But, the Naturalistic Monists (Jaļädvaitavādin) and the Absolute Idealism (Caitanyadvaitavāda) do not accept the view presented by the Jadacaitanyavādin because the effect cannot proceed from the cause which is dis simliar. The Naturalistic Monism maintains that the mind arises out of matter, and the Ideal Monistic Idealism maintains that matter is the expression of the spirit. Thus, the Monist does not accept the independent reality of matter and spirit. The priority of cognitive consciousness is the cardinal principle of the Idealist and reality of the objective world independent of consciousness is the assertion of the Realist. Matter is primary for the Materialist and spirit is primary for the Idealist.
1
Šatapatha Brāhmana 1, 1, 2, 3. Tad dvābhyāmeva pratyvaida rüpena calva nämnă ca.

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But the Dualist (dvaitavadin) posits the reality of spirit and matter independent of each other. One does not come from the other nor are they subordinate as reality to each other. The universe is the effect of the union of matter and spirit.
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The Nyaya, Valleşika and Mimamsā systems of thought contend that God brings together the atoms, and the universe is formed. The universe is the creation of such combination of the atoms. This is the union of the spirit and the matter. As the creation of the universe is based on the combination of atom, the Nyaya-Vaiseşika theory is called Arambhavāda.
Sankhya and Yoga philosophies give importance to the concept of Prakṛti with three gunas. According to the Sankhya, the evolution of the universe begins when Prakṛti comes in contact with Puruşa and there is disturbance in the balance of the gunas in the Prakṛti. Prakyti is unconscious, Purusa is conscious. Prakṛti is unconscious but active while Puruşa is inactive. In the presence of the Puruşa, disturbance in the three gunas is created and the evolution starts. The need for a Creator God is not felt for explaining the evolution of the universe. The consequent modifications and effect exhibited in the universe are due to the activities of the Prakrti. In the Yoga philosophy, the concept of God is brought, although indirectly, for explaining the process of reality. Therefore, the Yoga system is called theistic Sankhya. The causal theory accepted by the Sankhya-Yoga and the Vedantin is the identity theory of cause and effect. Effect is potentially present in the cause and when the cause expresses itself in the modifications, the effects show themselves. This causal theory of potentiality and actuality, as Aristotle mentions, can be considered in two parts: (i) Gunapariņāmavāda (expression of the modifications of gunas) and (ii) Brahmapariņāmavāda (expression of the modifications of the Brahman). Sähkhya philosophy and Madhvācārya accepts the theory of Guṇapariņāmavāda while Visiṣṭādaita of Rāmānuja advocates the theory of Brahmapariṇāmavāda for explaining the evolution of the universe. They maintain that Prakṛti, Jiva and Isvara are the three principles which are real and they are all the expressions of the Brahman. Brahman expresses itself in the aspect of Prakrti and that results in the evolution of the universe.
Jainism and Buddhism do not accept the theory of creation. They believe in the theory of modifications (parivartanavāda).

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The Buddhist theory of the world and its evolution depends on the doctrine of pratītyasamutpada. The Buddhists advocate the theory of aggregate and continuity and not permanence. In Jaina philosophy, whatever modifications are to be found in the universe, they are to be explained in terms of the combined co-operation of the jiva (living substance) and pudgala. These modifications can be considered into two parts : (i) natural (svābhāvika) and (ii) pracitcal (prāyogika) or phenomenal. The natural modifications are very subtle. They are not visible to the eyes. But the phenomenal changes are gross (sthūla) and they are visible to the eyes. The universe is, therefore, the result of the combined operation of matter and spirit.
The Vedic seers were perplexed about the origin of the creation of the universe. In the Nāsadiya sūkta of the Rgveda, the fundamental question of creation and origin of Creation has been raised. A series of questions have been asked. They are : What is the first principle of the universe ? Who can describe it? How did it originate and what is the cause of varieties in the universe ? Were gods created after the creation of the universe ? Who can explain the origin of this universe ? What is the cause of the creation ? Finally, who created the Creation and who did not? One who knows this, is beyond us, and it is possible that he also does not know.1
The Jaina philosophy is clear about the problem of the universe and its reality. Jainism inaintains that matter does not arise from spirit nor does spirit arise from matter. Both are beginningless and real: BHEDĀBHEDAVĀDA (THE DOCTRINE OF IDENTITY
AND DIFFERENCE) The problem of identity and difference in explaining the reality has given rise to four schools of thought. One school of thought gives primacy to difference (bheda), and the second gives to non-difference
1.3
1
Rgveda : 10, 129 Nāsadiya sūkta. Nāsadāsînnosadäsittadānī nāsīdrajo no vyomā paro yat. Ko addha veda ka iha pravocat kuta ajátā kuta iyam vis rştih. Arväg deva asya visarjnernāhā ko veda mata ābabhūva. “Iyaṁ visļştiryata ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi va na. Yo asyādhyakşah parame vyomantosonga veda yadi va na veda',

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or identity (abheda). The third school of thought gives importance to both as of equal reality and the fourth school maintains that there is the qualified distinction of bheda and abheda (bhedavisişta-abheda).
The school emphasising difference (bhedavāda) maintains that nothing is permanent. Everything is changing. Difference is the only reality while oneness or identity is an appearance. Where there is bheda (difference), there is reality. Sautrāntika and Vaibhāşika schools of Buddhism advocate this theory. Everything is momentary (kşanika). Every moment there is the origination and destruction. Nothing is permanent. Where there is no permanence, there is no non-difference. Jñára and padārtha both are momentary. What we call the Atman is merely an aggregate of five skandhas (physical and mental states) : vijñāna, vedanā, samjñā, saṁskāra and rūpa. These are the aggregate of the skandhas and what we call the self. 1 This theory is called sanghâtavāda (the theory of aggregates). This is also the theory of anātmavāda and it is also called pudgalanairātmyavāda. From the point of time, the theory of self and the world does not express the reality of permanence but only of the stream or a continuity (santāna) without anything permanent to continue. We find that all our empirical thinking implies the process of thought leading to the theory of impermanence. The identity and oneness are the expressions of the aggregate or collection, and it is merely with reference to time and space. In fact, things and cognition are different and there is only a stream or continuity of the things and cognitions which are discrete. Change is the fundamental principle of the universe and permanence is only the appearance. The wheel of the chariot moves on one point of axle and also stops with that point. Similarly, every jīva lives in moment as a thought is fleeting, so also the jiva is temporary and fleeting2
The Greek philosopher Heraclitus said that everything is changing and nothing is permanent. Permanence is only appearance, We cannot step into the same river-water twice. Every moment there is change, and change is the very essence of thing. One moment, it is and the next moment, it is not. It does not, however, mean that there is modification of a thing because modification requires a substance to modify but there is no permanent substance. One who
1 Şaddarsana samuccaya. 2 Visuddhimaggo,

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trusts his reasons and not the essence knows that everything flies and nothing is. Considered from the rational point of view we can say, impermanence is the essence of reality. David Hume also maintained that permanence is an appearance and change is reality. The illusion of permanence is due to the senses but reason knows that nothing is permanent. Whenever I try to catch 'myself', I stumble upon this or that perception. I do not find myself as permanent substance. Williams James propounded a theory of the stream of consciousness. Every passing thought is itself a thinker.3 Bergson enunciated the doctrine of Elan vital as the very essence of life and the universe. The Elān is the very source of the world and everything is the manifestation of the Elān.4
The abhedavādin affirms that reality is one, and difference is an illusion. The diversity and difference in life are due to our ignorance. The fundamental principle of the universe is one. It is; and the diversifications of the One are only an appearance. This view-point has been presented in the Upanişadas and by the thinkers of the Advaita Vedānta. The Absolutists, as they are called, posit the One as the uitimate reality because that is the consummation and the limit of the gradual process of the synthetic approach. The one is the perfection and duality is imperfection. This is the cardinal principle of the Advaita Vedāntu. Vijnanavāda and Śünyavāda have presented similar points of view.
In the Western thought, we get traces of the development of monistic philosophy from the time of Greek thinkers like Permenides. Permenides said that reality is and it does not become. That which becomes, that which changes, is not real. There must be something that changes. It is the eternal principle. It is the one principle which remains the central point of the changes. It is the sat in the language of Indian philosophy and change is the asat. He said, 'Ex nihilo nihil fit.' From the sat, you cannot get another sat, because it is the reality. That which becomes, must come out of that wbich it was not. If it were, it would not become and there is no problem of
The illusion of permanence is ascribed to the senses. It is by reason that we arise to the knowledge of the law of becoming." 2 David Hume, Ibid. 3 William James : Principles of Psychology, 4 Bergson, Henry : Creative Evolution.

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diversification of being. Therefore, being is, and all difference, multiplicity and change are mere illusion. As Permenides tried to establish the theory of being, Heraclites attempted to advance the theory of change on similar grounds. Jaina philosophers refuted the argument of those who tried to establish the reality as a change and flux, and established the theory of the reality of the Identity and Difference.
The third view presents a theory of identity and difference. According to this theory, identity or oneness is as real as difference and multiplicity. In the Nyāya-Vaiseșika theory, we find that there is equal emphasis on the universal and the particular (sāmānya and višesa). The substance and its modifications are based on the universality and the differentia of a thing. The universal and the particular are both important, for instance, the concept of cow as a universal, is as much derived from the generality of particulars, as particulars derive their identity from the universality of the universal. Therefore, the universal and particular are both independent and real. This is clear from the example mentioned above regarding the relation of the particular cow to the universal 'cow in general'. This view tries to reconcile the two theories which apparently contradict each other and affirm the reality of the universal or the particular as the case may be. The Syādvädamañjarī mentions that the universal and the particular are equally real and complementary to each other and yet different from each other.1
Next, we come to the theory of qualified monistic theory (višiştādvaita). There are two forms of this theory. One gives prominence to the unity for the oneness making multiplicity only as an expression of the unity. Rāmānuja presented a Qualified Monism in wbich the one expresses itself into the many. The Brahman and the world are real. The soul merges itself into the Brahman as the waters of tbe river merge into the waters of the sea. The triple principle of cit, acit and Tšvara are real. The Reality is one and the self and the world are the expressions of the reality. The world is considered to be the body of Tsvara and Tsvara is the soul of the world. fsvara is, therefore, considered to be the one with the cit and acit as its 1 Syādvadamañjari-7.
Ayuta siddhānāmādhāryādhārabhutānärh iha pratyayahetuh sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ.

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qualified expression. Cit and acit are derived from Ivara as they are the body of Isvara. His philosophy has, therefore, been called Visiṣṭādvaita (Qualified Monism). The primacy of unity is recognised and multiplicity is explained as emanating from the unity.
the other.
The Jainas have made a specific and significant contribution to this problem of the relation between the one and the many. According to the Jainas, the one and the many are equally real and ontological realities. As the multiplicity and difference are the facts of life, so is the unity. However, the two are not separate and independent realities. One implies the other: One cannot be expressed without Where there is difference, there is identity, and where there is identity there is difference. Jaina philosophy co-ordinates both identity and difference. Every object is characterised by the very nature of its generality and particularity (sāmānya-viŝeşa), identity and difference (bhedabheda) and permanence and change (nityānityatva). Evpry object expresses the generality of its class and particularity of the individual object. It would not be proper to say that an object expresses the substantiality and the unity only, because it also expresses as the inherent characteristic, the particularity and diversity as the form of modification (paryaya). Similarly it would not be correct to consider the unity and oneness an appearance and not real, because modifications are not possible without a permneont object which changes. Similarly, the identity and difference cannot be considered as independent entities because they do not express themselves independently of each other, and there is no third substance which unites them. Therefore, identity and difference should be considered as complementary and as simpling each other, though both are real. A thing can be described as similar, and dis-similar according to the point of view of and the context. Identity and difference are both applicable to a thing. It is identical, as well as, different from the different points of view. For instance, a thing is identical when considered from the point of view of similarity and genus, while it is different, looked at from the context of differentia and other species and individuals belonging to other species. Therefore, to say that identity and unity are real, and difference and change are unreal would be a logical and metaphysical fallacy. Further, identity and 1 Śrī Bhasya of Rāmānuja 3, 1, 9. "Sarvam paramapuruşeņa sarvātmanā,”

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difference cannot also be considered as separate and independent realities. They imply each other. Therefore, it would be apter to say, a thing is characterised by the performance and change, identity and difference. These are categories of judgement. It has, therefore, been said that reality is similar in a particular context kathañcit, is dis-similar from another point of view, it is describable from a still different context and indescribable from another point of view. It is real and also not-real considered from different contexts. 1 A thing has all these chasacteristics inherent in it. A thing is permanent and changing, general and particular, similar and different, one and the many and eternal and non-eternal. Aristotle expressed a similar view. A thing is characterised both by generality and particularity. It cannot be comprehended without the categories of generality and particularity, and nothing can exist without the categories of generality and particularity.2
Jaina thought has tried to comperhend the essence of a thing in its complex and comprehensive form. This view is, in a way, the expression of the anekānta point of view. It is possible to predicate contradictory attributes to a thing at the same time on the basis of the point of view (naya) and the contextual reference (nikşepa). This is the approach of the Bhedabhedavāda, (the theory of identity and difference). The prediction of the attribute of identity and difference at the same time does not nullify the comprehension of the nature of a thing, but it gives a clearer and synthetic picture of the object. Substanes is characterised by permanence and the modes by mutations and change. Substance and modifications are not different. It is the substance that undergoes modifications. They imply each other. DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE)
Jainism has presented the six-fold substances. They are: (1) Jīva (living substance or soul), (2) Pudgala (non-living matter), (3) Dharma (principle responsible for the motion in the world), (4) Adharma (principle of rest), (5) Ākāśa (space) and (6) Kāla (time).
1 Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā-25.
"Syännäsi nityaṁ sadṛśam virūpaṁ
Vācyam na vacyam sadasattadeva".
2 A Critical History of Greek Philosophy-W. T. Stace.
3 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : Jainadharma aur Darśana.
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57 practical and conventional measurements of time. Similarly, the conventional and practical distincition and division in Akāśa is considered as measurable space called “Dik' (direction) and it is not an independent substance.
The present synthesises the past and the future. The past and the future have their importance on account of the present. Whenever we accept the existence of a thing. we have to admit that it existed in the past and will continue to exist in future. It is not possible to say that the object would exist in original state for all time. It undergoes modifications ; still modifications do not affect the real and substantial nature of the object. In the Tattvārthasūtra, dravya (substance) has been defined as that which has undergone modifications, which undergoes and which will continue to do so in future also.1 The real nature of the object remains unchanged in and through all modifications. If it were not so, the substantial nature of the object would not remain and the past and the future changes would not have relation wbatever. The object does express the identity in mcdifications. The substance does imply the reality, Ācārya Umāsvāti says that dravya expresses the attributes of origination, permanence and destruction. He also says that substance is that which has modifications. He has in this connection, used the word paryāya (modification) in the place of utpada (origination) and vyaya (destruction) and the dhrauvya in place of guna. Utpada (origination) and vyaya (destruction) imply the concept of change. Every object has two aspects i identity and difference, permanence and change. Similarly, it exhibits the qualities of similarity and dis-similarity. The core is the permanent nature of the object and that which changes and undergoes modification. We find that the qualities are expressed in modifications. In the substantiality of the object, there is permanence, and in modifications we get change. Permanence and change, therefore, are equally real. The origination and destruction express modifications of the substances, but the substance remains permanent, it is not destroyed. For purposes of explaining this, Umāsvāti calls it “Tadbhāvāvyaya'.3 This is the characteristic of permanence. Ācārya Kundkunda defines dravya (substance) as that 1 Tattvärthasūtra, 5, 29. 2 Tattvärthasūtra, 5, 37. 3 Tattvārthasūtra, 5, 30.

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'it is itself'. Aparityakta has the characteristics of origin, continuity and has qualities (utpäda, dhrauvya and vyayayukta) and bas modifications (paryāya). 1 In this, we get the real definition of dravya. Pancāstikāyasāra describes the reality in similar way. In this sense, the Jaina thought does not consider reality from one point of view only (ekānta) eternal or non-eternal. It is both eternal in one sense and non-eternal in another sense. It is eternal from the point of view of its essential nature, but non-eternal from the point of view of the modifications (paryāyas). By presenting the nature of reality either as eternal in the language of Nyāya-Vaiseșika and Vedic thought, or as flux and non-eternal in the language of the Buddbist thought, we would not be giving a comprehensive and synoptic view of reality. It would be one-sided view (ekanta). Therefore, it is necessary to give a synoptic picture of the nature of reality in the manysided approach as the Jainas do. The Reality has to be considered as both eternal and non-eternal; eternal from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes. An object is, it gets modifications and it is also destroyed. It does not lose its identity in the changes. Change is not mere discrete flow of independent points. It is the thing that changes. Change and permanence are, therefore, equally real. We experience a thing as permanent only when there is substantiality in the changing modes. This theory of the Jainas of identity and change has been compared to the chemical change.
In 1789, Lawosier, an eminent scientist, propounded a theory of conservation of matter. According to this theory, matter is constant. Its modifications are only expressions. The modifications do not destroy matter nor do they add to the quantity of matter. Just as the coal when burnt becomes ash, the matter is not altogether destroyed. It is only converted into ash. Similarly, in the universe, oxygen and carbon dioxide are being continuously combined and dis-integrated without ever. affecting quantity of the gas. Nothing 1 Pravacanasāra : 2, 3.
Apariccattasahāveņuppādavvayadhuvattasarjuttarh.
Gunavar ca sapajjāyar, jam tam davvar ti buccanti. 2 Pañcāstikāyasāra, gāthā 8.
Sattā savvapayatthā, savissarūvā anantapajjāyā. Bhanguppādadhuvattā, sappadivakkha havadi ekkā.

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new comes out, it is only transformation or the modification of matter. For instance, if we keep a metal pot unused for a long time, it gets rusted. But the rust is not a new substance. It is only a chemical action on the matter due to its contact, and it forms as oxy-hydrate. The qualitative aspects of matter gets transformed into its different inodifications due to certain physical and chemical actions. The mass of matter remains constant and there is no change in the essential function and the nature of matter. Similarly, light-energy may be transformed into heat-energy. Magnetic attraction will not anyway fundamentally alter the quantity of matter or energy. They are only paryāyas, modifications, without affecting the quantum of matter. The Jainas have affirmed the same point when they say that in the modifications of dravya the quantum of dravya does not change. It expresses itself in different forms. Dravya is eternal, modifications express change without affecting the quantum of dravya. Therefore, dravya is constant in all its modifications.
The Sankhya philosophers have propounded a theory of permanence and change (nityānityavāda). Puruşa is eternal. Prakrti is also eternal, but it expresses itself in the form of its evolutes. The Nyāya-Vaiệeşika says that atoms and souls are eternal and the objects of the world like a pot and a piece of cloth (Ghața-pața) are non-eternal. The aggregates of the atoms are eternal. But unlike the Jainas, they do not accept the eternity involved in the paryāyas also. Patañjali, Kumārila Bhatta; Pārthasārathi and others do not accept the functional theory of eternity pariņāninityatvavāda ; but they accept the concept of the ultimate reality. ?
•
1 (a) Pātañjala Yogadarśana :
“Dravyam nityamāk rtiranityā. Suvarnam kadācidāk rtyā yuktaḥ piņạo bhavati, pindak știmupamrdya rucakāḥ kriyante, rucakākřtimupam ydya kajakāḥ kriyante, kațakāk stimujamydya spustikāḥ kriyante. Punarāvrtaḥ suvarņa pindah...... Akştiranya cānyā ca bhavati, dravyar punastadeva. Akrtyupabhedena
dravyamevāvašisyate. (b) Mimaṁsā ślokavārtika : 1-3 p. 619.
Vardhamānakabhange, ca rucakaḥ kriyate yadā Tadāpārvārthinaḥ śokahprāptiścāpyuttarärthinah. Hemārthinastu madhyastham tasmādvastu trayātmakam. (Contd.)

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) DRAVYA AND PARYAYA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES)
The term Dravya has many meanings. In its substantial sense it is eternal (Nitya). It is also used in the sense of a principle. Very often Dravya refers to the universal and paryāya refers to its modes.
The concept of the universal bas been considered by the Jainas in two respects : First, the universal in the sense of referring to the jīvas. For instance, jīvas, whether empirical individuals or the liberated souls, all are considered as jīvas. Empirical individuals have their distinctions on the basis of various principles like the place of residence, the number of sense-organs, etc. Liberated souls are the siddhas. They are also jīvas. This reference of the univeral (sämānya) to the jivas is called tiryak sāmānya.
The second distinction in the meaning of the concept of the universal refers to the verticular distinction of generality. This is called ürdhvatāsāmānya. For instance, an object may undergo modifications, all its modifications are its particulars and the object in its generality is constant. It refers to the universal. The Jiva, from the point of view of substance is the universal referring to the substantiality urdhvatāsāmánya. Again, if we describe the different stages of jiva in its various forms of existence, It would also be called ürdhvatāsāmānya.
Bhagavān Mahāvira was once asked by a disciple : How many jiva paryayas (modifications of jiva) are there ? Mahāvīra said i There are endless forms of jīva paryaya. "How is it?" asked the disciple. Mahāvira said : There are innumerable denizens of hell. There are numberless Asurakumāras and Stanitakumāras. There are innumerable earth-bodies and air-bodies (prthvīkāya and vāyukāya). There are numberless vegetable-bodies (vanaspatikāyas). Similarly, there are innumerable two-sense organism and in this order there are innumerable men. There are Vyantara beings. There are innumerable siddha jīvas (liberated souls). Therefore, the substance of jīva is infinite in
Norpādasthitibhangānāmabhāve syānmatitrayam. Na nāśena vinä soko, notpadena vină sukham.
Sthityā vina na madhyasthyar, tena sāmānyanityatā. Bhagavatį sūtra : 7-2-273. Bhagavatt sätra 1 7-3-279.
1 2

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its variety of modifications. In this dialogue, we find the expression of a specific form of distinction based on certain criteria. The modifications of the substances of jiva are to be found in infinite forms in this universe. Among the jīvas are also included the perfected souls. Therefore, this concept of generality or universality as applied to the jiva may be considered as tiryaksāmānya paryāya.
So far, we have considered the modifications of jīva at a particular point of time. But there would be infinite varieties of modifications within a span of many points of time. In this sense, a jiva has its infinite variations in point of time and space considered from the point of view of its modifications. While thinking about the various modes of a particular jīva we are looking at it from the point of view ürdhvatāviseşa (verticular particularity). The description of the different modifications of jiva has reference to generality in the sense that jivas assume various forms. Similarly, denizens of hell can also be described in terms of the various states of existence in hell that they undergo. This type of the infinite variety of existence of the denizens of hell who are of the same nature has been ably described in Prajñāpana.
One resident of hell is similar in its substantiality with another resident. But considered from the point of view of status, nature, place and time we can make distinction between the different types of hellish beings. From the point of view of the residence, colour, smell, etc., for instance, there are innumerable variations in the complexity of the hellish beings. The distinctions are numerous and various. Therefore, as has been described in the Prajñāpanā, we can classify the bellish beings into different varieties on the basis of the distinctions in their capacity of understanding and possession of various forms of knowledge like, matijñāna, frutajñāna and also on the basis of their colour and smell, etc. In this sense, we hav numerous types of denizens of hell. Even considered from their bodily forms, there are innumerable types of the beings. Some are tall, some are very short, measurements beings judged from one 'angula' to five hundred dhanusya. In between there are innumerable varieties. Similar distinctions could be made on the basis of their
| 2
Bhagavatī sūtra 25, 5. Prahāpana, 5, 48,

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span of life. Therefore, the jīvas can be considered from various points of view and can be classified on the basis of different criteria. These distinctions are referred to as urdhvatāsāmānyāśrita viseşa (particularity from the cross-sectional point of view).
Bhagavati sūtra and Prajñāpanā sūtra have given detailed study of jiva from the point of view of substance and also from the point of view of its modes. The changes and modifications imply the distinction of time and the modes and particularity imply the distinction in space. In this sense, words paryaya, viseşa, pariņāma, utpāda and vyaya have similar meanings. In the analysis of dravya, these words have been used in various contexts.
A question has been asked whether substance and mode are different or identical.
The Agama literature has considered the modes as different from substance. It has also been considered in some respects as identical. Bhagavati sūtra points out that modes are changing and not eternal and even after the destruction of the mode, the substance remains. Therefore, mode has to be considered different from substance. Otherwise, when modes are destroyed substance also will be destroyed. It implies that substance is not to be considered a s mode and mode is not identical with the substance. The attributes of a substance cannot be destroyed, but its variations and modifications may change.
The disciples of Bhagavan Parśvanatha had, presumably, some doubts about the question whether the disciples of Mahavira understood the concepts of sāmāyika. Bhagavan Mahāvīra said: The soul is sāmāyika, and sāmāyika is the essence of the soul. Here the soul is the substance and the universality and the equality are its essential features. They are expressed in the form of modes. In this sense, the modes are not different from the substance. The soul is identical with its attributes of universality, equality and omniscience.
Bhagavati sūtra1 and Sthānāngaa have mentioned eight types of the jiva or Atman : (1) dravyātmā (soul as substance), (2) kaṣāyātmā (soul in the affective state), (3) yogātmā (the soul as active), (4) upa
1 Bhagavati sutra 12, 10, 466.
2 Sthānānga 8,

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yogātmā (hermic energy of the soul), (5) jñānātmā (soul as knowledge) (6) darśanātmā (intuitive experience of the soul (7) caritrātmā (soul as an ethical being) and (8) viryātmā (the inherent energy of the soul). These distinctions have been made from the points of view of substance and modifications: The description of soul as a substance has been made from the point of view of substance, and the remaining descriptions of the seven states have been made from the point of view of modifications. The substance (dravya) and modifications (paryāya) are both mutually complementary to each other. One cannot exist without the other. Substance without modifications and similarly modifications without substance, are not possible. Where there is substance, there must be modes (paryāyas).1
1 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : Jainadharma aur Darsana (Hindi) pp.
123-129.

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Jaina
Metaphysics THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES
The Indian philosophical literature has made an exhaustive study of the concepts of Tattva (the first principle). Tattva comes from the word tat, and tat is a Sanskrt pronoun. By the suffix of the word tvu it connotes the meaning of this (tasya bhāvah tattvam). Tattva, therefore, refers to the first principle. In philosophical literature, there has been a very elaborate and deep study of the concept of the tartva.
From the practical point of view, tattva refers to the existing status (vastavika sthiti), the essence (sāravastu) and the summary (sārārsa) of a thing. In the philosophical thought the common sense point of view of tattva is accepted but transcended and given a richer content from the ultimate point of view. It means the nature of the substance, pure principle or the ultimate principle. In the Vedic literature, Brahman and Paramātma have been referred to as tattva. In the Sānkhya thought the first principle of the universe is described as tattva,
Different schools of philosophy bave given the description of the tattva from different points of view. But all of them emphasise that the tattva is very important in life. The life and thought are intimately connected with each other, and they cannot be separated.
1
Brhatnayacakra 4. Tattar taha paramatpham davvasahāvar taheva paramaparam. Dheyam suddham parama eyatha hunti abhihāņā. - Tattva, paramārtha, dravya svabhāva, par-apara, dhyeya, suddha parama - all these are synonyms.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY They also emphasise that without the first principles or tattva, the life cannot be dynamic, it would be still. So to isolate the contemplation of the first principles from the process of life could be to deny the reality of the ātman.
The entire Indian philosophy is based on the study of the first principles. The orthodox systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the concept of ultimate principles according to their philosophical predilections. The Cārvāka philosophy has also accepted the first principles. It says that earth (prthvi), water (jala), air (vāyu) and fire (agni) are the four ultimate principles of the universe.1 Akāśa is not the ultimate principle because it cannot be apprehended by senseexperience, but it can only be known through inference. Vaiśeşika philosophers first gave six principles : (1) Dravya (substance), (2) Guņa (quality), (3) Karma (activity), (4) Sāmānya (generality), (5) Visesa (particularity) and (6) Samayāya (inherence). Later, the principle of abhāva (non-existence) was added. Thus, there are seven fundamental principles of the universe. The Naiyāyikas have given 16 principles (padārthas) of the universe. They are: (1) pramāna, (2) prameya, (3) sarśaya, (4) prayojana, (5) drsţānta, (6) siddhānta, (7) avayava, (8) tarka, (9) nirnaya, (10) vāda, (11) jalpa, (12) vitandā, (13) hetvābhāva, (14) chala, (15) jāti and (16) nigrahasthāna. They are primarily logical categories. Samkhya darśana has enunciated 25 principles in the evolution of the universe. They are : prakrti, mahat, aharhkāra, pañca jñānendriyas (5 sense-organs), pañca karmendriyas (5 motor organs), pañca tanmātrās (5 elements) and pañca mahābhūtas (5 basic substances) and puruşa, the self. Yoga philosophers have accepted the Samkhya enunciation of the 25 principles. Pürya Mimarnsă has advocated that the injunctions of the Vedas are primary and they are the first principles. The Advaitavedānta is monistic philosophy and has postulated the first principle of the universe Brahman-all else is its appearance. The Buddha has formulated the 4 noble truths : (1) duhkha (misery), (2) duhkhasamudaya (cause of misery), (?) duhkhanirodha (cessation of misery), (4) duhkha-nirodha-mārga (way to the cessation of the misery). In Jaina thought the concept of tattva has been considered from two aspects : (1) şaddravya aspect (the six substances) and (2) seven tattvas or nine padārthas. The terms Dravya, Tattva and Padārtha are sometime considered as equivalent.
1 Bịhaspati : Prthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni.

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Hs TERMINOLOGY OF TATTVA
In Jaina metaphysics the terms sat, sattva, tattva, tattvārtha, artha, padārtha and dravya have been used in various contexts as equivalent terms. However, these terms have their variations of uses. Acārya Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthasūtra has used the word tattvārtha, sat and dravya in a similar way, in the context to reference to substance. These concepts have only linguistic variations, but there is no difference between the uses of the words conceptually. Acārya Nemicandra has mentioned a dychotomous division of the tattva into jīva and ajīva (living and the non-living) as dravyas. The universe is constituted of these two fundamental substances. The Buddhist philosophers have propounded a theory of the impermanence of things. Everything is transitory, everything is a flux. Therefore, reality is only fleeting and transitory. But Vedāntins, on the other hand, have formulated a theory of the absolute as the ultimate truth which is permanent and unchanging. The changing universe is an appearance. In this way, the Buddhists and the Vedāntins have approached the theory of reality from their different points of view : one from the synthetic point of view and the other from the momentary point of view. The Jainas say that these two points of view are one-sided, partial and ekānta. To assert their point of view is to commit the fallacy of exclusive "affirmation (ekānta). According to Jainism the reality is comprehensive and complex. Both the synthetic and momentary points of view are partial approaches to the understanding of the real. Both these approaches are partial truths. Because permanence and change are both real and without permanence there is no change. It is the permanent which changes. Therefore, the Jainas believe that they are equally real. We cannot assert exclusive truth in any one of them. Everything in the universe would be permanent if it is looked at from the point of view of substance and it will be a change and impermanent if it is looked at from the point of view of modes. Let us consider, now, the Jaina analysis of the theory of the reality.
THE NUMBER OF TATTVAS The question regarding the number of the tattvas has been answered by the Jaipa philosophers in different ways in different contextual references. There are three fundamental approaches to this problem. From the point of view of the cosmic order, it can be said that the universe consists of two fundamental principles :

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jiva (living substance) and ajīva (non-living substance). From ontological point of view, with the element of the spiritual considerations, we can say that there are 7 tattvas : Jīva, Ajīva, Aśrava, Bandha, Sarnvara, Nirjarā and Mokșa. If we include the ethical and religious overtones to these considerations, we have nine principles which includes the seven principles mentioned above and two more are added i.e., Papa and Punya. In the philosophical literature there appears to be a general agreement on the usage of the second tradition of the looking at reality from metaphysical and spiritual points of view and they give seven principles. In the Āgama literature, the third tradition is used. The Bhagavati?, Prajñā panā”, Uttarādhyayanasūtra: have mentioned nine principles. The Sthānānga4 mentioned two-fold classification : Jīva and Ajīva. Acārya Nemicandra has stated in the Dravyasangraha that there are two-fold distinctions in the Tattvas : Jiva and Ajīva on the basis of the Āgamas, mentioned above. Acārya Umāsvāti has included, in the Tattvārthasūtra, the principles of Punya (merit) and Pāpa (demerit) in the principles of Aśrava or Bandha and mentioned the seven distinctions of the tattvas (principles).5. Acārya Malayagiri has followed the enunciation the principles as given by Ācārya Umāsvāti, in his commentary on the Prajnāpana.
THE ORDER OF THE TATTVAS 4.3 A relevant question has been asked as to why the Jīva dravya has been given the first place and other dravyas are mentioned later. The answer to that would be that Jiva dravya is fundamental for the following reasons although other principles are equally important.
The essence of Jīva is consciousness. As such, jīva knows, it experiences the modes of Pudgala. It experiences the fruits of good and bad karmas. Each jīva is aware of the tendency of experiencing the pleasure of the world and also it has a craving for the realisation of the self. The principle of ajīva is useful for the soul to realise the highest end of Mokşa. It is like the ladder with the help of
āsaya sar
1 Bhagavati : Abhigama jīvājīvā uyaladdha puņnapāvā
vara nijjara kiriyāhigarana bandha mokkha kusalā. 2 Prajñāpana. 3 Uttarādhyayana, 28, 14. 4 Sthānanga, 2. 5 Tattvārthasutra, 1, 4. 6 Prajñāpanavetti.

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which, we can ascend to the other floor. It is like the boat by means of which we can cross the ocean of life. Similarly, the external world (ajīva) is a canvas on which the activities of the jīva are to be developed. In this sense, Ajīva is the next category in importance of the seven tattyas. Similarly, jīva in contact with ajīva will bring about the influx of karma (āśrava) and bandha (the bondage). The empirical individual (sarsārī jīva) experiences merit (punya) and pāpa (demerit) due to the influx of karma (āśrava) and bondage (bandha). Therefore, in some Āgamic books, punya and pāpa have been mentioned before the categories of āśrava and bandha; and in some books they have been included after the categories of aśrava and bandha. The separation of jīva and pudgala leads to mokşa. Samvara and nirjarā are the means for the attainment of mokşa. When the kārmic particles are entirely removed from the jiva, mokşa is possible. The order of the principles in many works has been Sarvara, nirjarā, bandha and mokşa.
WS PRESENTATION AND ELABORATION
The Acāryas present the philosophical problems to the disciples keeping in view the degree of their capability of understanding the intricacies of the problems. If the disciple is sharp-witted, the presentation becomes brief and sometimes even suggestive. Elaboration in simple language should be necessary to persons who are rather slowwitted. If the seven-fold principles are crystallised in a brief presentation, then the principles are to be expressed in the two-fold distinction of jīva and ajīva, because these two principles incorporate the other five principles in the form of expressions of the jiva and ajīva. The ways of the forms of tattvas are different. Āśrava, bandha, punya and pāpa are principles mainly concerned with ethical and empirical considerations. They are called “saṁyogi'. But sanyara, nirjarā and mokşa do not have their eyes towards the worldly attainments. One is based on the secular activity and the other turns towards spiritual salvation. The latter is therefore called “viyogi'. Aśrava is the influx of karma into the soul. The soul gets kārmic particles encrusted and it is vitiated by the influx of karma. This causes the bondage (bandha). Where there is āśrava, there is bandha. The soul gets entangled in the wheel of life and death due to the influx of the kārmic particles and vitiating the psychic states of the soul, through passions (kaşāyas). Auspicious bandha is punya and inauspicious bondage is pāpa. In this way, the four principles of āśrava, bandha,

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saīnvara and nirjară are closely associated with the principles of jīva and ajīva. Sarvara is to prevent the influx of karma, and that is possible by stoppage of the inlet of karma, just as we close the inlets of water in a tank for the sake of obstructing the flow of water inside. The function of nirjarā is to remove the karma, which is there associated with the soul, just as we remove the accummulated water from the tank for cleaning the tank. When all the karmas is removed, the soul becomes pure and free from kārmic tinge. It reaches the state of perfection. The function of the three principles is to remove the kārmic particles which are foreign to the soul.
· THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES
,H3 (TATTVAS) FROM THE SPIRITUAL POINT OF VIEW
The tattvas can be classified into three forms from the spiritual point of view of the tattvas which will be known (jñe ya), those that should be discarded and those that should be grasped and accepted. Jiva and ajīva are principles which need to be understood in the proper way (samyagjñāna). One who wants to realise himself would have the right knowledge of the principles of jīva and ajīva, otherwise, he would noi be able to develop self-control. For the sake of salvation, one should avoid bandha and saṁsāra. Mokșa is to be realised. Sarvara and nirjarā are the means for the realisation of mokşa. Aśraya, punyā and pāpa will bring the bondage (bandha) and they have to be discarded. If the merit (punya) is related to the good activity that leads to self-realisation, it has its functions for the path of realisation. In the chadmastha stage of gunasthāna the self is associated with punya along with the realisation of the triple jewels (samyagdarśana, jñāna and cāritra). In the lower stages there are emotional upsets. Those who are seeking to realise the self, but because they rely on the noble words of the munis and arhantas (tīrthařkaras), would attain the state of righteousness. In short, punya considered from a particular point of view (ekānta drsti) may be worthy of being discarded, but from other points of view, it has the characteristics of jñeya, heya (to be discarded) and upādeya (to be accepted). In the fourteenth gunasthāna, which is the highest stage, punya has also been discarded, because punya (merit) as well as pāpa (demerit) have no relevance in that stage. From the 11th to 13th stages of gunasthānas, it is only knowable (iñeya) and in other gunasthanas, the seeker after truth has need of the punya (merit)

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because with the help of the punya he will have tred his way to selfrealisation. In this sense, jīva and ajīva are jñeya (worthy to be known); āśrava (influx of karma), bandha (bondage) and pāpa (demerit) are to be discarded and nirjarā and mokşa are worthy to be pursued. Punya can be considered from various points of view. It is worthy of knowledge (jñeya), it is heya (to be discarded) from another view and punya needs to accepted in the earlier stages of self-realisation. It has all the three characteristics. 3 RUPI AND ARUPI (WITH FORM AND THE FORMLESS)
Jiva is formless. Moksa is also formless. There are 5 types of ajīva category : Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa, Kāla and Pudgala. Dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla are formless (arūpi). Pudgala (matter) has form. The modes of pudgala can be found in the forms of karma, āśrava, bandha, punya and pāpa. Those which have form are characterised by the qualities of varna (colour), gandha (smell) rasa (taste) and sparsa (touch). That which is characterised by the absence of these qualities is formless (arūpī).
3 JIVA AND AJIVA The question arise out of the nine principles, how many are jīvas (living substances) and how many are ajīvas (non-living substances). This question has been considered with reference to principle of saṁvara, nirjarā and mokşa. These are expressions of function of jīva. So these are also called jīvas. Aśrava, bandha, punya and pāpa are expressions of non-living substances. Hence, these are also called ajīvas. Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa, Kāla and Pudgala are nonliving substances. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WITH
REFERENCE TO DRAVYA Jainism makes a two-fold distinction in the study of tattvas as follows: (1) from the point of view of the ontological categories and (2) from the point of view of substances. We have already seen the classification of the substances from the ontological point of view. From the point of view of substance (drayya), tattvas have been classified into two : jīva and ajīva. On the one hand, there is the jīva category and on the others the ajīva. Ajīva has been further classified into different types as : (1) Dharma (principle of motion), (2) Adharma (principle of rest), (3) Ākāśa (space), (4) Kāla (time), and (5) Pudgala
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71 (matter). Jīva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa are called Astikāyas because they have three dimensional extensions. Astikāya connotes the characteristic of multi-dimensional extension, but Kāla (time) is not considered as astikāya, because it is not multi-dimensional. It has only linear dimension.
DRAVYA AND BHAVA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES) # 3
If we want to understand the nature of a thing, we have to consider the nature of the object from the point of view of its substance and its characteristic. Dray ya refers to the original matter and bhāva has reference to its modes. Dravya and bhāva can be considered from another point of view, i. e., drayya has reference to the material aspect and bhāva refers to the psychic state. The seven tattvas can be analysed from the point of view of substance and the modes.
The jīva as a substance is eternal, beginningless and endless. This is considered from the point of view of substance. But from the point of view of psychic state, jīva can be considered a substance expressing itself in various psychic ways like desires and other mental activities. Similarly, Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa are non-living substances. The modifications are also non-living (ajīva) substances. Punya can be considered from both dravya and bhāva points of view and punya affects the soul in its activity and the encrustations of karma. Similarly, pāpa also has two aspects : the material aspect and the psychic aspect. Jainism considered the various principles from the two fundamental aspects, i. e., from the point of view of material aspect and the psychic point of view. In this way, we get the drayyāśrava; and dravyāśrava expresses itself in mithyātva (perversity), avrata (violation of vows), pramāda (negligence), kaşāya (passions) and yoga (activity). In the same way, we have bhāvāśrava with reference to the same forms of expression like mithyātva, avrata etc. These are psychic states of the self. Saṁvara can also be considered from the material and psychic points of view. Samvara expresses itself in activities which are wholesome and which are meant to arrest the influx of karma. These activities may be expressed in the forms of practice of vratas, samiti and in three forms of gupti. By means of these activities, the influx of karma can be arrested and the kārmic particles are held in abeyance. There is the psychic aspects of sarvara which expresses itself in the psychic states of the self which are helpful for

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enabling us to stop the influx of the karmas. Nirjarā has two aspects : dravyanirjarā which expresses itself in ta pa (austerities) and bhāvanirjarā which is the psychic foundation for the practice of austerities. The bandha (bondage) has also been considered from two points of view i.e., dravyabandha which is the kārmic bondage and bhāvabandha which is expressed in the psychic expressions like emotions etc. The highest state of dravyamokşa is a state where all the karmas are removed and bhāvamokṣa is a state of perfect bliss and perfect peace of ātman.

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Ātmavāda : An Analysis
(Concept of Atman) VARIOUS THEORIES OF SOUL ht: 3 Sūtrakartānga discusses different theories of soul.1 Some philosophical theories postulate the ultimate elements as the highest reality of the universe. The earth, water, air, fire and space have been considered to be the ultimate elements of the universe, and soul is a product of the combination of these elements. In the Buddhist literature, we find references to these theories of the soul and there is mention of a theory that the soul as a thing consisted of the four elements excepting space. The Rigvedic seers speculated over the nature of the soul and they were perplexed to discover the real and the ultimate nature of the soul. They asked the question : "Who am I ?" "I do not know." In the philosophic discussions about the nature of the soul, several views have been presented which mention the nature of the soul in the materialistic and the idealistic strain. Some have said that the soul is composition of matter, some identify it with an aspect of praksti, some make the soul the essence of life (prāņa) and still others give an idealistic picture of the soul as a person (puruşa).
THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL Hos
Considered from the historical point of view, the materialistic view of reality is very ancient. We find mention of this view as a 1 Sūtrak stānga, 1, 1, 1, 7-8. 2 Sūtrak rtānga, 1, 1, 1, 7.
Santi pañca mahbbhūyā ihamegesimāhiyä.
Pudhavī āū teü va vāü āgāsa pañcayā. 3 Brahmajālasutta. 4 Rigveda-1, 164, 37.—Na vā jānāmi yadiva idava idamasmi.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY polimic in the Upanişads, the Buddhist and the Jaina literature. In the Svetāśvatara Upanişad, the problem of the ultimate source of the universe has been discussed; and mention has been made the matter is the ultimate source of the universe. In the Brhadāran yaka Upanisad, there is discussion about the ultimate source of the universe. It has been suggested that matter is the ultimate source of the material things, and consciousness in this universe. There is no consciousness in the dead body (na pretyasasjñā asti). Jayanta, the Naiyāyika philosopher, has suggested that the materialistic theory is to be found in ancient Indian thought in the Cārvāka philosophy. In the Viseşāvas yakabhäşya we get references to the materialistic theory of the soul.4 Sūtrak rtānga makes mention of the Cārvāka theory of soul as the combination of the five physical elements. In the Digghanikāya, there is a discussion of the view of Ajitakeśakambalin, who said that the soul is a product of the combination of the four elements except space. It is clear from the discussion of the materialistic theories, that they maintain the view of the soul as a product of the combination of the basic elements and consciousness is also a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. This view is called "Lokāyatamata'. This has been criticised by other systems of pbilosophy in India.
In the ancient philosophical literature, we also get references to the theory called tajjīvatacchariravāda as we get the materialistic conception of the soul. In the Upanişads, the theory has not been mentioned in this terminology, but in other philosophical works like Sūtrak rtānga,? Viseşāvaśyakabhāşyae and Majjhimanikāya we get references of this view.
1 Svetāśvatara Upanişad, 1, 2. 2 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanişad, 2, 4, 12. 3 Višeşāvasyakabhāşya, gāthā 1553. 4 Nyāyamañjari-Vijayanagaram series, p. 472. 5 Sūtrak rtānga, 1, 1, 17–18. 6 Digghanikāya-Sāmañña phalasutta. 7 Sūtrak rtānga, 2, 9-10
(a) iti padhame purisajā ye tajjīvataccharīrae tti āhie (b) docce purișajāye pañcamahabbhūie tti āhie
(c) Sūtrak rtānga-nir yukti, gāthā 30 8 Višeşāvaśyakabhāşya--doubts of Vāyubhūti 9 Majjhimanikāya-cūlamālunk ya sutta

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Pandit Sukhalal Sanghvi etc., has suggested that "Bhutacaitanyavada" and "tajjīvatacchariravada" are two different theories. If they were identical theories, there would not have been separate mention and separate discussion of these theories.1 Tajjīvatacchariravāda maintains that body and soul are one. Tathāgata Buddha has mentioned this problem as one of the unanswerable questions (avyāk ṛta praśna). In the Sutrakṛtänga, we get discussion about this theory. "The soul and the body are one and identical. If they are different, they could have been shown as separate entities as we can show the sword from its case, a nut from the bag and as we can get the butter from the curds, but we cannot show the soul as different from the body."""
These two schools of thought can be found discussed in the ancient Indian philosophical literature. It has been described that the fundamental substance of the universe is constituted of the fundamental elements like the earth, water, air and fire (prṛthvī, apaḥ, teja and vāyu).3 According to this thought, the consciousness has been described as a product of the combination of the elements.4 Just described. There is no other source except this. Just as we get alcohol from the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers, so also we get consciousness from the metabolic changes in the body. This type of materialistic theory or epiphenonomical theory of consciousness and also the materialistic theory of reality could be found in the Cārvāka philosophers in India and in the Greek philosophers like Thales, Aneximander and Aneximanes. They were monistic materialists. Democratus was a Pluralistic materialist. He propounded the theory of atoms. Similarly, in the Tattvasangraha we get the mention of a theory of Kambalāśvatara which mentions that consciousness is only body (kāyādeva caitanyam). According to the Tattvasangraha tajjīvataccharira is a theory of Kambalāśvatara. Digghanikaya mentions the name of Ajitakeśakambalin as a propounder of this theory. It is possible that Ajitakeśakambalin and Kambalāśvatara are the same persons.
75
In the Buddhistic iterature there is a part in the Digghanikāya called pāyāsīsutta. In the Jaina literature we have Rajapraśnīyasūtra.
1 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 77.
2 Sütrak ṛtänga, Pundarika adhyayana.
3 Tattvopaplavasimha, p.1.
4 Tattvasangrahapañjikā, p. 205

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In both these works there is a similar discussion about the questions of the king Pāyāsī or Pradesi regarding the nature of the soul. The king Pāyāsi did not consider the body and the soul as separate. In order to prove this theory he demonstrated that there is nothing that remains after the destrution of the body after death. He carried some observations in this respect and made some experiments. Perhaps, these were the first primitive forms of experiments. He had asked some persons that they should come and report as to where they were after death, but none came to report to him. He locked a man in a box and sealed it in order to show that after the death of the man, there would be nothing in the box except the body. He cut asunder the limb of the body of the person in order to locate the soul but he could not locate the soul. A youth, for instance, can discharge many arrows with his strength, but a young child cannot do so. This is because the strength is in the body, and if the body is destroyed the energy is also destroyed.
Rājā Pradesi carried these investigations and was sure that the soul is nothing but the product of the body. Apart from the body there would be no soul. His father was also of the same view. This materialistic conception of the soul as belonging to the organism was discussed in the Upanişads and in some cases it has been supported for the sake of presenting theories to the people of different abilities.
In the Chāndogya Upanişad, there is a story of Virocana and Indra going to Prajāpati for getting a clarification regarding the nature of the ātman. Prajāpati asked them to look into the pond of water and he said "you are that" i.e.. the body i.e.. the ātman. Virocana was satisfied with this view and he went on preaching the materialistic conception of the soul as identical with the body.
ATMAN AS PRANA (PRANMAYA ATMA) But Indra had bis doubts. He could not let be convinced of the view that the soul is the body. Then a different view possibly came to his mind that ātman is prana (the vital or life force). This view was held by many philosophers. They argued that without this life force, sense-experience would not be possible and sense-organs would not function. Take away the life-force and the sense-organs would be dead. The life force has sometimes been associated with breath because after death, breath would not function. Therefore,
1 Taittirīya Upanișad, 2, 1, 2. 2 Chāndogya Upanişad, 9, 9.

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ātman is the prāna and all functions of the life are possible because of ātman.1 In the Chāndog ya Upanişad it has been said that prāna is life force in the universe.?. Brhadāranyaka Upanişad describe that prāna is the god of gods3 But Nāgasena has refuted the theory of prāna as the soul in the Milindapanha.
The sense-organs have an important function in the body. Some identify the ātman with the sense-organs, but philosophers have criticised this theory of identifying the ātman with sense-organs. In the Chāndog ya Upanişad also there is a criticism of the theory as the story of Indra and Prajāpati continues. In the Brhadāranyaka Upanişad, it has been said that at death, the sense-organs cease to unction, but prāņa which is the source of the energy of the senseorgans is not destroyed. Therefore, indriyas function because of the prānas and indriyas have been described as prānas 5
In the Jaina literature, there is the mention of ten prānas (life forces), in which the sense-organs are also included.
Vācaspati, while discussing the vaik stika bandha, as accepted by the Samkhya, has suggested that there are views which mention that indriyas are the puruşa. These are the views which identify puruşa with indriya. They are Indriyātmavādins.
In this way, there have been several views which may be considered as materialistic in nature as they identify the ātman either with the body or the sense-organs. This is one of the views which is equally important in Indian thought. The materialistic view of the ātman as presented by the Cārvāka has been recognised as a separate darśana in the current of Indian philosophy.
5 ATMAN AS MIND (MANOMAYA ATMA)
It has been observed that the sense-organs do not function in the absence of the mind. The body may remain in a place resting for sometime, but the mind moves about. Therefore, the mind is more important than the sense-organs and some have suggested the theory that mind is the ātman. Paņdit Dalsukha Mālavaņiā says that
1 Tattiriya Upanişad, 2, 2, 3; Kauşītaki, 3, 2. 2 Chāndog ya Upanişad, 3, 15, 4. 3 Brhadāranyaka, 1, 5, 21. 4 Āimamīmārnsā, edt. Dalsukh Mālavaņiā, p. 13. 5 Brhadāranyaka Upanişad, 1, 5, 21. Si mkhyakārikā, 44

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there was first the view of ātman as prāna and later came the theory of ātman as the mind. Mind is subtler than the sense-organs and the prāņa. The philosophers do not uniformly agree as to the nature of the mind, whether it is material or immaterial. Some have suggested that the mind is immaterial, but the Naiyāyikasa and Vaisesikas3 have considered mind as atomic in nature. It is different from the material substances like earth, water, etc. Sāṁkhya darsana maintains that the mind evolved out of ahamkāra before the evolution of the pañcabhūtas and therefore the mind is subtler than the bhūtas (elements). Vaibhāșika school of Buddhism maintains that mind is of the nature of vijñāna and it is an expression of vijñāna.4
Nyāya philosophers have sometimes considered mind as ātman5 because mind is different from the body as we make a distinction between the body and soul. Mind is all-pervasive. Mind comprehends all that the sepse-organs grasp. Therefore, mind is considered to be ātman and it is not necessary to make a distinction between the ātman and mind. 6
Taittirīya Upanişad also says that mind is the ātman (anyoàntarātinā manoma yaḥ).?
The Brhadāraṇyaka Upanişad discusses the nature of the mind from different aspects. Mind is considered to be the highest truth (paramabrahma samrāt).8 Сhāndog ya Upanişad makes mind the Brahman.9 Tejobindu Upanişad describes mind in various ways and gives supreme importance to mind. Mind is the whole universe. Mind is the greatest enemy and due to mind we suffer untold misery. Mind is Kāla (time). Mind is sarnkalpa (will). Mind is jīva (soul). Mind is citta (consciousness). Mind is ahamkāra (indivi
vijñānam yaddhi tan
1 Atmamīmāṁsā, p. 15. 2 Nyāyasūtra, 3, 2, 61. 3 Vaiseșikasūtra, 7, 1, 23. 4 Abhidharma Koka-sannămanantarātitan
manah. 5 (a) Nyāyasūtra, 3, 1, 16.
(6) Nyāyavārtika, p. 336. 6 Taittiriya, Up., 2, 3. 7 Brhadaranyaka, Up., 1, 5, 3. 8 Brhadāranyaka, Up., 4, 1, 6. 9 Chāndogya, Up., 7, 3, 1,

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duality). Mind is antaḥkarana (inner sense). Mind is pṛthvi (the earth). Mind is jala (water). Mind is agni (fire). Mind is pavana (wind). Mind is ākāśa (space). Mind is sabda (sound). Mind is sparsa (touch). Rūpa (form), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and pancakosa (five sheaths) arise out of mind. The states of waking ((jāgṛti), dream (svapna), and sleep (suşupti) are all expressions of the function of the mind. Similarly, the deities of direction (dikpäla), vasu, rudra, āditya and others are all forms of mind. In this way, mind is the very source of universe. It is the very essence of the universe.
PRAJŇATMA-PRAJNANATMA-VIJÑANATMA
(ATMAN AS PRAJÑA AND VIJNANA)
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The philosopher transcending the speculations of atman as mind, reaches a stage when he finds atman as identical with prajñā (psyche). This is the later stage of development of the theory of atman, in the heirarchy of thought. The mind and the sense-organs cannot function in the absence of the psyche (prajñā). Prajñā is much more important than the sense-organs and the mind." In the Taittriya Upanisad, prajñā has been described as antarātmā and vijñānātmā as manomaya. In the Aitareya Upanisad, prajñā is considered as ultimate truth and it is an aspect of Brahman and mind is one of the aspect of the prajñā. Prajñā and prajñāna are considered as identical. The word vijñāna is considered a mode of prajñā."
1 Tejobindu Up., 5, 98, 104.
2 Kauşitaki Up., 3, 6, 7.
3 Taittiriya Up., 2, 4. 4 Aitareya Up., 3, 2. 5 Aitareya Up., 3, 3. 6 Aitareya Up., 3, 2.
Vijñāna, Prajña and prajñāna have the same meaning. In this sense ātman is described as vijñānātmā, prajñātmā and prajñānātmā. We have already discussed about the views which have considered mind as material and those views which say that mind is immaterial. Transcending these views we come to a realm of views where ātman is considered as psyche and the higher aspect of function of psyche. This is expressed in the self as a cogniser. Cognition by mind is

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possible only if there is a cogniser and that is considered to be, according to this theory, the prajñā. Indriyas are to be the means of cognising an object by the prajñā. We should bear in mind that in Kaușītakī Upanişad, the sense-organs and mind have been included in the psyche as the man in the sleeping or in an unconscious state does not cognise anything even if the sense-organs are there because the prajñā does not function. Therefore, the functions of these asceceries like the sense-organs and the mind are dependent on the prajñā or the psyche. The man gets up from sleep and he get awake and begins to recognise things. Similarly, if a man is reborn, his experience starts. In these cases, the senseorgans begin to operate and get experiences as fire is born from the spark.%. Man begins to get knowledge. The sense-organs, there. fore, are an aspect and function of the prajñā.3 Without the association with prajñā, sense-organs and the mind cannot function, Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the psyche is distinct from the sense-organs and mind. In the Katha Upanişad,5 we have a description of the grades of reality, one higher than the other. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than mind (manas), mahat (the great) is greater than buddhi, avyakta prakrti (undifferentiated prakrti) is higher than mahat and puruşa is the highest of all; because according to Sarkh ya, the mere presence of puruşa is sufficient to create disturbance in the equilibrium of the three guņas in the prakrti and then the evolution starts. From this, it is clear that the intellect (Vijñāna) is not the characteristic of the attribute of consciousness but it is the attribute of prakrti. From this we can say that in the search for vijñānātmā (i.e., ātman is identical with the jñāna) we arrive at the truth that the ātman is consciousness (cetanāmaya). The consummation of the hierarchy in experience will be the bliss (ānanda) which is the highest point of experience. It is very often suggested that ātman is ānanda. It is ānandamaya.
1 Kausītaki, 3, 8. 2 Ibid., 3, 2. 3 Ibid., 3, 5. 4 Ibid., 3, 7. 5 Katha Up., 1, 3, 10-11.

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CIDATMA (ATMAN AS CIT) 6.2 The Indian philosophers have described the different levels of the self in its experiences starting from annamaya to ānandmaya. These may be considered as the sheaths of ātman. In all these discussions, the outer encrustations of the ātman have been described, but the real nature of the ātman has not been mentioned. The contemplations and the nature of these aspects of ātman have led the philosophers to the conclusion that these different sheaths of ātman are also to be considered as the stages or the states of the self ; for instance annamaya ātma is the bodily self. It is the instrument of experience. It is like the chariot. The charioteer who drives the chariot is that ātman. Without the atman, the bodily functions cannot exist. The body and the self are two different principles. According to the Praśna Upanişad, the prāņa is an expression of the ātman. It arises out of the ātman, as the shadow of the man is due to the man, because he is a physical being, so also prāņa depends on the ātman. Therefore, ātman and the prāņa have to be considered as two different entities although prāņa is an expression of the ātman.
Kenopanişads makes it clear that ātman is distinct from the sense-organs (indriyas) and the mind (manas). In the absence of the atman they cannot function. As the essence of vijñānātmā (intellect) is to be found in the ānandātmā (the bliss). The essence of ānandātmā (bliss) is in the antarātmā, and that is the Brahman. In this sense, the Brahman is the highest reality distinct from the vijñāna and änanda.
Brahman and the ātman are not different, they are identical.5 The names are only different. The Brahman is sometimes described as the highest reality and the Puruşa, and it is the ultimate essence (Güờhatma) of all that is in the universe. The Katha Upanişad considers Buddhi-vijñāna (intellect) as a product of prakrti and there.
1 (a) Maitreyi Up., 2, 3, 4.
(b) Katha Up., 1, 3, 3. 2 Praśnopanişad, 3, 3. 3 Kena Upanişad, 1, 4, 6. 4 Taittiriya Up., 2, 6. 5. Māndūkya Up., - Sarvam hi etadbrahma ayamātmā brahma, 6 Kasha Up., 1, 3, 10-12.

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fore, jada (unconscious). It is possible that the seers of the Upanişads were not satisfied with this aspect of vijñāna, unconscious principle as an aspect of prakrti and proceeded further to find out the ultimate reality. They realised that the highest reality is the Brahman and Brahman is pure conscious. It is ātman and the identity of the Brahman and ātman is the consummation of the monistic theory of thought.
We have also seen that vijñānātman is not self-luminating (svataḥprakāśita). It is a product of prakrti, but it gets illumined in the presence of the puruşa and purşua is self-illumined. It cognises even intellect also. The Brhadāranyaka Upanişad, describes ātman as the higher reality and says that ātman is the cogniser It is aparokşa i.e., it gets direct experience. It grasps the prāna. It experiences through the sense-organs like the eyes and ears. It reflects with the mind. It cognises the knowledge. The self is the seer (draştā), the hearer, the thinker and the knower. It is cinmātra (pure conscious). It is illuminating (sarva prakāśarūpa) and and it is all-shining (jyotisvarüpa).5
The first seekers after the knowledge of the ātman were concerned with understanding the nature of the ātman in materialistic terms. Later the meditation of the ātman lead to the conception that the ātman is the immaterial and spiritual substance. The ātman cannot be grasped by senses. It is possible to know the ātman, if we transcend sense-experience and reach the state of the knowledge of the ātman through the direct experience of intuition. Deep contemplation on ātman is necessary and that is why we find Naciketā went to Yama and sought to know the nature of the self. Yama offerred him the pleasures of the world, but Naciketā was not tempted by the worldly pleasures because his aim was to know the self.6 Maitreyi gave up all wealth that her husband offerred for the sake of
1 Brhadaranyaka, 4, 3, 6-9. Vijñānātmã and prajñānaghana (4, 5,
13) are distinct. The former is prāk rt and later is Puruşa-cetana. 2 Brhadāraṇyaka, 3, 7, 22. 3 Ibid, 3, 4, 1-2. 4 Ibid, 3, 7, 23; 3, 8, 11. 5 Maitreyi Up., 3, 16, 21. 6 Katha Up., 1, 1, 23-29,

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knowledge of the self.1 Yajnavalkya said that all things of this world, all the animals, all the wealth, the son, the wife and the husband are all because of the ätman. It is therefore, necessary to know the ätman. We should meditate on the ātman.2
PRE-VEDIC TRADITION : ŚRAMAŅA CURRENT OF THOUGHT
+3
In this way, the discussion about the nature of the atman has been copious and all the theories regarding the nature of the atman have been discussed in the Upanisads. However, before the composition of the Upanisads, there was, in India the Śramana current of thought which was prevailing much before the Aryans came to India. The Śramana current of thought was full developed and had its own philosophy and it was primarily spiritual and secondarily worldly in outlook. This was the pre-vedic and non-vedic current of the thought. But we find that sufficient attention has not been given to the study of the pre-vedic Śramana current of thought, although the prominent conceptions of this current of thought like nirvāņa and karma and ascetic life have been assimilated in the general stream of Indian thought.
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JANMANTARAVĀDA (THEORY OF RE-BIRTH)
fal.3
There are many schools of philosophy which advocated the reality of infinite number of individual souls. Each of them presented its thought from a specific point of view.
All our activities have their after-effects. These after-effects constitute the karma. The karma has to be exhausted or experienced and there is no escape from it. If it is not possible to exhaust the karma in order to be pure-self in this life, we have to postulate the existence of life after death and a series of life as a consequence of the necessity of explaining the bondage and the destruction of the continuing karma that affects the soul. This has given rise to the theory of rebirth and of the other world. The question was very often asked: 'What would be the nature of the self after the destruction of the body and where would the self go?" On this difficult problem, there
1 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up., 2, 4, 3,
2 Ibid, 4, 5, 6,

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have been different theories of philosophy explaining the needs for the postulate of rebirth and the nature of the self in the cycle of birth and death.
NATURE OF SOUL ACCORDING TO JAINISM
Pandit Sukhalalji says that among those who believe that there are infinite number of independent souls which are all pure and perfect in their original nature the Jaina tradition is first and foremost. Jaina theory of soul is prominent and it has a special contribution to make to the theories of souls propounded in Indian thought. The reasons for this are twofold: (1) Jaina view is based on rationalistic ground and is very much amenable to reason, and (2) The Jaina theory of self has already established itself by the time of the 23rd Tirthaukara Pārsvanatha in the 8th century B. C. The theory crystalised during that period has largely remained the same in its But the Buddhist and Vedic theories were of non-self and have undergone major changes in the centuries that went by.
core.
According to Śramana tradition the nature of soul may be described as follows:
+1.3
1. Jīva is beginngless and endless. It has no beginning nor end. It is indestructible. It is eternal. From the point of view of substance the nature of jiva is pure and perfect and the same in all three phases of time-past, present and future. Therefore, it is eternal (nitya). From the point of view of modification jiva is anitya (temporary) because it undergoes various forms of empirical modifications. Therefore jiva is eternal but jiva as an empirical individual is not eternal.
2. Regarding the description of the empirical self (the saṁsārī jiva), we can say though milk and water, sesamum and the oil, and flower and its fragrance are related, as it seems the relation between the soul and body, but really the position of the soul is like a bird in the cage, like the sword in the sheath and like the sugar in a pitcher. The soul can become independent of the body.
3. One of the characteristic of jīva is contraction and expansion, that it pervades the body that it occupies whether big or small. In the body of the elephant, the soul pervades entire body of the elephant and if it is in the body of ant, it pervades the body of the

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entire ant. However, this characteristic of pervasion in a body, big or small, does not affect the fundamental nature and the number of pradeśas of the soul.
4. As space is formless and as it can be comprehended by its space-giving function, so also jīva is formless, yet we can comprehend the nature of the soul by means of intellect (vijñāna).
5. As time is beginningless and indestructible so is jiva which is bginningless and indestructible.
6. As the earth is the very basis of all things, so is jīva which is the basis of knowledge and experience.
7. As space is undiminishing and constant in all the three times, so is jīva which is indestructible, endless and beyond measure.
8. As the gold can get the form of garland, head-dress (crown) ear-rings, ring etc., but still as the substance of the gold is so also the jīva is the same although it wanders about in the wheel of saṁsāra, in the four forms of existence—the heavenly, the human, lower animal and the hellish stage.
9. As the sun spreads its rays and objects illumined and as the sun moves elsewhere at night and the light is not seen so also the soul that exists with a particular body experiences the life in this existence, and as it leaves this body, and enter another, this experience is no more.
10. As the fragrance of saffron and the lotus flower can be experienced by smell and not by sight so also jīva cannot be seen by the eyes yet we can know the existence of the self through the attribute of knowledge.
11. The music of the instrument can be heard but cannot be seen. In the same way, the jīva in its form cannot be seen. We can also understand the nature of the jīva by means of its characteristics and effects.
12. The ghost and the devils can enter the bodies but they cannot be seen. We can only infer the presence of these by the bodily activities. Similarly, we can know that there is self by observing the psycho-physical activities like laughter, pleasure and pain and bodily activities like dances etc.
13. The food we take is transformed into seven basic elements through chemical composition. Similarly, the particles of matter

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which are fit to be kārmic particle are transformed into kārmic particles (karmavargaņā) which obscure the free function of the soul.
14. Jīva is a source of different forms of energy like knowledge energy (jñānasakti), the energy of the basic power (vīryasakti) and will-power (saṁkalpaśakti).
15. Jīva, through its activity in the empirical world, accumulates sarskāra (mnemic traces) and through the saṁskāra a sūksmaśarīra (subtle body) constituted of material particles. This is called paudgalikasarīra. When the soul gives up one body and enters another in the next life the sūksmaśarīra will be there with it, with the load of mnemic traces of the previous life.?
16. Jīva is formless, but by its accumulated karmas it has acquired a body and through this body it also becomes with form.
17. All jīvas have the same qualities and capacity of development. Yet each jīva develops in different ways owing to several factors like the puruşārtha and other causes.
18. There is nowhere in the world, a place where subtlebodied and gross-bodied souls are not present.
19. Just as the particles of gold are mixed up with the earth in the form of ore, this mixed form of ore has been beginningless. It gets purified and pure gold is extracted with the help of fire. So also the jīva gets purified and reaches the state of perfection through sarvara and ta pasyā etc.
20. Just as it is not possible to decide whether the egg is prior or the hen, so also it is not possible to determine the priority or otherwise of jīva and karma. Both of them co-exist from beginning. less time.
COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH THE
SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW
We have so far discussed the characteristics of jīva from the point of view of Jaina philosophy. We shall now consider the comparative picture of Jaina view with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga view.s
1 Uttarādhyayanasūtra, 28, 11. 2 Tattvārthasūtra, 2, 26. 3 Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā, p. 81.

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1. Jīva from the Jaina point of view is beginningless and endless and it is characterised by consciousness (cetana rūpa). SāṁkhyaYoga also presents a similar view.
2. According to Jainism, jiva pervades the body that it occupies. It had a characteristic of expansion and contraction according to the size of the body. Therefore, it expresses itself in modes. But according to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, jiva is all-pervading and in its characteristic of consciousness, there is no possibility of pariņā. mitya of expressing in the form of modes.
3. According to Jainism there are infinite number of souls and each occupies a particular body. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition also accepts this view.?
4. The Jaina conception of the soul accepts the characteristics of activity and enjoyment (kart stva and bhokt stva) as belonging to the soul. It also says that the pure and the impure forms of attributes are possible due to activity, but the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition does not accept the inherent activity of the soul. According to the Sankhya-Yoga, the puruşa is passive, but it is conscious. Similarly, experiences and enjoyments and substantiality and attributes are not acceptible to the Samkhya-Yoga.3
5. The Jainas have advocated a theory that jīva acquires in its empirical, existence the mnemic traces (saṁskāras), which form the subtle body in terms of material particles. This subtle body moves along with the jīva into the next life. In the same way, in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition, puruşa itself has no attachments nor the consequential attributes of cetana. It is pure, unattached and it is not directly involved in the activity and the enjoyment. For the sake of explaining the continuity in the future life, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga also posits a subtle body (Sūksmaśarīra) which moves with the soul and which has the characteristic of pervading the body and experiencing the fruits of the karmas. This is pratipuruṣa In short, as the Jainas maintain the variety of expression of cetana in the empirical form so also the Sāṁkhya-Yoga accepts the subtle modes embodied in the principle of buddhi or lingā sarīra which is a product of prakrti. 1 Sāṁkhyakārikā 10, 1, 17, 2 Ibid, 18 3 Sāṁkh yakārikā 19, 20. 4 (a) Sāṁkhyakārikā 40.
() Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā, p. 83.

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6. The Jaina view of the soul is that the soul ls formless. But it appears to have form due to karmic encrustations and the subtle body. But the Samkhya-Yoga thinks that the soul is formless and the forms of the individual soul are due to the subtle and the gross bodies which are products of prakṛti. The illusion of a form arises due to the fact that the impressions received through the sense-organs are reflected in the soul and the soul therefore reflects it back. Just as space has no form, yet we, through our reflection, imagine the form of space. Similarly, the soul expresses the relection that give rise to forms.1
7. According to Jainism, the soul is the source of infinite energy, and the energy of knowledge, of will and of power, but in the Samkhya-Yoga we find these forces are attributed not to consciousness which is the essence of the soul, but to the subtle body which is the form of buddhi and buddhi is the product of prakṛti.2
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8. According to Jainism all the jīvas have the same capacity and the same energy, but personality distinctions are due to the differences in the puruşartha and other causes. In the Samkhya-Yoga also the difference in the personality development are traced to the Sūkṣma sarira which is the form of buddhi and the buddhi is the propuct of prakṛti. In its real nature each soul is equal.
COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH NYAYA-VAISEṢIKA VIEW
The Jainas and the Samkhya-Yoga tradition have presented a theory of the soul in which we find the nature of the soul as independent and consciousness. Consciousness is the essence of the soul. Similarly Nyaya-Vaiśeşika theory has given an independent view of the soul. Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, like the Samkhya-Yoga, accept the reality of the soul and its independence from the body. Souls are infinite in number and they are beginningless. They are eternal. They are spiritual substances. However, Nyaya-Vaiseşika does not accepts the Jaina characteristic of the soul as pervading the body, but it maintains that soul is all-pervasive like the views of the Samkhya.1 The Nyaya-Vaiseşika does not accept the characteristic of the expansion and contraction according to the needs of the body that the
1 Samkhyakārikā 62.
2 Samkhyakārikā 40.
3 Vaiseṣika Darśana 3, 2, 20; 3, 2, 21.
4 Vaisesika Darśana 7, 1, 22-Vibhavanmahānākāśastathā cātmā.

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soul possesses, but like the Samkhya-Yoga it says that from the substance point of view, the soul is kūțastha nityal. However, in some points regarding the characteristic of the soul like the substance, attributes and characteristics, the Nyāya-Yaisesika comes nearer Jaina view. The Sarkhya-Yoga says that soul is consciousness and has no attributes. But the Nyāya-Vaisesika like the Jainas accepts the possibility in the empirical sense. The soul is receptacle of many butes and modes. In the Jaina point of view the soul is considered to be a source of many powers but in the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, we do not find this view. However, the psychic states like knowledge, pleasure, pain, will, desire, hatred, dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) are all considered to be the attributes of the soul. These attributes are operative and they exist as long as the body exists. They arise and they are destroyed. However, these qualities are inherent in the psychic states of the jīva as expressed in the jñāna and darśana. According to the Jainas the predominent theory is that in the state of perfection jīva is consciousness, and has the characteristic of bliss (ānanda) and power (vīrya) and knowledge (jñāna), but in the NyāyaVaiệesika the consciousness is only an attribute of the soul and as such in the highest state of perfection consciousness cannot exist with the soul. It is analogus to unconscious states. Nor has the soul any other characteristic in the perfect state. The fundamental reason is that the Nyāya-Vaiseșika does not accept consciousness as the essence of the soul. It is only a quality, but the view of Jainas and of the Sārkhya-Yoga maintain that consciousness is the essence of the soul and according to them the soul is characterised by consci. ousness. The soul is consciousness. But according to Nyāya-Vaisesika, consciousness is the quality of the soul. Soul has consciousness; and hence in the highest state of perfection, the soul is unconsciousness
1 Prašasta pādabhāşya, Dravyasādharmya Prakarana
“Anāśritattvānityattve canyatrāva yavidravyebhyaḥ." 2 (a) Vaiseșika darśana 3, 2, 4 ; 5, 3, 5; 9, 3, 6.
(6) Prasastapādabhāşyagata Ātmanirūpaņa. 3 (a) Nyāyabhāşya 1, 22.
(b) Introduction to Ganadharavāda p. 105, Dalsukha Mālavaniā. (c) Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā—Pandit Sukhalālji, p. 86.

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Nyāya-Veisesika darśana has certain differences in the consideration about the nature of consciousness with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, as there are some similarities also. Sāmkhya maintains that self is consciousness, pure and simple, it is self-illuminating. It is free from the modifications like the modes of consciousness which do not really affect the true nature of consciousness. The modes of mental states are due to the reflection of the states in consciousness and in the self. In the highest state of perfection consciousness is free from the states like knowledge and feeling etc., which are mere modes without affecting the consciousness. Similarly, Nyāya-Vaisesika considers consciousness and modes as qualities of the self and self as only a substratum of the qualities. In the highest state, self is free from consciousness. Therefore, in the state of liberation (Mukti), the self is free from any attributes or modes. The same interpretation could be given in the case of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, although the Sārnkhya-Yoga believes that consciousness is the essence of the soul. In this sense, the Nyāya-Vaišesika conception of self in the state of liberation could be considered free from any qualities like space (ākāśa) with this difference that ākāśa is formless but it belongs to the empirical world. While soul is amūrta (formless) but not belonging to the empirical existence (bhautika). There appears to be no difference between the liberated soul and ākāśa, as there is absence of any quality or mode of consciousness in both. However, akāśa is a substance (dravya) and mukta jiva (liberated soul) is endless (ananta). There is only the denominational difference. There is no other difference between ākāśa and jīva.
Nyāya-Vaiseșika thought has similarities and differences with the Jaina and Sankhya-Yoga systems of thought. The Jainas maintain that jīva has the inherent characteristics of enjoyment (bhokt stva) and activity (kart rtva). According to the Jaina view, these characteristics are very much present even in the liberated state. But the Nyāya-Vaiseșika does not accept the presence of the characteristics of enjoyment (Bhokt rtva) and activity (Kart rtva) in the state of liberation, although they do admit the presence of these characteristics in the empirical state of the jīva. According to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, the states of consciousness like knowledge, will, etc., take their origin and are destroyed when in contact with the body (śarīra) and the jīva 1 Sanmatitarka, 3, 55.

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expresses the characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktṛtva) and activity (kartṛtva) only in relation to the body. In the liberated state these characteristics are absent. In this respect, the Nyaya-Vaiśeşika comes nearer to the Samkhya conception of self as consciousness.

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tent.
According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktṛtva) and activity (kartṛtva) of the soul are different in conThe jiva is eternal but is characterised in its very nature by the attributes of enjoyment and activity. The attributes of enjoyment and activity have association with the phenomena of origin and destruction. The jīva expresses modes of knowledge (jñāna), will (icchā) and activity (prayatna), and with the presence of these modes the jiva is considered as possessing the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. But in the liberated state, there is the total absence of the modes of knowledge, will and activity and, therefore, the jiva is not characterised by the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. These are totally absent in the liberated state. In this sense, the Nyāya-Vaiseşika makes a distinction between the jiva as substance and jīva in the empirical state as expressing the mental modes. From the point of view of ultimate existence jīva is nitya (eternal) but from the empirical point of view, jīva is active and is the enjoyer of the experiences. In this sense, they differ from the Jaina conception of jīva as having the inherent characteristics of enjoyment and activity. The fundamental principle involved would be the consideration of the Nyaya-Vaiseşika view that the substance is different from the The Samkhya-Yoga darśana does not accept the presence of attributes in the purușa. Puruşa is consciousness, but consciousness is not a quality of jīva as the Nyaya-Vaiseşika considers it to be. Consciousness is the essence of puruşa and does possesses the attributes. However, in both the systems of thought, the eternity of the soul is established from different stand-points. The Samkhya-Yoga takes the stand that the soul is eternal because it is pure consciousness and the mental states are only modes not connected as essential characteristics of the soul. The Nyaya-Vaiseşika considers the soul to be eternal because it is the substance and in this eternal sense as the substratum of qualities. Consciousness and its modes are only qualities of the soul and hence different from the soul.
attributes.
1 Nyāyavārtika, 3, 1, 6.

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The Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, like the Jainas accept the view that jīva is affected by the auspicious and inauspicious effects of activity through samskāra (the mnemic mass). The Jainas maintain that the after-effects are absorbed by the subtle body (the sukṣma sarira) which is empirical in existence. But the Nyaya-Vaiśeşika considers the manas as atomic in nature. The jiva being all-pervasive is not able to grasp the knowledge. It is the mind, which is atomic in nature, functions as the instrument of knowledge. The jīva has this atomic mind (paramāņu manas) when the jīva gives up one body and takes into another in the succeedining life, takes the other body also. According to the Jainas, it is, the sūkṣma śarīra (the subtle body) which goes with soul and enters into the body in the next life.
Samkhya-Yoga darșana postulates a sūkṣma-linga-śarīra (subtle body) which is the repository of the good and evil and their effects. It has the capacity of pervading the body it occupies. It is this Sūkṣma-linga-sarīra which goes along with the pure soul from one body into another in the next life.1 The Nyaya-Vaiseṣika presents its theory of after-life (punarjanma) in terms of its conception of the atomic view mind (paramāņu manas). The Jainas say thal jīva moves into the next life with the sukṣmasarīra with its characteristics of enjoyment and activity. According to the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, as also Samkhya-Yoga, there is no possibility of activity in the pure soul, these are accidental qualities and modes. But in the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, we find that there is the conception of the effect of the good and evil on the rise and fall of the states of jiva. It does not accept the Samkhya-Yoga conception of the impact of the good and evil on the Sukṣma-lingaśarīra and is only, as the Samkhya-Yoga says that we attribute the direct effect of these characteristics on soul.
THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF NATURE OF THE SOUL
Inh order to understand the views of the Buddha about the nature of soul, we should analyse the Buddhist view of the concept of non-self in the historical perspective.
Prior to the Buddha and during his time, there were two views regarding the nature of the soul: (i) The Atman is eternal and is not
1 (a) Nyāyavārtika 3, 2, 68.
(b) Gaṇadharavada, p. 121 (Introduction)
(c) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 89 (footnote) Pandit Sukhalalji.

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affected by any modes of time and empirical adjuncts; (ii) The second view was that the Ātman although permanent is affected by the empirical adjuncts. According to first view, the Ātman remains pure and perfect, unaffected by any psycho-physical modes in time - past, future and present. The second view, while accepting the Atman as the eternal principle, does accept the possible influences on the nature of the Atman by the empirical modes. Both these views, have one common factor of accepting the conception of Ātman as the permanent substance The Buddha was against the views of the eternity
tman. What you call self is merely an aggregate of physical and mental states. It is the sanghāta (aggregate) of the nāma (mental) and the rūpa (the physical states). It is nāma-rūpa. We have seen that the physical and mental states forming the ego (nāma-rūpa) are constituted of rūpa (physical states), sarskāra (mnemic mass), saṁjñā (congnition), vedanā (affective states) and vijñāna (psychic energy). There is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Every moment, there is change. What I am this moment, next moment I am not. This kind of description of the Buddha's view of the soul was considered Anātmavāda. It is difficult to say whether he denied the existence of a permanent self as the eternal or whether he refused to accept the empirical personality as a permanent entity. There has been a controversy over this problem. However, it is necessary to note that the basic attitude of the Buddha was 'sarvam Prahak'-everything is fleeting. The Buddha was considered as the "Nairātm yavādin' one who denied the existence of a permanent soul. The Buddha did not however accept the materialistic conception of
pul, as constituted if the material elements as presented by the 'lokāyata' view. He followed the middle path (madhyama märga). He accepted the concepts of rebirth, (punarjanma), karma, puruşārtha (fundamental values) and mokşa (liberation). In this sense, the Buddha did recognise that the concepts of Ātman, jiva and consciousness (cetanā) have important place in the system of thought, that he preached.
However, it would be a truism to say the schools of philosophy like, the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Jainism presented a definite view-point on the concept of the Atman. But Buddhism did not give a definite view of the self. Careful study of the development of Buddhist thought shows that there were five different streams of thought in the Buddhist view of the nature of soul

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1. Pudgala-nairātmyavāda (materialistic conception of non
soul)
2. Pudgalāstivada (the materialistic view of the soul)
3. Traikälika dharmavāda (theory of elements) and Vartamānika dharmavāda (the theory of momentary elements).
4. Dharmanairat nya-niḥsvabhāvatā or Sunyavāda (theory of Śunya).
5. Vijnaptimātratāvāda (theory of consciousess as soul.)1
All these theories have been fundamentally based on the important tenets that the Buddha preached in his conceptions of the four Noble Truths and the eight-fold path. They draw their inspiration from the Buddha's primary concern for freedom, misery and the spiritual values.
PUDGALA NAIRATMYAVADA
A.
In the Tripitakas there is the mention of the clear view that ātman is merely an aggregate of the skandha of physical and mental states. The mental states are constituted of vedana (feeling), saṁjñā (congnition), samskāra (mnemic mass) and vijñāna (the psychic energy). These undergo modifications and the chain of modification is called sanghāta. It is the flow of the modes of mental phenomena. All these are called nāma. Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad3 mentions the term namarūpa and there, it is suggested that the very nature of the principle expresses its nature and its modes. According to Buddha, however, there is no basic principle like nama-rupa and rūpa-nāma are the expressions of physical and psychic states. The Buddha says that there is a constant flow of the mental states like the vedanā, saṁjñā, and vijñāna. For this flow, there is neither the beginning nor the end. This is based upon and centred round the conception of the pudgala and therefore it is called nairatmyavāda.
1 Refer for the three views of Buddhistic Metaphysics-Buddhist Logic, Vol. 1, pp. 3-14, also Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 26. 2 Visuddhimaggo-khandhaniddesa, 14.
3 Bṛhadaranyaka Up., 1, 4, 7.-tadvedam tarhya vyāk ṛtamāsīt tannāmarūpābhyāmeva vyākriyata.

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4.3
PUDGALĀSTIVĀDA
The Buddhist sangha was against the conception of the permanence of the soul and the philosopher refuted the argument for the conception of the permanence of the soul, but after sometime those who believed in the permanence of the soul coming from the Brahmanic tradition joined the Buddhist sangha. They gave a new orientation to the Buddhist conception of nairatmyavāda in the light of their original predilections of the sasvata ātmavāda. They based their conception on the materialistic theory of the self. Kathāvatthu and Tattvasangraha have mentioned this kind of a theory of the permanence of the soul as a polemic against the Buddhist view of atmavāda.1 These pudgalvädins maintain that the jiva is of a material nature. When they were asked whether the jiva has form like the material objects they were not able to accept this view. The Pudgalăstivada entered the Buddhist sangha but as it was not consistent with the main concept of the Buddhist view as expressed in the ätmavāda, this theory lost its importance and remained only in name.
11 3
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The Pudgalaniratmyavādins had to perform a two-fold function: (1) It had to defend itself against the atmavādins and to show that there is no permanent self. (ii) Yet this theory had to accommodate the conception of the rebirth, bandha (bondage) and moşka (liberation). This gave rise to the theory of sarvästivada. According to this theory, the mental states designed as näma were referred to as 'citta' and it expresses itself in vedanā, saṁjñā, saṁskāra and vijñāna. These constitute the aggregate and the aggregate is in flux. These are included as dharma (elements). This theory had to defend on the basic stand of kṣaṇikavāda. Accordingly, the sarvästivädins presented the modes of 'citta' as flowing in three durations of time and presented the traikālikatā 2 But there appeared to be 1 Abhidharmadipa & notes, p. 254 ff.
(a) kaḥ punaratra samyujyate? (p. 254),...paudgalisyāpi avyākṛtavastuvādinaḥ pudgaloăpi dravyatoăstīti (p. 258)...nagnāțapakşe prakseptavyāḥ (p. 259).
(b) Tattvasan graha, kārikā 336.
2 (a) Tattvasangraha me Traikālika Parikṣā, kārikā 1786, p. 503. (b) Abhidharmdīpa-tippaņa sahita kārikā 299, p. 250.

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inconsistency with the original Buddhist conception of reality as impermanent and fleeting and is consigned to present only (värtamānika). By introducing the conception of vārtmānika to the moments of the present. The efforts to reconcile these views gave rise to the theory of sautrāntikavāda. The sautrāntikavāda accepted the sarvāstivāda conception of "citta' (mental) and caitasika (mental states). But they made them referring to the present moments only (vārtumānika). In this way, they tried to make the reality a flux, yet accepting tbe mental states of sarvāstikavādin as elements. DHARMANAIRATMAYANIHSVABHAVATĀ OR ŠUNYAVADA I
This was the age of vigorous philosophical discussions. Philosophical disputations were very prominent in this age. Some philosophers propounded the theory of being (sat); others refuted the arguments of this theory and enunciated the theory of nonbeing (asar). Still others presented the theory of the being and the non-being. In this way the permanent, the imperinanent, the one and the many and similar problems were discussed vigorously by the philosophers in this age. Nāgārjuna came to realise that the Buddha's catuṣkoți (four-fold predications) was not very useful for providing the philosophical basis for nairātmyavāda. Therefore, he presented a theory of Śüyavāda. The interpretation of the ośün ya' has been various. Some have suggested that śünya is the void. But some others have suggested that Nāgārjuna could not have considered the reality as the void because he was originally trained in the dvaitic conception of reality, as he was brought up in the upanişadic tradition. Therefore, they say that Nāgārjuna's šūnya is not the void, it is the ultimate reality which is unspeakable and inexpressible. However, as Nāgārjuna was converted to Buddhism and as he became the vigorous exponent of the nairātmyavāda and the theory of reality as momentary, it cannot be said that Nāgārjuna presented the absolutist view-point. Nāgārjuna's Śünyavāda did not in anyway refute the rationalistic and a spiritualistic conception of reality and the theory of evolution. VIJNAPTIMATRATAVĀDA V
After śünyavāda, comes Yogācāra. According to the Yogācāra school, Śünyavāda does not systematically consider any of the Buddhistic theory, but the Buddha's conception of nāma was primarily concerned with mental states. It is centred round vijñāna. There

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fore, according to the Yogācāra, reality is mostly mental in nature. It is vijñāna, and ātman is the expression of vijñāna, although there is no permanent Ātma. Vijñānavādins are generally considered to be a subjective idealists who give prominence to mental states and to the external works. The mental states are real and external world is only an expression of mental states. Vijñänavādins had to posit an objective conception of the storehouse of consciousness. It is ālayavijñāna.
In this way, we find discussion of the conception of self from different stages and gradually it has reached the idealistic position of the conception of the self as we find in the vijñānavāda. In this, the self is primarily mental and expressing mental states. Eminent philosophers like Dharmakirti, śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla tried to present this idealistic conception of the self in terms of vijñāna, yet not deviating from the original stand of Kșanikavāda.1
In the Buddhist tradition, all the schools of thought have presented their own views concerning the soul as cittasantāna' (the stream of consciousness). The vijñāna-advaitavādins maintain that there is nothing except vijñāna and the self is considered as a stream of mental states and self that is real. The physical states are subsummed under the general conception of vijñāna.2
In the Buddhist philosophy there is no discussion about the specific relation of citta vijñānasantati or Jiva. We cannot, therefore, say whether self have any reference to the states of bodily existence, however in some of the works like Visuddhimaggo there are reference to the bodily states and it is possible that the mental states like the pleasure and pain have relation to bodily states,
We have already said that in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Jaina thought and others there is a view that in the rebirth the Sūkşmaśarīra moves from one body to the other. Similar description we find in the Digghaknikāya about the gandharya. The description goes th who wants to go from one life to the other after death, has to wait for seven days with gandharva. In the kathāvatthu there is a discu.
1 (a) Pramānavārtika 2, 327.
(b) Tattvasangraha kī hahirarthaparikşā, pp. 550-82. 2 Santānāntara Siddhi Dharmakirti has discussed it in this book, 3 Visuddhimaggo-14, 60; 17, 163,

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ssion about the inner life in relation to the conception of gandharva. Similarly, in some other works and in the writings of Vasubandhu and other Vaibhāṣikas there is mention of transmigration from one body to the other1. It is like the subtle body. In Theravādī Buddhaghosa there is no mention of the subtle body (antarābhavasarīra). He has given certain examples of the movement of consciousness from one body to the other.2
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
3
UPANIŞADIC THOUGHT
In the Upanisadic tradition we do not get a uniformity of views regarding the nature of the self. Sometimes even in one Upanisad, we find the mention of different views, regarding the conception of the self. For this reason, those who have speculated on the nature of the self have presented various views. Badarāyaṇa wrote the Brahmasutra and in the Brahmasutra, we find the mention of various views of the self as presented by the ancient seers. Brahmasutra became a very important work like the Upanisads and several commentaries on that were written. But unfortunately all the commentaries are not available today. Śamkrācārya wrote a commentary on the Brahmasutra and presented Māyāvāda (theory of Appearance). But those who did not accept Māyāväda wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra and presented their own interpretations of the Brahmasutra refuting the Māyāvāda. Among them may be mentioned the Acaryas like Bhaskara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. These Acaryas presented different views in their commentaries but the basic uniformity of their presentation was that they all refuted the argument of māyāvāda and said that jīva is real as the Brahman is real. Jīva is different from the body. It is eternal and is imperishable. Śamkarācārya while presenting his māyāvāda based his argument on the Upanisadic teachings. Pandit Sukhalāljī has analysed the Upanisadic streams of thought as presented by these writers into three states, as 1. Samkara's Advaita. 2. Madhvācāryas Dvaita and 3. the Vedic interpretations of other Acaryas.3
Samkara said Brahman is real. It is the ultimate reality and all other things are appearances. The differentiations of Jīvas in the
1 Abhidharmadīpa, p. 142 with notes. 2 (a) Visuddhimaggo, 17-163 (b) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 99. 3 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 100.

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99 empirical existence are not real but are only appearance caused due to avidyā. Everything is Brahman, and jiva and the distinctions between the jīvas are not real distinctions. The Brahman and the atman are identical, 'Ahar brahmāsmi'.1 Madhvācārya's conception of reality was different from that of Samkarācārya. His was dualistic conception of reality. Brahman is real, jīva is also real. Jiva is not merely an appearance. Brahman and Atman are both equally real. There are innumerable jīvas. They are all eternal.
Bhāskara and other Ācāryas have maintained that jīvas are real. They are the consequential expressions of the Brahman. It may be said that they are the products of the Brahman. They are expressions of the Brahman, therefore, they cannot become an appearance.
In the Mahābhārata, there are three views of the conception of the jīvas based on the Särirkhya philosophy: (1) There are of 24 principles (24 tartvarādi) (2) those who maintain an independent eternal Puruşa still belonging to the 24 principles theory, i.e., 25 tattyavādī, and (3) those who maintain that puruşa is different from Brahman and belonging to the chavvisatartvavāda' i. e. 26 Tattvavādi.
It appears that ancient philosophers discussed these three streams of thought and the discussions were mainly based on the Upanişadic thought. In brief, the philosophical discussions concerning the trature of the self based on the Upanisadic tradition can be summari. sed into some forms of philosophy as (1) kevalādvaita (2) sat yopādhi. advaita (3) visiştādvaita (4) dvaitādvaita (5) avibhāgādvaita (6) suddhadvaita (7) Acintya bhedābheda and such other various forms. In general, we have exponents of the Advaita and Dvaitavada including Rāmānuja's Visiştādvaita.
Šamkara presented kevaladvaita. According to him, Brahman is the only reality. All else is appearance. The world is an appearance. Brahman is the ultimate reality and phenomenal world is only an appearance. According to him, the empirical individual soul is not an independent reality. It is only the phenomenal state of the atman. Aman and the Brahman are identical and the phenomenal reality of the ātman is due to avidyā and ābhāsa. Samkara takes recourse to the conceptions of māyā, avidyā aad ābhāsa for explaining the pheno
1 (a) Brahma Siddhi, p. 9–Jivobrahmiva nā parah.'
(b) Dr. C.D. Sharma : Bauddhadarśana and Vedānta, p. 234,

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menal world. He makes a distinction between the different levels of thought like the dream state, the waking state, the dreamless sleep and the turiya. These views are based on the upaniṣadic concept.
Appaya Dikṣita has written a commentary called Siddhānta LeśaSangraha on Vedanta Siddhanta Suktimañjarī. In this, he has given a commentary of the various views regarding the relation of the Brahman and ātman according to the kevaladvaita (pure advaita) strain of thought. Some of the views may be mentioned as follows: PRATIBIMBAVĀDA +
.5
Swami Vidyaranya and the commentators have given explanations about the relation between the Brahman and the jīva according to their stand-points. One of the prominent views is that the jīva is the reflection of the Brahman (the image of the Brahman)... This reflection is considered by some as un-understandable (avidyagata), as the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇa) by others and as based upon ignorance (ājñānagata) by still others.1
AVACCHEDAVĀDA + 3
Some commentators have used the term avaccheda in place of pratibimba and they maintain that the Brahman is not reflected in the antaḥkarana (inner sense), but jīva is an expression of the antaḥkaraṇa.2
BRAHMA-JIVAVĀDA
+3
According to this view, Jiva is neither the reflection of the Brahman nor its avaccheda', but the reality of the Jiva is due to avidya and the Brahman is due to vidya.3
In this way, there are important conceptions regarding the relation of the Jiva to the Brahman in the kevaladvaita as: (1) pratibimbavāda (2) Avacchedavāda and (3) Brahmābhedavāda.
Regarding the number of jīvas, there is no unanimity among
1 Vedāntasūktimañjarī, I paricheda, kārikā, 28-40. 2 Ibid. 41.
3 Ibid, 42.
4 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 104.

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the kevaladvaitins. According to some jiva is considered to be and the body with the jiva is living-body and others are non-living. Some others maintain that jiva is one, still other bodies are equally living and still other thinkers say that there are many jivas.1 These views have been briefly mentioned by Sadananda in the Vedantasära and Madhusudana Sarasvati in the Siddhantab indu.
101
According to Bhaskara, Brahman due to infinite variety of energy, expresses itself in the form of jivas as also in the form of the world. Jiva is the effect of the Brahman and as such it has functional truth. The Brahman is one, but its effects are many. There is no inconsistency between the concepts of unity and diversity. Just as the one ocean manifests itself into infinite number of waves, so also one Brahman manifests himself into the infinite soul jīvas. With removal of ignorance one realises that Brahman is one and the jīvas which appear to be atomic in nature are the same as Brahman.
one
Rāmānuja has presented the Visiṣṭädvaita theory. He said that the Brahman is real and the jivas are equally real. Jīvas are like the world which is the manifested Brahman, are also manifested in form. The unmanifested Brahman is manifested as the world and as the jīvas. The unmanifested psychic energy (citśakti) expresses itself in the form of manifested jivas and the source is the unmanifested Brahman which is Brahmanārāyāṇa.
Acarya Nimbarka said that the Brahman is one and undivided, simple and perfect, yet the jivas are the effects of the Brahman. Nimbārka has presented the theory of Bhedabheda (identity and difference). It is therefore called Dvaitadvaita, (the one and the dual). The one wind expresses itself in many forms, similarly, the one Brahman manifests itself into many jivas. These jīvas are equally real.
Vijñānabhikṣu says that puruşa is independent and beginningless like prakriti but not different from the Brahman, This view is called "avibhāgadvaita" (undifferentiated advaita).

Acarya Vallabha presents the pure Suddhadvaita. According to him, the world and the jiva are the phenomenal effects of the BrahThese effects are due to lila (magic or play). And the Brahman is pure and simple. It is a reality.
man.
1 Vedanta sūkti mañjarī, kārikā, 43-44

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A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Caitanya accepts the "acintyabhedabheda". The Brahman manjfests in different jīvas due to the inherent jiva sakti (the inherent energy of the soul). Jivas are both identical to and also different from the Brahman. This relation is beyond the speculation (acix. taniya).
Philosophers from Bhaskara to Caitanya bave considered jiva as atomic in pature. When the jīva removes ignorance by means of jñāna (kpowledge) and bhakti (devotion), then the jīva attains liberation. All these ācāryas are believers in the atomic nature of the soul (apujivavādi.) They maintain that rebirth is possible by means of the subtle bodies (Sükşmaśarīra).
Madhya is Vedāntin, but he does not believe in the theory of non-dualism (advaita) and non-difference (abheda). He maintains, on the authority of upanişadic tradition, that jīva is atomic in nature. There are infinite number of jīvas. They are eternal and real. They are not the effects of the Parabrahman, nor are they part of Brahman. When the jīva removes the ignorance, it realises the authority (svā. mitva) of the Brahman or Vişnı.
The Śaiva's do not accept the authority of the Veda or the Vedānta. They accept the pratyabhijñā darsana. They base their arguments on the pratyabhijñā. According to them, parabrahma is Śiva. Nothing else is greater than Śiva. The parabrahma or Śiva is the highest reality and by his will, he creates infinite number of jīvas and the world. From the point of view tattva (principles) jīva and siva are not different.
According to the upanişads and Bhagavadgitā, åtman is different from the body different from the manas. It pervades entire universe. It is not the effect of anything (avikārya)" and it is indescribable in words 6 The things (avikāryas) and the description of the 1 Kathopanişad 2, 15, 18-"na hanyate hanyamāne sarīre" 2 (a) Kathopanişad, 2, 3, 7, 80—The mind is superior to the sepse
organs, buddhi superior to the manas, mahat greater than byddhi, avaykta greater than mahat and puruga greater than ayyakta, Puruşa is pervasive (vyāpaka) and alinga (without
sex). (b) Kathopanişad 1, 3, 10, 11-There is nothing greater than puruşa. 3 Iša Upanişad-- śāvāsyamidam sarvam yatkinca jagatyām jagat. 4 Bhagavadgitā, 2-25, 5 Taittiriya Upanişd, 2, 4

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Brahman can only be in the negative as “neti-neti'.1 The Brahman is neither gross nor atomic, neither small nor large, neither water nor any liquid, neither shadow por darkness, neither wind nor ākāśa, neither the aggregate nor having qualities like taste, smell, neither eye nor speech nor mind. It is neither light nor prāna (life force). It is not mouth. It is neither in or out.
t 5 SIZE OF THE SOUL (PARIMĀŅA)
In the Upanişads we get different views regarding the size of the soul. It has been said that the ātman which is manomaya is within the heart and is of the size of grain of rice.
There is a view which says at the size of ātman is equal to the distance of the top of thumb to ihu tip of fore-finger. 4
The ātman is considered to be pervading the body.5 There is another view which says that ātman is all pervading.
There is another view which says that the ātman as residing in the heart and which is greater than the earth, than the space, than the world and in fact greater than all the universe.?
According to the Jainas, the jīva is eternal and has no end. Every jīva pervades infinite points of space. It has the capacity of pervasion. At the time of Kerali samudghāta the ātman pervades the entire universe for some time and at the time of the death of mundane soul pervades partially, and has infinite pradeśas.
The dharma, adharma, lokākāśa and jīva occupy equal number of space, points but from the point of view of measurement they do not occupy the equal number of space-points. Dharma, Adharma and Lokākāśa, are receptive and they do not express any qualities of action and reaction and there is no effect of any type. Sansārī jīvas 1 Brhadāranyaka Upanişad 4, 5, 15-Sa Esa Neti-Neti. 2 Brhadāraṇyaka Upanişad 3, 9, 8. 3 Ibid, 5 6. 4 Chandogya Up. 5, 18, 1-Pradeśa mātram. 5 Kausītaki Up. 35, 4, 20 Eşa prajñātmā idam-śarīramanu praviştah. 6 Mundaka Up. 1, 1, 6.–Sarvagataḥ 7 Chandog ya Up. 3, 14, 3. 8 Bhagavati 2, 10-Jivätthikāye-loye, loyamette, loyappamāne. 9 Bhaghavati 6, 6, 17.

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receive pudgala, they show activity and their effects are not uniform. Due to the accrusion of material particles like the kārmic particles, jīvas express expansion and contraction. Yet they are atomic jp nature also and except in the case of the state of kevalin samudghāta, they do not become all-pervasive. Therefore, the jīvas are called as of madhyama-parimāņa in the sense they have intermediate size.
It should be noted that the attributes of expansion and contraction do not really belong to the nature of the soul. The attributes are ascribed to the kārmic bodies. Due to the accretion of kārmic particles jīvas occupy a particular size of the body. And the effects of this type of pervasion of the body in a particular size is due to the kärmic body. The largeness or smallness of the kārmic body is due to the four directions (gati). In the liberated state these characteristics are absent.
The capacity of the jīva of pervading the entire body that it occupies is likened to the capacity of the light of the lamp which pervades the entire room big or small. As the light of the lamp illu. mines the room which is big or small, so the jīva pervades the entire hody big or small. This pervasion is possible due to the kārmic body.
The jīva which occupies the body of a small child, occupies the body of a youth, and also the body of an old man. The soul which pervades a huge body can also contain itself in smallest of the bodies, the body of an insect.
x? CHARACTERISTIC OF JIVA
From the noumenal point of view, jīva has the characteristic of cetanā (the light of consciousness). All jīvas have this characteristic of cetana (the light of consciousness), and it is the inherent characteristic of the jīva. But the development of the jīva differ in each individual case according to its capacity and on the basis of the intensity of the kārmic encrustations. Similarly, the development of jīva depends on the extent of knowledge based on the removal of knowledge-obscuring karma. In describing the distinction between jīva and ajīva it has been said that all the jīvas, however in the lowest Possible stage of development, possess an infinite part of kevalajñāna

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(omniscient knowledge). If that part of omniscience is also covered by the kārmic particles, it would become ajīva, but such a contingency never arise.
From the phenomenal point of view, jīva has the characteristic of growih, of intelligence and a state of existence like animal state etc. A machine can be made to eat food but it cannot make use of the digested food for its own development. There may be some machines which are self-controlled; for instance, a tarpedo has the capacity of moving on its own energy, but these machines cannot be produced by other machines nor do they produce such machines. They can be used. There is not a single machine which is self-skilled and self-producing. A railway train, for instance, can take tonnes of luggage and move, but it cannot fly like a bird. A bird has psychic energy which train or the machine does not possess. Therefore, the psychic energy is the criterion of distinguishing a living soul from non-living object.
MUKTA AND SAMSARI JIVA H 3
Jivas have been classified into two types as (1) mukta (liberated) and (2) saṁsāri (empirical jīvas). Both the types of jīvas are infinite in number. The sarsārī jīvas are to be classified into six types on the basis of the nature of the body they possess, as (1) Prthvīkāya (earth-bodied), (2) apkāya (water-bodied), (3) Tejaskāya (fire-bodied) (4) vāyukāya (air-bodied), (5) vanaspatikāya (vegetable kingdom) and (6) trasakāya (beings can move).
Except the trasakāya jīvas the other 5 types of jīvas can be distinguished into (1) gross (bādara) and (2) subtle (sükşma). The universe is filled with subtle jīvas. The gross-bodied beings cannot live without any support like the body and they reside in some parts of the universe. The number of the living beings which are earthbodied has been described with an analogy. If the living beings, contained in a lump of earth of the size of a fruit (āvalā), and if each living being were to get the body of the size of the dove, then the population of all the living beings in the lump will overflow the one lakh yojana of the jambūdvīpa.? 1 Nandīsūtra. 2 Addāămalagupamāne pudhavīkāe havanti je jīva.
Te pārevayamittà jambūdīve na māïnti.

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If the living beings contained in a drop of water were each to get a body of the size of a grain of sesamum, then they will overflow the jambūdvīpa.1
The living beings contained in a spark (cingārī) were each to get the body of the size of a small egg of louse (likha) then the jambüdvipa will be over-populated.2
The living beings contained in a fraction of air which moves a leaf of a margosa tree were to get the body of a tiny grain of khasakhasa then jāmbūdvīpa will be over-populated.
BODY AND SELF (ŚARIRA AND ATMAN)
The problem of the relation of the body and soul has been an important problem in philosophy. Three theories explaining the relation between the two have been presented :
1. Materialistic view which may be described as “Epiphenomenalism' used in describing the relation between body and mind.
2. Parallelism, and 3. Interactionalism.
Epiphenomenalism tried to dispense with mind and soul as an independent reality and make them a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. Consciousness (Cetanā) is the product of the metabolic changes in the brain cells. As the function of intestines is is digestion, the function of the lungs is breathing so is the function of cerebrum is consciousness. It is also considered as function a by. product of the chemical changes in the cerebrum. There is nothing like Atman or the consciousness as a separate reality.
The Atmavādins, i.e., those who advocate the reality of the Ātman as different from the body or the mind refute the arguments of the epiphenomenalists by showing that the use of the term action (kriyā) is ambiguous. It is one thing to say that the action or function of the intestines is to digest food and the lungs to breathe, yet another
1
2
Egammi dagabindummi je jiņa varehim, pannattā. Te jas sarisavamittā jambūdīve na māïnti. Varațțitandulamittā teū, jīvā jinehim paņņattā. Mattha palikkha pamānā; jambūdive na māïnti Je limyapatta pharisā vāu jīva jinehimpannattā. Te jas khasakhasamittā, jambūdīve na māīnti.
3

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thing to say that the function of the brain cells is to get consciousness. The consciousness and the cerebrum belongs to two different realms, qualitatively different. When we think of consciousness, we do not normally think of cerebrum, though we may associate the two. Different organs of the body have by themselves no active or creative function. Intestines do not digest the food, lungs do not breathe, but we digest and we breathe through the intestines and lungs. Similarly, it is the self that thinks and that is conscious, although the function may be operated through the cerebrum. Consciousness cannot be produced out of the un-conscious matter. The organs of the body are lifeless and without conscious energy, it is the self that gives consciousness. Without the self the body has no life, it is a dead-matter. The bodily organs by themselves do not function, Father Butler wrote “that the brain is formed of the dead hydrogen atoms, oxygen atoms, nitrogen atoms and phosphorous atoms. Imagine them separate and senseless. Observe them running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This is purely a mechanical process which can be seen by the mind. But can you see or dream or in any way imagine how out of that mechanical act and from these individually dead atoms, sensation, thought and emotion are to arise? We cannot create Homer out of the rattling of dice or differential calculus' out of the clash of billiard ball... You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular process and the phenomena of consciousness.”
It would be futile to compare the functions of digestion and respiration with the consciousness, because, the functions of digestion and respiration are unconscious It is indebatable fact that conscious, ness and psychic energy are an independent force not produced out of the bodily functions. Those who consider consciousness as the effect of the bodily functions have to face a different question : 'Am I acting on my self-will or am I influenced by the bodily functions ?
Psycho-physical parallelism is another theory which has been propounded to explain the relation between body and mind or in a sense the soul. Psychical and physical forces run parallel to each other without ever affecting each other. A physical state is correlated to a mental state, point by point, without affecting the other. Parallel occurance is the point common to both the states.
The third theory of the relation between the body and mind

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is the theory of interactionism. According to this view, the bodily and the mental states affect each other. There is interaction between each other. For instance, physical ailments like the stomach ache and other ailments do affect the mental states like the cognitive ability the emotional upset and the conative urge. Ill health does affect the mental energy adversely, while health will bring wholesome effect on mental life. For instance, particular type of food and drink would bring about mental states due to the toxic effects. Memory capacity can be improved by certain types of food. Injury to a particular part of the brain-cells would impair the power of memory. Similarly, if the certain parts of the brain-cells are adversely affected, there would be impairment to the mental energy. 13
EFFECT OF THINKING ON THE MIND
Body and mind are intimately related to each other. They interact on each other. Cognitive, affective and conative activity do affect the bodily condition. Vigorous process of thinking brings about bodily fatigue. Emotions do create certain metabolic changes
in the body like, secretion of glucose in the blood, coagulation of the blood and other chemical effects. The bodily and mental energy affect each other. The body and the mind are two qualitatively different substances. Still they influence each other. How this interaction is possible has been a difficult problem to solve.
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ATMAN AND THE BODY The Atman and the body are different substances. One is a spiritual substance, while the body belongs to the material realm. Atman is the psychic energy (Cetana), it is formless. Body is meterial, it is unconscious. It has form. Then problem is how the two diffeJainism tried to solve this rent principles interact on each other. problem of interaction between two qualitatively different principles by means of the concept of the gross (badara) and subtle (sükşma) body (sarīra). Every soul in this samsara is encased in the gross and subtle bodies. At the time of death, gross body is left here and the subtle body continues to be encrusted with the soul. When the soul enters the next birth it carries the subtle body with it. It enters another gross body with the subtle body. The subtle body is constantly being formed, like the snow-ball which adds particles of snow on its downward journey. The relation between the soul and the subtle body could be considered to be beginningless. It is always with the

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soul as long as soul remains in the saṁsāra. In this sense, it is possible to say that the soul from the point of view of phenomepal existence has a certain form. It is in its pure state formless. And in this sense the saṁsārī jīva takes the form of the gross body, by means of “sükşma sarira'. In this way, the body and soul are intimately associated with each other; and form and the formless can have associations with contradictions. When the soul attains its purity, it would have no connection with the body which has form. The relation between the body which has form and the soul which has no form is beginningless, but it has an end, as the soul, by its own efforts can free itself from the association with the body.
SOUL AND MODERN SCIENCE 1.3 Some scientists do not distinguish between mind and soul. Mind is considered as expression of the modes of the brain. Pavlov regarded the memory as merely the expressions of the metabolic changes in the numerous cerebral cells. Even Bergson, who established the reality of the self by rational arguments, did consider the memory is due to the physiological changes in the cerebral cells. As the photoplate receives the negative of photograph, so also the cerebra! cells do receive and preserve the impressions of the past. This could be described as the physical memory. The memory traces are revived due to appropriate stimulations. Therefore, the mind is not something separate qualitatively from the cerebrum. It is physical, Pavlov's theory has been described as muscle twich psychology. In this way, some scientists have tried to prove that there is nothing which is immaterial and spiritual. Everything can be explained, including mind and thought, through the operation of the bodily processes. How. ever, mind is both material and immaterial, the physiological basis is material and psychic functions are immaterial. Otherwise, we cannot explain the higher values of life. It cannot be said that Shakespeare wrote the Hamlet by mere movements of the muscles and nerves, by hands and with the brain.
In the yrtti of the Sūtrak rtānga, it has been described that the cognitive, affective and conative mental functions like thinking, memory, emotions and will are due to the function of the mind which is immaterial. The means of getting the mental states is
1 Sūtrakstāngavrtti, 1, 8.

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primarily physiological based on the function of the brain cells. Bat the mental states are not physical. They are immaterial. Brain is physiological and the brain cells are often called knowledge cells. (Jñāna tantu). It is true to say that body affects the mental states; but the mental states are not the bodily states. Some modern scientists have emphasised this point of view of the distinction of the mental and bodily states. It would not be possible to explain the qualitative distinction of the mental state from the body by merely asserting that the mental states are nothing but bodily. We find prominent qualitative difference in the mental states and the bodily states. Yet in a sense, we can say that they are also similar in some respects, beacuse the mental states are based on the physiological states in the brain.
It is clear from this discussion, that modern science is not clear about the nature of mind and body, whether there are prominent distinctions between the two. Even supposing that the cerebrum is the repository of the mental states, cognition and memory, it does not disprove the possibility of the presence of psyche (cetanā) as the prime-mover of the psychic states. Like the photo-plate, the cerebrum revives the impressions, preserves them and facilitates their revival on appropriate occasions. It is difficult to explain the 'why' of such processes and how the co-relation takes place. It is possible to explain the insoluble problem by positing the presence of psyche (cetanā) which is not physical in nature, but which is inscrutably associated with the bodily functions.
The phenomenal progress of science in the modern age is possible only because of the function of the psyche which is different from the brain rather bodily, although they are necessary as instrument or media.
Modern science says that there are 102 elements. They are material in nature and have from. All the experiments in science so far carried are on the empirical and the material aspects of things. The immaterial is beyond sense observation and is not amenable 10 experimental investigation. In the mental states we find characteristic which are not to be found in the physical states. Therefore, it can be said that the mental and physical states are qualitatively different, although they are not discreet as not to interact on each other.
Modern science has not been able to find a satisfactory solution

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to the problem of relation of body and mind. Even if we consider that cerebrum is the seat of memory and is an instrument for the revival of memory, it cannot be said that psyche (cetana) is not there at all. Like the negative of the photo-plate, the cerebral cells do function as repositaries of past events in the form of memory. But the cerebral part cannot function as a guarantee of the future events. The problems regarding the 'how' and the 'why' of the cognitive function can only be understood if we posit independent of the cerebrum. In the case of the mechanical retention of the negative in the photoplate there is no variation nor novelty. It is a necessary mechanical and routine process, which can be explained by means of the rules of mechanical science. But in the case of human mind, we find there is variation and unpresentability based upon the relation of the past impression. There would be individual variation in the expression of mental states and the revival of past impressions on the basis of the retention of the past impressions. However, this can be explained only with the help of the function of a psychic energy which is distinct from the physical function.
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There has been rapid and phenomenal progress in the field of empirical sciences. This has been possible due to the enormous amount of systematic thinking and imagination which are expressions of the psychic energy (cetanā śakti). This proves the presence of the independent psychic energy.
The Russian Scientist Pavlov carried extensive experiments concerning the study of the physiological problems of conditioned reflexes. He carried experiments on the dogs and the experiments are called 'the dog and the saliva experiments'. In these experiments, he first rang the bell and then presented food to the animals. After some time he rang the bell but did not give food. He showed, by the quantity of saliva collected after ringing the bell, that the animals were conditioned by stimulus response to the bell and the food. There is no question of any mental states like expecting food. It is merely a physiological response without any element of independent psychic
states.

However, it is also true that experiments shown that by operating on the animal and removing particular parts of the brain certain mental functions became inoperative. But the psychic was not lost. The animal behaved mechanical, ate food and other physiological processes like blood circulation and the respiration were also normal.

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These functions are not purely physiological. But they have the psyche as a spring cord. Experience is a criterion of the psychic energy and experience is neither to be identified with the physiological processes nor to be associated with them, although physiological processess are the basis of psychic activity. Even when certain physiological function do not operate, it cannot be said that the person does not experience the pleasures or pains, although he is not able to communicate his experiences to others. In the Agama literature it has been mentioned that a jiva does experience various experiences pleasant or unpleasant in the series of affix lives. One is blind, one is dumb, one is deaf and similarly one may be suffering from incurable diseases. If such a being is tortured by sharp instrument, he may not be able to communicate to others because of his dumbness and blindness etc., but he does suffer immeasurable feelings of pain. Such feeling of immeasurable pain is also experienced by Sthavarakaya Jīvas, but having no sense-organ to express, they cannot express their misery.
3
ORIGINAL FORM OF CETANA
Regarding the nature of cetana the philosophers have expressed two different views. According to one view, it is said that life cannot be produced from object. Life-force is equally real, independent and beginningless. Louis Pasture has shown by experimental investigation that life is a force by itself.
Louis Pasture carried experiment in this connection.
vaccum.
He took a bowl of glass, and kept some inanimate objects in it. He saw to it that no animate object, not even an egg is kept in the glass. Then he gradually removed the air inside the glass, and made it into a In this state no minute organism accumulated there even after a very long time. But when same objects were kept in the open for some days and it was found that some animate infinite small organisms were deposited on the surface of the object. From this, it was clear that the atmosphere contains infinite number of minute organisms fleeting in the air and they are deposited on the objects.
According to another view, it is maintained that life can be generated from inanimate objects. Some scientists like Freud, Russian lady scientist Lapesinskeya and the atomic scientist like Deraldure and his assistant Stanley Millar have suggested that life can be generated from the inanimate objects.

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Marxist theory maintains that the psyche is the qualitative transformation of the physical objects. As water heated to a particular degree becomes vapour and cooled to the zero degree, it solidifies into ice, so is psyche produced from the changes in the physical objects.
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But the question is, at what stage the changes in the physical things does consciousness arise? The cerebrum contains various forms of material particles and the gases like oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and phosphorus. Is it possible to determine which of these gases or physical particles become the origin of consciousness? Is it due to one of them separately, or due to the combination of all of them or some of them ? So far empirical sciences have not been able to give any solution to the problem of the origin of psyche out of the physical changes. They have not been able to determine the original nature of cetana.

It has sometimes been suggested that the atman can be identified with the sense-organs and the brain. This view is not correct because even when the sense-organs cease to function due to some defect, memory traces of previous experiences continue to be experienced without the functioning of the sense-organs. Similarly, it can be shown that atman cannot be identified with the brain. When the same function of the cerebral cell cease to work, even then mem⚫ ory may continue to be experienced. Therefore, it is not appropriate to identify the cerebrum with the atman although it is the source of knowledge. The sense-organs and the brain are only the instruments for getting experiences. As the sense-organs are the instruments of receiving external stimulations, so is the brain the instrument of retaining the sense-impressions. It has been pointed out that if the brain cells are injured, memory may be impaired. Yet we can say that in the mentally defective beings, consciousness does work, even though it may not function normally. But all other physiological and mental functions in some respects do work without impairing the normal physiological routine of the mentally defective. From this, can be shown that the psychic energy is different from the brain and its functionings, although brain cells are the respositories of the psychic functions. Tandula Veyaliya gives a description of the physiological functioning of the body. There are 160 urdhvagāminī and 'rasavahini' veins in the human body. They start from the navel

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and terminate in the head. The sense-organs function normally as long as these veins are working in perfect harmony.1
According to Caraka, the cerebrum is the centre of the senseorgans and the vital life forces (prāņa). It is a truism that if a particular chord in the brain is cut, a particular psychic function is paralysed, but this does not mean that the brain cells are the psyche.
ATMAN AND INFINITE PRADESAS We have already seen that ātman has infinite number of pradeśas. Finite number of pradeśas cannot form the jīva. From the point of view of biological science, infinite number of cells form the individual life and the body (psycho-physical organism). Body is composed of infinite material particles, but life is formed of the protoplasmic units. From the noumenal point of view, it is said that the ātman is a spiritual substance. It is simple and pure. It is eternal and perfect. And the description of ātman as constituting of infinite pradeśas is only to be looked at from the practical point of view. It is only an attempt, an imperfect attempt to find out the measurement of the ātman, if it is possible to say so. A piece of cloth is woven with threads. Threads are the part of the cloth. But threads by themselves do not constitute the cloth, although threads are necessary for the cloth. Nor can we say that the aggregate of threads could be called cloth. It is the pattern that is important. Similarly, the ātman has infinite number of pradeśas. They constitute the pattern of the ātman.
Consciousness is the characteristic of the ātman. This characteristic of consciousness is psychic energy and it is a differential of the ātman. The non-living substances do not possess this characteristic. Therefore, ārman is considered to be a pure substance, independent of other substances. The jiva expresses the charactertstics of sat (existence) and kriyākāritva (activity). Due to its characteris
1
Tandula Veyāliya. “Imammi sariraye sathisirāsayam nābhippabhavānam uddhagāmiņīnam siram upagayānam jāü rasaharņiotti ccaī. Vujāsim nam niruvaghāenām cakkhūsoyaghānajihabalam bhavai." Caraka Sarhitā---
Prāņāh prāṇabhrtām yarta, tathā sarvendriyāṇi ca. Yaduttamāngamangānām ģirastadabhidhīyate.
2

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tic of sat it is a padārtha (substance). Due to its characteristic of activity the jīva expresses modifications. But, in all these modifications it retains its essential nature and indentity. The stream of consciousness is the attribute of the ātman, and the ātman remains the same through the modifications constituted of origin and decay.
THE VIEWS OF THE SCIENTISTS webshop Prof. Albert Einstein says, “I believe that intelligence is manifested throughout all nature."1 Sir A. S. Eddington said, “Something unknown is doing, we do not know what it is... ...I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness..... The old Atheism is gone. Religion belongs to the realm of the spirit and mind, and cannot be shaken." Herbert Spencer maintains that the teachers and founders of the religion taught, and many philosophers ancient and modern, Western and Eastern have perceived that this unknown and unknowable is our very life.3 J. B. S. Haldane expresses his view on the nature of the self as, “The truth is that, not matter, not forces, not any physical thing, but mind and personality is the central fact of the universe." Arthur H. Compton has written to say, “A conclusion which suggests ...... the possibility of consciousness after death......the flame is distinct from the log of wood which serves it temporarily as a fuel."
In the book entitled 'The Great Design' there is a description of the views of many scientists regarding the nature of the self, and the design of the universe. According to their views, the universe is not merely a mechanical and unthinking process which roils its way with inexorible necessity, but there is a design and a plan. This postulates an intelligence which works behind the process of the universe and the designer, we may call this intelligence by any name we want.
Rene Descartes has said, by giving a very simple example, that 'I think, therefore I am'. He based his arguments regarding the reality
1 The Modern Review of Calcutta, July 1936. 2 Ibid. 3 First Principles 1900 4 The Modern Review of Calcutt

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of the self on the indubitable fact of the process of thinking and reasoning. He doubted everything but he could not doubt the doubter. The doubter is a substance.
Spinoza said that substance has infinite number of attributes, and among them consciousness and extension are prominent. Consciousness is a form of the attribute of thought. That is the Self. Similarly, extension has its infinite modes, they constitute the physical universe.
John Locke said that Self is the object of direct experience. "I think, I argue, I experience pleasures and pains.” The “l' is the substance, it is the substratum of experiences. Self is an object of knowledge.
George Berkely has shown that the universe is constituted of three principles : (1) The self, (2) God (Ultimate self) and (3) The external world. The consciousness is the essential characteristic of the soul. Without consciousness soul cannot exist.
The philosophers that we have just mentioned, Descartes, Locke and Berkely have shown that the reality of the self is self evident. No proofs are necessary, no arguments are necessary. But, David Hume denied the reality of the Self and said that it is only a fleeting collection of impressions. His view is nearer to the Buddhist concept of ātman as not a real substance but merely an aggregate of physical and mental states.
The scientists right from the beginning have been discussing the problem of the nature of the self but they have not come to any definite conclusion. The problem of the Self bas still remained a mystery.
THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATMAN
Attempts have been made to give positive proofs for the existence of the ātman. On the contrary, there have been attempts to: argue against the existence of the ātman. But on the whole, it can be said that arguments against the existence of the ātman do not hold ground. Therefore, there is a possibility of maintaining that the ātman is real. It is an independent substance It is a spiritual substance. We cannot get the knowledge of the ātman through the senses. Still, this would not be a counter-argument against the exis

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tence of the ātman. We see with our eyes and we see objects which are within the range of the sense-organ of sight. Similarly, there should also be a favourable circumstance of the presence of the light. Therefore, the function of sense-organ is limited by its physical capacity and environmental factors. But the experience of sight will be possible if there is a Self which perceive.
Those who question and those who doubt the reality of the Self have no valid arguments to give. The Self is expressed through the experiences of the senses. The Self cannot directly be seen through the senses. It can be inferred through its effects. Consciousness cannot belong to the material and non-living object. Therefore, the Self is different from the non-living object. We have seen that those who argued that consciousness is the product of the physiological and chemical changes in the brain cells, have not been able to prove that the brain cells or the chemical effect is the soul. They have not been able to show that the physiological processes produce mental states, although some Naturalist Psychologist like Pavlov have tried to demonstrate that all activities of an organism are physiological. It is of the nature of stimulus response and conditioned reflex. Moreover, evolution of anything has to be from within its nature. Nothing can evolve from something which is not of its nature. Therefore, the development of life has to be from life only. It cannot be from nonliving to life. That would mean arising of something out a thing of a different nature, as the Asatkāryavādin would assert. Therefore, it would be proper to consider that the immaterial soul and the material body are qualitatively different.
.
CLASSIFICATIONS OF JIVAS
Jivas have been classified into different types on the basis of the different principles. The foremost classifications of jīvas is (1) Mukta jīvas (liberated souls) and (2) Saṁsārī jīvas (soul involved in this world). This classification is based on the principle of the attainment of perfection.
Of the Sarhsārī jīvas, there are different classifications again on the basis of different principles. For instance, on the basis of the principle of the capacity of movement jīvas have been classified into :

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(i) Sthāvara jīvas (beings which cannot move e. g. trees) (ii) Trasa jīvas (beings which have the capacity of movement).1
Sthāvara jīvas are of three types : (1) Prthvī jīvas (Earth-bodied) (2) Jala jīvas (Water-bodied) and (3) Vanaspati (Vegetable kingdom).' Sometimes, the Sthāvara jīvas have been classified into five different types : (i) Prthvīkāya (earth-bodied), (ii) jalakāya (waterbodied), (iii) tejaskāya (fire-bodied), (iv) vāyukāya (air-bodied) and (v) vanaspatikāya (vegetable-kingdom). The jīvas of the air and fire-body have movement as their nature and they are called gati-trasa (moving). They have been distinguished into : gross (bādara) and subtle (sükşma). The subtle-bodied beings are pervading the entire universe, while the gross-bodied beings live in specific places of the universe.3
Gross earth-bodied being are of two types : (1) mrdu (soft) and (2) kathina (hard). The soft earth-bodied beings are again classified into seven types on the basis of the colour of their bodies : krsna (black), nila (blue), lohita (red), harita (yellow), śukla (white) pāņdu (orange) and panakamrtika. This distinction may be considered to be more scientific. Similar distinction bas been made in the Prajñā panā.
The hard portion of the earth has been divided into bhūtalavinyāsa (terrain) and karambapalo. These too have parts and have been further classified into 36 parts :1. Suddha-prthvi (earth)
9. Upala (some type of rock) 2. Sarkarā (sand)
10. Trapu (zinc) 3. Bālukā
11. Sisaka (lead) 4. Šila (granite, rocks)
12. Rūpya (silver) 5. Lavaņa (salt)
13. Suvarna (gold) 6. Osa (soft earth)
14. Vajra (diamond) 7. Ayasa (iron)
15. Haritāla (emerald) 8. Tāmra (copper)
16. Hinguluka
1 Uttarādhyayana Sutra, 36, 69. 2 Ibid, 36, 70.
Pudhavi āüjīva ya taheva ya vanassas
Icceye thāvarā tivihā tesim bheye suneha me. 3 Ibid, 36, 78, 86, 100. 4 Ibid, 36, 72.

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17. Manahśīlā
27. Markata 18. Sasyaka (a variety of emerald) 28. Bhujamocaka 19. Anjana
29. Indranila 20. Pravālakal
30. Chandana 21. Abhraka Bālukā
31. Pulaka 22. Abhrapatala
32. Saugandhika 23. Gomedaka
33. Chandraprabha 24. Rucaka
34. Vaidurya 25. Anka
35. Jalakānta 26. Sphatika
36. Süryakānta According to the Brhadvrtti commentary on the Uttarādhyayanasūtra Lohitākṣa and Masāragalla are species of sphatika and Marakata respectively.2
The gross water-bodied beings (sthūla jala) can be divided into 5 types, as : (1) Suddha udaka (pure water), (2) Osa udaka (dew), (3) Haratanu (green bodied) (4) Koharā (fog) and (5) Hima (ice).3
The gross vegetable kingdom is of two types, as : (1) pratyeka šariri (having separate bodies) and (2) sādhārana śarīri (having one body). The being having one jīva in one body is called pratyeka śarīri, but, if one body contains innumerable jivas (living cells) it is called sādhārana sariri.
Pratyekasariri being in the vegetable kingdom are of twelve types as : 1. Vrkņa (tree)
8. Parvaga 2. Guccha
9. Kuhuna 3. Gulma
10. Jalaja 4. Latā (creeper)
11. Auşadhitrana (medicinal grass) 5. Valli (plant)
12. Haritakāya (green bodied 6. Trana (blade of grass)
plant) 7. Latāvalaya (encircling creepers)
The beings of sädhārana sarira have innumerable types like
1 Kauțiliya Arthaśāstra, 11, 36. 2 Uttarādhyayana brhadyrtti, patra 689. 3 Uttarādhyayana, 36, 86. • 4 Uttarādhyayana, 36, 95-96.

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À SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY kanda and mūla etc. So far we have considered the sthāvara jīvas i. e., the living beings who have not got the capacity of move. ment.
Now we consider the trasa jīvas (living beings who can move about) i.e. self-moving beings. The trasa jīvas are of six types : 1. Agni (fire-bodied) .
ti trasa 2. Vāyu (air-bodied) " 3. Dvīndriya (two-sensed organisms) 4. Trindriya (three-sensed organisms) 5. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms) 6. Pañcendriya (five-sensed organisms)
The fire-bodied and the air-bodied beings do not possess selfwilled movements. Therefore, they are called gati trasa. They move about randomly. The other jīvas from two sense-organisms onwards have self-willed movements.
The fire-bodied and air-bodied animals are gross and subtle. The subtle-bodied beings pervade the entire universe, while the grossbodied beings have a habitation in a particular place. The grossbodied fire beings have various forms like angāra, murmura, suddha agni, archi, jwālā, ulkā, vidyut, etc.4
The gross air-bodied beings have the following types :
(1) Utkalikā, (2) Mandalikā, (3) Ghanavāta, (4) Guñjāvāta, (5) Suddhavāta and (6) Sarvartakavāta.5
Those beings who have the capacity of movement on their own account and being aware of the movement and those who can move forward and backward, expand and contract, create sound, express the feeling of fear and run about, all these are trasa jivas.
According to the terminology of the trasa jīvas, we can classify trasa jīvas on the basis of the crieterion of the number of sense-organs they possess. There are four types or trasa jīvas :
1. Uttarādhyanasūtra, 36, 97-100. 2. Ibid, 36, 108-127. 3. Ibid, 36, 112-121. 4. Ibid, 36, 101-109. 5. Ibid, 36, 119-120. 6. Daśavaikālika, adhyayana 4, sūtra 9.

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1. Dvīndriya (two-sensed organisms) 2. Trīndriya (three-sensed organisms) 3. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms) 4. Pañcendriya (five-sensed organisms).1
They are all gross-bodied and there is no distinctions of subtleand gross-bodied organism in this case. Two-sensed, three-sensed, and four-sensed organisms are sammürcchanaja i.e., they did not take their birth in a womb. They are self-born. The five-sensed organisms are of two types : (1) sammūrchanaja (self-born) (2) Garbhaja (born of womb).
From the point of view of the states of existence, the five sensed-organisms are of four types : (1) Nairayika (hellish), (2) Tiryanca (lower animals), (3) Manuşya (human) and (4) Deva (heavenly beings). Among the five-sensed lower animals, there are three types, namely, (1) jalacara (moving in water) (2) sthalacara (moving on the earth) (3) Khecara (moving in the air).*
The jalacara animals are of various types. Prominent among them are : (1) Matsya (fish), Kacchapa (tortoise), grāha, magara (crocodile) and surśumāra etc.3
The sthalacara animals are mainly of two types as : (1) catuspāda (four footed) (2) parīsar pa (crawling).*
Catuşpada animals are of four types as : 1. animals with one hoof-horses etc. 2. with two hoofs--oxen etc. 3. with round legs, like elephants. 4. with feet having claws and nails, like lions etc.5
Parisarpa animals are mainly of two types as : 1. Bhujaparisarpa (moving with shoulders) 2. Urah parisar pa (crawling with the stomach) reptiles, like
snake etc. 1. Uttarādhyayanasūtra, 36, 127. 2. Ibid, 36, 172. 3. Ibid, 36, 173. 4. Ibid, 36, 180. 5. Ibid, 36, 181. 6. Ibid, 36, 182.

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Khecara animals are of four types as : 1. Carma pakşi 2. romapakşi 3. samudgapakşi 4. vitatapakşii bat 3 SAMSĀRI AND MUKTA JIVAS
According to Jainism, from the point of view of substance and energy all jīvas are equal. There is no distinction between a jīva and I swara as a higher jīva. But from the point of view of modes, a distinction has been made among the jīvas as those who are liberated (siddha jīvas) and those who are in sarsāra (saṁsāri jīvas). They are considered to be the freed souls and those who in bondage in this wheel of sarsāra. When the soul is freed from the kārmic matter, it becomes pure and is freed from the wheel of life and death. Uttarādhyayana and other agama books give various synonymous words for mukti which have been used in their books : mokşa, nirvāna,bahihvihāra, siddhaloka,5 ātmavasati,& anuttaragati,? pradhānagati,& varagati,' sugati.10 apunarāvrtta,11 avyābādhal2 and lokottamottamals etc. The state of the soul in mukti condition is characterised by freedom from disease, without body, without experiences of misery, the enjoyment of the perfect bliss and peace, perfect purity and perfect holyness, without destruction and possessed
1. Uttarādhyayana sūtra, 36, 188. 2. Ibid, 6, 10. 3. Ibid, 36, 269; 28, 30. 4. Ibid, 14, 4. 5. Ibid, 23, 83; 10, 35. 6. Ibid, 14, 48; 7, 25. 7. Ibid, 18, 38; 18, 39-40, 42, 43, 48. 8. Ibid, 19, 68. 9. Ibid, 36, 67. 10. Ibid, 28, 3 11. Ibid, 29, 44, 21, 24. 12. Ibid, 29, 3. 13. Ibid, 29, 58.

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123 of perfect knowledge and intuition. It is free from rebirth and is in the highest state of perfection.
The ātman in the highest stage of perfection is the paramātman and there is really speaking no distinction between the ātman and the paramātman in the highest stage. In the highest stage of perfection, each ātman retains its individuality, unlike the Vedāntic conception of the identity or the merger of the ātman with the Bhahman. The jīva has perfect knowledge and intuition (samyagjñāna and darśana) and its inherent characteristics. When the kārmic particles are completely destroyed ātman becomes free from all the modes of the body like oldage, disease and death and is free from the rebirth. It has no empirical body attached to it. Therefore, it is considered to be ghanarüpa. Mokşa is not to be mistaken as a negative state of void. It is positive state of bliss. The size of the mukta jīva (freed soul) is of the dimension of the subtle body that it have been, last life minus one third of its form. This is because, during the sukladhyāna state (deep peaceful meditation) vibrations of the sūkşma śarīra are reduced to this form. Therefore, one-third portion of the earlier sūkşma sarira is eliminated.
A question arises, when the ātman is free from the body either it should be atomic in form or all-pervasive. Similarly, how can we explain the reduction of the sūksma śarīra to one-third śarīra in the highest stage.
! The answer that has been suggested is that the jīva has been shown to be pervading the body that it occupies in a particular empirical life. The form of the soul was neither atomic nor allpervasive. In the freed state the soul is without body. Therefore, there is no question of pervading or expansion or contraction of the soul. It has no form and whatever description is given about the nature of the soul in the liberated state, it is only with reference to
1. Uttarādhyayanasūtra 36, 66. (a) Arūvino jīvaghaņā nāņadarhsanasanniyā.
Aulam suhamsampattā uvamā jassa natthi ů. (b) Uttarādhyayana 29, 28; 9, 4; 29, 41. 2 Uttarādhyayana sūtra 36, 64
Usseho jassa jo hoi bhavammi carimammi 2. Tibhāgahīno tatto ya siddhānogāhanā bhave.

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the space points and not extensions. It is formless and therefore many siddhas can live together in the same space.
The soul in its liberated state is freed from the bodily activities like birth and death. It is in its own nature. It is saccidānanda (perefect reality, perfect consciousness and perfect bliss). Urdhvagati (tendency to go up) is the very characteristic of the atman and when the karmic encrustations are removed, it goes up freed from all karmas to the siddhaśilā. As long as the karma vitiated the soul, it is held down in the wheel of life and when the karma is destroyed, the ghanatva of the world i. e. the downward force of the world like the gravity does not affect the soul. It is freed from all the karmas.
The freed soul is free from the body. The movement is the attribute of the body and therefore, in the state of freedom, the soul has no movement at all. It has no other types of vibrations. It is free from material and bodily modes of movement and variations.1 Therefore, the soul moves towards the upward path to the siddhaśilā. The Bhagavati sūtra mentions the four causes for such state of ürdhvagati, as (1) prayoga, (2) asangată (3) bandhaviccheda, (4) tathavidha svabhāva.2 Due to the absence of the principle o motion (dharma) the soul does not go to aloka. The freed soul enjoy perfect bliss of itself.
Next distinction of the jīva is the samśārī jīva, i. e., the souls involved into the wheel of samsara. The samṁsäri jīvas are being eternall y moving from one state to the other experiencing the karmic effects and in turn accruing more and more karma It is full of karma and therefore, it is embodied and not freed from bodily modes. But the freed souls are free from karma. They are omniscient and perfect. The liberated souls are not bound by any other state. They enjoy their own state without being affected by any other external or internal forces. There are no distinctions between the different individual souls in the free state although they retain their individuality.
The liberated soul is completely free from the empirical adjuncts like the modes the of body and the mind. Therefore, there are no repetitions, revivals or reoccurence of the physical and psychic states because the karma is removed and the karma is the cause of all these modes.
154 Bhagavatī 3, 3.
155 Bhagavati, 7, 1, 265–
Nissangayãe nirangaṇāe gatipariņāmeṇam bandhaṇa cheyaṇāe. Nirindhaṇāye puvvappaogenam akammssa gati pannāyati.

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(A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE) Jivatuttva is opposite of ajīvatartva.1 Celenā is the characteristic of jīva and it has the attributes of upayoga i. e., jñāna and darśana. The substance which is in a body and which sees, knows and experiences pleasure and pain is called jīva.? The body in which there is no cognising substance experiencing pleasure and pain is the ajīva (non-living substance.)3
Ajīva is of two kinds : (1) rūpi ajiva (with form) and (2) arūpi ajiva (formless).4 Pudgala has form. The other four substances (dravya) Dharma, Adharma, Akāśa, and Kāla are arūpi (formless).
In the agama literature the substances having form have been called "murta" while those substances which have no form are called "amūrta."
DHARMASTIKĀYA Of the six dravyas, jīva and pudgala bave the capacity of movement. They have the capacity to move from one place other, but it does not mean that they are constantly moving every instant. It only means that they have motion as a capacity and possibility and are not absolutely stationary (sthitiśīla). The other four dravyas are having no motion. In Jainism, jīva and pudgala have been considered to be both gat iśīla (having movement) and sthitiśīla (being stationary)--and for this kind of movement they have
1. Sthānānga, 2, 1, 57. 2. Pañchāstikāya, 2, 122, 3. Pañcāstikāya 2, 124-125. 4. (a) Uttarādhyayana sūtra, 36.
(b) Samavāyānga, 149,

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY a medium of motion and that is the principle of Dharma; and Adharma is the principle of rest. These two are the functional principles."
In the Jaina literature the words dharma and adharma have also been used in the ethical sense as śubha (auspicious) and aśubha (inauspious). In the use of these words the Dharmadravya connoted assistance of movement, while Adharmadravya has a connotation of stagnation. Other Darśanas in Indian philosophy have not given thought to the conception of Dharma and Adharma in the sense of connoting the principle of motion and principle of rest. In modern science, Newton for the first time discovered the principle of motion. Albert Eienstein while advocating the principle of motion said that the universe is limited, similarly the space beyond the universe (aloka) is also limited. The universe is limited because the substance or energy is limited to the sphere of universe. Beyond this universe, there is neither substance nor energy which is responsible for the motion. What the scientists call Ether as the principle of motion, Jaina literature gives it the name of Dharmadravya (principle of motion.)
1. (a) Bhagavati, 18, 7; 7, 10.
(b) Uttarādhyayana sūtra 36, 6. 2. Hollywood, R. and T: Instruction Lesson No. 2, What is Ether ?
I am quite sure that you have heard of Ether before now, but please do not confuse it with the Liquid Ether used by surgeons, to render a patient unconscious for an operation. If you should ask me just what the Ether is, that is, the Ether that conveys electromagnetic-waves. I would answer that I cannot accurately describe it. Neither can any one else. The best that anyone could do would be to say that Éther is invisible body and that through it electromagnetic waves can be propagated.
But let us see from a practical standpoint the nature of the thing called Ether.' We are all quite familiar with the existence of solids, liquids and gases. Now suppose, that inside a glass vessel there are no solids, liquids or gases : that all of these things have been removed including the air as well.
If I were to ask you to describe the condition that now exists within the glass-vessel, you would promptly reply that nothing exists within it, that a vacuum has been created. But I shall have to correct you, and explain that within this vessel there does exist Ether' nothing else.

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Bhagavana Mahāvīra said that the Dharmadravya is one. It pervades the entire universe. It is eternal. It has no colour, smell, nor touch and taste. It is the principle of motion by which matter moves. All the activities and movement of the jiva in both physiological and psychological sense like physical movement and mental states, are due to principle of motion. It has infinite number of pradesas (space points). It does not move although it is the principle of motion. It is indestructible. It is the principle by which the movement is possible although it does not contribute directly either in the material substance or as the energy which makes objects move. It is formless and therefore it has neither the attributes of the physical objects nor the attributes of mental states. Dharmadravya is one and whole and does not appear as parts. It pervades the entire universe and there is no place in the universe in which Dharmadraya is absent.
Movement (gati) is the characteristic which refers to the move
So we may say that 'Ether' is a something that is not a solid, nor liquid, nor gaseous, nor anything else which can be observed by us physically. Therefore, we may say that an absolute vaccum cannot be created, for Ether cannot be removed.
We get our knowledge of Ether from experiments by observing results and deducing facts. For example, if within the glass-vessel, mentioned above, we place a bell and cause it to ring, no sound of any kind reaches our ears. Therefore, we deduce that in the absence of air, sound does not exist, and thus, that sound must be due to vibration in the air.
Now let us place a radio transmitter inside the enclosure that is void of air. We find that radio signals are sent out exactly the same as when the transmitter was exposed to the air. So we are right in deducing that electro-magnetic waves or Radio-waves do not depend on air for their propagation that they are propagated through or by means of 'something' which remained inside the glass enclosure after the air had been exhausted. This something has been named 'Ether.'
We believe that Ether exists throughout all space of the universe; in the most remote region of the stars, and at the same time within the earth, and in the seemingly impossible small space which exists between the atoms of all matter. That is to say, Ether is everywhere; and that electromagnetic wave can be propagated everywhere.

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ment from one place to the another, and Dharma assists movement. Just as the movement of the fish is possible in water although the water does not or may not make it to move. Similarly, the principle of motion (Dharma) is the principle by which the movement is possible. Without this principle, motion is not possible, just as the fish cannot move outside the water. Likewise, the movement of pudgala (matter) is possible due to Dharmadravya. To give an example of modern life, we can say just as the movement of the train would be possible because of the rails, similarly Dharmadravya assists momement. Similarly iīva and pudgala have movement because of principle of motion (Dharmadravya).
Motion and rest are the two states which are the characteristics of pudgala and jīva (matter and soul). They do not have mere motion nor mere rest, some time they move and some time they rest. In this world there are four states of movement and rest of a thing, as, (1) from rest to motion, (2) from motion to rest, (3) always at rest and (4) always in motion. Therefore, the movement and the rest are natural to the objects. And they have principles assisting them. They are the principles of Dharma and Adharma.
It is necessary to postulate the Dharma and Adharma as principles of motion and rest, because we cannot explain the movement and the state of rest in the universe nor can we divide the cosmos into Loka and Aloka. We have already said that Jiva and Ajīva have primarily the state of movement as a characteristic. The immediate causes of movement and rest in Jiva and Pudgala are in the very nature of these substances, however the efficient causes are Dharma and Adhārma, which are remote, and are causes for the movement and rest of the two.
The states of motion and rest are to be found in the universe and these two are possible by the Dharma and Adharma dravyas which do not themselves possess, motion or rest, but which assists the motion and rest. It is therefore possible to understand, how
1. Prajñāpanā, Pada 1, Vrtti
Dharmādharmavibhuttavat sarvatra ca jīva pudgalavicărāt. Nālokaḥ kaśchit syānna ca sammatametadarthāņām. Tasmāddharmādharmau, avagādhau vyāpta lokakham sarvam. Evam hi paricchinnah siddhyati lokastad vibhuttvät.

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important are the substances of Dharma and Adharma in this universe. Acarya Malayagiri said that the order in the Loka and the Aloka (universe and the beyond) is not possible without these substances.1
This world is a fact, because it is experienced through the senses. But the beyond i. e., the Aloka is not subject to sense-experience. Therefore, the existence and the non-existence of the aloka has been a problem. But when we accept the existence of Loka, we have also to postulate the existence of the beyond, because the limited does imply the unlimited. The logic of our arguments would certainly show that if there is a beyond, there must be a limited as if there is the limited which implied the unlimited. These are relative terms.2
In
The universe has all the six substances like the Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma and Adharma and Akāśa and Kāla. But where there is only Akāśa, it is the beyond; the unlimited and it is called Aloka. the Aloka, jiva and ajīva cannot exist because Dharma and Adharma are the criteria of the distinctions between the two spheres of Loka and Aloka, where Dharma and Adharma operate that is Loka, and where these principles are not operative it is Aloka.
Gautama Gaṇadhara asked Bhagavāna Mahāvira "What is the use of Dharmāstikāya for the jivas ?"
Mahavira said: "O Gautama, if the principle of motion were not to operate, where would be the motion? Who would come and who would go? How could the waves of the sound travel? How could eye lids open? Who would talk and who could move about? The whole world would have remained Dharmastikāya is the means to all the moving things.3
stationary.
Gautama asked, "Bhagavan! What is the use of the Adharmastikaya for the Jīvas ?
Mahāvīra said, "O, Gautama, if the Adharmästikāya were not
1. Prajñā panā, pada 1, vṛtti-Lokālokavyavasthānupapatteḥ.
2. Nyāyāvatāra-Yo yo vyuta pattimacchuddhapadabhidheyaḥ sa sa ghatoaghata vipakṣakaḥ
Yasca lokasya
savipakṣaḥ. Yathä vipakṣaḥ soãlokaḥ.
3. Bhagavati, 13, 4,

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to operate as principle of rest who would stand and who would sit ? Who would sleep ? Who could concentrate ? Who could remain silent ? Who can remain inactive? Who could keep the eyelids steady? The world would have constant movement without break. All that is steady and at rest is due to the principle of rest, i. e., Adharma."
COMPARISON WITH ETHER Many Indian and Western philosophers have recognised the reality of motion in the universe, but they have not found it necessary to postulate a principle by which the movement is possible. In the modern science Ether has been suggested to be the medium of movement. It is analogus to the Jaina conception of Dharma. The Ether is one of the outstanding discoveries of the modern science. The eminent scientist Dr. A. S. Edington writes “This does not mean that the Ether is abolished. We need an Ether... in the last century it was widely believed that Ether was a thing of matter having properties such as mass, rigidity, motion like ordinary matter. It would be difficult to say when this view died out...Now a days, it is agreed that Ether is not a kind of matter, being, non-material-- its properties are signaries (quite unique) characters such as mass and rigidity which we meet within matter will naturally be absent in Ether but the Ether will have new and definite characters of its own... non-material ocean of Ether."
Albert Einstein has propounded the Theory of Relativity and he has shown that Ether is non-material, continuous, non-discrete and co-extensive with space. While discussing the comparative study of the Dharmadravya with Ether, Prof. G. R. Jain says "sthat it has been established that the Jaina philosophers and modern scientists agree regarding the principle of Ether and the Dharmadravya as synonymous because both of them are non-material, non-discrete, continuous whole and all-pervading like Akāśa. They have no form, nor have they movement although they are the medium of movement."
1. Bhagavati, 13, 4. 2. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 31.

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131 ADHARMASTIKAYA !! As the Dharmadravya is necessary for movement in the world so is the Adharmadravya necessary for explaining rest and a static state of the objects. As in the absence of the Dharmāstikāya we cannot explain the existence of motion, so also we cannot explain the state of rest without Adharmästikāya. Like the Dharma, Adharma also pervades the entire universe. It is whole, and nondiscrete. As the sesamum oil pervades the entire grain of sesamum, so also the principle of Adharma pervades the entire Lokākāśa (the universe). Just as the shade of the tree provides coolness and possibility of rest for a traveller, similarly the Adharmāstikāya enables the jīva and pudgala substance to experience the state of rest. The question, if the state of rest which is due to Adharmāstikāya in what way does it help? For this, we can say, if the state of rest were not possible, then there would be continuous motion and there would not be any possibility of steadiness... This stage of steadiness and static existence is possible through Adharmāstikāya.
It has again been asked that if Dharma as a principle of motion and Adharma as the principle of rest, they are contrary, how can they co-exist ? Both of them are continuous, both of them are formless. They are ajīva and they are inferable.
For this, it can be said that their functions are different. One helps motion and the other helps the static existence. Both these functions are different; they cannot be attributed to the same
principle.
The third question has been asked : Dharma and Adharma are formless. How can they assist motion and rest? The answer is, that the capacity to help not necessarily remains in those substances which have form, even the formless substances have this capacity. Just as Ākāśa (space) is formless, but still it accomodates infinite number of things so also Dharma and Adharma are formless, they are the basic principles of motion and rest. Akāśa has the capacity of accommodating things, so also the Dharma and Adharma has the capacity to help the motion and rest.
The next question is: if Dharma and Adharma are all-pervading, then they must inter-penetrate each other. And there will be no distinction between them.

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For this, it can be said that as substances they are all pervading but as to their functions they are different. Each does its own functions although they do co-exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and the light of each lamp pervades the entire room. It does not mean that the function of one is not distinct from the other and it is lost and has no existence. Similarly, Dharma and Adharma are all-pervading, yet their functions are different and there is no contradictions in their functional distinctions.
Some thinkers have compared Adharma with the principle of gravitation and field. But Dr. Mohanlal Mehtā is of view that the Dharmāstikāya is quite different from the gravitational force and field and it is an independent principle.
Acārya Siddhasena Divākara does not find it necessary that Dharma and Adharma be considered as independent substances (dravyas) He considers that both of them are not substances but they are modes of substances.1
T AKĀŠASTIKAYA That substance which accommodates Jīva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Kala is called Akāśadravya. It is the basis of all dravyas and therefore it has a special function.3
Gautama Gañadhara asked to Mahāvira : “Bhagavan ! What is the use of substance of Akāśa for the Jīvas and the Ajīvas ?"
Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said : 0 Gautama, if Akāśa were not to be there, where would the jīvas be? Where would the Dharma and Adharma astikāyas pervade? Where would the Kāla extend ? Where would the dance of Pudgala be possible? The whole world would be without foundation ?
Akāśa is not a solid thing, but it is empty space which accommodates all things. It is all-pervading (sarva-vyāpī), formless (amūrta) and it has infinite points of space (ananta pradeśī). Ākāśa is divided
1 Niscayadvātrimśikā, 24 Prayogavisrasākarma
tadabhāvasthistathā. Lokānubhāvav rittantah kim dharmādharma yo falam: 2 Tattvārthasūtra 5, 18—Ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ. 3 Uttarādhyayana 28, 9-Bhāyaṇam savvadavvāņam naham ogāhala
kkhanam 4 Bhagavati 13, 4,

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into two parts: (1) Lokākāśa (the limited universe i.e. the world) and (2) Alǝkākāśa (the limitless beyond). As a lake gives space to the water, similarly Ākāśa is a resting place for all the dravyas. A question has been asked that if Akāśa were to be one and continuous, how could there be distinction between the Lokākāśa and the Alokākāśa? How can Akāśa be divided into these two? But the answer is, this division is not on the basis of substance, it is with reference to the functions of the Dharma and Adharma dravyas. Ākāśa is really one and continuous without parts, but we make a distinction between Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa because we have to explain the distinction with reference to the accommodation to the other dravyas. That part of Akāśa where substances like Jīva, Pudgala, Adharma, Dharma and Kala exists, is called Lokākāśa and the beyond is called Alokākāśa. Ākāśa is one and formless, it is all-pervading and even in the Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa, there is no distinction in substance.
A question has been asked that it may be true that which accommodates things is the Akāśa. Lokākāśa accommodates the substances. We may call it Akāśa. But the limitless and the beyond which is called Alokākāśa does not accommodate anything, hence void. Still why is it called Ākāśa? The answer is that the very nature of Ākāśa is to accommodate things and Lokākāśa accommodates dravyas, but in Alokākāśa there is nothing. So, there is no question of accommodating. In the Alokākāśa there are no substances at all. Substances are limited to the Loka, so Alokākāśa does not accommodate but it does not mean that it looses its function of accommodation. The fact is this that due to the absence of Dharma and Adharma as the principles of motion and rest in the Alokākāśa, it is completely free from any other substance. Therefore it is empty. It is the limitless. Therefore, it is called ananta (endless). It is the limitless beyond. In modern philosophy Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa have been considered as the forces in Akāśa.
A question is asked: How does Ākāśa accommodate a thing? That which has no place prior it can be given a place or the thing which was not there could be kept there?
1 Uttaradhyayana, 36, 2.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The answer is, every object is in one place or the other. It moves from one place to the other. As Ākāśa is beginningless, so are other substances.
A question is again asked : If all substances exist simultaneously and if Akāśa accommodates all substances on the basis of Dharma and Adharma, how can these substances be considered as those which get accommodation (adheya).
The answer is Ākāśa is more extensive than the other substances, It gives accommodation to all substances and so it is called base (ādhāra) and as the other substances take accommodation in it so they have been called ādheya. Just as the hands and the body can be related as the part and the whole, or the organs and the body. The entire canvas of the objects depend on each other. According to Jainism, water is the support of the earth. Vāyu is the support of water, and Akāśa is the support of Väyu. But Akāśa has no support outside itself. It is self-existent and it does not need the support of any other substance.
Lokākāśa has infinite number of pradeśas (space points), while Alokākāśa has limitless space. The wbole Akāśa is limitless and endless. It is limitless because, infinite pradeśas are taken out from the limitless Ākāśa, still infinite pradeśas remain. Therefore, from the point of view of extension, Akāśa has been considered to be of different as ananta (endless), paritānanta (endless more) and yuktānanta (still more endless) and anantānanta (endlessly endless).1 All these are the forms of the endless.
According to the Buddhists, Vaiśeşika, Sārkhya and Vedāntins, Akāśa is the substance. But we do not get an elaborate discussion of Akāśa in these schools of thought as we get in the Jaina philosophy. In the Buddhist philosophy, Akāśa is considered to have a characteristic of avaraņābhāva (absence of pervasion) and it is considered to be simple element (asanskrta dharma). But in the Jaina philosophy, Akāśa is not considered in a negative connotation, in terms of abhāva (non-existence), and also it is not considered as asamskrita dharma
1 2
Tattvārtharājavārtika, 5, 10, 2. Baldeva Upadhyāya : Bauddha Darśana, p. 239 (Hindi)

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À SOURCB-BOOK ÎN JAINA PHILOSOPHY because it has the characteristic in it of the origin, permanence and destruction (utpāda, sthiti and vināśa).
Vaiseşikas have made Ākāśa as independent substance and it has a characteristic of producing sabda (sound). They have considered the directions different from Akāśa.1 That which has the attribute of sabda is Ākāśa, and that which limits the external world by direction is called dik.? Nyāya-kārikāvals makes dik as that which has the attributes of the farness and nearness (dūratva and sämpiya) and which makes distinction between the one place and the other. Dik is one and nitya (eternal). By the phenomenal distinctions for practical purposes it is called the east and west and other directions.3 In the Jaina philosophy dik is not considered to be distinct from Akāśa. Because in the variable measurable distinctions of Ākāśa, we find the dik i. e. , the direction. These are conventional measures. Akāśa is not one which produces sound because sabda is produced by matter which has form and Ākāśa is formless. It is not possible to say that the formless Akāśa produced substances with form. Similarly, we cannot say that Akāśa is a product of prakrti nor is it an appearance of Brahman4 because Akāśa is an independent substance.
According to Jainism, Akāśa as a substance has infinity number of pradeśas. From the point of view of extension, it is endless and limitless extending from Loka to Aloka. From the point of time, Akāśa is beginningless and endless and considered from the point of view of nature, Ākāśa is formless.
Dik (direction) is a form of empirical measurement of Akāśa with reference to the existence and location of the things. It is the masurable extent of Akāśa, with reference to different locations. From the slanting loka (tir yak loka), we have the “disa and a anudiśā.”
1 Tarkasangraha p. 2, 9.
Tatra dravyāni prthivyaptejovāyvakāśakāladigatmamanānsi navaiva ... Sabdagunakamākāśam. tatryaikam vibhunityam ca...präcyādi
vyavahāraheturdik. 2 Vaiseșika Sūtra, 2, 2, 13. 3 Nyäyakārikāvali 46, 47. Dürāntikādidhiheturikā nityādigucyate.
Upādhibhedadekāpi prācyādi vyapadeśabhāk. 4 (a) Sadānānda : Vedāntasāra, p. 32.
b) Sāṁkhyakārikā, 3.

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Doh Diśā commences with two points of space of Akāśa, and increasing itself by two-two pradesas, it covers infinite number of pradesas. Anudiśā is a part of Disā. Ūrdhva diśā (upward direction) and adhodiśā (downward direction) begin with four pradeśas and in these, there are four pradeśas till the end. There is no increase in the pradesas.1
The East is a direction which a man, where he is, considers as the direction from which sun rises. The direction in which the sun sets is for him the West. If a man faces the East and expands his both the hands, the direction to the right hand is South and the direction to the left is the North. These directions are conventional measurements based on the sunrise and sun's movement. These are also called tāpadisās.2
In Acaranganiryukti we get another description of directions. It is for astrological purpose. The East would be in front of astrologer (prajñāpaka) the West behind him, the North to his left hand and South to his right hand. This distinction is called
Prajñāpaka
Disā.3
We should remember that Diśā (direction) is not an independent substance. Disa has been conventionally formed for the sake of measuring space and determining directions. Akāśa has infinite pradeśas (points of space). Just as every point in a piece of cloth is necessary for giving pattern, similarly all the pradeśas give a pattern for the empirical measurement of Akāśa. Pradeśa can be considered to be a point of space in which one parmāņu exists. This is the primary limits of measurement. When we measure and determine the directions like East and West, they are only for practical purposes. They are not to be considered as separate entities and we cannot consider the countries, the districts and the other sub-divisions as independent space. It is all one, but it is measured for practical
purposes.
1 Acaranganir yukti, 42, 44.
2 Ibid, 47, 48.
3 Ibid, 51.
4
Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain: Jaina Darsana, p. 174.

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In modern science Akāśa (space) is not to be considered to possess the characteristic of producing sound. Matter has attributes of producing sound. Sound is experienced by the sense organs which are material in nature. Therefore, material particles come into contact with the other material particles and due to the resistance of the material particles, sound is produced. The stimulation of the sound is received by the sense-organ--the ear. Due to this contact, the sound is experienced We cannot consider Ākāśa as the substance having the attribute of sound. Akāśa is not a product nor a mode of a material substance, nor is it extensible nor extendable due to the material substance. According to Sāṁkhya, prakrti is the primordial substance and Prthyī and Akāśa are the products of the prakrti But it is a question worth considering. The products of prak yti like prthvī, water and air and agni etc. have form and how can the product of Akāśa which is also a product of prakrti cannot ha form. The prakrti evolve into a variety of complex of modes to form the universe. The evolution of the prakrti is based on the distru bance in the equilibrium of the three gunas--sattva, rajas and tamas. But the evolutes of prakrti will have different qualitative distinctions as some having form and some formless, if we accept Ākāśa as a product of praksti.
It cannot be said that prakrti gives rise to Ākāśa and we cannot make Ākāśa, the product of prakrti. Because Ākāśa is inactive, formless, endless, and all pervasive. The products of a prakrti arises out of the disturbances in the three guņas and due to the presence of the puruṣa. Puruşa is inactive and pure consciousness. Puruşa is an independent reality and prakrti is to explain the evolution of the entire universe including Ākāśa. This appears to be difficult to understand.
Water, earth and other substances have Ākāśa as the matrix. In the case of water, the particles are little apart and they are bound to be in-between. Therefore, Akāśa accommodates all substances.
BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF AKĀŠA The Buddhist philosophers have considered Ākāśa to be a simple element (asarsak sta dharma). "They have described it as

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having the characteristic of anāvṛtti (non-covering) and āvaraṇābhāva (non-pervasion). It does not pervade anything nor is it covered by any object, those elements which have the attributes of origin and destruction are called samskṛta dharma (composite elements). But the Sarvakṣaṇikavādi Buddhists maintain that Ākāśa is a simple substance and not composite. But it is free from the characteristic of origin and destruction. Vaibhāṣikas describe the nature of Ākāśa as a non-pervasive element, but have its own characteristic." But the question is, is it possible to have an object with empirical characteristic and at the same time not produced? It is possible that we cannot describe the products of Ākāśa in the language of origin and destruction However, Akāśa is eternal and not produced unlike the other four elements like pṛthvī, ap, teja, and vāyu. So, abhidhammasangraha has described Ākāśa in terms of pariccheda (analysis), but Akāśa cannot be purely described in terms of pariccheda, because it is one and continuous and also because in empirical characteristic like origin and destruction are applicable to composite objects (samskrta dharma).
WESTERN CONCEPTION OE SPACE (ĀKĀSA)
The western philosophers have given an elaborate discussion about the reality and nature of space. There are different views. There is the rationalistic approach presented by Descartes and Leibnitz and that is the idealistic view presented by Plato, Aristotle and even upto Kant.
Descartes, Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space as a form of experience. Kant said that space is a form of perception. While Plato, Aristotle and others have said that space is an independent substance. The Jainas have given an independent reality to Ākāša and have considered it as an astikāya because it has the dual characteristic of astitva (existence) and kāyatva (extension).
Regarding the nature of Akāśa as sūnya (empty) or otherwise, philosophers are not agreed. The idealistic philosophers like Kant and others have considered the empty space as possible. Descartes,
1
Abhidharma kosa 1, 5.-Tatrākāśamanāvṛttiḥ.
2 Ibid., 1, 28-Chidramākāśadhātvākhyam ālokatamasi kila.

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Leibnitz and Plato and Aristotle have said that empty space without the content of objects is not possible. The Jainas have advocated the possibility of empty space in their concept of Alokākāśa. But from the phenomenal point of view, Akāśa is always filled.
Regarding the nature of Akāśa, there are different views. Kant and others, as we mentioned earlier, believe that space is a form of perception. It is the matrix on which perception is possible. All experience is possible because of the matrix and space and time. However, Akāśa is not an independent substance. It is an intellectual construct. If it is considered to be an independent reality there would be no distinction between Tswara and Akāśa.1 Ākāśa is jyñātāsāpekṣa (a product of intellect). It is a priori principle and it is cognitively priori which is a postulate.
Observation : The idealist philosphers have considered space as only a product of understanding and that has no independent reality. It is made to be based on cognitive consciousness, it is not in-reality. Even the support of the things that is attributed to Akāśa is a product of intellect. However, the things of the world requires some support and without the concept of Akāśa, we cannot construct the order of the universe, yet it cannot be said to be a mere product of imagination. Because the facts of the world contradict it. The idealist contention that the all-pervasive nature of Ākāśa would lead to the identity of the Iswara and Akāśa is not also correct. Thirdly, Kant said that space is a form of perception and it is intuitive perception. This view, appears to be inadequate, because space is a fact of experience and the things of the world do require a substance which give support to them.2 Euclidian Physiometry and the later mathematical development have proved contrary to the Kantian conception of space as a form of perception. Jainas and Kant agree in one point. In that, they accept the possibility of the empty space.
1 Cosmology, p. 101.
2 Cosmology, p. 97.
3 Refer to (a) Physics and Philosophy-Varanar Haisanavarg,
3
p. 81.
(b) From Euclid to Edington, p. 16-17.
(c) The Philosophy of Space and Time, Introduction, p. 60.

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According to Plato and Aristotle, space is considered as a substance. Plato has said that space is the blank principle. Aristotle would only accept the reality of space in the presence of physical objects. Descartes says that space cannot be considered as an attribute of the object.
Observations: If Akāśa has a reality of its own, it must be different from the physical objects, because physical objects are destructive while Ākāśa is endless. To occupy certain space and to obstruct of certain space are the characteristics of the physical objects, but to give space to these objects is a different thing. Many objects can exist together and the same object may exist in d objects at different times This makes it clear that the object occ
occupying the space, and space accommodating the objects are different subjects. According to Jainas, the substance of Ākāśa can accommodate many objects in one space. Ākāśa is formless, but if it considered in relation to the objects occupying space, it can be described as having form. However, Akāśa cannot inherit the qualities of the objects it accommodates.
Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space, a form of visible objects. Eienstein has considered space as a reality ; infact it is space-time reality.
According to Gasendi, space is a reality independent of matter and the Self. This view is nearer to the Jaina conception of giving independent reality to Akāśa. This has relevance to the scientific conception of space. Newton, like the Jainas, have accepted the reality of space with objects i.e., filled-space as having form.
Space is considered to be without movement (agatiśīla), one and continuous. It is like the void. However, there is a difference between Newtonian and the Jaina conception of space. According to the Newtonian conception, space is indelibly connoted with ether and matter. This is meant to explain the principle of motion. But according to the Jainas the principles of motion and that of rest (Dharma-Adharina dravyas) are independent substances and they are the basis of motion and rest in the universe. These two principles and the Akāśa are not inherent. In this sense, ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of Akāśa. Betrand

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Russell also comes to a similar view. He would like to distinguish the filled space, and empty space on the basis of rigours of logic? KĀLA (TIME) 1895
Jaina philosophers have presented two prominent views regarding the nature of Kala (time). According to one view, Kala is considered to be the mode of substances of Jīva and Ajīva. Kāla is considered to be an independent tattva.
According to the other view, Kāla is an independent substance, just like Jīva and Ajīva. In the same sense Kāla cannot become the expression of change in the objects although it is the medium of change, and Kāla is an independent substance. It is a dravya although it is not an astikāya, because it is not multi-dimensional but it is only uni-dimensional.
In the Svetämbara Āgama literature, there is the mention of both the views in Bhagavati,1 Uttaradhyayana, Jivabhigama3 and Prajñāpanā.4 Later Acarya Umasvati, Siddhasena Diväkara, Jinabhadragani, Haribhadrasūri,a Acārya Hemachandra, Upadhyāya Yasovijaya,10 Vinayavijaya,11 Devacandra,12 and other Svetambara ācāryas have mentioned both the views. Digambara ācāryas like Kundakunda, 18 Pūjyapāda,14 Bhattāraka Akalaṁkadeva 15 and Vidyanandasvāmi16 have mentioned that Kāla is an independent substance.
1 Bhagavati 25, 4, 734.
2 Uttaradhyayana, 28, 7-8,
3 Jivabhigama.
4 Prajñāpanā, pada 1, Sutra 3.
5
141
Tattvärthasūtra 5, 38-39 and see its bhāṣya by Siddhasena. 6 Dvātrimśikā.
7 Viseṣāvasyaka bhāṣya 926 and 2068.
8 Dharmasangrahaṇī, Gāthā 32 tīkā by Malayagiri.
9 Yogaśāstra.
10 Dravyaguṇaparyāya rāsa, see Prakaraṇa Ratnākara, pt. I, Gāthā 10, Lokaprakāśa.
11
12 Nayacakrasara and Agamasāra.
13 Pravacanasara, 2, gāthā 46-47.
14 Tattvarthasarvärthasiddhi 5, 38-39.
15 Tattvärtharājavārtika, 5, 38-39. 16 Tattvarthaślokavārtika, 5, 38-39.

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According to the first view of Kala, the measurable distance like samaya, muhurta, day and night are the modes of Kāla from the practical point of view. The modes are special features of the substances jīva and ajīva. In the constitution of the world, Jiva and Ajiva are the constituent principles and both of them are expressed in the form of modification. These modifications and their clusters are considered as Kāla. Kala by itself is not an independent substance.1
According to the second view, Kala is an independent substance. Just as Dharma and Adharma as principles of motion and rest are independent substances Jiva and Ajīva have their functions of movement and rest. But the movement and rest is possible in the medium of the principle of movement i. e. Dharma and the principle of rest. The two are independent substances. Similarly, time is a substance and change is possible in time.2
However, the two views mentioned above are not contrary to each other, but they are complement to each other. From noumenal point of view, Kala is abode of the Jiva and the Ajiva and not an independent substance. But from phenomenal point of view Kala is a substance. It is considered a substance because of its functions. The functions of Kala can be mentioned as change, effect, activity, the one and the other etc. For this reason, Kala is considered as dravya. The changes in the various objects are possible in time. The conventional measurements of time like samaya and avalika are not different from jīva and ajīva. They are the modes of these substances.
From the noumenal point of view, Kala need not be considered as an independent substance. By making Kala the mode of the substances of Jiva and Ajiva, the phenomenal existence can be explained. But from practical point of view, Kala has been considered as an independent substance just as Jiva-Ajīva and their modes are considered.
1 Pandit Sukhalālji: Darśana aur Cintana, p. 331.
2 Pandit Sukhalālji : Darśan aur Cintana, p. 332.
3 (a) Bhagavatī 2, 10, 120; 11, 11, 424; 13, 4, 482-483; 25, 4 etc. (b) Prajñāpanā, pada 1.
(c) Uttaradhyayana 28, 10.
4 Sthānangasūtra 95.

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If we survey the Jaina literature regarding the constitution of the Loka i. e., the universe, we find that there are two views mentioned. The first view maintains that the universe is constituted of six substances ($addravyas, and the other view advocates the constitution of the universe as made up of five principles, pañcāstikāya.2 However, according to Dalsukhabhāi Malavaņiā, the view of six dravyas mentioned in the Uttarādhyayana may be considered as an exception. In the Sverāmbara literature like Śthānānga, Jivābhigama," Bhagavatī, and Pañcāstikāya,” in Digambara literature, it is suggested that the universe is constituted of 5 principles (pañcā. stikāya).
Uttarādh yayanas and Dharmasangrahaņi have described Kāia as of the measure of two and a half dvipa (islands). In fact Kāla has relevance in the world of men and also in the astronomical and astrological calculations. The rotations and evolutions of planets are possible in time. In this sense, Kāla has relevance with reference to human intellect.
In the Digambara literature Kāla is not merely considered as an aspect of or an expression of human intellect with reference to human activity, but it is also pervading the entire universe.
It may be noted that although Kāla is a substance, it is not a substance like the other five substances having extensional dimensions. It is not a substance having the characteristics of skandha
1 Uttarādhyayana, 28, 7–
Dhammo adhammo āgāsam kālo puggala-jantavo.
Esa logo tti pannatto jinehim varadamsihi. 2 Bhagavatī 13, 4, 481.
(a) kimiyam bhante ! loyetti payuccas ? Goyamā, pañcatthikāyā.
(b) Pañcāstikāya, gāthā 3. 3 Agama yug kā Jaina-darśana, p. 214. 4 Sthānānga, 5, 3, 441. 5 Jivābhigama, 4. 6 Bhagavatī 13, 4, 481.
Pañcāstikāya, Gatha 3, 8 Uttarādhyayana, 36, 7,
Dammādhamme ya do ceva logamitta viyāhie. Logāloge ya ägāse, samaye samaya-khettię.

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It has no
It is
(aggregate of atoms), but it is of the nature of the anu. magnitude, therefore it has no kāyatva. It is not an astikāya. non-dimensional. The time series are always in forward direction (ūrdhva pracaya). It is a linear series.1 The span of Kāla is considered to be uni-dimensional. Dharma and Adharma and the pañca dravyas except Kāla have three dimensional forms. In these, there are aggregates of many points that Kala always moves in one direction, it is forward-looking. Every point of time is discrete and at a particular moment of time the present alone exists and the past has gone and the future has to come. Therefore, here is only one samaya every time. Therefore, there is no possibility of aggregate of time (skandha). As it is mono-dimensional, it cannot present a reverse direction i. e., tiryak pracaya. Therefore kala is not considered an astikāya. FORMS OF TIME (KĀLA)
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}
Sthānānga2 mentions four types of Kala: 1. pramāņa kāla, (measurable time), 2. Yathayunirvṛttikala (life span time of a jīva) 3. Maraṇakāla (moment of death) and 4. Addhākāla (time relative to the movement of sun and moon).
Conventional measurement of Kāla is impossible and is possible through the changes in the objects. The life and death are two relative spans of time. The duration of life is considered as yathayunirvṛtti kāla and the cessation of the duration of life is death and is called the maraṇakāla.
The measurement of time based on the revolutions of the sun and the moon is called the addhākāla. It is a primary distinction of measurement of time. The other distinctions are forms of this distinction. This is the phenomenal measurement of time with a practical purpose of determining the span of time. Therefore, this is restricted to the human world and it is meant to measure the various distinctions of time for human activities. We have already said that the real time i. e., niscaya kāla, is the mode of jīva and ajīva. And it is all pervading both in the Loka and Aloka. There are no divisions in real time. All the divisions from samaya to

1
Dravyasangraha, 22. 2 Sthānanga 4.

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pudgala-parāvartana are made of the addhākāla. The minutest division of kāla is samaya. It is indivisible. It can be described on tbe analogy of a hole in the kamalapatra or a hole in a piece of cloth.
If the 100 petals of lotus are kept one over another and if one is to pierce a needle so as to penetrate all the petals, it may appear that all of them have been penetrated simultaneously. But this does not happen. Every petal is pierced successively within the minutest fraction of time and that samaya which takes to pierce one petal is the unit.
As a strong man, you may tear a piece of cloth at once. It may appear that the piercing was done simultaneously, but this was not so. Every thread is torn at every fraction of time and that is the smallest unit of time.
In short, a piece of cloth is woven into large number of threads and each thread is constituted as the infinite points of cotton. When the piece of cloth is torn, every point of cotton and every thread needs to be torped separately and each requires an indivisible and minutest fraction of time and this is called samaya.
We may now mention the conventional measurements of time for the purpose of human activities from samaya, the smallest unit, to the largest unit of anantakālacakra. The indivisible minutest fraction of time
-one samaya Infinite number of samayas
--one avalikā 256 avalikās -one kşullaka bhava (the shortest life span)
2223 3773 avalikas
-one breath (inhaling and exhaling) 4446 3779 avalikās
| -one prāņa Sadhika 17 ksullaka bhava or-one breath 7 pranas
-one stoka 7 stoka
-one lava 381 lava.
-one ghațī (24 minutes)
Į Bhagavatī, 11, 11.

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77 lavas
-2 ghați or -65536 kşullaka bhava or 16777216 avalikā or
-3773 prāna or
-one muhurta (48 minutes) 30 muhurta
- one day and a night 15 days
-one pakşa (fortnight) 2 pakşas
-one mäsa (month) 2 māsa
-one rtu (season) 3 rtu
one ayana 2 a yana
--one year 5 years
-One yuga 70 crore-crores, 56 lakhs krore years -one pūrva Innumerable years
-one palyopama 10 Crore-crore palyopama
-one sāgara 20 Crore-crore sāgara
-one kālacakra Anantakālacakra
-one pudgala parāvartana THE NATURE OF KALA IN THE VEDIC TRADITION
The term Kāla has been used at many places in the Vedas and Upanişads. But we do not get a clear picture of the exact meaning of the Käla in all these references.
Kaņāda in the Vaisesika darśana has presented four sūtras for describing the principle of Kāla. He says that Kāla is substance, it is eternal and it is the ground of all activities. In the Nyāya philosophy Gautama has not given an independent interpretation about the nature of Kāla. Incidentally, he has described the nature of Kāla as the ground of all activities. Just as Vaiseșikas have done, the Nyāya-Vaiseşkas have a similar view of Kāla.
In the Pūrva-mīmāṁsă there is not much discussion about the nature of the Kāla. Jaimini has not given specific references regarding
1 See-Upanişad vākya koşa. 2 Vaiseșikadarśana 2, 2, 6-9.
Aparasminnaparam ugapacciram kşi pramiti kālalingāni. Dravyatva nityatve vāyunā vyākhyātam. Tattvaw bhāvāna Nityes
vabhāvādanit yeșu bhāvātkāraṇe kālākhyeti. 3 Pañcādhyāyi 2, 1, 23.
Digdesakālākāśeșvapyevau prasangaḥ.

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147 the nature of the Kāla. However, the commentator like Pārthasārathi and Pandit Rāmakrisņa, i have discussed this problem of time and have largely accepted the Vaiseșika concept of time, with certain' modifications in that, Vaiseșikas consider kāla to be indirect in cognition, while mīmāṁsakas make direct cognition. In this sense, we can say that Nyāya-Vaiseșika and pūrva-mimarnsa maintain the time as an independent substance.
According to Sāṁkhya, puruşa and the prakrti are the two fundamental principles, Ākāśa, diśā (direction), mind etc. are nothing but the products of prakrti. There is no independent substance like time, but it is only an expression of prakrti. Prakrti is eternal, yet it has its changing aspects. The gross and subtle matter are expres. sions of praksti.
In the Yoga philosophy, Patañjali has not discussed prominently the nature of time. But the commentator Vyāsa, in his commentary, has made specific mention of the time. He says that measurable units of time like muhūrta, prahara, day etc. are phenominal measurements of time and for practical purposes they are products of intellectual discrimination. We make distinctions in the different spans of time on the basis of minutest units of a kşana (moment). Ksana is real but it is not the fundamental substance. It is the ground of change, and the minutest unit on which change is measured is kşaņa He shows that kşaņa can be measured by the time-span taken by an atom to reverse form from one point to the other. In the Yoga philosophy, also like the Sāṁkhya, prakrti is considered to be unconscious, but active. Activity is the inherent characteristic of prakrti and therefore it does not need any other force to bring activity in prak yti. But the ground of activity and not the cause can be considered to be the principle of time. It is only an efficient cause, it is to be understood as a principle on account of which change can be
1
Yuktisnehaprapūraņī siddhāntacandrikā, 1, 1, 5, 5. Näsmākam vaiseșika devada pratyakṣaḥ kālaḥ, kintu prat yakşa evaw, asminkşane mayopalabdha it yanubhavāt. arūpas yāàpyākāśavat prat yakşatvam bhavişyati. Sārnkhya pravacana 2, 12-Dikkālāvākāśādibhyah.
2

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measured. However, unlike Vaiseşikas, Sankhya and Yoga darśanas, do not make Kāla as an independent substance.
Vedanta darśana is also called Uttaramīmārnsä or aupanişdika darsana. The propounder of this school of thought was Bādarāyaṇa. Bādarāyaṇa has not discussed the naiure of time but sankarācārya has presented his theory of absolutism. According to him, Brahman is the only reality. Ātman is the Brahman, all else is appearance. According to this theory, substances like ākāśa, atoms, etc. are not independent reality. However, as we have seen earlier other Vedāntins like the Visistādvaitins, of Rāmānuja school of thought and other forms of Vedāntins like Nimbārka, Madhva, Vallabha, etc. have given their interpretation of the relation of the Brahman and the Ātman although the foundational principle of the Brahman as the sole reality continues to determine their interpretations of the Brahman. They have not considered Kāla as an independent substance. All the Vedāntins along with the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga are agreed that the Kāla is a form of perception and is not an independent substance. Thus we have two views regarding the substance Kala in the Jaina philosophy. Similarly in the Vedic tradition, we have also two views, the one advocating the time as an independent substance and the other denying the independent substantially to Kāla (time).
THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KALA (TIME)
The Buddhists consider time as a mental construct for the sake of the practical purpose. Time is not an independent substance. It is an only experience. It is a cognition. The past, the present, the future are all phenomenal distinctions of time made for practical purposes and they are not real time.
1
Darsana ane Cintana, part 2, p. 1028-Bhāşya of Yogadarśana, pāda 3, sūtra 52. Atthśālini 1, 3, 16.
2

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li.. Pudgala (Matter): A Study
WHAT IS MATTER What the scientists call matter and what Nyāya-Valgesika call the physical universe (jada), the Jainas call it Pudgala. In the Buddhist philosophy, the word pudgala has been used to connote alaya, vijiāna, cetanāsantati etc. In the Jaina ägamas, atman embodied and associated with matter is also sometimes called Pudgala, but primarily the word pudgala refers to the substance with form. Of the six substances, five of them, except Kāla, are called Astikāya, because they have extension and astitva. Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, and Akāśa do not possess characteristics of integration (saryoga) and disintegration (vibhāga). Its distinctions are denoted by means of atoms. If we imagine the extension, if possible of the four substances, we can find that Jiva, Dharma and Adharma ave innumerable parts, while Akāśa is indivisible and endless.
ala is not indivisible. The minutest part of Pudgala is paramānu i. e, atom, and the biggest part of the Pudgala is the entire cosmos. Atom can be considered as micro-cosm and cosmos can be looked at as macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as mahāskandha and as pervading the entire universe. For this reason also, Pudgala is considered to have the characteristics of integration and disintegration (pūraņa-galana).
TERMINOLOGY OF PUDGALA The term Pudgala has two parts-pud and gala. Pud refers to
1
Bhagayati 8, 10, 361– Jīveņam ! poggalī, poggale ? Jive poggalīvi, poggalevi. Śabdakalpadruma koşa-In the fifth temporal stage (sama ya) of kevalinasamudghāta the matter that is separated from the ātman pervades the entire universe and it is called “acittamahāskandha."

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completing or joining, 'gala' refers to dropping or finishing. The substance which has the characteristic of constantly integrating and disintegrating i.e, joining and separating, forming and separating is called pudgala, Tattvärtharājavārtika2, Tattvārthavṛtti of Siddhasena,3 Dhavala and the Harivamsapurāṇa have stated that due to the characteristic of integration and disintegration, the substance Pudgala is considered to be matter. Pudgala is that substance which can be divided and also combined. Pudgala has the attributes such as sparsa (touch), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and varna (colour).
PUDGALA IS RUPI
In this sense, Pudgala is an object of sense-experience. As it has the attributes of rasa, gandha, etc. it is called rūpī or rūpavān (having form). The objects with form can be experienced and cognised through the sense-organs. Objects without form cannot be experienced through the sense-organs. For instance, substances like Jīva, Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Kāla are formless and we cannot get the experience of these through the sense-organs.
A question arises, namely, that as the Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha etc. can we say that these attributes are inherent attributes of the substance Pudgala or are they products of experience and imposed by the mind on substance?
The answer is, Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha, etc. The sense-organs do not impose these attributes on matter. Matter has the inherent characteristics of these varna, rasa, etc. Without
1 Sabdakalpadrumkoṣa-Pūraṇāt pud galayatīti gālaḥ. Tattvärtharajavārtika 5, 1, 24
2
Pūraṇagalananyarthasaṁjñatvāt pudgalaḥ.
3 (a) Tattvarthavṛtti 5, 1-Pūraṇād galanācca pudgalāḥ. (a) Nyāyakośa, p. 502-Pūraṇād galanād iti pudgalāḥ.
4 Dhavala-Chavihasanthanam bahuvihi dehehi pūraditti galaditti
poggalā.
5 Harivaṁśapurana 7, 36
Varna-gandha-rasa-sparśaḥ-püranam galanam ca yat.
Kurvanti skandhavat tasmat pudgalāḥ paramānavaḥ.
6 (a) Tattvärthasūtra 5, 23-Sparśarasagandhavarnavantaḥ pudgalāḥ. (b) Bhagavati, 2, 10.

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these attributes, matter has no existence at all. It is true that experience of these qualities is due to the contact of matter with the sense-organs. But it does not mean that these attributes are not in the matter. The relation is between the sense-organs and varnṇa-rasa is not between the cause and effect, but between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. Similarly, sense-organs are not the products of varṇa and rasa. Both of them have independent existence. They, however, interact on each other.
There is another question regarding the experience of illusions. If colour and taste are inherent attributes of substance, how is it that experiences of these attributes with different individuals differ and how is it that there are illusions, concerning the colour, taste, etc ? How is it that there are differences in the experience of taste and colour according to the differences in individual capacities, place and time etc ?
The answer is, it is true that these experiences of colour, taste, etc., may be different with different individuals and also in different circumstances. The causes are twofold (1) internal and (2) external The internal cause refers to the differences in the sense-organs, and the external causes are concerned with external stimulations. Due to these two types of causes, we experience diffences in the experience of rasa, gandha, etc. For instance, a person suffering from jaundice sees everything yellow. A colour-blind man will see everything grey. Similarly, our experiences of the melody and the music depend upon our mental get up. If we are in a bad mood, the music drags on. Such differences of experiences are also possible due to the differences in the intensity and the extent of the stimulations that the sense-organs receive from the external world. For instance, bright light may give different stimulations and discordant music may also give different stimulations for the harmonious music. Due to these differences in the external stimulations, we experience objects differently. These differences in experience are therefore due to the internal and external causes. However, the attributes of rasa, gandha etc. are inherently present in the substance. Without these attributes, substance cannot exist. Substance is the substratum of the attributes and the attributes are equally real and independent. The Jainas maintain the distinct relationship between the substance and the attributes.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY S THE FOUR TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)
Matter (Pudgala) is a substance and it is of four divisions (bheda) : (1) aggregate (skandha), (2) skandha deśa (aggregate occupying space), (3) skandha pradeśa (aggregate occupying limited space), (4) paramāņu (atoms).1 SKANDHA: y V1
The unit of formed matter (murta dravya) is skandha. It is the aggregate of atoms, i.e., from two atoms to infinite number of atoms arise. In the skandha, we find the integration and disintegration of paramānus. Similarly, the aggregates also may join with atoms, and that would be one skandha. If two atoms combine, the aggregate is called dvi-pradesī. And if the dvi-pradeśī skandha is divided, we get two atoms.
If three atoms are combined we get three-pradeśī skandha. If they are separated, we get either three paramāņus or one paramāņu and dyi-pradesi skandha.
If four atoms are combined, it is called Catuḥpradeśī skandha. If they are separated we get the following forms :
1. One atom and one three-atomed aggregate (three pradeśī skandha).
2. Two dvi-pradeśī skandhas (aggregates of two atoms each). 3. Two atoms each separate and one dvi-pradesī skandha. 4. Four atoms separate each.
Sometimes, infinite number of atoms combine and they form the cosmos.
The aggregates of atoms are called skandha. Skandha formation is of three types: (1) bhedapūrvaka (having distinctions) (2) sanghāta pūrvaka (collection), (3) Bheda and sanghāta pārraka (with distinctions and collection.)
The distinctions are possible due to internal and external causes. The internal causes, for the distinction between the one skandha and the other do not depend on any external factors. The
1 (a) Bhagavatī, 2, 10, 66.
(b) Uttarādhyayana, 36, 10. 2 Tattvārthasūtra 5, 26—Bhedasanghātebhya utpadyante. 3 Sarvārthasiddhi, 5, 26.

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153 causes are inherent in the skandhas themselves. The external causes are due to some external factors, and these are called skandhas formed due to external causes.
Formation of unity of different elements is called sanghäta. This is due to the external causes or the internal causes. Two different atoms combine and they form a sanghāta. The aggregates formed due to the distinctions (bheda) and sanghāta (union) are called bheda-sanghāta pūrvaka skandha. For instance, at a particular moment one part of the skandha gets separated and at the same time another skandha comes and joins it and forms a new skandha then this skandha is called the skandha due to distinction and union.
In this way, the skandhas are formed in three different ways. The aggregate may be formed only by bheda or only by sanghāta or sometimes due to both the processes.
In modern science, the concept of aggregate has been designated as molecule and it is very much discussed in the physical sciences. It has been pointed out that physical objects are formed due to the aggregates. These molecules have tremendous velocity in various directions in the gases and in the aggregate skandha. For instance, a piece of chalk is considered to be an aggregate of atoms and molecules. If it is divided into two parts and further divided into two parts and in this way if we divide the piece of atoms into infinite parts, the nature of the chalk remains essentially as chalk. The minutest part of the chalk-piece is also skandha. But as we go on dividing a piece of object, we may reach a point where it cannot be further divided. That is the indivisible unit of the object and that is also an aggregate skandha. In this sense, the Jaina concept of skandha and the modern concept of aggregate (molecule) have some similarities although there are some differences. According to Jainism, one unit or collection of units of atoms is called skandha : it may be a pot or a table or a book. If the pot is broken into two pieces, then also there are two skandhas and if it is broken into thousand pieces, there are thousand skandhas. Similarly, if we grind the pot into powder, each particle of the powder is a skandha. Modern science considers such a particle as one skandha also, It is a molecule. But, if we go further, the indivisible part looses its characteristics of a pot and may form as a part of something else. According

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to Jainism, however, the minutest part of the pot is also a skandha. It does not change the characteristic of a pot in the skandha, as long it does not reach the stage of an atom. The minutest parts of an aggregate are aggregate. SKANDHA-DEŠA:
Skandha (aggregate of atoms) may be considered as one unit. This unit can be measured intellectually as one unit (through out our intellect) and is called skandha-desa. If we imagine that this is a part of one pencil or a book it is considered to be ekadesa skandha. It means that deśa and skandha are not separate. They are only discriminations made due to intellect. If they actually are separated, then they become separate skandhas. SKANDHA-PRADEŠA ::
The inseparable unit of a skandha is called skandha-pradeśa. It means the paramāņu having the capacity to combine may be considered as skandha-pradeśa. It is the indivisible part, most subtle and which cannot be further divided. PARAMĀŅU :
The indivisible unit of a skandha is called paramānu. As long as it has the tendency to combine, it is considered to be pradeśa and if it becomes separate and remains separate, it is called paramāņu. The commentators on Jaina sastra have explained the nature of paramānu in different ways. Paramāuu pudgalai (matter), is indivisible (avibhājya), is indestructible (acchedya), cannot be pierced (abhedya), adāhya (cannot be burnt), agrāhya (cannot be grasped). We cannot have divisions of paramānu by any means even with the sharpest of the instruments. It can remain on the tip of a sharp sword and remain uncut. Fire cannot burn it. The rains cannot make it wet. The great Ganges cannot wash it away. The paramāuu as the minutest particle has no parts, does not occupy definite space and has neither beginning nor end. It is neither long nor short, neither big nor small. It has one definite form. As it is subtle, it is
12 Bhagavati 5, 7. 13 Bhagavati 5, 7--Paramāņu poggale nam bhante ! kim sa-addhe,
samajjhe, sapaese udāhu-aņaddhe amajjhe apaese ? Goyamā! anadąhe, amajjhe, apaese, no sa-aďdhe, no samajjhe, no sapaese.

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filhlit.
itself the middle, the beginning and the end. It occupies a point oi space. That which has the beginning, the end, and the middle in itself and is not possible to grasp it through the sense-experience, has no parts and that minutest particle is paramāņu. In the Pañcāstikāya sāra,8 we get the description of some of the characteristics of paramāņu. Paramāņu is that particle of matter which has one colour (varna), one smell (gandha), one taste (rasa) and two sparśa. A paramāņu is the cause of producing the sound, but by itself it has no sound. It is different from aggregate of paramāņu. In the paramāņu, the senses of colour, smell, taste and touch are present in specific degrees. But it does not have the sense of space (kşetrendriya). The šabda or word is an expression of the aggregate (skandha) in the form of sound. Paramānu is the cause of sabda, but it is not possible to say that one atom is the object of the sense of sight, smell, and other indriyas. Yet these senses coming from the sense-organs are the basic characteristics of paramāņu.
The distinction of pradeśa and paramāņu from skandha can be explained with reference to the non-differentiation (aprthakbhāva) and differentiation (Prthakbhāva).
THE FIRST DISCUSSION OF PARAMAŅU IN INDIA
In the Jaina āgama literature, is given an elaborate discussion about the nature of paramāņu. According to the Jaina pbilosophers, whatever differentiations and non-differentiation, integration and disintegration in the things take place--all these are possible due to the coming together and separation of jīva and paramāņu.
Some of the western philosophers are of the opinion that the atomic theory mentioned in some school of Indian philosophy has been borrowed from the ancient Greek thought. But this view does not appear to be satisfactory. There is no evidence for this. In Greek philosophy Democrates was the founder of the atomic theory, and he appears to have lived in the 5th century B. c. i.e. 460 to
1 Rajavartika 5, 25, 1-Sauksmyādyah ātmamadhyāḥ ātmāntāsca. 2 Sarvārthasiddhi, commentary, Sūtra 5, 25. 3 Pañcāstikāyasāra
Ek rasa, varņa, gandha, dvispa śa śabdakāranamaśabdam. Skandhāntaritam dravyam, paramāņu tam vijānīhi.

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371 B. C.1 The Greek theory of atomism has certain similarities with the Jaina theory of atomism. But there are certain fundamental differences between the two. According to the Jainas, the nature of atom is unconscious. But Democrates and Cārvāka in Indian thought have mentioned that what we call atman or self is only the subtlest form of atom.
It has been mentioned by Śivadatta Jṇānī that atomism is the speciality of only the Vaiseşikas. The roots of atomic theory as propounded by Vaiseşika system can be traced to the Upanisads. Jainas and Ājīvakas have given references to the atomic theory, but it was Kanada who gave a systematic explanation of the doctrine of atomic theory. But considered from subjective point of view, it can be said that Vaiseșika atomic theory was not prior to the Jaina theory of atomism and unlike the Jaina theory, Vaiseṣikas have given specific details about the nature of the atomic theory. The term aņu was used in the Upanisads. It reads "Anoraṇīyān, mahato mahiyān", but there is no mention of paramāņu in the Upanisads, nor is there any discussion about the paramāņu theory.
Dr. Jacobi is of the opinion that the mention of the atomic theory in the Upanisads and also in the philosophical literature of the Upanisads is very little and therefore in the Vedantic literature, there is a refutation of the atomic theory as supposed to have been mentioned in the Upanisads. In the Samkhya-Yogadarsana, atomic theory has not been accepted. And Samkhya-Yogadarsanas claim to be as old as the Vedas. But the atomic theory is an integral part of the Vaiseşikas, and the Nyaya philosophers have accepted Vaiseşika theory of atomism. Both these schools of philosophy, the Vedantic and the Nyaya-Vaiseṣikas belong to the Vedic tradition. Jainas and Ajivakas are considered to be non-Vedic in tradition. Jacobi says that he considered that Jaina theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism has its theory of atomism on the theory of matter. Modern philosophers have accepted the view that the atomic theory was first presented in a systematic form by the Jainas.1
1 Paschimi Darśana by Divānchand.
2 Bharatiya Samskṛti, p. 229.
3 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Part II, p. 199-200. 4 Darśanaśāstra kā Itihāsa, (Hindi), p. 129.

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TWO FORMS OF PARAMAŅU We have already seen that paramānu is indivisible, indestructible, inaccessible to senses and it cannot be burnt, nor can it be divided into parts. The description of these characteristics might trace some difficulty in the minds of modern scientists, because modern science has shown that paramāņu is not indivisible, it can be split,
If it is to be said that paramāņu is not indivisible, we cannot call it “Parama-aņu”. Modern science has shown that what we call paramānu, can be split. We do not deny this aspect of the nature of the paramānu as that which can be split. What we need is the recognition of the view that the Paramānu is the ultimate indivisible unit and it can be split. A satisfactory answer for this can be found in the Anuyogadvāra. There it has been suggested that paramānu has two forms: 1. sükşma paramāņu (subtle), and vyavahāra paramāņu (paramāņu from the practical sense).
The description of the paramānu as indivisible, indestructible etc. refers to sūksma paramāņu. Vyāvahārika paramāņu consists of aggregate of endless sükşma paramāņus.
Really speaking the aggregate of sūkşma paramānu is the nucleus of paramāņu (paramāņupiņqa). This cannot be grasped from ordinary or normal sense as it is subtle. And it cannot be split by ordinary instrument or weapon. As it is sūksma in effect, it is considered to be paramāņu from the practical point of view. And what the science calls 'atom' is the vyāvahārika paramānu (paramāņu from the practical sense). Therefore, Jainas also consider that if it is to split, it is practical paramāņu.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUDGALA Pudgala has four primary characteristics : (1) sparsa (touch), (2) rasa (taste), (3) gandha (smell) and (4) varna (colour). In every paramānu of the matter these four characteristics are present. These
1 Anuyogadvāra (pramāṇadvāra) —Paramāņu duvihe pannatte, tam
jahā-suhumeya, vavahāriyeya. 2 Anuyogadvāra (pramāņadvāra). Anantānam suhumaparamāņu pog
galānam samudayasamiti samāgayeņam vavahāriye paramāņupoggale nipphajjanti,

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY characteristics express themselves to twenty qualities. They are
(1) Sparsa (touch)-(i) šita (cold), (ii) uşņa (hot), (iii) rūkşa (rough), (iv) snigdha (oily or viscouse nature), (v) laghu (light), (vi) guru (heavy), (vii) mrdu (soft) and (viii) kathora (hard).
(2) Rasa (taste)-(i) amla (acid), (ii) madhura (sweet), (iii) kažu (sour) (iv) kaşāya (bitter), (v) tikta (astringent).
(3) Gandha (smell)–(i) Sugandha (fragrance), (ii) durgandha (foul smell).
(4) Varņa (colour)--(i) Krişna(black), (ii) nila (blue), (iii) rakta (red), (iv) pita (yellow) and (v) sveta (white).
We find the Samsthāna (formation), parimaņdala (globular), vrtta (circular), tryamșa (triangular) caturarśa (square) and āyata (rectangular) in Pudgala. Still these are not the real characteristics of the paramānu.1 These are the modes or form of paramāņu.
The twenty characteristics of Pudgala mentioned above, can be considered in respect of its measurement and intensity into three distinctions, as (1) sankhyāta (measureable), asankhyāta immeasurable) and (3) ananta (endless).
From the point of view of substance, paramāņu is partless and indivisible, but from the point of the view of modes, it is not so. Considered from the point of view of modes, the four characteristics of varņa, rasa, gandha and sparsa have their infinite modifications.3 We have already seen that paramānu has the four characteristics as mentioned with its sub-divisions like śīta, uşņa and snigdha, rūkşa etc. Considered from the point of view of modes, we find a paramāņu with infinite modes can become a paramāņu of one mode. And paramānu with one mode can express iiself into many modes. And paramāņu, according to the Jaina theory one paramāņu can transform itself from one attribute of varņa to rasa and to gandha to sparsa. The same is the case with the others.
The matter with one quality can remain in that stage approximately from one samaya to a sankhyāta kāla (innumerable points 1 Bhagavatī, 25, 3. 2 Sarvārthasiddhi 5, 23. 3 Sthānānga 4, 135-Cauvvihe poggalapariņāme pannate, tam jaha
vannapariņāme, gandhapariņāme, rasapariņāme, phāsapariņāme.

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of time). The same is the case in the case of transformation of paramāņus of two qualities to ananta qualities. All the modifications in the paramāņu on the basis of qualities are natural expressions of the modifications.
THE FOUR TYPES OF PARAMĀŅU
We have already seen that paramāņu is indivisible and without parts. But it has been suggested that other substances have their minutest parts which are intellectual constructs and they are also called paramāņus. In this sense, we can say that there four types of paramāņu as:
(substance
paramāņu)
-pudgala
(1) Dravya paramāņu paramāņu (material paramāņu).
(2) Kşetra paramāņu (space paramāņu) —ākāśa paramāņu. (3) Kāla paramāņu (time)—samaya (definite span of time). (4) Bhāva paramāņu-attribute.
Bhāva paramāņu is of four types as varna-guṇa, gandha-guṇa, rasa-guna, sparśa-guņa (colour, smell, taste and touch).
There are 16 sub-divisions of these qualities like
Madhura (sweet) Katuka (sour)
10.
11. Kaṣāya (bitter)
1. Krsna (black) 2. Nila (blue)
3. Rakta (red)
4.
Pita (yellow)
5. Sveta (white)
9.
12. Tikṣṇa (sharp) 13.
14.
6. Sugandha (fragrant)
7. Durgandha (foul smell) 15. 8. Tikta (astringent)
16.

Uşna (hot)
Śīta (cold)
Rūkṣa (rough) Snigdha (oily or viscouse nature)
These sub-divisions are one quality divisions (Ek-guņa). In short we can say according to the Jaina conception of paramāņu the paramāņu possess the four qualities mentioned above.
PARAMĀŅU INACCESSIBLE TO SENSES (ATINDRIYATĀ)
Paramāņu is not accessible to sense experience through the sense-organs, but it is not formless. It has form. It is so subtle that even when it has form, it cannot be grasped by the senses. It can only be seen through intuition or the higher perception.
1 Bhagavati 5, 7,

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The omniscient souls (kevalajñānī) can see the all substances, having form and formless. In the chadmastha stage of guṇasthāna where there is the destruction-cum-subsidence of karma and which is partial, one can know the paramāņu and also may not know it. One who has clairvoyant knowledge (avadhijñāna) can see the objects with form upto a particular distance, can know the paramāņu but one who can see only through the sense-organs cannot see the paramāņu.1 FORMATION OF SKANDHA
Imagine for a moment that each paramāņu is independent, isolated like a brick, then the problem arises how the combination of paramāņus and their integration bring the formation of mahākāyaskandha, the cosmos. When we construct a house, we keep the bricks one upon the other plastered with cement etc. But the cosmos is formed by its own principles of necessities and not by any external agency or intelligence. As the sky becomes laden with clouds and again becomes clear so also the skandhas are formed and are separated by their own nature. Still the problem remains-what is the object of such combination and disintegration of skandhas and
atoms?
The universe as we see is material in nature and is due to the integration of the paramāņus. Paramāņus combine into skandha, and skandhas combine to form the visible and gross objects. In Pudgala we find the inherent forces of integration and disintegration. When paramāņus integrate skandhas are formed and by the integration and disintegration of the skandhas different objects are formed. These forces of disintegration and integration are natural to matter and these forces are also operative due to the jivas, as jīvas are active. If the Pudgala has not possessed the inherent attribute of integration, paramāņus would have remained isolated, and if the force of disintegration were not in operation then the paramāņus, would have been found in an unorganised cluster. The cosmos would not be possible and there would be no use of the paramāņus and skandhas for the jivas.
1
Bhagavati: 18, 8.
2 Sthānānga 2, 221-225, Dohim thānehim poggalā sāhannanti-sayam vā poggală săhannanti parena vā poggalā sāhannanti, evam bhijjanti parisaḍanti, parivaḍanti viddhansanti.

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- According to the Jaina science, the formation of skandha has been explained in the scientific way on the basis of the principle of chemical composition.
The formation of skandha can be explained in the following process :
1. The paramānus combine themselves into due to their characterstics of viscousity. The separation of the atoms out of the skandhas is due to the attribute of roughness.
2. The paramāņus which are alike having snigdha come together and form into skandha. (If the two paramānus have the viscousity to a degree less than two, then the combination is not possible).
3. A paramānu which is viscous and the paramāņu which is dried, if they come together it is possible to form skandha. (In these cases the intensity of dryness should be more than two degrees).
4. Viscous and the dry paramāņus form skandha even when they belong to different categories.
In all these, there is one point of exception i.e., that paramāņus cannot form skandha if the dryness and the viscousity are of one degree difference.
In other words, (i) The parts which have different characteristics (jaghanya guņa) do not form into a combination.
(ii) The paramāņus with identical attributes like either the viscous or dry cannot form a combination.
(iii) The two coming together would form a combination.1
The Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras have expressed difference of opinion regarding the formation or combination of skandhas. According to the Svetāmbara tradition, if two paramāņus with viscous nature having abonimable attributes (jaghanya guņa) comes together there would be no bandha (combination), but if one paramāņu consisting abonimable attributes and the other of unabominable attributes (ajaghanya guņa) there would be a combination form; but the Digambaras maintain even if one paramāņu is of (jaghanya guna) there would be no bandha. According to Svetāmbaras in the formation of parts and from one part to the other the attributes of vis1 Tattvārthasūtra, 5, 32-35.

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cousity and the dryness vary in increasing degrees from two, three, four, upto endless gunas, then also, the combination is possible; but by the increase of one degree only bandha is not possible. But according to the Digambara tradition by the increase of attributes of two degrees only the combination would be possible. The parts having the degrees of intensity of viscousity and dryness from one unit to the infinite units in ascending order the combination would not be possible. The Svetāmbara version says the two, three or more qualities in the paramāņus would lead to the process of combination and this is possible if the qualities are of similar nature and not dissimilar; but the Digambaras say, the formation of combinations would be possible in both the cases where there are similar or dissimilar qualities. In short, the Digambara and Svetāmbara version of the combinations would be as follows : 1 ŚVETĀMBARA TRADITION
Sādrsa Visādrsa
(similar) (dissimilar) 1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya
no 2. Jaghanya plus ekādhika (one addition) no
yes 3. Jaghanya plus dvyadhika (two addition) yes
yes 4. Jaghanya plus triadhika
yes
yes 5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara
no
yes 6. Jaghanyetara plus ekādhika jaghan yetara no 7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika jaghynyetara yes yes 8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikādi jaghanyetara
yes DIGAMBARA TRADITION 1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya
no 2. Jaghanya plus ekādhika
no
no 3. Jaghanya plus dvyadhika
no
no 4. Jaghanya plus tryadhika
no 5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara
no 6. Jaghanyetara plus ekādhika jaghanyetara no 1. (a) Tattvārthasūtra, Pt. Sukhalalji Sanghavi, pp. 202-203.
(b) Jaina Dharma Darśana, p. 195.
no
yes
по
no
no
no .

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163 7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika jaghanyetara yes yes 8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikādi jaghanyetara no
After the combination of the atoms which of the paramāņus effect combination with what type of paramānus, is a question that has been asked very often. Similarly, another question has been asked very often, of the similar and the dissimilar paramāņus which of them combine together. The answer is, the paramāņus of similar qualities do not form combination. If the paramāņus are of dissimilar nature, they combine in the formation of the similar paramānus collecting together, or sometimes similar paramāņus in two degrees combine with similar paramāņus of one degree. The combinations are formed according to the substance and the place etc. The combinations are formed according to the integration of paramāņus. These types of combinations are considered as madhyamabandha. The combinations of paramāņus with higher intensity and qualities absorb the combinations of the paramāņus with lower intensity and qualities. In the tradition, similar qualities do not come together and the more intense qualities absorb the less intense qualities.
DIVISIONS AND SUB-DIVISIONS OF PUDGALA 5
The two major distinctions of Pudgala can be stated to be aņu (atom) and skandha (aggregate). On the basis of this distinction, we can classify the matter (pudgala) into 6 types.
(1) Sthūla-sthūla (very gross)--It contains the gross objects like, --earth, stones, wood etc.
(2) Sthūla (gross)— It has the following varieties, like-milk, curds, butter, water, oil and other fluid material.
(3) Sthūla-sūkşma (gross subtle)- It has the following forms, like-light, electricity, etc.
(4) Sūkşma-sthūla-Wind, vapour etc., belong to this category.
1. Tattvārthasūtra, 5, 36. 2. Tattvärthasūtra 5, 37. 3. (a) Niyamasāra, 21-Kundakundācārya.
(b) Gommațasāra, Jivakāņda, 602.

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(5) Sūkṣma-The objects belong to this category cannot be experienced by the senses e. g., Manovargaṇā (atoms of mental structure), etc. They are called Acākṣuṣa skandha.
(6) Sūkṣma-sükṣma-The minutest paramāņu is the subtlest form of atom.
That part of matter which is the aggregate of paramāņus due to the combination and disintegration is unaccessible to sense experience. If the aggregate of atoms becomes bigger and coarse (sthula) then the aggregate becomes accessible to sense-experience. The combination and disintegration of atoms is considered to be the coming-together of atoms and separation. The degree of the combinations so as to enable the aggregate to be coarser and coarsest will make the aggregate accessible to sense-experience.
THREE TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER)
Pudgala (matter) can be considered into three types on the basis of the distinctions on the types of combinations of paramāņus.1 1. Prayoga parinata--The collection of atoms processed by the jiva in the formation of the body is called prayoga-pariṇata-senseorgans, body, blood, flesh, etc.
2. Miśra pariņata-In this, the atoms are brought together by the jiva and they are again discharged, e.g., nails which are cut, hair, cough and excretion etc.,
3. Visrasā pariņata-In this, we find aggregate of atoms without the help of the jiva. The atoms come together by themselves, e. g., rainbow, clouds, etc.,
ORIGINATION, CHANGE & PERMANENCE IN MATTER
Matter is both permanent and impermanent.2 From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modifications, it is impermanent. From the point of view of substance, a thing is permanent because the atoms that form the aggregate are permanent, although the objects that are formed due to the combination of atoms change their nature and structure, and as
1. Bhagavati, 8, 1, 1.
2. Bhagavati, 14, 4.

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such, from the point of view of modifications of the substance due to the integration and is integration of atoms, it is impermanent. Due to the combinations of atoms, the substance is not considered to be permanent, but from the point of view of the original nature of atoms and from the points of view of place and the time of the combination, it may be considered to be relatively permanent,1 ::.. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MATTER
Matter may be considered to be of two forms on the basis of the manner of the integration and disintegration of atoms. The two combinations are :(1) Bādara (gross), (2) Sūksma (subtle). Infinite number of atoms combine together to form objects. Sometimes the aggregates so formed are subtle and they are not accessible to the sense-organs. The subtle forms of aggregate of atoms have fourfold attributes of touch, like-(1) śīta, uşņa, snigdha and rūkşa. If the atoms are combined to form gross objects, the objects have four forms of touch, like--guru-lughu, mrdu-kathinu. If dry atoms are combined together, then the object has the quality of laghu sparsa, but if the combination of snigdha paramāņus (viscous atoms) then the object gets the quality of guru sparśa. When molecules are affected by quality of softness and viscousity they combine into producing the quality of soft touch. Similarly, when heat and dryness are combined quality of roughness is expressed. In short, when the transformation is from the subtle qualities to the gross qualities then there would increase four types of touch.
ii; THE EXTENT OF MATTER
The molecules (skandha) and paramāņu (atoms) are considered from the point of view of flow, are beginningless and without any change. Considered from the point of view of effects, it has a beginning and it is characterised by change. Paramānus form themselves into skandhas and skandhas disintegrate into paramānus.
The paramānus can remain in their original states for atleast a period of one samaya or at the most upto asankhyāta kāla (innumerable points of time). In the same way, if the molecule remains
1. Bhagavati 14, 4. 2. Jainadarśana : Manana aur Mi māṁsā, p. 175.

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in its nature of molecule, it can do so atleast for one samaya and at the most for innumerable kāla. After this period, transformation is inevitable.
From the point of view of kşetra (place), we can say the paramāņu and skandha can remain in a particular point of space for a samaya or at the latest for innumerable points of time (kāla.)
If a paramāņu joins to form a molecule and again gets disinte. grated to its original nature of paramāņu it might take one samaya or at the most asankhyāta kāla.?
The molecule with two atoms or the molecule with three atoms can come back to its original position paramānus and that would take one samaya at least or ananta kāla (endless time) at the most.3
If a paramāņu or a molecule moves from one point of space (ākāśa pradeśa) and returns to that very point of sapce, it might take one samaya or at the most ananta kāla.
A paramāņu occupies one point of space, but a molecule may occupy one point of space, two, innumerable or numberless points of space. It may also pervade the entire lokākāśa. We have already seen that the aggregate paramāņus pervading the entire universe is called acittamahāskandha. It is cosmos. APRADEŠITVA (NON-SPACIAL POSITION) AND
SAPRADEŠITVA (SPACIAL POSITION) Paramānu considered from the point of view of substance and spacial position can be considered as apradeśī, as it does not occupy an extended point of space. But from the point of view of temporal extension, it is considered to be apradesī, because it is in one samaya, but if it is in more than one samaya, it is called sapradesi, as it covers extended space. From the point of view of bhāva, (nature) a paramāņu is apradeśī (non-spacial), if it is one guna (quality) but if it is characterised by many qualities it is sapradesi (spacial).
1. Bhagavati, 5, 8. 2. Bhagavatī, 5, 8. 3. Ibid, 5, 8. 4. Ibid, 5, 8.

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Considered from the point of view of substance, a molecule is sapradeśí (extensive in spacial extension). The molecule's extension is determined by the number of paramāņus it has.
From the point of kşetra (space), skandha (molecule) is sapradeśī (extensive) and also apradesi. A molecule which covers one point of space is apradesī, but if covers more than one point of space, it becomes sapradeśī.
From the point of view of kāla (time), a molecule which has a duration of one samaya is apradeśī. But if it remains for more than one samaya, it is sapradeść.
From the point of view of bhāva (nature), a molecule is characterised by one quality it is apradeśī. But if has more than one quality, it is sapradeść.1
MOTION OF MATTER !! Paramāņu is jada (unconscious) still it is characterised by motion. The motion of the paramāņu is sometimes due to some cause and sometime without any cause. In fact, a paramānu is not always in motion. It is sometimes in motion and sometimes not. In one samaya, it can travel from one point of space in the universe to another point of space in the farthest point which is at a distance of innumerable yojanas. The characteristic of motion is inherent in the atom, although it may not always move. So, the principle of movement (Dharma) is the principle due to which motion in paramāņu is possible. But the principle of Dharma is not the cause of the motion, it is only an efficient condition.?
A question arises, whether the motion in paramāņu is due to itself or is caused by jiva.
The answer is that paramāņu does not move because of jiva, as paramāņu is not transformed or combined into molecules, due to jīva. It is material in nature. And the cause is material only. Jīva has no power to move the paramānus.
1. Bhagavatī, 5, 8. 2. Bhagavati, 16, 8.

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Paramāņu can be described as being vibratory (sakampa)1 and non-vibrate (akampa). It is not unsteady, and not constantly vibrating. A molecule with two atoms has both the characteristics, and expresses both the characteristics like-vibration and non-vibration. It being composed of two atoms it has spacial vibration and also absence of spacial vibration.
Molecules with three atoms express similar forms of vibration and non-vibration. For instance, in the molecule one atom may vibrate and the other may not, the two atoms may vibrate and the one may not, and two atoms may remain non-vibratory while the one atom may not.
Molecules with four atoms may express all forms of permutations of vibration and non-vibration. One spacial point may express vibration while others may not. While the other points of space may express vibration and the one point may not and so on.
Molecules of five atoms and molecules upto the infinite number of atoms have similar characteristics of vibration and non-vibration. LIMITS OF MOTION OF PARAMĀŅU
The motion in paramāņu has certain limits. The natural motion is always in straight lines. If there are some cross-effects of other paramāņus and material particles, the motion gets curved. Jiva is not directly responsible for the motion in a paramāņu as it is extremely subtle. But jīva can influence the motion of moleculesbig or small. As the maximum form of motion has been described, so has the minimum form of motion been described. A paramāņu can move from one point of space to the other in slow motion in one samaya. The extension of the point of space is of the same extension as of paramāņu.
The motion in paramāņu, as we have seen earlier, may be due to more inherent causes or due to some other external factors present in matter. When the motion in the paramāņu say, but one thing is certain that after infinite number of points of time, paramāņu acts. Similarly, a paramāņu may stop movement within
starts, is difficult to
1. Bhagavati, 5, 7.

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one samaya or at the most within infinite part of avalikā.1 And after the infinite number of points of avalikā the paramāņu will definitely start motion.
The atoms are unobstructible (apratighālī) and they can penetrate any object of any type. For instance, atoms can penetrate a thick wall built of cast iron. Even the mountain like Sumeru cannot obstruct the movement of paramāņu.
Sometimes the movement of the paramāņu may be arrested by the particles of matter due to its contact with matter. But at that time paramāņu also affects the matter to which it has come in contact.
THE SUBTLE NATURE OF PARAMĀŅU The special characteristic of paramāņu is that it can occupy a point of space and the same point of sapce can be occupied by another paramāņu without any resistance. Similarly, the subtle form of molecule consisting infinite paramānus can occupy the same point without any resistance. This is the special characteristic of paramāņil. In this connection Acārya Pujyapāda has pointed out that there is no difficulty in atoms and molecules in occupying same point of space without friction or resistance because they have no visible extension and they are subtle in nature. For this reason, infinite number of atoms and molecules can remain in one pradeśa without any difficulty.
For instance, a lamp lights a room to the fullest extent and this room can also merge the light of many other lamps. Similarly, the light of the lamp illumines the room fully; but if it is covered by a small pot, it restricts its illumination to the pervasion of that very pot. It is clear from this, that the material aspect of the atoms of matter have the characteristics of contraction and expansion. For this reason and because of the power of contraction etc.,
1. Avalikā is 16777216th part of 48 minutes. 2. Jainadarśana aur Adhunika Vijñāna, (Hindi), p. 37. 3. Sarvārthasiddhi, 5, 16. Pujyapāda. 4. Tattvārthasūtra, 5, 16.

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a paramāņu can remain along with molecules in the same point of space... The subtle transformation is contraction
neformation is contraction of a paramāņu and in this it is reduced in its mass and effect. ,, THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF PARAMĀŅU
If we study paramānu in a scientific way, we find that aņu (atom) is of two parts. The central part is a nucleus in which there are two functions--the protons and the neutrons. The external part is the orbital shell. It contains electrons which move constantly with the velocity which is unimaginable. The volume of a nucleus is much smaller than that of an atom. If the orbital shell splits, then the circumference of an atom becomes smaller. These splitatoms are called stripped-atoms. In the language of the astronomical science that some stars have density which is two hundred times more than the densest object on our earth. Edington bas said that if one ton (28 maunds) of nuclear matter is taken, it can be contained in a basket or in our pocket. A star has been discovered whose density is 620 tons (17360 maunds) for every cubic inch. This heavy weight of the stars is due to the stripped atoms and the atoms in these, are primarily nuclear and they baye no orbital shells. The Jaina theory of atoms explains these phenomenon by means of the subtle process of movement in atoms.?
Modern science has shown that atoms are very subtle in extension and the subtlety can be explained that 50,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (50 sankhas) of atoms weigh 2 tolās and occupy only one tenth crore of an inch space. In the thickness of a cigarette-paper lakh of atoms may stay. A mole of dust in the air contains more than 10,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (ten nila) paramāņus.
The form of the atom orbits extension can also be measured if compared with the magnified size of a small drop of blood coming out of the head, if we pull one hair. The drop of blood may be magnified in size to the extent of 7 feet in diametre. Even then the atoms inside it will have the diametre of 1/1000 of an inch.3
1. Dravyasangraha. 2. Munisri Hazārimal Smrli Grantha, p. 374. 3. Jainadarśana aur Adhunika Vijñāna, p. 47.

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THE SIZE AND FORM OF THE MATTER The material-atom is one, without parts, without middle and without space.
A molecule with two atoms is with parts, but without middle and it has spacial extension,
A molecule with three atoms is without parts, it is with middle and has spacial extension.
Molecules with even number of atoms have characteristics like the molecules with two atoms. And molecules with odd number of atoms express the characteristics possessed by molecules with three atoms.
In the Bhagavatī sūtra we get description of the four forms of the existence of atoms.1
(1) Dravya-sthānāyu : It is the state when paramāņu remains as paraniānu and skandhas as skandhas i. e. molecules as molecules.
(2) Kşetra-sthānāyu : This is the ākāśa pradeśa, in which paramānus and skandhas exists.
(3) Avagāhana-sthānäyu : The specified form and size of paramānus and skandha.
The differences between kşetra and avagāhana is that the first is pertaining to space while the second to the pudgala (matter) itself.
(4) Bhāva-sthānāyu : In this form paramāņus express the attributes of touch, taste, smell and colour, either in the form of paramānus or in the form of skandha.
EIGHT COMBINATIONS (VARGAŅĀS) OF PUDGALA
Paramānus have been classified into 8 forms of combinations on the basis of the intensity and extension. They are called vargaņās.
(1) Audārika vargaņā : It is gross matter. This consists of the combination of paramānus to form gross bodies for the jīvas, vegetable, earth, water, fire and air.
(2) Vaikriya vargaņā : In this, we get the aggregates of matter which have the capacity of expressing the qualities, like-short and large, light and heavy, visible and non-visible, etc,
1. Bhagavatī, 5, 7.

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(3) Ahāraka vargaṇā: This is the aggregate of matter formed by the paramāņus and molecules with a capacity of forming body by Yoga-sakti.
(4) Taijasa vargaṇā: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the paramāņus with energy.
(5) Kārmaṇa vargaṇā: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the minutest particles of matter which are responsible for the formation of karma, like—jñānāvaraṇīya etc. This forms the subtle body.
(6) Svāsocchvāsa vargaṇā: This is the aggregate of matter which enables the function of breathing.
(7) Vacana vargaṇā: The collection of matter which is responsible for speech.
(8) Mano-vargaṇā: This is the collection of minutest particle which are very subtle and which forms the mind for the sake of reflection and thinking.
Matter is of infinite variety. Among them, the eight varieties mentioned above are prominent. These types of matter have graded existence forming from the gross matter which we get in earth, water, etc., to the subtlest form of matter in mind. One form of matter can be transformed into another form of matter due to the formation of molecules and the integration of paramāņus in different intensities.
According to the Jainas vargaṇās of one type may also be transformed into another.
The vargaṇās like audārika, vaikriya, āhāraka and taijasa have the qualities of eight types of touch and they are of the form of gross molecules. They possess the qualities-light or heavy, smooth and rough, etc. The vargaņās like kārmaņa vargaņās, bhāṣā and manovargaṇās have four types of qualities of touch. They are sublte molecules and they have the qualities of cold and heat, viscouse and dry. Svāsocchvāsa vargaṇā has four types of touch and also eight types of
touch.1
1. Bhagavati 2, 1.

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EIGHT DISTINCTIONS OF PUDGALA The Jaina philosophers have studied the pudgala (matter) with its various distinctions, the like of wbich we do not get in other systems of philosophy. In modern science, we find recognition to large extent of the Jaina view of matter. According to Jainism the function of pudgala is ten-fold. (1) sabda (sound), (2) bandha (combination), (3) saukṣmya (subtlety), (4) sthaulya (grossness), (5) saṁsthāna (formation), (6) bheda (distinctions), (7) tama (darkness), (8) chāyā (shade), (9) ātapa (heat), (10) Udyota (cool-light).1
(1) ŚABDA (SOUND) Śabda (sound) is produced due to the friction of one molecule with the other. The sound is the object of sense of hearing i. e., ears.
Vaiseșikas do not consider sabda as a mode of matter. But they make it an attribute of ākāśa. Sāňkhya-darśana considers the formation of sabda as the sense cause of ākāśa. Jainas differ fundamentally from the Vaiseșikas and Sänkhya philosophers. They maintain that sabda (sound) is material in nature, because it becomes an object of sense-organ. Akāśa is not material in nature. And it cannot produce sound. Similarly, ākāśa is not a product of sound as the Sānkhya philosophers say. Because sabda (sound) is material in nature and hence sabda (tanmātrā) the subtle elements should also become material in nature. If śabdatanmārā were to be material in nature its product ākāśa should also be considered as material. But ākāśa is not material in nature. Therefore ākāśa is not a product of śabdatanmātrā.
Secondly, ākāśa is a substance which is formless. It has no qualities like touch etc. But sabda has form and it has qualities of touch etc. It can be grasped. The substance which is formless must have qualities which would also be formless. And then it cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form. The objects which
1. (a) Tattvārthasūtra, 5, 24.
(b) Dravyasāngraha, gātbā 16. 2. Pañcāstikāya, 71.

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are formless cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form.
Thirdly, sound is produced by the friction of molecules and due to the friction there would be echo and sound production. If sound were to be the qualities of ākāśa which is formless such interruption of atoms and molecules would not be possible.
Fourthly, sabda can be arrested and checked. If it were the quality of ākāśa how could it be possible to check the sabda.
Fifthly, sabda has velocity (gatimānatā), but ākāśa is without any motion and is passive.
Sixthly, argument would be considered from scientific point of view, sabda cannot traverse in space if there were no matter. If sabda were the quality of ākāśa it would have penetrated into every point of ākāśa. Because quality pervades the substance having that quality and there is no question whether there is the need of the presence or not.1
Jaina agama literature has elaborately discussed the nature of sabda as material in nature and also the characteristics of sabda in its various aspects, like the production (utpatti), velocity (śighragati), pervasion in the universe (lokavyāpitva), stationary nature (sthititva) and other forms.2 According to Jambudvipaprajñāpti the ringing of the bell (sughoṣā ghaṇṭā) in a particular region will be echoed in a bell in a far of place even though there is no medium of transmission like the wires except the medium of air. This can explain the function of a radio. The sabda pervade the entire universe in a fraction of moment. This phenomenon was recognised and explained by Bhagavana Mahavira 2,500 years ago.3
-
We have already seen that sound is produced due to contact, friction and inter-action of the molecules formed by paramāņus. Sabda is of two types (1) prayogika (practical, artificial) (2) vaisrasika (natural).
1. Muniśrī Hazārimal Smṛti Grantha, p. 381.
2. Prajñāpanā, pada 11
3. Jambudvipaprajñapti.

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175 Prāyogika—The production of the sound in this form is possible due to efforts and these efforts are of two types—due to speech and due to efforts without speech. (1) Bhāşātmaka expresses some meaning. Therefore, it is called arthapratipādaka vāņi. (2) Abhāṣātmaka does not convey any meaning. Abhāṣātmaka sound is of four types-- (i) tata, (ii) vitata, (iii) ghana, (iv) saușira.
The tata form of sound is produced by a musical instrument made of leather (carma) like mrdanga, pațaha etc. The vitata sound is produced by musical instrument having streams, like-vīņā. The ghana type of sound is produced by musical instruments like tāla, bell etc. And saușira form of sound is produced by musical instruments which are to be blown through mouth, e. 8., conch (śankha), flute, etc. 1
The vaisrasika sabda is all sounds produced without any effort on the part of an individual, for instance, the thunder of the clouds is vaisrasika sound.
An individual grasps a sound and communicates it through language. The moment it is communicated through sound to other individuals, it passes on to other individuals. The sound so produced spreads in the ākāśu and the waves of the sound travel throughout space. If the intensity of the sound produced is low, the sound travels like the waves of the water for quite sometime for several yojanas and then the waves of the sound fade away. If the intensity of the sound produced is high, the waves of the sound travel to farther distances even upto the end of the world.
The sound that we hear spoken by a particular person is not the original word of the person speaking. It is the sound waves that travels through ākāśa in the form of sabda. The sound waves so produced spread in all the six directions-east, west, north, south, up and down.
If the waves of the sound spread in even combination (samaśreni) then we hear the miśra sabda (combined). It implies that we hear the
1. (a) Tattvārtharājavärttika, 5, 24, 2-6.
(b) Sarvārthasiddhi, 5, 24.

.

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sabdadravy a that is uttered by an individual and the sabdadravya i. e., contained the waves of the sounds. But if the waves of the sound are received in odd combination (viśreņi) we hear the sabda in the waves of the sound only.1
(2) BANDHA (COMBINATION)
Bandha means tieing, joining and combination (samyojana). Two paramāņus or more than two paramāņus can come together and become bound together. Similarly, two or more molecules can also come together. In this way, the combination or the aggregate can be of two or more paramāņus or two or more molecules. In samyoga (joining together), there is the combination without any distance (antara rahita avasthāna) but in bandha there is the identity or unision of the aggregate.
Bandha is of two types-(1) vaisrasika (natural) and (2) prāyogika (artificial).
Taisrasika bandha is of two types-(a) sādi (with beginning) and (b) anadi (without beginning). Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa have bandha which is without beginning, but in the case of matter the bandha has beginning. The paramāņus may join together in a group of two or more and form molecules. These are formed at a parti. cular time and they have a beginning. They may also be disintegrated. The lightening, meteors, the flow of water, fire and rain-bow, etc. have a beginning. Therefore their formation is sādi.
Prayogika bandha is of two types-(a) ajīvavişayaka i. e., connected with non-living matter and (b) combination which is connected with the living and the non-living substance (jīvājīvaviṣayaka).
The bandha or union of paramāņu in the case of wood and wax is of the ajīvaviṣayaka types. The jīvājīvaviṣayaka which is connected with the combination of the paramāņus in association with jīva and ajīva may be referred to those of karmic and quasi-kārmic (no-karma). The bondage of the soul with 8 types of karmas is called karma-bandha. The association of the soul with the bodily
1. (a) Prajñāpanā, pada 11, (b) Nandi sūtra

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forms like audārika body etc., is called nokarma-bandha. That is, it is associated with quasi-kārmic material.1 (3) SAUKSMYA (FINENESS) V.
Sūkşmatā is related to fineness. It is of two types-(1) antya sūksmatā (the ultimate fineness) and, (2) āpeksika sükşmatā (relative fineness). The ultimate fineness to be found in the paramāņu. The relative fineness has a reference to relative extension of the objects. One object is finer and smaller in size than another object. For instance, the sizes of the fruits like the lemon and the mangoes vary in form. One is smaller than the other. (4) STHAULYA (GROSSNESS) !!!
Sihūlatā refers to the largeness in size. It is of two forms: (1) antya sthūlatā which is all-pervasive. It is mahāskandha. It is the cosmos. (2) Āpekșika sthūlatā is relative largeness of the size. It is concerned with determining the size of the objects. One object would appear larger than the others, if we compare the sizes of the objects, for instance as we have seen earlier the size of a mango is larger than the size of betel nut. (5) SAMSTHĀNA (FORMATION)
Saṁsthāna connotes form or structural design. Saṁsthāna is of two types. The first type of samsthāna has been divided into two types as : (a) it is called ittham saṁsthāna which related to geometrical forms like triangle, rectangle, circle, etc. (b) anittham sarnsthāna refers to irregular forms. It has no specific form. However it has various structural designs --- regular or irregular and it has been classified into different types, utkara, cūrņa, khanda, cūrņikā, pratara and aņucațana
The second type of saṁsthāna bas reference to the different forms of the bodies which embody the jīva. It has also been classified into different types of : (1) samacaturasra, nyagrodhu, sādika,
1. Tattvārtharājavārttika 5, 24, 10, 13. 2. Ibid 5, 24, 14. 3. Tativārtharājavārtrika 5, 24, 15. 4. Ibid 5, 24, 16.

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vāmana, kubja and hundaka. For instance, vāmana refers to a dwarfish body and kubja refers to hunch-backed body. (6) BHEDA (DISTINCTION)
Bheda refers the disintegration of the molecules into different atoms or separation of some atoms from a molecule. (7) TAMA (DARKNESS):
Tama is darkness. It is that which obstructs vision and which is opposite of light.1
The Indian philosophers like naiyāyikas do not consider darkness (andhakāra) as a substance, referring to characteristics (bhāvāt. maka dravya), but these philosophers give a negative interpretation of darkness implying absence of light. But if light is a substance conception in nature (bhāvātmaka in nature), it is necessary to consider darkness also as a substance. Because light has form so also the darkness has form. . Modern science does not give a negative interpretation of darkness. It is considered to be a positive substance, because darkness is possible due to infra-red heat rays. These rays could be found in the eyes of some of the animals like cats, owls, etc. The negative of the photographic plates expresses similar phenomenon. It shows that in addition to the visible light, we have the invisible light which may be considered as darkness.2 (8) CHĀYĀ (SHADE);
That which covers the light is called chāyā (shade). If light is obstructed by opaque bodies we get shade. Shade may be considered as a form akin to darkness. But it is not absence of light, it is to be considered as modification of matter.
According to modern science, the visibility produced by the various combinatios of parmāņus can also be considered in the light reflections and these reflections are of two types : (1) vāstavika (natural) and the other (2) avāstavika (unnatural). Similarly, chāyā
1. Sarvārthasiddhi 5, 24. 2. Muniśrī Hazārīmal Smrti Grantha, p. 385. 3. Sarvārthasiddhi 5, 24.

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or shade can have reflections in these two types. We find that due to interferance bands of the counting machine when worked, give dark band. These are like the electronic effects. The dark band is not merely the absence of light, but it is the electronic effect, in the form of a dark band.
The light can function through reflection (darpaņa) and the refraction. These two functions can be natural or artificial. They also may be expressing different types of reflections and images. Inverted images would help formation of the correct images, if reflected upon. (9) ATAPA (HEAT)
Atapa is heat. It is the heat rays of light, By itself, it is cool but its light is hot. (10) UDYOTA (COOL·LIGHT)
Udyota refers to the rays of the light which give a cooling effect. It also gets cooled and its effect would be coolness. It is different from the heat of the fire.
The Jainas have considered the cooling and heating effect as the forms of light. This is a scientific approah to the problem and it shows remarkable insight and discriminating power into the phenomenon of light.
Scientists have considered light as the continuous process of movement. They say that the cosmos contains the light rays which are moving with a velocity which is un-imaginable. Earlier it was considered that light has no mass, but recent scientists have begun to realise that light has also mass (bhāra). It is characterised by electrical magnetism and every minute the light travels from the sun with unimaginable speed.
Heat is considered to be a quality of the matter. From the scientific point of view, paramāņus have distinctions like dhanāņu and rņāņu and they are constantly in motion, and inter-penetration. Then they express themselves in the form of heat.
Ordinarily, we find that electrical energy may be seen in two forms as ghana vidyut (electricity produced from the friction of
1. Sarvärthasiddhi 5, 24.

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particles) and jala vidyut (electricity produced from water particles). These two are the modes of matter. Scientifically considered, ghana and uşna are two forms of electrical energy. The basis of ghana is protons and the source of vidyutkanas is electron. When we find the lightning and the thunder produced, we find that there is friction of the proton and the electron particles and they produce electrical energy. This energy is accompanied by the sound. This process of radiation is called radio-active process. In ancient Indian science, the paramāņu were not considered to be as capable of splitting. But modern science has shown that the ancient conception is wrong. It has been shown that when atom is split, infinite energy released. This is the principle for the manufacture of atom-bomb.
We find that the principle of manufacturing the radiotransistors, telegraph is based on the fundamental conception of the material nature of the sound. Sound is a mode of matter. Just as the electrical energy transmits the sound-waves to far distance, so also the light waves transmit images to far off distances, so we find expressed in television.
In Jaina literature, it has been described that every moment the objects in the universe are receiving reflections and spreading far and wide. These are caught and crystallied in mirrors and water, and other forms of matter. Television is based on this principle.
Modern science has discovered the function of the X-rays. They are very subtle rays creating invisible effects. Therefore, we can say that the light as former mode of matter is expressed in such phenomena like X-rays etc. Thus we find all the sense-experience arising out of touch, taste, smell, etc., are nothing but modes of matter.
FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA The primary functions of jīva are six like āhāra (food), śarīra (body), indriya (sense-organs) śvāsochhvāsa (breathing), bhāsā (speech) and manas (mind). These express fundamental functions of the cetana in various forms; and these are material in aspect.
1. Muniśrī Hazārimal Smrti Grantha.

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Ācārya Nemicandra has pointed out that matter is responsible for the production of the body. Audārika śarīra is due to audārika varganäs (clusters of paramānus). Vaikriya sarira is formed by vaikriya vargaņās. Similarly āhāraka sarira is formed by ahāraka vargaņās. We can describe the śvāsochhvāsa (breathing) based on āhāraka vargaņās in the same way. Taijasa body is formed due taijasa var ganās. The same can be said about bhāsā and manas, and they are formed by the respective varguņās (fine particles of matter).
It is not necessary to give a detailed description about the āhāra, indriya, śvāsochlväsa and bhāşā. Jaina philosophers have made distinctions of sariras in the audārika, vaikriya, ahāraka, taijasa and kārmana into five types. We can experience the audārika śarira through the indriyas. The other forms of body cannot be seen through the sense-organs. They gradually become finer and finer.? Taijasa and kārmaņa bodies do not interact with other bodies. They can move in lokāsāśa according to their capacities. They do not suffer from any external bonds. These two forms of bodies are associated with saṁsārī jīvas from beginningless times. They are with every jiva. Every jīva can have at the most four bodies at a time. But all the five bodies cannot co-exist because the vaikriya and the āhāraka functions do not simultaneously express themselves. The vaikriya funcıion is generally possible in the pramatta daśā (in the uncontrolled state), but such is not the case of ahāraka function. Formation of āhāraka body is possible in the pramatta daśā. But when the āhāraka body is formed during the pure state of mind, apramati a avası hā is inevitable. Therefore, vaikriya and āhāraka functions do not take place simultaneously.
The mental functions are not possible without the material basis. While we think, thoughts emanate from the mind through the
1. Gommațasāra jīvakāņda 606-608. 2. Tattvārthasūtra 2, 38. 3. Ibid 2, 41-44. 4. Tatīvārthabhāşya vytti 2, 44.

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molecules of mano-vargaņās. Tbe thought forms gets shape through mano-varganās and these flit across leaving behind their traces in the form of thought-processes. These thought-processes have their different types of durations. Some continue to remain in the mind, some flash across the mind and some create impact in the mind as mental traces through the mano-vargaņās. These mano-vargaņās, therefore, leave the mnemic traces on the cerebral and have their effect on body.
In short, a samsārī jīva is very closely associated with various forms as in the form of gross bodies and the subtle body and in the mental functions. In this sense, we can say the matter has a tremendous influence on the functions of the jīva and the formation of the universe as such.

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Principle of Punya (Merit) and Papa (Demerit) : a Study
PRINCIPLES OF PUNYA AND PĀPA Punya (merit) is auspicious karma-pudgalas and papa (demerit) is inauspicious karma-pudgalas. Both are ajīvatattva.
A question may arise that the auspicious and inauspicious karmas, which are enumerated under principle of ajiva are the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of atman; and the tendencies of atman should be jiva, i, e., jiva-rupa, they cannot be ajīva. Why merit and demerit are enumerated under ajīvatattva?
are
The question is answered as the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of atman are mental, physical and vocal. These enumerated under the influx (āśravatattva). 1 Here the punya and pāpa, only means that the karma-pudgalas which are attractated by the psychological, physiological and vocal tendencies of atman and are connected with jiva; if they are auspicious, they are punya and if inauspicious, they are papa. The auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of ätman are bhāva-puṇya and bhāva-pāpa. As the result of atmic tendencies, the karma-pudgalas gets connected with the atman, they are called as dravya-puṇya and dravya-pāpa. Hence the tendencies of atman are bhava-punya and bhāva-papa, while the dravya-punya and dravya-papa are pudgalas-ājīvatattva.
As the ätmic tendencies are of innumerable types so the cause of punya and papa (merit and demerit) are also innumerable. Still
1. Tattvärthasūtru, 6/1-2

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due to behavioural point of view, many causes are enumerated of these are described in āgamas like Sthânănga etc.
TYPES OF PUNYA AND PĀPA Auspicious karma-pudgalas are called punya. It can be acquired by the auspicious deeds, like--to have sympathy and kindness towards the poor and distressed people and serve them, philanthropic deeds, to be glad to see good charactered people etc.
Āgamas have told that jiva can acquire punya by the nine deeds. These are
(1) Anna punya-to give food to the hungry ones keeping kindness and with faith and devotion to saints.
(2) Pāna punya-to give drinking water to the thirsty people.
(3) Layana punya-Layana means shelter. Everybody should give shelter (i.e., place for living) to the needy persons.
(4) śayana punya-sayana means to give space for sleeping. (5) Vastra punya-to give cloths to the needy persons.
(6) Mana-punya-to think that every body should be happy, none should be sorrowful, etc.
(7) Vacana punya-It means to acquire punya by sympathetic and sweet words.
(8) Kāya punya-A man may acquire punya, if he serves others by his boby. This type of punya can be acquired by physical auspicious activities.
(9) Namaşkāra Punya-This type of punya is acquired by vinaya. To bow to the elders, virtuous and meritorious people is the cause of this type of punya.
In other words, it can be said that the punya can be acquired by giving food, drinking water, medicine, etc., and to give place to rest to the needy persons, to have good feelings to every one, to speak sweet and advantageous words and to do good deeds by body. To bow,

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keeping devotion and faith in heart towards the deva, guru and dharma is also the cause of acquiring punya.
Acarya Umaswati tells, the auspicious mental, bodily and vocal activities are punya. 1 Auspicious and meritorious karma-pudgalas are called punya.2
Demeritorious karmas are pāpas. In other words, due to pāpa atman could not do auspicious deeds.1
There many causes of papa, yet, briefly, eighteen causes are described in the agamas. These are also called pāpa-sthāna (the homes of papa). These are enumerated as under :
1. Himsā (violence)
2. Mṛṣā (to tell a lie)
3. Caurya (theft)
4. Abrahmacarya (non-celibacy)
5. Parigraha (covetuousness)
6. Krodha (anger)
7. Mana (pride)
8. Māyā (deceit)
9. Lobha (lust or greed)
10. Raga (attachment)
11. Dveşa (detachment)
12. Kalaha (to make dispute)
13. Abhyākhyāna (to nickname anybody, to call bad names) 14. Paiśunya (back-biting)
185
1. Tattvärthsūtra, 6/3.
2. (a) Sūtrakṛtāǹga, Śīlānka-Vṛtti, 2/5/16 p. 127. (b) Mulacăra-Vrtti-ācārya Vasunandi, 5/6. (c) Samavāyānga-Abhāyadeva-Vṛtti, 1, p. 6. (d) Şaḍdarśana Samuccaya, Guṇa-Vrtti, p. 137. 3. (a) Pañcāstikāya-Vṛtti—Amṛtcandrācārya, 108. (b) Samavāyānga-Abhayadeva-Vṛtti, 1, p. 6. (c) Şaḍdarśana Samuccaya, Guna-Vṛtti, 47, p. 4. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 6/3.
137.
(b) Tattvārtha-Śrutsāgarīyā-Vṛtti, 6/3.

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15. Para-nindā (to blame) 16. Rati-Arati (Rati means inclination towards demerit and arati
denotes non-inclination towards auspicious deeds.) 17. Māyā Mrşāvāda (deceitful lie) 18. Mithyādarśana (delusion).
From the spiritual point of view, merit and demerits both are bondages. Indian thinkers have widely discussed these merits and demerits. Mīmānsakas gave too much force to acquire merits. They regarded punya (merit) as the aim of life. But Jain philosophy, by the different points of view, regarded punya as heya (abandonable), jñye ya (knowable jand upādeya (acceptable). By the noumenal point of view, punya and pāpa-both are abandonable. Pun ya is charming while pā pa reverse to it, i.e., uncharming. Punya is golden fetters while pāpa is iron fetters. Being sparkling and charming, the golden fetters is a bondage to ātman. It also bounds the ātman, as that of iron-fetters. There is no difference, if a sword is made of gold or iron. Both can be used equally to kill anybody. In the modern language, punya can be termed as first class imprisonment, while pāpa as rigorous imprisonment. But, for getting salvation, both are to be discarded.
According to behavioural point, punya can be called better than păpa. Due to pāpa, jiva has to bear the agonies of hell, and many kinds of miseries and pains, disfame etc., in this world. While as the result of punya, jīva gets the joyful heaven-life and fame, pleasure etc., in this world. The punya is like a shadow of tree. A traveller, after a long journey, under sharp sun-light, gets relief in the shadow of a tree; so jīva, during the long-long rigorous journey of his mundane life, gets rest and relief by the punya. Hence punya is regarded better and self-soothing.
> TWO KINDS OF PUŅYA Ācāryas described two kinds of punya. These are
(1) Punyānubandhi punya-This type of punya (merit) is virtuous both in operation (udaya) and result (phala-bhoga). It also paves the way to salvation to jīva.
(2) Pāpānubandhī punya-This is a punya, which gives joy to

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jiva, during operation; but leads it towards the wrong deeds. During this type of merit jīva earns pāpas.
For example, a man gets all types of worldly luxuries by his previously acquired meritorious deeds and in this life also he becomes virtuous, does philanthropic deeds, he keenly absorbs himself in such activities which may lead to the salvation, he acquires new punyas, while enjoying the consequences of previously acquired punyas. It is called punyānubandhī punya.
On the other hand, a man gets all means of happiness in world; but he leads a sinful life and earns new pāpas as the result of his bad activities. This kind of punya is called pāpānubadhi punya; because it is a cause of new pāpas.
In the Jaina literature, punyānubandhi punya is described like a guide, who leads ātman to his ultimate goal, i.e., salvation.
Quite reverse to it, pāpānubandhī punya is like a robber, who robs everything and makes man a beggar. So, this type of punya robs all the previously earned punyas; and becomes a cause of downfall of jīva.
Hence, punyānubandhi punya is regarded acceptable (upādeya) and păpänubandhi as abandonable (heya).
.!'. TWO KINDS OF PĀPA Like punya, pāpa is also of two kinds. These are
(1) Pāpānubandhī pāpa--Troublesome in present experience and also acquires sinful karmas for future.
(2) Punyānubandhi pāpa—Troublesome in present experience but acquires meritorious karmas for future.
The first kind of pāpa is troublesome both for present and future. Because, due to this type of pāpa, jīva experiences agonies, pains, disfame etc., in this life and also absorbs himself in sinful activities, so he acquires pāpa-karmas for future also. For example, butcher, fisherman are the men of this type.
The second type of pāpa is troublesome; but it acquires merits (punyas) for future. Because, due to this pāpa, though man experien

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ces miseries in present, but he absorbs himself in auspicious activities, so he earns punyas for future. Such persons are called as pāpānu. bandhi punya jīvas.
Hence, the principle of pāpa and punya is described in the Jaina literature with various points of view. By the noumenal point of view, being the fetters for ātman, regarded abandonable and kept in one category. While by behavioural point of view, pāpā is outrightly abandonable; but punya is acceptable upto some extent. Because, on account of this, ātman may progress and get the path of salvation, which is the ultimate goal and real home of mundane soul.

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Principle of Asrava (Influx) :
a Study
PRINCIPLE OF ASRAVA (INFLUX) The asraya, in Jain āgamas and philosophy is defined thus the thoughts, words and activities, by which the pudgalas of karmavargaņas flow-in, to get connected with ātma-pradeśas, is āsrava. In other words, psychological, vocal and physiological activitiesvibrations (yoga) of ātman, is āsrava. 1
Ātman and pudgala, both are of opposite nature. The qualities of ātman are--knowledge, consciousness and bliss; while that of pudgala are--touch,taste, smell and colour i. e., rūpi; it is also totally senseless, without consciousness and any kind of feeling. Pudgala is rūpi while ātman is arūpī.
Until and unless ātman remains in his own self nature, karmas do not inflow; but as soon as ātman, due to delusion, attracts towards other objects i. e., para-bhāva or vibhāva, the pudgalas of kārmanavargaņā, which are called as karmas, flow-in. The way of flowing-in of karmas is called āsrava. Aiman gets karmas through asrava.
As in a pond, water comes through a channel so the karmas come to the ātman through äsrava. Hence, āsrava or influx means the way of karmas to come to ātman.
FIVE TYPES OF ASRAVA: The causes of bondage are five, viz., mithyātva (wrong-belief), 1. (a) Sarvārthasiddhi, 6/2.
(b) Sūtrak rtānga-Sīlānka-vrtti, 2/5/17, p. 128. (C) Āvaśyaka-Hāribhadrīyā-V rtti, Mal. Hem. Hi. p. 84. (d) Adhyātmasāra, 18/131.

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avirati (vowlessness), pramada (negligence), kaşaya (passion) and yoga (psychophysical activities). The thoughts of atman by which karmas flow-in, is called bhāvāsrava, and flowing-in of karmic matter is dravyasrava. The emergence of karma-paryaya in the matter and coming upto ātman is dravyasrava. Though wrong belief etc., five causes are called as thought-influx (bhāvāsrava); but really at the first moment these are the efficient causes of psycho-physical activities, which is the immediate cause of attracting the karmic matter. So these (wrongbelief etc.,) are called thought-influx. The next momentary thoughts are bondage. According to the varying intensity of thought-influx, the karmic matter is attracted and attached with the soul.
The description of the five causes, i. e., wrong belief etc., is, briefly, as under
1. WRONG BELIEF (MITHYATVA)
It means reverse or contrary belief; or lack of metaphysical knowledge. Due to wrong belief, a person considers non-living as living matter and vice-versa, he also cannot differentiate between dharma (path of salvation) and adharma (cause of bondage). He remains in illusory state.
Wrong belief is of two types: (1) natural (naisargika or sahaja) and (2) grasped (grhita). Due to both of these wrong beliefs, the truth-seeking tendency cannot arise in the jiva. He exposes his belief in pseudo deities (ku-deva), pseudo-religion (ku-dharma), pseudosaints (ku-guru) and public follies (loka-mudhatā).
Wrong belief is the root cause of the infinite samsăra.
2. VOWLESSNESS (AVIRATI)
Vowlessness means lack of control over five senses and mind. In this state, jīva does not renounce the sensual pleasures, even he has no wish to do so. He wants to enjoy sensual pleasures and has no inclination towards renunciation. Due to the intensive passions ātman cannot accept the vows of a monk (śramaṇa-cāritra) and not even householder's vows.
3. NEGLIGENCE (PRAMADA)
Negligence is the lack of enthusiasm towards the spiritual progress. It is of fifteen kinds, viz; (1-4) talks about food (bhojankatha), women (strī-kathā), ruler (rāja-katha) and state (deśa-katha),

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(5-8) four passions --anger, pride, hyrocrisy and greed (9-13) five kinds of sensual enjoyments, (14) sleep (15) affection. Being indulged in these fifteen kinds of worldy activities, the jiva forgets his own welfare and gives no preference to salvation-path (mokşa-märg.) Consequently, jīva begins to acquire pāpa-karmas. Whether he does or does not the sinful deeds, yet, on account of negligence, pāpas are acquired.
This is why, Bhagawāna Mahāvīra said to his first disciple Ganadhara Gautama
“Gautama! Always be careful and do not be negligent for a single moment." 4. PASSIONS (KAŞAYA)
Passions (kaşāya) are the root cause of misery, pain and agony etc., to jīva. Thse are the main causes of transmigration of the jiva.1
Really the velocity of passions is very great. These are passions, which moves the jīva in the circle of life and death. As the passions extinguish, the circle of life and death stops. The passions keep the tree of transmigration green. Sayyambhava Suri said — The uncontrolled passions keep the root of transmigration fresh, due to them it can not dry."
Passions are spiritual defects. May these be manifest or not, yet they make defective the inherent qualities of ātman. On account of these, ātman gets the pains, miseries and agonies etc., upto long-long time in this world. Ācārya Virasena in Dhavlā, says that passions make the karma-field fertile.
Passions are four in number, viz., anger (krodhu), pride (mānu), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha). These are classified into two categories, i. e., attachment (räga) and aversion (dveșa). Anger and pride are dveșa, while deceitfulness and greed are rāga.
The four types of passions are fundamental passions. Besides these there are nine types of passions more. These are called no-kaşāyas (quasi-passions).
1. Pratikramanasutra-Vrtti-Acārya Nami 2. Daśavaikālika, 8.

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Some ācāryas have also classified four fundamental passions in many other ways, in räga and dveṣa.
These rāga-dveṣas (attachment and aversion) are the main āsravas (influx). Nyāya-sūtra, Gīta and Pāli Tripitaka literature also ascertain the raga-dveṣas the root of demerit or sin.
5. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL VIBRATIONS (YOGA)
The vibrations caused in atma-pradeśas, due to mental, vocal and bodily movements, is called yoga. In Yogabhāṣya etc., yoga is described as the check of mental activities; but Jaina philosophy differs at this point. In Jaina philosophy yoga signifies the mental, vocal and physical activities. These activities make the contact of karma-pudgalas with the atma-pradesas, so these activities are called yoga and to check-up or control these yogas is termed as dhyāna (meditation).
Literally the word yoga means to add, to join, to contact. Jaina philosophy uses this term in the meaning-to contact the karmapudgalas with atma-pradeśas; while yoga philosophy means to join atma with paramātma.
Really, atman is an active substance. Due to mental, vocal, physical movements, the vibrations in ätma-pradeses are caused. This activity continues upto 13th guṇasthāna (soul stage) i. e., kevalin state. The complete check up of yogas is possible only in 14th guṇasthāna. In this stage of soul the jiva becomes quite pure. According to Jaina philosophy, jīva can attain nirvāṇa (salvation) only after the destruction of karmic filth and yogic movements.
Yoga is influx (asrava). Auspicious mental, vocal and physical activities causes auspicious influx (śubha-āsrava); while inauspicious activities becomes the cause of inauspicious influx (aśubha-āsrava). Inauspicious influx is also called meritorious (Punya-asrava); while inauspicious influx denotes demeritorious (pāpāsrava).
TWO-FOLD DISTINCTIONS OF INFLUX (ĀSRAVA)
Influx (asrava) is of two kinds-(1) Subtle influx (Tryāpathic asrava) and (2) Sāṁparāyika asrava (activities backed by passions). Considered by the point of view of bondage, iryāpathic asrava, is

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is not the cause of bandha. Due to this kind of influx kārmic pudgalas flow in; but they does not combine with ātma-pradeśas; because the cause of bondage are passions and in this type of inflow, there is no existence of passions.
Sāparayika ásrava being backed by passions, is the cause of bondage. So, it is abandonable, for getting salvation.
INFLUX (ASRAVA) IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE !".
The original Buddhist literature is written in Pāli language and in Pāli word äsrava' is transformed as āsava. "Discussing äsava in Pāli literature, it is said--Avidyā is the cause of accepting any thing stable; while really it is unstable. A sava is the cause of this avidyā (delusion). :
Asava is distinguished into four types : . (1) Kāmāsava-Desire to get sensual pleasures.
(2) Bhavāsava--Desire of life, i. e., non-desire towards death. Due to this asaya, man wishes to live in the same body for a long time.
(3) Drşyāsava-Opposite point of view that of Buddha philosophy.
(4) Avidyāsava--To accept unstable things as stable etc.
A sava is the general result of avid yā; while sorrow, pain etc., are special results.
Professor Jacobi holds the view that “all the three words āstava, samvara and nirjarā are as old as Jainism itself. Bauddhas have borrowed the word äsrava from Jainas, which is the most important among all the three. The Bauddhas use this word in the same meaning, as that of Jainas; but they make difference in literal usage. The cause of this difference is--they do not accept karmas as real entity and also does not accept ātman; and the existence of āsrava is only possible in ātman. This also proves that karmavāda (theory of karmas) is the original thing of Jainas and it is much more ancient than the beginning of Buddhism.”?
1. (a) In Anguttaranikāya (3/58, 6, 63), three kinds of āsravas are
described-(1) kāmāsrava (2) bhavāsrava and (3) avidyāsrava. (6) Jinadharma-sar (Hindi), p. 121. 2. Encylopedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 472.

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A Study
PRINCIPLE OF SAVARA To check the influx (äsrava) is sarvara. It is the principle, opposite to influx (asrava). It checks the inflow of kārmic matter. Asrava (influx) is like a channel through which the kārmic matter flow-in. By checking the same channel to stop the inflow of kārmic matter is sarvara. The main function of saṁvara, is to check the impure activities of ātman, which are due to attachment and a version (rāga-dveşa).
Samvara is the activity of checking inflow (āsrava).1 On account of samvara new karmas could not come and get contact with ātmapradeśas.
There are two types or divisions and kinds of Sanvara(1) Dravya Samvara (material check-up of influx) and (2) Bhāvasamvara (thought check-up of influx).2
1. (a) Tattvārthasūtra, 9/1
(6) Yogaśāstra, 79 2. (a) Yogaśāstra, 79-80
(6) Sthanānga, 1/14 (Țikā) (c) Saptatattra.prakarana-Heracandra Suri, 112 (d) Tattārtha-sarvārthasiddhi, 9/1 (e) Dravyasangraha, 2/34 (1) Pañcāstikāya, 2/142, Amstcandra-Vrtti. (g) Pañcāstikāya, 2/142, Jayasena-Vrtti.

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Dravyasarnvara (material check-up of influx) means the checkup of receiving the karma-pudgalas ; while bhāvasaṁvara (thought check-up of influx) includes to give up the activities which are cause of increasing the circle of life and death, and to indulge himself in bis own spiritual sūddhopayoga (natural conscious attentiveness). So, samiti (vigilance), gupti (self-restraince) etc., are regarded as bhāva-saṁvara (thought check up of influx).
An example will be sufficient to clearly understand the subject.
Suppose, a man is throwing off water so that the pond may be empty. He is working hard ; but the water of pond is as much as before was. What is the reason ? The reason is that the water is regularly flowing in through the channels. How the pond may be empty ? He should first of all check-up the channels so that water may not flow in. Then he should throw off the water. By this process the pond will be empty.
So is the position of samvara. Now let us express the above example.
The ātman is a pond. The karma is like a water, which is filled in. Asravas are the channels though the medium, new karmas regularly coming, as water flows in through channels. A devotee is throwing off karmas by meditation and penances; but he does not check-up the channels through which newly bound karmas are regularly flowing in. Imagine, how could he accomplish his goal of mukti or to be free from the ties of karmas ?
Hence, samvara or to check-up the inflow of karmas is too much essential to get salvation.
TYPES OF SAVARA Gupti (self-restraince), samiti (vigilance), uttama kşamā (excellent forgiveness) etc. ten śramaņa dharmas, anuprekşā (reflection), parişaha-jaya (victory over the hinderances during penances) and charitra (right conduct) are the ingredients of sarvara, according to Tattvārthasūtra.' By all these, the saṁvara becomes complete. The
1. Tattvārıhasūtra, 9/2.

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same view is adopted in Navatattvaprakaraṇa,1 with slight difference in order. But the ingredients are the same as described by Umaswati in his Tattvärthasutra.
Regarding the number of ingredients of samvara, there are many
traditions.
But mainly there are five types of samvara?—
1. Samyaktva-to be free from wrong faith (mithyātva).
2. I rata-To renounce all the eighteen kinds of sinful activities. 3. Apramada-to have a keen desire towards auspicious deeds or dharma.
4. Akaṣāya-subsidence (upasama) of anger, pride, greed, hypocrisy etc.
5. Ayoga-stopping all the mental, vocal and bodily activities.
Besides these, to give up all the sins, like-violence, falseness, stealing, cohabitation or sexual desire, hallucination (marcha) of possessions; to control all the five senses and to control the mental, vocal and physical activities are also samvara. In this way, there are 20 types of Samvara.s
Śri Devendra Suri tells 57 types of Samvara, viz., 5 Samiti (vigilance), 3 gupti (self-restraince), 10 śramana dharmas (excellent forgiveness etc.) 12 Anuprekṣās (reflections), 22 parīṣaha-jaya (victory over the hinderances during penances) and 5 caritra (right conduct).
Swami Kartikeya in his Dvādaṣānuprekṣā tells only four kinds of samvara. These are- -(1) Samyaktva-saṁvara. (2) Virati samvara. It is of two kinds-(i) partial or small vows (Desa-virati) and (ii) great vows or complete vows (mahāvrata). Partial vows are for
1. Navatativa-prakarana 25.
2. (a) Sthānanga, 5/2/418.
(b) Samavāyāṁga, 5.
3. There is the description of 5 great vows in-Prasna-Vyakaraṇa, samvara dvara; Sthänänga 5/2/418 and 10/1/79.
4. Nava-tattva-prakaraṇa, 42.
5. Dvādaśānuprekṣā-saṁvarānuprekṣā, 95.

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house-holder and great vows for a monk. (3) Kaṣāya saṁvara (passions), and (4) Yogābhāva samvara, i.e., stopping the activities of of mind, body and speech.
Acarya Kundakunda in Samaysāra1 tells four types of Samvara, (1) mithyātva (wrong faith) (2) ajñāna (nescience), (3) avirati (vowlessness) and (4) yoga (activities of mind, speech and body)these are asravas; and to stop all these is samvara. Hence, samvara is also of four types.
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As far as there is asrava, due to it, the atma-pradesas (the spacepoints of atman) always remain vibrating. This vibration stops only when the inflow of karmas checked up. So, it can be said that the restlessness of atma-pradeśas is āsrava and the calmness is samvara. The restlessness of atma-pradeśas, which is due to asrava turns into calmness, as soon as the asrava or influx of karmas is stopped. Due to asrava there is regular inflow of karma-pudgalas in atma-pradeśas and this inflow is stopped by samvara. Therefore it is definite that the main cause of transmigration (saṁsāra) are asrava (influx) and bandha (bondage) while that of salvation are saṁvara (stopping of influx) and nirjarā (shedding or annihilation of karmas).3 BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF SAMVARA
-3
Tathāgata Buddha also accepts saṁvara. In Aǹguitaranikāya, he tells that asrava can be checked up by samvara. There the division of samvara is as follows:
(1) By senses (indriyas)-By the samvara (checking up) of senses, the type of asrava, which is possible due to senses, extinguishes.
(2) By pratisevana-If a man does not eat food, drink water, wear clothes and take medicine, etc., then his mind can not be happy and due to unhappiness he is bounded with karmic ties. Therefore, to keep the mind happy, he should take all these things. By this the inflow of karmas is checked up.
1. Sumayasara, 190-191.
2. Tattvärtha-sarvārthasiddhi, 9/1 3. Tattvartha-sarvarthasiddhi, 1/4

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But here he (Tathāgata) warns that if food is taken for tastefulness than it would be the cause of asrava (inflow of karmas).
(3) By adhivāsanā (tolerance)-A man, who wants to tolerate the physical hardship then he does not like bodily pleasures. For such a man, the tolerance of bodily hardships is the cause of checking up the inflow of karmas (āsrava-nirodha)
(4) By parivarjanā (forbearance)-Fierce animals, like-elephant, lion, tiger etc., and poisonous creatures, like-scorpion, snake etc., the places full of thorns, the meantype friends etc.,-all these are painful to a man. Therefore, all of these should be forbidden. By it, also, the asrava could be checked-up.
Here, it can be said that the Tathāgata Buddha does not believe in Käyaklesa tapa (mortification of the body). He wants that the devotees and monks should forbid all the painful circumstances and should live in peaceful places, so that the external causes of karmabandha (bondage of karmas) may not arise.
(5) By vinodana-A devotee and a monk and even a layman should not indulge in the vain discussions, like-himsa-Viturka (violentdiscussions), päpa-vitarka (discussions regarding sins), kama-vitarka (discussions regarding mean and false desires, sensual pleasures etc.,); because all of these are bandhaka-vitarkas (bounding discussions for atman). By forbidding these bandhaka-vitarkas, this type of asrava can be checked up.
(6) By bhāvanā (reflection)-Asrava is also possible due to inauspicious reflections. If a man does not indulge himself in the auspicious reflections then the reverse, i. e., inauspicious karmas may flow in. For stopping these inauspicious karmas or asrava, a man should always keep auspicious thoughts in his heart and head.1
Anguttaranikaya also asserts that the checking up of avidya (hallucination) is the checking up of asrava.2
1. Anguttaranikāya, 6|58. 2. Ibid, 6/63

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PRINCIPLE OF NIRJARĀ
Nirjară means the annihilation or shedding off the karmas. In the order of sapta tattvas (seven essential elements), it comes after samvara. Samvara stops the inflow of new karmas; while nirjara means the destruction of previous bound karmas. As the water of a pond dries up by the sharp sun-light, air, etc., if the inflow channels have been stopped. So the karmas, previously bound with the atma-pradeśas are annihilated gradually, if the inflow of new karmas have been stopped by samvara. By this point of view nirjară means the partial separation of karma-vargaṇās from the atma-pradeśas.1 According to Dvadasanuprekṣā, nirjarā means the separation of karma-vargaṇās or aggregate of karmic matter from atma-pradeśas. Umaswati says in his Tattvärthabhāṣya, being ripen by penances etc., the separation of karmas is called nirjarā.3
Suppose, a man is washing his dirty coat with washing powder or soap; but the dirt does not come out at the very moment. It comes out gradually as the soap enters through the threads of the coat. As much as the soap enters through the threads, the filth comes out. This can be an example of nirjară. The ascetic or devotee as much indulges himself in penances, so much the karma-vargaṇās separate from ātma pradeśas. Here we may take coat or cloth as atman, the threads of which it is made as pradeśas and filth as the karmavargaṇās or the karmic matter. The ascetic has checked the inflow of new karmas by samvara and began the penances; but the filth of previously accumulated kärmic matter takes time to separate. As much as the filth of karmas removed from ātman, so much the spirit or soul becomes pure. Complete exhaustion of karmas is the pure state of soul and this is the salvation.
Nirjară is like the ladders for getting the pure state of soul. As a man reaches the upper storey by step by step and every step should be firm and steady. So to get salvation atman also have to march forward by steady steps.
1. Tattvärtha-sarvārthsiddhi, 1/4
2. Kartikeya-dvādaśānuprekṣā, 66.
3. Tattvärtha-bhāṣya, Haribhadrīya-vṛitti, 1/4.
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Nirjarā is of two kinds, viz., (i) sakāma nirjara and (ii) akāma nir jarā.
The shedding of karmas on account of vrata (vows) etc., is called sakāma nirjarā and the annihilation of kārmic matter, ripen itself is
a niriarā.1 In akāma niriarā, kārmic matter separates itself after fruition and giving effects.
Vācbaka Umāswāti gives two types of nirjarā, as (i) abuddhipūrvaka (without the use of intellect) and (2) kusalamula (with intellect). The kārmic experience which the jiva gets unintellectually in the narak gatis etc., is called abuddhipūrvaka nirjarā. The nirjarā or shedding off karmas by pepances, vows etc., is kušalamula.
Swāmi Kārtikeya also describes two types of nirjarā. He says that the fruition power (the power by which the ātman experiences the effects of the karmans) of knowledge obscuring karmans etc., (jñānāvaranīja karma etc.) eight karmans is called their intensity (anubhāga or rasa or vipāka.) After the operation (udaya) of karmas and giving their fruits to ātman the karma pudgalas are separated from ātma-pradeśas. It is called nirjară (shedding off the karmas). It is of two kinds-(1) swa-kāla-prāpta (at the completion of duration of time), and (2) tapaḥ-k rta (by penances etc.).
The first type of nirjarā or the exhaustion of previously accumulated karmas i. e., swa-kālaprāpta nirjarā is always in existence of all the jīvas of four gatis. It is regular, without any interruption. The second type nirjarā, tapah-krta nirjarā can be done only the vowful (vratayukta) jīvas, i. e., the jīvas who have accepted the vows.3
The Candraprbhacarita states—the exbaustion of karmas i. e., nirjarā is of two types, viz., (1) Kāla-krta (by the completion of duration of time) and (2) u pakrama-k rta. After experiencing the effects of karmas, the shedding off the karma- pudgalas is kālajā nirjarā
1. Dharmasarmābhyudayam 21/122-23. 2. Taltvārtha-bhāş ya 917 3. Dvādaśānu preksā-Nirjarānuprekşā, 103-104,

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(separation of karmas on the completion of the duration of time). The upkrama-kṛta nirjarā takes place by penances etc. 1
The Tattvärthasara states-after the experience of effects, the annihilation of karmas, is vipakajā nirjarā, and to experience the karmas, which are not in operation, bringing in operation avalikā (udayāvalik ā) is avipākajā nirjarā. "
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Really, akama-nirjarā is automatic. It needs ro efforts on the part of ātman. The other names swakālaprāpta, abuddhipūrvaka, kāla-k ṛta, etc., also denotes the same fact. All the thinkers have the same opinion about this type of nirjarā; but they differ regarding sakäma-nirjarā.
Some of the differences of great thinkers are given here.
Sakāma-nirjarā is possible only by those who have adopted vows (aṇuvratas and mahāvratas) and self-control (samyama) and the akāma nirjarā takes place with all the rest samsārī jīvas-says Hemacandra Suri.3
In the opinion of Swami Kārtikeya-akāma nirjarā is the regular formality of all the mundane souls residing in four gatis and sakāma nirjarā is possible only by the souls who have adopted Vows.4
Generally prevailed phrase 'avipākā munīndrānāṁ savipākākhilātmānāṁ' (avipāka nirjarā is possible only by the Jaina monks, who have adopted mahāvratas and savipāka nirjarā pertains to all the mundane souls) shows the above mentioned phantom.
A general view also prevails that only the souls having right faith (Samyag-dṛṣți jīva) can do sakāma nirjarā; while the souls deluded in wrong faith (mithyadṛṣṭi jiva) can not do it.
Pandit Kbu bacandra Siddhantśastrī gives his conviction in the following words-yathākāla nirjarā (shedding off karma pudgalas
1. Candra prabhacaritam 18/109-110.
2. Tattvärthas āra 7/2-4.
3. Sapta-tativa prakaraṇa, gāthā 128.
4. Dvādaśānuprekṣā-Nirjarānuprekṣā, 104.

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after completing the duration time) is the regular process, and it pertains to all the mundane souls; because all the previously accumulated karma-pudgalas sheds off themselves after the specified duration of time, giving their effects (good or bad) to the jiva. So this type of nirjarā should not be regarded as the element of nirjarā; because it does not help jīva to get salvation. The other type of nirjarā. i.e., shedding cff the karmas by effort, is possible by penances, vows etc. Really, this must be called as principle of nirjarā; because it is the cause of salvation. Thus there is basic difference in the cause and effect of both types of niriarā 1
Hence it may be concluded that the annihilation of karmas due to penances, vows etc., is sakāma nirjarā.
The wet cloth dries up sooner, when we spread it under sharp sun-light ; and if do not do so, then it would take too much time to dry. The same position is with nirjarā.
When a person (devotee or ascetic) indulges himself wisely and with discrimination in penances and vows, keeping only the aim of karma-nirjarā in bis mind, then the sakāma nirjarā takes place. While akāma nirjarā is the result of unwise and without owning mahāvratas, penances etc., and the shedding off the karmas on the completion of their specified period.
Undiscriminatory and without self-control (samyama) the penances etc., are called unwise hardships (Balatapa). Though Balatapa is also a cause of karma-nirjarā and by it jīva can get worldly and sensenal pleasures; but it cannot be the cause of sell-purification.
The one and only goal of the devotee is to break all the ties of karmas, which are accumlated in the ātman from the times beginningless (anādikāla), and attain salvation. So, it is suggested in Daśavaikālika- 'a devotee should never practise penance, meditation etc., to get worldly pleasures, like-fame, immense riches, wealth, majesty, grandeur etc., during other life etc., but he should practise penances etc., only with the aim of nirjarā. :
1. Subhāşya Tattvārthasūtra, p. 378. 2. Dašavaikālika 9/3

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TYPES OF NIRJARĀ Pin The covering of karmas around ātman, is destructed by penances. So the penances are also regarded as nirjarā.?
The Sthânāngasätra ascerts as ege nijjarā--one nirjarā? There we get only these general wordings; but elsewhere twelve types of nirjară are described.
As the fire has no distinctions, while we consider its nature; but due to instrumental causes (nimitta käraņa), it has distinctions, like--wood-fire, stone-fire etc. So being nirjarā as one, with the point of view of its nature; but due to instrumental causes it is divided in twelve types.?
There are innumerable kinds of penances ! tapa), like-kanakāvali etc., so nirjarā may also be of innumerable types.
Acārya Abhayadeva writes in his yrtti of Sthānānga~Considered from the point of view of karmans, nirjarā is of eight types; because karmans (knowledge obscuring karnian etc.) are also of eight types. Being a produce of twelve types sf penances, nirjarā is also of twelve kinds. As nirjarā is the result of many causes, like-akāma (without any desire) tolerating hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc., and the vow of celibacy etc., it (nir jarā) is also of many types.5
But mainly, there are twelve types of nirjarā, on account of twelve types of penances. All the thinkers are one-minded on this point. These twelve types of nirjarā or tapas (austerities) are as follow:
1. Fasting (anaśana) 2. Eating less than one's fill or hunger (ūnodarī)
3. Taking a definite vow secretly to accept food from a householder only if certain condition is fulfilled (bhiksācari).
1. Navatattva-prakaraṇa, 11, bhāşya 90, by Devagupta Suri 2. Sthānānga 9/16- Ege nijjarā. 3. śāntasudhārasa-Nirjarā Bhāvanā, 2-3, Vina yavījayajī. 4. Navatattva-prakarana, 11, Devagupta Sūri. 5. Sthānānga, 1/16, Tikā.

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4. Abstinence from one or more of the six objects of taste (rasa-parityāga).
These rasas or tastes are-1. Kasu (sour), 2. Madhura (sweet), 3. Āmla (acidic), 4. Tikta (bitter) 5. Kāşāya (astringent) and 6. Lavana (saltish).
5. Mortification of the body or to tolerate the pains, griefs given by other beings or aroused by previously accumulated demeritorious karmas (kāyaklesa).
6. To be static in self-nature (pratisaṁlinatā). 7. Expiation (prāyaścitta). 8. Modesty (vina ya) 9. Servitude (vaiyyāv rtya). 10. Self-study (swādhyāya). 11. Meditation (dhyāna). 12. Giving up through non-attachment (vyutsarga).
Among these twelve tapas (penances), first six are external penances or austerities (bāhya tapas) and the last six are internal austerities (antaranga tapas).
ANASANA (FASTING) Fasting (anaśana) is the first of the external austerities. It is much more difficult to practise in comparison to other austerities. In this type of austerity a devotee has to win victory on hunger, and it is well known to all that hunger is too difficult to win. In other words, it can be said that huoger has got victory over every jiva of the world. It is a hero, who can be termed as world-victorious. Every type of sin is the consequence of hunger. But a devotee has to win this world-famous hero.
To win hunger and control the mind is anaśana austerity. Only to remain hungry cannot be regarded anasana austerity. Many man and animals, creatures etc., have to remain hungry when they could not get food and drinking water. But their being hungry can not be regarded as austerity. It would be austerity when a devotee can get food easily, but he wilfully keeps fast and

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controls his mind and indulges himself in auspicious and religious activities.
Considering from medicinal point of view, fasting is a cause of bodily-purification. It is the maxim of vaidyaka sastra-to keep fast is the best medicine (Langhanam paramauṣadham). The fast does not only purify the body but it also purifies the mind even.
Gitā says, by giving up to eat food the senses become pure and consequently mind also becomes pure. That is why, a Vedic saint has said-'there is no hardship greater than fast. But generally it is very difficult to practise, nay only difficult but most difficult to the superlative degree.2
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Really, to keep fast and observe anasana tapa is a fire-bath. One, who can practise it, will be capable to burn all the filth of body and mind. He will shine like a sparkling star.
what?
Ganadhara Gautama once asked humbly to Bhagawana Mabavira-Venerable! By keeping fast (anasana) jīva accomplishes
Venerable Bhagawana Mahavira replied thus-O Gautama ! By practising anaśana tapa, jiva is bereaved from the desire of living, alias his attachment towards the body and vital forces (präṇa).3 Consequently the ascetic gets bereavement from the attachment towards his vital forces and body.
One thinker warned the person, while keeping fast, not to do three deeds, viz., (1) anger (2) pride and (3) negligence (pramada). He as well suggested to do three deeds viz., (1) to observe celibacy (2) study the holy scriptures and (3) self-realisation.
The word anasana means forbearance of food. It may be at least for one day and at the most of six months and in special circumstances life-long.
1. Bhagavadgītā 2/59.
2. Maitrayani Aranyaka 10/62.
3. Uttaradhyayana 29/35.

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There are two distinctions of anaśana-(1) Itwarika (for specified period) and (2) Yavat-kathika-life long or upto death.1
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During itwarika tapa, there remains the limit of specified period and after this period, the fast-keeper has the desire of getting food in his mind. So it is called as the austerity with desire (sāvakānkṣa tapa); while during yāvat-kathika tapa, there is no existence of desire regarding getting food. So it called as austerity without desire (niravakankṣa tapa).'
There are innumerable kinds of itwarika tapa, i. e., to keep fast like-Navakarasi (for 48 minutes), porasi (for 3 hours), pūrvärdha (for beginning half of the day, i. e., for six hours from rising the sun) divasa-carima (for full day, it begins from the sun-set of the previous day and completes in the morning of the day-after) caturtha-bhakta (a full day-night fast), ratribhojanatyāga (not to eat and drink any thing after sunset upto the sun-rise the next day, i. e. full night) chattha-bhakta (two full day-night) etc. etc.3
Yavat-kathika anaśana is of two types-(1) pādapopagamana and (2) bhakta-pratyākhyāna.1
During bhakta pratyākhyāna, besides giving up the food, it is necessary for a devotee to pass every moment in studying holy scriptures, meditation and self-realisation.
Pāda popagamana is harder than bhakta-pratyakhyana. During this type of anasana, the devotee becomes static like a stalk. He does not even change his posture and remains in the same posture, in which he has accepted the vow of anaśana. For example, if he is standing then he will not sit, nor will lie or vice versa. If his eyes were open, he will not shut them and vice versa.
1. Bhagavati 25/7
2. Uttaradhyayana 30/9
3. Jainadharma me Tapa: Swarup and Viśleṣaṇa, pp. 181-199 by
Muniśrī Misrimalaji.
4. Uvavai sutra

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For pădapopagmana anaśana and santhārā, it is quite necessary that man must have vajra-rṣabha nārāch sanghananal of his body, otherwise it is impossible to be static like a mountain. Therefore it is not possible for other or general men. Agamas definitely ascerts that with the dispersion (vicheda) of 14 purvas the pädapopagamana santhārā also disjuncts.
ŪNODARĪ la The next type of nirjarā is ūnodari (eating less than one's hunger). It is second external austerity. It is also called avamaudarya. It can be said as to eat little food or limited food. Like food, unudarī also pertains to passions and possessions as well.
There are two division of unodarī-(1) Dravya (regarding matter or external) and (2) Bhāva (thought or internal).
Dravya ünodarī is of many kinds.
Bhāva ūnodarī means to subside the passions, like-anger, pride, hypocrisy, greed and to speak as little as possible, not to come into conflict with any body, etc.
Really speaking Dravya-ūnodari (external) makes the external life of an ascetic light and easy; while internal (bhāva) ünodarī paves the way for attaining mental and internal happiness and the evolution of good qualities.
BHIKSĀCARÍ In general sense bhikṣācari is to get food from a house-holder, but for Jaina mouks it is an external austerity, because he accepts food and drinking water only when his secretly adopted vow and certain conditions are fulfilled. He is not a general beggar who can accept every and any kind of food. He accepts it according to his vows and limitations.
Acārya Haribhadra Suri describes three kinds of bhikṣā(1) Dina-rriti, (2) Pauruşagini, and (3) Sarvasampatkari.?
1. It is the special type of bondage of the bones. It is such a strong,
that cannot be broken or cut by the sharpest weapons. 2. Aştaka-prakaraṇa 5/1

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The poor, orphans, oppressed, down-trodden, grief-stricken, and deef-dumb-blind-maim etc., who takes food by begging is called beggary or Dina-vṛtti bhikṣā.
Strong, sturdy, healthy persons capable to earn their livelihood, when beg to get food, it is called paurṣaghni bhikṣā. This type of beggary depresses the manhood and vigour of a person, so it is regarded the meanest type of beggary.
The non-violent and content saints take food according to their limitations from a house-holder only for giving dose (diet) to the belly is called sarva-sampatkarī bhikṣā. By it both the taker and giver gets auspicious gatis.
In the agamas, there is the description of many kinds of bhikṣācari.1
Jaina monk accepts the alms only when it is completely faultless and without any kind of shortcomings."
RASA-PARITYAGA
Rasa literally means-enjoyment increasing ingredients. The ingredients, which inspires attachment towards any thing, like-food etc., is called rasa. There are six kinds of rasas regarding food. These are—(1) Kațu (sour) (2) Madhura (sweet) (3) Amla (acidic) (4) Tikta (bitter) (5) Kāṣāya (astringent) and (6) Lavana (saltish).
By these rasas the food becomes tasty and delicious; and being so it is eaten more than hunger. So the rasas are also called inspiring elements."
Vigayas, like-Milk, curd, ghee, etc., are also called rasas.
Why these milk etc., are called vigaya? This question is answered by Acārya Siddhasena. He says-by eating or taking these the perversion (vikāra) arouses in the tendency of atman. So
1. (a) Uttaradhyayana 30/25 (b) Sthänänga, 6
2. (a) Uttaradhyayana 24/11-12 (b) Pindaniryukti 92-93.
3. Uttaradhyayana 32/10.

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the person falls down from the highest altar of Sarhyama (self-control) and consequently he has to go to vigati or durgati (downward conditions of mundane soul). Therefore, these things are the causes of sad effects (vik rti) and bad or inauspicious gati (vigati). Hence, things are called vigaz.?
But it should be remembered that the healthy diet is not altogether denied to monk. He can take vigaya, according to his needs, but he does not take it for the sake of taste only. For taste-sake even to chew and suck the food is also regarded as defect. Different types are described of rasas also.
KĀYAKLEŚA . Kāyakleša literally means to give turmoil to the body. The turmoil or trouble are of two types—(1) swa-k rta (done by own-self) and (2) para-k sta (done by others). The ascetic keeps no inclination or attachment towards his body. He firmly believes that ātman and body both are quite separate from each other.
Acārya Bhadrabāhu wrote in his Avaśyaka-niryukti-‘ātman and body are quite different -by this type of pure intelligence, the ascetic renounces the attachment towards his body, which is the cause of grief and ain.3
The thinking of spiritual thinker is thus - the pains, troubles and miseries are all to the body; not to me (self). The pain may be to body through trouble and turmoil. The body may be destroyed by the strokes of weapons. But utman can never be destroyed, it can never be destructed (natthi jivassa nasu tti). He think that I, i. e., my soul is full of conscience, cognition and bliss etc. No power of the world is capable to destroy it. It can never be destructed. Fire cannot burn it and water cannot drench it It is pure and blissful and this is my own nature.
| (a) Pravacanasāroddhāra Vrtti-Pratyākhyānadvūra.
(6) Yogaśāsatra, 3 Prakāśa-Vrtti. 2 (a) Bhagavati 7, 1
(b) Ācārānga 8, 6 3 Āvaśyaka-niryukti 1547 4 Uttarādhyayana 2, 27

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By the dint of this thinking and having deep faith to the core about ātma-svarūpa (nature of self) the ascetic tolerates all the agonies peacefully.
Sthanāngasūtra describes the type of Kaya-kleśa-Kayotsarga, meditation by utkatuka posture, to accept pratima (a special type of vow); vir asana, sitting in palathi posture for the study of holy scriptures, stand erect (Dandayat) posture, meditation in standing posture.1
Fourteen types of Kavaklesa are described in uvavai sūtra.2 This shows that Kayakleśa tapa is the mortification of body. PATISAMLI NATA
The process of bringing soul to its own nature, by taking off from external thoughts, is called Pratisaṁlīnatā. So samlīnatā is svalīnată (to remain in own nature). To restraint internally, the passions, senses and yogas, bringing back from external tendencies, is samlīnată.
Bhagavati sutra has given four distinctions of pratisamlīnatā. These are: (1) indriya (sense) pratisaṁlīnantā, (2) kaşāya (passions) pratisaṁlīnatā, (3) yoga saṁlīnatā, and (4) vivikta śaiyyāsana (sitting and stopping in a lonely place).3
PRAYAŚCITTA
Prāyaścitta is the formation of two words-'prayaḥ' and 'citta'. The word 'Prayaḥ' denotes sin and the word 'citta' denote viśodhana (purification). So prayaścitta (expiation) is the process of purifying the sinful activities.4
According to Acārya Akalanka offence is 'prayaḥ' and 'citta' means purification. Hence prayaścitta is the process by which crimes or offences are get purified.5
1 Sthānanga 7, 544
2 Uvavāi-Samavasaraṇa adhikāra,
3 Bhagavati 25, 7
4 Dharmasangraha 3, adhikāra.
5 Tattvärtha-rājavārttika, 9, 22, 1

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In the Prākṣta language word 'prāyaścitta' is termed as pāyacchitta'. The origination of word 'pāyacchitta' has been described thus'pāya' means pāpa (sin or demerit) and 'cchitta' means destruction. In this way, the process which destroys sin, is ‘pāyacchitta (expiation).1
There is a vast difference between expiation and punishment.
Suppose, a man has done a wrong deed due to negligence. After it he repents heartily for this wrong deed. He goes to his elders and clearly tells them all about his wrong activity and prays them to give any kind of punishment for the purification of that misdeed. He accepts the punishment told by the elders and practises the hardships etc., then it is expiation.
Now we take punishment. The ruler gives punishment to a criminal. First of all, he doe; not confess his guilt. He tells thousands of lies to escape himself from punishment. The judge or ruler needs proofs and witnesses to ascribe crime. If anyhow the crime is proved and he sentenced a legal punishment. Still there is no repentence in his mind and heart. He accuses judge, advocates and witnesses. So there is no chance of reform of the criminal by punishment.
Another difference is that, when expiation is self-punishment; while punishment is external. First is internal and second is external.
Ten types of prāyaściita are described in Sthānanga sūtra.?
By prāyaścitta (expiation) the defects are removed and the heart becomes pure. The simple hearted man can practise prāyaścitta (expiation).
VINAYA Vinaya (modesty) is directly related to heart. It is a spiritu il quality.
The word Vinaya (modesty) has been used in three different meanings, in the Jaina litera ture. These are
1 Pañcāsaka saţika, Vivarana 16-3 ? (a) Sthānānga, 10 (b) Bhagavatī, 25, 7

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(1) Vinaya-discipline (2) Vinaya-self-control, śīla, good conduct. (3) Vinaya---namratā (modesty) good behaviour.
Ācārya Abhayadeva wrote in Sthānānga-vrtti --Vinaya removes all the eight type of karmans and by it soul gets salvation.'
In the vrtti of the Pravacanasāroddhāra, it has been suggested that Vinaya refers to the removal of the karmas which lead to affliciions and which are enemies of the soul.
In the āgama literature like the Bhagavati, distinctions have been made of the Vinaya : (1) Darśana Vinaya (2) Jñana Vinaya (3) Căritra Vinaya (4) Mana Vinaya (5) Vacana Vinaya (6) Kāya Vinaya and () Lokopacāra Vinaya.
Vinaya (modesty) and formal courtesy or flattery (cāpalūsi) are diametrically opposed to each other. In the vinaya there is sincerity and the openness of the heart, but courtesy expresses only formality. It may not have sincerity. On the contrary, it may have veiled hypocrisy.
) VAIYYAVRTYA (SERVETUDE)
Vaiyyāvrtya refers to protection and service of things and individuals leading to the attainment of the righteousness. Through service, it is possible to be free from the Nāma and Gotra karma.3 Service to the diseased persons, the sādhus and the ācāryas leads us towards Nirjarā. Real and devoted service leads us to the freedom from the wheel of saṁsāra.4
Sthānānga mentions eight commandments and out of these two refer to the service to humanity,5
In the Bhagavatī sūtras ten types of vaiyyāvrtya has been suggested.
1 Sthānānga, 6, Țīkā. 2 (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthānānga 7 (c) Aupapātika, tapuvarṇana. 3 Uttarādhyayana 29, 3 4 Sthānānga 5, 1 5 Sthānānga 8 6 (a) Bhagavati 35, 7 (b) Sthānanga 10

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A poet has praised the qualities of the Vaiyyāv rtya and says that the excellence of service is so great that even the yogis cannot easily understand its importance.
SVĀDHYAYA (SELF-STUDY) Svādhyāya refers to self-study. It is a systematic study of the śāstras.1 Svādhyāya also means introspection on the nature of self.
The self-study increases the capacity of intellect. As food is necessary for the development of the body, self-study is absolutely necessary for the development of the mind. Self-study and contemplation, lead us towards creative thinking and towards the development of the mental capacity.
Wrong types of physical excercises are harmful to the body. Unwholesome food is injurious to the body. Similarly, study of literature like-sex literature, would be very harmful to the purification and to the development of the mental states in the proper direction. Mental activities become distorted and one loses the power of discrimination. It would, therefore, be necessary that we always study wholesome literature, although we may study less.
It is possible to be free from misery, through svādhyāya. The accumulated karma coming from a chain of previous life can be annihilated by svādhyāya. Svādhyāya, itself is a form of important tapas. Ācārya Sanghadāsagani says, that svādhyāya, is unique and the austerity of svādhyāya is unparallel because such noble type of austerity has not been experienced in the past, nothing so great in the present and nothing similar to it in future.5
The Vedic seers have also said that svādhyāya is a form of the tapas. We should not be negligent of svādhyāya.? Just as the wall becomes shining by constant rubbing and polishing, it reflects the
i Sthānānga, Abhayadeva vrtti 5, 3, 465 2 Svasya svasmin adhyāyaḥ-adhyaynam-svādhyāyaḥ. 3 Uttarādhyayana 26, 10 4 Chandraprajñapti 91 5 (a) Brhatkalpa bhāşya 1169 (b) Candraprajñapti sütra 89 6 Taittirīya aranyaka 2, 14 7 Taittirīyopanişād 1, 11, 1

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image of the persons standing in front of it, so also svādhyāya if done carefully and seriously and without fault, becomes transparent and it reflects the essence of all the śātras. Patañjali has said that it is possible to get the direct experience of the deities through svādhyāya.
Svādhyāya can be distinguished into five types as (1) Vacanā (reading), (2) Pracchanā (in.errogation), (3) Parivartanā (rotating or repeating loudly), (4) Anuprekşā (psychic preparation through meditat. ion) and (5) Dharmakathā (listening to religious stories).
I DHYĀNA (MEDITATION) Dhyāna is concentration of mind. Ācārya Hemacandra says that Dhyana is the concentration of mind on a particular subject. Bhadrabāhu also says, that Dhyāna refers to the concentration of the mind on a particular subject and fixing the mind on that subject.4
Dhyāna is of two types : (1) auspicious and (2) inauspicious. Inauspicious Dhyāna (aprašasta) is of two types : (i) Artadhyāna (concentration of mind on things of the world) and (ii) Raudradhyāna (revengeful concentration). Acārya Siddhasena Divākara has said “Subhaika' pratyayo dhyānań." It means auspicious dhyāna is concentration of mind on an auspicious object. It is suggested that the one who aims at the highest from of self-concentration which is called samādhi must avoid Ārta and Raudradhyāna and he must practise righteous concentration (Dharmadhyāna) and pure concentration (Sukladhyāna).6
Dharmadhyāna consists in the concentration of the mind on the auspicious and righteous objects. It is also been described as self-concentration i. e., concentration on the self by the self.? In this
"Subject.
1 Yogadarśana 2,944 2 (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthânānga 5 3 Abhidhāna cintamaņi kośa 1, 48 4 Avaśyakaniryukti 1456 5 Dvātrimsad dvātrimśikā 18, 11 6 Atta ruddāni vajjittā jhāejjā susamāhie.
Dhamma sukkāim jhāņāim jhāņam tam tu buhavae, 7 Tattvānušāsana 74

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way, the ātman withdraws itself from the external objects and concentrates on its own nature. Through Dhyāna, karma is destroyed, just as in fire, pieces of wood are burnt away. VYUTSARGA (GIVING UP THROUGH NON-ATTACHMENT)
Vyutsarga has two elements—vi' which means specific and 'utsarga' which means giving up, or renunciation. Vyutsarga, therefore, means' giving up or renunciation in a specific way.
Ācārya Akalanka says that vyutsarga may be referred as renunciation, non-attachment, fearlessness and giving up of hunger and thirst for things of the world. For the sake of self realisation and for the sake of righteousness, vyutsarga aims at self-denial and renunciation.
Vyutsarga is of four types, like-(1) Gana Vyutsarga (renunciation of group), (2) Sarira Vyutsarga (mortification of the body), (3) Upadhi Vyutsarga (giving up of the things connected with activities) and (4) Bhakta-pāna Vyutsarga (giving up of food and drink)
Śarīra Vyutsarga is considered to be Kāyotsarga. It refers to the affliction through the body. The seeker after self-realisation practises prāyaścitta for all the ills that he has done. He gives up attachment for the body and resolves to by free from all faults. With this firm resolution and with a repentent heart the weight of the karma becomes lighter. The stream of auspicious concentration of mind flows freely. It gives peace and tranquility. The ātman enjoys the pure bliss.
In the practice of kāyotsarga, it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and obstructions from the gods, from men and from the lower animals too. But one who is engaged in the practice of Dhyāna accepts these troubles with equanimity of mind and by this process the kāyotsarga gets purified. 3
Kāyotsarga is a routine procedure of everyday, and it is absolutely necessary for everyone to practise. In this, every moment, the mental preparation for kāyotsarga goes on. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra
1 2 3
Tattvārtha-rājavartika 9, 26, 10 Bhagavatī sūtra 25, 7 Āvaśyakaniryukti 1549

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says : “abhikkhaņam kāüssaggakārī'' – the seeker practises kāyotsarga very often. Kāyotsarga has been distinguished into two types : (1) Dravya-Kāyotsarga is concerned with the bodily aspect of self-control and (2) Bhāva-Käyotsarga is concerned with the psychic accompaniments of vyutsarga.Dravya-Kāyotsarga refers to the control of the bodily states and Bhāva Kāyotsarga is involved in the Dhar madhyāna. and śukladhyana. Kāyotsarga is one of the important forms of tapas and for this reason we get in the āgamic literature the description that kāyotsarga is in fact a full form of the vyutsarga. The seeker after self-realisation will attain full vyutsarga if he is successful in the practice of kāyotsarga.3
There is a regular procedure and the graded process of the practice of tapas from Anaśana (fasting) to Vyutsarga (renunciation). There is a steady flow of austerities in these graded processes.
From the discussions above, we may conclude that the Jaina description of tapas does not merely refer to the physical austerity, but it has also reference to mental austerity which consists of control and practice of mental states and events, which lead to the purity of the mind and soul.
1 3
Avaśyakacūrņi Jainadharma me Tapa - Svarüpa aur Viślesana (Hindi), p. 523

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The Principles of BANDHA and MOKSA :
A Discussion
THE PRINCIPLE OF BANDHA
The association of two things with each other is called Bandha. There are two types of Bandha: (1) Dravyabandha (the association or contact of the material things) and (2) Bhāvabandha coming together or joining of the psychic states and events). The Karmic particles coming in contact with the soul and creating the veil of obscuration, is called the Dravyabandha. The psychic states accompanying the physical activity and also those psychic states which are the causes of the physical activity and which come together and vitiate the Karmic particles associated with a soul is Bhāvabandha. In the Dravyabandha the atman is connected with the Karmic particles. In the Bhāvabandha the psychic states are associated with the soul leading to the Kärmic bondage. These two are complementary to each other and the one is intimately conected with the other. If the particles of the matter are brought together, there would be the specific form of binding or association. It may create chemical action. For instance, if the viscousity and dryness are combined in the particles of matter, a new chemical action will be created and new properties are formed. The atoms come together to form molecules and when they are combined in different degrees, chemical reaction is possible. Similarly, if the Karmic particles are formed into the aggreagates of Karmic particles, those will have some effect and association with the soul, although there is no chemical action in this activity. This is because the jīva and the karmic particles are qualitatively different. The manifestation of the jiva is to be found in the psychic and the conscious states while the modes of matter are unconscious. The manifestation of jiva is

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through the expression of caitanya (consciousness) and its states, while modes of matter are expressed in the qualities like taste, smell and touch etc.
THE TYPES OF BANDHA The Bandha has been distinguished into four types such as : (1) Prak rtibandha, sthitibandha, anubhāgabandha and pradeśabandha. Tattvārthasūtra uses the word anubhāva in place of anubhāga.
Prakrti karma refers to the nature of karma, Sthiti-karma has reference to the state and the limitation of the kārmic particles with the soul, Anubhāga is the in intensity of the experience of karma, while Pradeśa karma has reference to aggregates of kārmic partiles associated with the soul. Detailed discussion of this problem can be found in the theory of Karma as presented by the Jaina philosophers.
Philosophical literature on the Karma theory of the Jainas gives the analogical example of a pudding (modaka) with its medicinal properties. A pudding may be used for the sake of gastric trouble, some other puddings may be used for curing the diseases of phlegm and other types of intestinal disorders. Similarly, some form of Karma is responsible for obscuring knowledge, some other forms of Karma would obscure intuition, and still others would be responsible for limiting the inherent energy of the soul etc. There are some forms of Karma which create the deluding effects on the soul. This, we can say refers to the Prakrti-karma and Prakrtibandha.
Some puddings last for a day, while some others may last for a week and so on and after which the efficacy of the pudding will be lost. Similarly, the kārmic particles affecting the soul have their duration of the effect in varied degrees.
As some puddings are sweet and some sour, similarly the experiencing effect of the Karma will be different in intensity.
Just as a pudding may be half in size or full in size, similar description can be given about the Kārmic Pradeśa.
Praksti and Pradeśabandha are caused by activity (Yoga). Sthiti and Rasa-bandha are caused by Kaşāyas (passions). The intensity of passions depends on the nature, and the potency of the Kārmic

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particles. This is called by the expression of Sthitibandha and Anubhāgabandha. These types of Bandha are due to passions and emotional disturbances. In the case of those in whom the passions are subdued, and in the case of those, the passions are destroyed and similarly in the case of Kevalins, the kaṣāyas (passions) have no effects. There is no rise of kaṣāyas in the Kevalin. Even if the karmic particles are encrued in the soud of a Kevalin due to activity, they are immediately washed away in the next moment because the soul has reached the state of purity. In these cases, Sthitibandha and Anubhāgabandha are not possible in these cases.
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Bandha is of two types: (i) subha and (ii) aśubha. Śubhabandha (auspicious bondage) brings in merit and aśubha bandha (inauspicious bondage) brings in demerit. As long as Karma does not fructify in the form of an effect, it remains potential, and it is called the sattā state of Karma. The moment the Karma fructifies Punya and Papa flow in. The potential form of Karma is Bandha and the frucitification of Karma refers to the acquisition of Punya and Papa.
MOKṢA AND THE PATHWAY TO MOKṢA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
There are three great philosophies of the world-Greek philosphy, Modern Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. Aristotle, a great Greek philosopher said that philosophy begins in wonder. Plato also held the same view. Modern western philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Hegel hold a similar view expresed. It is said that the philosophical speculations are rooted in curiousity1 and curiousity results in misery. Birth, old age, disease and death have to be overcome for the sake of self-realisation. (This is possible through the arousal of the metaphysical curiousity). Indian philosophy does not merely aim at the achievement of the knowledge of the reality, but it has a dual purpose of knowledge and virtue. The main purpose of philo
1 (a) Athāto dharmajijñāsa–Vaiśeṣika darśana (b) Sankhya kārikā 1.
(c) Mīmāṁsā sūtra-Athāto dharmajijñāsā. (d) Brahma sutra 1/1-Athāto Brahmajijñāsā.

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sophy in India is to free oneself from the misery of this life. In this sense, we can say that in the western thought, the aim is purely academic, while Indian philosophy is practical and it aims at self-realisation. It is not merely an academic pursuit of knowledge of reality, but it has the highest aim of the realisation of the truth in life.
Moksa is the highest ideal of Indian philosophy. Śri Auro. bindo considers the concept of Mokșa to be the central point of Indian thought. This is the distinguishing feature of Indian thought. In the description of the Puruşārtha, Moksa is considered to be the supreme (parama puruşārtha). Mokşa is the highest ideal to be achieved and dharma is the means of achieving this supreme end.
In Indian philosophy the concept of Mokşa may be considered from four different points of view; viz. Vedic, Jaina, Baudhha Ajivaka. Ājīvaka has not remained as important philosophy. It is, therefore, not necessary here to consider the concept of Moksa from the point of view of Ājīvakas. The vedic tradition gives six darśanas like Nyāya, Vaiseșika, Sankhya, Yoga, Pūrva-Mimāṁsā and UttaraMimāṁsā, Pārva Mimāṁsā was primarily considered to be Karma Mimāṁsā. It was mainly concerned with the study of Moska. But in the other five darśanas, the concept of Moksa is important.
We should remember that as there are differences in the presentation of the nature of self, so are there differences regarding their speculation on the nature of Mokşa. Sometimes the concepts of Moksa are not only different but also contrary. Those systems of philosophy which have based their thought on the Upanişads and Brahmasūtra also differ regarding the nature of Mokşa. Some philosphies make a distinction between the Atman and Paramātman, some others consider them to be identical and still other philosophies consider the distinction and the identity to be equally real. Similarly, some philosophies have considered the Atman to be all-pervading, 3 and
1 Jaina āgama Bhagavatī etc. 2 Panạit Sukhalāl Sanghavī-- Adhyātma Vicāraṇā. (Gujarat Vidya • Sabha, Ahmedabad) p. 74. 3 (a) Mundaka up. 1, 1, 6 (b) Vaiseșiku Sūtra 7, 1, 22.
(c) Nyāyamañjari (Vijayanagaram) p. 468 (d) Prakaraņa pan p-158

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soine others make Ātman to be atomic. Some philosophic traditions have acceped the plurality of Ātman while others consider it to be one. However, all the philosophies mentioned above have accepted to primacy of the concept of the Atman in one from or the other.
NYĀYA-VAIŠEŞİKA
The Nyāya-Vaiseșika darśanas have generally a common view-point of the nature of Atman. They consider Ātman to be the ultimate and eternal substance. The Atman is not one. They believe in the plurality of the Atmans. There are as many souls as there are bodies. If the Atman were one, there would be no possibility of diversity in life.
Nyāya-Vaiseșika darśanas maintained that Ātman has consciousness. But consciousness is not the essense of the Atman, it is its attribute. The association of body, sense-organ and central function of mind give rise to cognition. This cognition is possible d consciousness. But consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is only a quality. Therefore, it can be said that the self as consciousness and not that the self is consciousness. This view of the nature of the self is different from the view of the nature of self presented by the philosophical systems like Sānkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. These systems do not accept the conception that consciousness is an attribute of the self. They consider it to be the essence of the self.In the highest state of Mokşa, according to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, self does not have any experience nor consciousness; it is pure sattā (reality). It does not experience pure consciousness or pure bliss, because in the sa Mokşa, the accidental quality of consciousness of the soul is absent. It is qualityless, and therefore in a sense, we can say it is free from consciousness and also because consciousness is an empirical adjunct of the relational categories.
The Nyāya-Vaiseșika says that the highest state of Mokşa is
1 (a) Brhadāraṇyaka up. 5, 6, 1. (b) Chăndogya Up. 5, 18, 1,
(c) Maitrei Up. 2 Adhyātma Vicāraṇā.

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absolute freedom from miseryl and there is no possibility of the recurrence of misery in any from.
Vātsyāyana the commentator on Nyāyasūtr:1 says that when perversity of knowledge is removed through philosophy, all imperfections are removed. When imperfection are removed, then the tendency to perform karma also ceases. With the cessation of the tendency to do karma, the cycle of birth and death also stops. The commentators on the Nyāyasūtra have pointed out that in the state of perfection there is absolute cessation of misery. In the state of Moksa the nine attributes like intellect, happiness, misery, desire, hatred, will (sarnkalpa), punya (merit) and pāpa (demerit) do not exist.5 In the final state of Mokşa the Nyāya-Vaiseșika lays emphasis on the absolute cessation of misery and the cause of misery.
Mallisena in the Syādvādamañjarī says that considered from the point of view of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika the worldly experience would be superior to the state of Mokşa, because in the worldly experience, we sometimes get happiness, but in the highest state of Mokşa, there is absolute cessation of happiness also. There is the absence of consciousness.
A disciple of lord Krisņa says that instead of the state of Mokşa as described by Nyāya-Vaiseșika, the description of life in Brndāvana is much better.? Śri Harşa says that the state of Mokşa described by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika presents a bloodless category since consciousness and sang happiness.8 Nyāya-Vaiseșika have analysed the concept
| (a) Atyantika dukkhaniv yttiḥ mokşah.
(b) Carama dukkha dhvaṁsah-Tarkadipikā 2 Bhāşya on Nyāyasūtra 3 Vaišeşikasūtra 3, 2, 18 4 Ātyantiko dukhābhāvaḥ- Nyāyavārtika 5 (a) Nyāyamañjari
(b) Tadatyanta Vimokşopavargaḥ-Sabhāşya Nyāyasūtram. 6 Syādvādamañjari, p. 6?. 7 Syādvādamañjari, p. 63. 8 Bharatiya darsana me moksa cintan : ek tulanątmaka ahyayana
(17, Malaviya nagar. 1973.)

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of Moksa from the empirical point of view. According to them, one who wants to realise the highest end must aim at the removal of the misery and the unholesome and unrighteous states of existence. There is no evidence to show that in the highest state of Mokşa, there is the presence of either the consciousness of bliss. In the highest state of Mokşa the self subsists in itself without any attributes of knowledge (jñāna), and bliss (ānanda).
SANKHYA AND YOGA DARŠANAS Sankhya and Yoga darśanas are compelmentary to each other. The Sānkhya presents the metaphysical aspect of reality, while Yoga is practical, in the sense, it presents the pathway to the realisation of the highest end. The Sānkhya gives the metaphysical foundations to Yoga and Yoga presents the practical pathway to the realisation of the highest end of perfection (Kaivalya).
Sānkhya presents the dualistic principles of Puruşa (self) and Praksti (matter). Puruşa and Prakrti are the ultimate realities. Prakrti is the primordial matter and it is the expression of the equilibrated state of the guņas - sattva, rajas and tamas. The presence of the puruşa disturbs the equilibrium in the gun.is and the activity of the Prakrti. The activity of the Prāk rti through the disturbance of the guna due to the presence of the Puruşa gives rise to the evolution of the universe. The modes, both physical and mental in the world are the expression of Prakrti. Prakrti evolves but it is not the product of any other higher principle. The things of the world are the products of Prakrti. But Puruşa does not produce anything nor it is produced by anything else. Puruşa is uncaused, eternal and is a spiritual substance. Consciousness is the essence of Puruşa. In this sense, we can say Puruşa is consciousness. The Bandha (bondage) and Moksa (the self realisation) are due to the states of Prakrti. Puruşa in its real nature is unaffected by the evolutes of the Prak rti.1 But through neiscience (avidyā) Puruşa falsely identifies itself with the evolutes of Praksti. Just as the image of a bird flying in the air is reflected in the waters of the pond below, so also the states of Bandha and Mokşa are reflected in the Purüşa.
1 Sähkhyakārikā 62.

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Sānkhya and Yoga philosophies have posited the plurality of self. This concept of plurality is not qualitative, but numerical. The Sankhya-Yoga contends that if the Puruşa were one, then with the death of the Puruşa all individual selves would have cease to exist. Similarly, if one Puruşa were to be in bondage or if a Puruşa were to be free from bondage and reach the Mokșa state, the same conditions would have been experienced by all the individual selves. Therefore, there are many selves. The Sānkhya-Yoga maintains that consciousness is the essence of the self and not a quality of the self as the Naiyāyikas contend. Puruşa is a subject and the congniser. The Sāňkhya-Yoga concept of the nature of Puruşa is similar to the Vedāntic conception of the Ātman, the Jaina conception of jiva and the monad of Leibnitz.
According to Sankhya, nescience (avidyā) is the cause of bondage. The self does not know its real nature. It forgets its real nature and indentifies itsels with the Prakrti and its evolutes. This is due to avidyā. But with the awakening of the real knowledge and discrimination, Puruşa realises that it is different from Prak sti. Then ignorance is destroyed, and the self becomes free from the bondage (Bandha).
Kapila does not elaborately discuss about the nature of Mokşa. Like the Buddha, he also says that this world is full of misery and the main object is to be free from misery. However, later Sänkhya philosophers have given description of the nature of Mokşa.
The main cause of bondag- is ignorance and the false indentification of Purusa with Prak rti and its evolutes. This is the bondage. The self, when it gets enlightenment, realises that it is free from Prak rti and this realisation leads to the freedom from the bondage. In the Sānkhya darśana Mokşa is also described as Kaivalya.
The conception of Mokşa of the Sānkhya-Yoga is different from the conception that the Nyāya-Vuiseșika presents. According to the Nyāya-Vaiseșika, although the self is a spiritual substance, it is not consciousness. In the highest state of Mugti there is no consciousness nor the mental states expressed in the self. In the state of Mukti, the states like intellect, happiness and other mental states are no longe:

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present and there is no scope for any activity of consciousness. According to Sānkhya-Yoga the self is free from any attributes (nirguņa), self-luminous and consciousness is the essence of the self. Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiseșika the Sänkhya-Yoga contends that in the highest state of Mukti, there is pure consciousness and bliss. This is the cardinal distinction between the two different schools of philosophy. The Nyāya-Vaiệeşika considers that mental states experiences are due to the contact of the body, mind and the states like intellect, misery and happiness, desires and other forms of psychic states are coinpletely absent in the state of Mukti. But Sankhya-Yoga maintains that the mental states and experiences are not due to the self, but due to the antaḥkaraņa (the inner organs). These states arising due to the antahkarana are reflected in the self the self falsely identifies itself with varied mental states and experiences. The self falsely believes that it is experiencing all the empirical experiences. And that is samsāra. In the highest state of Mukti, the self realises that it is not the agent of the experiences but these experiences are reflected in it, and it is different from the Prak rti and its evolutes. In the highest state of Mukti,the emprical experiences are absent, but pure conscious. ness is its real essence.
The earlier Sānkhya propounding twenty-four principles is different from the Sānkhya propounds twenty-five principles of evolution. According to this school, the empirical experiences like happiness and misery and knowledge and ignorance are primarily due to the Prak rti and its attributes. In the highest state of Mukti, these empirical experiences are absent. But the Sānkhya propounding twenty-four principles does not say that the self which is consciousness is completely different from the empirical consciousness due to the dance of Prak rti. In this sense, we can say to some extent that the Sānkhya with twenty-four principles presents similar view with the Nyāya-Vaiseșika. The former view of the Sānkhya points out that in the state of Moksa the activities of Prak rti are differentiated from the pure nature of the self. While the later schools of thought show that in the state of Mokșa there is the complete absence of the states of experience associated with the activity of Prakrti. The first view eriented towards the kārya prapanca (empirical activities) and the socond emphasises guņa prapanca (the attributes of Prakrti).The differences in the presentation of the nature of the self in the two schools

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of thought are only due to terminological differences and not due to to real differences.
The Nyaya-Vaiseşika says that the empirical experiences like happiness, misery and desire are due to the states of consciousness which is the attribute of the self. Therefore, in the highest state there is absence of consciousness. The thing appears to be somewhat ideational strange, although its presentation depends in the ideational distinction between the self and consciousness. Nyāya-Vaiseṣika distinguishes between substance and quality. The attributes and the modes arising out of the attributes are not related to the substance which is the substratum of the attributes. The modifications and changes in the states donot adversely affect the nature of the substance. These modifications are related to the attributes only and not to the substance. In this sense, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts the empirical states of the Atman as doer, the enjoyer and that which is in the state of bondage.
But the Sankhya-Yoga does not accept the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The Sankhya-Yoga posits the self as nirguna but consciousness as its essence.
The Vedantic philosophers like Sankara, Rāmānuja and Vallabha maintain that in the highest state of perfection there is the pure light of consciousness and bliss, although there are variations in their thoughts regarding the state of the Mokşa in relation to the self and the Brahman. In this sense, again, we can say that the Upanisadic conception of Mokşa is different from the Nyāya-Vaiseşika conception in some form. The Sankhya-Yoga conception of the nature of the Mokṣa comes nearer to the Upanisadic view. The Upanisadic view of Mokşa presents the self as in the state of pure consciousness and bliss and of the ultimate reality of the Brahman.
THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA (Nirvāṇa)
The Buddhist refers to the conception of Mokşa as nirvāṇa. Nirvana is aboslute cessation from misery. There is nothing real. Everything is momentary. There is no ātman as the permanent principle and Nirvana is a state of freedom and from misery, in fact freedom from everything. Nirvāṇa is the most important conception

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in the Buddhist philosophy. Prof. Murthy says that the history of Buddhist philosophy is the history of the conception of Nirvāņa.
In the Abhidhamma Mahāvibhāsā sāstra the etymological meaning of Nirvana has been discussed. Vāna refers to rebirth and Nirvāna is freedom from rebirth. Vāna also means bad smell and Nirvana would be freedom from bad smell of the karma. In the third sense, vāna refers to the jungle and Nirvāṇa would be escape from the thick jungle of karma. In another sense, Nirvana would be cutting of all the threads of empirical existence which are formed due to karma. The Pāli Texts Society explains the meaning of the word Nirvana as extinction. It is extinction of all empirical existence. Amarakosa also presents the same view. Several philosophers like Rhys Davids, Thomas, Anandkumāraswāmy, Dr. Rādhākrsnan and others maintain that the state of Nirvāna does not represent the denial of the self or personality. It has moral overtones. It is the highest state of moral perfection and it is full of bliss. Dr. Rādhākrsnan maintains that the concept of Nirvana is negative in its content. It is nothingness. The Buddha said that Nirvāna is freedom from misery and it is different from the adjuncts of empirical personality. The Buddha does not deny that highest state of perfection expresses bliss. He was only silent about it. According to the Buddha, some philosophers contend that Nirvana is the cessation of misery and the experience, but it is not the destruction of the Atman. It is the destruction of the desire, the passions and the craving for life due to ignorance.2 Maxmuller maintains that there is no version in the Dhammapada which gives the negative meaning of Nirvāṇa i. e.. Nirvana is absolute cessation. Wherever there is reference to the Nirvāṇa as cessation or destruction, there is ambiguity in the interpretation. Nāgasena has given the interpretation of Nirvāna as positive in content the discussions with king Milinda.3 In this sense, the Buddhist conception of Nirvana is different from the Nyāya-Vaiseșika conception of Moksa as a state in which there is no consciousness.
1 History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 212. 2 (a) Dhammapada 154. (b) Sarh yuttanikāya, Oghataracna sūkta, 3 Saryuttanikāya Kematherį sutta,

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The Tathāgata Buddha said that Nirvana is ‘avyāk şta', indescribable in words and inexpressible in thought. Nirvāna cannot be described in words nor its nature can be comprehended by thought. The nun Khema, while explaining the concepts to Prasenajit, says that just as the sands on the banks of the Ganges cannot be counted, just as the waters of the sea are immeasurable, so also the Nirvāņa is incomprehensible. It is beyond comprehension in thought and description in words.
The disciples of the Buddha however, took two different paths The Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna ways They give different conceptions of the Nirvāna. The question arose about the nature of Nirvāņa whether it pertains to individual existence or to the existence in general. Some say that Nirvāṇa refers to the individual freedom from misery, while some others have emphasised the cessation of existence in general as Nirvāņa. The first is the individualistic and the second is the universal content. The first is called the Hinayāna conception while the second refers to the Mahāyāna conception in its broad content.
The Buddha did not discuss the nature of Nirvāna and other metaphysical problems, because he was averse to metaphysical discussions. The metaphysical questions like Nirvāņa are avyāk sta, inaccessible for speculation. The result was his disciples followed different paths of interpretation. Some adduced negative interpretation of Nirvāņa as absolute cessation of existence, it is Sunyatā. The others gave a positive content to Nirvāṇa as a state with the bliss as its category.?
» JAINA CONCEPTION OF MOKŞA
There are varied interpretations regarding the nature of Mokşa in the Buddhist and Vedic traditions. But the Jaina conception of Moksa does not accept differences of opinion. This is possible because the Vedic seers did not discuss the nature of Mokşa. The later
1 (a) N. K. Bhagat : Patna University Lectures, 1924-25, p. 165.
(b) Samyuttanikāya Khematheri sutta. 2 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 416-17,

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philosophers of the Vedic tradition gave their own interpretations of the nature of Mokșa when the concepts were introduced in the Vedic tradition. The Buddha never claimed to be an omniscient being. He did not impose his views on his disciples. He said to his disciples that they should accept whatever stands the test of reason and should not accept any view because the Tathāgata has said. This is one of the reasons why there developed differences of opinion regarding the nature of Nirvāņa in the Buddhist philosophy. Moreover, the Buddha was silent over the nature of metaphysical problems like Nirvāṇa and the self. But this is not so with the development of Jaina thought. The Tirthařkara Mahāvīra was an omniscient, a Kevalin. And the word; of the Kevalin had absolute authority. Therefore, there did not appear to have differences regarding the inetaphysical problems like the nature of the Mokşu.
The Jaina conception of the universal and the particular, the identity and difference and the permanent substances and its changing modes as equally reil has influenced the Jaina conception of Mokşa. The principle of permanence, however, is not like the eternal principle of Puruşa and Prak rti in the Sārkhya philosophy. The Jaina conception of the Atman is a synthesis of the principles of permanence and modes. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is perinanent as a substance. From the phenomenal point of view, there are modes. Considered from the point of view of modes, the self is changing.
The Jainas do not consider the Atman as all-pervading like the Nyāya-Vaiseșika or atomic in nature like Rāmānuja's standpoint. They say, that Atman is madhyama pariņāmī, pervading the body that it occupies. It has the characteristics of both expansion and contraction in order to pervade the entire body, whether small or big. This is the empirical description of the soul from the empirical point of view. From the noumenal point of view the soul is eternal as a substance. It is non-eternal from the point of view of modifications. The Jainas have accepted the principle of the co-reality of substance and its modifications. For this reason, the Jainas contend that at the time of attainment of Mokşa the pervasion of the soul becomes less

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by one-third of the body of the soul just previously occupied by it at the time of Mokṣa.1
It should be remembered that though the quality of the contraction and the expansion is inherent in the soul but it gets expression due to the karmic body formed by the accumulations of particles of karma. The liberated soul has no body and therefore there is no question of contraction or expansion. The conception of the ultimate size of the soul just at the time of Mokşa is based on the conception of the size of the body that it last occupied. The soul has no form but due to its extension in space, it is described as having form.
The Jaina conception of Mokşa is different from other conceptions in Indian thought. This theory is a special contribution of the Jainas. This is because, the Jaina conception implies the pervasive quality according to the body; while according to some thinkers the soul is described as atomic in nature. This also gives a clear picture of the nature of the soul in the state of Mokşa.
According to the Jainas, the liberated soul has infinite knowledge and bliss because of its inherent nature of consciousness and bliss. The eternity of the soul is not the static eternity as in some systems of Indian philosophy, but it expresses the inherent nature of infinite energy. This conception of the nature of the soul in Mokṣa is a special contribution of the Jainas. It agrees with the Nyaya-Vaiseşika conception of the eternity of the soul so far as it refers to the soul as substance. In regard to the inherent characteristics of the soul as infinite knowledge, bliss and infinite energy, it is nearer to the Sankhya conception of the Puruşa. The Buddhist schools of philosophy of Yogacara posits the conception of Vijñāna as a centre of self and in the state of Nirvāņa it is referred to the 'alaya vijñāna' the storehouse of consciousness. In this sense of psychic energy of the soul, Jainas have a common point, but the Jainas do not accept the Kṣaṇikavāda of the Buddhists.
THE STATE OF MUKTI (MUKTI-STHÄNA)
There is a fundamental question regarding the state of the soul
1 Uttaradhyayana 36-65.

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at the time of Moksa : What is the state of the soul when it is liberated from the body? There are different interpretation on this question based on the different philosophical predilections.
The Nyāya-Vaiseșika and Sankhya-Yoga maintain that the soul is all-prevading. They also maintain that there are many souls. According to this interpretation, the liberated souls do not possess, different states from those that they possessed in the saṁsāra. In the state of liberation the souls become free from the gross bodies and also from the subtle bodies which is due to a gross body. The Jivātman or a Puruşa becomes different from the differentiated states and becomes all-pervading.
The Kevalādvaitin maintains that the ātman i. e., the Brahman has vyāpakatva, but there is no plurality. According to this theory, in the liberated souls the soul becomes free from the subtle bodies which is antahkarana. As a consequence of this, freedom from the subtle body, the soul is free from all empirical adjuncts. It realises the state of the Brahman. The difference between the souls that are liberated and the souls that are in bondage is with reference to the freedom and the presence of the sūkşma śarīra and the empirical adjuncts. The absence of the empirical adjuncts (upādhi) in the liberated state does not mean that the liberated soul is different from the empirical soul, it is the Brahmasvarūpa in its pure form.
The Madhva philosophy posits the souls as atomic in nature. They are different from Pārabrahman. According to this school of thought, the liberated soul lives in the sānnidhya of Visņu.
Similarly, those who maintain the soul as atomic in nature like the Visiştādvait in accept the plurality of souls. But in its real nature, the soul is not different from the Pārabrahman. When the soul is liberated it reaches the Brahmaloka and gets merged in the Brahman.
According to Vallabhācārya, souls are atomic in nature, but at the same time souls reach the state of Brahma in their state of merger with the Brahnan. Some souls get merged with the Brahma but some other souls, due to devotional preponderance enter the saṁsāra in the state of practical liberation for the sake of expression of devotion.

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THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF THE MUKTI-STHANA
The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent. Everything is transitory and in flux. In the state of rebirth, there is no perma. nent self that emerges from the earlier birth to the next birth. It is only the psychic continuity of vijñāṇa that projects itself into the next line. Just as a snow ball goes on accumulating, particles of snow in its movement, but it is not one substance, so also the vijñāna the psychic energy, loaded with its samskāra the anamic mass projects itself into the next life i. e., rebirth. Therefore, there is no permanent
self that is reborn.
The king Milinda asked to Nagasena: which of the states of life prior to Nirvana are nearer to the state of Nirvana? Acārya said that there is no analogy to explain the state of Nirvanṇa. We cannot say that in the state of Nirvana, the soul goes and settles in a sthāna.
King Milinda asked: "just as there are pearls in the sea, fragrance in the flower and the grains in the field, so also there must be a place for Nirvana which is permanent." Nag-isena replied: There is no state analogous to these which can be called Nirvana, in which we can say the self goes to settle there. However, the state of Nirvana is real. Nirvana is not something external. We have to realise the state of Nirvana in the purity of mind. Just as through the friction of two pieces of metal fire is created so also the Nirvana is a state of experience of the purtty of mind. We cannot say that there was first the fire or first the friction and then the fire. Similarly, we cannot distinguish between the state of Nirvana and the purity of experience.
The king said: We may accept the view that there is no special state of Nirvana. However, there must be some state from which a pudgala experiences the state of Nirvāṇa. The Acarya replied: Pudgala (the continuing self) is rooted in the Sila (righteousness), and can experience the state of Nirvana from any point of space. Therefore Nirvāņa is the realisation from the purity of the mind.1
1 Milindaprasna 4. 8. 62-64.

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THE JAINA VIEW OF THE MOKŞA-STHĀNA
The Jainas say that the Jiva has the characteristics of Urdhvagati (tendency to go upwards).1 When the karmic particles are removed and when the soul is free from karma, it moves upwards to the end of the Lokākāśa and remains in its pure form in the Siddhaloka, at the end of Lokaska. It does not move further because there is the absence the Dharmastikāya in Alokākāśa. This state of perfection at the end of the Lokākasa is called Siddhaśilā. The Jaina literature presents the extension of Siddhaşilā and such a description of the extension of the place where liberated souls reside is not stated in any other school of Indian thought. According to the Jainas the world where the human beings inhabit, has the extension of fortyfive lakhs of yojanas and the extension of the Siddhakşetra has also forty-five lakhs of yojanas. From the Karmabhumi of the human beings, men can attain perfection through their self-efforts. In this sense, we can say, that the state of mokşa is the highest state of perfection to be attained. It is the state of freedom from misery. It is a state of self-realisation.
MOKŞA MĀRGA (THE PATH-WAY TO MOKṢA)
We may now consider the pathway to Mokşa. Just as in the science of medicine, four factors are important for consideration, like: the disease, cause of the disease, the removal of the disease and means of the removal of the same; so also in the understanding self-realisation, and the spiritual with path for the salvation, we should also consider the four important principles like samsara, the cause of saṁsāra, mokṣa, and the pathway to mokşa.2
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The different schools of Vedic traditions have given their interpretations of the pathway to Mokşa. The Upanisads and Bhagavadgitā are the foundational texts for the Vedic tradition. On the basis of the thoughts expressed in the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita, Patñjali has given as elaborate discussion about Mokşa and pathway to
1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 19. 82 Uḍḍhaṁ pakkamai disam
(b) Prasamarati Prakarana 294-bhāṣya
(c) Tattvartharājavārttika
2 Yogadarśana Bhāşya 21. 25.

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Mokṣa. According to him the four cardinal principles are: (1) heya1 (misery), (2) heyahetu2, (cause of misery), (3) hāna3 (cessation of misery) & (4) hānopāyaa (the pathway to the cessation of the misery). Vātsyāyana, the noted commentator of Nyayasutra has elaborated the four principles of the Mokşa and pathway to Mokşa.
The Buddha enunciated, in his Sermon at Banares, the four noble truths (Aryasatya): (1) dukkha (misery), (2) dukkhasamudya (cause of misery), (3) dukkha-nirodha (cessation of misery) and dukkhanirodha mārga (the pathway to the cessation of misery). In the Jaina darśana, the four fundamental truths have been enunciated : (1) bandha (bondage), (2) āsrava (cause of bondage) (3) mokşa (state of liberation) and (4) samvara (the way to the cessation to the bondage).
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
ance.
The Bandha(bondage)is due to the passions arising out of ignorThis creates misery. Asrava is the influx of karma. It is the cause of misery. It is due to the passions and the activity. Mokşa is the complete freedom from kārmic matter. It is the state absolutely free from misery. Samvara is the way to the cessation to the misery. This is possible if the influx of the karmic particles is obstructed. The next stage would be the removal of the accumulated karma. This is the nirjara. These two constitute the pathway to Mokşa. In this sense, we can say that the Jainas have propounded the four fundamental and noble truths in the tradition of the Vedic and Upanisadic thought and similar to the Buddhist tradition too.
Every school of Indian thought have emphasised the importance of the concept of Mokşa as the highest stage of self-realisation. They have suggested that the root-cause of samsara and the misery in this life is due to avidya (neiscience). Avidya gives rise to passions (rāga
1 Yogadarsana: sädhanäpäda 16
2 Ibid 27
3 Ibid 25
4 Ibid 26
5 Nyayabhāşya 1, 1, 1.
6 Majjhimanikāya, bhaşabheka sutta, 4.

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dveşa), attachment and hardship (kleśa). Patañjali says avidyā, asmitā rāga-dveṣa and abhinivesa are the five obstacles or hardships which cause misery and which bring obstructions to the path of liberation. He has suggested that avidya is the root cause of all these things.1 Iśvarkriṣṇa' in the Sankhyakārikā has elaborated the five obstacles in the way to self-realisation. Kaṇāda has said avidyā is the root cause which gives rise to all sorts of passions and difficulties. Kathopanisad and the Bhagavadgītā have also empasised that avidya is the primary cause of all passions and difficulties. In the Buddhist literature, like the Majjhimanikaya it has been described that the Buddha has said that avidya is the root cause of misery because it leads to craving tṛṣṇā and other blemishes."
Jainism asserts that the root cause of samsara is darśanamoha & căritramoha. Darśanamoha refers ignorance or perversity of attitude in the sense of avidya used in other Indian thought. In the other system s of Indian philosophy, this has been referred to the cause of all blemishes. Caritramoha is perversity in conduct which has been referred to by other systems of Indian philosophy as asmitā, rāga, dveşa and tṛṣṇa. In this sense, the Indian systems of philosophy, including the Jainas, have given prominence to avidya (nescience) as the root cause of misery.
Kanāda says that avidya can be removed by vidyā (discriminative knowledge). Patanjali calls it vivekakhyāti. Akṣapāda has used the term tattvajñāna or samyagjñāna (right knowledge). The Buddhist have suggested that 'vipassana' or prajña are analogous to vidya. The Jaina have used the word samyagjñāna (right knowledge). It causes the destruction of kaşayas and other blemishes.
From the spiritual point of view, avidya is perversity of know
1 Yogadarsana 2, 3-4
2 Sankhyakārikā 47-48.
14
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3 Nyayasutra 1, 1, 2: Nyayasutra 4, 1, 3: 4. 1. 6.
4 Kathopanisad 1, 2, 5.
5 Bhagavadgitä 5, 15.
6 Majjhimanikāya ↑ mahatannesamkāya sutta 38,

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ledge. It is the absence of the right knowledge regarding the nature of the pure self. In the Vedic tradition, the pathway to destruction of avidyā and to the realisation of the Mokșa has been suggested 10 be three-fold as : (1) jñāna (knowledge) (2) bhakti (devotion) and (3) karma (action). The Buddha advocated the eight-fold path, for the realisation Nirvāṇa : (1) samyagd rşți (right belief) (2) samyagsankalpa (right resolve) (3) samyagvāk (right speech) (4) samyagkarma (right action) (5) samyag äjiva (right living) (6) samyag vyāyāma (right effort) (7) samyag smrti (right thought) and (8) samyag samādhi (right self-concentration). Buddhaghosa has enumerated three important ways, like śīla, samādhi and prajñā for the sake of realisation of Nirvāņa. Jainism has advocated the three-fold path for the attainment of perfection : (1) samyagdarśana (right faith), (2) samyagjñāna (right knowledge) and (3) samyagcăritra (right conduct). In this way the Indian philosophers, both of the Vedic and the nonVedic traditions, have emphasised the importance of the realisation of Moksa or Nirvāna, as the highest end of life. This has cxception only in the Cārvāka school. The different schools of thought have used their terminologies to describe the stages in the pathway to perfection, and in explaining the concept of Mokşa. The difference in terminology is mainly verbal and it does not effect the basic unity in the conception of state of perfection and pathway to the state of perfection. We find that there is a fundamental similarity of approach and a unity of thought in the description of the highest end of life, viz., self-realisation (Mokşa) and pathway to the realisation of this end.
1 “Magganam ashangiko settho.” 2 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 1.

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Part III
PRAMANAVADA
1. SYADVĀDA-THE BASIS OF
JAINA PHILOSOPHY 2. SAPTABHANGT -DISCUSSION 3. NIKŞEPAVĀDA-A STUDY 4. NAYAVĀDA-A STUDY 5. JÑANAVADA-AN ANALYSIS 6. PRAMĀŅA-A STUDY

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SYÁDVÁDA:
the basis of Jaina Philosophy
WHAT IS SYADVADA?
Anekāntavāda is a special contribution of the Jainas to the philosophical world. It is the unique contribution that the Jainas have made to the logic and epistemology. It is the foundational principle for philosophical position of the Jainas. Anekanta is the basic attitude of mind which expresses the fundamental principle that reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The points of view are the nayas and the naya is the psychological expression of the basic principle of anekānta. Syādvāda is the logical expression of nayavada in predication from. It has the significance of expression and communication in the logical and predicational pattern.
Syädvada is formed of the two words 'syať' and 'vada'. 'Syat' very often supposed to suggest the meaning of 'doubt' or 'perhaps' but 'syat' does not express doubt or uncertainty. It refers to a point of view or in a particular context, or in a particular sense.1 'Vada' presents a theory of logic and metaphysics. Syadvāda means a theory of predication of the description of reality from different points of view, in different contexts or from different "Universes of discourse." Syadvada is the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical predications.
1 (a) Aştasahasri, p. 296.
(b) Pañcāstikāyaṭīkā—Ṣri Amṛtacandra

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The Jaina ācāryas have made Syādvāda, the foundation of Jaina philosophy. Syādvāda promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points of view. Svādvāda expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problein of Reality. It affirms that there are different facets of Reality and they have to be understood from various points of view by the predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. The thinker having one-sided view in his mind can see only one facet of Reality, such thinker cannot realise reality in full. For this reason, Acārya Samantabhadra says that the word syāt is a symbol of truth. And therefore, the Jaina Ācāryas say that in some cases of predications, even if the term the syāt is not used, it is to be considered as implicit in the predication.3
Syādvāda presents a comprehensive and a synoptic picture of reality which expresses presence and co-existence with particular points of view, of the different characteristics like the permanance and impermanance, similarity and difference, expressibility and inexpressibility, reality and appearance.
Generally Syādvāda is identified with Anekāntavāda, bui considered from the logical distinctions inherent in two theories, we can say that Anekānta is the basic principle of the complexity of reality and the possibility of looking at reality from different points of view. Syādvāda is the expression of the Anekāntavāda in logical and predicational form.5 In this sense, Anekāntavāda is the foundational principle and syādvāda is the logical expression of the foundational principle.
Ācārya Samantabhadra says that Syādväda and kevalajñāna (ominiscient knowledge) are the foundational facts of knowledge.
1 2 3 4 5
Eyante niravekkho no sijjhaï vivihayāvagaṁ dayvan. Syātkāraḥ satyalañchanaḥ. Laghiyastraya, sl. 22. Anyayogavyavacched Dvātrimśikā, sloka-25 Ācārya Hemacandra. Laghīyastryaya, sl. 62. Akalanka

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The difference between the two is that kevalajñāna expresses the comprehensible knowledge of reality while Syādvāda expresses the predicational propositions of the experience of reality presented in kevalajñāna. The first, is a direct experience, Syādvāda is the indirect expression of the direct experience.1
SYADVADA : THE PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE - 3
The different systems of philosophy have given different pictures of reality. As a result, there is ambiguity and metaphysical confusion, because the pictures of reality presented by different schools of thought sometimes contradict with each other, and we are at a loss to know which theory of reality should be accepted. This creates intellectual chaos. For instance, even in the concept of the Atman, there are different views expressed by different philosophies. Cārvāka denies reality of the Atman as a perminent substance. Even in those schools of thought where there is agreement regarding the reality of the Atman, there are distinctions in the presentation of the nature of the Atman. Sānkhyā philosophy accepts the eternity and substantiality of the Atman. Consciousness is its essence. According to Sankhya ātman is passive without attributes.? Nyaya-Vaiseșika posit the reality of the Atman and say that Ātman is a substance which has qualities. Mimärsakas maintain that Atman is a substance and is eternal, although it expresses modification in different forms of status. Buddha, refuses to discuss the metaphysical problems like the Atman and Nirvāņa. He said that Ātman is a subject which is "avyāk rta” (indescribable) and became silent. In this sense, different schools of thought have given different interpretations about the nature of the Atman. Some say, it is all-pervading like space (Akāśa), some maintain that it is atomic in nature and some others say that Atman is of the size of the thumb.
Regarding the nature of the Alman, some say that it is the product of the elements. Some others maintain that consciousness is not the characteristic of the Atm in, but it is produced by the meta
1. Aptamīmaṁsā 105 2. aprachyutänutpannasthiraikarūpam nityam. 3. Majjhimanikāya, cüla mālunkya sutta 63.

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bolic changes of the body. Still others say that consicousness is not a quality of the soul, but is inherent in the soul. In this way, there are basic differences between the different schools of philosophy regarding the nature of the Atman.
The differences in the views regarding the nature of reality presented by different schools of thought are based on their basic outlook of, and their approach of looking at reality. Some take the synthetic point of view and present the picture of reality in a synthetic sense. They seek unity in diversity, and posit that the reality is one. It includes the consciousness and the unconsciousness as aspects of reality. Some other schools of thought look at reality from the empirical point of view. They seek to emphasise diversity as presented in the universe. Reality, for them, is not one nor a unity, but it is many and diverse. Some other schools of thought have said that reality is incomprehensible (ajñeya). In this way, there is intellectual chaos in the study of the metaphysical problems.
Anekāntavāda seeks to find out a solution out of this intellectual chaos. It seeks to find meaning in the diversity of opinions and tries to establish that these diverse views are neither completely false not completely true. They present partial truths from different points of view. The Anekānta seeks to determine the extent of reality present different schools of thought and gives a synoptic picture of reality. The eminent Acaryas, like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka and Haribhadra have presented the subtle logical distinctions and the metaphysical thought involving unity and diversity, the oneness and duality and other forms of philosophy on the basis of Anekānta. A comprehensive picture of reality is sought to be presented by the theory of Anekānta.
And for this reason, the theory of Anekānta has become foundational for Jaina thought. In fact, the Anekānta outlook is the basis for other schools of Indian thought. The Jaina Ācāryas have presented a synoptic outlook in undertanding the problems of philosophy on the basis of Anekānta. They say that Ekānta or dogmatism or one-sided approach to the problems of reality is not inherent in reality (vastugatadharma), but it is due to the working of the intellect. It is the product of intellectual discrimination. If the intellect is pure in its essence

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then Ekanta will disappear. The pure exercise of intellect will give rise to a synoptic view-point expressed in the Anekanta and the different partial view-points get merged in the Anekānta, just as the different rivers get merged in the sea.
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Upadhyāya Yagovijaya says that one who has developed the Anekanta outlook does not dislike other view-points. He looks at other view-points with understanding and sympathy, just as a father looks at the activities of his son. One who believes in the Anekānta outlook looks at the conflicting and diverse theories of realities with equal respect. He does not look at the diverse theories of realities as one superior to the other. He has the spirit of equanimity in approaching for the understanding of the problems of other theories. In the absence of the spirit of equanimity, all knowledge would be fruitless, and any amount of reading the sacred texts would not lead to any fruitful results.1
Haribhadra Sūri says, that one who develops the ekanta attitude and insists on his point of view is one-sided in his approach and would like to lead others also to his points of view. But the one who develops the synoptic outlook based on the anekanta attitude is always guided by objective and rational considerations in evaluating the theories of reality.
Anekanta states that the nature of reality should be considered and studied purely from the rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The ekānta attitude is compelling and it drives us to accept its point of view and discourages us to accept the others' point of view.
A milk-maid churns the butter milk, and while churning the buttermilk, she pulls the string on the side and loosens the string on the other. The consequence is butter is extracted from the buttermilk. Similarly, if we look at the different points of view of knowing reality in their proper perspective, considering the primary points of view as important and the secondary points of view with their due considere
1. Yasovijaya-Jñānasāra

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tion, truth can be understood in the true perspective and in a comprehensive way. The intellectual confusion is created by ekānt while the welter of confusion is cleared by Anekānta, The synoptic outlook of Syädvāda gives a comprehensive and true picture of reality.
THE IMPACT OF ANEKANTA ON OTHER DARŠANAS
The Anekānta attitude gives a comprehensive and synoptic view of life. Some of the systems of Indian thought have expressed their opposition to the Anekānta theory. Yet we can observe the impact of Anekānta on their theories also. It is not possible to disregard the Anekānta theory, as it is rational and objective in its outlook.
In the Tšāvāsya Upanişada Ātman has been described as a substance which moves and does not move, which is near and far, which is inside and outside. This is the expression of the Syādvāda point. of view.
Sankaracāryā and Rāmānujācārya have argued against the validity of Syādvāda on the ground that contradictory attributes cannot co-exist at the same time. But in trying to refute the validity of Syādvāda they seem to have adopted the Syādā.la outlook only. The description of the Brahman as 'para and apara" and the analysis of the degrees of reality as expressed in the pāramārthika, vyāvahārika and prātibhāsika satya, does express the spirit of Anekānta and Syādvāda. Sankara mentions that there is nothing in the world which is
purely without faults and without attributes--Istaṁ kimapi lokeěsmin na nirdosan na nirgūņam".
This would mean that everything has its good qualities and also its faults. Nothing is purely perfect and purely attributeless. This is the expression of the Anekānta.
Swāmi Dayānada Sarasvati was once asked whether he was a wise man or not. He said that in the field of darśana he is wise, but with reference to the practical world, he is not wise. This is an expression of Anekānta.
The Buddhist conception of the Vibhajyavāda and Madhyama
1
Tšā. Up. tadejati tannaijati, taddure, tadantike, tadantarasyasaravasya tad sarvāsyāsya bāhyataḥ.

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Mārga express the Anekānta spirit. The Sankhya conception of praṛkti as having the three attributes of sattva, rajas and tamas in the state of equilibrium in the original state of prakṛti and as expressed in varied degrees in the process of evolution expressess the spirit of Anekanta.
Among the Greek philosophers, Plato has presented the theory of the degrees of reality. The world of ideas is real and the physical world is real to the extent of the participation of the ideas in the physical objects. This is also the expression of the Anekanta.
Eienstein's theory of relativity express the spirit of Syādvāda.
From this, it is clear that Anekānta expresses the synoptic point of view and gives a comprehensive picture of reality in which partial pictures from different points of view are synthesised and harmonised. This spirit of Anekanta cannot be ignored by any school of thought because of its intrinsic value.
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Having considered the impact of Anekanta on the different schools of thought, it would now be necessary to understand the extent of the expression of the Anekanta in the different problems of philosophy like the problem of permanence and change, of the identity of self and the body etc.
PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE (CHANGE)
The Anekanta view presents a theory that every object is a synthesis of the attributes of permanence and change. From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modes, it is changing. Substance and modes are inseparable and complementary. Without the one, the other does not exist. Without substance (dravya), modes(paryāya) are not possible and without modes substance cannot be understood. It is the thing that changes. Changes does not exist without a thing. A thing changes in its attribute. For insance, jīva is a substance and its various states are its modes. Jiva is necessary for the expression of the various states like man, lower animal and bird. These are the modes of the jīva. Jīva as a substance and the states of jiva in the empirical sense, are both necessary and complementary to each other. Substance is permanent, but modes are changing. Jiva is permanent and is indestructible. But the modes as expressed in the states of jīva are not permanent. In

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this sense, Syādvāda expresses the synthesis of the theories of permanence and of change. Every substance is permanent but its modes are changing and in a flux. But it should be remembered that substance and its modes are not two different entities. There is not difference in essence, but the difference can be seen in expression. According to the Anekānta view, every object has the triple attributes of Origination, Destruction and Permanence. The modes originate and are destroyed but the substance remain permanent. This is true of every object and there are no exceptions to this.
When we meet a person whom we have already met, we recognise him and say he is the same man that we met. Rain brings greenery on the land. We have camphor on the palm and anon it evaporates, and then we say it is not there. All these states express modifications of the substance but these different states taken independently for consideration express the theories of permanence, change and destruction.
There are different theories of causation regarding the origination of the substance and objects. Some of the theories may be mentioned as Pariņāmavāda, Arambhavāda, Rūpāntaravāda and Vichedavāda. śānkhya philosophers have presented pariņāmavāda. According to them, cause and effect are not different events. Effect is in the cause. Cause has the potentiality of the effect is the actualisation of the cause. This is called Satkāryavāda. According to Satkarmavāda, that which is not, cannot originate and that which is, cannot be destroyed. It is only a transformation. It is the actualisation of the potential. Nyāya Vaiseșika darśanas present the Arambhavāda Theory. It is also called Asatkāryavāda. According to this theory, cause and effects are different events. When the effect appears, cause disappears.
According to the Naiyāyikas s swara is eternal (non-changing reality) while the flames of a lamp are non-eternal. The Buddhists maintain that there is nothing permanent and what we call a thing appearing to be permanent is an aggregate of states which are fleeting. A philosophical system which maintains that reality is the permanent and the eternal cannot easily dispense with the facts of life, which
1.
Tattvārtha sütra, Adhyāya 5

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present the changing modes. Similarly, a philosophy which gives exclusive importance to the flux cannot ignore a thing that changes. In this sense, the Naiyayikas considered the perceptible objects as impermanent and the Buddhists considered everything as fleeting, as a vast continuum.
The modern scientific view of reality accepts the fact of transformation. It has been suggested that nothing is destroyed, it is only that an object gets transformed. For instance, a candle burns, but in its process of burning the substance of the candle is not destroyed. It is transformed into some other element.
Similarly, we find transformation of water into a different form like ice and water, the gases like hydrogen and oxygen. As we are aware, water is formed through the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in a definite proportion of 2:1. By the process of disintegration, the hydrogen and the oxygen can be separated of the water, and water expresses itself in the form of gases, of hydrogen and oxygen. This view is supported by actual scientific experiments.
Modern science has shown that matter and energy are mutually convertible. The accepted principle of conservation of matter and energy has been a primary principle in the science of Physics and Chemistry. Therefore, matter and energy are convertible and
conservable.
From the stand-point of Syādvāda Jainas affirm that a thing is never destroyed. That which is not, never comes into being. There is nothing which is free from the modes of coming into being and destruction. Substance has the modes of origination and destruction. Therefore, every substance has its modes. A substance without modes cannot exist, and modes must have a substance for its substratum. Therefore, the Jainas maintain that substance and modes are both real. In this world, there is nothing which is purely permanent without modes and there is no change which has not got a thing as a substratum of change. For instance, the jīva is a substance, but it expresses itself the empirical world in its various modifications and states in diffe
1. General Chemistry by Finus Pauling, pp. 4 and 5
2.
Pañcāstikaya-15

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rent forms of life like men and lower animals. Just as a candle which is a substance changes in accordance with its flames which are suspectable to change. In this sense, the jīva and the chandle have both the characteristics of permanence and change. They are premanent in the form of substance, but changing in the form of modes.1
If a thing were to be purely permanent, it would have may remain in one static form only and there would not have been any states or changes. If there were only change and flux without any substance that changes, there would not have been any substratum and a support and any form. According to the Syādvda theory, permanence and change are equally real. It is thing that changes and has its modes. A thing as a substance is permanent, while the changing modes are not e manent. In this sense, a substance (dravya) has been considered a synthesis of pemanence and modifications. Substance is a substratum of change and changes take place in a substance. Modern science analyses an atom into its three constitutents (1) neutron which is its central and focal point, (2) electron which is moving with a velocity and (3) proton which is non-moving. THE IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ĀTMAN AND THE BODY. Hori ! The Atman and the body are both identical and different. Diffe. rent philosophical systems has given varied explanations about the relation between the Atman and the body. They consider consciouness to be a product of the metabolic changes of the body. With the destruction of the body, consciousness is also destroyed.” Sūtrak rtā. nga has mentioned a similar theory of tatjiva tatśarīravāda. It is slightly different from the Cārvāka philosophy, yet basically it does emphasis the identity of the jīva and the body,3
Some other darśanas have considered that Atman is different entirely from the body. While explaining this problem of relation of the body and the soul, Mahāvira said to his main disciple Gautama that Atman is different from the body in one sense, it is identical with 1. Anya yoga Vyavacchedika sl. 5 2. Bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ ? 3. Sūtrak stānga, 1, 1. 11.

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the body in a different sense. If Atman and body were considered to be identical, then the Atman will be destroyed with the destruction of the body. In this state, there is no possibility of the conceptions of the moksa and rebirth (punarjanma). But rational considerations and testimony of the Sastras do admit the possibility of mukti and rebirth. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the theory that the Atman and the body are different. At the same time, it is also necessary to postulate the relation between the Atman and the body as closely associated with each other from beginningless time. We experience pain if the body is hurt, but if the body of Devadatta is hurt, Jinadatta does not experience the pain, because the Atman of Jinadatta is not associated with the body of Devadatta.
It is clear from this, that the Atman of Devadatta is not associated with body of Jinadatta, yet the Atman of Devadatta is associated with his own body. In this sense, they are very closely associated and in the empirical sense they may be considered to be identical. But in the real sense of jīva as a spiritual substance, the association of the iīva to a particular body is only external and temporary.
SATTA AND ASATTA (The Real and The Unreal)
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Reality of a thing and the reality of its modes can be considered from the point of view of Syadvada. In this sense, a comprehensive seven-fold predication of Syadvāda presents the manifold aspects of reality in its affirmative and negative forms of predications. The affirmation and negation have to be predicated with reference to the identical nature of the four-fold aspects of consideration called 'svacatuşṭaya' and with reference to the four-fold aspects of cther nature of a thing 'para-catuṣṭaya'. For instance, the four-fold aspects of understanding the nature of the objects will be (1) Dravya (substance) (2) Kşetra (place) (3) Kāla (time) and (4) Bhāva (its nature). Every thing can be considered from the point of view of its own substance, place, time and nature and it gives affirmations. It may also be considered from the four-fold aspects of the otherness of a thing in respect of substance, place, time and nature. This brings the negative predications.1
1. Āptamīmāṁsā, sl. 16.

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We may take the example of a pot made up of gold. Its substance is gold. Therefore, from the point of view of substance, it is gold. Affirmative predications may also be made in respect of the place in which it is, the time at which it is and the real nature of the pot. For instance, its yellow colour and other modes are of its nature. But the same pot considered from the point of view of other material like the clay out of which the pots are made, may give a negative predication. Similarly, with reference to another place, another time and another nature, we may give negative predications. In this sense, the golden pot is a golden pot and it is not a pot made of clay. It is in a particular place and no: in any other place. It is at a particular time and not at other time and it is a golden pot with reference to its nature and characteristics like the yellowness of colour etc., and not a earthen pot with reference to the nature of the substance of clay. In this sense again, we may predicate affirmative predications with reference to its own four-fold aspects and negative predications make with reference to other four-fold aspects not belonging to it (paracatuştaya).
Some scholars consider that affirmation and negation at the same time contradict each other. But it has been recognised that affirmation and negation may be predicated of a thing from specific points of view in specific situations. There should be no contradiction between affirmation and negation as predicted from different point of view of the same thing. For example, we may affirm that a particular person is a man; and deny that he belongs to any other species than that of man. We may say that a particular person is an Indian and that he is not a Westerner; he is at present living, but he is not eternal; he is wise and is not unwise. These statements do not contradict each other and these statements are not only logically compatible, but are also compatible in fact. Such varied statements from different points of view are necessary to present a coherent and comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing with its many facets.
These examples do emphasis the fact that it is possible to present a comprehensive picture of reality by predicating different aspects of reality in their negative and affirmative states. For this, the Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme presenting seven-fold predications. That is called Saptabhangi.

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SAPTABHANGT Every thing is complex in its nature and it expresses many facets of its characteristics. To give a comprehensive picture of a thing in all its varied aspects the Jainas have formulated seven-fold predications incorporating affirmation, negation and inexpressibility with their possible permutations. We shall discuss about this in the later chapter.
It is necessary to note that Syādvāda presents the predicational form of expressing the nature of reality in different aspects. The seven-fold predications are not fragments of imagination, but they are only expressions of the many facets of reality for the sake of comprehension. Herman Jacobi says that Syādvāda opens the flood-gates of the comprehension of the nature of a thing in its different aspects.
An American philosopher Prof. Archie J. Bahm has stated that Syādvāda is the expression of non-violence in the intellectual form. This doctrine would be more effective to establish world-peace, if popularised. It is the foundational intellectual attitude of the Jainas. Mahatma Gandhi gave importance to non-violence and he emphasised the primacy of Syādvāda as the intellectual basis of the ethical doctrine of non-violence. Acarya Vinobha Bhave has emphasised the need of understanding Syādvāda for the sake of world peace. CLARIFICATION OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT
SYĀDVADA It would not be out of place to mention some misconceptions regarding the validity of the theory of Saptabhangi In the earlier portion of the Agamas, roots of Saptabhangi have been mentioned briefly.2 Ācāyra Kundakunda has mentioned some predications of the Saptabhangi as affirmation, negation and affirmation-negation,
Later philosophers like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka, Vidyānandi, Hemacandra, Vādideva etc., have developed the Saptabhangi doctrine in its fuller and detailed aspects of predications. Some
1 2 3
Syādvāda mañjarī 23 ţikā. Bhagavati, 7, 2, 773 Pancāstikāya, Pravacanasāra
:

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scholars have taken this as gradual development of the doctrine of Saptabhangi. According to them originally, the theory of Syādvāda was formulated not in its full form and it was later developed in its sevenfold predications. But we should recognise that the Jaina darśana was first presented by Tirthankaras. The Ganadharas formulated and taught the same to their desciples. Later it was expressed in the form of written documents. This gradual presentation of the doctrine in an elaborate form from the Tīrthankara to the Ganadharas and their
t mean that the doctrine was not fully formulated at the time of the Tīrthankaras. Tirthankara is an all-knowing Sarvadarśī. It is not possible to say that he did not know the Syādvāda doctrine in all its aspects. It would be apt to say that the doctrine of Saptabhangi was only elucidated by the Ganadharas and the later philosophers and not that they developed the theory in an elaborate form.
The first Tirthankara of this era is Rsabhadeva. His teachings were presented to people by the twenty three other Tirthankaras from time to time. These teachings were elaborated and crystalised in book forms by the disciples and philosophers of the later times. In the act of elaboration and presentation, certain factors like the capabality of the Ācāryas who had elaborated and intellectual climate of the time when it was presented in a.fuller and detailed form have to be considered. It is possible that the personal factors and the intellectual achievements of the later philosophers have influenced the presentation of the doctrines. Therefore, we find that in the later presentations in the book-form the scholars have used the two-fold objects of first presenting the other systems of philosophy as a polemic for refutation and later presented their own doctrine in a positive and constructive form. This type of presentation has developed in dialectical forms too.
But these factors have been ignored by scholars like Archie J. Bahm and they have misunderstood the elaborate presentation of the doctrines as the later developments. It has been suggested by scholars like him, that the Saptabhangi doctrine is the development from the Buddhist conception of Catuskoți niședha. This is far from the truth. If we look at this problem from the historical perspective we can very well say that Saptabhangi could not have arisen and developed out of

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the Buddhist theory of Catuskoți, because Jainism prevailed much earlier to time of the Buddha. There were twenty three Tīrthankaras before the Buddha. Tīrthankara Pārsvanātha lived two hundred and fifty years before the Buddha. He has presented the doctrine of Syādvāda. Sanjaya Velathiputta lived much earlier to the Buddha. He had criticised the Syādvāda as a from of sarśayavāda (the theory of doubt). From this, it is clear that Syādvāda was formulated before the time of the Buddha. The theory of Cațuşkoți was formulated much later than the Buddha.
We may also point out that there are fundamental differences between the Catūskoți and Syādvāda. The conceptual form of Catuşkoți is formulated as follows :
1. it is not that a thing is; 2. it is not that a thing is not; 3. it is not that a thing is and is not; 4. it is not that a thing neither is nor is not.
But Saptabhangi incorporates the predications of affirmation negation, and inexpressibility in their possible permutations. It is not merely an expresession of negation of a thing, it predicates the nature of a thing in its different aspects, in the form of affirmation and negation. The affirmation and negation are to be predicated with reference to the four-fold aspects of the self nature of the objects (sva-catuştaya) and the four-fold aspects of the other nature of the objects (para catuştaya). According to Saptabhangi, the predications of the nature of man would be that he is a man and he is not a non-man like other animals. But Catuskoți would express negative aspect of predications, as it is not that a man is a man, it is not that a man is other than the man. It is not that a man is and is not other than the man; and it is not that the man neither is nor is not other than the man. In this way, Catuşkoți is neither the expression of the affirmation nor is it the presentation of the different aspects of the nature of a thing.
Saptabhangi does not deny the possibility of the affirmative
1. Herman Jacobi : Jaina Sūtras-introduction,

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predications about the existence of a thing. It points that a thing is and has affirmative predications about its nature from its self-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects and it denies the absence of the other-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects. As we have seen earlier the Budhhist doctrine of catuskoţi is fundamentally negative in its predications.
SYĀDVĀDA IS NOT A THEORY OF DOUBT * According to Jainism, the nature of a thing is complex. It has infinite number of characteristics. In describing the characteristics, one has to look at it from different points of view. Therefore, the comprehensive description of the varied nature of the objects is possible by different predications involving affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The word “syāt” in the Syādvāda has created a good deal of controversy. The word has been very much misunderstood. It is very often suggested that 'syād' means "perhaps" or "may be”. This would lead to doubt and more probability. It would lead to scepticism. But the word 'syāt' has to be taken in a proper perspective. It does not mean perhaps and it does not express any from of doubt in the seven-fold predications. "Syāt means “in a particular context” or from one point-of-view. It refers to a particular 'universe of discourse' In this sense, 'Syāt does not lead to any element of doubt. Syādvāda would not present a theory of doubt. Prof. Baladeva Upādhyāya has also stated that Syādvāda is not a theory of doubt. It is not scepticism.
Šankarācārya in his Šānkarabhāşya has stated that Syādvāda has the element of doubt and it gives an indefinite knowledge. The iilusioned conception began from Śarkarācārya is still prevailing to some what extent. But as we have already said, the confusion that arises due to the word 'syāt is not to be taken as the final say regarding the value of Syādvāda. But, it may be pointed that the conditions of doubt are not present in the predication of Syādvāda, In the case of a man who is in doubt regarding his perception whether the object that he sees is the man or a tree, there is the elements of doubt and lack of determination. But in the case of seven-fold
1.
Anyayogavyavacchedikā, dvātrimsikä.

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predication, the affirmation of existence and the predication of negation are well defined and certain from specific points-of-view. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible. Prof. Phanibhusana Adhikari has stated that there is no theory which has been as such misunderstood as the Jaina theory of Syādvāda. It is possible that Sankarācārya did not go through the texts of the Jainas in their original form.
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All It is evident that Syadavāda is not the theroy of doubt. philosophies accept and utilise it in one way or other; but they hesitate to accept it by name.
The western thinker, Thomas says that Syadvāda theory has great depth and needs a keen intellect to understand. It gives a comprehensive picture of the varied aspects of reality. Syadvāda presents a picture of reality in its many-coloured aspects. The Jaina theory of Syadvāda is free from obscurations and inaccuracies of presentations. In philosophical world Syadvada is like an emperor.
Once Bhagavana Mahavira was asked what form of language the sadhu should use. Mahāvīra replied that the sadhu (ascetic) should use the language of Vibhajyavāda. Vibhajyavāda is interpreted as syādvāda.

REFUTATION OF CONTRADICTIONS
Śankarācārya has criticised the saptabhangi on the grounds of the impossiblity of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. For instance, a thing cannot have the attributes of coldness and hotness at the same time. But to one who has understood the theory of Syādvāda in its proper perspective of dialectical predication the charge of contradiction does not stand. If Śankarācārya were asked who he was, he would have replied that he was a sahnyāsī. If he were again to be asked, if he was a "gṛhastha" (a housedolder), he would hove said that he was not. Therefore, there would be no contradiction if it were to be predicated that as a sannyāsī Śańkarācārya gives affirmative predications of his nature as a sannyāsī he would negate the characteristics of a gṛhastha of his nature. These two opposite predications are consistent in their contexts and from their points-ofview. Thus we find syādvāda presents the many-folded predication from the different points of-view in different contexts. It does

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not present two contradictory predications from the same point-ofview. For instance, if from the same point-of-view, were to say that he is a sannyāsi and that he is not a sannyāsi, there would be contradiction, but there is no such uni-contextual predications in the Syādvāda. Therefore, Syādvāda presents dialectical predications from different points-of-view,
NAYAVADA Nayavāda is the basis of Syadvāda. It is the psychological aspect of anekānta. Nayavāda presents the theory of different pointsof view.
These points of view have to be expressed in predicational form for the sake of communication. That is done by Syādvāda. Syādvāda is the logical expression of Nayavāda. Nayavāda and Syādvāda are varieties of Anekāntavāda. Nayavāda is analytical in character and Syādvāda is synthetic.
Pramāna expresses the different characteristics of an object. But naya presents the specific characteristics of an object. While presenting the characteristic of an object naya does not deny the possibility of other characteristics present in an object. If it were to deny the possibility of other characteristics, the denial would be dogmatic. That is “durnaya”1 Predications have a reference to pramāņa. Naya is different from and is an aspect of the pramāņa in a particular sense. Just as a part of the sea? is not the sea, nor is it non-sea. It is the part of the sea. The naya comprehends the aspect and the charcteristics of an object. The different systems of philosophy project a particular point of view, a particular naya but their presentation is always onesided. They cannot have a full and comprehensive picture of reality in all its aspects. But Nayavāda demands us to look at reality from different points-of-view. That gives a fuller picture of reality.
The Buddhist approach of looking at réality was from the point of view of momentariness. Therefore, they emphasise that there is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is in a flux. The Buddhist
1 2
Pramānınyatatīvāloka-Vadideva. ślokavārttika–Vidyānandi.

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approach to the problems of reality, according to the Jainas is from the point of view of Rjusūtranaya. This partial approach of looking at reality does not give a correct picture of the real. Similarly, the Advantin looks at reality from the synthetic point of view Sangrahanaya. The other points-of-view present only an appearance. But the Nayavāda does not discard any point-of-view nor does it give exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. Nayavāda, therefore, gives a synoptic picture of different doctrines, like - Dvaita and Advaita Niscaya (noumenal) and Vyavahāra, yad rcchā-puruşārthavāda etc.
Nayavāda is against dogmatism which gives exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. Nayavāda presents the catholic approach to the problems of reality. Ācārya Samantabhadra had made obeiscience to Jinendra (Tirthankara) for presenting a synoptic approach to the understanding of reality in the Syādvāda. It has been said that a thing has three characteristics origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) substantiality (dhrauvya). For instance, a goldsmith prepares a crown after breaking up the pot made of gold. In this case, the first state of pot is destroyed and a new form of crown is made. But the substance out of which it is made and the material gold, is the same in both. Therefore a thing is permanent as a substance. But its modes change. Again, if a person only takes milk and refuses to take curds, he takes the substance, but he is not prepared to take its modification. Similarly, if a person takes curds, but does not take milk, he accepts the modifications and does not accept the substance out of which it is made. But one who does not accept the milk and its modes, has to give up milk and the curds also. The formation of curds involves the destruction of the state of milk and the production of the state of curds. But in both these, the substance of milk is constant.
Therefore, a thing has its substantiality and modifications. One who looks at the objects from the substance point-of-view as a synthetic approach (dravyārthika naya) and one who looks at the objects from the point of view of its modes has paryāyārthika naya. But the real nature of the object is complex. It has substance and its modes,

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both real. The substance point-of-view gives exclusive importance to the substance (dravya). This is called dravyārthikanaya, and the point of view which looks at reality from the side of its modifications is the paryāyārthikanaya. There is enormous literature on this problem of nayavāda in the Jaina philosophy. I do not propose to elaborate on this point for the fear of being lost in the woods.

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SAPTABHANGI :
A Discussion
Anekānta is the foundational principle of Jainism. It is the very essence of Jainism and it pervades the thought and philosophy of the Jainas. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a thorough understanding of Anekānta would give the key to the understadning of the Jaina darśana. For this reason, Siddhasena Divākara, in his Sanmati Prakarana, has stated that Anekānta is the very first and foundational principle which teaches us the first and the last lessons of the Jaina darśana. In everyday life, we find the spirit of Anekānta pervading the thought and life of the people. Therefore, he salutes the theory of anekānta.1
The Sārnkhya theory of evolution is expressed in the evolution of Prakrti in the presence of the Purusa. The Prak rti and the Puruşa are the primary principles. The development of the Vedānta has culminated in the principle of Advaita. The development of Buddhism can be seen in the theory of Vijñānavāda i. e., (theory of consciousness). In this sense, Anekāntavāda and Syädvāda are the be all and the end all in Jaina philosophy. The concepts of pramāņa and naya can be properly understood if we know the essence of saptahhangi. Pramāņa and naya present the background of understanding of Anekānta and Anekānta is expressed in the form of Saptabhangi.
SAPTABHANGT Question has been very often asked regarding the nature and the function of saptabhangi. The Jaina Ācāryas have discussed these problems elaborately. The nature of a thing is complex having many characteristics and the nature of any one of characteristic can be des
į Sanmati Prakarana, kānda 3 gāthā 69

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cribed in seven types of words. This can be called as in seven different ways. Therefore, this is called seven-fold predication of saptabhangi.1
For understanding the nature of a thing, it is necessary to know the thing in the light of naya (point-of-view) and pramāņa (valid source of knowledge). Naya and Pramāna do give a valid and comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the thing. The reasoning is of two types-svārtha (for one's ownsake) and parārtha (for the sake of communicating to others).2 Svārthādhigama aims at presenting the kno'vledge to oneself. While parārthādhigama is concerned with presenting the knowledge to others in the form of communication in language. This gives the predicational form of expressions. In the parārthādhigama we have 2 forms of expressions : (1) pramāna vākya which is concerned with the predication of the validity of the knowledge and its source and (2) naya vākya which is concerned with predicating the nature of a thing from a particular of point-of-view (naya). On this basis, a distinction has been made in the saptabhangi as pramāņa saptabhangi and naya saptabhangi.3 Pramāna vākya is comprehensive (sakalādesī) because it is more concerned with presenting the nature of the object as a whole in its various aspects through the valid source of knowledge. Naya vākya is considered to be vikalādesi (partial presentation) because it presents one aspect of the nature of reality from a particular point of view, although reality is complex and has infinite aspects.
Mallisena in his Syädvādamañjarī while describing the nature of an object, has stated that an object is constituted of the attributes and its modifications. Tattva, Padārtha and Dravya are synonymous to a thing or reality.
1 (a) Syādvāda mañjari 23 ţikā.
(b) Saptabhangītarangiņi p.{1. 2 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 6. 3 Saptabhangitarangiņī p. 1. 4 Anyayogavyavacchedikā, kārikā 22 5 Syādvādamañjarī, kārikā 23 vștti

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. Acārya Akalarka has stated that in the presentation of the nature of the object in its infinite aspects we have to adopt predicational form in the seven-fold predication which may include the positive and negative predications also without contradicting each other. The nature of the object can be considered from seven points of view and their predications would be seven-fold. Similarly, it has been said that curiosity (jijñāsā) may be analysed into seven forms; as a conse : quence there are seven-fold predications. Everything can be presented in seven-fold predications. These predications have been worked out on the basis of permutations of the fundamental three-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. Bhanga refers to the partial presentation (vikalpa) or a particular form of expression.
SAPTABHANGT AND ANEKANTA Anekānta is the basic attitude of the Jainas. It is the foundational principle. It expresses itself in the theory of naya (points of view) and the points of view are primarily epistemological and psychological. Predications from these points of view give us the dialectical form of propositional expressions. Saptabhangi is primarily logical. It is the logical expression of the psychological basis in Nayavāda. Anekāntavāda is the foundational attitude. Anekānta emphasises, as we have said earlier, that reality is complex and it has infinite aspects to be known and understood. These can be presented from different points of view. A particular point of view gives one aspect of reality and these various aspects have been classified into seven fundamental forms on the basis affirmation, negation and inexpressiblity. These predications are not absolute. They are related to each other. And all of them put together would give as a contradiction, if affirmational and negating propositions are presented. Again, we can say that Anekānta attitude gives a fuller picture absorbing all aspects of reality, Syādvāda is the dialectical presentation of the Anekānta attitude. The first is the expression and the second is the basis.
SYĀDVĀDA IN THE AGAMAS ! If we study the theory of Syādvāda from the historical point of
1
Tattvārtha Rājavārtika 1, 6. 51

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view tracing its presentation in the Āgamas, it is clear that Syadvāda and its predicational forms are not later developments. We can find the presentations in the Agamas enunciated from the philosophical points of view.
Gautama Gañadhara asked Bhagavāna Mahāvīra whether the earth called Ratnaprabhā is soul or not?
Bhagavāna Mahāvīra replied,(1) "from one point of view,Ratnaprabhā is ātmā, (2) from another point of view it is no soul; (3) from still another point of view its nature is inexpressible.”
Having heard these predications, Gautama asked again-Lord ! How you are describing the same earth in such different ways ?
Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said (1) it is a soul from the point of view of the self nature of the soul. (2) it is no soul from the point of view of other aspect than the soul and(3) from the point of both the aspects its nature is indescribable.
Then Gautama asked for clarifications on the same lines, regarding the nature of other earths, planets, the habitation of the gods (devaloka) and siddhasila (the place of the liberated souls). He received similar presentations from Mahāvīra. Then he asked about the nature of the Paramāņu (atom) and he got similar precepts. He then asked about the description of the nature of molecules with two pradeśas (having two space units) & he got the following answer.
(1) Molecule with two space units (dvipradesika) is ātman from one point of view.
(2) Molecule with two space units is not ātman from another point of view.
(3) Molecule with two space units is (indescribable (avaktavya) from still other point of view.
(4) Molecule with two space points is ātman and is not ātman from different points of view.
(5) Molecule with two space points is aiman and is indescribable.
| Bhagavati, śataka 12, 30, 10.

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(6) A molecule with two space points is not ātman and is indescribable.
Bhagavana Mahāvīra explained to Gautama Gaṇadhara when he was asked certain clarifications thus :
(1) A molecule with two space points is ātman from the point of view of its self-nature of atman.
(2) From the point of view of its nature other than the ātman (para-adeśa) it is not ātman.
(3) From the point of view of both the self-nature (sva-ādesa) and the other nature (para-ādesa), it is indescribable.
(4) From the points of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place unit (ege desi) and of the mode of non-existence of the same a molecule of two space points has the predications of affirmations and negation.
(5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and non-existence of the other place unit, molecule of two space has the predications of affirmations and inexpressibility.
(6) A molecule of one place unit having the modes of nonexistence and the other place unit the modes of existence and nonexistence a molecule of two space points has the predication of negation and inexpressibility.
Then, Gautama asked clarifications about the predications regarding molecules of three space points. Mahavira replied thus:
(1) A molecule of three space points is atman from one point of view.
(2) A molecule with three space points is not ätman from a different point of view.
(3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable in nature from still another point of view.
(4) A molecule with three space points is and is not ätman from a different point of view.
(5) A molecule with three space points is ātman, but is not (two) atmans.

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(6) A molecule with three space points from another point of view is (two) ātman and is not ātman.
(7) A molecule with three space points is ātman and is indescribable.
(8) A molecule with three space points is ātman and (two) indescribable.
(9) A molecule with three space points from one point of view (two) ātmans and is indescribable
(10) A molecule with three space points is not ātman and is indescribable.
.. (11) A molecule with three space points is ātman and (two) indescribable.
(12) The molecule with three space points is not (two) ātman and is indescribable.
(13) A molecule with three space points is and is not ātman and is indescribable.
Gautama Gañadhara asked clarifications regarding the function of these different predications. Mahāvira said thus :
(1) A molecule with three space points is ātman from the points of view of the self-nature of the ātman.
(2) A molecule with three space points is not ātman from the other nature.
(3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable from the points of view of both the natures.
(4) A molecule with one space point can be considered from the points of view of the mode of existence and also of non-existence. From these points of view, a molecule with three place units (tripra. desīs) is ātman and is not ātman.
(5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and also of the mode of non-existence of two place units and a molecule with three space points is ātman and is not (two) atman.
(6) From the point of view of the mode of existence of two

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place units and the mode of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is (two ātman) and is not an ātman.
(7) From the points of the mode of existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of the second place unit a molecule with three space points is ātman and is indescribable.
(8) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of the two place units, a molecule with three space points is the ātman and (two) indescribable.
(9) From the points of view of mode of existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of three space points is (two ātmans) and is indescribable.
(10) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence from other place units, a molecule of three space points is not ātman and is indescribable.
(11) From the points of view the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of mode of both existence and non-existence of two place units a molecule of three space points is not ātman and is (two) indescribable.
(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of wo place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one space point a molecule of three space points is not (two ātman) and is indescribable.
(13) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, and also the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is ātman, is not ātman and is indescribable.
After this, Gautama asked explanation about the predication of the molecule of four space points. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra enunciated nineteen predications
(1) A molecule with four space points is not ātman from the self-nature of the ātman.

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À SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (2) A molecule with four space points is not ātman from the nature other than the ātman.
(3) A molecule with four space points is indescribable from both the points of view.
(4) From the view-point of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is ātman and is not ātman.
(5) From the view-points of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of numerous place units, a molecule of four space points is ātman and is not (numerous) ātmans.
(6) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) ātmans and is not ātman.
(7) From the points of the view of modes of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) ātmans and is not (two) ātman.
(8) From the points of view of mode of existence of one space point and the mode of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is ātman and is indescribable.
(9) From the point of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and the modes of existence and non-existence of numerous place units and molecule of four space points it is ātman and is indescribable.
(10) From the points of view the mode of existence of mumerous place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) ātmans and is indescribable.
(11) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) ātman and is (two) indescribable.
(12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one

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place unit, a molecule of four space points is not ātman and is indescribable.
(13) From the points of view of mode of non-existence of one place units and of existence and non-existence of numerous (place units) a molecule of four space points is not ātman and (numerous) is indescribable.
(14) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of numerous place unit, a molecule of four space points is not (numerous) ātmans and is indescribable.
(15) From the points of view the modes of non-existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of two ; lace units, a molecule of four space points is not (two) ātmans and is (two) indescribable.
(16) From the points of view of mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one space point and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is ātman, is not ātman and is indescribable.
(17) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is not ātman and is (two) indescribable.
(18) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is ātman and (two) not ātman and is inexpi esssible.
(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of four space points is (two) ātmans, is not ātman and is inexpressible.
After this, the questions were asked regarding molecule of five space points, and Bhagavāna replied by enunciating twenty-two predicational propositions from different points of view. They are :
(1) A molecule of five space-points is ātman from the point of view of the self-nature of the ātman.

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(2) A molecule of five space points is not ātman from the point of view of other nature (paratva).
(3) A molecule of five space points is indescribable from both the self and other nature.
(4,5, and 6) These are similar to the predicational propositions of the molecule of four space points.
(7) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two or three place units and of non-existence of two or three place units & of non-existence of two or three place units) a molecule of five space point is (two or three) ātmans. (When we take the mode of existence of two place units, then we should take the mode of non-existence of three place units. When we take the mode of existence of three place units we should also take the mode of non-existence of two place unit.)
(8), (9) and (10) These are similiar to the predicational forms similar to the molecule of four space points.
(11) From the point of view of mode of existence of two or three place units and of existence and non-existence of two or three place units a molecule of five space points is (two or three) ātmans and is (two or three) inexpressible.
12, 13 and 14 predicational forms are similar to the predicational forms of a molecule of four space points.
(15) From the points of view of the modes of existence and nonexistence of two or three place units, and of non-existence of two or three place units, a molecule of five space points is not (two or three) ātmans and is (two or three) indescribable.
(16) This propositional form is similar to the propositional form of the molecule of four space points.
(17) From the point of view of existence of one place unit, nonexistence of the one place unit of the modes of existence and non-existence of one of numerous place units, a molecule of space of five points is ātman, is not ātman and is indescribable.

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(18) From the points of view of the modes of existeuce of one place unit of non-existence of numerous place units and of existence and non-existence of one place units a molecule of five space points is ātman, is not (numerous) ātmans and is indescribable.
(19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place units of existence and nonexistence of two place units a molecule of five space points is ātman, is not (two) ātman and is (two) inexpressible.
(20) From the points of view of the modes of existence of numerous place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is ātman is not (two) ātman and is (two) inexpressible.
(21) Prom the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units of non-existence of one place unit and from the point of view of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a moleule of five space points is (two) ātmans, is not ātman and is (two) inexpressible.
(22) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is two ātmans, is not (two) ātmans and is avaktavya (inexpressible).
In this way, various combinations and permutations of the propositional forms regarding the molecule of six place points has been presented. There are twenty three propositional forms. Twenty-two predicational forms are the same as described above and the twentythird is as follows:
From the points of view of modes of existence of two place points of existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of six space points is (two) ātmans, is not (two) ātn ans and is (two) inexpressible. 1
From the discussions given above, it is clear that the seven-fold
1
Bhagavati 12, 10, 469,

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predicational school called saptabangi, is not a later development presented by the ācāryas. Dalsukh Mālavaņiā 1 says that
(1) The syādvāda doctrine is based on the predication of affirmation and negation.
(2) From the combinations and permutations of the two propositional forms, we get other predications,
(3) The primary predicatons of affirmation and negation give rise to the possible logical combinations for the sake of presenting other forms of predications. Each predicational form must have its own view point. Each predicatonal form is accepted and is proved. It is valid from a particular point of view in a particular universe of discourse.
(4) The word “syāt” has been prefixed to every predicational form for the sake of expressing the implication of the point of view.
Therefore, this theory is called Syādvāda'.
On the basis of these considerations it is clear that the syāt is used for connoting a point of view or a specific situation. When this point of view is clear, the word 'syāt need not be used. But when it is implied, the word 'syāť has been used. Therefore, the word “syāt has a preference to the point of view or the context in a particular situation in the background of the other situations as a rational presentation.
(5) The third predicational form is "avaktavya" inexpressibility. Some Jaina philosophers have made it the fourth predication. But in the Agama literature, this predication has not got the fourth place. It is worth considering, how and when the predication of "avaktavya" was given the fourth place; and who gave it.
O In the seven-fold predicational forms, there must be seven predications including the affirmation and negation, neither more nor less. Therefore, the doctrine of seven-fold predications has its roots in the Āgamas. In the case of the predications regarding the nature of the molecules with three place units and in the case of more place
1 Agama yug kā Jaina darśana, (Hindi), pp. 112-113

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units the predicational forms are many. But these predicational forms are only permutations of the seven-fold predications based on the number of space only. It would be a fallacy to say that the saptabhangi doctrine is not restricted to seven-fold predications alone.
(7) The conception of the partial place unit structure (vikalādesa) and complete place unit structure (sakalādesa) is also to be found in the Agama literature, for analysing the doctrine of saptabhangi. In the āgamas, we find that the first three predications are “sakalādesī' and the remaining redications are "vikalādesi'. THE METHODOLOGY OF SEVEN-FOLD PREDICATIONS
From the point of view of grammatical presentation of the propositions, there are two forms of predications (i) of affirmation and (ii) negation. These predications are complementary, because affirmation implies the negation of its opposite and negation implies affirmation of its contrary. From the absolute point of view there is relation between the affirmation and negation, but considered from relational point of view, the two forms of proposition of affirmation and negation are complementary to each other. These two propositional forms combine to give rise to seven-fold (predications. The sevenfold predications are;
(1) Syād-ašti-From a particular point of view “it is'. (2) Syād-năsti-From a different point of view “it is not'.
(3) Syād-asti-nāsti - From a still different approach to problem ‘it is and is not.
(4) Syad avaktavyam-From another point of view, “it is inexpressible.'
(5) Syad astiavaktavyam-From a point of view, “it is and is inexpressible.'
(6) Syād nāsti-avaktavyam-From another] point of view “it is not and is inexpressible'.
(7) Syād-asti-nästi avaktavyam-From a different point of view 'it is, it is not and is inexpressible'.
In the seven-fold predications affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility are primary forms of predications. With the combinations of

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these three predications, we get the remaining four: asti-nasti (affirmation and negation), asti-avaktavyam (affirmation and inexpressibility), nāsti-avaktavyam (negation and inexpressibility) and asti-nāsti-avaktavyam (affirmation, negation and inexpressibilty).
These seven-fold predications have been mentioned in the Agama literature. In the Bhagavatī sūtra, seven-fold predications are mentioned.1 Kundakundācārya, in the Pañcāstikāyasāra2 has mentioned the seven-fold predications. The predication of avaktavya (inexpre ́sibility) has been made the third predication in the Bhagavāti sūtra and in the Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya. In the Pañcāstikāyasāra, Kundakundācārya has made it the fourth predication, but in the Pravacanasāra, he has placed it as the third predication. Later philosophers have used both the methods of predications according to their convenience. SYAD-ASTI (FIRST PREDICATION)
3
+ 5
The first predication is syad-asti. It implies that from a particular point of view of nature, a pot exists as a pot-syad asti ghaṭaḥ. The question of the relative approach to the problems from a particular point of view, has been given in this predication. For example, we affirm the existence of the pot, as pot, in the context of its nature, of the materia! out of which it is made like the clay, the place in which it is, the time of its existence and its nature as the pot. These refer to the self-nature of the pot. The affirmation as a predicate does imply the affirmation with reference to its self-nature which is expressed in the four-fold scheme of expression of dravya (matter) out of which it is made, the place of its existence, kala the time of its existence, and the nature of the function of the pot. The predication of affirmation also implies the predication of negation of its opposite. For instance,
1 Bhagavatī sūtra, sataka 12, 3010, p. 19-20.
2 Pancastikāyasāra-gāthā 14
3 Bhagavati sūtra, śataka12, 3010, p. 19-20 & Viṣeṣāvṣyakabhāṣya, gāthā 2-32.
4 Pañcāstikāya 14.
5 Pravacanasara jñeyādhikāra gāthā 115.

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the pot is made up of clay or some metal like brass. It cannot be made out of sand. Similarly, the characteristic and function of the cloth would be a cover. If the pot is not able to perform its function of holding water, then it would no longer be called a pot. Similarly, if a piece of cloth does not possess the qualities of covering or the function that the cloth has to perform, it would be no longer be called a piece of cloth. These are the inherent characteristics. If these distinctions in the functions of different objects were not to be recognised, then there would be no difference between a quantity of manure and a similar quantity of jaggery. In this sense, the function of the predication of affirmation has its importance in presenting the selfidentity of the objects.
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SECOND PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI)
The second predication is the predication of negation. It is Syad-nāsti. It expresses that in a particular context with reference of the other nature of the objects (para catuṣṭaya), there is the predication of negation. This predication has reference to the four-fold expression of the other forms and nature of the objects like the material out of which it is made, the place, the time and its nature. From the points of view of its nature, other than its own and its expression of other forms like place, time and the material out of which it is made, the pot is not a pot. For instance, the pot would be a pot and would function as a pot only, if it had its own characteristics. With reference to the other characteristics like its creation out of different materials like sand and its other place and time, it would not be pot, because it may not function as an object holding water. This predicition of negation from the other point of view is also important and the predicational forms would not be complete without the predication of negation. Vidyanadi says that the predication of negation has a reference to the other nature and the presence of opposite characteristics. If the negation were to be applied to the object with reference to its own nature, then the real nature of the pot would not be understood, and, infact, the nature of the pot as pot would no longer be existent. Similarly, if the negation were to be predicated
1 Tattvartha Slokavārtika 1, 6, 52.

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absolutey without reference to the other nature of the objects then it would lead to nibili m. It is, therefore, necessary to have second predication of negation. - THIRD PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-N ASTI)
The third predication is the composite predication of affirmation and negation. For instance, the pot is and is not. These predications are to be considered as presented successively from different points of view and not simultaneously. Otherwise, there would be contradiction. From the point of view of the four-fold scheme of expression of selfnature (svacatuştaya), the pot exists as pot. And from the point of view of the expression of other nature (para catuştaya) the pot does not exist as pot. In the first two predications, separate and independent expression of affirmation and negation have been made. But in the third predication the affirmation and negation are predicated of a thing successively for the sake of presenting the positive and the negative aspects of the thing.
FOURTH PREDICATION (SYAD AVAKTAVYAM)
The fourth predication presents the concept of inexpressibility. For instance, from a particular point of view and in a contextual situation the nature of the pot is inexpressible. The real nature of the pot in its pure form may not be expressible in terms of words, because a thing is complex and has infinite characteristics. All of them cannot be presented in words. This refers to the impossiblity of simultaneous affirmations and negations of the characteristics of the pot. This predication shows that we may understand the nature of the object in its various aspects, but it is difficult to predicate these characteristics in the form of language. But it should be realised that the predication of inexpressibility is not final. It has always reference to a particular point of view and the situation. Similarly, it is based on the acceptance of contradiction of the predication of affirmation and negation simultaneously. Otherwise, it would lead to agnosticism.
FIFTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-AVAKTAVYAM) .
This is the composite predication of affirmation and inexpressibility. For instance, it affirms the existence of the pot as a pot, but

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expresses the inability to express the full nature of the pot. These two predications are also to be considered as presented from two points of view in a situation. To make this as an absolute predication would lead to dogmatism and ultimately to agnosticism.
SIXTH PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI-AVAKTAVYAM)
The sixth predication is a composite predication of negation and inexpressibility. In the first instance, from a particular point of view it is not a pot and in the second instance, from the point of view of simu taneous affirmation and negation, it is inexpressible. SEVENTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-NASTI-AVAKTAYAM)
The seventh predication is a composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. These predications are considered as successive and not simultaneous, although in the case of the predication of inexpressibility it refers to the impossibility of affirmation and negation, simultaneously and consequently inexpressibility of its nature. Therefore, there should be no contradiction or ambiguity in the presentation of the composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpresibility.
The predications of the saptabhangi are dialectial presentations of the predications which are possible to express in their various forms of affirmation, negation and in xpressibility. The dialectics of logic has been an important contribution in the field of logic and metaphysics. Recent researches have shown that saptabhangi doctrine is very useful in understanding the dialectic of the theories of probabilities and quantum physics. Eminent scientists like J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalnobis hive recognised the importance of the doctrine of syādvāda for the dialectic of probability and for discoveries of biological sciences. ," "CATUȘTAYA” (EXPRESSION OF FOUR-FOLD ASPECTS)
A thing is complex in its nature with infinite number of attributes. Understanding a thing requires the insight of analysing its various aspects, positive and negative. From the positive aspect of self-nature, we can predicate the existence of a thing affirmatively. From the point
1. Samkhya : Journal, Oct 1958.

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of view of the four-fold expression of the aspects other than its own, we can predicate the negation of the existence of the object. The fourfold aspects are: (1) the matter out of which a thing is made (dravya), (2) place of existence (kşetra) (3) time of its existence (kāla) and (4) its nature (bhāva). From the point of view of the nature of matter out of which a thing is made, we may predicate its existence if it is consistent with its nature. If we have to refer to its place, time and its function, and if they are consistent with its nature, then we can predicate its existence. For instance, the pot is a pot. if it is r out of clay, if it is in a particular determined place, at a particular time and in its own nature. But if the object is referred to the fourfold expressions of its aspects other than its real nature, then we predicate the negation.
Syādvādananjari present the four-fold expression of the aspects of a thing from the phenomenal or the practical point of view (vyavahāranaya). For instance, from the point of view of the substance out of which it is made, we can affirm the existence of the pot as made up of clay, then affirm the existence of the pot in Pāțaliputra at a particular time, say winter and from the point of view of its nature as black.3
Every thing in the universe is complex in its nature with its infinite characteristics. Considered from points of view of its selfnature, in the four-fold expression of its aspects as mentioned above, we can predicate the affirmation of its existence as the object is considered from the point of view of the contrary nature with the objects with reference to the four-fold expression of its otherness of the aspects, we can predicate the negation of the object. In these predications there should be no contradiction at all, because as we have pointed earlier, a thing is not merely made up of positive qualities, it has also the negative qualities. Therefore, the Jaina conception of the seven-fold predication with reference to the four-fold expressions of the self-nature and the other nature is a coherent presentation of the analysis of the nature of the object. There is no inconsistency either logical or metaphysical in the seven-fold predications.
1. Pancădhyāyī 1,263 2. Syādvādamañjarī, kārikā 23.

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Again, there is no doubt or uncertainty in the seven-fold predications. We have seen that the word ‘syāt' is not an expression of uncertainty or mere probability. It is the expression of a particular context of a point of view. From a particular point of view the predication is always certain and never in doubt. Therefore, we find that the word 'eva’ is suffixed to the predicate. For example, syāt ghața asti eva'. It means that from a particular point of view of its selfnature the pot exists as a pot, and there is no doubt about it.
+6 ) THE USE OF THE WORD SYĀT
Every predication of the seven-fold predications is characterised by the primacy of the self-nature of predication svadharma. The other nature of the predication (anyadharma) is secondary. The word 'syāt' is used for the sake of giving emphasis on the distinction of the primary and secondary emphases of the self-nature and the other nature of the predications. The word 'syāt' is primarily concerned with empha sising the specific nature of the objects from a particular point of view. It aims at distinguishing between the primary emphasis of the specific nature and the secondary emphasis of the other nature of the objects. In this, the function of denial is not contradictory, but is relational. The word 'syāt, therefore, does give importance to the analysis of the specific nature of the object and not to doubt. This becomes necessary because the nature of the objects and the expression of the objects in the form of language will possibly be different, because words cannot express the full nature of the object of experience, but it becomes necessary to predicate the different aspects of nature from different points of view. If the words had the capacity of a full expresssion of the entire nature of the objects, then syāt would not be necessary. The expression of anekānta would be also possible without the use of the word 'syāt. For instance, in the proposition “aham asmi" (I exist), there are two terms : the subject and the predicate. These are the two terms which are consistent and are related intrinsically to each other. The proposition gives definite meaning of the existence of myself. In this proposition the use of
1. Laghīyastraya, pravacana praveśa 63.

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one of he words would be sufficient to give full meaning of the proposition, but for the sake of clarity and emphasis, the two words are used. Similarly, in the proposition—"pārtho dhanurdharah", gives a clear meaning of the nature and the state of Arjuna. It is not necessary to use the word 'eva' because the two words are self-explanatory. Therefore, the word 'eva' is not used. The proposition "asti ghatah” (the pot exists) gives a full and determinate meaning about the existence of the pot. But for the sake of clarification and emphasis the word “syāt' is also used, as it clears doubts and discrepancies. Ācārya Hemacandra says that the use of the word 'syāt' implies the expression of anekānta attitude. Akalankadeva says that the function of the 'syāt' is twofold, in giving emphasis on the validity of anekānta (samyakanekānta) & the validity & rightness of expression of one point of view (samyak ekānta). So he wishes to use the word syāt in naya and pramāna both types of saptabhangi.3
1.} SAPTABHANGT IN OTHER DARŠANAS
We have seen that the primary predications of saptabhangi are three-fold-affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. We find similar expressions in other schools of Indian philosophy like the Vedānta, Buddhism and Vaisesika.
According to the Advaitavedānta, the reality is one. It is Brahman. It is inexpressible, still it is. Therefore, Brahman is real, but it is inexpressible (avaktavya). In the Buddhist philosophy, there is nothing permanent or real. Every thing is fleeting, and is inexpressible in words. Language is an indequate instrument for expression of the complex nature of the objects and depth of the experience. Therefore, the Buddhist expression of the negation of a permanent reality still leaves the possibility of the real as being inexpressible. Vaiseșika school posits the seven-fold category and sämánya (generality) and visesa (particularity) as the two are independent categories which are equally real. Generality and particularity are independent categories though
1. Tattvārthaślokavārttika 1, 6, 56. 2. SyādvādaNañjarī, kārikā 5. 3. Laghīyastraya 62.

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related to each other and though expressing the affirmation and negation as predications. However, the real nature of the categories cannot be expressed in language. It is avaktavya'. In this way, the fundamental predications of the Jaina theory of Saptabhangi have been implied in the systems of philosophy like the Advaitavedānta, the Buddhists and the Vaiseşika.
PRAMĀŅA SAPTABHANGI
Pramāņa saptabhangi can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold predications with referene to the valid source of knowledge. It is comprehensive and all-covering, and it is called 'sakalādeśa.' While a predication from a particular naya (poit of view) is the predication from a particular point, because it does not give a comprehensive presentation of reality from all aspects. Therefore, it is called 'vikalādeśa' (partial presentation). The seven-fold predications from the saptabhangi are comprehensive gif they are exhaustive & cover the different points of view. If the partial presentation is there, it is called 'nayavakya'. The comprehensive presentation is called pramāṇavākya.
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Every thing is complex in its nature and is characterised by infinite attributes. To give a comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing in all its aspects, it would require to present the predications in an infinite number of ways. But such infinite number of predications is neither possible nor practicable. It would require infinite time but life is short and it does not permit us in the short span of time to present the entire nature of an object. Therefore, it is necessary to use Significant words pregnant with comprehenesive meaning. This is possible by the comprehensive presentation of the nature of the object in a language which uses the valid sources of knowledge. The synthetic view of presentation (abheda upacara) is necessary for the comprehensive predication of reality. The synthetic and non-synthetic and non-dual presentation implies the diversity of expression also in giving the diverse nature of the object. This is 'pramāṇa saptabhangī.' A question arises--what is the nature of 'abheda vṛtti' (the approach of unity) & non-duality? What do we mean by the presentation, specially when there is abundant diversity in the things of the world? We can ask what is the basis of the oneness the comprehen

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siveness and oneness (aheda ?). The answer to this would be, that the real nature of the object does not express unity alone or diversity alone, it is complex and the predications have also to be complex. The predication of the unity does imply the expression of diversity though secondary & sometimes is mentioned as inexpressible. The unitary & synthetic approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing is expressed in the different predications as presenting the following aspects of the infinite nature of the object : (1) Kāla (time) (2) utmarüpa (self-nature) (3) artha (meaning) (4) sambandha (relation) (5) upakāra (function) (6) guņideśa (existence in a place) (7) samsarga(association) and (8) sabda (expression in words). In this way, by presenting the synthetic and the synoptic picture of the objects in its various aspects like its nature, its substance, relation, causality etc., we get a comprehensive nature of the objects. This is 'sakalādeśa', because it comprehends to the various attributes of the object in a synoptic way.
In predicating the nature of the objects like jiva, we lay emphasis on the predication of existence (astitva) & this predication implies the predications of the other aspects of the objects like its nature, its relation, its function, the time and the place in which it is to be found. We analyse this with the reference to the eight aspects :
(1) Kāla : When we predicate the existence of a thing like a pot, we also predicate the existence of the other attributes like its colour, its size, its quality of hardness, etc. For this reason, with reference to the aspect of time the other attributes along with the existence are non-different and can be comprehensively apprehended.
(2) Atma-rúpa : It refers to the real nature of the objects. In predicating the real nature of the object, as for instance of a pot (ghata), we have also to predicate the other attributes lil colour, its hardness etc., by implication. These attributes are inherent in the very nature of the objects. Therefore, the description of the objects implies the description of the inherent qualities.
(3) Artha : Existence is an attribute of the pot. Similarly, the attributes of blackness and hardness are related to the objects. All these attributes exists in the same place and therefore there is no difference between existence and other attributes with the view of (artha) meaning.

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(4) Sambandha: Just as the relation of the attributes of existence with the objects is that of inherence, so also the relation of the other attributes with the objects is that of inherence. There is no difference in their relation.
(5) Upakara: Just as the attribute of existence implies the use and the function of the object like the pot, so also the other attributes imply the characteristics of that pot. In this sense, there is the relation of non-difference (abheda).
(6) Gunidesa : The relation between the object and its attributes is intimate and inherent in a specific place and situation. So is the relation of the object with other inherent characteristics. This type of relation is the product of intellectual discrimination.
(7) Samsarga: Just as the attribute of existence with the object is intimately connected, so also are the other attributes which are inherent. The distinction between the other attributes is not known through the senses. Therefore, the association of the objects with the inherent qualities can be considered to be one of non-difference.
(8) Śabda: The existence is predicated by the word 'is'. Similarly, the other inherent attributes of the objects are predicated by the word 'is'. The objects like the pot exists, is black, is hard etc. In these prepositions, the verb 'is' is the copula which connects the object with the attributes. If this connecting link were not to be there, then the attributes would not be associated affirmatively with the objects. The association of the object with its attributes is through the verb 'Is'. Thus it expresses the relation of non-difference.
In this sense, the relation of non-difference of the object with its essential attributes has to be considered in aspects of kala, deśa etc. This is the characteristic of the pramāņa svarupa & pramāņa saptabhangī. The relation of the object with its qualities with reference to the modes is not to be considered as primary in this connection.
NAYA SAPTABHANGI
14.3
Naya is a point of view that one takes in looking at an object. It presents a partial picture of the object, without denying the predication of other aspects of the same object. Naya can be considered from

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two points as “Sunaya' (valid point of view) and “Durnaya' (invalid point of view). Sunaya aims at presenting the picture of the object from a particular point of view, but it does not claim to say that it is the only and exclusive point of view. Nāya saptabhangi (the seven-fold predications from the point of view of naya) is a valid presentation of the predications of the naya and hence it is 'sunaya'. Another consideration regarding the analysis of the naya would be that the predications of the naya imply the differentiations of predications and not the nondifference of presenting the attributes. It is essentially 'bhedad rşți' to see the differenciated qualities of the thing, from a particular point of view.
From the Point of View of Kāla
Nāya saptabhangi gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The presentation of the inherent characteristics of the substance in a synihetic way is secondary of the Naya saptabhargi. In the pramāņa-saptabhangi, we find the effort at finding out the synthetic presentation in the diversified predications. But in the naya saptabhangi, we give prominence to the diversifications and to the analysis of the attributes from different points of view. This analysis may be considered from eight aspects like kāla (time), ātmarūpa (self-nature), artha (object) etc as in the description in the Pramāņa saptabhangi. It is as follows :
. (1) Kāla (time) : The attributes of the objects undergo constant modifications every moment. The emphasis on modifications at different points of time is the primary consideration in the nayasaptabhangi. In this sense, from the point of view of time, there is differentiation in the expression of modes and not the non-difference as in the case of pramāna saptabhangi.
(2) Atmarūpa (self-nature) : The attributes of an object express themselves in different modes. The different modes cannot be considered as identical and the distinction between attributes of an object
cannot be eliminated. If there are differences in the attributes and modes, then there would be do distinction between an object and another object and in the same object in different times. Therefore

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from the point of view of the aspect of ātmarüpa also there is the expression of difference and non-difference.
(3) Artha : From different points of view, the substratum of the attributes will have to be considered different, because if they were to be considered as one, then, there would be no distinction between objects, and the substratum will become one. The difference in the artha is an important characteristic of the naya-saptabhangī with reference to the artha of the substrum.
(4) Sambandha : With reference to the relation of the objects and the attributes of the objects, we find that the characteristics of differentiation is primary. For instance, the relation of Gurudatta with his son will be different from that of his relation with his wife or his brother.
(5) Upakāra : Upakāra refers to function or utility. This also implies differentiation in the context of the seven-fold predications of the naya. The functions of the different objects is different.
(6) Gunidesa : The objects with different characteristics express differentiations in different situations and places. Otherwise, if they were to be considered as identical, then no distinction would be possible as for instance, in that case, the experiences of pleasure and pain of one man would not have been different from the experiences of another man. This is the essential characteristic of difference in the objects having different attributes and modes.
(7) Samsarga : The relation between the different objects and their modes expresses the essential characteristics of differentiations and diversities. For instance, while eating the different condiments, the experiences of the different tastes have to be recognised although the ultimate experience of these will be a synthetic presentation of all the tastes together, as in the case of eating the beatle leaf, the beatle nut and cardamom.
(8) Śabda : The predications of the nature of different objects will have to use different words. One word cannot express the differentiated functions of the different objects. If it were not so, then all experiences and the characteristics of objects would have been explained by one word only.

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Thus we find that Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the differentiation of predicational aspect, while Pramāna saptabhangi gives emphasis on the non-difference (abheda) of the predicational form, as it is synthetic in nature.
Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between attributes and modes is one of the combination of non-difference and difference. When we study the object with reference to the different aspects of pramāna, we look at the object in a comprehensive way, and the predications of pramāna give the picture of the object in a synoptic way by emphasising the different aspects as a coherent whole. The differentiation is secondary. But in the sevenfold predications of naya, the emphasis is on presenting one aspect of an object from a particular point of view and the predications analyse the different aspects of an object. It does not give a synthetic picture. It is concerned with the analytic function of the predicational forms regarding the nature of object. In Naya saptabhangi, the nature of the object is analysed from different points of view with reference to its modes in different aspects of time, drayya etc. Therefore, the function of differentiation(Bhedopacāra pramāņa) is sakalādesa (comprehensive) and coherent, while Naya is vikalādesa (partial) and analytic.
| VYAPYA AND VYAPAKA BHAVA (PERVADED AND 13 PERVADING CHARACTERISTICS)
The relation between the Syādvāda and saptabhangi is of thə relation of pervasive and pervading characteristics. Syadvāda is pervasive while saptabhangi is pervading. Syādvāda, when expressed in definite predicational forms, becomes Saptabhangi. But Saptabhangi may be considered to be a form of Syādvāda or it may not be. Naya is not to be identified with Syādvāda, but it has the characteristics of expressing itself in the forms of Saptabhangi. This is to be found as a characteristic in the Naya and the Syādvāda doctrines.
NO INFINITE PREDICATIONS (ANANTABANGY)
We have seen that the nature of a thing is complex and it has infinite attributes. Therefore, a question has been asked that if the
1
Tattvārtha ślokavārtika 1, 6, 54.

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attributes of a thing are infinite why should there not be infinite predications ? The answer jto this is, that it is true that there are infinite attributes of a thing, but each attribute can be expressed in the sevenfold predications, and hence there would be infinite number of sevenfold predications. If each attribute were to express one predication only, then there would have been infinite predications for infinite attributes, but that is not so. Each attribute or characteristic has its seven-fold predications and its nature can be expressed in the sevenfold predications. Thus there would be infinite number of seven-fold predications.
Acārya Siddhasena and Abhayadevasūri maintain that the primary predications of the seven-fold predications would be affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The other four predications are permutations of the same. They are “vikalādesī" (partial expressions). 2 Similarly, Ācārya śāntisūri in his Nyāyāvatāra-sútravārtikas has also suggested that the primary predications of asti, nāsti and avaktavya are “sakalādesi' and the remaining four predications are vikalādesi. But Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya in his Jaintarkabhāṣā says that all the seven predications of the Saptabhangi are sakalādesi as well as vikāladeść. Akalanka and Vidyānanda have said that the seven-fold predications are all 'sakalādesi and 'vikalādeśī'. 4
Those Ācāryas who have considered the primary predications of sat, asat and avaktavya as 'sakalādesi' and the remaining 'vikalādesi' are of the opinion that the first predication is of identity or non-difference from the substantial point of view and we get a full knowledge of the nature of the substance. The second predication refers to the paryāyas, and from the point of view of non-difference in the case of the predication of negation, we may get the comprehensive picture of the object. The third predication of inexpressibility expresses the concept of difference (bheda) in an implicit way (avivaksita). In this
1 2 3 4
Tattvärtha Ślokavārtika 1, 6, 52. Sanmati tarka, saţika, p. 446 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvania Ed. p. 94. Pujya Gurudeva Ratnamuni Smrti Grantha, p. 133,

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way, the knowledge of the full nature of the object is possible without much difficulty. From the point of view of the concept of non-difference (abhedarüpa) the three predications comprehend the nature of the object in a fuller way (sakalādesi), while the other four predications comprehend the nature of the objects in partial aspects. Therefore they are vikalādesī.
Some other philosophers do not give prominence to this way of thinking regarding the comprehensive or the partial understanding of the nature of an object. Understanding of the nature of an object can be covered from the affirmative side by emphasising the positive aspects of the object; and by negating the contrary or the negative aspects of the object, we can very well get a fuller comprehension. Therefore, all the seven predications of the saptabhangi can be considered as presenting fuller comprehension (sakalādesi) or partial comprehension (vikalādesī) according to the nature and the emphasis of the predications.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SAPTABHANGT
The Indian philosophers in the past, have presented four-fold aspects of the predications for comprehending an object. The four-fold predications are (1) sat (affirmation), (2) asat (negation) and (3)ubhaya (affirmation and negation), (4) anubhaya (neither affirmation nor negation). In the 'Nāsadīya sūkta' of the Rgveda, two contradictory hypotheses of expression as affirmation and negation have been presented? It seems that before the seer of this sūkta, there were two opinions regarding the creation of the universe. Some suggested that the primary cause of the universe is being, while others said it is nonbeing. The seers then presented the third view i. e.--it is neither being nor non-being, but it is both neither being nor non-being (anubhaya). In this way, the three forms of expression of being, non-being and neither being nor non-being were expressed in the Rigveda. Similar view is also to be found in the Upanişads, and there is the possibility of the
1 Rigveda 1, 164, 46 2. Rigveda 10, 129

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presentation of both the points of view. In this tradition three-fold forms of expression of being, non-being and being non-being (ubhaya) are also found. In the view, where there is negation of both sat and asat, we find the fourth predication of neither being nor non-being (anubhaya).
In the Upanişads we get the four forms as expressions as sat (being), 2 asat (non-being), 8 sadasat (being and non-being) and neither both (anubhaya). Anubhaya may also be said to be avaktavya (inexpressible.)4 The predication of avaktayya has three meanings as (1) it is a negation of being and non-being (2) it is a negation of being,nonbeing and both (sadasat) and (3) sat and asat are to be considered as predicated simultaneously. The predication of avaktavya is very important in the Upanişads. 5 Avaktavya has been given the third place of predication, the first being sat and the second asat. In some places, the predications have been given the fourth place and in that case it expresses that the negation of the three predications of sat, asat and sa dasat. The predication of avaktavya can be considered as of two forms, as sāpekṣa (relative) and nirapeksa (absolute). Sāpekṣa avaktavyatā expresses the concept of inexpressibility of the sat, asat and of both. Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist philosopher, has presented the concept of inexpressibility of all the four predications of sat, asat, ubhaya, and anubhaya. This is the expression of catuskoți. In this way the sāpeksa (inexpressibility) predication is based on the negation of the first, second and third or all the four aspects. It expresses, the negation of
1. (a) Tsopanişad-tadejati tannaijati
(b) Kathopanişad 1, 2, 20-aņoranīyān mahato māhīyān.
(c) Mundakopanişad 2, 2, 1-sadsadvareryam 2. Chandogyopanişad 6, 2--sadeva saumyedamagra āsīt. 3. Chandogyo panişad 3, 19, 1-asadevedamagra āsīt. 4. Taittirīya Up. 2, 4-yato vāco nivartante. 5. (a) Kenopanişad, 1, 4-yadvācanabhyuditam. (b) Kathopanişad 2. 6, 12- naiva vāca na manasā prāptum
sakyoh. (c) Mängūkyopanişad 7,

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being, non-being, being and non-being and, neither being and nonbeing. These predications may be simultaneous or successive. This presents inexpressibility as a category. The concept of inexpressibility with reference to the predications is considered to be sāpekļa avaktavyatā (relative inexpressibility). Nirapeksa avaktavyatā (non-relative inexpressibility) is that which presents the concept of inexpressibility regarding the description of the nature of the object, as the nature of the object is incomprehensible.
The four-fold expressions mentioned above are to be found in the Buddha's concept of vibhajyavada, or avyāk stavāda. The Buddha described the problems regarding reality as presenting an end (or sāntatā) or as endless. Similarly, reality as eternal or non-eternal are questions which are inexpressible and indescribable (avyāk sta). The problem regarding the continuation or not of Tathāgata after nirvāna is a problem which is inexpressible and indescribable.
When the Buddha was asked -(1) does the tathāgatha exists after nirvāna ? the Buddha was silent. (2) does he not exist after nirvana ? he was silent. (3) does he exist and not exist after death 2- the Buddha was again silent, the final question was (4) does he neither exist nor non-exist ?1 He did not reply. .
For the Buddha, these problems were avyāk sta. They were indescribale in words. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. Similarly, the problems regarding the fact of misery (dukkha) can be analysed in terms of catuṣkoți. The questions regarding the man who suffers, whether he suffers due to himself, due to others, due to both or due to neither, are all avyāk sta problems.
At the time of Mahāvīra, we find a similar four-fold approach to the problems in the Ajñānavāda (theory of nesience) of Sañjaya Velaţthiputta. Sañjaya Velatthiputta gave answers to such problems neither in the affirmation, nor in the negation and not in both. He was avdocating the theory of doubt and uncertainty. For him, such problems were neither vyāk rta nor avyāk rta. It is difficult to predicate anything about them. In this sense, we can say that his theory was
1.
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primarily a theory of uncertainty and doubt. It is scepticism. In modern western philosophy, we find Hume's position similar to that of Sañjaya Velaţthiputta.
The theory of uncertainty was expressed by Sañjaya regarding some metaphysical problems like-(1) the existence of the other world, (2) the fruit of good or bad action and (3) the concept of immortality. According to him, it is difficult to say whether the world exists; whether it does not exist, whether it does and does not exist and whether it neither exists nor does not exist.
Sañjaya's theory of doubt is quite different from the Syādvāda of the Jainas. The theory of doubt presents uncertainty in any predication, while Syādvāda stands from the foundation of certainty of expression of different points of view. There is no doubt in the predicational form regarding the nature of the object predicated from different points of view. From a particular point of view, the predi. cation is certain and not in doubt. Similarly, Syādvāda does not advocate, as the Buddhists do, the theory of inexpressiblity as a final form of expression. The implication of the catuṣkoți of the Buddhists is that the nature of the problem is inexpressible in its fundamental aspect, but in the Jaina concept of inexpressibility (avaktavya) there is no uncertainty; it only says that the words cannot express the nature of the object in its different aspects. It is possible to predicate existence & non-existence simultaneously from a particular point of view, and therefore it is inexpressible. Syādvāda is neither scepticism, nor nihilism, nor the theory of ignorance. It is the theory of certainty of expression with a certain knowledge from a particular point of view.
Bhagavāna Mahāvīra presented the synoptic appoach to the understanding of the problems in his Anekānta and Syādvāda theories. Nature of a thing need not be analysed from the four aspects only as in the case of the predications in catuṣkoţi. But the nature of a thing is complex, it has infinite aspects and each aspect can be predicated in infinite ways. Therefore, every aspect can be presented in the sevenfold predications, and there are infinite number of predications.
In the Upanişadic period, the problem regarding the aspects of existence and non-existence (sat and asat) of the objects and their

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nature were discussed, but the discussion was not exhaustive. Sanjaya tried to explain away the problems by referring to the theory of ignorance and uncertainty. The Buddha presented the Vibhajyavāda and said that certain problems which are metaphysical are inexpressible (avyāk ṛta) but Mahāvira was not satisfied with such partial solutions of the problems. He gave a dialectic of the predications by the help of rigorous logical exercise and presented Syadvāda and Saptabhangiväda.

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NIKŞEPAVĀDA :
A Study
TERMINOLOGY OF NIKŞEPA :) Man vses language for expressing bis ideas. Without the use of language, he cannot express his thoughts Man is different from animals in this that he has the power of expressing in a language, while animals cannot make use of the language for expressing their experiences. Without the use of language it is difficult to carry on the activities in this world. Language is the medium of communication. There are numerous languages and millions of words in these languages. Each language uses different words for explaining things. It is, therefore, necessary to have knowledge of the use of language and the definite content of the meaning of the words that we use. Language would be useful and it will serve its function properly if its words are replete with exact meaning.
The function of Niksepavāda is to understand the exact content of the words in terms of meaning and its usage. This is the theory of nikșepa. The essence of the Nikşepavāda is to study the implications of the meanings in the words and in their definiteness and to try to find out the implications of the words in the meanings. In fact, the function of niksepa is to define words with reference of their content or the meaning and the usage.?
The other sense in which nikşepa is used is “nyāsa" it is implication and clarification. In the Tattvārthasūtra, the word 'nyāsa' has been used.2
| Dhavală-șațkhandāgama, Book 1, p. 10. 2 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 5.

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In the Tattvartharājavārtika, it is described as nyāso nikṣepaḥ, meaning the clarification and definitising of words.
UTILITY OF NIKSEPA
In the Anuyogadvāra it is stated that the main function of niksepa is to clear the meaning of the word and to find a definite meaning of the words. This is its use.1 Laghiyastraya describes the function of nikṣepa as to remove the inadequate meaning of a word and to present the exact meaning. Upadhyāya Yaśovijaya says that the function of nikṣepa is to present the correct meaning of the word by removing ambiguity and indeterminateness.3
The function of niksepa is to remove ignorance, doubt or perversity of meaning of a word. The primary function is to determine the exact meaning of the word used.
A question has been raised regarding the necessity of niksepa in the logical analysis of the meaning of term, specially when pramāṇa and naya give us the knowledge of the nature of the object.
The answer is that, pramāṇa and naya are concerned with presenting the knowledge of the object fully or partially. But niksepa is more concerned with linguistic use of the words and their meanings. The utterance of a word expresses the meaning that is intended by the person using it in addition to the meaning that accrues to the 'vord. The unintended meanings of the words are likely to create confusion and ambiguity in the use of words. For the purpose of understanding the nature of a thing, we have to depend upon the language that we use. Sometimes language presents difficulties in understanding the connotation of a word, because the real mening and the intended meaning may differ. Therefore, we have to consider two types of meanings of the word: (1) primary meaning and (2) the secondary. To make a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning, it is important to analyse the linguistic function of nikṣepa. The distinction between the primary and the secondary meanings is
1 Anuyogadvāra vṛtti.
2 Laghiyastraya svopajña vṛtti. 7, 2.
3 Tarkabhāṣā 3rd pariccheda

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possible to be understood through the different varieties of nikṣepa like nāma nikṣepa. So one cannot have the knowledge of object (tattvärtha) without the help of niksepa.1
Bhaṭṭakalanka in his Siddhiviniscaya has described the function of niksepa as the act of knowing and determining the meaning of the word used for understanding the nature of the things through naya. There are numerous forms of niksepa, but four of them are prominent. The object of these different forms of niksepa is primarily to dispel errors and misunderstanding about the meaning of the words used for explaining the nature of a thing. Through dravyarthika (from the point of view of substance) and paryāyārthika (from the point of view of modes) naya, we can understand the exact nature of the categories of jīva and ajīva etc. Nikṣepa does not only give us the knowledge of the category, but it removes doubts and indiscrepancies in the meaning. The primary importance of niksepa is to emphasise that we must use appropriate words mentioning the connotation of a term for explaining the nature of the objects.
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THE BASIS OF NIKṢEPA
The basis of nikṣepa can be analysed into four aspects as (1) primary (pradhana), (2) secondary (apradhāna), (3) imagined (kalpita) and (4) un-imagined (akalpita). Bhāva is unimagined drşti. It is therefore primary. The other three niksepas are more concerned with the mental constructions. Therefore, they are not primary.
Nāma nikṣepa enables us to recognise an object. Sthāpanā niksepa does not give us the qualities, but it gives us the idea of form. Dravya nikşepa enables us to know the meaning of the word with reference to its functions and also with reference to its prior and posterior characteristics. In this sense, the nāma, sthāpanā and the dravya nikşepas are expressions which are primarily concerned with grammatical and linguistic analysis of the statements and not so much with the expositions of the nature of the object. Therefore, they are not primary.
1 Lagihyastraya, p. 99
2 Siddhiviniscaya, nikṣepa paddhati 1.

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THE NIKSEPA METHODOLOGY
Nikṣepa presents a harmonious blending of the word and its expression. It would be difficult to understand the significance of the meaning of the terms used without nikşepa. The special characteristic of niksepa is that it gives clarity of expression and thought in analysing the meaning of the word as it is expressed by the word. The words signify the meanings and meaningful words are the primary considerations of the use of language. Words and their expressions convey the characteristics that the objects have. Sometimes, although the words do not convey the presence of attributes of an object, the implication of the presence of attributes is to be found in the use of the words. In this sense, the intention of the speaker is also important, otherwise the language will lead us astray and serious fallacies will arise. For example, a person who was a judge some time in the past, cannot be always considered to be a judge even at the present moment. It may be a false statement. This kind of a distinction in the use of the words and the significance of the meanings of the words in different situations is an importanat function of nikşepa.
Nāma nikṣepa refers to the name, more specially the proper name, arbitrarily given to an object without considering the presence or the qualities suggested by the name. For example, the name of a very poor man may be Laxminārāyāņa. A proper name has no connotation.
Sthāpānā nikṣepa, the denotation of a thing and the connotation is implied and projected in the object, although it does not by itself have that connotation. For instance, a stone image is referred to as God.
Dravya nikṣepa refers to the substance with its qualities implied in the word. For example, a pot which used to contain ghee in the past is even now called ghee-pot. Similarly, a pot purchased for keeping ghee, but which does not at present contain ghee, is also called a ghee-pot. A person who was an eminent lawyer gives up his practice as a lawyer and starts a business. Still he is called a lawyer. A person of wealth in this world is called Indra and a person who posse

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sses spiritual wealth of self-knowledge is called Indra in the spiritual sphere.
In this sense, the practical way of expressing the nature of things through words in order to present adequate meanings is called nikșepa methodology.
NAYA AND NIKŞEPA H.? The relation between naya and niksepa is that of the relation between the object and expression of its qualities. Naya is jñānātmaka (concerning knowledge). It is epistemological, while nikșepa is concerned with the expression of the contents of knowledge through language. In is logical and linguistic. Nāma and sthāpanā and dravya niksepa are all concerned with the substance and its attributes, while bhāva niksepa has reference to its modes.1
NAMA NIKŞEPA Nāma nikşepa refers to a proper name. It has no connotation. It is a name given to an object arbitrarily for the sake of recognising it for practical purposes. The proper name may have connotation when it gets an acquired connotation or it may be a meaningless name. For instance, in some cases we give a name to an object or an animal without consideration regarding its nature or qualities. An unlettered man may be called Vidyāsāgara. A poor man is named as Laxmipati. These names given to the two individuals are purely arbitrary and have no connotation. But if the names given to the individuals do acquire the connotations suggested by the name, it would be bhāva nikşepa. When one who is called Vidyāsāgara becomes a learned man, then it would not be merely a meaningless name. It would acquire a connotation. The names like Vidyāsāgara and Laxmīpati do suggest the connotation of learning and possession of wealth; but a proper name need not imply these characteristics, as they are given arbitrarily to an individual. The expression of the content of the meaning is not important in the Nāma niksepa, although the intention of the parents in giving these names to their children may be noble and filled with maud.
1 Sanmati prakaraņa 1, 6.

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line sentiments. But the function of the Nama nikşepa is only to present a name without the content of the meaning.
The Nama nikşepa refers to proper names, but some proper names have their various modes of expressions suggesting different meanings. For instance, Indra is also called Devendra, Surendra, Purandara and Sakra etc. But a proper name given to an individual cannot be exchanged to any one of these modes. Indra is always called Indra. He cannot be called as Surendra, Śakra, etc.
With reference to time, Nāma nikşepa has two aspects: one is permanent and the other is temporary. The names which are permanent for things which are eternal refer to 'sasvata-nama-nikṣepa'. The names like Surya, Candra, Mount Meru, Siddhaśilā, Loka, Aloka etc. refer to sasvata (permanent) nămanikṣepa. In the cases, where there are modifications and developments, the name may not remain appropriate for the object after sometime. This would be aśasvata (temporary) nămanikṣepa. For example, a girl may be called Kamalā in her parents' house and she may be called Vin.ală in her husband's house. This is a proper name without connotation and it is not a permanent name given to an individual.
STHĀPANĂ NIKṢEPA
Sthapana nikṣepa refers to the identification of the meaning of the word, although a meaning may not be identical. In this, we take a word and identify the meaning of the word with one object. Sthāpanā nikṣepa is of two types: (1) Tadākāra (of the same form) and (2) Atadakara (of different form). In these sadbhāva sthāpānā and asadbhāva sthāpanā may also be distinguished. If the meaning of an object is fixed on the object of the same form, it is called tadakara sthāpanā. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called tadākāra sthāpanä. But the signets of chess are also called as elephant or horse etc., but they are not identical with the shape of horses, elephants etc. Such identification of signets as elephants and horses is called ate dakara sthāpānā. Nāma and sthāpanā nikşepa are not very much significant with reference to the meaning of the objects in the practical life.
DRAVYA NIKSEPA
Dravya niksepa does not refer to the mental, the physical ele

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ment, like the intention as to the nature of the object; and its state in the past, present and the future does not depend on our intention and idea. Therefore it is called dravya nikṣepa, because it expresses the state of the object in one of the transferable forms, like, past as used in the present etc. For example, sometimes we use the description in the present context of the state although it may refer to the past state. Similarly, of the future state, we may refer in the present state. A pot which contained ghee in the past may still be called the ghee-pot. Similarly, if a pot is purchased for keeping ghee in future, the pot may still be called the ghee-pot. A person who was a judge in the past, but has since retired, may still be called a judge; or a person who is to be a king in future may be addressed as a king.
The scope of dravya nikṣepa is very wide. It may cover the expressions relating to the past or the future as projected into the present tense. The future king is also called king. And when the king is dead, his body is also referred to the king.
Dravya niksepa is of two types: (1) Agama dravya nikşepa' and (2) "no-agama dravya nikṣepa". No-agama dravya nikṣepa is of three types: (1) jña-sarīra, (2) bhavya sarira and (3) tad-vyatirikta. The Atman knows through a body and this is called jña-sarīra or jñāyaka śarīra. Similarly, we see the dead body of a learned man, and then we say that he was a learned man. This is jña-sarīra, no-āgama dravya nik şepa.
If the Atman is embodied and that atman will be a learned man in future, it is called bhavya sarira. For example, by observing the lustrous qualities of the body and other characteristics of a child we may say the child would become a learned man. This is a bhavya-śarīra no-agama dravya nikşepa.
In the first two types of niksepa, the emphasis is on the body which is only the medium. In the third, the emphasis is not so much on the body, but it is on the bodily activities, like-movement of the hands etc. For example, when an ascetic is preaching, he may make gestures with the hands. These gestures are tad-vyatirikta no-āgama dravya nikşepa.
Agama dravya niksepa refers to the implication of the meanings and the cognition content of the meaning, rather than the exact expre

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ssed form of the knowledge. In the no-āgama dravya niksepa there is the absence of both types of knowledge, expressed or implied. It only refers to the medium of knowledge i. e. the body. No-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikṣepa does not possess any content of knowledge. Therefore, it is called dravya nikşepa. This is of three types : (1) Laukika, for instance, according to the common parlance of language "Śriphala” is auspicious. (2) Kuprāvacanika, for example, according to this 'Vināyaka” (god Ganesa) is called auspicious. (3) Lokottara : From the ultimate point of view, religion with jñāna (knowledge), darśana (faith) and eāritra (conduct) is auspicious.
In this way, bereft of the content of the meaning, and also bereft of the present state of the object, we recognise the other states as the present and we impose the present state and consider to be always there. This is dravya nikşepa.
11.) BHAVA NIKȘEPA Bhāva nikșepa refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word.
The learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be said to be a teacher. This is Agama bhāva nik sepa. In this sense, he is a real teacher. A teacher who is engaged in the activities of teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of “No-āgama bhāva nikṣepa".
In these cases, the word has no reference to the aspect or the fun. ction in partial form. It has three forms : (1) Laukika, (2) Kuprāvacanika and (3) Lokottara.
We have seen that there are similar distinctions in the no-āgama tadvyatirikta dravya nikșepa, but there is a primary difference in the emphasis of the two forms of niksepa. The word 'no' in the dravya nikșepa implies the absence of the cognitive functions (āgama). But in the bhāva niksepa there is a partial absence of cognitive functions.1 The scope of dravya tadvyatirikta is primarily activity and not cognitive function. While the scope of bhāva tadvyatirikta is two-fold : i. e., the expression of activity and also the cognition implied in the activity.
1.
āgama savva nisehe, no saddo ahava desa paạisehe.

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For example, a teacher makes some gestures by the hand and turns over the pages. These activities do not refer to the cognition. In this sense, the word 'no' in the bhāva niksepa refers to the partial negation. The function of the bhāva niksepa is primarily concerned with the expression of the present state and the mode of the object. In this expression of niksepa, there is the absence of the distinction of activity of the body as a medium of cognition. This is the difference between the two types of nikşepa.
Every thing is expressed through nik sepa. It is the linguistic expression, there are infinite number of expressions, but every thing has to be expressed in the form of four expressions of niksepa. Only one niksepa will not give a full picture of the state of the object. Every object has its name. It is nāma nikşepa. It has its state. It is sthāpanā niksepa. It is referred to with reference to its material, it is dravya nik sepa and there is the expression of its nature and its attributes. It is bhāva niksepa,
We give below the classification of niksepa as discussed in the earlier pages.
NIKŞEPA
Nāma
Sthāpanā
Dravya
Bhāva
Tadākāra
Atadākāra Āgama
Noāgama
Jña-Sarira
Bhavya-sarira
Tadvyatirikta
Laukika
Kuprāvacanika
Lokottara
Āgma
Noagama
Laukika Kuprāvacanika Lokottara The concept of Nikşopa is primarily linguistic in nature. It is aimed at giving the exact meaning of a term.

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NAYAVADA: sin A Study
HOUGHT AND ITS BASIS
Nayavāda is a significant contribution of the Jaina logic and epistemology. If helps to understand the nature of an object in a comprehensive way. It is the basis of the principle of Anekānta.
It would be necessary to understand the foundational processes of thought for the sake of our knowledge of the Nayavāda. The empirical activities are of three types :
1. Concerned with knowledge and its effects. 2. Concerned with the objects and its modifications. 3. Concerned with the language and the use of the word.
The process of thought in which there is the predominance of a purpose or a will, it is jñānāśrayī, based on the knowledge. Naigamanaya is of this type. That which is based upon the object is arthāśrayi. Sangraha, vyavahāra and rjusūtra nayas are arthāśrayīs as they primarily refer to the objects and there modification. In these nayas, there is the analysis of the varied aspects and distinctions of objects. The sangrahanaya is primarily concerned with finding out the unity in the diversity of the modes of the objects. Nyāya and Vaiseșika system of philosophy are based upon vyavahāra naya. Kşanikavāda of the Buddhists is an expression of rjusūtranaya. The nayas which are concerned with the analysis of words and the linguistic study are called šabdāšrayī. Śabda, Samabhirūdha and Evarbhūta nayas are pertaining to the words. These nayas are primarily concerned with the linguistic study and the persons who study these give importance to the science of language.
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1. Naigamunaya refers to the purpose or the object in view that is in the mind of the person who is responding.
2. Sangrahanaya refers to the tendency to find unity among diversity.
3. Vyavahāranaya is very much concerned with particularity and the study of diversity.
4. Rjusūtranaya aims at presenting the aspect of reality from the point of view of the momentary present.
5. Śabdanaya analyses the function of the word and its meaning.
6. Samabhirüờhanaya refers to the etymological meaning of the word.
7. Evambhūtanaya analyses the specific situations and the contexts in which a particular meaning is referred to the word.
THE BASIS OF DISTICTIONS OF NAYA ... The primary consideration of sangrahanaya is the emphais on unity, while that of vyavahāranaya is on diversity. Sangrahanaya does not accept diversity as the basis and vyavahāra ignores unity in its search for diversity. But the basis of naigamanaya is the synthesis of the diversity and unity. It asserts that unity and diversity are equally present in an object, but the emphasis may be on one or the other according to the purpose of the analysis. In some cases, the unity becomes primary and the diversity is secondary, while in some others diversity becomes primary and the unity is secondary. The varied emphasis on unity and diversity is primarily mental and is based upon the purpose and the predilection of the individual. Sometimes, an object, which has the diverse modifications becomes important, but sometimes the modifications which are diverse are prominent.
Rjusūtranaya is based on the principle of diversity only. It is concerned with the analysis of the nature of the object from the point of view momentary present. It does not find any relevance for the
.
1.
Anyadeva hi sāmānyamabhinnajñānakāranaṁ. Višeşoăpyanya eveti, manyate naigamo nayah.

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past or the future modifications. Sabdanaya studies the meaning and function of the word. Its primary emphasis is on getting the exact meaning of the word. Samabhirūdhanaya has reference to etymological meaning of the word. Evarbhūtanaya is more specific and it aims at finding out the exact meaning of the word in a particular situation and in a particular context with reference to the present. These nayas are based upon the concepts of unity and diversity. The principles of unity and diversity are operative in these nayas in different forms as shown below :
1. Naigamanaya emphasises that the unity and diversity both are important.
2. Sangrahanaya gives prominence to unity and in that (a) parasangraha emphasises absolute unity while (6) apara-sangraha gives prominence to relative unity or oneness.
3. Vyavahāranaya is concerned primarily with the diversity and difference of both absolute and relative types.
4. Rījusūtranaya gives importance to diversity and difference. 5. Sabdanaya similarly gives importance to difference.
6-7. Samabhirūąha and Evambhūta are also concerned with difference.
In these nayas, sangrahanaya emphasises non-difference or unity. Those which give emphasis on difference or diversity are five in number and naigamanaya gives importance to both difference and unity. The Jainas have said that unity and diversity, oneness and manyness, and substantiality and modifications are equally important and real. There cannot be any diversity without unity and there cannot be any unity without diversity. Both are real, both are complementary. One without the other is not possible.
- THE TWO TRADITIONS We have seen that the nayas can be classified into two types as (a) dravyārthika -- those concerned with the understanding of substance and (b) paryāyārthika -- those concerned with the understanding of the modes. There are two traditions in understanding these nayas. One is the metaphysical tradition and the other is the logical tradition,

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Jinabhadragani Kṣamāśramaņa outlined the metaphysical tradition. According to him, naigama, sangrahe, vyavahāra and ṛjusūtranaya are dravyārthika nayas. While sabda, samabhirūḍha and evambhūta nayas refer to the paryāyas, therefore, they are paryāyārthika nayas. hasena Divākara has given the logical tradition. According to him, the first three nayas are dravyarthika nayas and the remaining are paryāyārthika nayas.1
Sidd
The metaphysical tradition considers rjusūtranaya as dravyarthika as it refers to the substance. This view is based on the 14th sutra of the Anuyogadvāra. According to this view, in this with reference to this naya, an individual without the upayoga (harmonic energy) is to be considered as from the point of view of substance as an individual. From the metaphysical point of view, if ṛjusūtranaya is not taken with reference to substance, it will contradict the statement in the Anuyogadvāra. But the logical tradition maintains that the statement in the Anuyogadvāra has reference to the modifications of an object at a particular point of time and reference to substance or object (dravya) is only formal. Therefore, there should be no contradiction in reading the statement of the Anuyogadvāra with reference to the analysis of the modes of a thing. The metaphysical tradition has given importance to the substance (dravya) which is secondary. Therefore, they considered it as dravyārthikanaya. But really speaking, according to the logical tradition, reference to the substance (dravya) is only secondary, while the modes are primary. Therefore, ṛjusūtranaya is primarily paryāyārthika. The metaphysical tradition gives importance to dravya as primary, while the logical tradition looks at it from the point of view of paryaya. These two are only distinctions in the approaches to the problems, but there is fundamental difference in their analysis. One presents the object from the point of view of substance and the other presents the object from the point of view of view of modes.
•
NAIGAMANAYA
L
3 Naigamanaya is the point of view by which the generality and
1 Nyayopadesa 18
2 Anuyogadvāra 14 3 Naya-rahasya, p. 12

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particularity of the object is synthesised. It gives importance to the aspect of generality and particularity of an object and takes a synoptic view of the relative importance of generality and particulrity.1 Nyāya-Vaiseşika2 darśanas maintain that generality and particularity are independent categories, but the Jainas do not accept this view, for the particular and general are inter-dependent. One cannot exist without the other. There is no particular without the reference to the general and there is nothing general without reference to the particular. A thing can be looked at from the points of view of generality or of the speciality of an object. When we want to distinguish one object from another, the emphasis is on particularity or differentia, although it has general nature in relation to other similar objects. We give secondary importance to general characteristics or the universlity. For instance, when we distinguish one man from the other, we consider them in particulars, but the general nature of man as such remains secondary. Similarly, when we look at objects from the point of view of generality as belonging to a class, its special characteristics or differentia remain secondary, although they are there in the objects. When we consider two different men as man, we make the distinguishing feature of the two men, as secondary.
Naigamanaya is concerned with the synthetic approach to the problem of understanding the nature of the object and its qualities, the relational activity and the agent of the activity. The two aspects like the substance and activity, the relation and the objects of relation and activity and the objects of activity, have both the aspects of identity and difference. From a particular point of view, they can be considered as identical, because there is no absolute difference between the substance and its qualities etc. But from another point of view, i. e., from the point of view of looking at objects on the basis of distinctions and particularity, the differences are emphasised. In these cases, when the identity is emphasised differences are looked as
1 (a) Tattvārthabhāṣya 1, 35. (b) Nayakarṇikā
(c) Anuyogadvāra sūtra ṭīkā.
2 Syālvälinañjarī, śloka 14th ṭīkā

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secondary and while the differences are emphasised, identity is considered as secondary. This is the cardinal aspect of Naigamanaya. Akalarika says that when one considers identity (abheda) as primary, difference (bheda) is considered to be secondary. Similarly, while emphasising difference, identity is considered to be secondary. This is the main presumption of Naigamanaya. For instance, the object and its qualities are intimately related to each other. They cannot be considered as apart. Jiva has its attributes and happiness is one of its attributes. When we say jiva is happy, sometimes there is the primacy of the identity of jīva and happiness. The difference Letween the jīva and happiness is also emphasised, but happiness here becomes secondary. To comprehend both the aspects in their primary and secondary forms is the function of Naigamanaya. It may atso be noted that if the emphasis is given on oneness, then the diversity or manyness is secondary in its importance. Sometimes, identity gains primary importance and sometimes difference is emphasised upon.
There is a distinction between Naigamanaya and the synthetic comprehensive approach of looking at a thing which may be called sakalādesa. In the sakalādesa, all the attributes are considered equally important and it gives a synthetic approach. But in Naigananaya, prominence is given to substance sometimes, and at other times its attributes gain secondary importance. Particularity is looked at from the relative point of view and the distinctions and entity are emphasised with the relative prominence.
In the phenomenal approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing, naigamanaya gives importance to a relative appreciation of generality and particularity. The generality is a unifying characteristic while particularity presents the differentia. For instance, if a hundred wrist watches were considered to be wrist watches, in this the generalty is primary. But if each wrist watch is taken by individuals recognising it as his own, here particularity or its differentia or the special characteristics of the object as an individual object is emphasised. Thus both the aspects are present. The emphasis is mental and it depends upon the point of view that we take at a particular time.
1. Laghīyastraya 2, 5, 39

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When we again take up two individual men as distinct with their personality, we emphasise the particularity and the difference although the generality is secondary. But if we consider the two individual men as men essentially, we give importance to the generality particularity.
If one is asked where he stays, he might reply that he stays in the world. If he is further asked to specify, he might go on partcularising by stating that he stays in Jambūdvīpa, in Bhāratavarşa, in Rajasthan, in a particular lane in Udaipur and or in a particular room in a house in a lane in the Udaipur city. If he is still asked to further specify the particular location, he would say, “I live in my body". In this way, with reference to the habitation or residence, naigamanaya presents the specific characteristic in light of generality. Progressively, he goes on particularising the place of residence. The previous statements are more general than the succeeding statements.?
Some philosophers have referred the function of naigamanaya to the purpose or the end which an action or an object implies, 9 It has reference to the purpose of action. A man who is going to a forest with an axe to cut the wood is asked what he is doing and he would reply he is cooking. This statement has a reference to the object or the purpose for which an action is being done.3 This is the point of the naigama.
Naigamanaya is expressed in three forms : (1) Bhūta Naigama (2) Bhavisya Naigama (3) Vartamāna Naigama. To impose the characteristic of the present tense to the past incident or a thing, is called bhūta naigama. On the Dewali festival day, we say, to-day Bhagawāna Mahāvīra attained salvation. Though 2500 years before Bhagavāna Mahāvīra attained nirväna, but in this, we impose the present tense to an incident which happened more than 2500 years ago. Bhavişya naigama imposes the present tense to a future incident. If a person is to attain kevalajñāna, we say that he attains nirväna after a specific period. The Vartamāna Naigama refers to the imposition of the present tense to
1 Haribhadriyāverśyakațippaņe, nayādhikära. 2 Tattvārtha Rājavārtika 1, 35, 2 3 Haribhadrīyāvasyakațippaņe nayādhikāra.

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an activity which has been started, but which has yet to be completed. For instance, if one starts preparing bread and if he were asked : what have you prepared ? she would say, 'I have prepared bread', although the bread is yet to be prepared and it is in the process of being prepared. Here we are imposing present perfect tense on the action that is yet to be completed.
Naigamanaya is of three types.? :(1) Dravya Naigama, (2) Paryāya Naigama and (3) Dravya-Paryāya Naigama. The functions of these three are: (1) to apprehend two objects (2) to apprehend two conditions and (3) to apprehend one thing and one condition respectively.
Naigamanaya expresses the Anekānta point of view. According to the Jajnas, the one and the many are equally real. Without the one, many cannot exist, and the many have reference to the one. The concept of cow (cowness) is the one referring to the many individual cows. Similarly, the concept of the animal is common to the cows and other animals. From the point of view of the concept of the substance, all animals and inanimate objects have reference to that one concept. Similaraly, existence is the one concept which refers to all that exists. The emphasis on the one or the many is a matter which has relation to the concept or is the intellectual construction. The unity and diversity are facts of life. The universe exists with its rich diversity. The diversity as considered from the point of multiplicity is a fact of life, which may express contrary qualities. The universe is constituted of the living and the non-living. From the point of view of looking at the universe as cetanā the universe may be considered as one, although there are many forms of consciousness.
From the point of view of consciousness and the unconsciousness there would be distinctions, but considered from the points of view of substantiality and inter activity, the diversity has one common element. Similarly, considered from different points of view, the on and the many are relational terms. Each refers to the other. Therefore, the Jainas said, the one and many are equally real.
1 Tattvārthašlokavārtika, p. 269–270.

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S NAIGAMABHASA (FALLACY OF NAIGAMANAYA)
Naigamābhāsa is a fallacy which arises out of the mis-interpretation of Naigamanaya. Naigamābhāsa consists in giving primary emphasis on the distinctions between the substance and its qualities, activities and the object of activities as absolute distinctions. 'But the object and its qualities and the action and the agent of activities cannot be distinguished in the absolute sense. If they were absolutely different then the relation of inference between the object and its qualities cannot be real. Therefore, the relation between the object and its qualities have to be considered a relational and equally real. The Nyāya-Vaiseșika considers the object and its attribute as denoting essentially difference. That would be naigamābhāsa.
The Sānkhya philosophers have considered knowledge and happiness which are qualities of the self as different from the self. According to the Sānkhya philosophers, knowledge '(jñāna) and bappiness (sukha) are inherently related to the tri-attributal (tri-gunātmaka pra. krti). They come out of Prakrti and also submerge in it. The self (puruşa) due to contact with the prakrti believes that knowledge and happiness are experienced by him. But these experiences belong to the buddhi (intellect) which reflects the states due to its contact with praksti and its attributes. Intellect is also not the inherent essence of the self. In this way, the Sānkhya philosophers consider knowledge, happiness and the self as distinct. This is Naigamābhāsa, because really there is no difference between the self and the knowledge. Wherever there is self, there is knowledge.1
SANGRAHANAYA (SYNTHETIC POINT OF VIEW)
Sangrahanaya is the synthetic point of view which seeks to find unity in diversity. It aims at finding out the common element in many objects. Every object is the synthesis of many qualities-generality and the particularity. It is the synthesis of the unity and the diversity. And to find out the unity in the diversity is the function of Sangrahanaya. Sangrahanaya seeks to establish the common point
1 Ācārānga--je vinnāyā se āyā, je āyā se vinnāyā. 2 (a) Tattvārthabhāşya 1,35
(b) Pramānanayatattvāloka 7, 13

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between objects and bring them together as belonging to one category, although they have many differences, excepting the one characteristic of existence. To seek the general among the particulars is the object of sangrahanaya.1
Vedānta and the Sankhya darśanas look at reality from the synthetic point of view (sangrahanaya). Sangrahanaya seeks to find reality as one without distinction.2
Sangrahanaya finds unity and oneness in numerous modes of an object. Similarly, it finds the one common point in the many objects due to the similarities. According to the sangrahanaya the one is real, the substance is real and the modes cannot exist without the substance.
The sangrahanaya is of two types : (1) ‘parasangraha' and (2) ‘aparasangraha. Parasangraha aims at finding out the oneness of the reality from its diversity in the world. And a parasangraha seeks to find the unity and the oneness in an object from its numerous modes. From the points of view of attributes it seeks to find out the common element among the many attributes. It finds out the 'cowness' from the all the cows. Similarly, amidst the many individual men, the concept of the man in general is presented.
The limit of the aparasangrahanaya is up to the attainment of the unity in this world amidst diversity. This common point between the six dravyas has a reference to the aparasangrahanaya and the common point is referred to as apara-sāmānya. “It is the phenomenal generalty”? This leads to the conception of substance (dravya). It expresses the common characteristics of dravyatva in the sixsubstances.
2 3 4 5 6 7
Sangraha ślokāk Anuyogadvāra Laghiyastraya śloka 32 Prainānanayatattvāloka 7, 14 Ibid 7, 15 Ibid 7, 19 Ibid 7, 20.

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1.3 SANGRAHABHASA (FALLACY OF SANGRAHANAYA)
Parasangrahanaya refers to the concept of the oneness as the ultimate reality and parasangrahanayābhāsa also refers the ultimate oneness of the reality. But the difference between the two is parasangrahanaya does not deny the diversity and distinction in the phenomenal objects. But parasangrahanayābhāsa denies the reality of the diversity of the phenomenal object. Hence it is called the nayābhāsa. It emphasises the reality of the absolute which is one and the multiplicity as an appearance.
Vedānta darśana is the example of parasangrahanayābhāsa because it posits the reality of the absolute Brahman and considers the phenomenal world of diversity as an appearance. Aparasangrahanaya accepts the reality of the general concepts like substance etc. And it does not deny the distinctions between the substances like dharmadravya etc. But aparasangrahanayābhāsa denies the reality of the distinctions between the substances.
VYAVAHĀRANAYA (PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW)
Vyavahāranaya is the practical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It can be considered to be an empirical approach to the problems of grasping the object from the synthetic point.1 'Vyavahāranaya analyses the different aspects of the objects in a scientific way and it helps in understanding the phenomenal world. The sangrahanaya grasps the generality, the rjusūtranaya looks at the moments and not to the continuum while the vya· vahāranaya attempts to understand the coherent relation between the
substance and its attributes, general and the particular and also to the empirical significance of understanding the object. The general is comprehended through its specific nature. Therefore, this is called the practical point of view or the empirical point of view.
In other words vyavahāranaya comprehends reality from the
1
(a) Tattvārtha Rājayārtika 1, 33, 6 (b) Tattvārthaślokavārtika p. 271 (c) Laghīyastraya kārikā 42 and 70

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practical and the commonsense point of view.1 A thing can be understood in respect of its substance and its modifications. With reference to the substance, it has its forms like the matter (pudgala), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time). With reference to the modifications as substance, we find various classifications of the jīva substances, like the siddha jīvas and the samsari jivas. These classifications may be based on different principles like the presence of the attributes in different degrees at a particular time or the evolutionary process wherein the attributes are presented in a chronological order. This naya aims at analysing the nature of the object for practical purpose. When we know an object like a pot (ghața), we are more concerned with understanding the nature of the object in its modifications and attributes rather than in its generality i. e., potness or the pot in general (ghatatva). Similarly, if a patient is to be given medicine, we do not merely say that the medicine should be given, but we specify a particular medicine.
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Vyavahāranaya is practical in outlook. Without its pragmatic nature for the empirical world vyavahāranaya has no value. Vyavaharanaya is of two types: (1) sāmānya bhedaka wherein we are concerned with presenting the general nature of the object. For example, in describing the dravya we try to present the distinction between the jiva dravya and ajīva drava (2) viśeşa bhedaka; gives the analysis of the specific nature of a thing and makes distinctions in the various types of the thing on the basis of differentia. For example, samsārī jīvas gie classified into nāraki (living in hell), tiryak (lower animals), manuşya (human beings) and deva (heavenly beings). This kind of distinction on the basis of specific nature of the object continues to be made till we reach the minimal point where we get the individual only and not a type of species. Below this point, there would be no distinction possible. The main use of this naya is to understand the phenomenal world in its details. It is consistent with the practical outlook of life.
1 Tattvärthabhāṣya 1, 35 2 Viseşāvasyakabhāṣyavṛtti 3 Laghiyastraya 3, 6, 70

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Vyavahāra drșți (practical point of view) does not merely grasp the substance, but it also presents the particular distinctions of the object for the sake of understanding the nature of the object. In this sense, we can say although its function is analytic, it is not restricted to the analysis of modes only. It is more concerned with the presentạtion of a thing with its specific attributes and modes. Therefore, it is referred to as dravyārthika naya (concerning dravya). Naigama, sangraha and vyavahāra nayas are forms of dravyārthika nayas.1 5 VYAVAHĀRANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF VYAVAHĀRANAYA)
The point of view which is not consistent with the practical point of view and which presents a picture contrary the existing nature of the object is called vyavahāranayābhāsa. It is a fallacy concerning vyavahāranaya.? Vyavahāranaya makes a distinction between substance (dravya) and its modifications (paryāyas). But this distinction is not absolute. If the distinction were to be considered as absolute and not relative then it becomes inconsistent with the presenation of the object as it is. And that is vyavahāranayābhāsa. Cārvāka darśa make a distinction between substance and its modifications. It posits reality as consisting of the modes of the four elements-earth, water, fire, and air and nothing else. Consciousness also is a product of the modes of these elements i. e., due to the metabolic changes of the body. This is vyavahāranayābhāsa.
5 RJUSŪTRANAYA Rjüstranaya is restricted to the understanding of the modes and he states of the momentary present, and not as a continuum. It looks at the object as a modification of the momentary present. The past modifications are destroyed, the future modifications are yet to come; the two cannot be comprehended. What we can get to know is the momentary present and the states and events in the present moment. Attempt to know the past modes or the future ones would be futile
1 2 3 4
Pramāṇanayatattväloka 7, 6. Tattvārthaślokavārtika p. 271 Pramāṇanayatattväloka 7, 25 Pramāṇanayatartvāloka 7, 26

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like seeing the sky-flower. It is not an object, it is only the state of the object in a particular moment. The object is merely an aggregate of the states in the present moment. According to the rjusūtranaya, the object is from the real point of view not an object at all. It is only a state. When I say-I am happy, it only expresses the present state of my being Rjusūtranaya gives importance to such modifications of the present moment, and considers that what is real is to be found in the present. For instance, the pleasure of the present moment and the possession of the wealth of the present moment are important and not their past and the future states. This does not mean that rjusűtranava gives absolute emphasis on the present moment only. It only gives primary importance although the past and the future states are considered as secondary. It only says that they have no practical value, According to the rjusūtranaya every state of an object is different. The first and second states and others are distinguishable. The state of an object at a particular moment lasts only for that moment. Next moment, it is different. In analysing the statement “the crow is black” rjusūtranaya states that the crow is a crow and blackness is blackness. They are two different states. If both were considered as identical then the cuckoo and other black animals would be crow. The blackness of the crow does not exhaust the states of the crow, because it
s other states present at the moment, like-its possession of blood. flesh, bone etc., which are of different colours, then how can we say that the crow is of black colour only.
According to this naya a potter (kumbhakāra) would not be con. sidered as a potter as long as he is engaged in preparing some other articles like the umbrella or a palanquin, but the moment he is engaged in preparing the pot, he may be called the potter.
We cannot say that the wood is burning, because the act of burning requires a series of numerous moments. Innumerable moments are necessary in the process of burning. The moment the wood burns. it is no longer wood, it would have been destroyed as the wood and turned into coal. Again all wood is not burning, some of it is still un
1 (a) Anuyogadvāra
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burnt. One can easily see that in the process of burning some portion of firewood is burnt, some is burning and still some of it is not burning. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the wood is burning. The wood can be described as burning and as not burning, as burning it is not wood and as wood it is not burning.
The rjusūtranaya in its suble form would also maintain that in the act of eating, we are not eating at all. Because the act of eating involves the series of moment, and each moment presents a particular action. When we take food in the hand in a particular moment, it is not eating. Next moment we keep it in the mouth, it is also an act in a particular moment and when we gulp the food it is not eating at all. The rjusūtranaya does not accept the continuum of the actions in different moments. It looks at the object at a particular moment. It is not very much relevant for understanding the nature of the object from the practical point. The comprehension of the nature of objects from the practical point is possible from naigama and vyavahāra nayas. In the rjusūtra naya primary emphasis is given on modifications and that too of the moments, although there is the implicit acceptance of the substance which has modifications. But this is secondary.
Rjusūtranya has two forms (1) Sūkşma rjusūtranaya and (2) sthüla rjusūtranaya. The sükşma rjusūtranaya comprehends the state of the object at a particular moment only, but the sthūla rjusūtranaya looks at the state of the object as it is presented in the series of moments constituting the present.? Akalanka has given copious examples of rjusūtranaya. RJUSŪTRANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF RJUSŪTRANAYA)
Rjusūtranaya gives primary importance to the modifications (paryāyas) considering the substance (dravya) secondary; but the rjusūtranayābhāsa (fallacy of rjusutranya) totally neglects the substance and considers the modifications the only redity. 8
The Buddhistic kşaņkavāda is a clear example of the fallacy of
1 Nayacakra. 2 Tattvārtha Rājavārtika, p. 96-97. 3 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 7, 30.

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rjusūtranaya, because according to Buddhists, there is no existence of substance, only the modifications remain. Even in the state of salvation the continuance of consciousness extinguishes like a lamp. Thus it totally exhausts. And according to their view the substance of consciousness finally comes to an end.
ŠABDANAYA
!!!
Śabdanaya has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the meaning of the word in the context of time, gender, number, case and prefixes that are attached to the word. According to various contexts of time, gender, number, etc, the meaning of the word changes. The aim of this naya is to determine the exact meaning of the word.2 This naya is primarily concerned with the linguistic part of the expression of thought. According to this naya, the meaning of the word is determined by its function, the use in the various contexts with reference to the number, gender and the prefixes etc. When we say the mountain Meru was, is and will remain, it has a reference to the time element in the expression of the word. But the difference in each expression emphasises the difference in the contexts of time, the past, the present and future and accordingly in the object as well. It recognises the difference in the state of mountion Meru, of present, past and future time. We may determine the meaning of the word with reference to the modifications of the word. When we say that he prepares the pot and the pot a contains water; in these statements the meanings emphasise different contexts with reference to the
potter, and the function of the pot. Three genders of the word give different meanings. A word used in a masculine gender will have a different meaning from the same word used in feminine gender. The word taţah, taţi and taţaṁ have different meanings.
1 Pramāņaņayatattvāloka 7, 31. 2 (a) Laghiyastraya sloka 44.
(b) Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 794. (c) Tattvārthaslokavārtika p. 272, 273.
(d) Pramānanayatattvāloka 7, 32. 3 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 7, 33.

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With reference to the prefixes the words will have different meanings also. Prefixes 'a', 'vi', 'pra' and sam' for the word hāra will give different meanings. Ahāra means food, vihara is walking about, prahāra is striking and samhāra is destruction. Due to the different prefixes, words will have different meanings. Science of language presents innumerable details regarding the meaning and function of the word. The linguistics is a developing science and the Sabdanaya is the root cause of this development. It incorporates all the traditions which are responsible for the development of linguistic science.
ŚABDANAYĀBHĀSA (FALLACY OF SABDANAYA)
Śabdanayābhāsa is a fallacy which consists in maintaining that the meaning of the word is not affected by the contextual situations and the different prefixes. Reference to different points of time may bring different modifications and these modifications have to be recognised as facts. But the sabdanayabhāsa does not recognise this important fact that there is the possibility of changes in the meaning due to contextual changes. To emphasise and retain the same meaning even if the contextual emphasis and references are changed is called sabdanayābhāsa.1
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SAMABHIRUDHANAYA
Samabhiruḍhanaya refers to the meaning of the word, within the contexts of its etymological analysis. It goes to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its origin. The evolution of the word may lead to various changes in the meaning. However, the origin of the word needs to be considered for understanding the exact meaning of the word. In the varied modifications of the word it would be necessary to understand the stages of the modifications, and the modifications will show different meanings. To show this, is the function of samabhirūḍhanaya. Samabhiruḍhanaya accepts the difference among the synonyms of the same word. In the sabdnaya we try to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its function
1 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 7, 34
2 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 7, 37

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in context of the number, the gender and the prefix, etc. But samabhirūḍhanaya is concerned with analysing the etymology of the word and on the basis of this analysis it distinguishes the meanings of the same word due to its varied modifications in different contexts, may there be no difference of number, gender etc.1 Words like Indra, Sakra, and Purandara are referred to the same person Indra. But they have different meanings.2 Words like Rājā and Nṛpa may apply to the same man, but they have different meanings with reference to the etymology of the words. Rājā is one who shines and Nrpa is one who rules. Samabhirūḍhanaya, has given importance to the etymological sense of the word. On the basis of the roots of the word, its meaning differs. The words Indra and Śakra, although applicable to the same person, do not signify the same meaning.
In the sabdanaya we do not make a distinction in the meaning of the word in the same gender, but samabhirūḍhanaya finds differences in the meaning of the same word with reference to its roots and its variations in modifications. The dictionary gives different meanings of the same word, but really speaking the same meanings of the different equivalents of the word about an object do not mean the same thing. They have different shades o meanings due to the contexts of the origin of the word. For example, the word cow (go) has eleven different meanings, but these different meanings are only expressions of different senses due to the different contexts of the origin. In this sense the word has the force of meaning with reference to the agent as well as the expression of the word by the agent. These differences in the meaning can be considered as potency of the word. In this way, samabhiruḍhanaya refers to the distinctions in the meaning of the word with reference to its varied modifications.
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In the Jaina literature we talk of the universal spheres which have their galaxies. But in the scientific langauge we say that the universe consists of numerous stellar systems. Samabhirūḍhanaya gives
1 Ślokavārtika
2 Pramāṇanayatattvaloka 7, 37
3 Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain-Jaina darśana, p. 463-64 (Hindi)

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definite meaning of the term with reference to its roots although the different words are applicable to the same object. It is necessary to have a scientific study of the etymological function of the word. So this naya is very much useful in the scientific analysis of any object. In a general sense the words like ghata, kuța or kumbha refer to the same object i. e. the pot. But each word has different meanings, with reference to its roots. Ghața refers to that which contains, kuța refers to that which has uneven form. Both the words are etymologically different.1 With a view to avoiding confusion in the words it would be necessary to study the etymological s«nse of the words and to emphasise upon the difiniteness and its truthfulness for fixing up the meaning. Otherwise, ambiguity in the meaning will create confusion. Avoiding the confusion and specifying accuracy is the speciality of this naya. Samabhirūdhanayābhāsa
Samabhirüdhanayābhāsa is a fallacy which arises in ignoring the distinctions arising due to functional sense and giving exclusive emphasis on the etymological distinction of the word.3
13 EVAMBHUTANAYA Evambhūtanaya is more specific and its meaning is narrowed down to the present context. The meaning of a word, in the case, is determined by its relevance to the present context. The functional meaning of the word based on its etymological content may be operative or may not be operative, but in the case of evambhūtanaya the emphasis is given on the present use and the content of the meaning operative at the time of expressing the word. The etymological sense is secondary although it may have remote relevance. Indicating the 1 (a) Avaśyakamalayagiri vrtti
(6) kuța kauțilye, kuțanat kauțilyayogāt kuțah. 2 Jaina darśana ke Maulika Tattva, Muni Nathamal ji, Part I, pp.
385-386. 3 Pramānanayatattvāloka 7, 38 4 (a) Sarvārthasiddhi 1, 33
(b) Akalankagranthatraya tippana p. 147 5 Pramānanayatattvāloka 7, 40

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present meaning of the word when the word is actually expressed is the significant factor in evambhūtanaya. We call Indra as Indra only when he is sitting on the throne. When he is not sitting on the throne he need not be called Indra. The name Purandara would be meaningful when Indra is in the act of destroying the town. We can call him sakra when he exhibits his powers. The meaning of the evambhutanaya has reference not so much to the individual as a name, but the name is applicable and is relevant in the present context of its function of meaning. A pujārī (priest) would be called a priest and the name of the priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity. This naya visualises the expression of powers and qualities at the present moment. Evambhūtanayābhāsa : (fallacy of evambhūtanaya)
Evambhūtanayābhāsa is a fallacy which consists in negating the relevance of the present function and its etymological meaning of a word. If a word were to be used in its etymological sense only sometimes the meaning may be relevant and sometimes the meaning may not be relevant, because its present function of the word may not connote the etymological sense. But to negate the present function only and trace it to the etymological sense and to apply to the individual is the fallacy called Evambhùtanayābhāsa.2 Evambhūtanaya has reference to the meaning traceable to the etymological sense, but applicable to the present function. In this sense, to connote the general meaning of the word without reference to the present function would lead to the fallacy of evambhūtana ya.3 To call a broken pot a pot, would lead to this fallacy, because the etymological sense of the pot (ghața) would be that which holds or which contains, but the broken pot, as it is broken, cannot contain or hold anything. Therefore, in the present context, it should not be called ghața. Otherwise, similar meaning will have to be applied to the objects which have ceased to function, as in the case of the cloth that is destroyed. If the word has its mean
1 Dravyānuyogatarkanā 2 Pramānanayatattvāloka 7, 42 3 Nayopadeša 39

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ing without reference to its function then any name would be appropriate to any object with any function. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict the meaning of the word to its function in the present context. Oherwise it loses its potency.
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THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF NAYAS
We have considered the n yas in their different aspects from the Naigamanaya to Evambhūtanaya. As we proceed from Naigamanaya to Evambhūtanaya the scope of the meaning becomes restricted and narrower at every stage.1 Naigamanaya is wider in its content because it embraces the generality and particularity, and unity and diversity. In this naya sometimes generality is given primary importance and particularity becomes secondary. Sometimes particularity is comprehended with greater emphasis and generality becomes less important. Sangrahanaya is less comprehensive than naigamanaya because it grasps only the general, the unity and not the diversity. The vyavahāranaya is less extensive and narrower than sangrahanaya, because it refers to the particularity and it is analytic only. Ṛjusūtranaya is restricted to a still narrower field, because it limits its understanding to the momentary present. It is more concerned with the modifications and not with the substance which has modifications. Śabdanaya is still narrower than ṛjusūtranaya in the sense that it is concerned with the understanding of the meaning of the word of the moment. Samabhirūḍhanaya narrows down its scope still further, because it refers to the root of the word and presents the etymological sense. Then we come to the limited field of application of the point of view in the evambhūtanaya. It refers to the meaning of the word in the present context and does not look before and after. There is a gradual narrowing down of the scope and the content of the naya from the naigama to the evambhuta. Because of this, the nayas in their various aspects have reference to each other and are related to each other in presenting the varied picture of the object in its content and meaning.
1 Tattvärtharājavārtika 1, 36.

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METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF NAYA
1
4.3 So far, we have studied the logical and epistemological interpretations or the concept of naya. Now, we may now try to understand the metaphysical implications and content of the concept or naya. From the metaphysical point of view, naya can be distinguished into two types: (1) Niścayanaya (the ultimate point of view) and (2) vyavahāranaya (the phenomenal point of view). Niścayanaya presents the picture of the object and its meaning from the ultimate point of view. We may call it the noumenal point of view, because reality can be looked at from the phenomenal and noumenal point of view. The noumenal point of view, goes to the source of the reality and finds out the ultimate meaning of reality. Vyavaharanaya is the phenomenal point of view, it is analytical in nature and it presents the picture of the object in its relation to other objects. It is relational in its aspect. Vyavahāranaya is sometimes considered to be secondary to the niscayanaya. It is called upa-naya also. Acārya Kundakunda says vyavahāra naya is "abhūtārtha" (the relational thought) and niscayanaya refers to the bhutartha in the sense it is ultimate and pure (suddha).1
Niscayanaya, being śuddhanaya, grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while vyavahāranaya is practical in its approach, and tries to understand the phenomenal nature of reality.
In the Jaina Agamic literature, there is distinction of the niscaya and vyavaharanaya whose functions are to look at reality from two points of view. i, e., from the ultimate and the practical points of view, just as in the advaita philosophy, we have the ultimate and the practical points of view which are referred to as "Paramarthika and vāyvahārika dṛṣṭi". The Buddhist mention the paramartha and sāṁvrtta points of view. The Upanisads mention the sthula and the sükşmadṛṣṭi. But there is difference between the Jaina approach to the problems and the approaches of the other absolutistic philosophies. Jainas look at reality from the niscayanaya in order to find out the real nature of the object, with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to the distinctions and paryāyas. But they do
1 Samayas āra gatha 11

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not deny reality of the distinctions and the paryāyas, as do the Vedāntins in considering the external world as an appearance.
In the Buddhistic literature, a distinction has been made between paramārtha satya (ultimate truth) and lokasaṁvrtti satya (the practical truth). What the Buddhist in the Vijñānavāda and the Śünyavāda call the paramārtha satya and the Vedāntins call the pāramārthika drsti, the Jainas call it the bhūtārthanaya or the niscayanaya.
Vyavahāranaya has been distinguished into two types : (1) sad. bhūta vyavahāranaya and (2) asadbhūtavyavahāranaya. Sadbhūtayyavaharanaya refers to the analysis of substance and its qualities while describing a thing. This naya has two forms: (a) upacariti sadbhūta and (b) anupacarita sadbhūta. That vyavahāra naya which grasps the nature of the objects with reference to its substance and its attributes in the relational and conditional form is called upacarita sadbhūtavy:avahāra naya. And the naya or a point of view which tries to understand the relation between substance and its attributes without their being essentially related, is called Anupcarita sadbhūta vyavahāranaya. Matijñāna and śrutajñāna are attributes of jīva from the practical point of view. In the case of matijñāna conditioned by empirical adjuncts due to the encrustations of karma is the jīva. It is considered to be a phenomenal approach to the understanding of the jñāna, because it is not pure and free jñāna. It is called upacarita. In the case of anupacarita sadbhūta vyavahāranaya there is the awareness of the distinction between the object and attributes. The soul and its attribute of jāna are considered to be distinct and without any conditioning due to freedom from karma. Kevalajñāna is the pure jñāna of the soul and it is unconditioned. Kevalajñāna is free from impurities and passions. In this, we are aware of the distinction between the substance and its attributes.
Asadbhūtayyayahāranaya can also be distinguished into two forms as (1) upacarita and(2) anupacarita. Anu pacurita asadhūta vyavahāranaya tries to understand the relation between the substance and its attributes as in the case of the body and the jīva. The relation is not inhe
1 Madhyamikakārikā, āryasatyaparikṣā, sl. 8.

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rent in the jiva, but it is accidental due to conjunction. But this conjunction is inseparable as long as the empirical'life lasts. Therefore it is anupacarita.
But upacarita asadbhūta vyayahāranaya understands the distinction between the substance and its attributes in the relation of accidents which are primarily separable as, in the case of Devadatta and his wealth. Relation between the Devadatta and his wealth is only acciden. tal and also separable. This type of comprehending the relation is upacarita asadbhūta vyavahāranaya.
Niscaya naya is the pure point of view. It is the ultimate point of view. It is the noumenal point of view. In this, there is the fuller understanding of the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The self is known in its pure form and its qualities are considered to be distinct, though accidentally related. They are not the essence of the soul. For example, the effective and connotive states are the modifications which arise out of knowledge, feeling and connotation. These are not inherently related to the soul, although consicousness is the essence of the soul. This type of an attitude gives a clear and a synoptic view of the relation of the soul and its attributes. And there is a clear awareness that the self is not these attributes. From the noumenal point of view, self is seen not bound and it is also apprehended that the bondage of the self is not eternal. The self is seen as pure and perfect without the impurities of the kārmic particles. The mind, body and the sense organs are considered as separate although they are related to the embodied soul. But this relation is not eternal.
From the practical point of view the self appears to be bound and as having a shape. But from the niscaya point of view the self is pure and perfect and is uncontaminated, with the kārmic matter. The yyavahāranaya is analytic and tries to find out the distinctions and differences, but suddhanaya or niscayanaya looks at the object in its pure nature and the fundamental aspect of the object. Niścayanaya comprehends the pure nature of the self as distinguished from its attributes and modifications, which are mainly looked at from the practical point of view. Vyavahāranaya is the point of distinction,

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while niscayanaya aims at getting the pure point of view of non-distinctions.
When we say that knowledge is the essence of the Atman, we are saying this from the noumenal point of view. But when we say that knowledge is the quality of the soul, we are using the practical point of view. In these expressions, the Ātman is considered to be the substance having attributes and knowledge is the attribute possessed by the Ātman. This relation of the Atman and knowledge as substance and attributes is to be considered not as a relation of dependence, but as of inherence. When we consider the relation of the ghee that is in the pot and the pot, the relation is of conjunction because the two objects are separable. But when we consider the relation of jñāna (knowledge) and the self there is the relation of inherence. According to Jainas, the relation between the substance and quality is neither that of exclusive difference nor of exclusive identity. It is the relation comprising of difference and identity. The attribute of knowledge cannot exist without the Atman. This understanding is due to sadbhūtavyavahāranaya.
In order to understand the distinction between niscaya and the vyavahāranaya, it is necessary to analyse the spatial concept of relation as in the case of jīva and the kārmic particles. The jiva and the kārmic particles are to be found in space. Both of them are to be found in the same space. This is the practical point of view. From the noumenal point of view each object lives in its spatial position and not in the spatial position of others. The Atman is in itself. Karma has its own spatial position. But from the practical point of view, we say that the bound soul is to be found in conjunction with the kārmic particles in the same spatial position, just as from the practical point of view we say, when we mix water and milk, that it is milk. We do not make a distinction between water and milk from the point of view of spatial position. But from the real point of view, water is water and milk is milk. They are distinct. Similarly, the Atman and the kärmic particles are considered to be together from the practical point of view. But in reality, they are distinct, as also their nature is distinct.

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It should be noted that the distinction made between the naigama and the other nayas and vyavahāra and niscayanaya has been made with the purpose of emphasising the practical and the spiritual point of view. Naigama and other nayas are meant to analyse the nature of the object and to understand their implications in the empirical world. But the purpose of distinction between vyavahāra and niscaya is to lead one to the spiritual world in understanding the real nature of the self. It aims at leading us from the facts to reality, from the world to the realisation of mokşa.
PRAMĀŅA AND NAYA !!.? It was considered in the previous stages that naya is the point of view that a person takes in knowing the objects.1 It apprehends one specific feature of the object, but pramāna has no such distinction of partial understanding of the objects in relation to its other aspects. It comprehends the object in its fullness. Pramāņa comprehends the nature of the pot (ghața) in all its aspects. But naya grasps its nature in one of its aspects. In this sense, it is partial comprehension. Pramāna does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in its entirety. But Naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and gives emphasis on a particular aspect of the object. But both naya and pramāņa are forms of knowledge. We can say that pramāna is sakalādeśa (comprehensive and full), but naya is vikalādesa (partial). The comprehensive understanding of the object gives a synthetic picture of the object in all its asjects of substance in relation of its attributes. It is a comprehensive knowledge. Naya being vikaladeśa need not however be considered as purely pratical and incomplete knowledge, because it looks at the object from a particular point of view and presents the picture of the object in some aspects, although the awareness of other aspects is in the background and is not ignored. Both the sakalādeśa and the vikalādeśa approaches to the understanding of nature of the object are equally important and complementary to each other. Both of
1 (a) Laghiyastraya, sl. 53, Akalanka
(b) Siddhiviniscaya, țīkā p. 517, Akalanka (c) Nyāyāvatāra tikā 29, Siddhassigaņi.

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them are concerned with grasping the nature of the object in relation to its attributes. Sakalādesa grasps the objects with all its attributes while in vikalādesa it is restricted to the apprehension of one parti. cular quality. Sakalādesa may be considered to be the expression of
the Syādvāda, while vikalādesu expresses naya.? 2.3 DRAVYARTHIKA AND PARYAYARTHIKA POINTS OF VIEW
Dravyārthika and paryāyārthika drsti refers to the point of view of substance and that of modes. Dravyārthika drsti is a comprehensive point of view. It grasps the generality without ignoring the particularity of the modes. Paryāyārthika drsti is analytic and is mainly concerned with the distinctions of the modes of an object. Ācārya Siddhasena says that in the teachings of Mahālira we find a synthesis of dravyārthika and paryāyārthika points of view. All other points of view are forms of these two points of view.2 When Mahāvīra was asked whether jīva residing in hell is eternal or noneternal, he said from the dravyārıhika point of view jiva is eternal, but from the point of view of its modes existing in this world (paryāyārthika or vyucchitti naya) the jīva is non-eternal.3 Dravyarthikad rşti is also called avyucchitti naya. From the point of view of substance (dravyārthika) every substance is permanent with its modes. From 'the point of view of the modes the object is impermanent, because here we look at the object from the points of view of changing modes. The dravyārthikanaya presents an outlook of comprehension and non-difference, while paryāyārthika naya emphasises distinction and difference. In the Bhagawati sūtra the word bhāvārthika has been used in place of paryāyārthika.
DRAVYĀRTHIKA AND PRADEŚĀRTHIKA DRȘTI
Drayyārthika drşti refers to the point of view of substance, while pradeśārthika drsti looks at the objects in its different modes and its analysis in its spatial distinctions. The distinction between paryāya and pradeśa can be considered in respect the modes and the i Laghīyastraya 3, 6, 62. 2 Sanmati prakarana 1, 3. 3 Bhagavati 7, 2, 279. 4 Bhagavatī 18, 10/25, 3/25, 4.

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spatial points. Paryāya refers to the different modes of an object, while pradega refers to the different parts of an object occupying the different spatial positions. A pradeśa is the point of space occupied by the smallest point of pudgala (matter). According to Jainas, matter occupies different points of space and there is no definiteness about this. But the other substance like, dharma, adharma, lokākāśa
d jīva occupy determined space points. But in the case of matter there are variations according t) the nature of the aggregates of the atoms coming together. Mahāvīra gave the analysis of substance from the point of view of spatial positions also. He said from the point of view of substance, modes, pradeśa and from the points of view of qualities, and bringing all these points of view in a synthetic sense “I am one”. But from the point of view of paryāya, I am jñāna and darśana as two modes. From the point of view of pradeśa, I am permanent and is indestructible. From the point of upayoga I am changing (asthira) because I express myself into different mental states. Similarly, I express modes in the past and the present. In this he has used the pradeśa drşți for expressing the permanence and indestructibility of the Atman. From the point of view of pudgalapradeśa the self is not changeable and is eternal. These in no variation in the Ātma pradeśa (the spatial point of Atman).
Pradeśārthika drști is useful in another way. From the point of view of substance, the object is one, but from the point of view of prideśārıhika the object may be looked as many, because it occupies many space points. In the Prajñāpanā, dharmāstikāya is considered to be understood from the drayyad rşți as one, while from the pradesārthika drșți it is many because of its numberless space points. The object which is comparable to other objects from the point of view of substance is not comparable from the point of pradeśārthikadrsti, just as the dharma, adharama, and äkāśa astikāyas are considered to be comparable (tulya) from the point of view of pradeśārthika as they occupy numberless pradeśas. But ākāśa being anantapradesi, it is incomparable. In this way, the objects may be considered from the
i
Bhagavatī 18, 10.

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points of view of dravya and pradeśa. They may also be considered as comparable and incomparable with reference to the points of space occupied by the objects. This gives a comprehensive picture of the objects.1
VYAVAHARIKA AND NAIŚCAYIKA DRSTI Philosophers have discussed about the problem of the reality of the objects. They have faced the question regarding the reality and have asked whether the sense-object is real or that which is beyond the sense experience and which can be gasped only by the intuition (Prajña) is real. The Cchāndogya Upanişad presents the view that knowledge which is through intuition is real and that which we get through sense experience is only an appearance. The ultimate reality is one and non-dual. The diversity that we find in the phenomenal world which is known through sense experience is an appearance. But many philosophers held different views.
The Carvāka holds that whatever is known to the sense experience is real and all the rest is unreal. The materialists maintain that matter alone is real. Different philosphers have emphasised the effusive reality of either things known to sense experience or reality apprehended through reason or intuition. But the Jaina does not find any contradiction in the assertions made by these philosophers. The Jainas take the stand on the basis of the nayas and on the methodology of syādvāda. Reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The noumenal point of view gives us the ultimate thing of the world. The real is known through intuition and reason. But from the practical point of view of the phenomenal point of view, the things of the world are as much real as the ultimate things known through intuition. There is no contradiction in maintaining realities of both spheres from the different points of view. The practical point of view gives us the picture of reality which is sensible, and could be grasped. The ulimate point of view
1
(a) Prajñāpanā, pada 3, stra 54-56 (b) Bhagavatī 25, 4. Cchandog yopanişad 6, 1, 4,
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(niscaya naya) leads us to the comprehension of reality which is the subtle essence of the phenomenal world. Both of them are equally real.
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In the Bhagavati there is a dialogue between Bhagavāna Mahāvira and Gautama Ganadhara regarding the different aspects of reality. Gautama asked Mahavira, there are how may colours, smell, taste and touch in treacle. Mahāvīra said, from the practical point of view it is sweet. But from the real or ultimate point of view it has five colours, two types of small, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. Similarly, Gautama asked the question regarding the qualities of a black-bee. Mahavira said that from the practical point of view the bee is black. But from the real point of view (niscayanaya), it has five colours, two types of smell, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. In this way, Mahavira gave answers to many questions from the practical and the real points of view. It is clear from this, that Mahāvīra understood that both the practical and the real points of view present the picture of reality which are equally real and valid. They do not contradict each other nor is one less real than the other.
ARTHANAYA AND SABDANAYA
seven
Anuyogadvāra, Sthānanga3 and Prajñāpanā1 mention nayas. Among these seven nayas, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhūtanayas belong to the category of sabdanayas.5 Naigama, sangraha, vyavahāra and ṛjusūtra nayas have reference to the objects. Therefore, they are called dravyarthikanaya.
TYPES OF NAYAS I
Acarya Siddhasena maintains that there are as many nayas as there are statements. And there are as many views and theories as there are statements.1 In this sense there are numerous nayas and
1 Bhagavati 18, 9. 2 Anuyogadvāra 156. 3 Sthānanga 7, 552.
4 Prajñāpanā 16.
5 Anuyogadvāra 148, 6 Sanmati prakarana 3, 47.

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they have been variously described. However, the Jainas have attempted the primary ways of the describing a thing and main points of view which are the basis of their description. The dravyanaya and paryāyanaya include numerous forms of expressing the nature of a thing and the numerous points of view, although in theory there would be infinite ways of expression. In the agama literature, as well as according to the Digambara tradition,1 seven prominent nayas have been mentioned. Naigama, sangraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhiruḍha and evambhūta are the seven primary nayas. Acārya Siddhasena Divakara does not consider naigamanaya as an independent naya and he mentioned six nayas. Umäsvāti has in the earlier part mentioned five nayas: naigama, sangraha, vyavahāra ṛjustūtra has been and sabda are the five primary nayas.2 Naigama naya distinguished into two forms: despariksepi and sarvapariksepī. Sabdanaya has three forms: samprata, samabhirūḍha and evaṁbhūta.3
NAYA AS PRAMAŅA OR APRĀMAŅA
Nayavada is a comprehensive and a special from of thought in the Jaina logic. Every object is looked from the points of view which are nayas. Jinabhadra kṣa māśramaņa says that the naya theory pervades the entire Jaina philosophy and thought."
Jaina logicians were faced with a question regarding the validity of the nayavāda. Is the naya a pramāṇa or not was the primary question. If it were a pramāņa why are they differently mentioned ? And if it were not a pramāņa then it would be false knowledge and there is no scope of false knowledge in the philosophical world.
The Jaina logicians say that naya is neither pramāņa nor apramāņa (not pramāņa). It is part of the pramāṇa. A drop of water of the ocean can not be considered to be the ocean and also not the non-ocean, but a part of the ocean.5 Similarly, a soldier is neither
1 Tattvārtha rājavārtika 1, 33.
2 Tattvärthasūtra 1, 34.
3 Tattvārthabhāṣya 1, 34-35, p. 314-315.
4 Viseṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya
5 Tattvārthaślokavārttika 1, 6 Naya Vivarana, sl. 6.

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?
an army, nor a non-army; but the part of army. The same argument is true in the case of describing the nayas.
Pramāna comprehends the nature of the objects in the different aspects, while naya looks at it from a particular point of view. It grasps one aspect of the object. In this sense, naya is the partial presentation of the nature of the object, while pramāna is comprehensive in its presentation. But naya does not give false knowledge nor does it deny that the other aspects of knowledge of the nature of the object are true. In this sense it is synoptic in outlook and it is not invaid. SUNAYA AND DURNAYA: RIGHT NAYA AND WRONG NAYA
We have seen that pramāņa comprehends objects in its various aspects and it is exhaustive in its presentation. But naya looks at the object from a particular point of view. However naya does not deny the possibility of looking at the object from other points of view and it accepts that the nature of the object is complex and the presentation from other points of view may also be valid. This is Sunaya, but if the naya for a point of view were to insist that its presentation is only valid and all other presentations from different nayas, are invalid, this is durnaya. We may also say that pramāna comprehends the tat, (that) and the atat, while naya grasps only the tat. Naya is concerned with the presentation of 'tat' only. Durnaya has a negative function also. It aims at negating and denying the other aspects of presentation.
Umāsvāti says that Durnaya is one-sided in its approach because it emphasises that the point of view taken by the naya is the only correct point of view and the other points of view are wrong. Ācārya Siddhasena Divākara has also stated that Durnaya is a mithyā drsti (perversity of attitude) because it is dogmatic in outlook. It asserts the truth of its point of view and rejects the other points of view.2
1
(a) Aştasahasri. (b) Umāsvātik sta Pañcāšaka. Sanmati prakarana 1, 21.
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But in order to understand the nature of the object in all its aspects, it is necessary to accept the presentation of the object in different points of view also. Otherwise, the picture would be one-sided, just as a garland of diamond can be called a garland only when the different individual diamonds are arranged and attached in a systematic way.1 Just as the garland of diamonds depends on its cohesion on the thread that weaves out the diamonds, so also nnyavāda weaves out the right attitude and right knowledge (sa'nyagd rşti) and samyagjñāna.
Acārya Kundakunda says that the one who takes the stand of looking at the things from two different nayas understand the truth of the presentation of the two nayas. He does not reject the other point of view, because he knows that the other point of view has also its value.
Everything is complex in its nature, presenting the many facets of its qualities. We cannot describe the entire nature of the objects from one point of view; that would give a partial and inadequate picture of the object. To understand the object in its various facets from different points of view, does not mean that we are presenting different views about the reality. There is no difference of opinion in presenting the different aspects of the objects from different points of view. Such a presentation would give a comprehensive picture of reality and not one-sided picture of reality.3
Everything can be looked at from the point of view of the knowledge about it, expression in words and the nature of the object itself. From the point of view of knowledge, we get different facets of understanding. From the point of view of the objects of knowledge, we can present different variations of the view. For instance, as the universe it is one. On the basis of the distinction between jiva and another jiva it is two. On the distinction of substances, there are six substances. Looked at from the point of view of astikāya,
1 2 3
Sanmati prakarana 1, 22-25. Samayasāra 143. Tattvārthabhāşya 1, 35.

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there are five astikāyas. But these distinctions do not present different views, they only present different facets and variations of looking at the reality." UNIFORMITY AND CONTINUITY IN THE JAINA DARŠANA'-.
The study of different systems of Indian philosophy makes it clear that the Vedic tradition and the Buddhist philosophy present varied, and sometimes conflicting metaphysical theories among themselves. The vedic tradition gives the monistic, the dualistic and also the pluralistic theries of reality. Similarly, the Buddhist philosophy has been presented in various theories often conflicting with each other in their ultimate metaphysical stand-points. For instance, in the Buddhist philosophical systems there are divergent theories of realities like realism, subjective idealism, idealism and even nihilism. The Hsnayāna schools of thought like Vaibhāșika and Sautāntrika presents the realistic approach to the understanding of the universe by positing the dharmas (elements). Mahāyāna schools of philosophy like vijñāna. vāda (Yogācāra) and Mādhyamika present the idealistic stand. The Mādhyamika school is said to be nihilistic because according to this school everything is unreal, there is nothing real. The real is the śünya (void), although śünya has been interpreted by some as the absolute which is inexpressible. However, the Buddhist philosophy have a common current of thought expressed in the prthakāda (doctrine of momentariness) and madhyamavāda (the doctrine of middle path). Thus we find that the Vedic tradition and the Buddbist thought present a variety of philosophical school, very often diverting from each other, even to the point of being conflicting in the case of the realist and idealist schools of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna sects. Similarly the vedic tradition also presents the realistic thought in the NyāyaVaiseșika and the idealistic stream in the vedānta.
Seeing the vast differences in the various sects of vedic and Buddhistic traditions, it is hard to believe that these are the off-shoots of one current.
But if we survey the development of the Jaina thought, we find there is uniformity and continuity in the Jaina tradition. There is 1 Jaina Darsana – Dr. Mahendra Kumār Jain, p. 446.

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consistency in their approach to philosophical problems. Jainism, realistic in its approach and empiricist in its methodology. The distinction between the syetāmbara and digambara tradition have shown certain differences which are only superficial pertaining primarily to religious practices. The fundamentals of Jaina philosophy have been accepted by both traditions. For instance, there is unanimity of thought in their acceptance of the doctrines like six substances (saddravya), nine categories (nava padārtha) and seven tattvas (principles) and pañcāstikāya (five dimentional substances).
This unanimity and consistency in the Jaina tradition has been possible due to the fundamental outlook of the Jainas expressed in the nayavāda and syādvāda. The nayavāda gives scope for catholicity of outlook. It asserts that others may also be right and the rightness of each point of view is partial and it adds to the comprehensive picture of reality. In this sense, the Jainas have been tolerant in accepting the various points of view in order to present a coherent picture of reality. The nayavāda and syādvāda express the spi it of tolerance. They symboli e intellectual non-violence.

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JNANAVĀDA:
A Study
(THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE) THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SELF AND THE KNOWLEDGE
The self and the knowledge are related to each other, not in any external way, but the relation is inherent. It is samavāyi (inherent relation) and not conjunction, (samyoga) as external elements. Jñāna is not external to self, it is the essential characteristic of the self. Self has Jñāna and self cannot exist without Jñāna, but this relation need not be construed as a relation of a thing and its quality in the sense that the Nyāya-Vaiseșika maintain. Therefore, knowledge is inherently related to the self. From the practical point of view we may distinguish knowledge and self. But from the pure and noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between knowledge and self. Although jñāna is the essential characteristic of the self, it cannot be considered to be externally related. Knowledge and self are very intimately connected as even to say that they are identical.
Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (sva-para-prakāśaka). Cognition illumines the object it cognises and also it illumines itself, cognises itself and this fact of self-cognition can be understood by an analogy. Just as the lamp illumines the object around it and it illumines itself, similarly the self has cognition as its essential quality and cognition cognises itself and cognises the object of cognition. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the nature of knowledge.
1 (a) Acārānga 5, 5 166–je āyā se viņņāyā, je viņņāyā se āyā
(b) Samayasāra gāthā 7 (c) Bhagavati 12, 10 ņāņa puna niyamam āyā.

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In the Agama literature, the charaeteristics of knowledge have been presented from the points of view of identity and of difference. From the point of view of identity (abhe a), it has been said that self and knowledge are one and there are no differences. From the point of view of difference, knowledge is the quality of the soul. From the point of view of identity and difference (bhedabheda), self can be said to be neither completely different from knowledge, nor completely identical with knowledge.1 Knowledge is identical with the self. Therefere, it is not different. Knowledge is the quality of the atman. Therefore, it is different also.
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge and the object of knowledge are independent of each other. Knowledge is the quality of the self. Substance, quality and the modes are the objects of knowledge. Knowledge and its object do not produce each other. The object of knowledge may give us knowledge but it is not inherent with the act of cognition. It is related to the object when it is produced from the object, then it has the characteristics of the object. In that case, the identity of knowledge with the self would be remote. When we cognise an object the process of cognition involves the activity of the self. However, cognition depends on the object of cognition. The media through which we have to cognise an object are the body, sense-organs aud the mind. But they are not conscious. When the senses come in contact with the object through the stimulations, then the process of knowledge starts. The act of cognition is not some new creation. It is the process of the activity of the self to the media of the sense-organs and the mind in contact with the object. The process of cognition and the extent of knowledge depends upon the capacity of the knower.
We have seen that knowledge is possible by the self through the sense-organs and the mind, but the function is limited. The mind also has a limited capacity. The mind comes in contact with a particular sense organ at a time. Therefore, we can cognise an object
1 Svarupa sambodhana, 4.

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through the operation of the sense-organs and through their limitation. But we also get knowledge without the media of the senseorgans. This knowledge need not be limited. Because the limitations of the sense-organs are not operative in the complete or uneneveloped knowledge. Through the complete knowledge all the objects can be cognised at a time moment.
1294
KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE
The relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge is like the object and its quality. The subject of knowledge is characterised by the possession of cognition. The object has a characteristic as the object of knowledge. Both these are independent. But both are intimately related in the sense that the object enters into relation with the cognition as the object of cognition and cognition has the relation of knowing the object. In this sense, we may say that there is no difference between the object and cognition.
KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION
The psychic energy that the soul possesses is expressed in cognition, perception, and experience. The eyes perceive. The other experiences are possible through the other sense-organs including the manas. According to the agamas the experience through the eyes as well the experience through the other organs may be considered as darsana. Avadhi (clairvoyance) and kevala (omniscience) may also be considered as darśana. In this analysis darsana does not mean only perception. But it means the experience of the universe and the nondifference. Knowledge (jñäna) is analytic and it presents the varied characteristics of the object. Jñana is of five types, while darśana is of four types. Manaḥparyaya jñāna (telepathy) is not considered as drasana, because it cognises difference only.
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1
The universe has diversity when considered with reference to attributes, modes, but considered from the point of substance, it is one and undifferentiated. Therefore, we cannot say that the universe is one only or diverse only. The capacity of empirical knowledge is limited. Therefore, we first know the generality of the substance and then we cognise the diversity to be founded in the attributes and modes,

ܕܪ

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The kevalajñāna (omniscience) is not limited. Its capacity is infinite. It cognises everything including the substance and its modes. The omniscient knows everything in the moment of its experience, in the aspect of its universality. Then he cognises the diversity. This is the procedure of kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana.
The chadmastha who has reached the tenth guṇasthāna does not grasp everything in one moment of experience. He cognises the subtle nature of the cognition and after numerous moments he grasps the universality that is in the substance. The universality and the diversity of the object are progressively experienced. Jñana cognises particularities and is analytic, while darśana experiences the universality and is synthetic. Knowing the generality first and then cognising the diversity would involve the process of darsana and jñāna.
KNOWLEDGE AND THE AFFECTIVE STATES (VEDANA)
Of the five sense-organs, the sense organs of touch, taste and smell are sensory. They cognise the objects and experience the senses of touch, taste and smell, but the sense-organs of sight and hearing are instruments of cognition only, because they cognise the objects, but do not experience the objects as there is no direct contact with them.
We experience the external objects through the sense-organs, but the process of experience is not the same in all the sense-organs. The sense-organ of sight has a greater capacity of cognity of cognition. But it cognises the object without touching it. The sense-organ of hearing is less in its capacity to experience, because it can cognise the sounds which touch it, or come in contact. The senses-organs of touch, taste and sound are less in their capacity of experience as compared with the other two. Because they can experience the object when they come in direct contact with the objects and therefore they can cognise the objects and experience the experiences. But in the case of the eyes and the ears there is no direct contact with the objects of experience. Therefore, they can only get knowledge, but they do not directly get the experience. In the case of the mind it can have both knowledge and experience, although it does not come in direct contact with the object. This is because the mind transforms itself

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into the form of the object to be cognised. The mind can also have the higher type of experiences in the manaḥparyayajñāna (telepathic knowledge). The cognition that we get without the contact with the object through the sense-organs is not sense-cognition, but it is extrasensory experience. It is neither completely free from the sense-organs and the mind nor is dependent on them. It is the state which happens between these two.1
AFFECTIVE STATES -- PLEASURE AND PAIN!. We exp:rience the external world through the sense-organs and mind exaggerates it. The qualites of touch, taste, smell and form are original characterstics of an object and the sound is the modification of the object. The sense-organs receive the stimulations and the mind organises and interprets the sense stimulation. The feelings of pleasure and pain are due to the conjunction and separation of the external objects in relation to the sense-organs. These affective states are not pure cognition. Its experiences cannot be had through the unconscious sense-organs. Nor can these feelings be considered to be ignorance or ajñāna. The feelings of pleasure and pain are created due to the conjunction of cognition and the external objects.
The pleasure and pain are experienced through the sense-organs and mind. The animals without the possession of mind experience organic sensation and not feelings, while animals who have minds experience sensations as well as feelings. Pleasure and pain cannot be experienced simultaneously. The self experiencing these feelings is not in its pure state and the experience of pure bliss is not to be considered as the experience of feeling. Bliss is the pure state of experience, the soul gets in its pure form. The self-experience cannot be named as self-feeling, it is called as self-realisation.
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGAMAS!)
The theory of knowledge in the āgamas is very ancient. In the Rājapraśniyasūtra, Keśikumāra śramaņa explains to Raja Pradesi the theory of knowledge as presented in the āgamas. The āgama classify knowledge into five types :
1
Jñānasāra așțaka 2, sl. 15.

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1. Abhinibodhika jñāna (sense experience) 2. Śrutajñāna (indirect knowledge) 3. Avadhijñāna (clairvoyance)
4. Manaḥparyayajñāna (telepathy) 5. Kevalajñāna (omniscience)1
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Keśikumāra Śramana belonged to the Parsvanatha tradition. The five types of knowledge mentioned in the Parsvanatha tradition have also been presented by Mahavira.2
In the Uttaradhyayana sūtra there is a dialogue between Keśi and Gautama. From this, it is clear that there was no difference of opinion between them regarding the theory of knowledge and metaphysics although there were slight differences regarding the practice. If there were difference regarding metaphyics these would have been mentioned in this discourse. The Digambara and Svetämbra traditions have the same theory of 5 types of knowledge, although there is some differences regarding the nature of kevalajñāna and kevaldarśana.
From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on the basis of the agamic theory of knowledge we get three stages.4 The first stage describes the 5 types of knowledge. It also mentions the distinctions in the abhinibodhika jñāna (senseexperience) into 4 stages like avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā The first stage gives the following classification of knowledge.
JÑANA5
abhinibodhika
Т
avagraha
1
śruta
ihā
avāya
The second stage makes a distinction in the knowledge as pratyakşa (direct) and parokşa (indirect) with its sub-divisions. There is
1 Rājapraśniya sūtra 165.
2 Bhagavati 88, 2, 317.

avadhi manaḥparyaya kevala
I
dhāraṇā
3 Uttaradhyayana sutra, adhayayana, 23.
4 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaṇiā, Agama yuga kā Jaina Darśana, p. 129.
5 Bhagavati 88, 2, 317.

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no place in this for sense-experience as direct knowledge because according to this view direct knowledge is that which is obtained by the soul without the help of sense-organs. The sense-organs are obstructive to the acquisition of knowledge by the soul directly. The knowledge obtained through sense-organs and by other means like reason are considered to be indirect knowledge. The other systems of philosophy considered sense-experience as direct knowledge, but Sthānanga has made a clear distinction between the direct knowledge obtained by the soul without the medium of the sense organs and indirect knowledge which is through the sense-organs and other means, Bhagavatī sūtra presents the classification of knowledge which is slightly different from the two traditions that we discussed. In this jñāna has been distinguished into two types and not the 5 types. And these 2 types are pratyakşa and parokşa. It evidently shows that it is the first stage of the theory of knowledge. Bhagavati sūtra gives the classification of knowledge as shown in the table--
JÑANA
Pratyakşa
Paroksa
Kevala
No-Kevala
Abhinibodhika
śrujtána
Avadhi
Avadhi
Manahparyaya
Mar
Angapravişta
Angabābya
Bhavapra- Kşayopa- Rjumati iyayika samika
Vipul- | Avaśyaka mati
Āvašyakavya
tirikta
Kālika
utkalika
Śrutaniḥśrta
Aşrutanishsta
Arthāvagraha
Vyañjanāvagraha Arthāvagraha Vyañjanāvagraha
1
Sthānānga 71.

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In the third stage there is a slight modifications in the classification of the types of knowledge. This classification distinguishes the matijñāna (sense-experience) into two types as pratyakşa and paroksa. This is considered to be (a) due to sense-organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs (no-indriya). We give below the classifications of (a) the sense organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs as discussed. According to Nandi sutra,1 the gist of third stage of knowledge is as following:
JÑANA
Abinibodh ka Śruta
Pratyaksa
Indriya Pratyakṣa 1 1. Śrotrendriya pratyakṣa 2. Cakṣurindriya pratyakṣa 3. Ghranendriya pratyaksa 4. Rasanendriya pratyaksa 5. Spargendriya pratyakṣa
Abhinibodhika
Avadhi Manaḥparyaya Kevala
No-indriya pratyakşa
1. Avadhi
2. Manaḥparyaya 3. Kevala

Parokşa
Śrutniḥśṛta
Aśrutaniḥśṛta
1
I
Avagraha Tha Avaya Dharaṇā Autpā- Vaina- Kar- Pāriņamiki tiki yiki maja Buddhi
Śruta
Arthāva graha
Vyañjanavagraha
The analysis of the theory of knowledge as presented in the three stages gives a picture of knowledge as developed from first to the third stage and graduality imply metaphysical consideration. The
1
Dr. Mohanlal Metha Jaina Darśana, p. 209.

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first stage has no metaphysical basis. This is the earliest presentation of the theory of knowledge. It has five divisions of knowledge and matijñāna has been distinguished into 4 different stages as avagraha, ihā, avaya and dharaṇā. The Bhagavati sutra carries the tradition of this stage. The second stage introduced metaphysical considerations with reference to the nature of the self. It distinguishes the knowledge into 2 types as pratyakṣa (direct) and paroksa (indirect). The later philosophers have followed this distinction. The basis for the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge is to be found in the clarity and certainty on one side and indefiniteness and relative knowledge on the other side. Pratyakşa is the knowledge that the soul gets directly. Parokşa is the knowledge which is acquired through the sense-organs and other indirect media. Pratyakṣa jñāna has been distinguished into three types as 1. avadhi (clairvoyance) 2. Manaḥparyaya (telepathic cognition) and 3. kevalajñāna (omniscence). From the point of view of the certainty and purity of knowledge there is the graduated excellence in the three types of knowledge. Kevalajñana is a pure and project knowledge par excellence. Abhinibodhika jñāna and Śruta jñāna are parokşa (indirect) knowledge. Abhinibodhika is also called mutijñāna. Matijñāna is knowledge acquired through the contact of the sense-organs and the mind by the soul. Śrutajñāna is arrived at through the functions of the mind. Mati, śruta, avadhi and manaḥparyaya have distinctions regarding the nature and the degree of certainty.

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The third stage takes into consideration the viewpoints of other systems of Indian philosophy and attempts to correlate the Jaina standpoint with that of the other The other systems of Indian philosophy consider sense experience as pratyakşa but the Jainas considered it as parokşa. With a view to avoiding ambiguity in the use of the terms the Jainas also adopted the term pratyakṣa for sense-experience. But they called it saṁvyāvahārika pratyakṣa (direct knowledge from the practical point of view). Nija-pratyakṣa or pāramārthika pratyakşa is the knowledge which is arrived at not through the sense-organs, but which the self gets directly. Avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala would be nijapratyakṣa according to the Jainas. Jinabhadragaṇī Kṣamāśramaņa has elaborated this point in the Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya. From

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this stand-point the schematisism of the classification of the knowledge would be as follows:
(1) Avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala is pāramārthika pratya.
kşa.
(2) Śrutajñāna is parokşa.
(3) Indriya-pratyakşa (sense-experience) is paroksa from the pāramārthika point of view and pratyakşa from the practical point of view.
(4) Knowledge arrived at by the mind only is parokşa.
Ācārya Akalanka and some other ācāryas have distinguished pratyakşa into pāramārthika and sāṁvyāvahārika. The distinction has its basis in the Nandisutra and Viseşāvaśyakabhāşya.
The Abhinibodhika, jñana has been distinguished into the four different stages like avagraha, īhā, avāya and dhāraņā.
These stages have been scientifically analysed and discussed by the Jaina ācāryas. The mental states like memory (smarana) and recognition (pratyabhijñā) have been defined with reference to their metaphysical implication by the later ācāryas. But there is not much basis for definition of the concepts like smarana and pratyabhijñā in the āgamic literature. The main cause of this is, that there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation at the time of āgamic literature. But later logicians has to compete with the scholars of other darśanas in interpreting their logical and psychological concepts. We may now consider the nature of five types of knowledge and also of memory (smarana), pratyabhijñā (recognition) and anumāna (inference) etc., from the point of view of pramāṇa and also from the metaphysical implication.
MATIJÑANA Matijñāna is sense experience. It is arrived at with the help of the sense-organs and the manas (mind).2 In the āgamic literature
1 Viseşayaśyaka bhāşya 95 and its svopajña vrtti. 2 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 1".

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matijñāna has also been called ābhinibodhika jñāna.1 Tattvärtha sūtra mentioned equivalent names like mati, smrti, saṁjñā, cintā and abhinibhodha. These words are used synonymously. In the āvasyakabhāsya the following terms are mentioned as equivalents-ihā, apoha, vimarsa, mārgaņā, gaveşaņā, smrti, mati, prajñā etc.8
Nandisutra also uses the same words. In the Tattavārtha Sūtra svopajñabhāşya, a distinction has been made in the sārvyāvahārikamatijñāna, into two types, as (1) indriyajanya (sense contact experience) and anindriyajanya or manojanya (i, e. knowledge born of the contact with the mind alone).5 Siddhasenagaņi mentions three forms of sāṁe vyāvahārika pratyaksa as indriyajanya, anindriyajanya (manojanya) and indriyānindriyajanya (born of the contact of the sense-organs and the manas both). That knowledge which is born of the sense-organs is indriyajanya and the knowledge which arises out of the contact with the mind alone is anindriyanjanya, while in the case of indriyānindriya - janya the mind and the sense-organs function jointly.
INDRIYA (SENSE-ORGANS) ''
The sense-organs is the distinguishing mark between the living organism and the non-living objects. Some ācāryas like Pūjyapāda has used the terminology and alayses the meaning of the word indriya. The etymological meaning of the word would be one who has power and wealth-indratīti indraḥ. But here the word indra refers to the ātman. Knowledge is possible through the means of indriya. According to this the meaning would be knowledge of the essence of the ātman through the medium of the Indriya. Similarly, the word
1 (a) Uttarādhyayana 28, 4
(b) Nandīsūtra, sūtra 59, Punyavijayaji-ed, p. 25. 2 Tativārtha sūtra 1, 13. 3 Višeşāvašyakabhāşya 396. 4 Nandīsūtra sâtra 77, Ed. Puņyavijayji, p. 27 5 Tattvārthabhāşya 1, 14 6 Tattvārthasūtra ţikā 1, 14.

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Indra has a reference to activity. It means that the ātman has the natural characteristic of activity, but due to the accretion of karma the self cannot get direct knowledge. Therefore, it requires a medium and that medium is the sepse-organ. Therefore, that through the medium or which the self gets the knowledge is called indriya. There are five sense-organs, the sense organ of touch (sparsa), the sense-organ of taste, the sense-organ of smell, the sense-organ of sight, the senseorgan of hearing. The five sense-organs have the five senses : Senses of touch, taste, smell, form and hearing. Therefore, these senseorgans have been considered as receptive of the stimulation. They are the means through which experiences are the possible.
1. The sense-organ receiving the stimulation of touch-the sense of touch.
2. The sense-organ of taste has sense of taste. 3. The sense-organ of smell has the sense of smell. 4. The sense-organ of form has (rupa) the sense of sight (eyes). 5. The sense organ of receiving sound has the sense of hearing.
Every sense-organ has two forms (1) physical sense-organ (dravendriya) and (2) psychic sense-organs (bhāvendriya).3 The dravyendriya is expressed in the form of a sense-organ with its basic meterial form like the retina in the eyes or the ear for hearing.
The physical part of the sense-organs, therefore, is called Dravyendriya and the psychic part of the sense is bhāvyedriya. The physical part of the sense-orgnas is created by the rise of the corresponding nāmakarına, the psychical part of the sense-organ is caused by the destruction and subsidence of knowledge obscuring karma (jñānāvarniya karma) Dravyendriya is again sub-divided into (1) nirvștti and
1 (a) Sarvärthasiddhi 1, 14, 102, 3 Bhāratiya Jñänapitha.
(b) Rajavārtika 1, 14, 1, 59 Bhāratiya Jñānapitha. (c) Dhavalā 1, 1, 1, 33; 7, 2, 6, 7.
(d) Jainendra Siddhāntakoşa Part I, p. 316. 2 Pramāņamīmāṁsā 1, 2, 21-23. 3 Sarvārthasiddhi 2, 16, 179.

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(2) upakarana." Nirvriti is the organ itself and upakarana is the protective physical cover like the eyelid in the case of the eye. Each of these two is again sub-divided into antaranga and bahiranga. Bhāvendriya has its distinction from the point of view of its upayoga. Bhāvendriya is a psychic part of the organ, it is also divided into two parts labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi is the manifestation of the specific sense-experience due to the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge obscuring karma. It may be referred to as the removal of psychic impediment which have to be eliminated if sense-experience is to be made possible. Upayoga is the psychic force determining the specific sense-experience coming out of the contact of the specific sense organs with the object of stimulation. Thus the Jainas make a distinction between the physical structure and the psychical element involved in the sense-organs. Jainas have given a detailed analysis of the structure of the sense-organ.
PROCESS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE
The development of the sense-organs is not uniform in all the animals. There are gradations in the animals according to the number of sense-organs posscssed by them. We have one-sensed organism two-sensed organisms, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed organisms according to the number of sense organ they possess. Similarly, the size of the sense-organs and its capacity to experience may also vary with different animals. The capacity of sense-experience determines the different gradations of animals. Therefore, it can be said that labdhi (the capacity) is the basic factors for the distinction between different sense-organs and their function. Without labdhi, nirvștti, upakarama and upayoga cannot exist.
Next to Labdhi comes nirvytti as an important factor in the function of the sense-organs. Thus, we find that it is possible to have upakaraṇa in the absence of upayoga, nirvștti in the absence of upakarana and labdhi in the absense of niryrtti. But it is not possible to have
1 2
Tattvārthasūtra 2, 17. Tattvärthasūtra 2, 18.

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the functions as it is not possible to have nirvrtti without labdhi and upakaraṇa without nirvrtti and upayoga without upakaņa. We give below the table of the functions of the sense organs :
INDRIYA
Paudgalika (dravyendriya)
Atmika (bhāvendriya)
nirvytti
upakaraņa
Labdhi
upayoga
MIND (MANAS)
Each organ is different. One sense-organ can not receive the stimulation connected with other sense-organs. It requires a subtle sense-organ which is called, mind. Mind grasps the sense stimulation of all the sense-organs. Therefore, it is called sarvārthagrāhi.1 It is a quasi-sense-organ because, it is very subtle. It is sometimes called anindriya because of its subtlety and not because the absence of the sense-organ. The function of mind, which is inner-organ is knowing and thinking. The Jaina theory of mind, as developed by the Jaina ācāryas, is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed. The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and psychological approaches to the problems. It is predominently a realistic approach. The mind and its state are analysed at empirical level. The mind recollects the past impressions, grasps the present stimulations and imagines the future. Therefore, it is also referred to apprehending impressions of the long periods (dirghakālikā sarjña). Jaina āgamic literature mentions the word samjñā with reference to the manas and the animals which possess mind have been called saṁjni. The functions of the mind can be anaysed as (1) analysis of the meaning of the impression-īhā, (2) Apohadetermination,(3) mārgaņā-analysis and discrimination, (4) gaveşaņā
1 Pramāņamīmāṁsā 1, 2, 24. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.): Some Problems in Jaina Psychology (Karnataka
University, Dharwar) 1961, p. 17.

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discrimination and distinctions, (5) cintā--obstructions and thinkings about the how and the why, (6) Vimarsa - analysis and appreciation. These constitutes the charateristics of samjñā and the organism, who possesses the characterstics is called Samjñi, i. e. having mind.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIND a .
That through which we think, is mind. We may distinguish two types of substances in this world--(1) Substances having form and (2) Subtances without form. The sense-organs are substances with form and they grasp the present stimulations only. Mind is a substance without form, and it grasps the present impressions, recollects the past impressions and imagines of the future ideas. Therefore, it has a reference to the past, present and the future. The mind also, like the indriyas has a reference to the material aspect in connection with the psychic force. Therefore, mind is distinguished into two phases---(1) the physical mind and the (2) psychic mind (dravya manas and bhāva manas). In the Viseşāvaśyaka bhāşya; we get a description of the two phases of the mind. The material mind may be called the mental structure. It is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of the mind meant for the function of the mind. It is further described as a collection of fine particles, which are meant for exciting thought-processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact with the jīva with the body. In the Gommațasāra jīvakānda there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a full blownlotus with eight petals. The material composition of the mind consists of the subtle particles of matter which are called manovargaņās. Therefore, it is different from the ātman and the ajiva (non-living substance.)
| Jainatarkabhāşā--manaḥ sarvendriya-pravartakam, āntarendriyas
svasamyogena bāhyendriyanugrāhakaṁ. ataeva sarvopalabdhi
kāraṇam. 2 Višeşāvaśyakabhäşya 3525 A. Ma and Abhidhāna rājendra Vol.
p. 4 comm. 3 Gommațasāra : jiva kāņda. verse 443. | Bhagavati 13, 7, 494 ātā bhante maņe anne maņe? Goyamā, no
ātā maņe anne maņe mapijjamāņe......maņe.

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The bhava manas is the psychic function of the mind. It is the result of the activities of the dravya manas. It is expressed in mental processes like thinking. In this sense, bhavamanas is sometimes identified with self, because it is a thinking self. Therefore, the self is both manas and not-manas, in the sense it is a thinking self and the psychic function is a quality of the self. The bhavamanas is not therefore entirely distinct from the activity of the self, it is referred to as belonging to the activity of the self. As we said earlier, bhāvamanas has two functions-labdhi and upayoga. First is the mental set and the
second is the activity of the mind.
Dhavala refers to the mind quasi-active (nokarma). The dravya manas is the result of the operation of certain forms of namakarma, while bhavamanas is due to the destruction and subsidence of the antarāyakarma and the no-indriya-karma. The mind in its undeveloped form (aparyāpta) consists of the material particles which are yet to cohere. Therefore, in this state the developed psychic functions are absent.
FUNCTIONS OF MIND
The function of mind, which is the inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Sthānanga describes it a samkalpa vyāpāravati. It is also referred to as cittamanovijñāna. Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya defines manas in terms of mental processes. The mind grasps the sense-impressions received through the sense-organs.4 The mind gets knowledge for us through the sense-organs. But in all forms of knowledge, it is not necessary to have the instrument of sense-organs. The sense-knowledge is through the sense-organs and it is limited to the stimulations coming through the objects in this empirical world. But mind can also have its own function without the stimulation received through the sense-organs. They are knowledge through the mind only. It is nanojanya. Such psychic functions of the mind can be mentioned as thā (integration),
1 Sūtrak ṛtāngā vṛtti 1, 12 2 Dhavalā, sūtra 36, p. 130 3 Viseşāvasyak ibhāṣya 3523 4 Caraka sutrasthāna 1, 20.

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;:.?
E OF MIND
avāya (association), dhāraņā (retention), smrti (memory), pratyabhijñā (recognition), tarka (implication), anumāna (inference) and agama (knowledge from testimony).
PLACE OF MIND The Vaiseșikas,1 Naiyyayikas 2 and Mimāṁsakaså have considered mind as atomic in nature. Therefore, mind is not considered to be eternal, in its causes. Sārnkhya, Yoga and Vedānta drašana consider mind to be a product of prakrti and ahamkara and is atomic in nature. It is due to avidyā. According to the Jainas and the Buddhists the mind is neither pervasive nor atomic in nature, it is madhyama parimāņa. It is finite in its cxtension. Nyāya, Vaiseșika and the Buddhist philosophers consider mind as emanating from the heart.
Nyāya-Vaiseșika and the Buddhist systems consider that the manas is in the heart. According to the Samkhya-Yoga and Vedānta the place of the heart is all pervasive in the body because it is in the sükşma sarira (gross). According to Jainsim, bhāvamanas is in the ātman, but regarding the place of the dravyamanas, there is no agreement. The Digambara tradition maintains that the place of the dravya manas is in the heart, while svetāmbara tradition does not give any specific inclination about this. Pandit Sukhalāl says that the svetāmbara tradition maintains that the dravya manas is all-pervasive in the body. Although it is difficult to determine the exact location of the manas in the body, atleast there must be some centres of mind through which the mental function takes place. It may be located partly in the brain and functioning through the sense-organs.
The sense-organs are functioning in one direction only, because these are receptive and they are functioning in particular part of the
| Vaisesika sütra 7, 1, 23 2 Nyāyasūtra 3, 2, 61 3 Prakarana p. 151 4 Māthara kārikā 27
5 Yogaśāstra 5, 2 26 Darsan i aur Cintana, p. 140 (Hindi)

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body. But from the point of view of psychic energy the sense-organs function in the pervasive way. The function of the sense-organs depends on the subsidence and destruction of the kārmic matter which gives rise to the removal of the obscurations connected with the point of sense-experience. This is all-pervasive in the body. From the point of view of grasping and understanding the subject, manas can be considered pervasive of the body.
a) EXISTENCE OF THE MANAS Different philosophers have given arguments for the existence of the manas. The Nyāyasūtra says that we can infer the existence of the manas because without manas, knowledge is not possible. Vātsyāyana says that the manas can be proved because certain mental functions like memory and cognition are not possible to be obtained through the sense-organs only.3 Annambhatta says that mental states like pleasure are possible through the medium of manas. Jainas“ maintain that mental states like doubt, dream-cognition, pleasure and pain and connotive activity are not possible without the medium of manas.
We may now analyse the different stages of avagraha, ihā, dhāraņā, avāya as stages of sense-perception.
u AVAGRAHA Avagraha is a sensational stage where there is an awareness of the object without cognising the specific nature of the object. It only presents the general characteristic of the object in cognition. We cannot, in this, know the specific details about the nature of the object. This is the stage which may be considered to be the stage of sensation following the stage of darśana in the sense of the threshold of consciousness. In the avagraha we do not really get the general characteristics of the
1 Nyaya sütra 1, 1, 16. 2 Vätsyāyana bhāşya 1, 1, 16 3 Tarkasangraha 4 Sanmatiprakaraṇa ţikā kānda 2 5 Bhagavati 1, 3. 6 Pramāṇamīmārsā 1, 1, 26

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object, but only the awareness of the object that we get. In this sense, it would be different to make avagraha as determinate cognition coming after darśana. In that case darśana will become mere species of the jñāna and it would be reduced to mere sensation. The higher form, of darśana like the kevaladarśana would be meaningless.
Avagraha is therefore the stage of sensation. It is the first stage of experience. It is the given, it does not involve the stage of darsana which is qualitatively different from jñāna. Avagraha is a species of jñāna. It is immediate experience.
STAGES IN THE AVAGRAHA :!:'>> Avagraha has been considered to be the stage of consideration. This has been further distinguished into 2 stages : (1) vyañjana avagraha and (2) artha avagruha. Vyañjanāvagraha is the earlier stage. In the Višeşāvasyakabhāşya, we get the description of the vyañjanāvagraha. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation. It is only the reation of the sense-organs and the object in the form of sense stimulations. In the Nandīsūtra, we get the example of the earthen pot and the drops of water. It gives a description of the stage of vyañjanavāgraha. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when water is poured, a portion of the water is absorbed by the pot. And there is no sign of the existence of the water. If we go on pouring the water again, at a certain stage the water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. The stage when the water begins to be visible in the threshold of saturation. The drops of water below the threshold get absorbed in the pot. Similarly, a person who is asleep receives the sound stimulation continuously for sometime. The sound atoms reach the ear. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ear becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound athough the auditory stimulations were pouring in. We may call this, the stage of first awareness, "the threshold of awareness.” The sound sensation begins to be experienced the moment
1 2
Sarvārthasiddhi, 1, 15, 111 (a) Tattvārthasūtra 1, 17-18 (b) Dhavalā 1, 1, 1, 115, 354, 7. Višeşāvaśyakabhāşya, 191, 193.
3

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the threshold is crossed. That stage is arthāvagraha. Arthāvagraha is the experience of sensation, while vyañjanāvagraha is the earlier stage of physiological stimulus condition. The Nandisutra has beautifully explained this point in the example given above. The illustration is called mallaka drsțānta. Vyañjanāvagraha is a condition of arthāv. agraha, which is the stage of sensation. The presence of vyanjanavagraha may be admitted as a condition of arthāvagraha although it is explicit not because of its undeveloped existence, 8
Avagraha has also been distinguished from the logical point of view as vyāvahārika avagraha and naisargika avagraha. Naisargika avagraha grasps as the generality without distinction. But vyāvahārika avagraha experiences the generality with the distinctions implicit. Avagraha has been described with some equivalent expressing its modes like avagrahaņatā, upadhāraṇatā, śravaṇatā, avalambanatā and medhā. Tattvārthabhāşya mentions the following synonymous terms like avagraha, graha, grahaņa, ālocana and avdhāraņa.5 Şațkhaņdāgama mentions the following as the equivalents, avagraha, avadhāna, sāna, avalambanā and medha.
Avagraha is the sensational stage and that does not give the knowledge of the nature of the object. It only gives awareness of that and does not explain the "what'. The complete psychosis of perceptual cognition would be possible when we experience the other three stages of perceptual process than īhā, avāya and dhāraṇā. In this sense, our empirical experience will not complete with avagraha. Avagraha is not self-sufficient. Arthāvagraha is mere sensation which lasts only for only one instance. It immediately transforms itself into more specific cognition, i. e., īhā.
1 Nandīsūtra 34 2 Jaina tarkabhaşā, p. 3, 3 Višeşāvasyaka bhāsya 196. 4 Nandīsūtra 51 p. 22, Punyavijayaji. 5 Tattvārtha bhāşya 1, 15. 6 Şațkhaņdāgama 13, 5. 5 sūtra 37 p. 242

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THA
Thā is the second stage of Matijñāna. In it one cognises the nature of the sensation like the sound. Nandīsūtra gives synonyms of īhā : abhoganatā, mārgaṇatā, gaveşanatā, cintā and vimarsa,1 Umāsvāti gives the synonyms as ūha, tarka, vicāraņā and jijñāsā.2
Vyañjanāvagraha is the potential condition of awareness. Arthavagraha is the dawning of the awareness. Tha is the tendency twards cognising the specific features of the object. Tha has been very often translated as speculation. But it would be more appropriate to use the word associative integration.
The Jainas thought that, as Tha is striving for determinate and specific cognition, it is possible to confuse it with doubt (sarśaya). But iha should not be confused with doubt (sarśaya) although it does involve a striving towards the determinate knowledge. In the case of doubt, the alternatives are equally pressing and they are not certain, which is to be accented. But in ihā there is a tendency to determinate cognition. I hā is the mental state in which there is striving for the ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and the avoidance of the untrue. Siddhasena Divākara also draws the same line of distinction between ihā and samsaya. For instance, on receiving a sense impression of sound, there arises a doubt, whether the sound comes from the counch or horn. The mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference. The sound is perceived as a sweet and an aggreeable. This quality is attributed to the sound of the counch and not at the horn. In the Pramāṇamīmāṁsā it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between sensation (avagraha) and associative integration (ihā), even when the object is the matter of habitual perception. But the existence of the state of doubt is not easily detected owing to the rapidity of succession of mental event.5
1 Nandisutra 52 2 Ibid 31 3 Tattvārthasūtra bhāşya 1, 15 4 Višeşāvašyaka bhāşya 1, 83-84. 5 Pramānamīmāṁsā 1, 1, 27

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AVAYA
The third factor in matijñāna is avaya. From the stage of associated integration (īhā) we come to the stage of interpretation. The sensations of interpreted and the meaning is assigned to the organisation of sensation. Tha is integration of the sensations, avāya interpretes and determines the meaning of the sensation.1 In avaya there is a definite determination about the meaning of the perception. In this we come to the judgement about the nature of the object. This is therefore called perceptual judgement, still it is non-verbal. Avaśyakaniryukti defines avaya as determinate cognition. In the Sarvārthasiddhi, we get the description of avaya as cognition of the true notion of the object through cognition of particular characteristics. Umāsvāti says that upagma, upanoda, apavyādha, apeta, apaviddha, apanuta and apagata are synonyms of avaya. They mean the determinate cognition. Nandīsūtra gives āvartanatā, pratyāvartanatā, buddhi, vijñāna as synonyms. Tattvārtha bhāṣya describes avāya as the stage of ascertainment of right and exclusion of wrong. For example, on hearing sound, a person determines that the sound must be of a counch and not of a horn, because it is sweet and not hard. This type of ascertainment of the existing specific features of the object is called avāya and it involves perceptual judgement.
Some Jaina logicians say that avāya has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is only the exclusion of non-existing qualities. They ascribe the cognition of the existing quality to a later stage of experience called dhāraṇā. But Jinabhadra says that the view is not correct. Because avaya does not merely perform the negative function of excluding non-existing qualities. But it also determines the existing characteristics. Umāsvāti agrees with this view. Pūjapāda says that avaya cognises specific features of the objects cognised in the
1 Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, 1, 1, 28.
2 Viseşāvasyaka bhāṣya, 1, 79.
3 Sarvārthasiddhi, 1, 15.
4 Tattvärthasutra bhāṣya, 1, 15.
5 Nandisutra, 53.
6 Tattvärthasūtra bhāṣya, 1, 15.

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stage of ihā, in the final determination of the objects. Avāya can be used to be perceptual judgement and it can be compared to the apperception involved in the perceptual experience. But avāya need not be the final determination of the specific feature of the objects as it is the perceptual judgement. Therefore, in this characteristic of the describing the avāya the two traditions concerning the negative or the positive function of avāya are in agreement.?
DHARAŅA
Dhāraṇā is retention. It is essential of the perceptual experience. Nandīsūtra defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for the number of instances or innumerable instances. It gives sthāpanā and pratişthā as synonyms of dhāraņā.3 Umāsvāti defines dhāraņā as the final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions. According to Umāsvāti retention develops through three stages : (1) nature of the object is finally cognised, (2) the cognition so formed is retained, and (3) the object is recognised on future occasions. Avasyakaniryukti defines dhāraņā as retention. Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perpeptual cognition. Pūjyapāda Devanandi defines dhāraņā as a condition of the absence of forgetting the what has been cognised by perceptual judgement, by avāya. Akalanka says that it is the absence of forgetting what has been cognised by perceptual judgement. Some logicians like Vadideva do not accept dhāraņā as a condition of recall on a future occasion. Thus we find that some logicians make dhāraņā merely retention of perceptual experience, while some others make it also the condition of recall, of that experience on a future occasion. Hemacandra reconciles his views of retention and the condition of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in Viśeşāvaśyakabhāşya. He says that retention is
1 Dr. Mohanlal Metha : Jaina Darsana. 2 Nandisütra, sūtra, 54. 3 Sarvārthasiddhi, 1, 15. 4 Tattvārtharājavārtika.

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the absence of the lapse of perception, but it is included in the perceptual judgement.
The analysis of the perceptual experience shows that it involves the four stages of the development of the perceptual experience. The concrete psychosis does involve all these four stages of perceptual experience.
Dhāraṇā has been distinguished into three types: (1) avichuti in which there is the retention for a long time and it is not washed away. (2) Vāsana-It is the psychic condition of dhāraṇā after it ceases to function as dhāraṇā. This may be compared to the disposition that modern psychology uses. Dispositions are responsible for giving recollection. (3) Anusmaraṇa is a mental condition which arises out of dhāraṇā and which retains the effects of dhāraṇā. It will facilitate recollection. This may be compared to the engram complexes described in modern psychology. Nandisūtra gives the following synonyms of dhāraṇā - dharaṇā, dhāraṇā, sthāpanā, pratiṣṭhā and kostha. Umāsvāti mentions pratipatti, avadhāraṇā, avasthāna, niscaya, avagama and avabodha as synonyms. 2
We have so far seen that matijñāna is experienced through the stages of four factors like avagraha, īhā, avāya, and dhāraṇā. Avagraha has been distinguished into two types: vyañjanāvagraha and arthāvagraha. Vyañjanavagraha is of four types, the sense of touch, ta te, smell and hearing. Vyañjana has three different meaning (1) sabda etc, pudgala dravya. (2) upakaraṇa indriya (accessory meterial) and (3) viṣaya and upakaraṇa conjuction i. e., the contact between the object and sense-organs. Vyañjanavagraha is implicit awareness or apter to say that it is the threshold of awareness. The sense-organ of sight (the eyes) and the quasi-sense organ of mind are aprāpyakārī as there is no contact with the object and these sense-organs. And therefore, vyañjanāvagraha is not possible in these cases to experiences.
The Buddhist consider the sense-organ of hearing also as aprāpyakārī. The Nyāya-Vaiseṣika do not consider the eyes and the manas as aprāpyakārī.
1 Nandisutra, 54 and 55
2 Tativārthabhāṣya 1, 15

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From the scientific point of view the eyes and the manas do not come into contact by physical contact with the object of stimulation. The eye is considered to be a sensitive lense which receives stimulations sent by the objects, through the rays of light. The image of the object is formed on the retina and the mind consolidates it by interpreting the stimulations so received. Therefore, 'that the Jaina view that the mind and the sense-organs of eye are aprāpaykārī, is consistent with the modern scientific analysis, of the visual perception.
The four distinctions in matijñāna as mentioned above are avagraha (with its division vyañjanävagraha and arthāvagraha) iha, avāya and dhāraņā. They have been further divided into different types : five sense-organs plus the manas. These six have the four stages of matijñāna. i.e. they are 24. The sense-organs except the eyes and manas have vyañjan āvagraha. Therefore, they are 4 so the total would be 24+4=28. According to the Svetāmbara tradition, each type of cognitive experience is further sub-divided into 12 types like (1) bahu (many) (2) bahubidha (different types) (3) alpa (less) (4) alpavidha (les intense) (5) kşipra (quick) (6) aksipra (slow) (7) aniścita (interminate) (8) niệcita (determinate) (9) asandigdha (definite) (10) sandigdha (indefinite) (11) dhruva (certain) (12) adhruva (uncertain). The bahu means many and alpa means one. The cognition of many objects is bahugrāhi and the cognition of one object is alpagrāhi. The cognition of many types of object is bahuvidhagrāhī. The cognition of one type of object is alpavidhagrāhī. The relation between bahu and alpa has a reference to the number and the reference between the buhuvidha and alpavidha has reference to the types. Śighra (quick cognition) is called kşipra and that knowledge which is not quick is considered to be akşipra. The cognition which has been obtained without any motive is called aniścita. And that cognition which has been obtained due to certain motives and based on the previous cognition is called niścita. Niścita (definite) cognition is certain (asandigdha) and the indefinite knowledge is sandigha. Avagraha and īhā can also be distinguished on the basis of the criterian of indefiniteness. In these cognitions, there is the awareness of the object. But the specific nature is not determined. The cognition which arises out of the

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definite stimulations (avaśyambhāvi) is certain (dhruva). But that cognition which arises casually undefined stin ulations is uncertain (adhruva). Out of the 12 types of cognition that we have seen, the 4 have reference to the object and the remaining have a reference to the subject cognising the aspect.
The Digumbara tradition gives the classification of the distinction of the matijñana with slight variation. According to the Digambara tradition niścita and aniścita cognition have been considered and named aniḥśrta and nihśrta. Anihśrta cognition apprehends the stimulations partly and in the nihśrita cognition, we have the apprehension of the stimulations tully. In this sense the Digambara tradition also used the forms anukta (inexpressed) and ukta (expressed) in place of asandigdha and sandigdha. The anukta implies cognition through opinion and ukta implies cognition through the words.2
There are 336 kinds of matijñāna. These are obtained by multiplying 28 (as previously described) kinds with these 12 types, i. e., 28 x 12=336. There is light difference regarding thc mames of these in Svetämbara tradition also.
11.3 ŚRUTAJÑANA Śrutajñāna is knowledge obtained through discursive reasoning subsequent to matijñāna. It is necessary to have use of language for the śrutajñāna. In the case of mati the hearing of words is implicit, but when the words are uttered the meaning of the two words are remembered. Matijñāna in this sense expresses the potentiality of the meaning as implied in the stimulations of the word. But in the case of śrutajñāna knowledge arises due to the explicit expression of the meaning signified by the word. In this sense śrutajñāna would not be possible without matijñāna. The śrutajñāna would be possible when the kārmic matter obscuring the śrutajñāna is removed. This is the internal cause of the śrutajñāna. The external condition of śrutaiñāna is matijñāna. This is because even if we have sense knowledge
1 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 16 2 (a) Sarvārthasiddhi, 1, 16.
(b) Rājavārtika 1, 16.

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it may be not possible to have knowledge through discursive reasoning as in the case of śrutajñāna, because the karmic encrustations obscuring the śrutajñāna are still operative. This may be interpreted as that unless the mental set is formed and psychic impediments are removed śrutajñāna is not possible.
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In the early agamic literature śrutajñāna has been considered to be knowledge through the scriptures. It is knowledge obtained through the scriptures given by the authorities (Aptapuruşa) and also the knowedge obtained through the words of omniscient. There are two types of śrutajñāna—angapraviṣṭa and angabāhya. Angapraviṣṭa is of 12 types and angabāhya has many types.
Angapravista śrutjañana may be referred to as knowledge obtained through the scriptures given to us in a codified form by the ganadharas of tīrthankara. Tirthankaras have taught the doctrines. This is arthaśruta. While the garṇadharas have codified and presented in the form of sastras. This is arthaśruti. Due to the deduction in age and the ability to grasp, the acaryas in a later stage, wrote books explaining the knowledge contained in the āgamas on various subjects. This is angabahyaśruta. In this, original meaning was given by the Tirthankaras. This is angapravista. Later the meanings are elaborated by the elder ācāryas it is called Angabahya. The angabāhya literature has various divisions like kālika and utkälika etc. The detailed description about this have been given in our work entitled Jaina Sahitya aur Samskṛti. The śrutajñāna is primarily concerned with knowledge and the literature is called śruta because it gives knowledge. Acārya Bhadrabahu has stated that there are various distinctions in the śrutajñāna based on the words and their permutations. It is not possible to give the elaborate description of the permutations of the words. However, we can mention 14 types of śrutajñāna: (1) akşara (2) anakşara, (3) saṁ jñī, (4) asaṁjñī, (5) samyak, (6) mithya, (7) sādika, (8) anādika, (9) saparyavasita, (10) aparyavasita, (11) gamika, (12) agamika, (13) angapravişṭa and (14) angabāhya.
1 Tattvärthasūtra 1, 20
2 Agama Sahitya: ek Paryavekṣaṇa, p. 1-54, Pub. Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, Varanasi-1.

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The fourteen types of śrtuajñāna can be classified into different parts on the basis of the nature of the śrutajñanā (i) aksara śruta- it has three sub-divisions-(i) samjñākşara refering to the form of the letter (word) (ii) vyañjanākşara-sound of the letter, it is pertaining to phoneticism (iii) labdhyaksara-refering to the psychological maturation or the mental set of expressing the word. Samjñākşara and vyañjanaksara are considered to be dravya śruta, because they are concerned with the expression of the śruta, while labdhyaksara is considered to be bhāvašruta, because it is psychological is nature.
Coughing, respiration and sneezing are anaksara fruta because they do not involve the expression of any letter.
Samjñā is of three types, therefore those possessing samjā are also classified into three types. It is called samñi śruta and is of three types : (1) dirghakāliki-it covers the past, present and the future ideas. (2) hetūpadešikī—in this we are primarily concerned with the thinking about the present circumstances with its consequences. (3) drstivādopadegiki - in this there is a right understanding and also the comprehension of the various apects of the thing. Those who have these samjñās are called somjñi and those who do not possess these samjñās are called asamjñis.
Asamjñis are of three types : (1) those who cannot think of the future and cannot have the perspective regarding the long duration of time are the first type of asam jñi. (2) those who possess slight mental activity, although they are having mind are called amanaskasamjñi and they are of the second type. (3) Those who are possessed of perversity of attitude are the third type of asamjñi.
The śrutajñāna which comprises of the knowledge of the twelve angas as presented by the Tirthankara and is called samyakšruta. And that knowledge which is contrary and which does not contain the knowledge presented by the Tirthankaras is called mithyāśruta.
That knowledge which has the beginning and which starts at a particular time is called sadika śruta. And that knowledge which has no beginning and which are eternal truths is called anādika śruta. The frutajñāna may be considered to be anādika from the poin' of

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view of substance of knowledge and sādika from the point of view of its modes.
That knowledge which comes to an end is called saparyavasita. And that which cannot be destroyed and which is eternal is called aparyavasita śrutajñāna. In this distinction also the criteria of points of view of substance and modes is operative.
That śrutajñāna which is comprised of the similarity of teaching is called gamikaśruta and that in which there is no harmony and similarity is called agamika śruta. We have already explained the distinction between the angapravişta and the angabāhya śruta.
MATIJÑANA AND ŚRUTAJÑANA It is necessary to understand the relation between matijñāna and śrutajñāna in certain respects. Every empirical individuals (saṁsārī jivas) has mati and śrutajñānas. But the question is regarding the upper limit of the possession of these two forms of knowledge in an individual. A question has been raised whether on the attainment of the kevalajñāna, there still remains matijñana and does srutajñana operative. On this question, there is a controversy. Some Jaina scholars say that on the attainment of the kevalajñāna (omniscience), there is no place for mati and śrutajñāna, because (1) mati and śrutajñāna are obtained due to partial destruction and subsidence of the jñānāvaraniyakarma, and (2) in the case of the kevalajñāna all the four karmas have been destroyed. But some other scholars maintain that on the attainment of the kevalajñāna the matijñāna and śrutajñāna are not
ted. They are still present and operative although the effect is negligible and unascertainable. Just as in the bright sunshine, the light of the stars and the planet is not clearly visible and is dim because it is merged in the light of the sun. So also, the effect of the matijñāna and the śrutajñana are not discernible in the light of the kevaljñāna. The second view appears to be consistent with Jaina stand point.1
Śrutajñāna is described as the knowledge accompanied by the expression in words and significant with meaning. Matijñāna is know
1 Mohanlal Mehta : Jaina darśana, p. 229.

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ledge which generally preceds śrutajñāņa and is not accompanied by śrutajñana. Matijñāna is of two types: sabhilāpa and anabhilāpa. But śrutajñāna is only of sabhilapa type.1 Arthāvagraha is not sābhilāpa while all other forms of matijñāna are sābhilāpa. Śrutajñāna is sābhilāpa but it should be noted that only săbhilapa jñāna is not srutajñana. Because, knowledge which used words cannot be considered as śrutajñāna. The knowledge which uses words is meant for others (parārtha) and it is meant to communicate the knowledge to the other individuals. It is used for explaining to others by means of lanugage. Matijñāna can also be sākṣara as it uses certain expressions, but it is not meant for the sake of others and it does not serve the purpose of communicating to others. Śrutajñāna on the contrary is sākṣara and also it is primarily concerned with use of language for expressing the thoughts and experiences.s
The function of matijñāna is to experience the sensory experiences like touch, taste, smell, form, and sound and also to give meaning to these experiences. The function of śrutajñāna is to comprehend the meaning of these experiences to the use of words and sentences and to communicate to others. Therefore, mati is considered as arthajñāna and śruta as sabdārthajñāna.
The relation of mati and śrutu is that of the cause and the effect. Matijñāna is the cause and śrutajñāna is the effect. Śrutajñāna is that knowledge which gives meaning through the use of the language and based on the memory. Śrutajñāna gives the possibility of acquiring meaning to the word and that meaning is retained after the knowledge is obtained. First, there is matijñāna through the stages of avagraha, etc. and then we get Śrutajñāna.
Dravyaśruta becomes the effect of the matijñāna (pertaining to the hearing sense-organ) but bhava śruta cannot be the effect of matijñāna and therefore according to this viewpoint śrutajñāna is considered the effect of matijñāna. From another point of view dravya śruta
1 Viseşāvasyka bhāşya vṛtti 100
2
I bid 170.
3 (a) Anuyogadvāra 2
(b) Viseşāvasyakabhāṣya vṛtti 100

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is not the consequence of the sense of hearing but it becomes the subject. This is because, knowledge is obtained through language; but language itself is not the essence of knowledge. Language is the medium through which knowledge is presented. Knowledge obtained through previous knowledge or convention in tradition can be considered as śrutaniḥśrita matijñāna, for instance, the knowledge that we get about the word 'cow' or the knowledge to the understanding of the nature of the cow on the perception of the animal is the śrutaniḥsrita matijñāna, because it based on the previous information and the sarskāras that we have already obtained.
Matijñāna is primarily concerned with the cognition of the object in the present while śrutajñāna comprehends the objects with reference to the present, past and the future. Therefore, with reference to the presentation, śrutajñāna is considered to be different from matijñāna. In that case the śrutajñāna is primarily based on the use of language.
The knowledge which is expressed through the language for the sake of understanding and also for communication is called śrutajñāna. In the case of matijñāna, expression in the from the language is not primary.2
AVADHIJÑANA Avadhilñāna is a from of extra-sensory perception. It is pratyakşa or direct perception. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense-organs and the mind. However avadhi has limits, it can apprehend only such things which have form and shape. It cannot apprehend the things which have no shape and form. Of the six dravyas, pudgala becomes the object of avadhijñāna, because the other dravyas do not have form. Similarly, there are limitation in the avadhijñāna with reference to the substance (dravya), place (kşetra), time (käla) and nature (bhāva) of the objects. Avadhi is that kind of extra-sensory perception which grasps the objects with
1 2 3
Višeşāvaśyakabhäşya vrtti 168 Tattvārthasūtra-Pt. Sukhalalji pp. 35–36. Tattvārthasūtra 1, 28.

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reference to its substance, place, time and nature and beyond the capacity of the normal sense-organs.?
. OBJECT OF AVADHIJÑANA The avadhijñāna has limitations with reference to its objects in the light of the substance, place, time and nature.
(1) With reference to the substance it can apprehend the minutest particle and also it can extend its knowledge to the cosmos.
(2) With reference to space one can get avadhijñāna from the smallest part of the finger to the knowlege o' the entire cosmos. . It is possible to get avadhijñāna on the basis of the knowledge of the cosmos and imagine similar stellar universes,
(3) With reference to time avadhijñina can cognise to the minutest part of the period called avalika. And for the duration of the entire innumerable avasarpini and utsarpini periods.
(4) With reference to the nature of the object known through avadhijñāna, we can say that one can have clairvoyance cognition with reference to the mildest psychic mode to the entire clustre of modes. L ELIGIBLE BEING FOR AVADHIJÑANA
The living beings in the four states of existence are eligible for getting avadhiiñāna. Gods (residents in heaven) and hellish beings get avadhijñāna by birih. Therefore it is bhavapratyaya.2 Men and the animals get avadhijñāna due to efforts, it is gunaprutyaya. In the case of the beings in heaven and hell avadhijñāna is to be found n them by birth. They need not do any mental and moral practice for obtaining it. But this is not the case with human beings and the animals. In the case of human beings avadhijñāna is possible through mental and moral discipline. Men have to practice vratas, and they get avadhijñāna through the acquisition of merit. The avadhi of the human
1 Nan disutra, sūtra 28, p. 13 edited by Punyavijayaji 2 (a) Tattvārthasūtra 1, 21-22
(b) Sthānanga 71 (c) Nandīsūtra, sūtra 13, p. 10, Puṇyavijayaji.

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beings as well the five-sensed animals is due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant kārmic veil. Therefore, it is called guņapratyaya avadhijñāna.
A question arises regarding the destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas in the case of the birth of the heavenly and the hellish beings. Sometimes a question is asked that if these beings possess avadhi as bhavapratyaya, then is it not necessary that there should be destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas in the case of these beings ? The answer to this is that in the case of heavenly and the hellish beings the destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas would have taken place at the time of their birth, otherwise the possession would not be possible. Therefore, those beings in whom destruction and the subsidence takes place at the time of birth, they will have avadhi and so it would be bhavapratyaya. But in the case of those who have to acquire merit for the sake of obtaining avadhijñāna it would be guna pratyaya.
Gunapratyaya arvadhijñāna has been classified into six types.
(1) Anugāmi-It is that type of avadhi which continues to be present with the individual wherever he goes.
(2) Ananugāmi-In this case the avadhi ceases to function, if the individual goes to another place, from the palce where avadhi was acquired.
(3) Vardhamāna— In this avadhi inreases in intensity as it goes on developing.
(4) Hiyamāna-In this the avadhi goes on decreasing in intensty as the time passes.
(5) Apratipātī- This avadhi lasts up to the life or until one attains kevalajñāna.
(6) Pratipātī– This avadhi does not last long. It vanishes after sometime.
With reference to the spatial extension of the object cognised in avadhi Tattvārtharājvārtika distinguishes three types (1) deśāvadhi, (2) paramavadhi (3) sarvāyadhi.
1 2
Nandisutra, sūtra 15, p. 10 Rājavārtika 1, 22, 5 (vrttisahita).

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Deśāvadhi has been distinguished further into three types (a) jag. hanya deśāvadhi in which one can know only the smallest part of the finger. (b) utk rşța deśāvadhi the scope of the knowledge of the avadhi in this is the entire universe and (c) ajaghanya utk rşta deśāvadhi intuites the objects of the medium size neither of the highest nor of the minutest part.
Similarly, raramāvadhi also can be distinguished into three different types. But sarvävadhi is of one type. The uppermost limit of the intuition in this is the innumerable place-points beyond the scope of paramāvadhi. The scope of this is the entire universe. And it cannot intuite anything outside the universe as there is nothing outside the universe. Deśāvadhi is possible to be obtained by the beings in the four states of existence, but paramāvadhi and sarvavadhi are possible only for the munis. 2
Jinabhadragani ksamāśramaņa says that it is possible to study avadhijñāna with reference to the seven nikṣepas- dravya, kşetra, kāla, bhava, bhāva, sthāpanā and nāma.8
MANAHPARYAYA JÑANA Manaḥparyaya jñāna is possible for human beings only; and only the human beings who are self-controlled and who acquire merits get the manahparyayajñāna. In other words, only Śramaņas can acquire manaḥparyaya jñāna. The human beings who are without self-control Cannot possess manaḥparyayajñāna. Manahparyaya is telepathic expression. In this one experiences and cognises the mental states of others. This !view of manahparyaya based on the Jaina conception of the nature of the mind as material in content consisting minute and fine particles of matter called ma'ovar ganās. Due to the infinite modes of the formation of the mind one understands the mental states operating in the minds of others. 1 The measurement of extension is possible with the criterion of a
finger. 2 Tattvārthasāra, Amộtacandrasūri, p. 12. Gaņeśaprasad Varņi
granthamālā I. 3 Višeşāvašyaka bhāsya 4 Avagyaka niryukti 76.

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Manaḥparyaya experience is not inferential knowledge, it is direct experience. This is not through the instrument of mind, but the soul gets it directly and mind and the mental states are the objects of knowledge of manaḥparyaya.
THE TWO TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT
There are two traditions for explaining the nature of manaḥparyayajñāna. The first tradition is mentioned by ācārya Pujyapāda1 and Akalanka. According to this tradition, manaḥparyaya cognition reveals the meaning of thoughts expressed in others minds. There is no distinction between the thought and the content of thought. It is the material objects and the state of thought by the mind of others that are intuited in the manaḥparyaya. The mind undergoes the process of change while thinking and the objects content of this process are intuited in manaḥparyaya.
369
12.
The second tradition is given by ācārya Jinabhadragani. According to Jinabhadra, one possessed of manaḥparyayajñāna intuites the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects of thought by the mind only by inference. Therefore, we can say according to Jinabhadra that one possessed of manaḥparyaya knowledge, object thought of by others only by way of inference. Manaḥparyaya implies that we know the modes of the mental states and The not the objects that are thought of by these mental states. objects are known by inference.
1 Sarvārthasiddhi 1, 9.
2 Tattvārtharajavārtika 1, 26, 6-7.
3 Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya 814.
4 Tattvārthasūtra 1, 29,

It seems that the second tradition propounded by Jinabhadragaṇī is more consistent, because in manaḥparyaya it is not easy to get the intuition of the object thought of by the mind. The objects of thought are secondary and are not the main content of the thought. If manaḥparyayajñāna were to intuite the mental states and objects, then this kind of intuition would have grasped the formed and the formless

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objects, but this does not happen. In this case of the avadhijñāna, we can intuite objects having forms, but in the case of manah paryaya, we intuite the mental states. The objects of the mental states are known through inference and then because of this, the objects which have form and also formless can be known through manahparyaya by means of inference.1
Dis TWO TYPES OF MANAHPARYAYA
Manahparyāyajñāna has been distinguished into two types : (1) rjumati and (2) vipulamati. Vipulamati intuites subtle forms of mental states, while rjumati is not able to grasp the subtle forms.* Rijumati is temporary and it may last for sometime and vanish but vipulamati once obtained will continue atleast till the attainment of kevalajnana.s
THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OF MANAHPARYAYA
Manahparyayajñāna intuites different aspects of the knowedge from the points of view. i. e. dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva. (1) From the point of view of substance (dravya) manahporyaya intuites mental statge and events, through the manovarganas (fine particles of atoms constituting mind). (2) From the point of view of place (kşetra) the scope of the manahparyaya jñāna is restricted to the region, where the human beings live. (3) From the point of view of time (kāla) it intuites mental states for innumerable moments of time and it can extend
pto past and future. (4) From the point of view of nature (bhāva), it can intuite the infinite states of manovarganas.
AVADHI AND MANAHPARYAYA Avadhi and manahparyaya jñāna are both extra-sensory perceptions which the self can get directly without the help of the sense-organs and the mind. But both these forms of intuition are restricted to the cognition of objects having form. Therefore, they are incomplete and not perfect forms of cognition. They are vikala pratyakşas. But kevala jñāna is the complete and perfect. Therefore, it is sakalapratyakşa.
1 Jaina Darsana-Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. 2. Nandisutra, sūtra 31. 3 Ibid 31.

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Avadhi and manaḥparyaya can be distinguished from each other on the basis of the clarity (visuddhi). The criterian of clarity (visuddha) is,here, not concerned with any inadequacy. But it has reference to the intensity of experience, and the subtlety of cognitive forms. Manahparyaya intuites the mental states and events of other individuals. The distinctions between the two forms of direct cognition can be presented in the form of an analogy. A physician knows and treats the patient in general. He is the doctor, which cures the diseases of whole body. But there are doctors who are specialists as of eye, ear, heart etc., the different parts of the whole body. In both types of the physicians there is a difference of generality & speciality. Similarly, avadhi and manahprayaya have the distinction of subtelty, and un-subtlety of perception. Manahparyaya intuites the objects in its subtlety. While avadhijñāna gets a less subtle congnition of the objects. With reference to the kşetra, avadhijñāna can intuite the objects from the minutest part of the finger in the entire cosmos. While manaḥparyaya is restricted to the human abode only. Avadhijñāna is possible for obtaining in all the four states of existence. But manaḥparyaya is restricted to the human being of self-controlled character. The scope of Avadhijñāna is to intuite the objects having form and not all of its modes. But the manahparyayajñāna intuites mental states which are based on the finest particles of matter constituing mind.
KEVALAJÑANA (OMNISCIENCE) 1. Kevalajñāna is direct cognition of everything in the universe. It has a reference to the knowledge which cognises without the help of sense-organs and the mind. The self intuites everything without the help of the sense-organs and the mind.1 With the destruction of the jñānāvaraniya karma (knowedge obscuring karma) all distinctions disappear. And it is not necessary to have mind and sensory-organs as instruments for gaining the knowledge.
According to the Jainas the soul in its pure form is pure consci
1 (a) Viseşāvasyakabhāşya.
(b) Viseşāvasyakabhāşya vrtti 84

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ousness and knowledge. It is omniscience. It is obscured by the karmas and the veil of karma is removed as omniscience dawns.
In the Vyakhyāprajñapti Gaņadhara Gautama asked Bhagavāna Mahavira, "does the kevali (omniscient) knows through the indriyas or the manas ?" Mahavira replied, "he does not know the objects through the indriyas and mind." Then Gautama asked, how does he know? Mahāvīra replied, 'the omniscient knows the limited and the limitless. These cannot become objects of sense-organs'.1
Kevala also means pure.2 When the jñānāvaraṇīya is removed, all impurities are removed and therefore it is called kevala (pure knowledge). Kevala also means full or complete. When the jñānāvaraṇīya karma is removed one gets full or complete knowledge. Therefore, it is kevala.
The other meaning of the word kevala is extraordinary or superior. When the jñānāvaraṇīya karma is removed, the knowledge that we get is superior and nothing is comparable to the knowledge. Again kevala would also mean ananta (endless). When the jñānāvaraṇīya karma is removed, knowledge that we get has no end, because all the veil that cover the knowledge have been removed.
Kevala would mean omniscience (sarvajñata), although sarvajħana has to be taken in the right sense. When the impurities and obscurations of knowledge are removed, we get pure, super, normal and perfect knowledge. Therefore, there would be no deficiency or defect in that knowledge. Therefore, in this sense kevalajñāna may be called perfect and pure knowledge and omniscience.
The Jainas are agreed on the nature of the omniscience. Omniscience intuites all substances with all their modes of the world and the beyond. All substances and modes are intuited by kevalajñāna®.
1 Vyakhyāprajñapti 6, 10
2 Viseṣāvasyakabhāşyavṛtti 84
3 Ibid 84
4 Ibid 84
5 Daśavaikālika 4, 22.
6 Tattvārthasūtra I. 30.

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There is nothing to be known and nothing unknown. It is the knowledge of all substances and modes of the past, present and future, all in one. The fullest realisation of the capacity of the self when all the impediments are removed is to be found in the keyalajñāna. When the kevalajñāna is attained, all imperfect knowledge is washed away.
THREE VIEWS ABOUT DARŠANA AND JÑANA _.?
The Jainas make a distinction between anākāra and sākāra upayoga. They say that anākāra upayoga is indeterminate cognition, it is darśana. It is intuitive in nature. While sākāra upayoga is determinate cognition, it is jñāna in nature. Sākāra upayoga is specific cognition and cognises the specific qualities of the objects. Sākāra & anākāra are the distinctions made on the basis of determinate and indeterminate cognition. 2
The distinction between jñāna and darśana in the Jaina epistemology has been very ancient. The kārmic matter which obscures knowledge is liñānāvaraniya karma &that kārmic inatter which obscures darśana is called darśanīvaraniya kārma. When the relevant karma is removed, we get jñāna or darśana according to the intuition, where jñānāvaraṇīya karma or darśanavaranīya karma has been removed. In the āgama literature jñāna has been referred as jāņai and darśana has been referred to as pāsail”. Digambara ācāryas contend that the function of jñāna is external and is meant to grasp the external objects. It is extroverted (bahirmukha). The function of darsana is introverted and is mainly concerned with intuiting and grasping through intuition. It is antarmukha, introverted. Acārya Virasena, in his commentary called Dhavalā on șațkhandägama of Puşpadanta says "what comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is jñāna and comprehension of the self of the same nature is darśana. Virasena says that the only difference between them is that jñāna knows the external reality while the darśana intuites the internal self.
The distinction between darśana and jñāna has been made on the basis of the nature of cognition, whether the cognition is of general or
1 2 3
Tattvārthasūtra bhāşya 1, 9. Prajiāpana sutra Şafkhandāgama, Dhayalā șikā 1, 1, 4

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particular. According to this view darśana intuite the general features of an object without analysing the particulars. While jñāna gives the cognition based on the analysis of the specific features. According to the Jainas the universal and the particular are equally important and both of them are the essential charactertistics of the object. Without the one, the other cannot exit. Therefore, that cognition which grasps only the universal without understanding the specific features would not be a valid cognition. Similarly, the congnition which analyses the specific features of an object without grasping the universal aspect would also be not a true cognition.' Presenting this view point Brahmadeva, in his commentary on Dravyasangraha has suggested that the distinction between darśana and jñāna also be studied from the points of view of naya, especially from the logical and metaphysical point of view. From the logical point of view,it would be better to say that darśana grasps the universal features of the object. But from the metaphysical point of view the self is to comprehend the general and the specific features of the object or the inner or the outer aspects.2 From the practical point of view darśana and jñānas can be distinguished but from the noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between darśana and jñāna. The distinction between darśana and jñāna made on the basis of the principles of generality and particularity has been refuted by the Jainas from another point of view. It is said that this distinction has been made with a view to adopting the phraseology and falling in line of the other systems for the sake of logical distinctions. But one who has understood the Jaina philosophy properly has grasped the āgamic view of darśana and jñāna. The āgamic point of view emphasises that the aiman is distinct from the other objects, but darśana and jñāna are aspects of the same upayoga of the soul."
This type of the view of the non-distinction between darśana & jñāna has however been held by a few philosophers. Many Jaina philo
2 3 4
Şaškhandāgama, Dhavalavrtti 1, 1, 4. Dravyasangraha vrtti gāthā 44. Dravyasangraha výtti gāthā 44. Dravyasangraha vrtti gāthā 44.

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sophers do accept the distinction between the sākāra and anākāra upayoga. Their contention is that darsana is a expression of anākāra upayoga which grasps the general features of the object. While jñāna is an expression of the sākāra upayoga which analyses the specific features because it is the expression of upayoga in its anākāra form. Upayoga has these two forms sākāra and anakära. But here there is no distinction of generality and particularity in the object.
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We may now consider the relation of darsana and jñāna from the point of view of kāla (time). Jaina philosophers are agreed that in the case of chadmastha (one who has reached upto the 10th gunasthāna), he experiences darsana and jñāna successively. But in the case of the kevalin regarding the experience of darśana and jñāna there are different views. Three views have been mentioned. The first view says that the kevalin experiences darsana and jñāna successively. The second view gives importance to the simultaneous cognition of darsana and jñāna. According to the third view there is no difference between darsana and jñāna. They are identical. In the Prajñāpanā, there is a dialogue between Bhagavāna Mahāvīra & Gaņadhara Gautama. Gautama asked Bhagavana Can we say that a kevalin who grasps the nature of the Ratnaprabhā pṛthvī through forms, example, its colour and area etc., at the same time he intuites the object. Mahavira said, this interpretation is not correct.
Gautama asked, does the kevalin not simultaneously grasp the general nature of the pṛthvi & understand the nature through various categories of cognition. What is the reason for this?
Mahavira said, that the cognition of the kevalin is sākāra and his intuition is nirākāra. Therefore when he intuites (darsana), be does not cognise. But when he gets cognition, he does not inituite. They are successively possible. In this way up to the adhahsaptamiPrthvi, from Saudharmakalpa to Iṣatpāgbhāra pṛthvi, from the paramaņu (atom) to the innumerable pradega skandhas, you should understand this order of cognition and intuition.1
1 Prajapana pada 30, sutra 319, p. 531.

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The Avašyakaniryukti and Vise şavāśyakaniryukti maintain that in the case of the kevalin the darśana & jñāna upayoga cannot be present simultaneously. The Svetāmbara āgamic tradition supports this view and maintains that jñāna and darśana upayoga cannot be had simultaneously even in the case of the kevalin.8
The Digambara tradition however contends that in the case of the kevalin it is possible to have kevaladarśana and kevalajñāna simultaneously. All the Digambara ācāryas are agreed on this point.“ Ācārya Umāsvāti also says in the case of mati and śrutajñāna e.c., there is the successive presentation of jñāna and darsana, while in the case of the kevalin the intuition and cognition are simultaneous.5
Ācārya Kundakunda, in the Niyamasāra says just as the light and heat of the sun are simultaneously experienced, so also the kevalin experiences darśana and jñāna simultaneously.
The third tradition is presented by ācārya Siddhasena Divākara, in the fourth century A. D. In his Sanmatitarka prakaraṇa, he has stated that distinction between jñāna and darśana could be made upto manahparyaya, but in the case of the kevaladarśana and kevalajñāna it is difficult to distinguish between the two.? Jñānāvaraņiya and darsanāvaranījya karmas are destroyed simultaneously. Therefore, expressions of upayoga as a result of the simultaneous destruction of jñānāvaruņiya and darśanāvaraṇīya karmas, cannot be distinguished between jñāna and darśana as successively experienced. 8 In the case of the keyalin when he attains kaivalya, mohanīya karma is first destroyed and then the jñānāvaraniya, darśanāvaraṇīya and antarāya
1 Araśyaka-nir yukti gāthā 779 2 Viseşāvaśyaka bhāşya 3 Bhagava'i 18, 8; 14, 13. 4 (a) Gommațasāra jivakānda 730
(b) Dravyasangraha 44. 5 Tartvārthasūtra bhāşya, 1, 31. 6 Niyamasāra, gāthā 159 7 Sanmati prakaraņa 2, 3. 8 Sanmati prakaraạc ?,,

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karmas are destroyed simultaneously. When there is no succession of time in the destruction of jñānāvarniya and darśanāvarṇīya karmas there is no possibility of the successive presentation of the kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana. They have to be presented simultaneously. And also because there is no distinction in the upayoga, although upayoga expresses itself in the anākāra and sākāra forms. In the case of the kevalin state there is no distinction between darśana and jñāna. And to consider darśana and jñāna as distinct would raise some other difficulties. If the kevalin is to know everything at one moment of experience, then for all times he will be knowing everything. In that case, his knowiedge would not be perfect because he would go on knowing and experiencing. In that case, how can it be omniscient. But in the case of omniscience, knowledge and experience are perfect and one. And there would we no distinction between jñāna and darsana. Jñāna is determinate (savikalpa) and darśana is indeterminate (nirvikalpa). This kind of distinction between the determinate and indeterminate cognition is not be found when the kārmic matter obscuring knowledge and intuition are destroyed.2 As long as there is perfect, not but imperfect expression of upayoga there would be distinction between determinate and indeterminate cognition. But when upayoga is perfectly and fully expressed, there would be no distinction of this type. One more difficulty would be that darśana (intuition) would be without the element of jñāna. But in the case of jñāna, the element of darśana is involved.3 In the case of the kevalin when be gets omniscient knowledge, then darśana again would not be possible because darśana is not involved with jñāna although jñāna involves darśana. Therefore, the successive cognition of darśana and jñāna in the case of the perfect knowledge would not be possible. The Digambara tradition accepts the simultaneous cognition of darśana and jñāna. But in the Svetāmbara tradition there are three streams of thought : (a) successive cognition of the two, (b) simultaneous cognition and (c) non-difference of darśana and
1 2 3
Sanmati prakarana 2, 10 Sanmati prakarana 2, 11. Ibid. 2; 22.

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jñāna in the case of the kevalin. These three streams of thought have been coordinated from the point of view of (naya) by the famous logician Yagovijaya in the vikrama 17th century. From the point of view rjusūtranaya, successive presentation of darsana and jñāna in the case of kevalin is acceptable, because the view-point is to look at the particular moment the present. Jñāna and darśana in these moments can be considered as the cause and the effect. However, the relation of the cause and effect would be the view-point presented by rjusūtranaya. From the point of view of vyavahāra naya, the distinction between jñāna and darśana is accepted so the simultaneous cognition of both would be the acceptable view. From the point of view of samgrahanaya the emphasis is on non-difference between jñāna and darśana. It appears to be from the point of view of rational consideration that the non-difference point of view is more adequate.
There is the āgamic point of view which is based on the natural process of cognition and intuition. It is natural that in the first moment we experience the particulars as distinct and then we cognise the general among the particulars. The characteristic of cognition (jñāna) is of this type. It is a synthesis of bheda (difference) and abheda (non-distinct) and bhedābheda. However, knowledge with its emphasis on distinction and darśana with its emphasis on non-distinction cannot occur simultaneously.
Thus we have studied the problems of knowledge and intuition from the āgama yuga to the dārsanikayuga. Detailed discussion on these problems would be beyond the scope of this small book.
1
Jñānabindu.

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14. - PRAMĀNA :
A Study
PRAMĀŅA IN THE AGAMIC LITERAUTURE HER
In the agamic literature, we get elaborate discussion of pramāna (valid source of knowledge). A good deal of discussion has been carried out on regarding the nature and types of pramāņa.
In the Bhagavatī sūtral there is a dialogue between Gautama Gapadhara and Bhagavāna Mahāvīra. Gautama asked Mahāvira, :Bhagavan ! in the case of the kevalin who is to relinquish the body for the last time, his cognition and intuition are perfect. Similarly, can we say how a chadmastha, gets knowledge ? Mahāvīra said, in the case of the chadmasth1, knowledge is not spontaneous, it is through the valid sources of knowledge like śravaņa (bearing) and other pramāņas. On this, Gautama asked a question on the basis of hearing? Mahāvīra replied, from the point of view of kevalin.........
Gautama again asked by what pramāna does the chadmastha get knowledge ? Mahāvīra replied, knowledge is possible through four pramāņas : pratyakşa, anumāna, upamāna and agama. The description of the four pramānas has been given in the Anuyogadvāra.
In the Sthānānga, the term pramāna, and hetu has been used. From the point of view of niksepa pramāna has been distinguished into : dravya pramāna, kşetra pramāna, kāla pramāna and bhāva pramāna.
In the Sthānānga where the word hetu is used the four-fold
1 2
Bhagavatt sūtra 5, 3, 191, 192. Sthānāága 321.

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distinction of pramāņa as pratyakşa (direct), anumāna (inference), upamāna (comparison) and agama (testimony) has been presented.
In some places three-fold distinction of pramānas has been mentioned. In that case the word vyavasāya is used, meaning determined cognition. Vyavasāya is of three types, pratyakşa, prātyayika and ānugāmika. 2
There are different traditions regarding the distinctions in the types of pramānu, some have mentioned three pramāṇas and some other four pramāņas. Sāṁkhya philosophy mentions three pramānas and Nyāya mentions four pramāņas. Both these traditions, are mentioned in Sthănānga. In the Anuyogadvāra there is an elaborate discussion of the pramāņa which is mentioned below.
L. PRATYAKŞA (DIRECT) Pratyakşa has been distinguished into two types as (1) indriya pratyakşa (sense-pratyakşa) and (2) no-indrija pratyakşü (knowledge without the help of the sense-organs). Indriya pratyakşa is of five types, as (1) auditory perception (Śrotrendriya pratyakşa) (2) visual perception (cakşurindriya pratyakşa) (3) alfactory experience (ghrănendriya pratyakşa) (4) experience of taste (jivhendriya pratyakşa) and touch experience (sparśanendriya pratyakşa).
No-indriya pratyakşa is of three types : (1) avadhi pratyakşa (clairvoyance) (2) manaḥparyaya pratyakşa (telepathy) and (3) kevala pratyakşa (omniscience). The cognition through mind (mānasa pratyakşa) has been included in the sense-experience (indriya pratyakşa). Therefore, there is no separate mention of mānasapratyaksa. The later pbilosophers have given a separate status for the cognition through mind.
ANUMANA (INFERENCE) Anumāna (inference) Ias been distinguished into three types as (1) pūrvavat (from cause to effect) (2) śeşavat (from effect to cause) and (3) drșțasādharmyavat (from universal to practicular). Nyāya',
1 Sthānānga 338 2 (a) Sthānānga 185
(b) Sthānānga, Abhayadevavrtti 3Nyāyasūtra 1, 1, 5.

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Bauddhał and śānkhya2 darśana have accepted these three forms of inference.
Püryavat - Puryavat proceeds from the cause to the effect, from the antecedent event to the consequent. For instance, when there are clouds, we say it will rain. Similarly, a mother seeing her son after several years, when he returns from abroad. In the first few moments she could not recognise, but she sees a sign on his body and instantly she recognises him as her son. This is pūrvavat anumāna.3
Śesavat-sesavat anumāna is from effect to the cause, from cause to effect, from quality to the substance, which is the substratum of quality from constituent forms to the agent of constitutent forms and the source of dependence to the dependent. These are the five types of seşavat anumānas.
From effect to the cause, we move from knowing the effect & we infer the cause. For example, from the sound of particular thing, we say it is a sound of particular instruments. We also proceed from cause to effect as in the case of, we infer the quality of a pot from the clay.
We infer the nature of the substance having qualities on the basis of the qualities, as for example we infer the standard of gold by rubbing it; from the smell, we infer the nature of the type of the flower, from the taste, we infer the salt of any other object.
In the case of inferenc: from the constitutents to its objects, we infer, for example, from the horns the type of buffalo, from the ivory the elephant, from the hood we infer the existence a horse and from mane we infer the existence of lion.
When we infer the dependence of an object, from the object of dependence, we infer the presence of fire from the smoke; from the presence of a collection of swans, we infer the existence of water and from the good nature of a man we infer his family background.
1 Upāyah sdaya p. 13. 2 Sarhkhyakārikā 5-6. 3 Anuyogadvāra sūtra, pramāna prakaraña

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We infer from the cause to the effect in two types. But in the case of avayava and avayavi etc., there is no such distinction.
Drsțasādharmyavat-In this, the inference is from the general to the particular, on the basis of common points and similarity. For instance, on the perception of a particular object with its quality, we infer the nature of similar objects. In this, from the particular object we go to the species and gunas. For example, when we see a person we infer the existence of similar persons in that land.
There is a form of inference called visesa, drsta anumāna. In this, we distinguish one object from a large collection of objects and we infer the specific nature of that object. For instance, when we distinguish one man and recognise him from among the large crowd, we use this inference. Sāmānya drsta inference is like upamāna (comparison) while viseșa drsta upamāna is analogue to pratyabhijñā (recognition).
Anuyogadvära has made a distinction in anumāna as of three types on the basis of the consideration of time : (1) atita kāla grahaņa-When we see the greenery all-round and the overflowing ponds, we infer that there has been good rain in that part. (2) pratyutpanna kala grahana-In this also, we infer the causes from the effect, although the causes may be remote causes. For instance, if an ascetic who goes for begging food, if he gets sufficient food, then he infers that there is plenty in this part. (3) anāgata kala grahanaIt is from antecedent even to the consequent event. For instance, when we see thunder and lightning and when the sky is full of dark clouds, we infer that it would rain heavily.
Apart from these three types of anumāna based on the criterian of time we may infer wherein contrary situations might give negative inference. For instance, if we see the land very dry, we infer that there has been famine. When the ascetic does not get sufficient food during his begging round, he infers that there has been famine in that area. in THE CONSTITUENT PROPOSITIONS OF INFERENCE
(Syllogism) Syllogism refers to the constituent propositions which are

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called avayavas. There is not much discussion about this problem in the original agamas. The syllogism is meant for the communication of one's thoughts to others. It presents the methodology and the procedure of expressing one's thoughts to others so as to it effective and valid. Daśavaikālikaniryukti has a discussion about this problem and it mentions various forms of syllogism from the syllogism with two propositions to the syllogism with ten propositions.1 The syllogism with two propositions has been mentioned with two specific functions. In the case of syllogism with only two propositions, hetu is not mentioned only udaharana is mentioned along with pratijñā. We give below a schemata of the number of propositions involved in the various types of syllogisms based on the number of propositions. (1) a syllogism with two propositions mentions pratijñā and udāharaṇa (2)a syllogism with three constituent propositions mentions pratijñā, hetu, udaharaṇa, (3) a syllogism with five propositions mentions pratijña, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upasaṁhāra and nigamana.
A syllogism with ten propositions has been elaborated as follows pratijñā, pratijñāvi§uddhi, hetu, hetuviśuddhi, dṛṣṭānta, dṛṣṭāntaviśuddhi upasaṁhāra, upasaṁhāravi§uddhi and nigamana, nigamanaviśuddhi.
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The ten membered syllogism has also been mentioned in the following way: pratijñā, pratijñāvibhakti, hetu, hetuvibhakti, vipakşa, pratisedha, dṛṣṭānta, āśanka, tatpratişedha and nigamana, 2
It may be noted that there is sufficient discussions about the twomembered, three-membered and five-membered syllogism in the other darśanas. But Bhadrabahu alone has given an analysis of the tenmembered syllogism."
2.3
UPAMANA
Upamāna is comparison. It is nearer to analogy in the western logic. It is based on the points of similarity (sādharmya) and points of difference (vaidharmya). Accordingly, upamāna is distinguished
1 Dajavaikālikaniryukti 50.
2. Dasavaikaälika niryukti 92.
3. Nyāyasūtra 1, 1, 32.
4. See Jaina Darsana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 250.

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into two types : sādharmya upamāna and vaidharmya upamāna. Sādharmya upamāna is further distinguished into three types :-(a) Kincit sādharmyopanīta. It consists of the similarity in terminology like aditya and khadyota, candra and kumuda. The terms applies to the similar objects on the basis of similarity of functions denoted by the words. (b) Prāyaḥ sādharmyopanita-This is based on the points of similarity perceived in two objects. For instance, when we see an animal in the forest which resembles the cow we say that this animal is like the cow. Because there is "sufficient similarity between the two. (c) Sarvasādhrmyopanita-In this there is complete similarity so as to deny the same quality to the other individuals and other objects. For instance, the object or the individual is unique because the qualities that one possess cannot be applied to others. For example, indra is Indra only, Tirthankara is tīrthankara only and Chakravartin is chakravartin only.
Vaidharmyopanīta upamāna is based on the points of difference. It is also of three types : (a) Kiñcit vaidharmyopunita-In it we express the distinction between the cow and the horse (b) Prāyovaidharmyopanīta-In this, there is emphasis on the distinctions on the contrary qualities. For instance, the black is not white. (c) Sarvavaidharmyopanīta, In this, the specific and peculiar qualities have been specifically distinguished. For example, a good man did actions which are good only and bad man very often does action consistance with his character.
Dr. Mohanlal Mehtā says these examples are not adequate to explain this type of analogy. We may give examples of good and the bad, the servant and the master etc.
s
AGAMA
Agama is testimony. It is the acceptance of an authority. It is of two type (i) Laukika āgama and (il) Lokottara āgama. Laukika āgama refers to the expression regarding the empirical events and Lokottara āgama refers to the philosophical and spiritual discussions
1.
Jaina darśana Dr.-Mohanlal Mehta

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385 as given in the fästras. For instance, we can mention Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa as laukika āgamas while the ai gas like Acāranga, Sülrakrtāngā, Samavāyānga, Bhagavati, etc., coming from the omniscient tirthankara are lokottara agama. Lokottarāgama has been distinguished into three types as sutrāgama, atthāgama and tadubhayāgama.' Agamas have also been distinguished into three types from another point of view : ātmāgama, anantarāgama and paramparāgama.. Agama has also been distinguished into two forms as artharüpa and sütrarūpa. The tirthankara preaches the doctrines to his disciples, i.e. artharüpa agama. It is ātmägama for tirthaikara because it comes from the omniscient only and not received from any other person. Ginadharas receive the teaching of the tirthankara directly. There is no third person in between them. Therefore this arthāgama received by the ganadharas is anantarāgama for themselves. But on the basis of this arthāgama, ganadharas present it to the others in the forms of Sūtra (aphorisms), therefore this sūtrāgama for the ganadharas is ātmāgama. The disciples of the Ganadhara receive the teaching directly and there is no third person involved. Therefore, agama teaching received by the disciples from the Ganadharas direcly is called anatarāgama for the disciples. But from the point of view of the content of the teaching it is paramparāgama, because it comes from the master to the teacher in succession. In this sense, the teachings received by the ganadharas cannot also be considered as ātmāgama because it was received from the tirtharkara. For the disciples of the ganadharas and their disciples in succession sutragami and arthāgama are to be considered as parumparāgama only.
:. So far, we have discussed the nature of pramānas. The validity of the pramāņıs have been discussed in the āgamas and on the basis of that discussion, the later ācāryas have developed a system of logic
1. Anuyogadvāra 49-50. p. 68-Punyavjayaji Ed. 2. Ibid, sūtra 470, p. 179. 3. Ibid. 4. Avašyaka niryukti, gāthā 92. 5. Anuyogadvāra sūtra 470, p. 170.

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presented in the methodology of the polemic (pūrva pakşa) and the construction of the theory of logic on the basis of the polemic. In this, the later ācāryas have made a significant contribution to the development of Indian logic.
3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAMĀŅA
Pramāna is characterised by valid knowledge. The relat on between jñāna and pramāna is one of pervaded and the pervasion. Jñana is pervasion (vyāpaka) and pramāna is vyāpya, Jñāna is of two types : Yathāratha (valid) and ayathārtha (invalid). Valid knowledge is that which is consistent with the previous knowledge and is definite and certain. That knowledge which is expressed by doubt (sarśaya) and perversity (viparyaya) is invalid knowledge. The knowledge which is valid is free from doubt and is certain and well-defined.
DE CAUSATION OF PRAMĀŅA
The general characteristic of prāmaņa is--"pramayāḥ karanam pramānan" It is the instrument of the pramā. “Tadbhayati tatprakarānubhavah pramā" that object which is known as it is, called pramā. It is the object of valid cognition. For the cognition of an object several factors contribute, but all of them cannot be called karaña (instruments of knowledge). Karana is that which is the instrument of knowledge and by which knowledge is cognised. The conditions for using an axe would be the hand and the blade. The hand would be a condition no doubt, it is the less essential condition than the blade.
- The philosophers are agreed on the general nature of pramāņa, but there are differences of opinion regarding the sources of the instruments (karaṇa) of valid cognition. In the Buddhist literature consistency and adequacy (yogyatā) are the criteria or karana. In the case of the Naiyāyāyikas sannikarşa (contact) & jñāna (cognition) are the criteria or karana of pramāna. But in the Jaina darśana jñāna is considered to be karana,2 Although Sannikarşa and adequacy
1 (a) Nyāyabindu 1, 19, 20.
(b) Pramāņa samuccaya, p. 24
(c) Tavttvārthašlokavāritika 1, 3, 44. 2. Nyāyabhāşya 1, 1, 3,

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etc., are useful for grasping the meaning of the cognition, but jñānía is much more important for understanding the meaning. Jñāna establishes the intimate contact between itself and the object. . DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PRAMĀŅA
The ācāryas have used different terminology for explaining pramāna. According to the Jainas the essence of pramāņa is well-defined knowledge (nirņāyaka jñāna). Ācārya Vidyānada in his Tattvārthaślokavārttika (1, 10, 77) says that pramāna is that whicb establishes the correct and well-defined knowledge. This is the characteristic of knowledge.
Pramāņa determines the exact meaning of a thing. This is the characteristic of pramāņa. The other characteristics mentioned about prāmāna are only variations of the descriptions of the determinateness of the meaning of the thing. The use of other characteristics mentioned are due to three reasons : (1) to differentiate between the description of the pramāņa given by one school from the description given by the others, (2) to refute the description of other characteristics of pramāņa mentioned by other schools of thought and (3) to refute the discrepancies and errors in the description of nature of pramāņa.
Ācārya Siddhasena in his Nyāyāvai āra says that the function of pramāņa is to illumine the self and also the object. Therefore, it is self and the other illuminating. The Mimärsakas do not accept the view that the pramāna is self-illuminating. According to them pramāna is to cognise the object in a definite way. We cognise the object and therefore, we are the subject of cognition and cognition is the knowledge. This is the 'paroksa jñānavāda".1
Nyāya-Vaiseșika consider cognition and the object of cognition as distinct. According to them, all knowledge except the divine knowledge is cognised by the other cogntion, Sankhya philosophers consider cognition as a product of prakrti and therefore, acetana (unconscious). According to them, cognition is the mode of prakrii, it is sometimes a perverse expression of the mode of prakşti. There
1. Mimārhsā ślokavārtika 184-187.

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fore, it is unconscious. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this argument and has used the word sva-ābhāsī.1 According to Jainism, he says jñāna is sva-abhäsī.1 Its characteristic is cognition. The cognition is not the object of cognition nor is it the pramāṇa, as in the case of the cognition of Iswara. Cognition is not unconscious and not the mode of prakrti. Knowledge is the characteristic of the soul.*
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The Buddhists consider cognition as real and the world of physical object as an appearance. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this stand by using the word "para ābhāsi". He has shown that the objects have an independent existence and reality, independent of the cognition of the object.
The Jainas maintain that knowledge and the object of knowledge both are real. Viparyaya (fallacious knowledge) is not a praman. Therefore, the term "bādhavivarjita" has been used. In this way, ācārya Siddhasena has attempted to distinguish the characteristics of pramana as described by the Jainas from jñāna given by other schools of thought.
Akalanka has used the term "anadhigatārthaka” and “avisaṁvādi''for explaining the characteristic of pramāṇa. And he has justified the use of the word "sva-parāvabhāsaka” as the characteristic of pramāņa. Acārya Māņikyanandi has followed the footsetps of Akalanka. He has suggested that pramāṇa determines the exact nature and the real nature of the object. In this, he has followed the tradition established by ācārya Samantabhadra and Siddhasena and developed by Akalanka.7
Vādidevasūri says that pramāņa is sva-para-vyavasāyī jñāna (cog
1. Syadvādamañjarī, kārikā 12.
2. Ibid, kārikā 15.
3. Vasubandhuk ṛta vimsatikā.
4. Syadvādamañjarī, 16.
5. Aştasati, 175.
6. Nyāyaviniscaya țikā, p. 63.
7. Parikṣāmukhamaṇḍana, 1, 1.

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nition of the self natured cognition and of the object.)' In this, he has not given importance to the word apūrva used by Māņikyanandi.
During this time, two schools of thought were developed. Digambara ācārya did not accept the knowledge which is received by stimulations and which is continuous (dhārāvāhi) as pramāņa, while Svetāmvara ācāryas has considered the cognition also as pramāna. Vidyānandi has made it clear that the cognition that determines the self-natured cognition and of the nature of the object as pramāna, whether it is received and comprehended or not comprehended.
Ācārya Hemacandra has discussed this question in an elaborate way and had used very subtle and meaningful terminology, so we may say that the exposition of the Acārya Hemacandra had given the final picture of the nature of the pramāna. He says pramāna gives the correct knowledge of the object (samyak nirnaya).3
The Digambara and the Gretambara tradition bave used the different terminologies, but really there is not much of difference in the content of the meaning of the interpretations given by the two traditions. The development of the controversy regarding the nature of the pramāņa reflects the prevailing logical tendency and disputation of the time.
KNOWLEDGE AND PRAMANA The analysis of the nature of pramāna shows that there is no difference between the knowledge and pramāna. Jñana means samyakjñāna (right knowledge). Knowledge reveals itself and cognises the object. The Jainas hold the nature of cognition as sva-par-prakāšaka. Just as a lamp reveals the objects and also reveals itself, similarly knowledge reveals itself and cognises the other objects. The Jainas have said that pramāna is knowledge which is fruitful, determinate and certain. In the Nyāyabindu. nirvikalpakojñāna (indeterminate knowledge) has been considered to be a pramāna' But the Jaina logicians
1. Pramānanayatattvāloka 1, 2. 2. Ślokavārtika 1, 10, 78. 3. Pramānamīmārāsā 1, 1, 2. 4. Nyāyabindu, prathama prakarana.

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refute this view and they say that nirvikalpa cognition cannot be a pramāņa nor even as apramāṇa because if there is nothing determinate we cannot say whether it is pramana or not. Nirvikalpa can be attributed to darśana. Pramāņa cannot be valid cognition if it is not determined and determinate.
d
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THE CRITERION OF THE VALIDITY OF
KNOWLEDGE (PRĀMĀŅYA)
Pramāņa is truth. There is no doubt about it, although different words have been used for describing the word pramāņa. Several words have been used to describe the nature of pramāṇa yathärtha, abadhitattva, arthakhyāpana, apūrva, arthaprāpaṇa etc. These words have been accepted by some schools and rejected by others. Acārya Vidyanandi explains the characteristics of abadhitattva as that wherein we find the absence of the badhita (discrepancies). The criterion of abadhitattva is its being incoherent and consistent.1 Acarya Abhayadeva has refuted this stand in the Sanmati tīka.2 Acarya Akalanka, the Buddhists and the Mimamsakas maintain that the function of pramāņa is to make explicit the meaning of the word and to make the knowledge from the known to unknown. Vadideva sūri and Hemacandra have refuted this stand."
In this way, there has been a long controversy on the nature and function of pramāņa and the relation of pramāna and jñāna. It may be noted that the pramāņa has to point to the pragmatic test. Unless the valid cognition leads to the successful knowledge, the cognition cannot be considered to be valid. At the same time it should be noted that cognition and truth must be consistant and mutually related.
1. Tattvärtha ślokavārtika 175.
2. Sanmati tīkā p. 614.
3 Tattvärtha slokavārtika 175.
4 (a) Pramāṇanayatattvaratnākarāvarikā 1-2.
(a) Pramāṇīmīṁsā.

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THE VALIDITY OF COGNITION We have seen that pramāņa refers to samyagjñāna (correct knowledge). But it is necessary to distinguish between the correct knowledge samyagjñāna and mithyājñāna. The Jaina logicians have given the criterion of validity of knowledge on the basis of the two-fold functions (i) the self-cognition of the cognition and the cognition of
the object. Sometime cognition becomes valid by itself and some time it has to be verified by means of some other cognition.
Therefore, the words svataḥ and parataḥ are used. If cognition is self-valid, it is true to itself and it is a pramāņa. But in some cases, cognition has to be verified through some other mearis. The Naiyyāyikas do not accept the validity of knowledge. According to them the validity or other wise of cognition has to be determined by some other criteria outside cognition. Therefore, it is praratch pramānya.
· The Mimāṁsakas maintain the view of the self-validity of knowledge. The invalid knowledge is due to external circumstances and differences. It is not necessary to have any external criteria for determining the validity of knowledge. This is the svataḥ prāmānyavāda. The Naiyyāyikas do not accept the svatah pramāṇyavāda (self-validity of knowledge). According to them validity of knowledge can be determined by circumstances whith are eternal to knowledge. That knowledge is valid which corresponds to the facts or the external objects. That which is contrary to the fact is invalid knowledge. This is the criterion of correspondence to determining the truth or the falsity. of knowledge. Sänkha darśana is of the opinion that the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both determined by self. There is no necessity of an external condition to determine the validity or otherwise of knowledge. The Jainas are against the three views mentioned above. According to the Jainas, the validity of knowledge can be determined by the self or by the external circumstances according to the situation. They accept both the theories of svatan pramānya and parataḥ prāmāṇya of the validity of cognition. But they say
1 (a) Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 1, 18
(b) Pramānamimārsā-1, 1, 8.

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the validity or otherwise of congnition is determined by the situation, for instance, a man is thristy, he drinks water and he knows that the water has quenched his thrist. In this cognition, it is not necessary to have external circumstances for determining the validity of knowledge. Again, if we see light coming out from a closed room, and if we do not know from what source the light comes, whether it is from candle or an electric light, we have to open the door and see. In this case, the validity is determined by external circumstance. Therefore, in this situtation it is paratah.1
RESULT OF PRAMĀŅA
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Now the question has been asked: what is the result of the effect of pramāṇa. In the Pramāṇamīmāṁsā (1,1,34) it has been suggested that the aim of pramāņa is to make the object clear. It is to illumine the object. Pramāṇa enables to comprehend the two objects of the nature of the object. We cannot get a correct nature of the object unless we have the knowledge of the distinction between pramāṇa and apramāņa. The direct result of pramāņa is to remove ignorance. This is the effect of all forms of pramāņas. If we consider the effect of pramāņa in various degrees, we find that in the case of kevalajñāna it leads to happiness and bliss. With this knowledge, one gets full comprehension, just as the rays of the sun's light make everything clear. The omniscient person wards away ignorance and enjoys eternal bliss. He develops an attitude of non-detachment for the things of the world. For those who have other forms knowledge except the kevalajñāna they develop the capacity of comprehension and discrimination. Similarly, they develop tendency towards good action and a disgust towards evil actions."
THE NUMBER OF PRAMAŅAS
In Indian philosophy, there is no agreement between the different schools of Indian thought on the question of the number of pramāņas. The Cārvāka school maintains that sense-perception is the only valid source of knowledge (pramāṇa). Vaiseşikas recognise pratyakṣa and anumāna as pramāṇa. Sānkhya darśana mentions three pramāņas;
1. Jaina Darsana-Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 255-257, 2. Nyāyāvatāra 28.

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pratyakşa, anumāna and sabda. Nyāya darśana accepts four pramānas : pratyakşa, anuiāna, upamāna and sabda. Prabhākara school of Mimā. msā has given five pramaņas: pra'yakşa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda and arthāpatti (implication). The Bhätta school of Mīmāṁsā gives six pramāņas by adding abhāva or anupalabdhi (cognition of absence). Buddhists have mentioned only two pramāņas : pratyakşa and anumāna.
In the Jaina epistemology, there are three different views regarding the number of pram īņas. In the Anuyogadvára sütra four pramāņas : pratyakşa, anumāna, upamāna and agama have been inentioned. Acārya Siddhasena Divākara mentions three pramānas : pratyakşa, anu'nāna & ägu.. Unāsvāti in his Tartvārthasútra, Vādidevasūri in his Promāņanayatattväloka, and ācārya Hemacandra in the Pramāņamīmāṁsā have recognised two prumāņas : pratyakșa and parokșa.
The Buddhists have recognised prtayakșa and anumāna.2 The Jainas have mentioned that anumāna is a form of parokşa pramāna and there are ag ina etc., many forms of paroksa pramāņ:. The Jainas maintain that the Buddhist classification of pramāna is not exhaustive, because it does not mention āgama etc. as a pramāņa. The contention of the Cārvāka school that indriyapratyakşa is the only pramāņa is not correct because it ignores other forms of pratyakşa, which we can get without the help of the sense-organs directly by the soul. Our knowledge of the mental states of others on the basis of the observation of external behaviours cannot be considered to be pratyakşajñ ina. It implies anumana. Similarly, without anumāna it is difficult to get th: knowledge of the relation of the cause and effect. We may state that without anumina it is difficult to establish one's ova position on the basis of the refutation of the opposite position and also to establish the truth for otherwise of the existence of the other world.3
The criterion of the validity of knowledge is that cognition should be valid and it must correspond to the facts. For all the
1. (a) Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 2.
(b) Praināņainīmāṁsā 1, 1,9 10, 2. Nyāya'indu 3. 3, Pramānamimāṁsā 1, 1, 11.

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forms of pramāņa, this is the primary criterion. The pramānas can be classified into pratyakșa and parokşa. The anumāna, upamāna and āgama are considered to be parokşajñāna. Arihāpatti is the form of anumāna, abhäva or anupalabdhi is a form of pratyakşa. The object has its nature of existence or non-existence. We can apprehend the existence and non-existence and both these states are directly appreheded. Therefore, it is not necessary to enumerate abhāva or anupalabdhi as a separate pramāna. For example, we perceive the absence of the book on the table, in this, we perceive the table and in perceiving the table without the book which was there in the past, we perceive the absence of the book. This is a form of perception. Therefore abhāva cannot be different from pratyakşa.
.? THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRATYAKŞA
The Jainas contend that clearaess and distinctness (vaisadya) as the charactetistic of Pratyakşa.1 Siddhasena Divākara maintains that pratyakşa apprehends the meaning of the nature of the object directly without the medium of any other form of source of knowledge. % This criterion can be understood when we know the distinction between pra'yaksa and parokşa. Akalanka in the Nyāyariniscaya states that clearness and distinctess (sp.stuñanz) is a criterion of pratyak sa. He has used the terms "sīkāra" and añjasi to explain the criteria of clearness and distinctness for pra'yaksa. Jaina darśana does not accept sannikarsa as a crterion as having been used in the Vaišeşikas and not do the Jainas accept "kalpanāpod'a tra” as the criterion of pratyakşa. Vaisadya would mean that type of cognition which does not require any other forin of cognition to make the meaning clear. In the cas: of anu nāra and other forms of purokşa jñāna there are intermediary cognition and media like lingajñāna (the knowledge of the middle terin), vyāpti (universal concoinmitance of the middle
1 (a) Pramānımīmārisā 1, 1, 13.
(b) Pramānanayatattvāloka 2
(c) Parikṣāmukha, 2, 3 2 Nyāyāvatāra śloka 4, 3 Nyāyaviniscaya śloka 3.

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major term) and smarana (memory etc). This is the differenciating term and the characteristics of pratyakṣa. Pratyaksa, therefore, cognises the object directly and fully without any other media. But while in the case of anumāna, we proceed from previous knowledge to some other knowledge based on the previous knowledge. That knowledge which is based on the previous knowledge, is parokṣa jñāna, it is not direct.
TWO TYPES OF PRATYAKŞA
The Jainas have classified pratyakşa into (1) ātmapratyakşa and (2) indriyānindriya pratyakṣa. Atmapratyakşa is the knowledge that the soul gets directly without the help of sense-organs. The indriyanindriya pratyakṣa is empirical knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs through the mind or knowledge obtained through other sources like reason and testimony.
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Aimapratyakşa has been classified into two typeys: 1. Sakala pratyakşa which is kevalajñina, 2. Vikalapratyakşa which is nokevalajnina. It is partial knowledge short of omniscience. Nokevala jñāna is of two types: (1) avadhijñāna and (2) manaḥparyaya jñāna. Indriya-anindriya pratyakşa has four stages (1) avagraha (2) ihā, (3) avaya and (4) dhāraṇā. Ātmapratyakşa is the direct knowledge that the soul gets without the help of indriyas, the manas, and other pramāņas. This is pāramārthika pratyakṣa or no-indriyapratyakşa. In the indriya pratyakşa one gets direct cognition through the medium. of sense-organs and the manas, without the help of the middle term or the process of reasoning.
Siddhasena Divakara1 says that direct knowledge is that knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs without the medium of reasoning proceduce & the analysis of the meaning .In this analysis, he uses the word aparokşa and that is a significant word. Because Naiyyayikas consider pratyakşa jñāna to be the knowledge which is obtained through the contact of sense-organs and the object. They do not use the word aparoksa because it would convey negative meaning
1 Nyāyāvatāra 4.

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for them. But the knowledge obtained through the contact of the sense-organs and the object is not know ledge that the soul or the cog. niser gets directly, it is, therefore, not pratyakşa. This contention of Siddhasena Divākara has the support in the Bhagavati' & Sthânānga? on the anlysis of pramāna.
Ācārya Hemacandra, Akalanka and Māņikyanandi have elaborated the nature of pratyakşa They have used the word "visada" as a characteristic of knowledge, in place of "aparokşa”. From the practical point of view the use of this terminology has been mentioned and has the support of Nandisutra. According to them pratyakşa has been distinguished into two types as mukhya and sarivyavahāra. The mukhya pratyakşa is the knowledge that the soul get directly with out the help of the sense-organs. The samvravahāra pratyakşa is that knowledge which one gets through the sense-organs and the manas. In this analysis of the samvyavahāra pratyakşa the words “aparokşatayā" and 'arthagrahaņa" do not figure in as the criteria of pratyakşa. Therefore, the word visida has been used.
The word viŝada is meant to clear the meaning of ihe cognition with reference to clarity and perceptual judgement. The meaning of the sarvyavahāra pratyakşa and anumāna would be clear with the use of visada. However, the word aparoksz is nearer to the concept of the Velān:ic anlaysis of pratyakşı, and the word visada has similarity with the description of the nature of pratyakşa, as given by the Bud. dhists. But considering the content of the meaning in the two verses there are some fundamental distinctions. The Vedāntins maintain that pratyakşa jñāna is possible through the medium of antaḥka. rana (inner sense-organs). The antahkarana takes the modfication of the object i.e., ceen & is reflected through the intellect to the soul and that is a pratyaksa jñāna. But according to the Jainas, there is no other medium between the object and the cognition in the case of the pra. tyaksa jň ina. To consider that antahkarana is illumined by the suddhacaitanya (pure consciousness) and also to maintain that antalkaraña gets modified to the size of the object is not very adequate explantion.
1 Bhagarati 4, 3. 2. Sthānānga 5, 3. 3. Nandisutra 2, 3.

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It is, therefore, more appropriate to maintain that suddhacaitanya directly cognises the object without the help of any modifications or reflections.
According to the Buddhists pratyakṣa is nirvikalpa jñāna. It is indeterminate cognition. But Jainas maintain that nirvikalpaka bodha cognition (dirsana) is not determinate cognition. Therefore, it is neither pratyakşa nor even pramāṇ.1
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We have already seen that pratyakşa according to the Jainas have been distinguished from two points of view: (1) pāramārthika (the ultimate point of view) and vyāvahārika (phenomenal point of view). In the pāramārthika pratyakṣa we have mentioned two types: sakala and vikala. And vyāvahārika pratyakṣa has been distinguished into four stages: avagraha, ihā, avāya and dharaṇā.
PAROKSA
2
That knowledge which is yathartha (adequate) and yet which has the characteristic of being unclear and distinct is called parokşa pramāṇa. 8 Parokşa is opposite of pratyakşa. In this, there is the absence of clearness and distinctness (vaisadya and spaṣṭatā). Parokṣa is of five types (1) smaraṇa-smrti (memory), (2) pratyabhijñā (recognition) (3) tarka (logical discussion), (4) anumāna (inference) and (5) āgama (testimomy). *
Most of the Jaina logicians have made these five distinctions in the paroksa pramāṇa. But Vādirāja in his commentary on Nyāyavini§caya called Pramāṇā niṛṇaya,5 that parokşa can be classified into two types (i) anumāna and (ii) āgama. Anumana is of two types: (1) primary (mukhya) and (2) secondary (gauņa). Gauṇa anumīna is
1. Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva (Hindi) Part I, 264-265
2 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 2, 4
3 (a) Pramāṇamīmāṁsā 1, 2.
(b) Pramāṇanayatattvāloka_3, 1 4 Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 3, 2.
5 Pramāṇanirnaya p. 331.

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of three types (1) smarana (2) pratyabhijñā and tarka. Smarana is the cause of pratyabhijñi and pratyabhijñā is the caure of tarka. Hence these three are the instruments in the formation of anumāna. Therefore he has considered these as gauna. There is another reason mentioned in tíre Nyāyaviniscaya, in that work pratyakşa, anumāna and āgama have been mentioned as praināņas, and other pramāṇas have been included as form of anumāna. LB REFUTATION OF CĀRVĀKA VIEW
The Cārvāka maintains that sense-percetion is the only valid sou. rce of knowledge, there is no other pramāņi. The criterion for determining the pramāna suggested by Cārvāka is avisaṁväda (non-contradiction with fact). And the other pramāṇas except the indriya pratya. ksa are based or do not possess these characteristics. Anumāna and other pramāņas are based on probability. And there would be distinctions and differentiations in the strength of probability on the basis of the time element and the element of form. In these cases, it would be difficult to find the characteristics of avinābhāva and avyabhicāra (unerring). For example, a sour and bitter fruit may be transformed into a sweet fruit through the passage of time and in a different place due to some material transformations also. Therefore, the inference regarding the fruit as bitter would not be adequate. Similarly, the case is with smarana and other pramānas.
But this contention of the Carvāka is not satisfactory, because even to affirm the sweetness or otherwise of the fruit in the first instant would involve the process of inference and other forms of pramāņas. Similarly, to make a distinction between pratyākṣa pramāna and other forms of pramāņas as invalid source of knowledge on the basis of the criterion of avisaṁvāda (non-contradiction) would involve the process of inference. Similarly, it is not possibl: to know the mind of the others without the help of the inference. Because through the indriyas we cannot know the mind of others.
We can know the mental states of others by inference on the basis of the behaviour and their sppech.: The inference is based on
1 Dharmakīrti, Pramāņamimārisā

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the universal relation between the middle term and the major term and the application of that universal relation to specific instance. If this application is inconsistent and incoherent, valid inference would not be possible. The Carvaka maintains that the other world is unreal. This conclusion of Carvaka is also based on inference. If we do not make use of the inference for getting knowledge, life would be difficult and knowledge impossible. It would be necessary to correlate the cause-effect relation for the sake of becoming valid conclusions in inference. Similarly, in practical life we have to depend on the testimony of others for the sake of knowledge. Otherwise the knowledge and the life would not be possible on surer foundation. Human knowledge has no limits. Therefore, knowledge obtained through othermeans than the direct cognition through sense-organs, like inference and testimony would not become inconsistent and invalid. 1
MEMORY (SMṚTI)
3
The revival of the mental traces due to retention could be memory. Memory depends on recollection of the mental states retained in the mind of past experience. The recollection of the impressions received in the past is due to various causes, physical and the mental. The mental states of interest would be an important condition of memory. Jainas consider memory as a form of prajñā.
Other darganas in Indian philosophy do not give the status of pramă a to memory. According to them memory cannot become a pramāna because it has reference to the past events and the past events were perceived in the past and are no longer present the mind. At most, this is a form of revival of perceptual experience. But Jainas maintain that the correct knowledge of object with reference to the past, present or the future may be considered to be a pramāṇa. Memory presents the valid cognition of the past event through recollection. Therefore, it is pramāņa. Knowledge received through memory is
1 (a) Pramāṇamīmāṁsā 1, 2, 3
(b) Parikşamukha 3, 3.
2 Mahendra Kumar Jain, Jaina darsana, p. 294-295

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consistent and has a reference to the past event. Because the criterion of pramāṇa would be correctness (pathārıhatā) and correspondence to the fact of life.
The other Daršanas maintain that the past experience is no longer present and therefore how can it generate a valid cognition. The Jainas contend that the object is not the cause of cognition and cogni. tion is possible through its own conditions of cognition. Cognition has its own capacity of expressing itself and revealing the object. Similarly, the thing can become the object of cognition. The relation between the cognition and the object is not to be considered as a relation between the effect and cause. The relation between the object and the cognition of the object can be expressed as the relation between the illumination and the illuminator. Therefore, the Jainas have rightly contended smrti (memory) as a pramāņı. If we do not accept smrti as a pramāņa, then anumāna cannot be considered as a pramāņa. Because anumāna depends on the linga (middle term) which is not based on pratyakşa. Similarly, the cognition of the major terni is not possible without the memory of the universal relation of the major term and the middle term. M:nory, therefore, is an essential condition of inference.
V.3 PRATYABHIJÑA (RECOGNITION)
Pratyabhijñāna is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of pratyakşa and smarana (memory). In this, we say this is Devadatta. We recognise that the cow at home is the animal that we see. We also say that the bufallo is different from the cow. These statements are expressions of recognition. The process of cognition in this would be, we see Devadatta, we recollect that we have seen him in the past and we recognise that Devadatta that we see, is the same Devadatta that we have seen earlier. We see an animal in the forest called gavaya. We remember the cow at home which is similar to this animal and we say, we recognise that this animal is like the cow at home. This
1 (a) Parikşāmukha 3, 5.
(b) Pramāņamimārsā 1, 2, 4,

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is called sādrsa pratyabhijñāna as it is based on similarity. But we can recognise the distinction between the buffalow and the cow. It would be recognition based on the point of dissimilarity. Therefore, it is "vaisādrsa pratyabhijñāna''. Pratyabhijñāna is recognition arrived at through the process of perceptional memory. Similarly, all relational cognition like the statements : this is near, this is far, he is taller, and the elderer etc., are all forms of recognition.
The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Therefore, nothing continues to remain from the past. Pratyabhijñāna cannot be considered as a pramāna. Because, it is said to be cognition which proceeds from the past to the present. But as a thing is not possible and there is no continuity of thing, there cannot be a cognition of the past in the present. The past cognition has been destroyed. The present cognition has no reference to the past. Therefore, recognition cannot present the past cognition into the present. Pratyabhijñāna would include two cognitions. One refers to “that which was experienced in the past", & the other cognition refers “this which is actually experienced now". These two cannot become one cognition. Therefore, the Buddhists do not consider recgonition as a pramāņa. The other systems of Indian philosophy like Nyāya, Vaiseșika and Mimärhsakas, say that pratyabhijñāna is a valid cognition, but it is a form of perception and it can be included in the pratyakşa. But the Jainas contend that the Buddhist view of pratyabhijñāna as two separate cognitions and therefore not a pramāņa and the view of other systems of philosophy making praryabhijñāna as a from of perception are both inadequate. Pratyakşa has a reference to cognition of the present. Memory refers to the cognition of the past event, but pratyabhijñāna gives a synthesis of the cognition of the present with the recollection of the past incident. Therefore, it is a pramāna and is a valid source of knowledge. It is a paroksa pramāņa.
TARKA (HYPOTHETICAL REASONING) -1 Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is conditioned reasoning.1
1. Pramānamimārsā 1, 2.

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It is also called üha. It has also been referred to as cintă in the Jaina śāstras. It is inference based on the previous condition. It has two constitutent conditional propositions as the major premise. It can be stated as "if 'a' is 'b' then 'c' is 'd', and because 'a' is 'b' therefore 'c' is 'd'.” For instance, if there is fire, there is smoke and if there is no fire there is no smoke.
Vyāpti is the universal relation between the middle term and the major term. Tarka is inference based on the positive and negative conditions of the universality of relation between the middle term and the major term.
Generally all schools of Indian philosophy have accepted tarka as a pramāņa. The Naiyāyikas maintain that tarka is a from of inference and not an independent pramāna. It is an auxilliary pramāņa and is based on conditioned relation between the antecedent and the pramāna. The knowledge that we get through tarka strengthens the validity of knowledge. Pramāna is valid cognition and tarka strengthens and supports this cognition by hypothetical reasoing. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas has considered tarka as secondary pramāņa. Logicians like Udayana and Vardhamāna have considered that tarka has function of supporting the valid conclusion by presenting the universality of condition. Knowledge of vyāpti is strengthened by tarka. But the Nyāya does not accept tarka as an independent pramāņa. The Buddhists have accepted that tarka is useful in the establishment or vyāpti, but still they do not give the tarka the status of a pramāna. But Jainas have recognised it as a parokşa pramāņa. According to the Jainas the knowledge of vyāpti in its positive and negative aspect is possible through tarka. "
Anumāna (inference) cannot take the place of tarka, because it is based on tarka. The knowledge of vyāpti is possible through tarka and inference is based on knowlege of vyāpti. Therefore, anumāna is possible because of tarka. And anumāna cannot take place of the tarka. The two are different pramāṇas.
in ANUMANA (INFERENCE) Anumāna is knowledge which is arrived at through the means

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of other knowledge. It is possible through the middle term and therefore it is said that anumāna is possible through linga.' Linga is the middle term which connects the major and minor terms. Just as we can infer the existence of fire through the perception of smoke. Smoke is the linga. It is the means through which inference is possible. Fire is the major term about which we infer. It is called Sadhya or lingi. Dhūma (smoke) is the attribute of fire. Without fire the existence of smoke is not possible. Therefore, the relation between fire and smoke is of avinābhāvī (universal positive relation). The absence of fire will also be the absence of smoke. The relation is also universal considered form the negative sense. But the converse is not true. By the absence of smoke we cannot infer the absence of fire, because there may be fire without smoke, but there cannot be smoke without fire.
The relation between the major term and the middle term will have to be universal, both positively and negatively. In the sense that the presence of the middle term will bring the presence of the major term. And the absence of the middle term will bring the absence of the major term. This type of relation is the basis of valid inference. Akalanka terms this relation as "sādhyavinābhāvābhinibodhaikalakşaņā”. This type of relalion is also called anyathānupapatti, as it presents the universality of relation of the negative sense. Sadhana or linga is called hetu.
All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvāka, accept anumāņa as a pramāna. Cārvāka darśana does not give anuināna the status of pramāņa, because it is based on vyāpti. And vyāpti cannot be grasped by direct perception through perception. The Cārvāka does not accept the phenomenon of extra-sense-perception or knowledge obtained not through the sense-organs, but through other means. The other systems of philosophy have distinguished it into
1 (a) Pramāņamimāršā 1, 2, 7.
(b) Parikşāmukha 3, 14. 2 Laghiyastraya 3, 22

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two types : (1) Svārthānumāna (inference for oneself) and (2) Parārthänumāna (inference for the sake of others).
SVARTHANUMANA (INFERENCE FOR ONESELF)
Svārthānumāna is inference for oneself in which we get valid inference on the basis of the vyāpti. But this is not expressed in the verbal proposition. It is meant for oneself and the moment it is expressed in the form of proposition it becomes parārthānumāna. The universal relation may refer to co-existence of succession. For instance, in the case of the invariable concommittance of mortality, and man, there is the universality of co-existence. But in the case of the presence of clouds and the consequent rain there would be succession.
SADHANA In the Pramānamimärhsā, ācārya Hemacandra mentions five forms of sādhana : (1) Syabhāva, (2) kāraṇa, (3) kārya, (4) ekārthasamavāyī and (5) virodhi.1 Svabhāva sādhana is the essential characteristics of the object. As for instance, heat is the characteristic of the fire. Śabda (sound) is non-eternal because it is not the cause (kāruņa), it is the effect (kārya). When we see the collection of dark clouds in the sky, we infer the possiblity of rain and in this, the relation is between cause and effect (karana-kārya). In the inference between cause and effect there must be necessary relation between cause and effect and not the contingent relation. Moreover, the absence of that cause should bring the absence of the effect. The inference from effect to cause is the type of inference in which we proceed from effect to the cause of that event. For instance, we see the open space outside wet, when we get up early in the morning, then we infer that it must have rained. In this, we proceed from effect to the cause.
In some cases it is possible to have a conjunction of effect as in the case of juice of many fruits. To infer the nature of the juice from the fruit is the inference from cause to effect. But to infer from the juice, the nature of the fruit would be from effect to cause. This
1 Pramānamimärhsā 1; 2, 12

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type of inference, is called ekārthasamayāyī inference, because there is the co-existence of the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object.
Inference from the negative relation of universality would be virodhi sādhana. For instance, fire and cold are contrary to each other. If one exists, the other cannot exist. In the presence of the fire, there would be no cold. But a small portion of fire cannot - remove cold, therefore the relation between the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object of attribute has to be adeqdate (samyak).
PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA (INFERENCE FOR OTHERS) 1
Parärthānumāna is inference meant for others. It is communicated for the sake of others. Svārthanumāna is meant for self-expression. In the case of parārthānumāna, a person communicates his reasoning or the methods of reasoning for the sake of coming to the conclusion to other person who does not know. It is communicated through the propositional form (avayava). This knowledge and inference is not meant for one who already knows and has the knowledge of the methodology or reasoning.
In parārthanumāna knowledge is obtained by the self (svayamjñānātmaka), and while it is communicated to others through the medium of communication in propositional forms.
The conceptional content of parārthānumāna has to be communicated in the propositional form for the sake of giving knowledge to others. This type of communication in parārthānumāna may be considered in two forms : (1) affirmative and (2) negative. Both of them are based on the universal relation between the sādhya and sādhana. In the affirmative form of communication, the universal relation of the presence of the effect or the thing having attribute. For instance, the presence of smoke on the hill entails the inference of the presence of fire. The negative form of communication of universality of relation, gives the relation between the cause and the effect and the
1 Pramānamimärhsā 2, 1, 1 2 Pramānanayatattvāloka 3, 23

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thing and its attributes in a negative way. The absence of the cause will entail the absence of the effect, Similarly, the absence of the essential attribute will entail the absence of the thing. The absence of fire on the hill will entalil the inference of the absence of smoke.
AVAYAVA (CONSTITUENT PROPOSITION OF INFERENCE) ? Parärthānumāna has to be communicated in propositional forms for the sake of giving knowledge to others. The question arises regarding the number of constitutent propositions forming parārthanumāna. Logicians are not agreed on this point. Sänkhya philosophers say that there are three constituent propositions (avayava) : (1) pakşa, (2) hetu and (3) udāharana. Mimárnsakas mention four constituent propositions; (1) paksa, (2) hetu, (3) udāharana and (4) upanaya. The Nyāya mentions five constituent propositions like : (1) pakşa, (2) hetu (3) udáharana (4) u panaya and (5) nigamuna,
We have already discussed about the number of constituent propositions that the Jainas present, Generally for an intelligent man, two propositions mentioning the major term and middle term in one proposition and the second, the minor premise are sufficient for inferring the conclusion. But to men of dull intellect, ten propositions would be required for explaining the process of inference. Generally five constitutent propostions are accepted.
PRATIJÑA
Pratijñā is the first proposition. It expresses the statement regarding the major term, It is the statement of what is to be proved,1 For instance, we state there is fire on the bill.
HETU
Hetu is the statement of reason which mentions the presence of the middle term, It states--because there is smoke, the presence of the smoke is a symptom for the presence of the fire, although we can say the presence of the smoke does not entail the pesence of fire.
1 2
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UDAHARANA
Udaharaṇa is the statement of the major premise containing the universal relation between the major and middle term, And also the examples. In the Aristotelian tense it is a major premise, which examples the universal proposition and in which there is the universal relation between the major and the middle term, But in the udāharana, there is also the example. For instance, the statement would be "where there is smoke there is fire as for example in the kitchen," Udaharana is, therefore, a combination of the deductive and inductive process. While Aristotelian major premise impurely deductive and formal,1
UPANAYA
Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular situation. It expresses the middle and minor term and says that this particular situation falls under the category of the major premise. For example, there is smoke in this hill, this is the application of a particular situation to the general proposition.
NIGAMANA
407
Nigamana refers to the conclusion which we arrive at finally on the basis of the combination of minor and major premises. It is the result of the application of the vyāpti and pakşa dharmata. It is the restatement in a final form what was intended to be proved in the pratijñā, For example, we say therefore there is fire on the hill. The inference based on five constituent propositions may be summarised as follows i
(1) Pratijñā-there is fire on the hill,
(2) Hetu-because there is smoke.
(3) Udāharaṇa-where there is smoke there is fire, for example, in the kitchen.
(4) Upanaya-this hill has smoke.
1
Pramāṇamīmāṁsā 2, 1, 13
2 Pramananayatattvāloka 3, 49, 50 3 Ibid 3, 51, 52

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(5) Nigamana—therefore this hill has fire.
This form of inference is based on the universality or relation between the middle term and the major term in the positive sense of the existence of the relation, Therefore, it is called sādhārana drstānta, which shows the universal relation in the absence as in the case of the absence of fire in the water.
3) AGAMA Agama is testimony, It is the acceptance of the truthful statements of worthy man. It is the aptayacana. Aptapuruşa is the man of authority. He is the expert in the subject and he knows how to present his knowledge in a subject in a proper form. He is free from hatred and attachment. He is objective in his approach and has no prejudices or bias. He is not afflicted by mithyātva, From the practical point of view statement of such an āptapuruşa is important, In the parărthānumāna āptatva is not necessary while in the āgama
vould be necessary, The statements of an āptapurusa (the authority) are valid for all the time--past, present and the future. Tirthankaras are considered to be the āptapuruşa par-excellence. We have already discussed about the agama as a pramāna in the earlier chapter.
it would be ne
1
Framāpanayatattväloka 4, 1

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-KARMAVĀDA
KANAVADA
DOCTRINE OF KARMA

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KARMAVĀDA :
A Synopsis
THE IMPORTANCE OF KARMA THEORY The doctrine of karma is the most important doctrine in Indian thought. All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvāka accept the doctrine of karma. Karma is the basic pre-supposition of Indian throught. In this world, there is evident inequality in the status and the experiences of individual men. Some are happy while others are miserable. Very often the virtuous lead miserable life. Bad men are happy. Several attempts have been made in the different philosophies of the world to find out an adequate solution to the problems of inequality in life. The Indian philosophers presented the theory of karma as a possible solution to the inequality in life. The Jainas have given a systematic study of karma theory based on rational considerations. They have infact built a science of karma theory. In the literature dealing with the theory of karma, we find that Jainas have made a substantial contributions to the literature of the karma theory. They are called as karma śāstras or karma granthas, In addition to the specific writings on karma theory, we find abund. ant material scattered in various philosophical literauture both āgamic and non-āgamic on the doctrine of karma.
LITREATURE ON KARMA THEORY Jaina Literature on karma theory is very vast & thought-provoking. If we study the Jaina literature on this subject, we can make three divisions of the karma literature : (1) pūrvātmaka karma śāstras, originating from the sources of the purvas. (2) Pūrvoddhrta karma jāstra which is based on pürvas and elaborated on the basis of the doctrines given in the pūrvas. (3) Prākaraņika karma ścistra, it is an

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elaborate discussion about the development of the theory of karma as discussed in karma literature.
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
If we study the Jaina cannonical literature, we find that 8th půrva out of the 14 pūrvas relate to the discussion about the theory of karma and it is called Karma Pravāda. Similarly, a part of the second pūrva is also called Karma Prabhṛta. A part of the fifth pūrva is called Kaṣāya Prabhṛta. There is a discussion on the karma theory in these works. The karma theory is elaborated in the purvoddhṛta literature coming after the pūrvas and based upon original discussion in the purvas. The nature of the development cannot be easily explained as much of the purva literature is lost, according to both the traditions of the Jainas. Though some pūrvoddhṛta karma śāstras are available to us but there are slight variations in the presentation of the theory of karma in the two traditions. Digambara tradition gives importance to Şaṭkhaṇḍāgama and Kaṣāyaprābhṛta as the two important works dealing with karma theory. In the Svetambara tradition we have Karma Prakṛti, Karma Śataka, Panca sangraha and Saptatikā. These are the pürvoddhṛta granthas.
In the prākaraṇika karma śāstras, we have numerous works and they are based on the pūrvoddhṛta karma literature.
This form of literature was given during the periods from Vikrama 8th century to the 16th or 17th century. Later litereature of the karma literature is the elaboration of the karma theory.

From the point of language in which the karma theory has been presented we find there is abundant literature in prākṛt samskṛt and regional languages. Purvātomaka and pūrvoddhṛta literature is to be mainly found in Prākṛt language. The prakaraṇika karma literature is also to be found in Prakṛt literature along with its commentaries. Later writings on karma theories are generally in Samskrt. There is a good deal of literature on the karma theory in the regional languages like-Kannada, Hindi and Gujarati. Works in Kannada and Hindi mainly belong to the Digambara tradition and works in Gujarati refer to Svetambara tradition. On the whole, the literature on karma theory is very vast and we may estimate that the Digambara
.

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writing constitute about 5 lakhs of ślokas and Śvetāmbara literature comes to about two lakhs of slokas.
In the Svetāmbara tradition, the earliest independent work on the karma theory is the Karma Prakrti of sivasarma Suri. It has 475 gathas. Acārya has discussed in his work the eight processes of the kārmic mechanism like bandhanakarana, sankramanakarana, udvartanākaraṇa, apavartanākaraṇa, udiranākaraņa, upasamnākaraņa, nidhattikarana and nikācunākaraña.
There is also a description of the concepts of udaya and sattā of kārmic matter, There is a commentary (Cūrni) on this book. There are other commentaries (tīkā) written on this work ācāryas like Malayagiri and Yasovijaya. They are in sanskrt. Ācārya Sivašarma has also written a šataka on karma theory and Malayagiri has written a commentary on this. Candrarși Mahattara, a disciple of Pārsvarsi has written pañcasangraha and syopajñavrtti on the karma theory. There is also a Digambara 'vork called Prākst Pañcasangraha which is earlier than this work. It appears that the Digambara work was not found to be consistent with the āgamic version. Therefore, Candrarşi Mahattara wrote this (new) Pañeasangraha. Acārya Malayagiri has written a saṁskșt commentary on this. There are other works like Karmavipāka, Karma-stava, Bandba-svāmitva, Saptatikā and Sataka. There are svopajñabhāşyas also on these works. Devendrasuri has written five works on karmı theory based on the early works on this subject. In this way, we find there is abundant literature in the Jaina śāstras on the theories of karma.
KARMA THEORY AND THE OTHER DOCTRINES
Before we study the nature of the theory of karma, it would be necessary to examine the other theories which attempt to explain the inevitable equality among man. Several theories have been presented. We mention a few of them like Kālavāda, Svabhāvavāda, Niyativāda Yadschhavada, Bhūtavāds, Puruşavāda, Daivavada, & Puruşārthavāda.?
1
Svetāsvataropanişad 1, 2

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There is a brief discussion about these theories in the works menti. oned below.)
vis KALAVADA (THEORY OF TIME)
According to the theory of Kālavāda the various states of existence and happiness and misery of individual beings are determined by kāla. Kāla is the determining principle which creates and destroys. It determines the good and bad of actions. In the Atharvaveda, there is an independent sūkta for describing the importance of kāla (time). Kāla has created the earth (prthvi), it is the basis of the sun and the heat of the sun. All the beings of the world depend on kāla. The eyes perceive things due to kāla. Kala is the T svara. It is the lord of Prajāpati. Kāla is the first of the gods. There is nothing more powerful than kāla. In this sukta, kāla has been described as the first cause of the universe.
In the Mahābhārata, there is the description of the importance of the kāla as a first cause of the universe and is the basis of life and death and happiness and misery of all beings, let alone the human beings.8
In the śāstravārtā-samuccaya, it has been stated that time determines everything, living being entering into the womb of the mother, the childhood and all other incidents connected with life and experience, are determined by time. Kāla is the destroyer of everyone. Kāla is awake when everyone is asleep. It is not possible to transgress the limits of kala and it is not possible to have any events or experiences in the absence of kāl1.4 The concept of 'Time' is so important in philosophy that the Naiyāyikas gave time very important status equal to the creation of the universe.5
1. (a) See Atmamināṁsā p. 86-94-lt. Dalsukh Mālva ņiā.
(b) Jaina Sahitya kā Brhad Itihās, part 4, p. 8
(c) Jaina Dharma aur Darsına, p. 416--424 Dr. Mobanlāl Mehta 2 Atharvaveda 19, 53.-54 3 Mahābhārata, śāntiparva 25, 28, 32 etc 4 Šāstravārtāsamuccaya 165-168 5 Nyāyasiddhānta muktāvali 45

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SVABHAVAVADA (THEORY OF NATURE)
According to this theory, everything takes place according to its nature. Nothing happens contrary to its nature. Svetasvatara upanisad mentions svabhāvavada. The Bhagavadgitāa and Mahābhārata have given a description of svabhāvavāda. In the Buddhacarita, we get the description of svabhāvavāda and it has been stated that according to this theory, the pointedness of the thorns and the variety in the birds and animals is due to the very nature of these things. Svabhāvavāda does not recognise the will or efforts of the individual. Acārya Haribhadra in his Sastravārtāsamuccaya, says that according to svabhāvavāda the events and experiences are determined by the very nature of the objects. For example, the various stages of life like the childhood and oldage are determined by the nature of the individual. There is no external force. Svabhāva plays an important part in the life incident and experiences of individual beings. In fact, even pulses and rice can be cooked due to their very nature. For every action, the nature of the event or the object is the determining factor. This theory of svabhāvavāda does not recogaise the creator or the controller of the universe except the very nature of the objects and even ts.
Niyati-vada (Theory of necessity-Necessarianism)
According to this theory, everything happens out of necessity. What is to happen must happen, there is no chage in that. Everything is determined and there is nothing left to chance. Freedom of will has no place in the niyativāda. The western philosopher Spinoza says that it is due to igonorance that we say that we are free and that freedom of the will is an impotrant factor. Whatever happens, must happen. We cannot change the past because the past has already gone. We do not know the future and it is not desirable to swing
1 Śvetasvatara 1, 2
2 Bhagavadgītā 5, 14
3 Mahābhārata Santiparva 25, 16
4 Buddhacarita 52
5 $āstravārtāsamuccaya 169-172

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from hopes and fears. Yesterday is dead and tomorrow is unborn. Everything is determined. It is therefore not proper to blame anyone for the failure nor to offer praises for the success.
The first mention of the niyativada is to be found in the Svetasvatura upaniṣad. But the Buddhist tripitakas and the Jaina āgamas have given exhaustive discussion about this theory of niyativāda. In the Dighanikāya Samaññaphila sutta, there is a description of niyativāda as given by Mankhali Gośālaka. According to Mankhali Gośalaka the evil that living beings do, has no other reason except its very necessity. Similarly, the good is necessary and has no other external reasons. We cannot say that we change our destiny and that by our efforts we can build up our personality. The beings in this world experience the pain and sufferings through six types of resistance. Having gone through the 84 lakhs of mahakalpa and the wheel of life, the wise and ignorant are like to become free from misery.1
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In the Jaina āgamic literature also, we get beautiful description of niyativada and akriyāvāda. Sūtrakṛtānga, Vyakhyāprajñāpti® and Upāsakadaśānga1 have given adequate description of niyativāda. In the Buddhist literature, it has been suggested that Pakudha Kātyāyana, and Purana Kasyapa advocated niyativada. There is not much of a difference between niyativāda and akriyāvāda. They agree in their fundamental principles. But later the disciples of Purana Kagyapa joined the fold of the disciples of ājīvikas."
Acarya Haribhadra while describing the nature of the niyativāda states that everything is determined by the origination of a thing in a particular way, the states of a thing and its destruction are all deter
5
1 (a) Dighanikāya sāmaññaphala sutta
(b) Buddhacarita, p. 171-Dharmananda Kaugāmbi
2 Sūtrakṛtānga 2, 1, 12; 2, 6
3 Vyakhyāprajñapti, śataka 15
4 Upāsakadaśānga, adhyayana 6-7

5 Dighanikaya÷sämaññphala sutta
6 Buddhacarita p. 179-Dharmānanda Kaugāmbi

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its
mined. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to refute theory because refutation would be a form of niyati according to them. Necessity devours everything.1
YADṚCHHAVADA (ACCIDENTALISM)
L
According to Yadṛchhavada, whatever happens, happens accidentally without any reason. There is neither the cause nor reason for happening of the event. Therefore, it is not necessary to explain the causal relation between the different things. Yadrchha means accident and without any reason.2 According to the Naiyāyikas, Yadṛchhavada refers to animittavada and according to this theory, no explanation can be given for any phenomenon, 3
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We can find the mention of yidṛchhāvāda in the Śvetāśvatara upanisad, Santiparva of Mahabharatas and NyāyasutraR We can, therefore, say that the yadṛchhavida is a very ancient theory. It has been referred to by various names like akasmātvāda, animittavāda, akāraṇavāda, ahetuvada and yidṛchhavada. In this theory, there is no relation between the cause and the effect, the reasons and ground of the reasons.
Some philosophers identify svabhāvavāda with yadṛchhāvāda but it would be apt to say that there are some differences in the sense that svabhavavāda makes svabhāva (nature), the cause of the event. But yadṛchhāvāda altogether denies the causal relation."
BHUTAVADA (THEORY OF ELEMENTS)
The Bhutavāda maintains that everything in the universe is due to primary elements like earth, water, fire and air. Material and mental phenomena are due to these four elements. There is nothing:
1 Sāstravārtāsamuccaya 174
2 Nyayabhāşya 3, 2, 3
3 Nyāyasūtra 4, 1, 22
4 Svetasvatara upanisad 1, 2
5 Mahabharata Śāntiparva 33, 33
6 Nyāyasutra 4, 1, 22
7 Nyayabhāṣya-Translated by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa 4, 1, 24

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outside these elements. Those philosophers who advocate the theory of atman are doing nothing, but expressing the materialistic approach of the ātman in the sense that the ātman is the product of the elements. There is no ātman which is different from this element. There is nothing like a spiritual substance, the body is found due to the combination of the elements and when the body is destroyed the elements are separated and there is no trace of the ātman at all.
Just as the assembly of small parts of a machine, make a machine running in order. So also the organism disintegrates if the limbs are destroyed. Similarly, by mixing beatle nut, beatle leaves and lime we get red colour. So also the combination of different forms of the four element gives rise to consciousness. Consciousness is a by-product of the metabolic changes in the organism, if the body is destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. In the Sütrak stānga, there is the mention of tatjīva-latsariravāda and pañcabhūtavāda. It has been suggested that body and mind are not separated. This theory is also called anātmavāda or năstikavāda, because it denies the consciousness of mind or God. The theroy of pañcabhūtavāda says that jiva is the product of the combination of the five bhūtas (elements) prthvi (earth), jala (water), agni (fire), vāyu (air) and ākāga (space), There is a difference between tatjīva and tatsarīravāda and pañcabhūtavāda in that the former maintains that the soul and body are identical while the later maintains that soul and consciousess are products of the combination of the five bhūtas. When the body is destroyed, the soul is also destroyed.
According to the theory of elements, whatever is amenable to sense is alone real. Whatever is not verifiable to sense-experience, is not real. In this sense, the other world, heaven and hell, the soul and god are unreal. Pratyaksa is the only pramāna. The functionac utility is the only criterion or activity of reality. It is in this sens! materialistic and pragmatic in its approach. The Darwinian theory of evolution is an expression of this Bhautikavāda. It advocates the possibility of the development of the mind through the evolution from
1
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matter. In this sense, consciousness is a form of matter and evolute of matter.
PURUŞAVADA (THE THEORY OF CREATOR) According to this theory. I svara is the creator, sustainer and the destroyer of the universe. Tsvara is the person who is responsible for the origination, protection and the destruction of the universe. The intelligence and the power of Tfvara remain įntact even at the time of pralaya (dissolution) of the universe. Purusavāda is, therefore, theistic in approach.1
Puruşavāda can be distinguished into two forms, as brahmavāda and I svaravāda which is theistic.
Brah navāda maintains that just as the spider is the efficient cause of the web, and the banyan tree is the cause of the numerous roots branching dowi virds, so also puruṣabrahma is the efficient cause of the entire universe, in its creation, maintenance and destruction. Brahm in is, therefore, the basic principle of the universe. It is the upādāna kāraņa, in a sense, the primary or the material cause.
T svaravādins maintain that matter and spirit are primordial and original substances. The interaction between matter and space and their association is due to Y svara. In this sense, I svara is the efficient cause, of the creation, sustenance and the destruction of the univ. erse. Without Tsvara, nothing is possible and nothing moves. He is the controller of the universe and he determines the nature of things and the movement of things.
... DAIVAVĀDA (THEORY OF FATE) Daiv.zvāda emphasises the predominance of fate which is the determining factor in the activity of man. Everything is predetermined by fate or destiny. The moving finger writes and have written, moves on, not a word can be changed of it. We are children of fate, Man is a slave of fate. We have to suffer the onslaughts of destiny and experience the fruits of karma. Destiny shapes our end and we have to experience the karma determined by fate. There is a distin
1 Prameyakamalamārtanda, p. 55 2 Atmamimārsā, kārikā 89-91

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ction between daivavāda and niyativäda although they appear to be identical. Daivavāda accepts the authority of karma as a determining factor in the prevalent inequality of status. But in the niyativāda, fatalism and determinism are absolute and unexplainable and inexplicable.
PURUŞĀRTHAVADA (THEORY OF SELF EFFORT)
According to the theory of self effort, individual jīvais responsible for shaping its own destiny. There is nothing as fate or destiny which is supreme, Men are masters of their own destinies. Self effort is the main cause of the success of our work or the failure, as it may be. The principle of freedom of the will is the basis of this theory.
La THE JAINA VIEW The Jaina view of karma presents a synthesis of determinism and free will, of kala, niyati, puruşārth zvāda etc. The Jainas maintain that the thing of this world and the activities are complex and as they are complex and we cannot explain the causes of the things and activities with reference to one or the other cause like : kāla, niyati, svabhāva and puruşārtha. We have to find out the causes and the predominance of one or the other in the complexity of things, it is necessary to introspect and find out the causes of happiness and misery within oneself. Ācārya Siddhasena Diväkara says, that it is not proper to give importance to one of the five causes like kala, svabhāva, niyati, karma and puruşārtha and to involve the other. A phenomenon or an event is complex and all the cause may operate in various degree. Acārya Haribhadra also has supported this view.3 We have to take a synoptic view of things and look at these problems from the point of view of anekānta (manysided approach). Ācārya Samantabhadra says that we have to seek the causes for the effect born without any individual efforts in fate or destiny. But self effort and conscious effort make towards attaining a goal makes us give importance to puruşa for understanding the result in activities.
1 2
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In some cases daiva (destiny) plays an important part and in some other way puruşārtha also plays an equally imporant role. We have to consider the puruşārtha and daiva as playing their dual roles in the explanation of things. The Jainas do not accept the predominance of I śvara for explaining the living and the non-living substances of the universe. It would be fruit-less to believe that T svara or Brahman is the primary cause of the origination, maintenance and destruction of the universe. Karma is an important factor which cannot be ignored in explaining the inequality of the beings of the universe. Similarly, it would not be an adequate explanation to maintain the cause of the phenomena of the universe and also the states of the jīvas, is to be found in some material source like the elements or the matter. It is necessary to posit a non-material substance like the pure consciousness for explaining the activities of the living beings. It is not possible to accept that a material substance becomes a cause of the immaterial or the mental. If that were to be soul, the very causal principle will have to be given out. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate the reality of the material and the imamaterial principle like matter and spirit for explaining the phenomena of the universe and giving an adequate explanation of the fruits of
the karm
KARMAVĀDA (A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE)
The study of karmavāda in the historical perspective would require us to look at the theory and its development from the Vedic times & onwards. The Vedas are ihe earliest records of the world. The question arises: Whether the Vedic seers were aware of the karma theory or not? This has raised a controversy. There are two views on this subject.
The first view maintains that the Vedic seers were not aware of the karma theory. According to this view, there is no mention of the karma theory, in the Vedic literature, Vedic philosophers explained the variety and the unique value is the state of individual being with reference to external reality. Some said that the elements are
1 Aptamīmārsā 88-91

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the root causes of the diversity in the world. Some others maintain, that Prajapati Brahman is the ultimate source of this variety in this world. In this way, the cause has been referred as some divine destiny and we find the development of the thought in the Rgveda has been from polytheism, mono-theism and monism. But all of them looked outward to seek the causes of the complexity in the universe. Many gods like Mitra, Varuņa were worshiped and invoked to give them happiness in this world. Yajña were performed and oblations like material objects and the living animals were offered in the yajñas. This stream of thought could be traced in the age of the samhita and the Brahmanas.1
But in the age of Aranyakas and Upanisads there is a shift in the emphasis in the philosophical speculation. The invocation to gods and the performance in the yajña become secondary. It is true that there is less discussion of karmavāda in the Vedic literature before upanișads. But it is also true that the upaniṣads were not agreeing regarding the diversity in the world. Some accepted kāla and others rārabaha, and some others mentioned the view of svabhāva and niyativāda. The emphasis on karma casually gains ground.
The second view emphasised that although there is no specific and detailed discussion about the karma theory in the Vedic samhitas, there are mentions of the karma thory in the Vedas. In the Ṛgveda we get the following mantras: Subhaspatih (the protector of the subha karmas), Dhiyaspatiḥ (the protector of good karmas), vicarşaṇiḥ and viśvacarşaṇiḥ (the seer of the good and bad karmas) and visvasya karmano dhartà (the basis of all karmas). These mantras show that there is mention of the karmic theory although in a brief way. The karma theory in its real form can be traced to Ṛgveda, although the development of the theory is to be found later. In the Rgveda it has also been suggested that one who does auspicions karma attains immortality (amaratva). Jiva continually takes birth and it dies in this world. Vamadeva has given a description of many of his previ
1
(a) Ātmumīmē ṁsā Dalsukh Malvaṇiā p 78-79-80 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darśana, Mohanlal Mehtā

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ous births. Men worship gods and pray to them for the sake of getting themselves away from the evil effects of karma and rebirth. In the Vedic samhitās, there is a description of sancita and prārabdha karma. There is also the description that those who do good karmas go to brahmalɔka through the devayana and those who have sadhārņa karma go to candraloka through pitryana. It has also been described that the jiva due to its karma takes different forms in the different births like a tree or a creeper etc. It is clear from the following mantras "mā vo bhujemānya jātameno”, mã vo enɔ anyakṛtam bhujema" etc. It has also been suggested that one can reep the fruits of karma gained by others through their activities. Therefore, these mantras have been recited. Primarily, a jīva experiences the fuits of karma due to the activities performed by oneself, but sometimes through a peculiar influence of a peucliar power, one jiva can experience the fruits of the karma of the other jiva.1
From the discussion of the two views regarding the development of the karma theory in the Vedic literature, it may be noted that there has not been a full fledged discussion of the developed theory of karma in the Vedic literature, although there is mention of the concept of karma. But the concepts like theory of Fate and yajña have gained prominence and karma theory becomes secondary. We do not get adequate discussion about the nature of karma and the mechanism of the working of the karma. In the Vedic literature, there is emphasis on yajna karma and gradually gods have been invoked for the sake of cquitable distribution of karma. Attempts have also been made to integrate karma theory with the theory of yajña; This we find in the Pūrvamīmāmsa. We also find that the development of the yājña theory has also led to the development of the devavada (theory of deities). In the Brāhmaṇas we find a gradual substitution of Prajapati in the place of many gods and there is suggestion that the dispensation of karma is done through Prajapati. Prajapati dispenses fruits according to different karmas acquired by individual beings, just like
1 (a) Bharatiya darśana: Umseha Misra, p. 39-41 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, p. 432

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a judge dispenses judgement. This current of thought is also to be found in the philosophical systems like Nyāya, Vaiseşika, Sesvara Sankhya and Vedānta.
The performance of yajña has also been referred to as karma. It is non-permanent and it exhausts itself the moment the fruits of yajña are dispensed with. But this dispensation needed an agency. Mimāṁsā darsana introduced the concept of apūrva for the purpose of distribution of fruits of karmas with the help of which the gods dispense karma. In Vaiseșika thought adrsta has been mentioned as an attribute and it has two forms of dharma and adharma. The Nyāya school consider dharma and adharma as saņskāras. The soul is affected by saṁskāra through the effect of good and bad karmas, under the guidance of ad rşta. Adrsta is the attribute of soul and it remains with the soul as long as the effect of the karma is not dispensed.
If I svara were not be dispense the fruits of karma to the jiva the fruits of karma would be meaningless. The Sänkhya consider karma as a product of praksti. The good and evil tendencies are influenced by sarskāra. Saṁskāra is a disposition to the kārmic effect. The Vedic tradition gives importance to the karma and its effects on the individual soul.
BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KARMA
V The Buddhist and Jaina philosophies belong to the śramara current of thought which give emphasis on karma. The Buddhists have given elaborate discussion on the invisible effects of karma. The Buddhists say that the variety and inequality among living beings is due to karma. Due to the infatuation and the effect of emotion, the jiva acts through the body, speech and mind, and produces like attachment and hatred. In this way, the wheel of sarsāra moves on
1 Nyāyasūtra 4,1 2 Sänkhyasūtra 5, 25 3 Milinda pragna 3, 2

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eternal.1 It is beginningless and endless. 2 It goes moving upto infinite times.
Once, king Milinda asked Nagasena: What is the effect of karma according to the activity of the jiva? Acārya said, it cannot be shown, where the karma resides.3
In the Visuddhimagga, karma is described as formless (arūpī).a · Abhidhammakoşa describes karma as avijñapti (inexpressible).5 This type of description can be considered sapratigha and not apratigha.® The sautrāntikas have considered karma as arūpa (having no form). And they do not accept the avijñapta nature of karma.7 The Buddhists have considered karma as (subtle) sūkşma. Bodily, mental and speech activities are described with reference to karma and they are considered to be vijñapta and pratyakşa. In the Budhhist terminology, it is described as vāsanā and avijñapti. They considered mental saṁskāras as vāsanā and bodily and speech saṁskāras as āvijñapti.8
The vijñānavādins have described karma as vāsanā. Prajñākara says that all activities whether it is of prakṛti (pradhāna), karma and of Isvara is due to vāsanā. Even if we consider Isvare to be the judge dispensing karma, therefore it is needed for postulating vāsanā for explaining variety in the universe. We can, therefore, say in other words, that the karma, activity which is primarily of Isvara also or of pradhana--all these are the streams of vāsanā, which merge into the ocean of vāsanā only. According to the Sunyavādins, the neissance (avidya) which is beginningless is to be considered as vāsanā.
The Jainas have made a special contribution to the study of karma theory. The Jaina analysis of karma is scientific and they
1 Anguitaranikāya, tikanipāta sūtra 33, 1; p. 134
2 Samyuktanikaya 15, 5, 6 Part 2 pp. 181-182
3 Milindaprasna 3, 15 p. 75
4 Visuddhimagga 17, 110
5 Abhidharmakoşa 1, 9
6 See Atmamīmāṁsā p. 106
7 Naumi Oriental Conference p. 620
8 Abhidharmakoşa 4th pariccheda

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have developed the science of karma. There is enormous literature in the study of Jaina theory of karma. Etymologically, considered, karma means activity, it refers to any activity in this tife. The grammarian Pāņini has defined karma as that which is palatable to the doer is karma.1 To the Mimāṁsakas, karma is considered to be the performance of the yajña. It is kriyākāṇḍa. According to the Vaiseşikas, karma or activity is an inherent category of the substance. It is that which is not a quality nor conjunction or disjunction of objects. The Sankhya school describes karma as the expression of disposition (samskara) The Bhagavadgītā mentions karma as "karm aśīlatā", i. e, engrossment in action. The Nyāyaśāstra refers to the activities like expansion and contraction, movement in general, movement upwards and movement downwards as forms of karma. In the smärta tradition, the duties of the four stages of life (āśrama) and the four Varnas are referred to as karma. The Buddhists have traced the variety and the inequalities of the jivas to the karma. The Jainas have mentioned two forms of karma (bhāva karma and dravya karma). Bhāvakarma is psychic in nature, it refers to the psychic states responsible for the activities and dravya karma refers to the material particles of karma accruing to the soul and vitiating the pure nature of the soul. Acarya Amṛtacandra says that the influx of karma is due to the activities (yoga) that the soul has in contact with the pudgala.5 Karma is material in nature according to the Jainas and it obscures the pure nature of the soul.
KARMA IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS
The Jainas have given the specific content for the conception of karma. The other systems of Indian philosophy have used different concepts like māyā, avidyā, prakṛti, apūrva, vāsanā āsaya, dharmādharma, ad ṛṣṭa, saṁskāra, daiva, bhagya etc., for
1 Aşṭādhyāyi 1, 4, 79
2 Vaiseşikadarśanabhāṣya 1, 17 p. 35
3 Sankhyatattvakaumudi 67
4 Gitā 2, 50
5
Pravacanasāra tīkā 2, 25

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explaining the phenomenal reality in the world and the consequent inequality in the world. In the Vedānta darśana, we find the use of the concepts like māyā, avidyā and prakrti. The Mimarsā uses the term apūrva. The Buddhists have used the word vāsanā and avijñapti for explaining the varieties in the universe. Sānkhya used the word āśaya in a specific sense and we find the use of the words ad rsta samskära and dharmādharma in the Nyāya Vaišeşika.
In many of the schools of Indian philosophy the term daiva, bhāgya, punya and pāpa have been freely used. In Indian thought it is only the Cārvāka darśana which does not believe in the theory of karma and does not accept soul as a substance.. Carvāka does not also believe in the concepts like the past life, the other world and the other transcendental concepts.1
According to the Nyāyaa school of thought, the three-fold acti. vity of the jīva (body, mental and speech) are affected by the passions and the emotional upsets like attachment and hatred etc., and it consequently gives rise to dharma and adharma. Dharma and adharma can be considered to be saṁskāra, Vaišeşikas have given 24 gunas and adrşta is one of the guņas. It is different from dharmadharma and saņskāra.3 Dharma and adharma have been included in sarskāra. But in the Vaiseșika darśana, they have been included in adrsta. Rāga and dveşa (attachinent and hatred) give rise to samskära, saīskāra give rise to birth and janma is again responsible for rāga and doșa. In this way, the root cause of sarskāra is beginningless.
According to Sănkhya Yoga darsana, the variety and complexity and also resulting in inequality are due to the five Klešas., like avidyā, rāga, dveşa and abhinivesa. These complexities create saṁs
1 (a) Jaina Dharma our Darsana p. 443 (b) Karmavipāka ke hindi anuvāda ki prastāvanā
--Pt. Sukblālji p. 23 2 Nyāyabhāsya 1, 1, 2 etc 3 Prasastapädabrāsja p. 47 (Choukbambhā Sanskrit Series. Ben
ares 1930)

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kāra. Sarhskāra has also been referred to as āsaya, vāsanā, karma : and apūrva. In this form of description, klesa and sarskāra are the root causes of the wheel of life and they are beginningless.
The Mimāṁsakas say that the various activities of men like the performance of yajña gives rise to apūrva and apūrva gives rise and gives the fruits of all the activities like the performance of yajña. Apūrva is the potency born of the performance of duties mentioned in the injunction of the Vedas. The other forms of activities are not considered to be apūrva.?
The Vedāntins have used the concept of avidyā and māyā for explaining the variety in the universe. Tøvara is māyājanya (the product of māyā). He dispenses the fruits of karma. In this sense, the experience of the fruits of karma is due to the agency of Iswara.
The Buddhists maintain that the dispositions born out of mental crisis are vāsanā and the dispositions arising out of the speech and bodily activities are avijñapti. The lobha (greed) dveșa (hatred) and moha (infatuation) produce karma. Jiva gets engaged in activities in bodily, mental and speech due to these emotional disturbances, so also these disturbances and activities produce the lobha, dveşa and moha in turn. This is the wheel of life, which is beginningless.
THE NATURE OF KARMA ACCORDING TO JAINISM
The Jainas have considered karma as material in nature. The kārmic particles envelope the soul but do not destroy the real nature of the soul. They have an obscuring function. Therefore, they affect the different paryāyas of the soul. Man is in bondage due to handicuffs, he gets intoxicated by liquor and becomes unconscious by chloroform. These are material objects. Similarly, the soul gets obscured and its pure nature is obscured and not destroyed due to the influx of karma.
1 2
Yogadarsanabhāşya 1, 5 etc (a) sabarbhāşya 2, 1; 5 (b) Tantravārtika 2, 1, 5 Sankarabhāşya 2, 1, 14 Sankarabhāśya 3, 2; 38—41
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Karma is material in nature. The bondage by chain is material. It is of lesser strain that the bondage of jiva by karma. The kārmic bondage is subtle, yet material in nature. The karmic particles enter the soul and vitiate its purity. The effect is very subtle and strong. The karmic particles affecting the soul are called karma-vargaņās. The particles of matter which are responsible for constituting the body are called 'Nokarma-vargaṇās'. The two are the finest particles of matter and we can say that the atoms constituting karma are the material objects. The body is also material. The relation between the two is samavāyī (inherent). The earth particles are physical in nature, so also objects formed out of earth particles.
Palatable food brings the experience of pleasure. While injury by Sastra (weapons) brings dukha. These two are paudgalika (physical) and so are the experiences of karmas paudgalika.
From the point of view of bondage (bandha), jīva and pudgala (matter) are not different, but are correlative. From the point of view of their nature they are different. Jiva is immaterial and formless and is characterised by cetană. While pudgala is material and is unconsciousness (acetana).
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The objects of sense-organs are the experiences of touch, taste, smell, form and sound. They are murta (having form). So are the indriyas (sense organs) which are the medium of experiences and expressions. Similarly, the experience of pleasure and pain are murta and so are karmic particles which are the causes of these experiences.1
The murta experiences mūrta only, murta binds the murta. Jiva is amurta but it gives occasions for the bondage of karma. Therefore, jīva becomes occasion (avakāśarūpa) of the bondage of karma.
fold
In the Upanisads & the Bhagavadgītā, the auspicious and inasuspicious activities have been referred to as karma. But the Jainas use the word karma in the sense of the after-effect of activities,"
Jiva attracts the karma-vargaṇās by the activity which is threee., bodily, speech and mind. The karmic encrustations with
1 Pañcāstikāya 141 2 Ibid 142

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the jīva is due to these activities and the activities are in turn specificated by the karmic enrcustations. In this way, the kārmic particles of encrustations and the yoga of the jiva are mutually interactive. Karma and the tendency to activity are intimately related with each other with the mutually casual relation.1
In this way, karma is of two forms : (i) Dravyakarma and (ii) bhävakarma. Dravyakarma affects the bhāvakarma and bhāvakarma affects the dravyakarma. They are mutually interactive. Just as the seed becomes the tree and the tree gives the seeds. This has been the process for beginningless time. Similarly, interaction of dravyakarma and bhāvakarma has been from beginningless time.
While discussing the karma theory, we should note that the impact of karma on the soul which is immaterial has been studied in this perspective. Dravyakarma or the bhāvakarma are both to be considered in material nature. And also has the characteristic of consciousness as synthesis. Dravya and bhāva karma have the elements of the material nature and the element of consciousness is an aspect of soul are prominent, but the question of the presence or the absence of material or immaterial nature is not very important. The interaction of the material and the immaterial and the process of interaction has to be considered. In the hhāvakarma there is the atmic aspect which is predominant, it is primarily psychologcial; while in the dravyakarma, the aspect of the material particles is prominent. The question has been asked that if karma is considered to be material particles, what would be the distinction between the pudgala and karma ? Similarly, if bhāvakarma has the atmic aspect as predo. minent what is the difference between the soul and bhāvakarma ?
The answers to these questions can be found in the anlaysis of the nature of the soul as the doer (karta) and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (bhoktā). Moreover, it is necessary to understand the distin. ction between the sarhsārī jīva (mundane souls) and the mukta jīvas. The mundane souls are in bondage of the karma. There is the mixture of the caitanya (consciousness) and the jadatva (material in nat
1 Karmapraksti-Nemicandrācārya viracita 6 2 Dharma aur Darsana-Devendramuni (Hindi) p. 42

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ure). The mukta jiva is free from this bondage. It is pure consciousness. It has no element of jaḍatva. The soul that is in bondage in this wheel of transmigration attracts the particles through the activities of speech, body and mind and the fusion' of the karmic particles with the soul takes place just as water mixes with milk. In this way, there is the synthesis of the consciousnes elements and the materiality of the body.
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A further question arises regarding such synthesis of the material and the consciousness elements in the empirical jiva and also in the karma. If both have the same forms of combination, what is the difference in between the karma & the empirical soul? Answer to this may be given with reference to the nature of karma & jiva. The empirical jiva with reference to karma as jaḍatva, but same jiva with reference to the conscious aspects is consciousness. There is no possibility of pointing out the extent to which the jivatva and the karmatva could be distinguished in measureable distinctions. It is not possible to say that the jīvatva and the jaḍatva are to be distinguished separately in the empirical existence. The distinction is not primary. But the fusion as apparent. The empirical soul is always engaged in activity and when it is free from empirical activity, it sheds off the karmic particles accruing to it. In such cases, the absolute distinction between kärmic matter and the pure soul and consciousness, we can point out that there is absolute distinction. In the mundane soul and in the phenomenal existence these absolute distinctions are not amenable to empirical investigations. But in the highest stage of perfection, there is this distinction, between the pure jiva and pure karma as matter. Therefore, we can mention the three stages of the soul and pudgala karma: 1. suddha pudgala (pure karmic matter), 2. Suddha atman (pure soul) in the state of perfection and 3. the co-mingling of the karmic matter and the atomic element in the samsārī jīva. The empirical nature of the individual soul has been referred to as having the characterisation of kart ṛtva aud bhokt ṛtva.
RELATION BETWEEN ATMAN AND THE KARMAN

Atman or soul is immaterial while karma is material in nature. How can there be relation between them? This is a natural question

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that has been asked. The answer to this question lies in the phenomenal nature of the jiva in the samsara. The empirical soul is involved in the wheel of tramsmigration from the beginningless time. It is bound by the karma from the beginningless time and has been affected thereby. The jiva that has been in bondage due to karma is considered to be having form. In this sense, the amūrta jīva being involved in the wheel of life due to karma is murta and therefore the jīva has both the affects the rūpī and the arūpī aspects. The liberated jīva is arūpī, i. e., having no form, while empirical soul has form.
The souls which are free from the karmic matter are not in bondage. The souls that are bound by the karma get themselves further bound by the karma. The relation between the karma and the jiva has neither beginning and is neither prior nor the posterior. Just as the material objects like the jaggery and the flowers when mixed and collected give rise to the intoxicating quality, so also, the material aspects of karma is encrusted with the immaterial self.
H.3
WHO BINDS THE KARMA?
The karmic bondage is possible only to those who are in bondage. Jivas who are in bondage get the encrustation of karma more and more.1 Due to the rise of mɔhaniya karma, passions like rāgadveşa (attachment and hatred) are produced. They give to the influx of asubha karma (inauspicious karma). The jīvas which are free from attachment (moha) are called vītarāgī and in their activity there is subhakarma. The new bondige of the soul by the karma is not dependent of the earlier bondage. And the souls which are free from bondage have no karmic bond, We can say that the soul that is bound gets itself involved in bondage. But the soul that is free has no bondage.
Gautama asked Mahāvira: Bhagavan! Is the jiva that is in misery, affected by misery? or the jiva that is not in misery affected by misery?
1 Prajñāpanā 23, 1, 292 2 Bhagavati 9 3 Bhagavati

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Mahavira said, "O Gautama! the jiva that suffers misery is involved to suffer more misery, but the jiva that is free from attachment and misery does not experience misery. The sorrows afflict those jivas which suffer from sorrow, through passion and the increase of misery. The souls that are free from misery do not attract
sorrow. 1
Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! who binds the karma samyata (self-controlled), asam yata (non-self-controlled), samyatā. samyata (partially self-controlled).
Bhagavana replied, "Gautama! the self-controlled, the not self-controlled and the partial self-controlled, all of them attract the karmic particles. The empirical jīva which is active gets itselfbound by the karma, and it is affected by karma.
CAUSE OF KARMIC BONDAGE
The bondage of the soul with the karma is from the beginningless time, but the question arises what are the causes of these bondage and Gautama asked Mahavira, to explain the cause of the bondage. Mahavir replied, "Gautama! the rise of the jñānāvaraṇīya karma brings the intensity of the darśanavaraniya karma. From the darśanavaraṇiya karma comes the darśanamoha karma, Due to darsanamoha karma arises mithyātva -perversity of attitude and from the mithyātva karmic influx arises. 2
The Sthānanga3, Samavāyānga 5th Samavaya and Umāsvāti have pointed out the five types of karmic bondage: 1. Mithyatva (perversity) 2. Avirati (lack of self-control), 3. Pramada (negligence), 4. Kaşaya (passion) and 5. Yoga (activity).4
In short, the kar nic bondage is possible due to two prominent causes (1) Kaşṣāya (passions) and (2) Yoga (activity).5
1 Bhagavati 7, 1, 266
2 Prajñāpanā 23, 1, 289
3 Sthānanga 4, 8
4 Tattvārthasutra 8, 1
5 Samavayanga 2nd samavāya

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The kārmic bondage is of four parts depending on the processes of the kārmic influx. They are prakrti—the nature of karma, sthitithe relation or duration, anubhāga (the intensity of the experience of karma), pradesa (the extension of kārmic particles).
The bondage based on prakrti and pradeśa is possible due to yoga, while the sthiti and anubhāga are due to passions.2 Passions are a primary force for the bondage of karma. In the development of the stages of self-realisation, the two causes of passion and yoga work upto the 10th gunasthāna and the bondage due to these two causes is considered to sāmparāyika bandha i.e., the bondage having the force of passions.8 In the case of the souls that are free from passions, still the kārmic flow may take place, but it is only due to the activity (yoga). It is temporary and it is called, iryäpathika bandha (bondage without passions and have been described to be of two sama yas in the Uttarādhyayana sütra (29, 71) and Prajñāpanā (23, 13, 37). Pandit Sukhalälji says that according to Digambara tradition the duration of the bondage of the iryāpathika karma is one sumaya. There is yoga (activity) in this stage, but there is the absence of passions. Therefore, the kārmic bondage due to passion would not be possible. Passions bring the intensity and duration of karma.
Kaşāya is of four types : Krodha (anger), māna (egoity), māyā (deceitfulness) and lobha (greed). Sthānānga and Prajñāpanā have mentioned four causes of kārmic bondage. In brief, passions can be considered of trvo types, (1) rāga and (2) dveşa. Rāga and dveşa
1 Tattvārthasūtra 8, 4. 2 (a) Śthānānga 4th sthāna. (b) Pañcama Karmagrantha, gāthā 69 3 Tattvārthasūtra 8, 2. 4 Tattvārthasūtra 6, 5. 5 (a) Gommațasāra karmakānda
(b) Tattvārthasūtra, Ed. Pt. Sukhlālji., p. 217 6 (a) Sūtrak stānga 2, 26. (b) Sthānānga 4, 1, 251.
(c) Prañāpana 23, 1, 290

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include all the four forms of passions.' In rāga (attachment) deceitfulness, and greed and in dveşa, we find the anger and egoity included. 2 Räga and dveşa bring about the bondage of the eightfold of karma.8 Rāga-dveșa are considered to be bhāvakarma. The root-cause of rāga-dveşa is mohu (infatuation). Ācārya Haribhadra says that just as if a man anoints oil on his body and the anointed body attracts the particles of dust deposited on the anointed body. So also the kārmic particles get glued to the soul due to rāga-dveșa.6 We should remember, that the perversity which is the cause of the bondage of karma is developed by attachment and hatred. The intensity of attachment and hatred crowds the understanding, and brings the perversity of outlook. It clouds the capacity of discrimination.
The Buddhists also, like the Jainas consider mithyājñāna (perverse knowledge), moha (delusion factor) as causes of the karmic bondage. The Naiyyāyikas say that mithyājñāna is a cause of moha. Moha is not only responsible for deluding knowledge, but for creating a false identification of the self with the external object and with body, senseorgans, manis, feelings, etc. The ätinan deludes itself to be all these, This is the cause of the kārmic bondage.7 Vaiseșikas support this view. 8 According to the Sārkhya philosophers perversity of outlook is
1. Uttarādhyayana 32, 7. 2. (a) Shãnăn ga 2, 3. (b) Prajñāpanā 23.
(c) Pravacaņasāra, gāthā 95 3. Pratikramanasütravștti—Ācārya Nami. 4 (a) Uttarädhyayana 32, 7. (b) Sthánānga 2, 2, (c) Samayasāra,
gāthā 94, 96, 109, 177. (d) Pravacanasāra, 84-88. 5 Avašyaka ţikā. 6 (a) Suttanipāta 3, 12, 33. (b) Visuddhimagga 17, 302.
(c) Majjhima nikāya mahatanhasankhayasutta 38. 7 (a) Nyāyabhāşya 4, 2, 1 (b) Nyāyasūtra 1, 1, 2; 4, 1; 3; 4, 1, 6. 8 (a) Prašistupāda p. 538--Viparyaya nirūpaņa
(b) Prašistapāda bhāşya -saṁsārāpavarga prakaraņa

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the mithyājñānal and it is the cause of bondage. The Yoga darsana mentions that kleścı (mental disturbances) are the causes of the kārmic bondage and klesa is caused by avidyā.8 Upanişads, Bhagavadgital and Brahmasūtra have traced avidyā to be the primary cause of bondage.
In this way, the other Indian systems of thought are in broad agreement with the conceptual content of the Jaina theory of bondage although there is wide variation in the use of terminology.
NIŚCAYA AND VYAVAHĀRA NAYA The Jainas have studied the karma theory from both niscaya naya and the vyavahāra naya. Niscaya naya is the noumenal point of view in which we look at the ultimate nature of the objects in its inherent quality. Vyavahāranaya is the practical point of view which looks at the objects in relation to other objects. The question arises, whether karma can be described in terms of kart rtva (activity) and bhokt stva (enjoyment) from the points of view of niscaya and vyavahāra nayas. Niscaya naya presents the real nature of the objects in its intrinsic value without reference to any other object. In this sense, we can distinguish between the pure self (suddha ātman) and the pure matter (suddha pud. gala) and we cannot analyse the nature of the jíva which is embodied and which is mixed with the kārmic particles. Therefore, vyavahāra naya can present a description of the nature of the empirical indivi. dual ego in relation to the kārmic encrustation. From the noumenal point of view, the self is described in its pure state and karma in its pure state. Therefore, there is no contradiction to say that the two descriptions vary without conflict. The subject matter of both are different. Their jurisdiction is limited and distinct. Niscaya naya presents the pure nature of the self and the karma so it connot describe the kart stva and bhokt rtva of karma by the soul.
1 Sähkhyakärika 44-47-48. 2 Mātharvrtti 44 3 Yogadarśana 2, 3, 4. 4 Kathopanişad 1, 2, 5. 3 Bhagavadgitā 5, 156. 6 Pañcama Karmagrantha--prastāvanā; p. 11

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KARTṚTVA (ACTIVITY) AND BHOKTṚTVA OF THE KARMAN
Some philosophers have ignored this distinction and have analysed the nature of the karma with reference to kartṛtva and bhoktṛtva from the noumenal point of view. This has created several problems, because in this, there is a confusion in the nature and the function of the suddha jīva and saṁsārī jīva (empirical individual). Similarly, this view has also ignored the karma and the pure matter. According to this view, jiva is not the doer of the karma and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, because karma is essentially material in nature and is not very much concerned with the immaterial jīva. They ask a question regarding the relation between the immaterial jīva and the material karma. How can the immaterial jīva be related to the material karma? Therefore, they say the relation is farfetched and the karmic particles are due to the matter as originating from matter and the soul cannot act upon it.1
1
In this analysis, the jiva is not considered to be related with the material karma with reference and enjoyment, because the conscious jīva cannot be related to the un-conscious karma. Jiva (spiritual substance) cannot be intimately connected with karma which is unconscious and material. But we should realise that empirical soul is associated with the material karma and the material karma is the modification of the pure pudgala. This association of the jiva with the karmic particles is due to its activity (yoga) in body, mind and speech. If the self and the matter were to be in their pure state only, there would not be a question of the inter-mingling of the jiva and the karmic particles. The karmic particles get associated with and they enter into the self which is the empirical individual and not the pure self. In this sense, we can say that the karma is associated with the empirical jīva from the phenomenal point of view and not from the noumenal point of view. This inter-mingling of the karma with the soul is very often compared with the mixing of water and milk. Again matter which is pure does not transform itself into karmic particles on its own but this transformation is possible due to the soul's activity.
Pancama Karmagrantha-prastāvanā, pp. 11-12

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Again we have to determine the relation between the dravyakarma and bhāvakarma. The relation between the two is considered to be mutual. Dravyakarma generates bhāvakarma. The perfect souls, like the siddhas, are free from the dravyakarma and therefore the bhāvakarma does not affect them. When the jīva attains the siddha-hood it is free from the certain material karma. In this sense, we can say that jiva which is empirical, i. e., the individual jīva in this world is the kartā of the kārmic particles and the bhoktā of the fruits of karma.
Those who do not accept the kartstva and bhokt rtva of the jiva give the analogy of handsome boy who attracts a beautiful girl. The girl gets attracted to the boy and runs after him. In this case, the girl is active and the boy is merely an occasion (nimitta) for her activity." In this way, the pudgala gets attracted to the jiva and gets transformed into kārmic particles. In this, the jīva is not responsible for the activity and the jīva is the only occasion (nimitta). Activity is attributed to the pudgala. But this relation of the bhokt stva and kart stva can also be attributed to karma. If ātman were neither the doer, nor the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, then he would neither be in bondage nor would be released from the bondage of karma. These terms of bondage and release are not relevant. It is only from the phenomenal point of view, we can speak of the bondage and the release. And from the noumenal point of view, the relation of the bondage and re
the relation of the bondage and release of the soul from the shackles of karma and the karma description with reference to the kart stva and bhokt sva are not possible.
But the analogy of the boy and the girl with reference to the karma and soul is not adequate. The facts are different. The pudgala that is matter becomes active then the pudgala at once get attracted towards the soul and they are transformed into kārmic particles. The kārmic particles and the self get mixed up and on proper occasions the kārmic particles produce their effects and get separated again. This is due to the activity of the jiva. In this sense, this type of activity
1 Pañcama Karmagrantha- prastāvanā, p. 12.

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is not possible for the jiva alone without the association of pudgala in the form of kārmic particles and similarly, pudgala in its isolated state cannot get attracted to the soul. The co-mingling of the jīva and pudgala is responsible for the association of jiva reference kārmic particles. Therefore, we cannot make a statement from the absolute point of view that jīva is pure cetana and karma is pure jaḍa (unconscious). Jīva also has been intimately associated with the kārmic particles can be considered as jaḍa and karma because of its association with the jīva can be described as having consciousness. When the jiva and karma becomes separated completely in the highest state of perfection, then we can say that jīva is pure consciousness and pudgala is pure matter and unconsciousness.
The samsarī jīva (empirical individual) get associated with the karmic particles and due to the association, the bhavakarma in the form of răga-dveşa (attachment and hatred) are born. A question arises that if jiva in its pure form and pudgala in its pure form are active in their own pure nature, then how can the bhavakarmas be born and who would be responsible for these? The bhavakarmas are neither purely due to the self nor due to the pure pudgala. Therefore, what is the cause of the bhavakarma ?
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The answer is, the individual ego is neither the pure atman, nor the pure pudgala. It is a mixture of the atman with the karmic particles which are modifications or expressions in the empirical sense of the karmic particles. We can say that it is an organism and not a pure soul. The passions like raga-dveşa are produced due to the association of the karmic particles with the conscious jīva through the activity of the jiva in the form of bodily, mental and speech. All this is due to the diversity and variety of the encrustations of the kärmic particles in the soul.
Those, who consider the relation of karma with the soul from the noumenal point of view, say that atman has its essential nature in jñana, darśana and caritra and the expressions of the essential nature are due to be found in the emotional set up like rāga-dveṣa. And due to this, the karmic particles pollute the soul. And therefore, the soul is not the karta of the karmic encrustations nor the bhoktā.

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For instance, the potter is not the cause of the pot although he prepares the pot; In common sense of language, the potter is considered to be efficient cause of the pot. But in the real sense of the relation, the potter is only an occasion but the clay is the material cause of the
pot. 1
But this analogical example is not adequate because the relation between the pot and the potter is neither inherent relation nor very intimate relation. But the relation between the self and karman is inti. mate like the mixing of the milk and the water. Therefore, the associa. tion of the karman with the self cannot be compared with the causal relation of the potter and the pot. The intimate combination of the kārmic particles with the soul has an effect of synthesis and one neces. sarily affects the other. This does not happen in the case of the relation between the potter and the pot. The ātman is not only an occasion, or the efficient cause of the kārmic particles enter the soul, but it is the kartā in the sense, due to its activity, in body, speech and mind kārmic particles enter the soul. Similarly, ātman is the bhoktā, the enjoyer of the fruits of the karma. Due to the various activities of the ātman in its empirical form, the kārmic particles have attracted and they become intimately associated with the soul. There. fore, ātman is considered to be the kartā. And because the ātman in its empirical sense has the experience of the fruits of the karma, it is also bhokta.
LIMITS OF KARMA According to the Jaina theory of karma, karma is intimately associated with the body, mind and the ātman (psychy), of the individual. These have their defined limitations and they function within these limitations. Similarly, the karma that is intimately associated with the individual self has to operate within these limitations. If we do not accept the limitations of the karma, then the karma would be all-pervasive like the ākāśa, We may also say that the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies and this is due to karma, Due to karma, the ätman gets involved and associated with the body that it occupies in its full pervasion. When the soul
1 Pañcama Karmagrantha - prastāvanā, p. 13.

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gets freed from the body it also gets freed from the karmas. But the sarhsāri ātman is somehow associated with one or the other body and, therefore, associated with the kārmic particles within that limitations.
Another question arises and has been asked : The karma associated with the body working in the limitation of the body--can it transcend the limitation and bear its fruits ? Is it responsible for the various types of the effects of karma expressed in the possessions like wealth and other external objects that a man gets which are not intimately associated with the body ? For such things also, is the karma responsible ? It is also possible that the self may not be directly or indirectly associated with the external objects and events although these objects have their impact of the experiences of the jiva. In such cases can we say that the karman is responsible for such type of association in bondage.
The answer is, the Jaina theory of karma mentions eight types of karmas, which are intimately connected in some form or the other with the jiva. Jñānāvarana, Darsanāvarana, Mohanīya and Antarāya karmas are considered as ghātikarma because they effect the essential characteristics of the soul like jñāna, darśana, happiness and vīrya (energy). Veduniya, Ayu, Nāma and Gotra karmas produce different states of the body. In this way, all the eight karmas are intimately associated with jiya and the body and not directly associated with other external objects. From the point of view of the usage of the term (parampara) of the word, it can be said that karna can be somehow connected to the other objects external to the body and the self, if such a connection is proved.
If the kārmic particles are intimately associated with the body and the self, then the question arises how can we explain the possession of wealth and richness which give happiness due to merit (punyajanya)?
The answer is, the possession of wealth and having relations who give happiness and other pleasant experience are due to the rise of karma, it is possible to say in such cases, that these are the upa-punya, i. e. kaima brings punya and punya gives rise to experiences of pleasure and bliss. In fact, the function of punya is to give the experiences of

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pleasure and punya is possible through śubha karma. It is also true that the external objects and creations are the cause of experiences of pleasure. The experience of pleasure and pain and all bodily, mental and ärmic experiences are due to the internal causes. The association of karma is seen with the internal causes and not with the external objects. The external objects have their own causes of origination, duration and destruction, and they are not due to karma. The karma is limited to us only i. e., the embodied seif and the body, and not all-pervading. These external objects have nothing to do with karma. Karma is associated with the embodied individual soul and the jīva attracts the kārmic particles in varying degrees according to its activi. ties. The external objects are only occasions by which the self gets experiences of pleasure and pain and therefore, on common parlance, it is said that the external objects are the results of punya and pāpa.
The various physical and mental states of an individual are due to karma. The body, sense-organs, the functions of mind and body are all due to karma. But the possession of external objects like wife or the husband or the relation or the loss of these, famine or bumper crops, various natural calamities like the earth-quake etc. or the anger of the king-all these are not the effect of the karma. These are only the occasions, the experiences, that man gets because these are primarily mental states. It is true that some of them do affect the mental states. The possession of wealth and other relatives may become occasions for creating pleasure in our mind. The loss of wealth may bring pain, but these external things are not themselves due to karma. For instance, the birth of a son is not due to the punya of the father, nor the death of a relative is due to the papa of the individual soul. These are due to the karmas of those individuals affected and karma in their cases also is occasion by the external objects. It may be true that we get pleasure by the birth of a son. This experience of pleasu is due to the Mohaniya Karma, but the birth of a son is not due to Mohanīya Karma. The experiences of pleasure and pain on the occasion of birth of son or loss are due to the punya or pāpa of the father occasioned by the birth or the death of the son. In this sense, the son is not born due to the punya of the father, nor is loss of the son is due to the pāja cf the father. In this way, the relation of the indi

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vidual self with other objects can be explained on the basis of personal experiences which are due to punya or papa occasioned by the events and individuals in the environment. The operation of the karma, the rise, the suppression (upaśama) and destruction of the karma (karmakşaya) are all determined by the limits of the individual self or the body due to the activity of the organism through body, mind and speech. The rise of the karma is not possible beyond this. The crux of the problem is that external objects and events are due to their own causes and not due to the rise of the karma to the individual soul..
RISE OF KARMA (UDAYA)
Udaya refers to the rise of the karma. It refers to the span of time of the operation of karma.1 The karmic particles bound to the soul get matured enough to express themselves (nişeka)—and then they express themselves, i. e., the udaya of the karma. The rise of the karma is possible from two ways: 1. when the karma gets matured and fit to express itself it becomes prāptakāla udaya. 2. If it expresses itself prematurely, it is called aprāptakala udaya. When the karma gets bound to the soul, it does not get the potency of getting expressed immediately, it requires a definite time to mature itself and till that time, it is in the potential stage. This is called abadhākāla. During this period, the karma, in its potential form, not yet expressed. Abādhā means the period of potency.
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The period of potentiality of karma (abādhākāla) can be divided into two forms of durations (sthiti): 1. avasthānakāla and (2) anubhāva or nişeka kāla. In the abadhākāla, the karmic effect is not yet expressed. It is in the potential form. It is in the avasthana kāla. But when the abādhākāla is mature enough to express itself, we get the experiences of karma. The abadhākāla and the anubhava kāla have their own specific duration. If we exclude from consideration the concept of the abadhākāla we can say that nişeka and anubhāva are of equal duration. The longer duration of the karma can be due to
1 Bhagavati 6, 3, 236
2 Bhagavati 6, 3, 236-vṛtti.

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the intensity of the experience of karma. This can be reduced in the duration and intensity of experience through the tapas. The soul can become free from the karma in a shorter time.
The rise of the karma is possible after the completion of the duration of the time of potentiality and when the problem of actualisation comes. In the normal course when the time of karma arises, and is affected extranuous forces like ascetic practices, tapas and other sādhanās would not be possible. But due to apavartanā the kārmic variation through udīraṇā would be possible. But if the karma-rise is yet to take place, then tapas and sādhanās would be useful for the premature realisation of the karmic effect.
The rise and fruition of karma may be sahetuka (by means of willed effort) or nirhetuka (without willed effort). The rise and the fruition may take place naturally without any external pressure or due to some pressures like internal or the external pressure. For example, without any external cause one may get angry and vedaniya kārmic particles may effect the soul. This is nirhetuka udaya.1 In the same way, experiences of laughter, fear and other forms of emotional upset may give rise to karmic particles to flow in.3
THE KARMA THAT ENTERS WITHOUT EFFORT (Svataḥ udaya hetu)
The karmic particles that develop the soul may be due to some natural causes without any effort (conscious or unconscious). It is of different types:
1. Gatihetuka udaya - It refers to the karmic matter due to the state of the self (gati) at the particular time. For instance, in the state in the hell (naraka gati) there is the rise of asätavedaniya karma (pain producing karma).
2. Sthitihetuka-This refers to the state of an individual at a particular time. For example, at the time of the rise of the mohaniya
1 Sthānanga 4, 76, vriti; p. 182.
2 Sthānanga 4
3 Sthānanga 4, 75-79.

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445 karma in its intense form, it is possible to have perversity of outlook (mithyātva moha) and attachment.
3. Bhavahetuaka udaya-This refers to the rise of different types of karma in a particular life span. Though all the samsāri jivas have rise of Darsanāvarņiya karma and this karma is the cause of sleep but manuşya and lower animals are affected by sleep, while heavenly beings and the hellish beings do not get sleep. This is bhavahetuka udaya.
These three types of karmic influx and bondage are due to svataḥ vipāka udaya (rising out of their own internal causes).
THE RISE OF THE KARMA DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES
The kärmic rise may be due to external causes also. These may be considered as due to two causes as : (1) pudgala hetuka udaya. This is due to the kārmic particles rising out of some material causes. For example, if a stone is thrown or if some one hits us, we get pain. This is to asātāvedaniya karma, arising out of material causes. Similarly, experience of pain is possible due to some form of unpleasant exchange of words which give rise to anger. These are sahetuka vipāka udaya. (2) In the sense, that the kārmic bondage arises due to some particular causes the bondage of the kārmic particles due to the consequence of the material cause (pudgala pariņāma). For exam. ple, taking heavy meals or due to some diseases organic disturbances take place. This is also (hetuka udaya) rising out of the consequences of the material causes, giving rise to the bondage of kārmic particles to the soul. Again, for example, intoxicating liquor affects the clarity of mental states. This is also pudgala pariņāmana hetuka.
In this way, the rise and fruition of the kārmic particles into the soul is due to various causes. If these causes are not operative the fruition of the karma is not possible. It is called pradejodaya vipāka. In this, the experience of kārmic effect is not very clear. It is indistinct. However, the kārmic bondage has ? to be experienced and exhausted.
1
Prajapana 23, 1, 293,

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Gautama asked Mahavira: 'Bhagavan! can we say that one cannot be free from the experiences of the karma which are inauspicious.' Mahavira said; "Yes, it is true that we have to experience the pāpa karma'.
Gautama asked Mahavira to explain the process. Mahavira said, 'O Gautama ! I have described two types of karma 1. Pradesa karma (extension of the karmic particles) and 2. anubhāga karma (experience of the karmic effect). Pradeśa karma has to be exhausted, some may be exhausted through the experience of the intensity and some without experience in the intensity of the karmic particles,1
PURUȘĂRTHA (SELF EFFORT) AS DETERMINING FACTOR
What we call puruṣārtha (self effort of an individual jīva), does play an important part in the intensity and experience of the karmic bondage. From the point of view of the past karmic bondage, we can say that it is both important and not an important factor in shaping the experiences of karma. If the efforts, made in the present time, are less than the efforts made in the past, then the present efforts will have less impact on the manner of experience of karma. If the present impact is greater, it is possible that it may modify the intensity and experience of the past bondage of the karma.
Karma need not be considered only in two parts as bandha (bondage) and udaya rise of karma. There are other states of impact of karma. The karmic particles and the karmic experiences can be attributed and modified to particular processes like apavartanā, udvartanā, etc. These processes of the rise, experience and the exhaustion of karma may be mentioned as follows:
1. Apavartana-In this, the karmic intensity may be decreased in experience, it is rasaghata or mandikaraṇa.
2. Udvartana --The intensity of the karmic experience may be increased. This is udvartanā, or it is also called tīvrīkaraṇa.
1 Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vṛtti

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• 3. Udiraņā---In this the kārmic states which is to fructified at a later date more intensely can be made to be fructified and experienced in a less intense way.
4. Sankramana - It is the transformation of karma in its different intensities of experiences. For instance, some part of karma is auspicious karma (śubha karma) and its fruition (vipāka) is also auspicious. Some part of karma is auspicious, but fruition is inauspicious (asubha). Some forms of karma is inauspicious, but its fruition is auspicious. In some cases both the rise of the karma and its fruition are inauspicious. That type of karma which it binds inauspicious way and rises auspiciously it is called aśubha-subha vipāka. But the karma which is in the form of auspicious bondage, but arises in an inauspicious way, it is subha-aśubha vipāka. That karma whose rise is inauspicious, but fruition is auspicious is called aśubha-śubha vipāka. And that karma whose rise and fruition is both auspicious has been referred to subha-śubhavipaka.
The difference in duration between the kārmic bondage and its rise is called sankramaņa. Sankramana is the transformation of the karma-praksti. In this, the transformation takes place between the substance of the same karma. For instance, in the dargunāvaraṇīyakarma transformation between the cakşu and acakşu darśanīvaraṇīya is possible.
Sankramaņa is of four types : 1. Praksti sankramaņa 2. Sthiti sankramaņa, 3. Anubhava sankramana and 4. Pradeśasankramaņa. Praksti sankramana is a transformation of the kārmic bondage already collected into the kārmic experiences are at present being received. Similarly, sthiti (duration) and anubhāga (intensity of experience) also get transformed.
Apavartanā, udvartanā, udīraņā and sankramana refer to the rise (udaya) of the kārmic matter. In this rise and at the time of rising, there is no transformation. But the kārmic matter that is yet to rise can be transformed by the individual efforts like sādhanā. In this sense, we can say that the individual jiva is responsible for its own karma and for the exhaustion of the karma. If this freedom of the will in the process of the transformation of karma were not to be accepted, then we land ourselves in niyativāda (the theory of necessity).

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IS THE ATMAN FREE, OR IS IT BOUND BY KARMA?
We have seen that the individual states and its position are determined by the bondage of karma that the individual has acquired. Auspicious karma brings auspicious results and inauspicious karma gives inauspicious results.1
The karmic process has primarily two forms: bondage and the other rise and fruition. The individual jiva is free in the sense that it can do the karma and the bondage that he gets is due to his own activity. In this sense, he is free because he acts and gets the bondage. But the karmic bondage that he has already acquired due to his own activity has to be experienced and exhausted by him. In this sense, in the case of rise and fruition of karma that has already been bound to him, he has no choice, he has to experience the effects of the karma that he has accumulated. And therefore in the fruition of karma and experiences, he is not free. For instance, one is free to take opium, but once he takes the opium he cannot escape the effects of opium. Whether he wills it or not, the opium produces its effects on his organism. He has no choice in it. This does not mean that he completely dislaids of the fruition of the karma that he has already acquired. He can transform the karmic effect in its intensity of experience by reducing the intensity or increasing the intensity. For example, after having taken the opium he may try to reduce the effect of the same by taking the counter affecting medicine. By this, he can reduce the intensity of the opium. Similarly, he can reduce the intensity, as we have seen, of the experience of the karmic effect by means of certain processes and practices. In other words, the question of the dependence of the jiva and karma is difficult to be determined, because if the soul gets sufficient strength due to the maturity of its activity and duration of karma, the activity of soul becomes predominent, and the karma is subordinated. But if the karma becomes stronger the soul's activity becomes subjected to kārmic particles. Therefore, in some cases soul predominates and in some others, karma predominates.
The mechanism of the operation of the karma may be considered as of two types:
1 Daśāśrutaskandha 6
2 Viseşāvasyaka bhāṣya 1, 3.

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• 1. Nikācita, in which the maturation of the kārmic process will take its determined course.
2. Anikācita, in which the maturation of the kārmic process may take different terms and may fructify in different ways. The same can be put in the different forms
(a) Nirupakrama where the process of the operation of karma takes its determined course and there would be no resistance from the individual moral activities.
(b) Sopakrama, in which the individual effort may deviate the kārmic process.
The jiva is subject to the kārmic activity in the process of nikacita process of the rise of the karma. As long as the liva does not make effort to thwart or to deviate the fruition of the kārmic activity, jīva will be in the hands of karma. But if the kārmic process has to be channelised either in the direction of suppression or the destruction of the karmic process the jīva his to make consistent moral effort and observe tapasyā (ascetic practice).
In the Pātañjala Yogabhāsya, it has been suggested that the vedanīya karma born out of adrşta has three different forms of expression. One of them is that some karmas can be exhausted without fruition by the mɔral practices like prāvascita (confession). In the Jaina terminology it is called pradesodaya.
UDİ RAŅA Gautama asked Mahāvīra : 'Bhagavan ! does the jīva in crease the intensity of karma when it has risen or does the jīva increase the intensity of karma when it has not risen ? Does the karma increase the intensity when the karma has risen and expressed itself in the form of kārmic particles ?
Mahāvira replied, 1. The intensity of karma is not increased when the karma has not already risen or expressed itself. It does not increase the intensity when it has not risen. Only when the rise of the karma is possible because of the capacity of the rise of the karma although at the moment it is not expressed itself, in such cases the jīva
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Pātañjalayoga 2, 13 bhāşya.

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assists the increase in the intensity of the kärmic experience. Similarly, after the rise of the karma, it is not possible to increase the intensity of experience. The increase in the intensity of karma would not be possible if it is already increased, because if the increase of intensity is further increased, there would be no increase of intensity of karmic experience and there would be no end to the process of increase. 2. The increase in the intensity of karmic experience would not be possible in the cases where the increase in the intensity will take palace in future date. 3. The rise of the karmic particles will not give occasions to intensities, if the karmic particles are weak after its rise. 4. The rise and the intensity of karmic particles will be possible only in such cases where there is not yet the rise and increase of the intensity of karma, but where there is potentiality and capacity for the increase of the karmic intensity.
THE CAUSATION OF UDI RAŅĀ
Sometimes, the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself and in such cases there is no need to do self-effort. When the duration of karmic bondage is over, the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself. It is ripe for the rise and therefore no special efforts on the part of the jiva are necessary for effecting the rise.
Gautama asked Mahāvīra, 'Bhagavan ! when the karmic process is about to rise, but which has not yet risen and which is capable of rising (udīraṇā yogya) and increase, in such cases when the increase in the intensity of karmic process takes place and we say that individual effort, the strength of the individual jīva in these cfforts and the capacity (bala) and the near energy (vīrya) are necessary to operate or are not necessary.
Mahavira said, that jiva helps the process of rise and increase of the karmic process which are not yet risen cannot be made to rise and increase in intensity, 2
In this process, the one's destiny and the efforts of the individual jiva are both necessary. Due to the individual efforts the jiva effects
1 Vyakhyāprajñapti 1, 3, 35, 2 Bhagavati 1, 3, 35.

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certain processes in the karmic particles. This is possible to the yoga (activity) of the jiva, which is of three types: body, speech and mental. If the activity is auspicious, that is subhayoga, if the activity is inauspicious which lead towards the obstruction of self-realisation, is inauspicious.
Mithyātva (perversity), avrata (lack of self-control), pramāda (negligence) are all instrumental to yoga. But the activity without the kaşayas is subha while the activity that is accompanied or motivated by kaṣāya is asubha. Śubhayoga brings auspicious tendency and asubhayoga brings inauspicious tendency. The two tendencies sat and asat bring about the process the udīraṇā.1
VEDANA
Gautama said to Mahāvīra "Bhagavan! some say that the jiva experiences vedana according to the type of bondage that it takes place. Would it be correct to say that ?"
Mahavira said: "Gautama! the explanation given by these persons is one-sided and is not the whole truth. Some jivas experience the vedană (emotional states) according to their desserts earned through the type of karma acquired. But some other jivas 'experience different vedanās also.
Gautama said: 'how is it?'
Mahavira replied: "that jiva which experiences the vedanā or affective states according to the type and intensity of karma can be said to experience evambhuta vedana and those jivas which experience different emotional experience from the desserts are said to experience unevambhūta vedană.
Mahavira replied to another question stating that vedana (feeling) rises out of the karmic particles accrued in the past. The karmic particles flowing in into the soul at the present moment do not produce vedanā.
NIRJARA
Atman and the atomic particles of matter are distinct and as long as they are distinct, both of them are pure. But when there is contact
1 Vyakhyāprajñapti 1, 3, 35.

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between the ātman and the particles of matter, ātman is considered to be rūpi (having form) and atomic particles are converted into karmavarganās. When these kārmic particles get glued to the soul, then they are considered to be the karma which have the capacity of producing effect. When the kārmic effect gets exhausted the particles of karma is separated, and they become mere pudgala or matter. They become akarma and are separated from soul. This process of extraction of the kārmic particles from the soul is called nirjarā.
In the common parlance it is said that nirjarā is a process where the karma is separated from the soul, by the exhaustion of the effect of karma.
The fruits on the tree become ripe in two ways. The fruits may become ripe on the tree only, after the period of maturity is over or they may be made ripe by plucking them from the trez and using artificial methods. In the later case, it may take lesser time for the fruits to be ripened. In the same way, karma becomes mature for expression of its effects either in its natural process or it may made to fructify prematurely by certain moral and spiritual process. If the fructification of karma takes its natural process, this is called karma paripāka. But if the karma is made to fructify prematurely by means of certain moral and spiritual practices, then we call it karma nirjarā. Karma-paripāka is neither dharma nor adharma. Nirjarā is a process of fructification of kārmic effect, much earlier than it would have been possible for the karma to fructify in normal course. The fructification of karma is very auspicious also. Therefore, nirjarā would be avipāki nirjarā. It is also considered as sahetuka nirjarā. And this is dharma. Subha nirjarā is dharma.
PRIORITY OF THE AIMAN OR THE KARMA
A question has been asked regarding the priority of the karman or the ātman which is earlier ? The answer is, both the karman and ātman are anādi (beginningless) and the relation between them is also beginningless. However, there is the karma flow into the soul and new karmi enters into the soul every moment. There is not a single

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453 moment in an empirical jīva when the karma does not enter in. In this specific sense, we can say that the influx of the karma has a beginning and in the general sense of the relation of the karma to the soul."
A question has been pertinently asked regarding the adequacy of explanation of the usual statement that the kārmic influx is anādi (beginningless), but it has an end. How can that which is beginningless can have an end ?
The answer is, in general sense that which has no beginning has no end, specifically with reference to the generic relation. But with reference to particulars this fact of relation need not be true. For instance, the relation between the gold and ore of the gold, between milk and ghee is anādi because gold is in the ore and ghee is in the milk. But they can be separated, in this sense, the relation has an end.
But from the point of view of the relation of the specific karma to the soul, we can say that the association of karma with the jīva has a particular point of time and therefore, it had a beginning. Similarly, the karma that has accumulated in the soul can also be washed away at a particular time, and the new karma enters. And there is new bondage. But the flow of karma as such into the soul in its generic aspect is beginningless. Although from the point of view of specific karma, it has beginning and also an end. The karma that is flowing into the soul from the beginningless time can be exhausted by the self-control, tapas and other moral and spiritual activities. The accumulated karma gets destroyed and the ātman becomes free from the
kärmic encrustation.” 1.THE SUPREMACY OF THE KARMA OR OF THE ATMAN
A question has been asked regarding the supremacy of the ātman or of the karma which is supreme, which is more powerful ?
1 (a) Pañcāstikāya -- Ācārya Kundakunda.
(b) Paramātmaprakāśa 1, 59-60. 2 (a) Pañcādhyāyi 2, 45, Pt. Rājamalla
(b) Lokaprakāša-424
(c) Sthānānga 1, 4, 9, ţikā 3 Uttarādhyayana 25, 45.

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The answer is that both are supreme and both are powerful. Both have infinite energy. Sometimes jīva gets opportunate moments for the fruition of karma and by its activity in the righteous direction. It drives out the karmic bondage. But sometimes karma becomes predominent, and jiva has to suffer the effects of the karma and be under its control.1 From the point of view of looking at objects as an external reality, the karma appears to be more prominent. But if we introspect on ourselves we find the atman is equally important and powerful. Just as a spider weaves its web and gets into it, so also the jīva acquires karma and gets involved in the karmic bondage. If the jiva wills, the karmic bondage can be cut off. Therefore, it can be said that however, powerful the karma is, the jiva is more powerful than the karma. From the commonsense point of view, we find an experience that the stone which is hard is very often cut by the liquid water that flows over it. The flowing waters of the river cut through the hard and solid rocks. Similarly, the atman is more powerful than karma if it wills. As long as Hanumana did not know his real strength, he suffered indignities from Rāvanu and from the Nagupāśa. But once he realised his real strength, no body could control him. In the same way, the atman has infinite strength and energy and we do not know it. As long as we do not know it, we suffer the bondage of the karma. But the moment, we realise the inner strength of the atman, the shackles of the karma fall down one by one.
THE FRUITS OF KARMA
The empirical jīva experiences the fruits of karma. From the point of view of enjoyment of fruits of karma, the fruition has been distinguished into two types: (1) Subha karma, auspicious fruits of karma, which may also be considered as punya (merit) or kuśala (auspicicus and gccd); and (2) ośubha karma, the fruits are inauspicious, it may be referred papa, which is also akusala (inauspicious and evil). This distinction has been mentioned in various schools of Indian
454
1 Gaṇadharavāda 2, 25.

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philosophy like Jaina', Bauddha”, Sankhya?, Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiseșikab and Upanişads. The fruits of the karma which are conducive to the spiritual realisation give rise to punya and those which are not conducive to self-realisation are inauspicious and they give rise to pāpa, All desire punya and do not want pāpa. However, one cannot escape the effects of punya and päpa.
The kārmic bondage that the jiva has already acquired has to be experienced and exhausted in this life or in the succeeding life.? There is no escape for the ātman from experiencing the fruits of the karma good or bad arising out of the kārmic bondage.
The Buddha said to his disciples that one cannot escape the fruits of the karma at any cost, whether you want to avoid it by various mcans, you may fly in the skies, you may enter the sea, or fall in the valley, wherever you go karma cannot be escaped and the effects of pāpa have to be experienced."
Similar views has been expressed by the great poet Sihalana Miśra belonging to the Vedic tradition. 10
According to ācārya Amitagati, we experience the fruits of good and bad karmas, that we have acquired. If we have to experience the fruits of karma from other sources, the karma that we have acquired would be meaningless. 11
1 Tattvārthasūtra 6, 3-4 2 Visuddhimaggo 17, 88. 3 Sänkhyakārikā 44 4 (a) Yogasūtra 2, 14
(b) Yogabhāşya 2, 12. 5 (a) Nyāyamañjari, p. 472.
(b) Prasastapāda, pp. 637, 643. 6' Brhadāranyaka Upanişad 3, 2, 13. 7 (a) Bhagavatī sūtra (b) Sthānāngasūtra 77, 8 Uttarādhyayana 4, 3. 9 Dhammapada 9, 12. 10 śāntigatakam 82. 11 Dvātrirhšikā 30

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A SOURCÉ-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Ācārya Kundakunda says that jīva and the karmic particles are mixed together and at appropriate occasions they get separated. But as long as they are mixed together, the karma continues to give its effects either auspicious or inauspicious way. We get pleasure or pain accordingly.1
The Buddha had his foot pricked by a thorn once. He said to his disciples that “in my ninety one previous life, a man was murdered by my sharp weapon therefore, the thorn has pricked me".2
Similarly, Bhagavāna Mahāvila had to suffer great physical and mental tortures during his period of sadhana. All this must have been due to the effect of karma that he bad acquired in the previous lives.
TSVARA AND KARMAVADA The Jainas maintain that every individual jīvu experiences the fruits of karma according to bis desserts. He does not accept Nyāya) conception of Ī svara as the dispenser of karma. Because Tswara has no place in the system of karma. Karma is associated with jiva. It envelops the jīva and produces the effect. The karmic effect is determined by the kārmic matter, the extensity of karma, the time, the bhāvakarma and other factors like the birth, the sihiti, (duration) 8 etc. All these determine the total kārmic dispositions and shape the personality of the individual. The food ibat we take may be sweet or bitter, palatable or not, the food itself has not these characteristics, but these experiences come because of its association with the cogniser and the psychic effects and the individual consciousness. The individual self experiences these different types of food according to the variation in physical and psychic condition.
1 Pañcāstikāya 67 2 Şaņdarśana samuccaya ţikā 3 See; Bhagavāna Mahāvīra : Ek anuśīlan by the author. 4 Uttarādhyayana 20, 37. 5 (a) Nyāya darśana, sūtia 4, 1.
(b) Gautamasülla, adbyāya, 4, ā, 1, sūtra 21. 6 Bhagavati 7, 10. 7 Pañcasangraha. 8 Prajñāpana, p. 23.

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457 The śramaņa Kālodāyi asked Bhagavāna Mahāvira, "Bhagavan ! can we say that jīva experiences the bitter fruits of pāpa karma as bitter 71
Bhagavāna Mabāvīra said, "Yes." Then Mahāvīra was asked to explain the process of experience the fruits of inauspicious karma.
Mahāvīra said, 'just as if one were to eat the food well and cleanly prepared, yet mixed with poison, he may experience the taste of the food as good and tasteful, but the effect of the food, as it contains poison will be gradually harmful to the body. Similarly, the kārmic effect due to the activities actuated by various kaşāyas and the eighteen types of inauspicious deeds from violence upto mithyādarśana may be pleasant in the beginning, but they do show inauspicious effect.
Kālodāyi asked further question, “Bhagavan ! if the jīvas perform good karmas, will the fruits of those karma be good ?”'
Mahāvīra said “Yes'. Then Kālodāyi asked him the process of the fruition of auspicious kurma into merit.
Mahāvira said : just as actions performed due to auspicious merit, one who does not injure any living being and is free from all the 18 sinful acts from violence upto the mithyādarśana (perversity of attitude) will earn punya (auspicious fruits of karma). The auspicious work brings auspicious fruits of karma.3
Just as a machine like the electronic calculator having no intelligence, still makes complicated calculations, which in the case of a human being would require good deal of intelligence, so also karma, though material in nature consisting of kārmic particles, works out the schémata of the effects of kaina. It is not necessary to postulate the presence of fśvara for the dispensing of karma. He is not free to distribute karma as he wants. One man's karma cannot be transformed to another. If this were possible, then freedom of the will have
| 2 3.
Bhagavatt 7, 10. Vyākhyāprajñapti 7; 10 Bhagavati 7, 10

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no meaning and the Tsvara would have been powerful and karma would be some commodity to be distributed at His will. But we find, that karma works his own way. There is a regulated mathematical and determined effects of karnia which works their own course. In this sense, Tswara has no place in the karma theory.
', TRANSFERENCE OF KARMA
According to the Vedic tradition, the individual ātman is at the mercy of the all powerful Ī śvara. Without the grace of T svara the ātman cannot do anything. I švara is the one who dispenses karma to different individuals, Who sends one to the hell or heaven.
The Jaina theory of karma does not accept this view. There is no possibility of dispensation of karma by any external agency like I švara. Karma cannot be distributed like pieces of money. One man's karma cannot be transformed into other. The individual soul is free. It is by its own activity that it earns the karmic bondage in this empirical world. Each individual soul is responsible for its rise or fall. The ātman which gets involved in the wheel is like the river vetaraņi or the tree kūtaśālmalī. The soul expresses its two nature, gets the fruits of perception. The individual soul is the doer of its own karma and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma. The soul that follows the righteous path is its own friend, while the soul that goes astray and follows un-righteous path is its own enemy.
The Jaina theory of karma maintains that the fruits of karma expressing in happiness and misery are the results of the activity of the soul. The soul gets the fruits according to its dessert. The Vedic tradition and the Buddhist view are refuted by the Jainas, regarding the distribution and the transform of karma.s
1 Mahābhāratā, Vanaparva, adhyāya 30, sl. 28. 2 Uttarādhyayana 20, 36 3 Uttarādhyayana 20, 37 4 Uttarādhyayana 4, 4; 6, 3 5 (a) Airamimithia - Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaniā p. 131
(b) Sri Amara Bhārati, Bhāratiya dardano me karma virevcana
- Upadhyāya Amaramuni

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. One man's karma cannot be transformed to another. If that were so, the efforts of the jīva would be futile because the jīva would not know that its good actions would give him good results. It would then be possible in such cases that one does good actions and someone else would enjoy the fruits of that karma. This would not be an adequate explanation for the distribution of karma.
THE FUNCTION OF KARMA The function of karma is to get the soul involved in this wheel of life and death. As long as the flow of kärmic bondage continues, the soul gets involved in this wheel and is not free. This is the general function of kärmic action. In the specific sense different types of karma have their different functions, in creating the bondage, to the individual soul.
TYPES OF KARMA Jaina karma theory has distinguished karma into eight types; 1. jñānāvarāṇīya karma, 2. darśanāvaraņa, 3. vedanīya, 4. mohaniya 5. nāma, 6. ayu, 7. gotra and 8. antarāya.2
Out of these eight karmas - jñānävaraniya, darśanīvaraņa, mohaniya and antarāya are gh iti karmas, because they obscure the inherent nature and capacity of the soul, like jñāna and darśana.Vedanīya, āyu, nāma and gotra karmis are aghatī karmas because they do not affect the original capacity of the soul nor do they obscure the capacity. Therefore, they are called aghāti karmas.
The consciousness is the characterisation of the soul. The soul has infinite energy. Similarly, it is characterised by infinite knowledge (anantajñāna), infinite intuition (ananta darśana), infinite bliss
1 Dvātrirsikā, Ācārya Amitagati, 30-31. 2 (8) Uttarādhyayana 33, 2-3. (b) Sihănah ga 8, 3, 596, (c) Prajma
panā, 23, 1, (d) Bhagavati, śataka 6, uddeśaka 9 p. 453 (e) Tattvārthasūtra 8, 5 (f) Prathama karmagrantha, gāthā 3,
Pancasangraha 2, 2. 3 (a) Pañcadhyāyi 2, 998.
(b) Gommațasāra-karmakānda 9 4 (a) pañcādhyāyi 2, 999.
(b) Gommațasāra karmakānda 9

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A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (ananta sukha) and infinite energy (ananta vīrya). Jñānāvaraniya karma obscures the intellectual knowledge of the soul. Daršanāvarana karma covers the darśana, mohaniya karma obscures the right attitude and faith and right conduct also. Therefore the ātman will be bereft of the ananta sukha. Antarāya karma obscures the infinite energy of the soul, by which the soul will be temporarily incapacitated for expressing the energy which is inherent in the soul. In this way, the ghātī karmas or obscuring karmas are basically responsible for the different states of the karma.
Those types of karma which do not affect, the original nature of the jiva but which affect the fruits and the determining effect of the original nature of the jīvas are called aghātī karmas. Aghāti karmas are directly connected with the karmic particles of matter and not directly with the jiva. By the rise of the aghātī karmas, the soul gets mixed with the paudgalika dravya (material particles of karma).
Because of this, the jīva which is amurta will be considered as mūrta. The jīva is bound with the sarīra (body), and the inherent characteristics of jiva like infinite jñāna, infinite sukha, a murtakarva (formlessness) and agurulaghutva (neither small nor big) do not get occasions to get express themselves. Vedanīya karma obscures the infinite happiness or bliss of the soul. Ayu karma obscures and obstructs the eternity of the soul. By nāma karma, the jīva is limited in its expression of the status. And the gotra karma thwarts the expression of agurulaghutva. When the ghātī karmas are removed, the ātman attains omniscient knowledge (kevalajñāna) and omniscient intuition (kevala darśana) and becomes Arihanta. But when the aghāti karmas are also removed, the body is cast away, and the ātman is freed from the material existence, and becomes siddha, buddha or muktu. Jñānāvaraņa karma
Jiva is characterised by pure consciousness. Upayoga is the essential characteristic of the jiva. Upayoga has been variously interpreted, sometimes as an expression of jñāna and darśana and sometimes as the resultant of consciousness. Sākāra upayoga expresses jñāna
1 Tattvārthasūtra 10, 1 2 Uttarādhyayana 28, 10 3 Niyamasāra, 10

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and nirākāra upayoga expresses darśana. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi in his book, "Some Problems in Jaina Psychology” has interpreted upayoga in psychological term stating that upayoga may be referred to as the kārmic energy which is primarily responsible for expression of jñāna and darśana. He has used the world upayoga on the pattern of the Macdugallian sense with certain modifications.? Jñānopayoga is the expression of conscious energy which is associated with discriminative knowledge by which the self distinguishes between species, the attribute, action and other forms of distinguishing of the empirical jīva. Daršanopayoga apprehends the generality of the object in a concrete psychosis. Jñānāyarana obscures such discriminative knowledge. Just as a piece of cloth tied round the eyes so as to obstruct the perception will obscure the sense perception through the eyes. The consequential expression of jñānāvarana karma will be to obscure knowledge of the five types : matijñāna (sense perception) 2. śruta jñāna (inferential knowledge) 3. avadhijñāna (clairovance perception) 4. manahparyayajñāna (telepathic cognition) and 5. kevalajñāna (omniscient cognition). 5
Matijñānāvārana karma obscures sense experience, obtained through the contact of sense organs and the manas. The frutajñānāvarana karma obscures knowledge obtained through inference and discriminative knowledge which is defective. Avadhijñānāvarana karma obscures knowledge which may be considered as clairvoyance knowledge and which is mainly concerned with the perception of objects having form. Manahparyāya jñānāvarana karma obscures the telepathic cognition. Kevalajñānāvaraṇa karma covers the omniscient knowledge which includes the simultaneity of knowledge-the substance and modes.
1 Tattvārthasūtra 2-9 and its bhāşya. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Some Problems in Jaina Psychology (Karnatak
Uni. 1961) 3 Pramānanayatattvāloka 2. 7. 4 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha 9
(b) Gommațśāra (karmakāņda) 21
(c) Sthānānga 2, 4, 105 tīkā me uddhịta 5 (a) Uttarādhyayana 33, 4 (b) Prahāpana 23, 2 (c) Sthầnặnga 5,
464 (d) Tattvārtha sūtra 8, 6–7.

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The consequential expression of the jñānāvarana karma may be either sarvaghāti (complete) or desaghātī which is partial.' Sarvaghātī jñānāvaranīya karma obscures the knowledge which is complete and which arises from the obscuration of knowledge, while daśaghāti jñānāvarana karma obscures partial knowledge obtained through the matijñāna and other forms of jñānāvarana. Mati, śruta, avadhi and manaḥparyaya jñānāvarana are desaghāti, while kevalajñānāvarana is sarvaghāti, because the sarvaghātī jñānāvaranu karma is concerned with the total obscuration of knowledge. However although survaghāti kevalajñānāvarana karma obscures omniscience but the jñāna of the ātman is not wiped out of the essential. When the dark clouds cover the sky, the light of the sun percolates through the clouds and enables us to distinguish between the night and the day.2 Again, just as the light of the sun piercing through thick dark clouds obscuring the vision of the sun illumines different parts in the surroundings and the buildings according to the natures and the type of construction and colour pattern. So also the jñānāvaraniya karma obscuring matijnana illumines various things with different intensities. There is no complete destruction of matijñāna. If that were to take place, jīva would be considered to be ajīva.
The maximum duration of this karma is 30 koțākoți sāgaropama and minimum antarmuhūrta" (less than 48 minutes).3 Darsanävarana kar na :
Darsanāvarana kurma obscures the intuitive experience. It obscures and inhibits the possibility of the cognition in which we apprehend the generality of an object without the discriminative knolwedge of the particulars. Due to the obscuration of the darśanavarana the
1 Sthānanga sutra 2, 4, 105 2 (a) Sthānāņāga, 2, 4, 105 ţikā
(b) Sthānānga-samavāyānga, pp. 94-95 Pt. Dalsukh Mālvaniyā
(c) Nandīsūtra 43 3 (a) Uttarādhyayana 33, 19-20
(b) Tattvārthasūtra 8, 15 (c) Pañcama Karmagrantha, gāthā 26.

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avenues for knowledge are generally closed. Analogical example in this connection may be mentioned in that the darśanavaraṇa may be compared to the watch man (dvārapāla) at the door of a king. Without whose permission we cannot see the king himself. Similarly, if the darśanavaraṇa karma obscures intuitive experience, we cannot get easily the jñāna (discriminative knowledge).1
Darsanavaraṇa karma is of nine varieties: 1. cakşu darśanavaraṇa 2. acakşu darsanavaraṇa 3. Avadhi darśanāvaraṇa and 4. kevala darsanavaraṇa 5. nidra (sleep) 6. nidra-nidrā (deep sleep) 7. pracală 8. pracalăpracalā and 9. styānardhi. 2
Cakşu darsanavaraṇīya obscures the visual experience. Acakşu darsanavaraṇīya obscures the forms of experience obtained through the sense-organs other than the eyes, and the mind. Avadhi darsanavaraṇīya obscures the clairvoyance intuition and kevala darsanāvaraṇīya veils the omniscient experience. Nidra is a form of activity which is responsible for the obscuration of darśanavaraṇīya karma. It is sleep which is considered light sleep. Nidra-nidrā is heavy sleep. Pracala is a form of stupor by which one gets sleep even sitting or standing. Pracala-Pracala is a heavy sleep which one gets even while walking. We may consider this as somnambulistic. Styānardhi is a very deep sleep where even activity is possible during sleep. It may be referred to hypnotic form of sleep.
Darsanavaraṇa karma may be partially affecting (deśaghati) or totally affecting (sarvaghati). Cakşu, acakşu, avadhi darśanāvaraṇīya are deśaghati while the remaining are sarvaghātī. Kevaladarśanavaraṇīya karma, like kevalajñānāvaraṇīya karma is sarvāghātī.
1 (a) Sthānanga 2, 4, 105 tikā.
(b) Prathama Karmagrantha 9
(c) Gommatas āra (karmakāṇḍa) 21, Nemicandra
2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 5-6
(b) Samavāyānga sūtra 9, (c) Sthānanga 8, 3, 668, (d) Tattvārthasūtra 8, 8, (e) Prajñāpanā 23, 1.
3 Thāṇānga 2, 4, 10-darisaņävaranjje kamme evam ceva. tikā-deśadarśanavarṇīyāṁ cakṣuracakṣuravadhidarśanāvaraṇīyaṁ ; sarvadarśanavaraṇīyaṁ tu nidrā pañcakaṁ kevaladarśanāvaraņiyam cetyarthaḥ, bhā vanā tu pūrvavaditi,

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When darsanavaraṇīya karma is completely removed the jiva experiences infinite intuition. If the darśanavaraṇīya karma undergoes suppression and destruction, partial (kṣayopasama), then cakşu darsana and acakşu darśana and avadhi darsana experiences would be possible. The minimum duration of darśanāvaraṇa karma is one 'antarmuhurta' while the maximum duration will be 30 crores of crores sāgaropama.1
Vedaniya karma
Vedaniya karma causes experience of the pleasure and pain. It is of the two forms (i) sātāvedaniya which is responsbile for the experiences of pleasure concerning senses and the mind; while (ii) asātāvedanīya brings about painful experience.2 These two experiences are concerned with the body and the mind. Vedaniya karma can be compared to a drawn out sword besmeared with honey. Sātāvedanīya is like the honey on the sword, while asātāvedaniya is like cutting one's tongue while licking.*
Sātāvedaniya karma is of eight types like: manojñ1 sabda (pleasant words), manojña rūpa (pleasant form), manojña gandha (pleasant smell), manojña risa (pleasant taste), manojña sparsa (pleasnt touch), sukhita mana (mind which is pleased), sukhita vāṇī (pleasing speech) and sukhita käya (pleasing body).5
Asātāvedaniya is similarly of eight types associated with unpleasant experiences of sabda, rūpa, gandha, rasa, sparśa, mana, vāṇī and unpleasant body (dukhita kāya).o
Asātāvedaniya karma causes painful feelings through the senses and the mind, thereby bringing misery to the being."
1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20 (b) Tattvärthasūtra 8, 15
(c) Pancama Karmagrantha, gāthā 26 (d) Prajñāpanā, pada 29 u. 2, su. 293
2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 7 (b) Sthānanga 2, 4, 105.
3 Tattvärtha 8,8 Sarvärthasiddhi
4 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, 12 (b) Sthānānga 2, 4, 105 țīkā
5 (a) Sthānanga 8, 488 6 (a) Sthānanga 8, 488 7 (a) Sthānanga 8, 488

(b) Prajñāpana 23, 2
(b) Prajñāpanā 23, 3, 15 (b) Prajñāpanā 23, 3, 15

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The shortest duration of the vedanīya karma has been mentioned as antarmuhurta in Uttarādhyayana sūtrul and Prajñāpanā.: Bhagavati mentions two samayas as the minimum duration.: There is no contradiction between these different statements, because muhurta includes antarmuhurta which can be described as having the duration of two samayas. But Tattvärthasūtra and Karmagrantha have mentioned twelve muhurtas as the minimum duration of this karma. This discrepancy may be explained with reference to the sāmparāyika asrava and Tryāpathika äsrava. The maximum duration would be 30 crores of crores sāgara. Mohaniya karma
Mohanīya karma is deluding karma. It causes emotional disturbances and leads one astray, making him believe that this world is very much real and one clings strongly to the experiences of this world. In this sense, we may say it cause; "delusions". This is the most powerful of the eight karmas. Mohiniya karma is the primary form of karma which is responsible for the wheel of samsāra.5 In this sense the real nature of the arman, which is purs and non-attached, free from the passions, is very much affected by the perversions of the emotional disturbances. By this karma, one ordinarily loses the power of dis. crimina:ion. The effects of this karina can be compared to the effects of alcoholic drinks in which one loses the power of thought and discrimination and the sense of discriminating good from bad.6
.
i Uttaràdhyayona 33, 19-20. 2 Projñ ipanā 23, 2, 21-29 3 Bhagavati 6, 3-Vedanijjam jaha do samayā I 4 (a) Tuttvārthasūtra 8, 19.
(b) Tattvārthabhāşya (C) Navat ittva Sahitya Sangraha; Devananda Sūţiksta, Saptatattva
Prakarana (d) Jaina Darsina, p. 354 · Dr. Mohanlal Mehtā. 5 Vinayacandra Caubīsī 6 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, gāthā 13
(b) Sthäninga 2, 4, 105 ţikā (c) Gom natis.ār.2 (k:ırmıkāndu) 21,

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Mohanīya karma is of two types : (1) Darśanamohaniya which affects the intuitive experience and (2) Căritramohaniya ; it affects good conduct.1 Darsana in this sense refers to the state of intuition of right tattras and the real nature of the atman.2 Just as the consuming of liquor stupifies, so also mohaniya karma causes stupification of the mind by which he looses the power of discrimination between right and wrong. In this, one identifies himself with all that is external to him. And without discriminating the righteous from the unrightcousness, one identifies himself with the uprighteous activity.
Darsana mohaniya karma is of three4 types : 1. Samyakrva mohaniya, in this, the expression of samyaktra, if it is to come, cannot be obstructed, but it is slowed down and vitiated with numerous faults. 2. Mithyātva mohaniya, in this the faith in the righteous item is lost. 3. Misra mohaniya, in this one develops the mixed attitude in which righteous is also present along with wrong attitude. It is also called samyakmithyātva mohaniya.5 Mithyātva mohaniya is sarvaghāti, while samyaktva mohaniya is desaghātī as it partially affects discrimination. But miśra mohanīya is saryaghātī with reference to the relation of relative emphasis of the mithyātva and samyaktva.
Second distinction in the mohaniya karma is the cāritra mohaniya karma. It affects the right conduct of the soul. It thwarts activity leading to right conduct.?
Cāritra mohaniya is of two types : 1. kaşāja mohaniya and
1 (a) Uttarādhyayana 33, 8
(b) Sthānanga 2, 4, 105
(c) Prajiāpanā 23, 2 2 Tattvārtha sūtra 1, 2 3 Pancadhyāyi 2, 93, 6-7 4 (a) Uttarādhyayana 33, 9.
(b) Sthānānga 2, 184. 5 Prathama Karmagrantha, gāthā 14-16 6 (a) Gommațasāra (karmakānda) 39
(b) Sthānānga 2, 4, 105, ţikā me uddbfta 7 Pañcādhyāyi 21, 6.

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467 2. nokaşāya mohaniya. Kaşāya refers to the passions and emotional upset. Kaşāya mohanīya is of 16 types while nokaşāya which refers to the quasi-passions or quasi-emotional upsets has seven or nine types.
Kaşāya mohaniya has reference to the emotional upsets. It etymologically comes from kaşa and aya meaning attachment or attraction towards saṁsära which is kașa. These emotional upsets lead us to the attachments to the worldly things and empirical experiences and the consequent involvement in the wheel of life. Krodha (anger), māna (egoity), māyā (deceitfulness) and lobha (greed)--these are four types of passions. Each of them has four different levels of intensity : 1. anantānubandhi, 2. apratyākhyānāvarana, 3, pratyäkhyānāvarana and 4. samjvalana. In this way, there are sixteen variations of expression of emotional excitement. The rise of these mohı. niya karmas, i. e., kışāyas or emotional upsets like anger, disturb the individual's mental activity.
Anantānubandhi is of longer duration and because of this, the soul wanders into worldly life for endless time (anantakāla). This is responsible for the destruction of samyaktva.
Apratyākhyānāvaraṇīya h is the effect of partial destruction and due to this ātinan connot accept the frāvaka vratas or aņupratas and follow the righteous path.5
Pratyākhyānāvarana obstructs the āt'nan to become a monk or śramana.
Due to the samjvalana kaşāya it is difficult to get the opportuni. ties for practicing right conduct for a śramaņ2.?
| (a) Uttara dhyayına 31, 10. (b) Prajñāpanā 23, 2. 2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 11. (b) Prajñāpana 23, 2. (c) Sthānānga 9, 700
(d) Sam avāyānga 16. 3 (a) Avašvaka Malayagiri vrtti p. 116
(b) Viseşāvaśyaka bhāsya, gāthā 1227. 4 Tattvārthasutra 8, 10 bhāşya 5 Tattvärthasūtra 8, 10 bhāşya 6 Tattvārthasütra 8, 10 bhāşya 7 Tattvärthasūtra 8, 10 bhāşya

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Gommațasāra also mentions these points.
Anantānubandhi kaşāya operates for the whole of life. Apratyākhyāna has its effects for one year. Pratyakhyāna kaşāya produces its effects and continues its operation for four months, While sarjvalana has its effects for 15 days.
In the Gommațasāra karmakānda there is a description of the duration of the effects of kaşāyas with reference to the emotional experiences.3
No-kaşāya Mohaniya-We now describe the intensity and duration of nok aşāya mohanīya karma. Nokaşaya refers to quasi-passions which arise due to the operation of kaşāyas, 4 They are also called as akaşāyas. Nokaşāya does not mean absence of kaşāya, but it is a quasi-passion in which there is the intensity of passion without the qualitative differences. There are nine types of nokaşayas : 1. laughter (hāsya), 2. rati (liking towards the other living or non-living things or dislike towards the samyama), 3. arati (disliking towards the worldly affairs and interest towards self-control samyama) 4. bhaya (fear), 5. śoka (grief) 6. jugupsă (disgust)? 7, strīveda (sensual desire with a man) 8. puruşaveda (desire of intercourse with a woman), 9. napurhsakaveda (desire of sexual intercourse both with the man and woman). In the Uttarādhyayana seven distinctions have been mentioned. There the three types of vedas have been considered as one. In other words, by the single word veda all the three vedas have been denoted.
It would be worth-while considering on the basis of psychological analysis, to be associated with somehow with instincts or the better word propensities in the sense that Mcdonell has used. This
1 Gommațasāra, jīvakānda, gāthā 283. 2 Prathama karmagrantha, gāthā 18 3 Gommațasāra karmakānda. 4 Kaşāyasahavartitvāt, kaşāyapreraņādapi.
Hāsyādinavakasyoktā nokaşāyakaşāyatā. 5 Tattvārtha Rajavartika 8, 9-10. 6 Sarvārthasiddhi 8,9 7 Ācārya Pūjyapāda
yadudayādātmadosasaṁvaraņaṁ paradoşāvişkarņam sā jugupsā.

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needs further psychological study. In this way, caritramohaniya karma has twenty-five varieties and among them four saṁjvalana kaşaya and nine nokaṣāya i. e., thirteen varieties are the disturbances which affect partially. Therefore, they are called deśaghati, while the others (i. c. remaining twelve varieties have their effects totally. Therefore, they are called sarvaghāti.1 The duration of the mohaniya karma is for one antarmuhurta at the minimum and for 70 crores of crores sagara at the maximum.2
Ayuşkarma (Age Determining Karma)
Karma that determines the age of an individual jīva is called ayuşkarma. When the age determined by the karma is over the individual jiva embraces death."
This karma has been compared to the prison house. The udge sentences a prisoner to undergo punishment for a specific period and as soon as that period is over, he is released from the prison. Similarly, the individual jīva gets embodied in a particular body in a particular life for a specified period of time. For the determined period of time, the soul cannot be free from the bodily existence in that particular body. The ōyuşkarma is not concerned with giving pleasure or pain, but its function is to determine the age limit of a specific individual jīva.5
The consequential distinctions of ayuşkarma is of 4 types: 1. one that determines like the life span in the hell (naraka āyu), 2. the one determines the life span in the lower animals (tiryañca
1 (a) Sthähänga 2, 4, 105, tīkā
(b) Gommaṭasāra, karmakāṇḍa 39
2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 21
(b) Tattvärthasūtra 8, 16
3 (a) Tattvärtharājavārtika 8, 10-2
(b) Prajñāpanā 23, 1
4 (a) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha; vṛttyādisametaṁ, Navatattva
prakaranaṁ 74.
(b) Gommatasāra, karmakāṇḍa 11.
(c) Prathama Karmagrantha, gāthā 23
5 Thānanga 2, 4, 105 ṭīkā

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ayu), 3. the life span determining karma in the case of human being (manuşya āyu) and 4. that which determines the age of the residents of heaven (devayu).1
The age determination may be considered in two ways: 1. apavartaniya and 2. anapavartaniya. Apavartaniya refers the decrease in the age due to external condition. Anapavartaniya refers to the nondecrease under any circumstance of the duration of the ayu.2
Apavartaniya ayu does not however mean that it is possible to terminate the life of an individual jiva without exhausting the duration of the age as determined by the age determining karma. In only means that one can hasten the experience of the ayu karma which would have taken a longer time. This experience of karma can be reduced in antarmuhurta. In the common sense parlance, it is called premature death. But we should remember that in the case of the human being and the lower animals residing in karmabhūmi it is possible to have such reduction in the experiences of the exhaustion of karma bringing about premature death. Eut there cannot be such reduction of age in the hellish beings, gods, tīrthamkaras and even human beings and lower animals of bhogabhūmi i. e., the land of enjoyment.
Ayukarma extends in its duration to one antarmuhurta at the lowest and 33 crores of sagaropama at the highest. Bhagavati mentions the highest duration as a third part of the purvakoți and 33 sāgaropama. This includes the period of time required for formation of the new life after the karmabandha in the previous life is out off, to the time when the germination of the new life starts. In other words this includes also the period of potentiality (abādhākāla) of ayuşkarma.
Nāma karma
Nama karma is that type of karma which determines the
1 (a) Tattvärthasūtra 8, 11
(b) Prajñāpang 23–1
(c) Uttaradhyayana 33, 12
2 Tattvärthasūtra 2, 52. Pt. Sukhalālji kā vivecan, pp. 112-116.
3 Uttaradhyayana 33, 22.
4 Bhagavati 6, 3

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status and other conditions of the individual jiva. 1 According to this theory, nāma karma determines the different formulations of the bodily forms of the different individual status and the determining experiences."
The nama karma has been very often compared to a painter who paints various pictures of men and animals. A good painter presents varieties of forms of animals and birds. Similarly, nămakarma presents the determined life of individual soul in different stages like naraka, mānava (human) or heavenly status. This karma determines the bodily form, the different limbs of the body, senseorgans and the general stature of the individual body. "
Nāma karma primarily is of two types: (1) Śubhanāma karma which gives auspicious presentations and (2) aśubhanāma karma which gives inauspicious presentation. The first is the consequence of punya (merit) and the second is determined by demerit (papa). Nāma karma expresses itself into forty-two types of consequential forms.5 They are:
1. Gati nama-It determines the status of the individual soul in (a) hell, (b) lower animal states, (c) in the human states and (d) in the stage for the heavenly beings.
2. Jati nama-The nama karma that determines the form of the individual with reference to sense-organs and the species of the animals is called the jati nima. It has five forms: 1. one-sensed organism, 2. two-sensed organism, 3. three-sensed 4. four-sensed and 5. five-sensed organisms. These are determined by the năma karma.
3. Śarīra nāmakarma-It determines the type and the form of the sarira that the jiva gets as the fruits of its karma. It has five
1 Prajñāpand 23, 1, 288 tikā
2 Gommatasă ra karmakāṇḍa 12.
3 (a) Sthānanga 2, 4, 105 tikä
(b) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha, avacūrṇi vṛttyadi same aṁ, -Navatattvaprakaraṇaṁ 74
(b) Thaṇānga 2, 4, 105 ṭīkā.
4 Uttara 33, 13
5 (a) Samavāyāṇga samavāya 42, (b) Prjañāpanā 23, 2-293.
(c) Tattvärihasūtra 8, 12.

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY forms: (a) audārika sorira (b) vaikriyaka, (c) āhārcka (d) taijasa and (e) kārmana sarira (kārmic body).
4. Śarira angopānga nama-lt determines the different parts of the bodies and also the limbs of the bcdies. It is of three forms: (1) audārika sarira angopanga (2) vakriyaka sarira angopānga and (3) āhāraka sarīra argopanga. Tuijasa and kārmaņa sariics (bodies) have no limbs.
5. Sarīra bandhana nāma kurma is that body of the kārmic particles which associates the karmic particles which were accrued previously and are being accrucd in present. It has five forms: 1. audārika śärira bandhana namu, 2. laikriya sarīra bandhana nāna, 3. āhāraka sarira bandhana nāma 4. taijasa sarira beandhaa nāma, and 5. kärmaņa sarira bandhana nāmo.
In the Karmagrantia, fifteen distinctions have been made regarding the Sarira landhana nama kurma. We give below the same distinctions in their original form:
1. Audārika-audārika bandhananāma 2. Audārika-laijasa bandhunanāma 3. Audārika-kārmaņa bandhananāma 4. Vaikriya-vaikriya bandhunanáma 5. Vaikriya-taijasa bandhancnāma 6. Vaikriya-kärmaņa bandhananāma 7. Ahāraka-āhāraka bandhananama 8. Ahārka-taijasa bandhananāma 9. Ahāraka-kārmana bandhananāma 10. Audārika-taijasa-kārmana bandhananāma 11. Vaikriya-taijasa--kārmaņa bandhananāma 12. Ahārka--taijasa--kārmana bandhananāma 13. Taijasa--taijasa bandhananāma 14. Taijasa--kärmaņa bandhananāma
15. Kärmara--kārmana bandhananāma The audărika, vaikriya and ñharaka karma particles are not directly connected with eath other. Therefore, their interconnected bondage has not been mentioned here. . 6. Šarira sanghāta namakarma is concerned with the association and arrangement of the different karmas which have been accumula

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ted due to various factors and the kārmic particles which are accruing due to the influx of karmas. It has five forms : (a) audārikasarira sanghāta nāma karma, where the kārmic particles of similar nature accrued and accruing are arranged in a proper way, so as to determine the form of the body, etc. Similarly, the functions of other four allied karmas can be mentioned, like (b) raikriyasarira sanghāta nāmakarma, (c) äharaka sarīra (d) taijasa sarira and (e) kārmana Sarira sanghāta nāmakarma.
7. Samhanana nāma karma is concerned with the formation and structure of the bone in the body. There are six forms in this : (a) vajra vrşabha nārāca saṁhanana nāma-karma (formation of hard and strong bones), (b) vrşabha nārāca samhanana namo karma (c) nārāca sarhhanana nāma karma (flexible and not brittle bones). (d) ardha nārāca samhanana nāma karma, (e) kilika samhanana nāma. karma (joint bones), (f) sevārta samhanana nāma karma (auxilliary bones).
8. Samsthāna nāma karma is concerned with the determination of the size of the different parts of the body. It has also six forms like : (a) samacaturasra (even form), (b) nyagrodha parimandala sarnsthāna (globular and round forms), (c) sādi samsthāna (formation of the ends of the body), (d) vămana samsthāna (formation of short bodies, (e) kubja sarhsthāna (formation of dwarfish bodies and (f) hunda saṁsthāna (unequal bodies).
9. Varna nāmakarma is that type of nămakarma which is responsible for determining the colour of the individual organism. It is of five types : (1) krsnavarnanāma (black), 2. nilavarnanāma (indigo), 3. lohitavarnınāma (grey), 4. hāridravarnanāma (yellow) and 5. svetavarņa nāma (white) determining karma,
10. Gandha nāmakorma : This náma karma determines the smell of the individual organism. It is of two types : 1. surabhigandhanāma (pleasant smell) and 2. durabhigandhanāma (unpleasant smell).
11. Rasa nāmakarma is connected with determination of the taste of the individual experiencing it. It is of five types : 1. tiktarasa nāma (pungant) 2. kațurasanāma (bitter) 3. kaşāyarasanāma (astrin

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gent) 4. āmlarasa nāma (acidic) and 5. madhura rasa nāma (sweet). '
12. Spuršanāma karma determines the nature of the touch of the individual organism. These are of eight types : 1. karkaša spars 1 (hard) 2. mrdu sparsa (soft) 3. guru sparsa (weighty) 4. laghu sparsa (unextended and light) 5. snigdha (greasy and smooth) 6. rūkņa sparsa (hard and dry) 7. śīta sparsa (cool touch) and 8. uşna sparśa (warm). The sparsa nama karma determines them.
13. Agurulaghu nāna : This karma determines the extent of the intensity neither too little nor too much in its intensity and duration.
14. Upaghāta nāma : With the rise of this karma the individual jiva suffers hardships and physical tortures due to physical deformation like pratijivhā (defects in tongue or defects in teeth, etc.)
15. Paraghāta nāma : By the rise of this karma one can influence others even through his talk or appearance. It is also possible that due to this karma, the individual jiva would be able to harm other jīvas.
16. Anupūrvī nāma : This type of karma enables an individual jīva to traverse a particular distance after it leaves its first body at the time of death and before it enters the other state of existence. It enables to cover some space so as to reach the next stage of existence. It has four types : 1. naraka ānupūrvī nāma (leading towards hell) 2. tiryak ānupūrvīnāma (it has the capacity of leading the soul to a point which to enter the lower stage of animals) 3. manuşya ānupūrvi nāma (leading to the human existence) 4. devānupūrvi nāma (leads to the next type of heavenly being).
17. Ucchvāsa nāma : By this karma, one can breath properly.
18. Atapa nāma : By this karma, an individual organism can get warm for the sake of life. Or, an organism, being himself cool,
1
This type of karma operates in the case of one-sensed organism, because the body of the one-sensed organism is first cold and then it can get hot.

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can expedite warm-light, e. g., the light of gross ankaratna fixed below the sun.
19. Udyotanāma karma : By this karma the organism becomes cool and gets sufficient energy and light? or, expedites cool light.
20. Vihāyogati nama : By this karma the individual jīva gets either the good or the bad gati (walk). It has two types : (praśasta (auspicious gati) and aprašasta (uncomfortable or inauspicious gati).
21. Trasanāma karma : It enables an individual organism to get the capacity of motion.
22. Sthāvara nāma karma : By this karma individual jīva cannot move at his will.
23. Sūkşma nāma : This karma determines the subtle body of the individual jiva.
24. Bădara nāma karma determines the individual to have a sthūla śarīra (gross body).
25. Paryāpta nāma : By this, the individual soul gets appropriate functions (paryāptis) suitable for its status.
26. Aparyāptanáma : In this the individual soul may not get all the necessary and fitting functions of the organism.
27. Sādhāraņa śarīranāma : By this karma the infinite līvas get a common and normal body.
28. Pratyekaśarīra nāma : It determines the specific body of the jiva.
29. Sthiranāma karma : It determines the type of the bones, . the teeth and flesh that a body gets in the proper form and proper place.
30. Asthira nāma is responsible for the disharmony and discardent arrangement of the bones, the flesh etc.
31. śubhanāma : By this karma one acquires a beautiful body and limbs.
1
The Śītaprakāśa (the cool night) arises from the deva, labdhidhārī muni, vaikriya sarīra, the moon and the stars.

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32. Asubha nāma karma is responsible for the acquisition of ugly body and limbs.
33. Subhaga nāma karma : By this karma one becomes populai and the impression on the others would be pleasant, even if he does nothing for the good of others, he becomes saubhāgyaśāli i. e. he acquires good things of life.
34. Durbhaga nāma karma is responsible for the unpleasant experiences of life and he becomes un popular.
35. Susvara nāma karna : This type of karma is responsible for the melodius voice one gets.
36. Duḥsvara nāma karma : By this one gets an unpleasant voice.
37. Adeya n jina karma makes an individual jiva respected by his words.
33. Anādeya nāma karma : By this, even the true words of the individual jīva are not respected.
39. Yaşah n ima karina : This brings fame to the individual soul.
40. Ayaśaḥkirti nāma karma : By this karma one is unlucky and does not get success. He gets disfame.
41. Nirmāņa nāma karma : By this the limbs of the body are properly arranged.
42. Tīrthankara nāma karma : By this karma one gets the opportunity and the capacity of establishing right path (dharma tīrtha).
Prajñāpanā? and Gommațasāra. have given 93 types of nāma. karma, and Karmavipāka mentions fifteen types of bandhananāma and 103 types of nā nakarma distinctions. The distinctions in the nāmakarma on the basis of 67 prakstis are to be considered from the point of view of distinctions of auspicious and inauspicious karma. And also
1 2 3
Prajñāpanā 23, 2, 293. Gommațasära karmakāņda, 22. Karmavipaka (Hindi translation) Pt. Sukbalālji, pp. 48, 105.

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from the point of view of four-fold distinctions of varna. Elsewhere also, 71 distinctions have been made in the consequential effects (prakṛti) in the same nama karma, by which subhanāma karma has been distinguished, into thirty seven1; and thirty-four types of asubhanāma karma. This is a brief analysis of the different types of namakarma. This analysis has no ideological difference. The duration of the namakarma is 8 muhurta in its lowest and 30 crores of crores sāgaropama in the highest3. Gotrakarma
That type of karma which determines the status of the individual in the family and the society is called gotra karma. This has reference to the higher status or the lower status of the family in society." Acārya Umāsvāti has given a description of the concept of gotra in terms of the higher and the lower status with reference to the desa (country), jāti (community), kula (sub-section of the community), sthāna (status), māna (respect in society), satkāra (the type of honour in society) aitvarya (the extent of prosperity or otherwise). In the case of the individual in the lower state of society, Umasvāti mentions some sections.5
Gotrakarma is primarily of two types: 1. Uccagotra karma which determines the higher status and the place of the individual in the family and in society. 2. Nicagotra karma which determines the lower status of individual in the family and the society."
Uccagotra karma is of eight types:
1. Jati uccagotra associated with the high status of the family with reference to the mother side.
2. Kula uccagotra, high status of the family from the paterna]
side.
1 Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha-Navatattvaprakarana 7, başya 37. 2 Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha: Navatattvaprakaraṇa 8, bhāṣya 49. 3 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 23.
(b) Tattvärthasutra, 8(17-20. 4 Prajñāpanā, 23/1288 Ţikā. 5 Tattvārthasūtra, 8/13 Bhāṣya. 6 Uttaradhyayana 33, 14,

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3. Bala uccagotra, it concerns the power and strength of the individual with reference to his family also.
4. Rūpa uccagotra concerning the form of his body with reference to the heredity of the family.
5. Tapa uccagotra, the quality of virtues etc., with reference to the family.
6. Śruta uccagotra with reference to the knowledge and learning for the family and the individual.
7. Labha uccagotra refers to the gains of the individual with reference to his family.
8. Aiśvarya uccagotra is concerned with the prosperity of the individual and the family.1
Nicagotra karma is also of eight types" :
1. Jāti nicagotra associated with the maternal side.
2. Kula nīcagotra the lower state of the family from the paternal side.
3. Bala nicagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family with reference to the strength and power.
4. Rūpa nīcagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family and individual with reference to the form, beauty etc.
5. Tapa nīcagatra, refers to the lack of self-control and higher virtues in the individual and with reference to the family.
6. Śrutanicagotra, it refers to the lack of learning and intell
igence.
7. Labha nīcagotra, it refers to the loss of gains and profits for an individual with reference to the family.
8. Aiśvarya nīcagotra, it is absence of prosperity of the individual and family.
This karma has been compared to a potter (kumbhakāra). The potter makes a variety of pots out of the same clay. But some are
1
Uttara 33, 14.
2 Prajñāpanā 23, 1, 292; 23, 1, 293,

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used for the sake of making kumbha or kalasa for the worship of gods. They are aquainted with fragrant ointment like candana etc. But some others are used for keeping wines and alcoholic drinks. In the same way, individual jīvas according to the type of karma get various types of existences with reference to their karmic deserts. Some are poor, some are rich, some are virtuous, and some are vicious. Some are born in rich families and some in poor families.1
Gotrakarma is of 8 muhurtas in the minimum and 20 crores of crores sāgaropama as the maximum.
In general, nāma nnd gotra karmas are related to each other in the sense they are associated with the forms and the state of the body and the mental states. The various forms and mental states are due to these karmas. Namakarma determines the possession of subha and asubha sarira (body). And gotrakarma is considered for determining the status of the individual organism with reference to the high or low status. The subh (auspicious) sarīra brings pleasure and aśubha śarīra (inauspicious body) brings pain. Similarly, the high or the lower status of the individual is determined by the gotrakarma.
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A question arises whether it would be necessary to distinguish between the nama and gotra karma as separate, as they are closely associated with the same functioning regarding the form and the status and body and the mind.
For answer to this, we will have to refer to the distinction connected with the association of the nama karma of the individual body while gotra karma with reference to the status of the individuals and their family status.

A second question arises of the form and the status of the individual bodies and the family status, where to be determined by the heredity and the heritage of the parent status, why should it be necessary to have two types of karma as nāma karma and gotra karma. Moreover, if the form and the status of the individual in the family are to be determined by heredity and family circumstances, individual karma will have very little place.
1 Thānanga 2, 4, 105 țīkā.

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But it may please be noted that the determination of the individual status in the family and society is not only determined by the parents or the family, but this is possible with the karma that individual has earned in this respect. The individual is himself responsible for these; and he has earned it. The family and the society are only occasion and the environ'nental factors which enable the individual to be placed in good or bad comfort, in different status in society and family by his own karma.
Nāmakarma determines the individual concerning his birth as man or gods in the heaven or in the animal kingdom. It is also connected in the formation of the types of sense-organs that he possesses and the types of bodies that he inherits like audārika, vaikriya etc. Gotra karma is also concerned with the status of the individual. Therefore, again a question is asked whether gotrakarma has anything to do with the determination of the types of sarira etc.
But gotrakarma is not directly connected in the formation of the individual bodies and the sense-organs etc. Because the higher or the lower gotra of an individual is not relevant for the possession of a particular body, short or tall, particular colours - black or brown, particular types of sense-organs like healthy sense-organs or deformities. For instance, a man born in the higher family
family may have deformities in the body, may be of dark chlour and may be also ugly. On the other hand, a man who is born in a lower family may be handsome and healthy. Therefore, gotra karma has nothing to do with the determination of the bodily forms in their various aspects. It is concerned with the status of the individuals with reference to his family and mental make up. However, nāmakarma and gotra karma are closely associated with each other regarding the formation of the indiv'dual personalities.
Another question has been raised regarding the criteria of determining the lower and the higher status of an individual in the family and in society due to the operation of the gotrakarma. The answer to this, will have to refer to the biological and social heredity. We find that physical and mental poiss of an individual as determined in society in a dignified way is largely due to the family upbring

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ing. Just as a beautiful body is due to the biological heredity, similarly the status of the individual and upright behaviour and his character and personality are to a great extent influenced by the biological heredity and family up.bringing. Antarāya karma
Antarāya karma obscures and also obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. By the rise of this karmı, constructions would be created for the enjoyment of the normal pleasures of life and the experience of an individual. This karma has been compared to the finance minister of the king. The king orders to give money to a person but the finance minister very •ften withholds and delays the disbursement, of what is given. He creates difficulty in the implementation of the king's order. So, also, is the function of antarāya karma. It obstructs the energy of alman regarding the act of giving dāna (donation) and other forms of generous act.
Antariya karma is of five types : 1. Dani antarāya karma -It creates obstructions in the giving of gifts and charity. 2. Labhāntarāya karma-Due to the rise of this karma, one is prevented from enjoying the fruits of his labours. He does not get the profits that he earns. 3. Bhogantarāyn karma -[t prevents the enjoyment of normal pleasures of life although the pleasures are at hand. For instance, one cannot eat delicious food kept on the table for dinner due to illhealth. 4. Upabhogantarāva karma --This prevents the enjoyment of pleasures frequently available, as for instance, one is prevented from getting good house, wearing good clothes and ornaments. 5. Viryāntarāya karma - It prevents an individual from performing actions and duties which require strength and drive.
Antarāya karma can also be considered of two types : 1. Pratyutpanna vināśā antarāya karma-By the rise of this karma the objects which are acquired are either lost or destroyed. 2. Pihita āgāmipatha
1 2
Pañcidhyāyi 2, 1007. Thārāhga 2, 4, 105 ţikā,

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antaraya karma-This refers to the obstructions created in the enjoy, ment of the forthcoming experiences and objects.1
Antaraya karma is of one antarmuhurta duration in the least and at the maximum it is of thirty crores of crores sāgaropama.
The soul has the inherent characteristics of moving upwards (urdhvagati), just as a gourd (tumba) has the capacity of floating on the surface of water. But if the gourd is smeared with clay it becomes heavy and it does not flow. Similarly, due to the encrustations of karmic particles the soul is prevented from going upwards and from purifications; so it gets involved in the wheel of empirical existence, it goes down.
Antaraya karma is concerned with the obstructions of the possibility of getting enjoyment of the possession and the fruits of activity.
The question arises whether antaraya karma is directly related to the external objects and the possession of enjoyment of external objects? For instance, in the possibility of giving charity etc. If there are obstructions these obstructions are due to antaraya karma.
The possibilities of knowledge and other experiences and possessions depends upon the naturality and appropriateness of occasion which has reached the stage of maturity of experience. We may call this labdhi. Labdhi is the appropriateness of fructification. For instance, even when there is a donor to give charity and also when there is the preparedness of accepting charity, by an individual or an institution, it may not be possible that the act of charity may materialise due to some other external forces. But when all the forces are favourable for actualisation then charity is given. This is the labani with reference to time and other circumstances. Labdhi, therefore, may be referred to the capacity, the potency and the fructification of realisation. Just as jñānāvaraṇīya karma obscures valid knowledge
1 Sthānanga 2, 4, 105. 2 Uttaradhyayana 33, 19. 3 Jnātā sutra,

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so also other forms of karma prevents the relevant experience. Antarāya karma refers to the inherent energy of the soul for knowledge experienced and action. Antarāya karma obstructs the energy to operate in the direction of getting experiences are external, for example the act of charity, the gains, the enjoyment of the objects and the objects connected with the inherent energy of the soul are external, but the acts connected with charity and experiences of their individual in experiencing the fruits of karma are internal in the sense that they are directly connected with the expression of soul energy.
There may be external objects ready to be given as charity, the conditions for giving charity may also be favourable, but if there is no internal urge on the part of one who gives charity is not yet aroused, the act of charity would not be possible. Due to the rise of danāntarāya karma, the person who wants to give dāna is not mentally ready. This is as idbhāva. When he is willing to it becomes sadbhāva. But sometimes we find occasions when even in the absence of the desire to give charity the charity is given, while even with the best of intentions the desired charity, we may not give it. In these circumstances dināntarāya karma operates in different ways. But the external circunstances are not directy related to dānāntarāya karma. It has a reference to the internal urge, the psychic factor which is responsible for the act of giving charity. The external circumstances are only occasions which are indirectly responsible for the rise, suppression and destruction (kếayopasamana) of the antarāyakarma. The real cause is psychological. It is the inner urge which is the expression of anantavirya (the infinite and inherent energy of the soul).
We also find that sometimes the circumstances are favourable, the objects are there, still we do not get the objects. This is due to the opesation of lābhāntaraya karma, which does not permit the rise of the desire of for getting the objects. Sometimes, we may have a desire to have the object, but circumstances may not be favourable. Similarly, in some situations all the three factors, the desire to give, the desire to take and the object that is desired are all present, but

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still we do not get the object due to some unfavourable and accidental circumstances. In this sense, we find that the operation of antarāya karma is directly connected with the internal factors of the individual and not with the objects which are external. The circumstances play an important part in the determination of the act of possession of the objects. Sometimes, the lābhāntarāya karma may not have origin to express itself, even then it is possible that we may not get the objects. In some situations even with the operation with the rise of the lābhāntarāya karma, we may get the objects. The bhogāntarāya and upbhogāntarāya karmas are also directly related to the inherent energy of atman and not with external things. The same position is true about vīryāntarāya.
Therefore what is primarily important is that the antarāya karma obstructs the infinite energy of atman (ananta virya) and is not directly related to get or not get the external things.
.."
THE INTENSITY OF KARMIC EXPERIENCE
The intensity of the experiences of kārmic fruition is primarily dependent upon the emotional set and the operation of kaşayas. If the kaşāyas (emotional set) is intense, the kārmic experienc’s will also be intense, it would give rise to păpa karma and if the kaşāyas are not intense the kārmic experiences would not be intense, it would give rise to punya karma.
KARMA-PRADEŠA
An empirical individual (jiva) is constantly engaged in activity through body, mind and speech. Due to these activities karmic particles flow into the soul and envelope the soul. The extent of the enveloping of obscuration of the kārmic particles into the soul is referred to as karma-pradega. The influx of the kārmic particles into the soul are distributed into'eight types of kārmic particles and they envelope the soul in their own way. There is bondage. The ayu karma receives the least of the amount of the kārmic particles among those which are glued to the soul. Nāma karma and gotra karma have a little more share than that of ayu karma, but equal share of the kārmic

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flow. Jñānāvaraṇīya, darganāvaraṇīya and antarāya have a little more quantity of kārmic particles that flow in; but they have equal share. Mohanīya karma gets more quantity and the vedaniya karma bas still more, in other words vedaniya karina gets the greatest share. These pradegas are again distinguished on the basis of consequential effects (uttarapraksti) and these varying degrees of pradeśakarma depend on the corresponding varying degrees of the influx of kārmic particles of their nature.
KARMA-BANDHA
We have already seen that the kārmic particles (karma vargaņās) pervade every point in the universe. Individual soul is constantly in activity through the mind, speech and body. Due to these activities motivated and accompanied by kaşāyas attract infinite number of particles of karma vargaņās into the soul. In the case of the ekendriyas (one-sensed organisms) influx is of six directions. But if there are obstructions it would have influxes from three, four or five directions. But in the case of all other jīvas the influx of karma is from all directions. With reference to the kşetra (space), the jīva can attract the kārmic particles from the area where it exists itself but the kārmic particles outside this sphere of extension would not be attracted. We should realise that the variation in the quantity of the influx of karma depends on the variations in the types of activity. If the activity is slow, the influx of kārmic particles also would be slow. This is called in the āgamic language, pradeśabandha. In other words, the ātman has numberless pradesas (space points). On each pradeśa, there would be glued infinite number of kārmic particles and this karmı pradeśa in the space point of a soul is called pradega
1 (a) Uttarādhyayana 32, 18.
(b) Bhagavati, šataka 17, uddeśā 4. 2 (a) Visesāvasyaka bhāşya, gāthā 1941, p. 117, II Pt.
(b) Pancasangraha 284.

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bandha. The bondage and the association of kārmic particles to the soul pradeśas is called pradeśa bundha.
Gautama asked Mahāvira, “Bhagavan! Can we say that jīva and pudgala are intimately associated with each other in the form of bondage, close knit association as if they are one like the water and milk?"
Bhagavāna replied, Yes they are very closely bound together; and he explained the process of pradeśa bandha. "O Gautama", he said, sjust as a lake is full of water overflowing with the waves dashing against the banks and suppose a boat with innumerable holes at the bottom and the sides is left in the water, the water perforates into the boat and is full of water, the boat sinks, so also the soul is bound with kārmic particles and becomes one with each other. 2
The kārmic encrustations of the soul due to the activities of the soul creates āvarana (veil) and it obscures the knowledge, intuition, experiences of pleasure and pain and other types of experiences on the basis of the different capacities and original nature of the kārmic particles. When the kārmic particles which are material in nature get bound to the soul, they form themselves into different types. This is called prak știbandha.
Prak rtibandha and pradeśabandha are due to yoga and the diffe. rent forms of activity. The bondage of the karmic pariicles to the soul arising out of the yoga only and its forms of activity can be compared to the depositing of dust particles on a wall which is dry. They do not affect the wall and they can be blown away. Such types of kārmic bondage takes plac: in the 11th and 12th and 13th
1 (a) Bhagavatī 1, 4, 40 vrtti. (b) Navatativasāhityasangrala avacürni vrtyādisaine:ain navatalt
raprakarana, gātbā 71 ki vștti. (c) Navarattvasahity asangraha; Devānandasūrik rta saptatattra
prakarana adh, 4. 2 Bhagavati 1, 6, 3 (a) pañcama Karmagrantha, gātha 96 -joga payadipaesaṁ.
(b) Thāņānga 2, 4, 96 ţika.

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stages of gunasthānas. Because the normal human activity is in existence, but there is the total absence of the passions and emotional upsets (kaşāya). By this, there is no bondage worth the name which leads to the furtherance of sarsāra.
Yoga and kaşāya operating together would create bondage which is more endurable and whose effects have to experienced before their freedom. This type of bondage arising out of the yoga and passions (kaşāya) is called sthitibandha. In other words, the kārmic bondage that the soul gets through jñānāvaraṇa karma etc. and the duration the karmic bondage in the atma pradesa is called sthitibandha. 1
The soul by its activity and kasāyas attracts kārmic particles both of auspicious and inauspicious nature. If kārmic particles give rise to auspicious results it is called auspicious karma (subhakarma); and the karmic particles giving rise to inauspicious results is called aśubhakarma. After the rise of the karma, they experience the fruition of the kārmic bondage may be in various intensities and duration according to the nature of the kärmic particles. This type of variations is determined at the time of kārmic bondage. This is called anubhāgabandha.
The kārmic bondage expresses itself on appropriate occasions and at that time there is the udaya or the rise of the kārmic experiences with various intensities. If the occasion is not appropriate the kärmic particles may rise, but without giving any fruition may disintegrate themselves as material particles. As long as the appropriate occasion for fruition does not arise, the experience would not be possible. The rise of the kārmic particles for fruition gives rise to the experiences of karma and the exhaustion of karma. The experiences of karma depend on the nature of the kārmic particles. For
1 Sthitih kālāvadhāraṇam. 2 (a) Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 výtti.
(b) Anubhāgo raso jäeyaḥ. (c) Tattvärthasūtra 8, 22-vipākoănubhāvah I.

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instance, jñānāvaraṇīya karma obscures the knowledge and darśanīva
karma obscures intuition and faith according to their nature of the kārmic particles and the strength. Similarly, the other types of kārmic particles creates obscuration like the mohaniya and vedaniya and cāritra karma according to the strength of the kārmic particles and their original nature. There can be no alterations in the original nature of the kārmic particles,
But in the case of the consequential effects of the experiences of the one karma may be changed to the experiences and the consequential effects of the same original karma. In other words, the kārmic consequential effects (uttaraprak sti) may be transferred and transformed. For instance, matijñānāvaraniya karma may express itself in the obscruation of śrutajñāna. But this type of consequential transformation is possible in the case of similar types of kārmic particles (sajātiya), and not of dissimilar types of kārmic particles. As for instance, darśana mohanīya cannot be transformed into cäritaramohaniya and vice-versa. Similarly, sanyaktva ve laniya (right form of feeling karma) and mithyālva vedaniya, consequential effects cannot be transformed. And also the consequential effect of (uttaraprakrti) of ayukarma cannot also be transformed, as for instance, the àyukarma of a lower animal cannot be transformed into the āyukarma of the human being. The same is the case with other forms of āyukarma.
Just as there is transformation of the karmic effect on the basis of the nature of the kārmic particles, so also there is possiblity of transformation of the various kārmic bondage. The karma which has lower intensity may be transformed into the karma which is of higher intensity and vice-versa.
Gautama asked Mahāvira, "Bhagavan ! it is said by some that all the jīvas experience the karmas according to the kārmic bondage that has been earned by them. Is it true ?”
1 (a) Tattvārthasūtra 8, 22 bhāşya.
(b) Tativārtha; 8, 22 Sarvārthasiddhi. (c) Višeşāraśyaka bhäşya, gāthā 1938. (d) Tattvärthasūtra Pt, Sukhlālji (Hindi) p. 293, 2nd edition.

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Mahāvira said, "O Gautama ! this is not completely true, because all the jīvas do not experience the karmic experiences exactly the same way according to the nature of the intensity of their kārmic bondage. Some jīvas do experience the kārmic experiences exactly according to the nature and the intensity of the bondage. This I say, eambhūtavedanā. But in som cases there are possibilities of variation of experiences due to the activity of the jiva and due to the transformation of the bondage intensities. This is called "unevambhūta vedanā.1
Sthānānga mentions four types of consequential effects of karma with reference to its kārmic particles (karmavipäka): (1) the kärmic particles may be of śubha karma (auspicious) and the consequential effects may also be śubha (auspicious), (2) the karma may be śubha but its consequential effects (vipāka) may be aśubha, (3) karma may be asubha while the consequential effects inay be śubha and (4) karma may be aśubha and the consequential effects also may be aśubha.2
Naturally a curiosity arises as to the causes of such consequential effects-why is it that the original kārmic particles may be auspicious while the consequential effects may be different ? Jainas have attempted to give a solution to this problem by the processes of t ation, fruition, suppression and destruction of karmic particles. These have been called avasthā (position) and there are eleven avasthās, of the relation between the nature of the karma and the nature of the fruition of karma in varied forms. These states are : 1. bandha
1 Bhagavati 5, 5. 2 (a) Sthānānga 4, 4, 312. (b) In the Anguttaranikāya similar discussion regarding the trans
formation of the auspicious and inauspicious into their effects
is to be found - Anguttaranikāya 4, 232-233. 3 (a) Dravyasangraha țīkā, gāthā 33
(b) Atmamimárnsä Pt. Dalsukha Mālvaņiā, p. 128. (c) Jaina Darśana. (d) Sri Amar Bhārati, varsa I.

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(bondage) 2. Satā (potential states) 3. udvartană (increase in the intensity) 4. apavartană (decrease in the intensity of fruition) 5. sankramaņa (transformation) 6. udaya (rise) 7. udiraņā (premature actualisation) 8. upasamana (suppression) 9. nidhatti (in which there is possiblity of increasing and decreasing the intensity of the fruition of karma but cannot be transformation and premature realisation of karmas) 10. nikacita (absence of increase or decrease or tansformation or premature realisation) 11. abādhākāla, the period of potentiality before actualisation.
1. Bandha-Bandha is bondage in which the kārmic particles envelops the soul and become almost one with the soul just as the mixture of water and milk is indistinguishable. We have already seen the four types of bandha,1
2. Satta-Sattā is a state of the nature of the kārmic particles attached to the soul and they are in the state of potentiality not yet expressed. It is a state of the soul with reference to the karma after the bondage and before the realisation of the karman.
3. Udvartanā-It refers to the increase in the intensity of the experience in the fruits of karma. This variation and increase in the intensity of the fruits of karmı depends upon the variation in the intensity of the emotional states.
4. Apavartană-This refers to the process of decreased realisation and decrease in the intensity experienced with reference to the transformation of sthiti (duration) and anubhāga (intensity of fruition) of karma. Jainas have worked out a complicated scheme of transformation of sthiti and anubhāga of karma. The increased realisation
1
(a) Tattvārthasūtra 1, 4, Sarvārthasiddhi. (b) Uttaradhyayana 28. 24 Nemicandriya tīkā. (c) Sthānanga 1, 3, 9 ţikā. (d) Navatattvasāhit yasangraha : saptatattvaprakarana, gāthā 133 (e) Dravyasangrana 2, 32, Nemicandra Siddhānta Chakravarti. (f) Thāņānga 1, 4, 9 tikā. (g) Navatattvasāhityasangraha vrtyādisametar Navatattvaprakara
nam, gāhā 71, ki prāksta avacūrni.

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of āyukarma is however not possible with all the beings, with celestial and infernal beings and the human beings in their last existence, chakravarti and tirthink iras. The increase and the decrease in the realisation of the karma is based on the nature of suppression or the expression of karma. For instance, sometimes aśubhakarma may be accompanied by actions which are subha or śubhakarma may be followed by the actions which are inauspicious and the consequential effects of these kārmic processes are therefore, affected by the nature of the karma and the later actions bring in different types of karma.
5. Sankramana-Sankramana is transformation of one type of karma into another in respect of (1) its nature (2) duration (3) intensity and (4) the strength of kārmic matter. For example, asātāvedaniya karma can be transformed into sātāvedanīyakarma. Similarly, a person having right faith (samyagd rşti) transforms the mithyātva karma into samyak-mithyātva karma and samyaktva. But any karma cannot be transformed into any other karma. Mutual transformation is not possible in the case of darśana mohaniya and cäritramohaniva karma, nor between any two of the four sub-types of the āyukarma. Transformation is possible between the sub-types of the particular type of karma except in the cases mentioned above. A person having wrong belief (mithyātva) cannot easily transform the mithyātva into the mixed or samyaktva as it requires greater energy. Similarly, a person of right belief is pure and it is not easy for him to fall back into the kārmic state of wrong belief. The four types of sankramana mentioned above are : (1) prak rti sankrunaņa, (2) sthiti sankramana, (3) anubhāga sankrumana and (4) pradeśa sankramana,
6. Udaya - It is the rise of the karma in the process of fruition. When the karma rises and after giving its fruits becomes transformed into mere particles of matter. It is phalodaya. But sometimes without
1 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma aud Rebirth (L. D. Institutue of Indo.
glogy, Ahmedabad) ch. 2. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2. 3 Sthānānga 4, 216.

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giving fruits, the karma gets disintegrated into particles of matter, and it is destroyed. It is called pradeŝodaya.
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7. Udiraṇa-It is a premature realisation of the karma. Karma does not immediately bear fruit as soon as it is bound. It arises after the period of potentiality or the period of non-production which is called abadhakala. And it continues to operate till it fructifies fully. But it is not possible to make a defined predicational rule about udīraṇā. However, in the normal course of thing udiraṇā is possible in the case of the same type of karma which is in operation.
8
Upasamana--This is the process of the suppression of karma, before it bears effect. Upasamana is possible where there is a possibility of udvartanā and apavartana and transformation (sankramaṇa). Upasamana is only suppression and not destruction of the karma in producing its effects, just as the burning embers of fire produced by coal are covered by ashes and they are prevented from giving their full effects of the fire. But as soon as the ashes covering the embers of fire are removed the effect of fire is felt in its intensity, so also the suppressed karma has to get itself exhausted and produce its effects in varying degrees after the process of suppression no longer ope
rates,
9. Nidhatti-It is the process by which karma is made incapable of all processes except udvartana and apavartanā-increased and decreased realisation. Under certain conditions the karmic particles are so intensely glued that it becomes impossible to affect them in any way except by increased or decreased realisation.1
10. In the Nikacita even these processes are impossible. In this case the duration, intensity and strength of the karma are deterJiva is bound to mined by the very time of the bondage of karma. suffer the fruition of this type of karma.
11. Abadhakala - Abādhākāla is the duration of the karmic state from the time of its bondage to the time of fruition. The extent of the abadhākāla has been measured with reference to the extent of
1 Kalghatgi (T. G.): Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2.

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the duration of the type of karma. Generally, the ratio is one hundred years to one sägaropama period of time of its fruition as the original karma. For example, maximum duration of the jñānāvaraņiya karma is thirty crores of crores sāgaropama. And the abadhakala will be measured as three thousand years. In the Bhagavati, we get the calculations about the periods of abādhākala of the 8 types of karma. In the Prajñāpanā also there is the calculation about the extent of the abadhākala with reference to the consequential effects of the original karma, 2
The Jainas have made a systematic study of the theory of karma. The Jaina contribution to the theory of karma is unique. In the Yogasūtra of Patañjali, there is the mention of the consequential _effects of the fruition of the different karmas. Yoga darśana mentions three such types, as : (1) niyatavipāki, in this the karma gets expression at a determined time, gives fruit and exhausts. (2) aniyatavipāki, the karma rises and is destroyed without giving fruit. (3) avāyagamını, this refers to the process of the transformati type of karma with the similar type of karma or the sub-type of karma. These three concepts of Yogadarśana may be compared to the Jaina concepts nikācita, pradeśodaya and sankramana.
KARMA AND REBIRTH :
The subject of rebirth is very closely associated with the doctrine of karma. The two are basal pre-supposition of Indian thought. They are postulates of Indian thought. Rebirth is a corrolory of the principle of karma. If karma is fully exhausted, the series of births will come to an end; but it is not possible to exhaust all the karma that has been accumulated in one single Ife. The karma that we have accumulated in the past gives rise to various births. It is a cycle of existence and rebirth.3 Rebirth is very closely associated with the karma and jiva. The karma of the past life is responsible for the
1 | 2 3
Bhagavatī 2, 3. Prajnapana 23, 2, 21-29. Acārānga 12, 6.

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present life." Karma of the present life will be responsible for the future life. The accretion of karmı, as kārmic particles of āyu karma enter the soul which is responsible in various ways for determining the states of existence in the succeeding life, the length of life and the status of the individual in all its different lives. 2 Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said that passion like krodha (anger), māna (egoity), māyā (deceit) and lobha (greed) are the root cause of the cycle of births, In the Bhagavadgitā we get an analogical description about rebirth and the chain of birth. As a man takes out the old clothes and wears the new one, similarly the soul casts away the worn out body and takes on a new body, after death. This is possible through the process of “āvartana" (transference).5 The Tathāgata Buddha once explained that the pricks of the thorn that he suffered were due to the violence and injuries caused to a human being in his ninetyone previous life.
The new born infant expresses various emotions like joy, fear and sorrow. These are primarily due to its memories in the past life. The new born infant, the moment it is born, starts sucking the milk from the mother's breast. This is due to its learning and habits that it had acquired in the past life. As the young boy grows into a youth si nilarly the jīva enters a new life and the body, and grows, into full stature. The new born in fact experiences pleasure and pain and expresses various emotions. All these can be traced to the dispositions (samskāras) acquired by the infant from its previous life due to the heritage of its kurinis, may call it collective uncon
1 Bhagavati 2, 5. 2 Sthānānga 9, 40. 3 Daśavaikālika 8. 39. 4 Gitā 2, 22. 5 Gītā 8, 26. 6 Ita ekanavatik alpo śiktyā me puruso hatth.
Tena karma vipākena pā le vidho smi biksavaḥ. 7 Nyāyasútra, 3, 1, 11. 8 Nyāyasūtra 3, 1, 12. 9 Višeș avasyaka bhāşya.

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scious, the ratial-unconscious as Jung has said as equivalent to karma. These are due to the saṁskāras dragged on from previous life. In this way, the Indian philosophers have adduced arguments and have tried to show that the rebirth is a fact of life. The soul gets involved in the wheel of life, (samsara) and is born and reborn in different existences.
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As we said earlier, the karma and rebirth are basal pre-suppositions. If we do not accept the theory of karma, rebirth cannot be explained and rebirth can be explained only on the basis of the principle of karma. If rebirth were not to be accepted as a fact principle of life, it would be difficult to explain the prevalent inequality in this world and the experiences of various types of existences in this life and in this world without reference to karma.
The western philosophers also were not unaware of doctrine of rebirth although this doctrine was largely ignored in the western thought. Pythogoras was aware of the principle of the rebirth. Plato said that the soul always weaves new garment. The soul has a natural strength which will hold out and is born many times. Schopenhaur explicitly mentions the doctrine of rebirth and said that the doctrine has relevance for explaining the concept of distribution. He said that it is at once obvious to everyone who hears of the rebirth for the first time.

The Jainas have given an elaborate study of the doctrine of rebirth as based on the karma theory. There are four states of existence: the human, the lower animal, the heavenly being, and the infernal world. The soul moves one to the other according to its desserts. The karma that it has accumulated determines its existence and status in the next life. The time gap between the death in a particular life and rebirth in the next life is called antarakāla, This duration of time varies from one, to three or four samayas. In the antarakāla the gross phsycial body has already been left, jiva is without the gross physical body and is seeking to get into the new body. This process of movement from the old body to the new body is called "antarāla gati". This may be "rju" (short and direct) and vakra (curved and indirect). The direction of the movement depends upon

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its previous performance. If the direction is straight and direct it is rjugati. If the direction of the movement is uneven and indirect, it is called vakragati. The direct movement (rjugati) requires one samaya and the least effort on the part of the jiva to enter from the previous to the next life. When the soul departs from the previous body it acquires the speed of that body and it darts of to its next destination like an arrow. In the case of the curved direction it has to make certain efforts. When the soul reaches the point of curve the previous body is to some extent arrested, then the jiva has to depend on the energy of the sūkṣna (subtle) karmic body. The time required for traversing the distance from one birth to another birth in the next body depends on the number of curves in the direction of the next body. If there is only one curve it will require two samayas. If there are two curves it requires three samayas and if there are three curves, it requires four sanayas. Generally, the universe is extended in three directions like: upwards, downwads and crosswise. In the case of the residence of the heaven, hell and crosswise in the case of tiryak gati (lower animals).
The soul requires two samayas in its movement the direction of the upper world to the lower world. world (urdhvaloka), it takes the direction of the eastern side and in the lower world it turns to the direction of the western world. In the case of the duration of the three samayas for the movement there are two turns. One is north-eastern direction and the other south-west direction. In the first samaya it moves in the direction of the lower world, in the second samaya it takes a turn towards the western and in the third samaya there is turn to the north-western side.
In the case of the duration of the time in the movement upto four samaya there would be three turns. First, it moves towards the lower world, then turns towards the south-western side, then towards the western side and lastly north-western side. This movement in different directions is called "tri-vakră catuḥ sāmayikī”.
In all these cases the movement of the jiva is with the help of the sūkşma sarira (subtle body), as the gross body is no longer. But the gross body will be created in the next life with sāṁskära and with the help of the subtle body and the energy available. According to the

generally from
In the upper

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karma there when the jīva casts off one body and moves towards the direction of assuming the next body it is guided and directed by anupúrvināma karma. This type of karma is like the row that controls the movement of the bullock. However, in the case of the movement from the earlier to the next body in the straight direction (rjugati), there is no need for any guiding anupūrvīnāmakarma. During the movement only the taijasa (electria) and kārmana (karmic) body accompany. Audārika and vaikriya bodies are created freshly for the new life on the basis of its sarskāras.
A pertinent question has been raised regarding the absence of the sense-organs during the movement of the jīva from the previous body towards the formation of the new life. The question is asked, if the gross body is not there, there would be no sense-organs and if the sense-organs are not there, there would be no cognition or sensing of the direction. In that case how can the jiva proceed its journey in proper way?
The answer to this question has been given from the point of view of anekānta. Bhigivānı Mahāvira says it is true that there are no physical sense-orgins (dravyendriyas). But the functions of the sense-organs are not altogether lost. They are expressed through taijasa and kārmana sarira, just as the modern machines like the aeroplane are controlled by electric motivations through the computors. We can, therefore, say during the movement of the jiva from one body to the other, there may not be the physical sense-organs, but there is the presence of the psychic sense-organs.
THE PATH TOWARDS MOKŞA ! ! The Indian philosophers, except the Cārvākas, accept the mokşa as the highest ideal and they have shown the way to mokşa. The path to mokşa given by different Indian philosophers may give different emphasis on one or the other aspect of the cognitive, the affective and the creative functions. For instance, Sankhya darsana and the Advait 1 Vedānta give emphasis on jñāna mārga, while Rāmānuja and others emphasise the bhaktimārga. Caritra is also given importance, in the way to attain to mokşa. However, all are agreed that the karmı has to be removed and the soul to be purified in order to

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A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY attain mokşa. The soul can be purified by penance and meditation etc., as the ore of the gold has to be purified through various processes, like-beating etc. But the Jainas have not given only exclusive importance to the jñānamärga as is done in the case of Sähkhya, Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism, nor it does emphasise exclusively the kriyākända, the pathway through activity and ritualism, as is emphasised by the Parvamimārsā, But the Jainas say that jñāna and kriyā (căritra) are both necessary for the mokşamārga. There should be a synthesis of both these. Jñana with caritra would be necessary. Even if the Jñana were less, but căritra were to be emp basised, then it would be a way to mokşa. But knowledge without caritra, however great it may be, will not lead to the highest end of perfection. Acārya Bhadrabāhu says that knowledge without good conduct may be compared to a donkey carrying sandle wood.
The Jainas contend that the pathway to perfection lies in the synthesis and the harmony of the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. In the āgamas, we find that the pathway to perfection is through sinyagjñāna, samyagdargana, samyagcaritra and tapas. There are only terminological differences in the expression regarding the pathway to perfection. The perfection and the general contention is that right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct would be necessary as mokşamārga.
Gautama, the Buddha, gave importance to the stoppage of karmic bondage (sarvara) as the first step to Nirvāna. Jaiq is also give importance to samvara. Acārya Hemacandra says that just as a house with many windows and doors kept open attracts dust from all the directions, so also activities of the jira bring about karmic
1 2 3 4 5 6
Avaiyakaniryukti, gāthā 94 Avašyakaniryukti, gathā 99. Avašyakaniryukti, gāthā 100 (a) Tattvärthasūtra. 1 (b) Āvasyakaniryukti, gāthā 103. Uttarādhyayana 28/2-3. Tattvārtha 1, 4. Sarvărthasiddhi

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499 particles. The first step therefore is to close these doors and windows so that the fresh kārmic particles do not enter the jiva. This is, as we have already seon, the process of sarhvara. We have also seen that the process of samvara oan be compared to the stoppage of the inflow of water into the tank through the different inlets. For the sake of cleaning the tank we bave first to stop the water, so that the fresh inflow of water is not possible. Samvera is such a process of the stoppage of the influx of karma through varied channels. Once the influx of karma is stopped through the stoppage of the influx i, e., through sarkvara, next step would be to remove the karma that is already collected into the soul and that is process of nirjarā. This process may be compared to the cleaning of the accumulated water in a tank. One who seeks to attain mokşa had also to clean the accumulated karma,' and the removal of kur na from the jīva pradeśa is called Nirjara.
When all the karmas are removed the atman reaches perfection and the liberated. Once the karmas are remove i and the ātman reaches perfection, fresh karma would not enter into the soul, just as the fried seeds do not sprout.5
SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION • The Jaina contribution of the theory of karma is significant. It has developed a scientific theory of karma with its emphasis on the atomic nature of karma as karmavarganis and with its elaborate scientific description of the processes of karma. Maxmuller says that karma theory has influenced mankind to a great extent. When we know that our present actions are due to the effects performed in the past and that our present actions will be responsible for the future life, we become more conscious of the distinctions between the virtue and vice
1 Navatattvasāhityasangraha : Sri Hemacandra Sūriksta Saptatattva
prakaranarh 118-122. 2 Uttară. 28, 35. 3 Tativârtha 1, 4. Sarvärthasiddhi 4 (a) Tattvartha 10, 3, kļisnakarmakşayo mokşah.
(h). Śivagità 13-32 ş Tativậrthabhāşyagat i antima kārika 8

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and we face the difficulties of life with equanimity of mind. We strive to become good.1
Karma is infact a striking answer to the fathomless injustice to the nature of things, and it appeals to the overpowering strength of the necessity of justice. The conception of an all controlling law of natural distribution which links together successive earth lives of each individual soul both satisfied by sense of justice and through light on the problem of seemingly unmeritted suffering. 2
Having discussed the arguments and counter-arguments of the logical justification of the doctrine of karma, we may say that from the real point of view (niscaya naya) logical justification of the doctrine of karma is not possible nor necessary. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers.3
门
1 Darśana aur Cintana, khaṇḍa II, p. 216.
2 Warren (H.C): Buddhism in Transitions (1922) p. 48.
3 Kalghatgi (T.G.), Jaina View of Life (Jivaraja Granthamākā no.
20) 1969, pp. 110-11.

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PART V Jain Daraśna and the Philosophies of
the World
1. PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD-A STUDY. 2. JAINA AND BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHIES :
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3. JAINA AND SANKHYA PHILOSOPHIES :
A COMPARISON 4. JAINA AND VEDANTA PHILOSOPHIES :
COMPARISON & CONTRAST. 5. LEGACY OF THE JAINA DARŠANA TO THE
WORLD OF THOUGHT

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Philosophies of the World:
A Study
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the two traditions, i. e., the Vedic and the Śramana traditions. The Vedic tradition advocates the authority of the Vedas. It is traditionalistic and rationalistic in
oach. The śramana tradition does not accept the authority of the Vedas. It is empriricist in outlook and analytic in its methodology. It is based upon the experiences of the secis for its fundamental truths and the empirical experiences for the understanding of the phenomenal world.
The Jaina tradition advocates authority of the teachings of the Tirthankaras as presented through the āgamas not because it is the fipal word of the Tirthankara but because of their omniscient experiences which have been transmitted to the disciples and which has been codified through the sūtrāgamas. The Veda-darsana and the teachings of the Upanişads belong to the Vedic tradition. Later systems of philosophy like the Nyāya, Vaiseșika, Sankhya, Yoga; Purvamimärhsā and Vedānta belong to the Vedic tradition. The philosophy of the Vedic tradition is also considered to be orthodox systems of philosophy and are called "āstika darśanas", primarily because they accept the authority of the Vedas and also because they believe in the creator God, and therefore atheistic. Buddhism, Jainism and Cärvāka darsinis belong to the śramanic tradition or avedic tradition (non-vedic).
VEDIC THOUGHT 1.13 The earliest presentation of Indian thought can be traced to the Vedas. The Ķgveda is the earliest document which is supposed to be

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A SOURCE-BOOK ÉN JAINA PHILOSOPHY philosophical in content. The main problems of Vedic aryans were concerned with the worldly problems. Their outlook was to live a happy life in this world. The Vedas contain hymns addressed to the gods for getting the benefits of the world. Occasionally, the Vedic seers have expressed flashes of philosophical insights.
The main problem connected with philosophical study in the Vedic speculation was cosmic. A pertinent question was asked : 'What is the source of this Universe ? This was peresented with reference to the many Gods who were personalised forces of nature. In these discussions, we may however trace the philosophical development in the Rgveda in the direction of thought from 1. naturalistic polytheism to 2. monotheism in which the conception of benotheism as suggested by Maxmuller may also be included, and 3. monism. Naturalistic polytheism was the first current of philosophical thought. The phenomena of nature were symbolised as Gods and they were worshipped. For instance, Varuna was the sky God. Mitra his companion. Sürya is the sun God. Savitra is the solar God and there were a host of many other Gods - about three hundred and thirty three were worshipped.
There was the idea of Ria. It was the conception of the order in the universe. It is a cosmic principle. Varuna is considered to be the custodian of this principle and it has been suggested that the doctrine of karma developed from the principle of Rta. From the naturalistic polytheism, evolved the monotheistic tendency. As we have seen earlier, Maxmuller mentions little intermediate stage of henotheistic tendency, by which one God became prominent for sometime. The highest position was granted to Vigvakarman in the Rgveda at a later stage. Similarly, Prajāpati attained the highest rank.
Monotheism developed out of the tendency of the philosophic mood of the Vedic seers. In the contemplative mood, the seers asked some pertinent questions : What is the source of this universe ? and who has been the first born ?.' These questions lead to the philosopbic development of monotheism. The philosophers and the Rgveda presented the monistic thought in their one famous statement : The ultimate reality is one and the wise call it by many names,1
1
ekar sat viprā bahudhā vadanti agaim, yamam mātariśvam āhuḥ.

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The Upanişads developed contemplative philosophy and presented rich and varied philosophic theories. There are 108 Upanişads. Of them, eleven are important on which Sri Sankarācārya has written commentaries. The Upanişads state the divine and mystic contemplation about the ultimate principle of life. The idea of one God, a supreme and the principle of Rta were helpful in the development of philosophic thought in the monistic and absolutist direction. The fundamental philosophical concept of the Upanişads is the identity with the ātman and the Brahman, all else is the appearance. This is the cardinal principle of the Upanişads. The idea of self has been discussed in different Upanişads in different aspects. In the dialogues between Yājāavalkya and Janaka and between Prajāpati and Indra, we find the progressive development of the definition of the self. Similarly, in the Katha Upanişad we find the description of the self as the charioteer and the body as the chariot. Similar idea is to be found in Plato's conception of the soul.
In the Bhagavadgitā, we get a beautiful synthesis of the triple path of knowledge (jñāna), performance of duty (karma mārga) and devotion (bhaktimārga) for the attainment of the highest and selfrealisation. The Bhagavadgitā also gives the encyclopaedic information about the duty and responsibilities of the secular life. It is, therefore, a compendium of the harmony of the secular and the spiritual.
CĀRVĀKA DARŠANA . Cārvāka darśana is non-Vedic in its tradition. It is materialistic in approach. It refutes the arguments for the existence of God and of the authority of the Vedas. Its fundamental approach is secular, as this is worldly. It is difficult to give a list of authentic documents of the Cārvāka darśana, as the description of this school of thought is mainly found in other schools of Indian philosophy. The fundamental epistemological stand of the Cärvāka is : Pratyakşa is the only pramāna. Sense experience is the only source of knowledge. All other sources of knowledge are not valid. Therefore, what is available through the sense-organs and what can be verified through the sense experience is alone real. All else is illusion. Therefore, the

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A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY cardinal injunction of the Cār vāka is to seek pleasure, for tomorrow we die.” “There is neither a permanent soul nor heaven nor helt; why fret about them, if today be sweet”.
“When the body is destroyed nothing remains. Therefore, we should seek pleasure as long as we live."1
; JAINA DARŠANA The Jaina philosophy is realistic and pluralistic. It is empiricist in its methodology. Jaina presents the seven categories which may be considered metaphysico-spiritual category. The Jiva and ajiva constitute the universe. Jīva is active and due to the activity of the jiva, the kārmic particles enter into the soul and obscure right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct. This obscuration and association of karma with the jīva is beginningless, but it has an end. When the liva gets free from kārmic matter, it gains its purity and perfection which is its real nature. That stage is the stage of perfection, the mokṣa stage. This stage can be attained by triple path, as samyagdarśana, jñāna and carita. The doctrine of anekanta and ahiṁsā are the fundamental principles of metaphysics and ethics. The principle of atman, karmavāda, nayavāda, nik sepavāda, pramānavāda, saptabhangi and anekanta are the foundation pillars of Jaina philosophy.
J. BAUDDHA DARŠANA Buddhism also belongs to the framana current of thought. Buddhism is a religion preached by the Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama. In his first sermon at Vārāṇasī, the Buddha presented his philosophy to his five disciples. That is called dharmacakra pravartana. He said that we should follow the madhyama mārga (the middle path). The fundamental philosophy of the Buddha can be presented in two principles : the four noble truths and the eight-fold path. Dukha is the first noble truth, dukha samudaya is the second noble truth. It is the cause of suffering and explains this with reference to the theory of causation of pratītyasamutpāda. Dukhanirodha is the nirvana and
1
Yāvatjivet sukham jivet, şņam kļtvā ghștam pibet. Bhasmibbu tasya dehasya, punarāgamanaṁ kutaḥ.

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$07 this is the third noble truth. Dukhanirodha märga is the fourth noble truth, it gives a transcendental self. The self, what we call the ātman is not real and what we call the atman is only a collection or an aggregate of the five states; physical and mental. It is the skandha of these states : 1. vijñāna, 2. vedanā, 3, samjñā 4. saņskāra and 5. rūpa. There is nothing more than this. This he calls the nāmarūpa."
Thus we find the foundational principle of Buddhism is dukha, and the ultimate aim is dukha nirodha or nirvāņa.
It is difficult to say what he meant by nirvana, although it has very often been interpreted as a state of nothingness. The origin of suffering arises out of our attachment to the various things of life, craving for the things of life. Every thing is in a flux and nothing is permanent. It is all a temporary and in a flux. The highest end is the attainment of the state of nirvāna which is freedom from the state of misery,8
SANKHYA & YOGA DARŚANA ? Sankhya and Yoga philosophy are complementary to each other. Sankhya presents the metaphysical side while the Yoga according to Patañjali is the methodical effort to attain perfection, through the control of different elements of human nature, physical and psychical. Cittayrttini rodha is the cardinal principle of Yoga, The Sānkhya metaphysics is accepted by Yoga and the Yoga methodology is largely accepted by Sānkhya philosophers. The Sāňkhya is dualistic. It posits the two ultimate principles : 1. puruşa and 2. praksti. Puruşa is passive, it is pure consciousness. Prakịti is active, but unconscious. Praksti is the primordial matter and puruşa is the self. Sänkhya postulates the plurality of elf. The Sankhya theory of the evolution
1 dukha saṁsāripaḥ skaņdbāste ca pañca prakirtitā”.
vijñānam, vedanā, samjñā, saņskāro, rūpameva ca. 2 Saddarśana samuccaya, Bauddhadarśana –
samudeti yato loke, rāgādināṁ gaạo khilah.
ātmāmiya bhāvākhyaḥ samudayaḥ sa udābstaḥ. 3 ksņikāḥ sarvasaṁskārā, ityeva vāsanā matā.
sa mārga iba vijñeyo, nirodho moksa ucyate.

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of the universe is presented in the light of the association of prakṛti with puruşa. When the prakṛti is in the proximity or in contact with puruşa, activity starts. Then there are disturbances in the equilibrium of the three gunas-sattva and rajas and tamas. These disturbances give rise to the various principles of the universe like mahat, ahaṁkāra, manas, the five sense-organs and five motor-organs; the five elements (pañca tanmātrās). Thus evolution consists of the twenty-five principles including the puruşa. The ultimate ideal for the puruşa is to realise. The Yoga presents the practical path for this realisation of puruşa to attain its own pure nature. The Yoga gives eight-fold practical path in which 1. yama and 2. niyama are the ethical background and 3. asana 4. prāṇāyāma and 5. pratyāhāra are the physicopsychological preparation, 6. dhyāna and 7. dhāraṇā are psychic exercises, 8. Samādhi is the culmination and the psychic process of the highest realisation. This is the aṣṭānga mārga.
NYAYA-VAIŚEŞIKA DARŚANA
The Nyaya and Vaiseşika darsanas are also complementary to each other. The Nyāya gives logic and epistemology; while Vaiseşika presents metaphysics. The Nyaya is also called pramāṇaśāstra, because it presents the theory of pramāņas. According to Gautama, there are four pramāņas: 1. pratyakşa, 2. anumana, 3. upamana, and 4. sabda pramāṇa. Nyāya is theistic in its approach. It accepts the creator God. The Vaiseşika gives the theory of atomism and the fundamental self-category like 1. dravya (substance). 2. guna (attribute), 3. karma (activity) 4. sāmānya (generality) 5. viseşa (particularity) 6. samavāya (inherence) and 7. abhāva (non-existence). The Nyāya-Vaiśeşika ideal is also to attain mokşa which is called apavarga. This is possible by the highest knowledge of the padarthas and by removing ignorance.
MIMAMSA & VEDANTA DARSANA
Mimämsä and Vedanta darśanas are also related to each other very closely. Mimämsä is considered to be karmakāṇḍa, while Vedānta is concerned with the knowledge of the Brahman. The object of the Pūrvamīmāmsā is to help and support the situations for the attainment of salvation in two ways: 1. by giving methodology of interpretation

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with the help of which complicated Vedic injunctions regarding the rituals may be understood and 2. by giving philosophical justifications of the beliefs on which ritualism depend. Rādbākrişnan says that the aim of the Pūrvamimāṁsā is to examine the nature of dharma. It is practical in the sense. It prepares the ground for the performance of the Vedic injunction. This is based on the Pürvamīmāthsā epistemology wherein six pramāņa have been mentioned ; the four as given by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika and others are arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi.
The Vedānta darsana emphasises the identity of the Brahman and the self. The cardinal principle of Advaita Vedānta of Sankara is the identity of the Brahman and ātman and the ultimate ideal is the merger of the Brahman and at nan. Rāmānuja emphasises the merger of the atmın with the Brahman and not the identity. The dualistic Vedānta (dvaita) advocates the reality of the ātman and Brahman even in the highest stage of mokşa.
Thus, we find the cardinal and the foundational principle of all Indian thought is 1. the fact of misery and 2. the ideal of attainment of the state of freedom from misery and attainment of perfection. The Cārvāka systein alone is phenomenalistic in its approach, and does not accept the trans-empirical reality.
The concept of ātman is one of the cardinal principles of all Indian thought, except the Cärvāk is aad in a sense of the nihilistic aspect of Buddhism. Thus we find that there is much common ground between the various systems of Indian philosophy. We should also realise that the ancient Indian thought was catholic in outlook. This can be very clearly evidenced by the fact that Cārvāka was the status of a darsana.
GREEK PHILOSOPHY I ? B . Early Greek philosophy is also sufficiently ancient. We may consider the development of Greek philosophy from the seventh century B.C. to the 4th century B.C. The early beginning of Greek philosophers were still groping to find out the ultimate source of the universe in some physical phenomenon. When Mahāvīra and the Buddha were preaching in India, Greek philosophy was in its

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infancy. The early Greek philosophers were primarily concerned with the enquiry regarding the ultimate source of the universe. They sought to find out in some ultimate substance of this universe.
The earliest philosopher Thales, said that water is the source of the universe. Aleximander traced it to the unlimited and Aleximander said that air is the source of the universe.
There were two currents of thought which developed after the Ionic philosophers. They are the Electicus and the later philosophers who preached the doctrine of flux like Heraclitus. Permanedes said that reality "is". It is being and change is the appearance while Heraclitus advocated that change alone is real, and the being or permanence is unreal. He said we cannot step into the same water again. Heraclitus was called "Heraclitus the dark", because his sayings were obscure. Then came the philosophers like Democrates to preach the doctrine of elements and also the atomists. Pythagoras was a mystic. He was perhaps influenced by the Indian mystics. He talked of the rebirth and the influences of our action on the future life.
This was a stage of naturalist philosophy. But intellectualists at that time were aware to seek the ultimate reality in some phenomenal source. Various theories, sometimes conflicting, created confusion in the minds of the thinkers. There was intellectual chaos. This was reflected in the philosophy of the sophists, who made knowledge relative and subjective. Protogoras said "Homo mensura"-"man is the measure of all things." We cannot get objective criteria of reality. The sophists brought philosophy to the brink of extinction when they said that nothing can be known and anything can be known, it cannot be communicated.
This was the stage of intellectual chaos when Socrates came on the screen. From the period of Socrates onwards the search for the ultimate reality was inwards. Socrates was convinced that philosophy consists not in the knowledge of the external world, but in the knowledge of the self. "Know Thyself" was the cardinal principle of the Socratic teaching. Socrates said knowledge is virtue and virtue is knowledge. Knowledge and virtue are convertible terms. Socrates

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was a simple man. He did not write any book but he discussed philosophy with the intellectual of his time sitting in the market of the Athens. He had many great disciples and one of them was Plato.
Plato was an aristocrat. He hated democracy. The ideal state is the 'Republic' in which the philosophers should be the king. The philosopher-king should have very simple and virtuous life and guide the destinies of the nation entirely for the good of the people. He made a distinction between the different classes on the basis of the function, like the guardian class, the soldier class and those whose function was to obey i. e., the workers class.
Plato's political and social philosophy was based on metaphysical structure of the decrease of reality. The idea is real. It is perfect, it is eternal and it is simple. The things of the world are the imitations of the objects in the physical world. Ideas participate in the physical object and to the extent to which ideas participate, they are real.
Aristotle was Plato's disciple. It can be said that Aristotle gave the first lessons of rationalistic philosophy which synthesise the idealism and rationalism to some extent. Aristotle said that there are two fundamental principles of the universe : 1. form and 2. matter. Both of them are abstract principles. The phenomenal world is the expression of form and matter. Form is potentiality and matter is actuality.
Aristotle was a genius and he wrote books on many subjects like Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy, etc. It is said all the later philosophies are nothing but footnotes to the philosophy of Aristotle.
After Aristotle, pbilosophy in the west declined. The authority of Aristotle was so great that he was referred to as the only greatest authority and no development in philosophy took place till the end of the middle age. The middle ages were the dark ages.
Revival of philosophical speculation was to be found in the rationalist and empiricist schools in modern philosophy beginning with Descartes as a great rationalist and Locke as a great empiricist. In Kant, we get a synthesis again. Kant is considered to have brought a

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Copernican revolution in philosophy and later philosophers like Bradley built a structure of the idealistic philosophy. Recent philosophy has gone off the taagent with logical positives and the anlaystical schools.
in ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY
Arabic philosophy can be considered to have started with prophet Mohamed. Before the birth of Hazarat Mohamed, there were three different deities : 1. Lāt 2. Lajjā and 3. Manāt. There were three religious currents at that time. The Jews were the followers of Moses. The Christians were the followers of Jesus. These two religions were infact outside religions influencing the Arabic world. These religions were not indigenous to the Arabic world, The Arabs had their own religious practices. They worshipped different deities in Makkā. In this way, the Arabic world was full of many religious currents and men were practising various faiths. The Arabs were neither united nor affluent at that time. Jewish people were known for their trade and the use of horses and camels and Arabia was famous for dates. There was trade with other countries which was carried through the seas from their ports. Hazarat Mohamed gave the Holy Kurān. It is simple but very significant. Even an uneducated man can understand and practise righteousness, following its teachings.
When the people of Arabia came in contact with other countries because of their trade, there was the interaction of philosophical and religious thoughts. Because of that, different traditions developed like : 1. “Motajala tradition". 2. Karāmī tradition and 3. Asari tradition All the Arabic current of thoughts former to Motajală tradition were based on faith and does not permit differences of opinion and philosophic speculation. So this may be considered to be a religious tradition. But later the devotees of Motajala tradition introduced philosophical discussion and so Motajalā tradition in Islām is the first philosophic tradition built on the basis of this new light.
The cardinal principles of the Islāmic philosophy can be mentioned in five principles :
1. The self (jiva), is free to do activity (karma). It need not bconsidered to be a slave of any other higher beings. To believe

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513 that the activities of living beings are determined by other higher being and to punish them would be injustice.
2. God is omnipotent and great and the world has good and evil alike. God is the symbol of the good and not of the evil. Therefore, God does not elevate his creatures to heaven or punish them to hell.
3. Like other Muslims the Motajala tradition considers this world as a creation of God. The creation is out of nothing (abhāva). In this connection, it is against the Aristotelian conception of creation.
4. The Motajala tradition considers Kurān as the sacred book written at a particular time. In this sense, it has a beginning. Unlike the orthodox Muslims, it does not accept the beginningless nature of the Kurān.
5. The Motajalā tradition brought about a synthesis between the orthodoxy as presented in the authority of the sacred texts and the function of reason. It also did not accept certain orthodox beliefs.
:, THE SUFI TRADITION
The term "Sūfi' comes from the Greek word “Sophi". It means “Wisdom'. In the 8th century A.D., the works in Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic and the süfi tradition developed in the Arabia on the basis of the Greek philosophy concerning mysticism. For the first time, the Safi epithet was given to Abū Hāsim who died in 770 A.D. At the time of Paigambar, and other philosophers who were preaching at that time were considered to be As phiasts (sahāvā or companion) and even after Paigamhar these were remembered by this name.
The Muslim philosophers have used the term Süfi in different senses. It has been said that the Sufi philosophers were those who renounced everything for the sake of realising the God. It has also been said that life and death are all dependent on God. The Sufi philosophers were same and they spend their life for the practice of the self-realisation. According to the Süfi philosophy, man is a part of God or an aspect of God. The highest realisation consists in the merger of the self with God. It comes nearer to the Vedāntic concep

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tion, specially of Rāmānuja, where he advocates the merger of the self in the Brahman in the highest state of self-realisation. The Suft philosophers presented the practical path of self-realisation which contains elements of Pātañjala Yoga. They say, that the realisation is possible through the practice of dhyana (contemplation) and absorption in the God. It is analogous to the stages in dhyāna, dhāraṇā and samadhi of the Patanjala Yoga. Sufism is more a philosophy than a religion.
Mansur is supposed to the founder and propagator of Sufism. He is to pronounce and repeat the prayer "Anal-huq" meaning, 'I am the God'. This concept is analogous to the Advaitic concept of the identity of the atman and the Brahman (ahım brahmasmi). As we have seen earlier, the word Sufi has its Greek origin and it also means "wool," and "standing in line". The ancient mystics practised the ascetic practices using wool directly touching the body. Since they were using suff (wool) they were known as Sufis. The other meaning which is popular is "standing in line". The Sufi mystics practised asceticism by standing and concentrating with other practices like prāṇāyāma.
The Sufi mystic, Malik Mohammed Jayasi has given his famous discourse on the aspect of love in his Padmavata which is described as divine and is primarily spiritual.
MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
We have seen that after Aristotle, philosophy was stagnant for sometime. The middle ages were dark ages and whatever philosophy developed was merely theological. Subsequently, philosophical enquiry started with the scientific spirit became prominent. In the middle ages, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. But in modern western philosophy, we find the revival of the spirit of enquiry. This spirit expressed itself in two directions: 1. deductive rationalistic enquiry bised on deductive and mathematical methods, and 2. empiricist enquiry which is founded on experience and analysis of common
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In the modern age, Descartes ani Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From the Cozito, ergo, sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with compliments, which is indeed, away from that of the common sense. Descartes split the world into two substances and postulated a God separate from each of them. He arrived at the conception of the self on the basis of his method of "doubt". He doubted everything but he could not doubt himself. However, his scepticism was only a means to an end and not an end in itself. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between the God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result was Spinoza's substances became lion's den to which all the tracks lead and from which none returned. Leibnitz continued the rationalistic tradition and arrived at metaphysical fantacy, in presenting his theroy of monds. God was for him, the monadus-monadum. The empiricist philosopher used a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theavatatus, Socrates explains the protogoran doctrine that knowledge is through sense-experience. English empiricism repeats the logical movement, but does not save itself from its own conclusion of scepticism. We can see the empiricist's method steadily marching from Locke, Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English Empiricist movement, states that ideas first introduced for explaining the operation of the human understanding, under mind, everything by themselves, pitifully nacked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them". Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go no further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental
position.
Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, claimed to have brought Copernical revolution in philosophy. Empiricism faced the blind wall of scepticism and phenomenalism while rationalistic philosophy built up a philosophical fantacy in the theory of spiritual monds. Kant's was a critical philosophy. He wanted to examine
1 Kant; Works, p. 105.

a

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But the Humean tendency has been recently revised by the Cambridge philosophers, to the brink of extinction. Widtgenstein's Tractatus discusses the problem of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and proposition and the task of philosophy. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies and logical proofs are only mechanical devises for recognising the categories. Mathematics consist of equation and the proposition of Mathematics are without sense. The metaphysician talks non-sense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand “the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like a composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy,1 Bertrand Russell writes that the influence the Tractatus made on him "was not wholly good”, and the philosophy of the "philosophical investigations” remains to him completely unintelligible. Logical positivism is the philosophical movement emanating from the “Vieana Circle". Logical positivists explain that they have completely overthrown speculative pbilosophy. Philosophy to them is only logical analysis ; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, logical classification of concepts, proposition and theories proper to empirical science. Thus philosophy was identified with the logical syntax, the higher level discussion of language and it is
1 Stenius (Eric) : Tractatus - A Critical Exposition of its Main Lires
of Thought, (1960). p. 226. 2 Russell (B): My Philosophical Development (1959), pp. 216-217. 3 Ayer (A. J.) · Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48,

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important non-sense. Philosophy classes are converted into supergrammar classes.
Thus a survey of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy faced continually in past of the conflict between the consequences of the priori methods and empiricists faverish denial of metaphysics. To save philosophy from this impose we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problem of philosophy. We should realise that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured door. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood while realism could not see the wood in the tree. These two ways of approaching the problems were exclusive and absolute ways and to realise this point that both these ways are partially view of the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and to see the whole. In this sense, the Jaina view of anekānta comes nearer to the solution of the problems. Intellecutal tolerance is the foundation of the doctrine.2 The Jaina view of anekānta steers clear of the conflicting existence of extremes of empiricism which resulted in the metaphysical impossibility and of rationalism which resulted in the philosophical fantacies of absolutism. The Jaina view asserts that the truth is many-sided and it can be looked at different angles. The Whitehead's fundamental attitude of philosophy is essentially the same as the Jaina anekānta view when he presented the theory of coherence.
THE NEW AGE IN THE INDIAN THOUGHT The culmination of the Vedāntic philosophy is to be found in the age of Madhva. Later philosophy emphasise not so much the karma-mārga, nor the jñāna-mārga, but the bhakti-märga. The influence of the Muslim conquest of India, brought a cultural impact on the philosophical traditions in India. The idol worship was gradually replaced by contemplation and devotional song. In the 15th
1 Broad (C.D.): Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. Muirhead,
(J.H.) Vol. (1924), Critical and Speculative Philosophy. 2 Kalghatgi (T.G.) Jaina View of Life, Jivarāja Jaina Granthamālā
1969, p. 10.

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A SOURCE-BOOK ÎN JAINA PHILOSOPHY century A.D., Kabirdās was against the idol worship. The influence of this tendency could be traced in the Jaina tradition also in the thought and practices of the Sthanakavāsi tradition, Ia Saurāstra, Dayānanda Sarasvati was against the worship of idol and it developed into Ārya Samāj. In Bengal, witnessed a renaissance in the Brahmasamāj and Prārthanāsamāj. · Swami Vivekānanda gave a new interpretation to the absolute idealism of Vedanta, with reference to the social and political problems. Dr. Rādbākssoan adopts a synoptic interpretation of the universal application of the Vedāntic conception to the problems of philosophy. Bāla Gangādhara Tilak presented the karmayoga in his interpretation of the Bhagavadgitā, in the Gitä. rahasya. Sri Aurobindo built a super structure of mystic philosophy presenting the concept of superanuated consciousness and the evolution of the matter into spirit from men to supermen. Mahatma Gandbi spiritualised politics. We find fresh scholars like Pt. Sukhlālji and Dalsukh Mālvaņiā giving new interpretation of the Jaina philosophy.

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Jaina and Buddhist
Philosophy COMMON POINTS BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES!
Jaina and Buddhist darśanas have many common points between them. They belong to the śramana current of thought. They revolted against the Vedic ritualism of the Yajñas. Both the darśanas gave prominence to the principle of ahiṁsā, although other darsanas in Indian thought have also given importance to the principle of ahirsa, but Tathāgata Buddha and Sramaņa Bhagavāna Mahāvira went against violence committed during Yajñas for the sake of oblations and preached the practice of ahiṁsā in the daily life. Mahāvira gave a subtle analysis of the concept of ahimsā. The two darśanas were also against the classification and the distinction of society into the different types of jātis, like the brāhmaṇa, ksatriya, vaisya and südra. The Vedic tradition is to believe that these distinctions were primarily concerned with the birth of the individuals into different classes. But the Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept such a distinction and they said that the distinctions are functional and have nothing to do with the high or the lowly character of the individuals. Mimāṁsakas consider the Vedic authority as apauruşeya, but Jainas and the Buddhists gave the status of pauruseya to the authority of Vedas as well as to their agamas and tripitakas. The Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept the theistic conception of God. The Jaina philosophers have refuted the arguments of the Naiyyāyikas about the belief in the creator God. This worldly life (samsāra) is beginningless and the chain of action and reaction. Both of them accept the doctrine of karna and the good and evil fruits of karma.

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> METAPHYSICAL DISTINCTIONS The Buddhists are phenomenalists and nibilists in their outlook. They advocate the transitoriness of the things of the world. They say everything is in a flux and nothing is permanent. The Jainas accept that though there is impermanence and flux in the world, but it is from the point of view of modes and paryāyas. They say that the Buddhist approach is from the phenomenal point of view specially with reference to the momentary existence. It is the rjusūtranaya. The Jainas say that reality is characterised by the origin (utpāda), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (permanence). Lut these have to be looked from different points of view. The Jaina conception of anekānta is the basic point of view.
The Buddhist philosophy later developed into various schools both realistic and idealistic. The Vaibhāşikas and Sautràntikas were realist schools which posited the reality of external world and ultimate substances (elements) (dharma). The knowledge of these elements is possible, says Vaibhāșika through perception while Sautrāntika make it an object of inference.
: Yogācāra and Madhyamika are idealistic schools of philosophy. Yogācāra advocated the reality of consciousness and the objective storehouse of consciousness (alaya vijñāna) as the ultimate reality. The Mädhyamikas bave denied reality except the sünya. The sünya has been interpreted in different ways, negatively as the white, but positively as the absolute which is anirvacaniya. Here it comes nearer to the advaitic conception of the Brahman.
We should realise that the sünya of the Mädhyamika need not be interpreted as the void or the nothingness. The Madhyamika darsana can be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism as the absolute which cannot be described either by negation or by affirmation or by the permutations of the two, i.e. through the catuṣkoti. So the absolute is indescribable. Hence it is called by the word "Śünya,'s
1 Mukhyo mādhyamiko vivartamakhilam sūnyasya mene jagata. 2 Madhyamika kārikä 1, 7.

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Jainism is dualistic. It posits the reality of jīva and ajiva. These have been considered from two points of view, from the noumenal (niscaya naya) and phenomenal (vyavahāra naya). Similarly, in Buddhism we have two points of view which may be referred to as svalaksana which gives the noumenal point of view and sāmānya laksana which gives the phenomenal point of view. Similarly, things of the world can be looked at from these points of view. Logically considered also, we can see the general in the particular and the particular in the general. For instance, we can see the general concept of man in individual man and we can also see the differentiating individual man and we can also see the human characteristics in different individuals. To affirm that the one alone is real and the other is an appearance is dogmatic assertion. The Buddhists take the one point only and i.e., as we have seen rjusutranaya, the momentary point of view, Svalakṣaṇa has been interpreted as that which gives the functional meaning of a word or a thing. For instance, the function of a cloth is to cover and the function of the pot (ghata) is to hold the water. This is the arthakriyā or the essential meaning of the word and the essential characteristic of a thing.
CONCEPTION OF ATMAN
The conception of the ātman as a permanent substance bas been one of the problems of controversies and the difference between the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddhists advocate the conception of anātma. There is nothing permanent like the soul. For what we call the soul or the ātman is merely the aggregate of the physical and mental states (nāma rūsa). Rūpa is the physical state and nama expresses the mental states like l. vedanā (feeling) 2. sam jñā (cognition) 3. sarskāra (disposition) and 4. vijñāna (psychic energy.) These different states are not permanent, they are fleeting. Therefore, there is nothing like the permanent ātman, yet the Buddhists believe in the cycle of birth and death and in the rebirth.
CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA Similar differences would be found in the conception of nirvana

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A SOURCB-BOOK İN JAINA PHILOSOPHY and mokşa. The Buddhist conception of nirvāna is negative, it is the state of freedom of vision. It is a state of nothingness. It is the flowing out of the empirical states just like the blowing out the flame of the lamp. It is the Dukhanirodha. We have already seen that attempts have also been made to interprete the state of nirvana as a positive state of bliss. Some philosophers say that the Buddha carried the tradition of the Upanişads. Therefore his conception of nirvana is positive in content, as refering to the state of bliss (ānanda). The Buddha very often refers to the attainment of the Brahmatva. This type of differing interpretations have been given due to the Buddha's silence on metaphysical problems.
The way to the attainment of mokṣa or nirvāna have also been presented by the Jainas. The Jainas say that the way to the highest realisation of mokşa is possible through the synthesis of the triple path of samyagdarśana (right intuition), samyagñāna (right knowledge) and samyagcăritra (right conduct). The Buddha enunciated the eight-fold path as the fourth noble truth which is mentioned as the dukhanirodha mārga, the way to the cessation of the suffering. This path is the eight-fold path : samyagd rşți (right attitude), samyaksankalpa (right resolve), samyakvāca (right speech), samyak-karma (right effort), samyakājīva (right way of living), samyakvyāyāma (right action), samyaksmrti (right thoughts) and samyaksamadhi (right concentration). It is also called middle path (madhyama marga)
:.?
PRAMANAVADA
There are variations in the emphasis on the importance of the different pramānas by the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Jainas consider valid cognition corresponding to the external reality as the pramāna, (yatharthajñāna). But the Buddhist philosophers refer to the pramāna as that knowledge which is inconsistent, which is not incoherent and which leads to the knowledge of the unknowns. The
1 Saudarānanda 16/28, 29 2 Pramāgamavisamvādijfānamajfātāıthaprakāšo vā.

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Jainas have distinguished pratyaksa and parokșa pramānas. Pratyakşa is that knowledge which the soul gets directly without the help of the sense-organs; and the knowledge through the sense-organs and indirect knowledge through inference etc., are paroksa jñāna. For instance, avadhi, manapparyaya, and kevala are pratyakşajñāna while muti, śruta are parokşa jñānas. But later the Jainas have modified their terminology and say that the later was also praiyaksa pramāna but it is vyāvahārika pratyakşa. This knowledge arises through the cooperation of the indriyas and the manas. But according to the Buddhists coherent knowledge is pramāna, knowledge which is inconsistent is not pramana. Similarly, pratyakşa is that type of knowledge which is free from intellectual discrimination or intellectual superimposition. Inteilectual super-imposition refers to the
position refers to the categories of understanding like näina, jäii, gūna kriya etc. The knowledge witbout the association of the activity of the mind (kalpanarahita) is indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa). Praiyakşa has been distinguished into indriya praiyakşa, manusa pratyakşa, svasarhveaana pratyaksa and yogaja pratyakşa. Anumāna is knowledge which is indirect and which is of samanya lakşana, The Buddhists recognise pratyakşa and anumāna as the pramana.
The Jainas recognise āgama pramāna and this can be considered to be of two type as : (1) arthägama which is the direct teaching of the Tirthankara to his disciples. (2) Sūtrāgama is the codification of the teaching the lirihunkuras in the form of sūtras. In the case of the Buddhists contention regarding the distinction of the sabda and the artha, the word and he meaning is different. They find that the two may not cohere and be identical. There may be contradictions and opposition as in the case of the enmity between the snake and the mungoose. There is not much of a relation between the word and the meaning. The relation between the word and the meaning is to be considered as not clarifying the meaning of the word but only as giving the negative function of denying the contrary function for instance, the word cow does not signify the animal cow but it only
1. Kalpanāpodhamabbrāntaṁ pratyakşan.

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A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAÍNA PHILOSOPHY denies the possibility of other meanings of the objects other than the cow. THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE
The Buddhists have advocated the doctrine of impermanence (ksånikavāda). Their cardinal principle is sarvam kşanikam, sarvar prthak, everything is a flux, nothing is permanent. But the Jainas do not find out any contradiction in the two categories of permanence and change. A thing may be permanent and also it may change. Change and permanence are the two stages of existence considered from different points of view. For instance, a thing may be permanent from the point of view of substance, but from the point of view of modes, it is changing. For example, the gold may be turned into an ornament or an idol of God The same thing will be melted and turned into a necklace. In this example, gold as a substance does not change, but its modes are changing and therefore the modes and permanence are both real from different points of view.
Thus we find that the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers have many points of agreement although there are certain important differences. Primarily, the two currents of thought are the framanic currents of thought.

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Jaina and Sankhya
Philosophies : a Comparison
The Jaina and Sähkhya philosophies are very eminent. They belong to the framanic current of thought. Sankhya thought has no relation to the Vedic tradition. It is sometimes suggested that Kapila, the founder of Sähkhya thought was the disciple of Marici and Marici was the disciple of the first Tirthankara Rsabhadeva. This has been corroborated by scholars. We cannot say anything about it. The framanic tradition of Śrnkhya thought has been accepted by other philosophies in India. Sankarācārya was very clear that śānkhya thought was against the Vedic tradition, and also against the śruti and smrti coming from the Vedic tradition. The Padmapurāņa made it clear that Nyāya, Vaiseșika and Patañjali's Yoga philosophies also are contrary to the fruti. Therefore, it was unacceptable. The composition of Nyāya sūtra must have been in the second century or the third century B.C. Vaiseșika sütra must have been written during the same time and also the Yoga sutra of Patañjali. The writers of these sūtras were very much influenced by the gramaņic current of thought and the framanic thought was very popular during that period. This is also clear from the fact that several terms like kevali, sukladhyāna, jñanāvaraniya karma, samyagdarsana etc., are to be found in the Patañjala-Yoga; and these terms are nowhere in Vedic tradition.
Some scholars believe that the Sankhya is very ancient. Jainism must have been influenced by the Sankhya thought. If we glance at the Jaina āgamas, we do not find such evidence that it was influenced by the Sankhya darsana. Perhaps, those scholars who maintained the view of the antiquity of Sankhya darsana to the Jaina darsana,

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may not have seen the Jaina āgamas. They might not have been available to them.
The Jainas darśana is dualistic. According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles. We may call them dravyas, the jiva and the ajīva. The jiva is pure and simple. It is characterised by consciousness and upayoga. It is also characterised by infinite knowledge and intuition, and infinite energy. It is active. Due to its activity it comes into contact with the material karma and gets involved in the wheel of sarhsára. This involvement is beginningless. But it has an end. One can attain moksa by removing the kārmic particles.
Just as Jainism is dualistic, Sankhya is also dualistic. According to the Sankhya philosophers, there are two ultimate principles-the puruşa and prakrti. The purusz is pure consciousness, but it is passive. Prakrti is jadi, it is unconsciousness, but is active. When the prakrti comes into the proximity of the puruşa, the disturbance in the gun as of the sattva, rajas and tamas takes place and the evolution of the universe starts. This entire universe is the product of prakrti, in the presence of puruşa. Puruşa is only a spectator of the dancedramı of prakrti through which the universe evolve.
The Jaina darśana's ajīva tattva with reference to pudgala is alluded to prakrti of Sinkhya. The universe is the product of prakrti according to Sähkhya and according to Jainism the variegated universe is due to the infinite modes of the pudgala (matter). The major aspect of the praksti of the Sankhya can be compared to the Jaina conception of pudgala and ākāša."
The Sankhya philosophers say that the reality of puruşa is self evident. There is no need to prove the existence of the self. Similarly, puruşa is self-illuminative, just as the lamp illumines itself and illumines the surrounding area. It is not necessary to prove this essential characteristic of the puruṣa. Puruşa is neither the indriyas nor the
1 (a) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha, Darsana aur Jaina darsana.
Muni Sri Nathamalji p. 125. (b) Muni Nathamalji : Satya ki Khoj, Anekānta ke Aloka me.

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527 body nor the manas. It is different from these. It is characterised by caitanya; and caitanya (consciousness) is the essence of the puruşa and not its quality. The Jainas consider the ātman or the jiva chacacterised by bliss (ānandamıya), but the Sankhya philosophers differ in this respect and say that ānanda (bliss) is not a characteristic of the puruşa, but it is the attribute of prakrti. And therefore, according to the Sähkhya, in the highest state of self-realisation there is no place for ananda. We have also seen that the puruşa is only the spectator of the dance of the prak rti in its evolution of the world. The self is pure and simple and eternal. According to the Jainas the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies (dehamätra). This is from the point of its substance. The Vedāntin considers the ātman as the one with the Brahman. The Advaitin advocates the identity of the ātman with Brahman and according to Visiştādvaita the ātman is the nature of the Brahman and in the highest stage of the ātman merges with the Brahman, just as the waters of river merge with the sea-water.
The Sinkhya philosophers postulate the plurality of selves (puruşa). If the self were one, then certain logical difficulties would have arise, to explain the variety of experiences and status. If one self were to die, all the selves would have died. The experiences of the one self would have been the experiences of all other selves. But the facts of experiences are different. There are wide variety of individual experiences and the status of different individual self. Some are rich and some are poor. Some are happy and some are miserable. Therefore, it is clear that there are many selves. The Jainas have also advocated the reality of many selves. The Jainas say that an object can be studied from different points of view and permanence and impermanence can be predicated of individual self from two different points of view. From the point of view of substances the selves are permanent, but from the point of view of modes as expressed in infinite number of organism, the selves are changing and are impermanent. Origination and destruction are characteristics of the self, if viewed from the point of view of modes. But the self is permanent from the point of view of substance.
What Jaina darsana calls paryāya (mode) Sänkhya calls it asat

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(appearance or unreal). Dhrauvya or permanence is analogus to sat. According to the Sänkhya philosophers, every object in action is asat but sat in its causation. The prakrti is constituted of three gunas : the sattva, rajas and tamas. These gun is get modified. But Jainas use the gunas as something permanent.
There is no modification of the gunas. Sattva, rajas, tamas in the Sähkhya darśana are causes of the mental states of pleasure and pain. Acārya Samintabhadra has also presented a similar conception regarding the three-fold aspect of origination, destruction and permanence of things.
According to the Jainas jiva is kartā (doer) and bhoktă (enjoyer) of the fruits of karma. It is characterised by consciousness. Upayoga is the energy and jñāna and dargang are the expressions of upayoga. When the object is grasped in its generality, it is darśana and when it is grasped in its specific aspect it is jñāna. In this jñāna and darjana are the characteristics of jiva. Jiva is also the doer (kartā). And it says 'I see' 'I hear' and 'I do'. But in the case of the Sähkhya darsana the ātman is fuddha (pure), nitya (eternal) and buddha (enlightened) in
rts and states, even in the empirical experiences, the ātman does not really undergo all the modifications and experiences of pleasure and pains. It is reflections of the modifications of prakrti, which undergoes these modifications and the ātman imagines that it is undergoing modifications. Just as rose flower if kept near a crystal, the crystal appears to be rosy, although the crystal does not have that colour. But if the atman is to experience its fruits, it must be kartā also. Bhokta and kartā are inter-related. In general kart rtva or activity implies freedom of action. Kart stva is of two types : 1. Adhisthāna kart stva and 2. Upādāna kart stva. In the Sankhya darsana, pūruşa is adhişthātā as well as the upādāna. The world is the product of prakşti just as the pot is the product of clay. In the Sankhya darśana, praksti is also considered to be the agent (activity). And it means that prakrti is responsible for the variety in the world. Without the presense of the ātmin, praksti cannot produce anything, although the ātman or puruşa itself does not do anything. But it falsely believes, it is active. In this sense, there is the sense of the

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appearance of the activity in the purus, but really the puruşa is not active.1 Gunas are necessary for the modifications of things in the prakṛti. Puruşa's presence is also necessary. Gunas are of the capacities of the production (prasavadharmi) and in this sense they are kartā. This is the causal meaning of the karta. Vacaspati Miśra has suggested that akartṛtva bhāva is present in the puruşa because puruşa himself is not directly responsible for the production of the things of the world."
In other sense puruşa may be considered to be akartā because he is not directly responsible for the variegated things of the world. But in another sense, we may say that prakṛti is kartā, but with the presence of puruşa which is responsible for the creation of the universe. When prakṛti comes in the vicinity of the purusa evolution starts, just as the iron filings get disturbed and are attracted towards the magnet in the presence of the magnet.
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The evolution of the universe therefore depends in a sense on the co-operation of the puruşa and prakṛti. Puruşa is passive, it is the spectator, but the presence is necessary for creating the disturbance in the gunas in the prakṛti. As long as the prakṛti is not in the presence of puruşa the gunas are in a state of equilibrated tension. The moment the prakṛti comes into proximity of puruşa, there is a disturbance in the gunas and the evolution starts-starting from the mahat to the pañca nah ibūtas. We have already discussed the twentyfive principles of evolution which is the canvas of the universe. In this sense, we can say that puruşa or the atman according to the Sankhya is characterised by cetană and is both karta and bhoktā.
Thus we find that there are some prominent features common to both schools of philosophy although there are certain differences concerning the nature of prakṛti and the characteristics of pūruşa.
1 Sankhya saptati, Jayamangalā vyākhyā
Nirgunasya puruṣasyāprasavadharmitvādakartṛtvaṁ.
2 Aprasavadharmitvāccākartā Vācaspati Miśra. 3 Rajendrasuri Smāraka Grantha, pp. 335-343,

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Jaina &Vedanta
Philosophies In India, philosophic development in its various aspects has been prominent. India is the cradle of philosophic thought. Many philosophical systems have arise. Some of them coherent to each and some are contrary to each other. We have seen that India has given respect to every school of thought. Even Cärvaka is considered to be a darsana. In this chapter we shall consider a comparative picture of Jaina darsana and Vedanta. !
THE PHENOMENAL WORLD According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles of jiva (living substances) and ajiva (the nonliving substance). Ajiva may be considered from two points of view. That which has a form is pudgala (matter). And that which does not have a form and it includes substances like dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time). These are the six substances and we have already discussed about the Jaina conception of the universe, on the basis of these dravyas.
In the Vedānta darsana the universe or the phenomenal world is only an appearance (asatya) while Brahman the ultimate reality is the only real. Sri. Sānkarācārya says which is always samarüpa (uniform), is satya. The objects of the universe in this phenomenal world are not always uniform. They undergo constant change and modifications. Therefore, it is an appearance and unreal. The ultimate reality is the Brahman. It is one, uniform and constant. Therefore, it is real. The satya or the real is constantly

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real for all times. And that is noun nal reality (päram irthika satya). From the phenomenal point of view, the phenomenal world is real. But from the noumenal as, therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world is unreal. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world can be considered to be the real from the phenomenal point of view. But things of this physical world are unreal from the noumenal point. Just as the rope appears to be the snake so also this phenomenal world appears to be real. In this sense, we cannot predicate absolute unreality to the phenomenal world nor can we predicate absolute reality. There are degress of reality and Sankara postulated the concept of the degrees of reality. F. H. Bradely followed the tradition of Sankara, in describing the degrees of reality. The appearance of the phenomenal world appears be real due to ignorance (avidya).
According to the Vedānta the avidyā has two functions : (i) the function of āvarana (covering), and (ii) the function of viksepa (distortion). The principle of avarana may be considered to the power of avidyā which created intellectual discrimination and it is the cause of this samhsāra, the phenomeoal world. Due to the influence of this avarana sakti which creates intellectual discrimination, man considers himself to be the doer and the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain. Similarly, due to the power of ignorance ākāśa was created. From akaba comes wind, from the wind agni (fire), from the agni comes iala (water) and from jala comes prthvi (earth). In this way the subtle bodies were created from subtle elements and gross bodies were created by gross elements (sthula bhūta). From the sūksma sarira (subtle body) comes the sense-organs of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell -- these are the five jñanendriyas. Speech, Dāni (the hands), pāda, pāyu, upastha-these are the five karmendrivas. Buddhi is the determining nature of antahkarana while manas is the expression and modifying sense of the antahkarana.
There are three types of kogas (covers): 1. Vilnānamavakoga which includes the jñānendriyas and the buddhi. It is responsible for the experiences and the knowledge. 2. Manomayakosa which includes the sense-organs and the minis. It has the discriminating function and connotive in aspect. Prānamaya "koga includes karmendriyas and panic ovayus. This is the engergising source. The sūksma sarira is the expression of the synthesis of all the three košas.

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) PRAMANAVADA
The Jainas presented the theory of anekāntadrsti for understanding the infinite varieties of the universe. They said that reality is complex and substance has its infinite modes and aspects. The ekānta point of view i. e., the one-sided point of view cannot understand the complexity of the universe. The various points of view by which the universe was looked at and understood presents the pramāna śāstra of the Jainas. It refers to the naya and pramanu and we have already discussed this topic in detail.
The Vedāntin has mentioned five pramānas for the sake of understanding the noumenal and phenomenal truth : 1. pratyakşa 2. anumāna, 3. upamāna, 4. agama and 5. arthāpatti. From a very broad point of view the Jaina conception of pramāna appears to be different from that of the Vedāntic conception. However, if we look at it very closely we find that there are not much discrepanceies and differencys between the pramiņas. They present the same sense.
We have seen that the Jainas have mentioned pratyakpa and paroksz as two primānas for understanding the noumenal and the phenomenal truths. Pratyaksa is the direct knowledge. We have also seen that the terminology was adopted with modifications for the sake of consistent view of epistemology in the light of other schools of thought. Jainas used the term nijapratyakşa and sānhvyāvahārika pratyaksa. According to the Jainas parokșa jñāna can be classified into 1. smrti (memory), 2. pratyabhijñā (recognition), 3, tarka (hypothetical reason) 4. anumāna (inference) and 5. āgama (testimony). Vedāntin does not use the word apratyaksa or parokşa, although the pramānas--anumana, upamāna, agama and arthāpptti are indirect ways of cognition. Anumāna and agamas are considered to be independent pramānas according to Vedānta. Jainas have classified as parokşa praināxa. Upamāna of the Vedāntin is analogous to the pratyabhijñā of the Jainas. The Vedāntic conception of arthāpatti refers to the implication involved in the perception and the consequent implication for the sake of clarification. As we find in the Mimārsakas for example, that Devadatta is getting fatter everyday although Devadatta is fasting

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during day.' We have to conclude that Devadatta is eating at night. In these forms of expression of arthāpatti, there is the element of vyapti and the presence of vyapti would make it a form of inference. Therefore, the Jainas would consider it a form of inference.
IDEALISM AND REALISM
The Jainas have classified the philosophical theories as idealistic päramärthika) and realistic. This distinction depends upon the distinction of reality on noumenal (pāramārthika) and phenomenal (vyāvahārika). Consciousness and unconscious matter are the noumenal realistics. They are real and the Jainas have accepted the realities of the external world. In this sense, Jainism is realistic. And Jainism is dualistic also because there are two types of realities which are equally important and real, i.e., conscious jiva and the unconscious world emanating from pudgala. The Jainas say that to consider consciousness as unconsciousness and unconsciousness as consciousness is mithyadṛşti. It is perversity of knowledge.
According to the Vedanta there are three grades of reality: 1. pāramārthika satya (noumenal reality) or ultimate reality, 2. vyāvahārika satya is the phenomenal reality and 3. pratibhāsika satya, the state of reality in the state of appearance as in the case of the experience of the real in the dream state. Brahman is the only reality and the world is an appearance. In this sense, the pure consciousness with characteristics may be ascribed to the Brahman only, and the non-living physical events as is the appearance. Right knowledge is that knowledge which knows the distinction between the real and the appearance.
THE DUALISTIC-NON-DUALISTIC THEORY
Jainism is a spiritualist philosophy which maintains that the atman is real and independent spiritual substance. The other systems of philosophy which accept the reality of the atman present in different way. The Vedantin has described the nature of the atman following the tradition of the upanișads. According to the Vedāntin, ātman is the ultimate principle and Brahman and atman are identical. The vast expanse of the universe which is unconscious is rooted in the

! ! 群

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atman and this theory is called Caitanyādvaitavāda. Contrary to this theory, there are philosophers who maintain that the ultimate substance is the unconscious matter. This is the materialist or the naturalistic theory. It is called Jadadvaitavāda.
But the Jainas have reconciled the contraries in the two theories and advocate the reality of both the conscious ātman and the unconscious matter. Both are equally real. In this sense, it may be said that there are three currents of thought in India : 1. Atmādvaitavāda which maintains the reality of the self as consciousness. 2. Jadādvaitavāda, wbich maintains the reality of the physical universe and 3. Dvaitavāda (dualisitc) which maintains the reality of the both. And in this sense, Jainism is dualistic because it advocates the reality and independence of spirit and matter which constitute the matter and the universe.
The Jainas accept the principles of permanence and change as both real. From different point of view of substance, i.e., permanence and from the point of view of modes, change is equally real. Therefore, the Jainas formulate the triple principle of origination (utpada) destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya) as equally real. From the niscaya point of view the consicousness and the unconsciousness are the two ultimate principles. But from the vyavahāra point of view the changing universe is equally real. But it should be realised that the Advaita darśana does not accept the reality of the changing universe on the same footing as the altimate reality of the Brahman. The physical world is an appearance and this appearance is due to avidyā which is an expression of māyā.
In this sense, we can say the Jaina anekānta view bas attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of the living and the non-living, the one and the many and permanence and change for absolute reality. The anekānta outlook gives the solution to the problems.
THE PATHWAY TO REALISATION The Jainas bave presented the triple pathway to the realisation of mokşa. Samyagdarsana (right intuition), samyagjñāna (right knowledge) and samyagcäritra (right conduct). There is the need

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of the harmonisation of the there paths for the attainment of mokṣa. One alone will not do. The Vedantin, specially the advaitin, has given importance to jñāna mārga for self-realisation. According to this theory, the way to realisation is the realisation of the highest truth of the identity of the Brahman and the atman or as in other systems of Vedantic philosophy the oneness of the Brahman and the ātman in their essential nature. Śri Rāmānuja and the other Vedāntins like Madhvacharya have given prominence to Bhakti mārga. Rāmānuja mentions prapatti. According to Vedanta, the forces of ignorance are threefold. Due to this force of ignorance, one feels that the phenomenal world is real. These three forms of ignorance are dependent on the three levels of experience the dream level, the waking state and the pure state, or the dreamless state, which is a pure state. When all the states of ignorance are removed, knowledge of the highest reality is possible and the bondage is removed. The Vedanta also mentions the triple path of sadhana of realisation. 1. sravana (listening to the scriptures) 2. manana (grasping the truth) and 3. nididhyāsana (holding steadfast to the truth). Thus we find Vedānia has given prominence to jñāna mārga in addition to the Bhakti in Rāmānuja.
Thus we find, there are many points of agreement between the Vedanta and the Jaina darsanas.1
1 (a) Muni Nathamalji, see-Atīta kā Anāvaraṇa,
(b) Muni Nathmalji 1 Jaina Darśana 1 Manana aur Mīmāmsā.

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Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought
Jainism has occupied an important place in ancient thought. It has made significant contributions to the stream of Indian thought. What we call Indian philosophy, or Indian culture is a long flow and the synthesis of the two streams of thought, the Vedic and the Śramana current of thought coming together and harmoniously synthesising into each other. We find that Jainism has contributed immensely to the development of the Indian view of life. The Jainas have given equal emphasis on reason and state. We find the same type of emphasis in other systems of Indian philosophy. Sankara gives importance to both reason and intuition.
Jainism may be considered from the point of view of its metaphysical structure and also of its emphasis on ethical values. The foundational principles of ethical structure would be anekanta, while the moral fibre is expressed and based on the all-pervading principle of ahimsa (non-violence). The Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical thought may be considered to be anekanta, ahimsa and aparigraha. These constitute the perennial philosophy of Jainism.
The concept of ahimsa is to be found in other systems of Indian philosophy, but the systematic study of ahimsa as of theory and the way of life is presented by the Jainas in their all-pervading principle of ahimsa. Ahimsa is the highest principle of conduct. Therefore, Jainas have called it as paramodharmah. It appears that the Jaina theory of ahimsā as a moral injunction has been a pre-aryan principle which was later assimilated in the aryan way of life. The Jainas made

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non-violence as the most fundamental principle of religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principles almost to the point of making it a perfect science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to ahimsā.1
The Jaina theory of ahimsa is based on the analytic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic and Jainas believe in the plurality of the jivas. From the practical point of view, the jivas have also been classified into various types on the basis of different principles like the sense-organs, and the life forces possessed by them. Ahimsa is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual or any life-force of the individual by the three yogas, activity, and trikarana. We are not to injure a living being, however, small it may be or a life-force of an organism, directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf or by giving consent someone else to do injuries. We are asked not to injure a living being physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injuries nor should harbour any thoughts of injuring any living being. In the Tattvärthasutra, himsā is defined as injury (violence) caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred. The consequence of violating the principle of ahighsā is misery in the world and in the next world. He who commits violence is always afflicted and agitated. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world". After death, he is reborne taking a despicable life. The Jaina conception of ahimsa has influenced the lives of many great votaries of ahiṁsä. Gandhiji socialised the spiritual principle of ahimsa. Gandhiji. said, 'I believe in loving my enemies. I believe in non-violence as the only remedy opened to the Hindus and Muslims, I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart." Though the doctrine of ahimsa
1 Kalghatgi (T.G.): Jaina View of Life, p. 164.
2 Tattvärthasūtra VII, 8.
3 Sarvärthasiddhi VIII, 5-9
4 Ibid
5 Young India, Dec. 1920-Love and Hate-1922.

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is negative yet it has a positive content. It is not mere abstinence to injury to life. It is love. Himsă causes destruction of life and des tuction of one's own personality. It lowers the personality of man, Gandhiji said "non-violence is the law of our species and violence is the law of the brute".1 Non-violence would be panacea for the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace to us.
The Jaina conception of non-violence as an ethical principle has permitted the entire structure of the Jaina ethics and the way of life. Other codes of conduct and vratas like satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha are all geared to the promotion of the practice of non-violence as much rigorously as possible and as far as possible according to the functions of the individual in society, be an ascetic (muni) or a citizen (śravaka). All other virtues are expressions of ahimsa. Therefore, it is said that Jainism advocates the universality of the principle of non-violence-'ahimsa paramodharmah'. For instance, the individual is a social being and he has to aim at social betterment if self culture is to be pursued. The Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages an individual as a social being, in as much as the individual depends on society for his intellectual, moral and material gains. Even the ascetic is incapable of transgressing this basic principle of individual and social justice. The adoption of ahimsa and other virtues can be seen to be expressed in the aparigraha also.
The Jaina view of aparigraha may be presented in the context of modern society in three cardinal principles 1 1. Desireless, 2. nonpossession and 3. develop an attitude of non-attachment towards the possession. An ascetic or a religious fanatic may be desireless but it may be out of a sense of superiority and out of arrogance of virtue, these are not the ideals of society. We should develop an healthy attitude of renunciation and non-attachment which would bring in us a confident calm in our daily life. They adopt the practice of aparigraha as a social virtue based on the spiritual principle of non
1 Romain Rolland-Mahatma Gandhi, p. 48

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attachment. It would foster spontaneous socialism in an age when we are trying to force upon people the socialistic pattern of society without the spiritual basis of non-attachment.
Anekānta is the intellectual expression of ahiṁsā. Anekānta forbids to be dogmatic and fanatic and agressively insist upon expressing our attitude. Anekānta says that reality is complex. It can be looked at from different points of view and each point of view gives a picture of reality which is at once true but partial. But to insist that the particular point of view and the picture of reality are the only true picture would be dogmatic, and i, e., ekānta. Jainas wanted to avoid the aggressively dogmatic outlook towards looking at things. They have adopted a synoptic point of view which gives the comprehensive picture of reality in which all other aspects of reality are woven into a synthetic hold.
The anekānta is an attitude of mind. It is the foundational principle. Nayavāda expresses the point of view. It is psychological while syadvāda is the logical expression of nayavada formulated in propositional forms. We have said that anekānta is the basic principle, nayadāda is analytic and syādvāda is synthetic. We have also considered the importance of syādvāda in the back-ground of the criticisms offered against it, by philosophers like Sankara, Rāmānuja and some of the modern philosophers. These philosophers as we are aware, have considered syödvāda as a formulation of doubt and uncertainty. First, because, syādvāda mentions seven-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. And secondly, because, the word syät indicates the attitude of doubt as it means 'perhaps', but we have seen that syāt does not mean “perhaps', it does not connote the expreșsion of 'doubt,' the statement made in every predication is a certain statement but predicated from a particular point of view. All the propositional forms present the pictures of reality from the different points of view and syādvāda presents the synthetic picture or more aptly a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science is slowly leaning towards the appreciation of syādvāda as a methodology of multi-valued logic for the solution of problems wbich are metaphysicoscientific. Physicists have begun to realise that syādvāda as multi

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valued logic and methodology which can solve many different problems of quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Similarly, eminent statisticians and biologists like Mehelnobis and J. B. S. Haldane have shown, the methodology of multi-valued logic as expressed in the syādvāda would be very useful in the study of theory of probability and the genetic evolution.
The metaphysical structure of Jainism is based in its formulation of the six-fold distinction of dravya like jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla. We have already seen that the cosmic. principles of dharma and adharma and ākāśa and kala have been scientifically analysed like the Jainas. It is the special contribution of the Jainas in their analysis of the distinction of akāsa into lokākāśa and alokākāśa. Similarly, the Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of time by pointing out that time (kāla) is monodimensional and therefore is not an astikāya. Similarly, the Jaina theory of atomism has its own significant contribution in the analysis of the nature of atom. The Vaišeşikas distinguished between different types of atoms like the earth atoms, water and fire atoms, but the Jainas have not made qualitative atoms. That atoms can be distinguished in their combinations in forming the objects. The same atoms can form water or earth etc. Democrates comes nearer to the Jaina theory in this conception.
The Jainas have also made significant contribution in their analysis of the theory of knowledge and their doctrine of karma. Knowledge for the Jainas is self-illuminating. Pramānas were distinguished into pratyakşa and parokşa, but pratyakşu was that form of knowledge which the soul gets directly without the medium of sense-organs, they consider that sense-organs are impediments in the way of the soul for getting clear knowledge. Knowledge received through the sense-organs was considered to be parokşa, but later with a view to accommodating the use of other Indian philosophers and with a view to avoiding academic chaos in understanding the problems of epistemology, the Jainas adopted the phrase of nijapratyakşa, for the first and sārvyāvahārika prātyak sa for the knowledge arising out of the senseorgans and the contact of the mind.

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541
: The Jaina theory of karma is unique because Jainas have given a methodical and scientific analysis of the doctrine of karma. The Jiva due to its activity attracts kārmic particles which are material in nature and these kārmic particles envelope the soul and obscure knowledge, intuition and activity.
This obscuration brings bondage (bandha). The way to the spiritual salvation is to remove karma and the removal of the karma has to pass through stages. We have first, to stop the fresh influx of karma, i. e., called sarvara and then the annihilation of karma i. e., already accumulated by various means like suppression of the kārmic effect or destruction of karma. This is nirjara; and once all the kar nas are removed, we reach the highest state of perfection.
We have so far given a brief resume of the essential features of the Jaina contribution, to the development of the Indian thought. The essential features of Jaina philosophy, we may call the perennial philosophy of the Jainas. The Jaina view of life is realistic-empiricist coupled with pragmatic outlook. It is not a quietistic optimism, it advocates a struggle towards perfection and the pathway towards the realisation of the highest end of perfection. In this sense, the Jaina Weltanschauung is meliostic.

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PART VI
APPENDICES
1. REFERENCE BOOKS INDEX 2. INDEX OF TECHNICAL TERMS 3, JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE
AND AUTHORS

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Page #566

Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā
Abhidharmadipa and its notes (tippaņa)
Abhidharmakosa
Anuyogadvāra
Adhyatmasara
Anguttaranikaya
APPENDIX I
Reference Books
Index
Aṣṭaka prakarana Abhidhana Cintamaņi kcṣa Anuyogadvāra (Puṇyavijayajî)
Aṣṭaśati
Aṣṭasahasri
Anyayogavyavacchedikā
Ashok Ke Phool (Dr. Hazari Prasad Dvivedi) Amar Bharati-(Sanmati Jñanapitha, Agra)
Avagyaka niryukti
Atmamimāṁsā (Pt. Dalsukh Mālavaṇiā)
Acaranga niryukti
Āgamasara
Agamayuga kā Jaina Darśana (Pt. Dalsukh Malvania)
Avaśyaka Haribhadriyāvṛtti
Apta Mimāmsā
Acarānga
Avaśyaka Malayagiri vṛtti Alapapadd hati

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'śāvāsyopanişad Uttarādhyayana sūtra Uttarādhyayana : Ek Parisilana Uttarādhyayana Bșhadvšiti Uvavãi Upāyahşdaya Rsabhadeva : Ek Parisilana Rgveda Aitareya Upanişad Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Kathopadişad Kausitaki Upanişd Kauțiliya Arthasástra Cosmology Kenopanişad Karmagrantha Kathāvatthu Kalpa sūtra (Devendra Muni) Gitā Ganadharavāda (Pt. Dalsukh Malvania) Gommațasāra (Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravarti) Gautama Sūtra Caraka Samhita Candraprabhacaritram Candraprajñapti Chāndogyopanişad Jaina Dargana (Dr. Mohanlal Mehta) Jaina Dārganika Sāhitya kā Simhāvalokana (Dr. Dalsukh Malvania) Jaina Dharma and Darsana (Dr. Mohanlal Mehta) Jaina Dars ina : Manana aur Mimāṁsā (Muni Nathmal) Jaina Darśana--Dr. Mahendrakumar Jivabhigama Sutra Jaina Darśana aur Adhunika Vijñāna Jaina Dharma me Tapa : Svarupa aui Viślesaņa--Śri Marudhara
Kesariji Mehārāj Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva Jaina Sūtras (Dr. Herman Jacobi)

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•
Jaina Darśana ke Maulika Tattva (Muni Nathmalji)
Tattvänuśāsana
Tattvasangrahapañjikā
Tarkabhāṣā
Tattvärtha-Śrutasāgariyā vṛtti
Tattvärthabhāṣya tikā
Tattvärtha sūtra
Taittiriya Upanisad
Tattvasangraha ki babirārtha parīkṣā Tejobindu Upanisad
Tandulaveyāliya
Tarka sangraha
Tattvartha sūtra-Sarvārthasiddhi Tattvärtha sūtra-Rajavārtika
Tattvartha Sūtra-Ślokavārtika Tattvartha Sutra-Pt. Sukhlalji
Tattvärthabhāṣya-Haribhadriyā vṛtti Taittiriya aranyaka
Tattvärtha Sutra-Siddhaseniyā tikā
Tattvārthasara (Amṛtacandra Suri, Ganesha
Granthamälä)
APPENDIX I
Dighanikāya
The Philosophy of Space and Time, Introduction Dravya-guna-paryāya rāsa
Dravyasangraha
Darśana aur Cintana-Pt. Sukhlalji
Dvādaśānuprekṣā
Daśāśrutaskandha
Daśavaikālika niryukti
Dravyanuyoga tarkaṇā
Dvātrimsikä (Amitagati)
Dharma sangrahani, Malayagirivṛtti
Dharmabhyudayam
Dharmasangraha
Dhavalā
Dhammapada

Prasad
547
Varni

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548
Dharma aur Darśana (Devendra Muni) Dharma ane Darśana (Devendra Muni) Navatattva prakaraņa mūla
Navatattva vicāra mūla
Navatattva vicāra (Sri Bhāvasagara)
Navatattva vicarasaroddhāra
Navatattva prakarana (Sri Devagupta Suri) Navatattvasara prakaraṇa (Añcalika Jayasekhara Sūri)
Navatattvasāra
Navatattva bhāṣya
Navatattva bālāvabodha (Harṣavardhanagaņi) Navatattva bälävabodha (Sri Pārśvacandragani) Navatattva balavabodha (Kulaka) Navatattvarasa-Śrī Rṣabhadāsa
(-Śri Bhāvasagara)
(-Śri Saubhagya Sundara)
33
Navatattva Joḍa (Śrī Vijayadāna Suri) Navatattva stavana (Śrī Bhagya Vijayaji) (Sri Viveka Vijayaji)
""
""
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Navatattva Chappai (Śrī Kamalaśekhara)
13
95
Nyayamañjarī
Nyāyasūtra
Nyāyavārtika
Nyāyāvatāra
Niscayad vatriṁśikā
Nyāyakarikavali
Nayacakrasära

(Śri Saubhagya Sundara) (Sri Vardhamana Muni) (Lumpaka Muni)
Nyāyakośa
Nandisutra (Punya Vijayaji. M. Edited)
Nyāyabindu
Nyāyabhāṣya Niyamasāra

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APPBNDIX 1
549
Nyāyaviniscaya commentary Nyāyamañjari Navatattvasāhitya sangraha Nyāyopadega Nayarahasya Nayakarnikā Nyāyakumudacandra Nayopadesa Nyāyāvatāra tikā (Siddharsigapi) Pravacana sāra Pancāstikāyasāra Prajitāpanā Pramāņavārtika Prajitāpanā vștti Prašo opanigad Prasastapāda bbāgya Pañcāstikāya & Pañcāstikāya vștti Pafcādhyāyi Pascimi darśana (Dr. Divānchand) Pratikramaņa sūtravștti (Acārya Nami) Pancāstikāya-Amrtacandrasūri ksta Samaya Vyākhyā Pañcästikāya-Jayasena vpiti Piņdaniryukti Pañcāģaka saţika vivarana Pariksāmukha Pramāṇanayatattväloka Pramāṇanayatattvaratdāvatārikā Pramāņamīmāṁsā Pramāņa nirnaya Paramātmaprakāśa Pascasangraha Physics and Philosophy (Burner Hoisburg : From Yuclid to Edington) Brahmajāla sutta Brabmasiddhi Bauddha Darsana aur Vedānta-Dr. C. D. Sharma Baudhhadarsana (Baladeva Upādhyāya)

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Bhagavati
Bharatiya Tattvavidyā (Pt. Sukhlalji)
Bharatiya Samskṛti
Bhagavana Mahavira : Ek Anugilana-(Devendra Muni)
Bhagavana Ariṣṭanemi aur Karmayogi Śrkrigna: Ek Anucintana
(Devendra Muni)
Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha
Majjhimanikāya
Mimāmsāślokavārtika
Madhyamika kārikā
Mundaka Upanisad
Maitreyi Upanisad
Mandukyopanisad
Muläcāra vṛtti (Vasunandi)
Maitrāyaṇi Araṇyaka
Māṭharakārikā
Muni Hazārimal Smrti Grantha
Milinda Praśna
Mahabharata Yoga Śāstra
Yukti Sneha Prapūraṇi Siddhānta Candrikā Yoga Darśana
Yogadarśana bhāṣya
Yogadarśana tattva vaiśāradī
Yogadarśana Sarasvati tikā
Loka prakāśa
Laghiyastraya
Viśvadarśana ki Rūparekhā (Pt. Vijayamuni)
Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad
Viśuddhimaggo
Vṛhadnayacakra
Vigeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya Vedanta sukti manjari
Vaiśeşika sūtra
Vijñāna ki Rūparekhā Vṛhannavatattva

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APPENDIX I
551
Višeşāvāsyaka bhāşya vṛtti Sarvadarganasangraha Siddhiviniścyaya çikā (Akalanka) Saptatattva prakaraṇa (Hemachandra Sūri) Samayasāra (Kundakunda) Sanmati prakarana tikā Syādvāda ratnākara Siddhiviniścyaya Samyukta nikāya Sankhyatattva kaumudi Sankhya sutra Sthānānga-Samavāyānga Svarūpa aur Sambodhana Sāňkhya pravacana Sūtrakstānga vȚtti Sanmati tarka Sthānānga & Sthānānga--Abhayadeva výtti Sāhitya aur sarsksti (Devendra Muni) Samācāri šataka Sarvārthasiddhi Syādvādamañjari Sūtrakstānga Sutrakstānga niryukti Sānkhyakārikā Satapatha Brāhmaṇa Śvetaśvataropanişad Śabdakal padruma kośa śāntasudhārasa Šāstradipikā śāntiếatakan Sivagitā Saddarśana samuccaya Šatkhaņdāgama Śri Bhasya Rāmānuja Hariyamsa purāna Haribhadriyāvaśyaka tippaña

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APPENDIX II
Index of Technical Terms
Akarmabhūmi-The world where there is no activity like agricul
ture, writing...etc.
like-fasting, celibacy, sleeping on the floor
Akāmanirjar ā-It refers to the removal of kārmic particles by actions etc., not voluntarily but out of compulsion as in the case of a man who is imprisoned and who has to undergo these hardships.
tgurulaghu-It refers to the absence of the two characteristics of
heaviness and lightness.
Agurulaghuguna-It is the characteristic which expresses neither the lightness nor the heaviness as in the case of the characteristics of the soul. It is infinite in character.
Ajiva-Non-living substance.
Ajñāna-Ignorance due to the perversity of attitude which arises due to the rise of jñānāvaraṇīya karma,
Anu-An atom.
Atyantabhāva-Absolute negation; for example, the sky flower or the son of barren women or horns of a rabbit.
Addhāsamaya- It refers to time or the indivisible part of time. Adharma --The unrighteous attitude which is responsible for the downfall of the soul in the spiritual path.
Adharmadravya - Principle of rest.
Adhigama-Sense experience of the objects. Adholoka-The lower world.
Adhruvabandha-The bondage of the kar nic matter of a soul in the cases where there is the possibility of the non-bondage of the karmic matter and the consequent freedom from bondage.

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Adhruvabandhini-It refers to the psychic attitude by which there is
the possibility of bondage or there may not be any bondage of
any karma. Adhruvodaya - The rise of the sātāvedanīya karma etc., on subsequent
Occasions due to the non-destructions of the previous dispositions. Ananta - Endless or infinite. For instance, kevalajñāna is ananta. Anantavirya-Infinite energy of the soul. Anantānubandhi - It is a process by which samyagdarsana is withheld
and if the right knowledge has already arisen it vanishes. It is an endless series of the expressions of passions (kaşāya) or
emotional states. Ana pavartantya-It refers to the exhaustion of āyukarma as per
schedule without any decrese in the duration or intensity. The āyukarma of this life is determined due to the previous karma
needs to be completely exhausted. Inabhigrahita mithyātva - Mithyātva is the perversity of attitude which
arises due to wrong teaching and due to the clinging of wrong
teaching. Anākāropayoga-Indeterminate upayoga i. e. darganopayoga. Anabhigrāhika mithyātva-This is the perversity of attitude which
arises due to the belief that all other views and theories are · equally true. Anikācita-It is contary to nikācita in which the processes of
utkarsana (increase), apakarsana (decrease) and sankramana
(transformation) of kārmic matter are possible. Anekānta--The many-sided approach to reality. Antarāya Karma Karma which determines and obstructs the
inherent energy of the soul. For instance, it obstructs the activity
of giving alms etc. Antyasūksma—The ultimate subtlety which is to be found in the
atom. Antyasthūla-Ultimate vastness for graspness. This refers to the
entire cosmos and the matter of the cosmos. Apakarxana-Decrease in the intensity of the kārmic effect. Apavartană-It is the transformation or the decrease in the states and
intensities of the effects of bondage.

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A SOURCE-BOOK İN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Apavartanā sankramana-It is the process of the reduction of the
experience and the effects of the kārmic intensities. Aparartya--- It is the premature realisation of the āyukarma as in the
case of death by accident or poisoning. Apratipāti-It is a form of avadhijñāna (clairvoyance) which lasts upto
the kevalajñāna (ompiscience). Apratyākhyāna kaşāya—It refers to the kaşayas or passions which
inhibit the expression of right conduct of a house holder i. e.,
frävaka. Abadhākāla–It is the duration of time from the bondage of the
karma to the rise of the kārmic effect. Abhigrahita-It is the mithyātva or perversity of belief which is
acquired due to the teaching of others. Arūpī–Formless matter. It has no characteristics of sabda (sound),
rūpa (form), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and sparsa (touch). Arthanaya—It is that point of view or naya which is different from
vyañjana and is distinguished from the other characteristics
like gender, number, time and agency. Arihâvagraha-It is determinate concessional stage in which there
is the awareness of the sensation. Ardhamāgadhi bhāşa-It is the ancient language spoken half the part
of the Magadbadeśa and it included the 18 dialects. Aloka-It is space beyond the world. It is the limitless space. Avagraha-It is a sensational stage of experience. Avasthita (dravya)-It refers to the substance like pudgala which has
a determinate space points, dharma, adharma, lokākāśa and jiva have infinite number of space points while pudgala and alokākāsa have endless space points. These substances never go beyond
their space points hence they are called avasthita. Avāya (apāya)-It refers to the stage of perceptual experience (indriya
pratyakşa). It is perceptual judgement. Aviorahagati-Direct movement of soul. Vigraha means obstruction
or uneven direction. The jiva in its movement gets uneven direction due to certain obstructions and that is called vigrahagati. Contrary to this is direct movement, it is called rjugati. So the direct movement of jiva for one samaya is also mentioned as avigrahagati.

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Avipaka nirjarā-It refers to the kārmic matter which arises prema
turely due to certain spiritual efforts and the karma is destroyed, just as a mango fruit is prematurely ripened by artificial
methods. Astikāya-It refers to the five substances, they are--jīva, pudgala,
dharma, adharma and ākāša, because the space points of these
substances signify the collective nature or they are in collection. Akāśa-It is space. It accomodates the substances like jiva, dharma,
adharma, pudgala and kāla. Agama--It is testimony of an authority who is pure and perfect. It
is aptavacana. Abadhākāla—It refers to the duration of time between the bondage
of the karma and the fruition of the karma i. e., the potential
state of the kārmic effect. Abhigrahika—It is the state of mind which is dogmatic and which
affirms that a particular view is right and all others are wrong. It
is the form of mithyātva (dogmatic assertion). Indriya-Sense-organs through which sense-experience is possible,
due to the contact of the sense-organs and the manas. Tryāpathakriya-Tryā means yoga (activity). The kārmic flow which
is accrued due to one type of activity is called Iryāpathakarma and
activity is called iryāpathakriya. I svara—The perfect soul which has attained kevalajñāna and which
has reached the highest stage of perfection is called isvara. Thă- It is a stage of sensation. It may be called associative inte
gration by which the stimulations are received and organised. Uccagotra—It is the state of the individual existence in this life with
reference to his position, society, his power, form and other status in social life. This high state of social existence is attained
due to the good karmas. Udiranā--Udirana is that process by which the kārmic matter of long
duration and fruition power are brought in udayāvalikā so that
they can be experienced soon. Udvartanā—It is the increase in the duration and intensity of
experience of karma.

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Udvartanakaraṇa-To increase the intensity of the karmas which are beyond udayāvalikā. Upakaranendriya-These are the material sense-organs of the body, which are helpful in perception. For example, a man sees by the help of cornea, so cornea is upakaraṇendriya.
Upayoga-It refers to the energy of the soul which is responsible for the knowledge and intuition (jñāna and darśana).
Rjusūtranaya-It is the point of view of the momentary present. The Buddhist point of view is an example of ṛjusūtranaya.
Ekatva pratyabhijñana-It is recognition in which perceptual judgement and the recollection are synthesised. In this form of experience we recognise an object as the one which has been experienced or seen in the past and say it is the "same". Evambhutanaya-It is the point of view which refers to the sabdanaya and it refers to the functional use of the term. Aud trikasarira-It refers to the gross body because 'udara' means
gross.
Audayika bhava-It is the state of mind with reference to the effective state originating from the rise of the karmic matter.
Karma-It is the technical term which refers to the after effect of reactivity. The Jaina theory of karma explains karma in terms of karmic particles and makes distinction in the karma as of eight types. Similarly, the karmic effect may be wholesome or may be bad. Jainas have given a scientific theory of karma. Kaşaya-It arises due to karmic influx. The kaşayas are the root
cause of birth and death that is cycle of trans migation.
Kārmaṇa Śarira-It is the karmic body and is very subtle and is
responsible for the various kārmic effects.
Kāla (Time)-The Jaina theory of kala gives a realistic picture of kāla as an independent category. It is mono-dimensional and therefore it is not an astikāya.
Kevalajñāna-Omniscient perfect knowledge. Kevala darsana-Omniscient intuitive knowledge.
Ksaya-Destruction of karma. Chaamastha-Chadma means jñānāvarana and darśanāvaraṇa karma. The jiva who lives in the state of these two karmas is chadmastha.

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Jina-One who has conquered the feelings of attachment and
aversion and all the four types of passions. He is free from 18
types of defects. Tapa (Austerity)— They are meant to destroy the eight types of
karma. Taijasa śarīra—In modern technology it can be called as Electric
body. Trasa nama-Trasa nama karma refers to the rise of the karma by
which the two to five-sensed organisms are born. Dargana-It refers to the belief or faith. Dik-It refers to direction in space. Drşțivāda—The twefth holy scripture (anga) of Jainas. In it the
elements with their modes etc., were vividly described. Dravya (Substance)-It is the shelter of attributes and modes. It
has origination, destruction and permanence. It is eternal. Dravya niksepa—It is the understanding of the nature of the object
from the point of view of substance based on the dialectical
considerations. Dravyāstika naya—It is the point of view of substance. Dveşa—Hatred, krodha-anger, māna—egoity, arati-dislike and bhaya
fear are expressions of dveşa. Dharma dravya-Dharme as substance, it is the principle of
motion. Dhāraņā (Retention)—It is condition of recollection also: It is an
element in avagraha. Dhrauvyam-It refers to the duration or permanence of the aspect of
the substance. Naya-A point of view. Naraka- The nether world where hellish beings reside. Nāma niksepa—It refers to the understanding of a thing by mean
of its name, i. e., proper names without reference to their nature:
It is the dia lectical process. Nikācita—It is a state of karmic particles in which there is neither
increase nor decrease in the intensity of the karmic effect. Nor is
there transformation of kārmic process. Nik gepa—It is a dialectical process wbich presents ihe various aspects

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for understanding the nature of the things through the point of
view of substance, dravya. its qualities and proper name etc. Nigoda-The particular state of jīva is nigoda, in which it may reside
for infinite period of time. Nidhatta—It is the state of condition (karmic) in which the increase
or decrease of the intensity of the karma is determined by the capacity of the karmic condition. It does not refer to the rise
(udaya) or any other kārmic state. Niyativāda--Determinism as a theory. Nirjara-It is a process of the removal of the accumulated karmas. Nirvāna--Freedom from bondage of the worldly existence, Niscaya naya—The noumenal point of view. Nica gotra--The lower and miserable state of an individual with
reference to its individual and social status. Naigama naya-The point of view which has a purpose or an end. Noindriya pratyakşam It is the form of pratyakşa which is due to the
noindriya i. e. mind, without the help of the sense-organs. Nyāsa-It is a method of knowing the nature of a thing from various
points of view. It is also called nikşepa. Paryüyārthika nayam-The point of view of modes. Palyopama-It is a measure of time by the Jaina standards. Pāpa--Demerit. Piņdaprakrti—The aggregate of the many sub-types of karma: Pudgala–Matter. Lesya-A specific theory of the Jainas wł ich says that the soul gets
colour due to radiation from various activities. Vyāpti-It is a foundational principle of inference. It refers to the
universal relation between the middle term and the major term. Subhanāma—The nāma karma which brings auspicious bodily organs,
sweet melidious sound, fame etc., to an individual. Sankramana–Transformation of one form of the sub-type of karma
into another form of sub-type of the same karmu. Sarjñā-Instincts. It refers to the instinctive urges of all animais
including even the heavenly beings regarding hunger, fear, sex urge and the instinct of possession.

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APPENDIX II
5$9
SarjniJīva which possesses samjña., i, e, mind, by the help of it,
they can learn, think, understand etc. , Sanghāta-It is the aggregate of the particles. The atomic aggregate. Sarhvara-- It is a process to stop the influx of the new karmas. Sarhanana-It is a state of the bondage due to the rise of certain
types of karma: It refers to the bones of the body. Sør-It is a reality which refers to the origination, the destruction and
the permanence of the state of a thing. I Samiti (control)—A form of moral rule which refers to the control of
movement, control of speech and control of niksepana, etc. Sükşma (subtle)-It neither causes hinderance to others, nor other
things can hinder it. Sthāpanā niksepa-It is the dialecticalgform of understanding the
nature of a thing by the recognition of the present state. Sthāvara—It refers to the stationery souls like sthāvara jīvas, the earth
and water-bodied beings, plant... ...etc. Syādvāda-It is the theory of seven-fold predications to express the
comprehensive nature of the things. It is the special contribution
of the Jainas to the world thought. Svādhyāya-It is the self-study or the study of holy scriptures meant
to promote the spiritual realisation of the self.

Page #581

Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors
ŚWETAMBARA AND DIGAMBARA
Author
Abhayadeva Abhayatilaka
Ajitasena
Ajñātakartṛka

APPENDIX III
Time
V. 11th cen.
V. 14th cen.
⠀⠀
Work
Sanmatitikā
Pañcaprastha nyāyatarka vyākhyā Tarkanyāya sütra ṭīkā Nyāyālahkāra vṛtti Nyayamanidipikā (Prameya ratnamālā tīkā) Saḍdarśana Ślokavārtikaṭippaṇī1 Saddarsanaprapanca1
Prameya ratnamālālaghuvṛtti1 Arthavyanjanaparyāya-vicāra1
Svamatasthapana1
Sṛṣṭivāda parīkṣā1
Saptabhangi1
Sanmatitarka1
Sabdakhaṇḍavyākhyāna1
Pramānasiddhi1
Pramāṇapadartha1
Paramatakhaṇḍana1
Nyāyābhūta1
Nayasangraha1 Nayalakṣaṇa1 Nyāyapramāṇabhedi1

Page #582

APPENDIX III
561
Author
Time
Akalankadeva
V. 7th cen.
Work Nyāyapradipikal Pramānanaya prabandhal Pramānalaksanal Matakhandanavādal Visegavādai Laghiyasıraya (svopajšavștti sahita) Nyāyaviniscaya Pramāna sangraha Siddhiviniscaya (svopajnavrtti sahita) Tattvārtharājavārtika Astagati (Aptamimārsā ki vrtti) Samayaparīksā? Nyāyadipavaliviveka Brhatsarvajñasidahil Laghusarvajñasiddhi Jivasiddhi çika Vyatireka dvātrimsikā (Not available) Prameyaratnamālā (parikşāmukha țīkā) Prameya rainākara
Amarakirti Amstānanda Muni Anantakirti V. 10th cen.
Ananda süri
Anantavirya
V. 12th cen.
Siddhiviniscaya tīkā Nayo padesa ţikā
Asādhara
V. 13th cen. Anantavirya (vrddha) v. 9th cen. BhāvaprabhasOri V. 18th cen. Bhāvasena traividha
V. 12-13 cen. Bhuvansundara sūri
V. 15th cen.
Visvatattvaprakāga
Parabrahmotthāpana (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra) Laghu-mahavidyāvidambana (...do...) Şad trirhấatjalpa sanksepa Utpadádi siddhi saţika
V. 17th cen. V. 13th cen.
Bhavavijaya Candrasena Cīrukirti Panļitācārya
Prameya ratnālankārgi

Page #583

+362
Author
Devaratna
Devabhadra sūri Devanandi
Devaprabha
Devasena
Dharmabhigana
Gunaratna
Haribhadra
Hemacandra
Jagannatha Jayasimha sūri
Jinadeya
Jinapati sūri
Jinesvara sūri
Tatey Role Jñanacandra
Khandanakanda Kumaranandi

A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Work
Time
བ་
V. 17th cen.
V. 12th cen:
V. 6th cen.
V. 13th cen.
990 V.
V. 15th cen.
V. 15th cen.
V. 8th cen.
V. 12th cen.
V. s. 1703
V. 15th cen.
V. 13th cen.
V. 11th cen.
V. 15th cen.
V. 8th cen,
Nyāya ratnavali (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra) Nyāyāvatāra tippana Săra sangraha
Jalpanirnaya
Pramana prakāśa Bṛhatsarvajñasiddhi1 Nyāyadīpikā
Saddarsana samuccya ki tarkarahasya dīpikā
Anekanta jayapaṭākā (with commentary)
Anekantavāda pravesa
Saḍdarsana samuccaya Sästravārtā samuccya (with
A
commentary)
Nyayapravesa tikā Dharmasangrahaṇī
Lokatattva nirṇaya
Anekanta praghatta (In Jaina grantha-granthakāra) Tattva tarahgini (... do..) Pramana mimämsä
Anyayogavyavacchedadvā
trimsatikā
Kevalibhuktinirākaraṇa1
Ratnakarāvatārikä tippaṇa Karunya kalikā1 Vādasthala1
Sanmati tīka, Prabhālakşya satika
:
Ratnākarāvatārikā tippaṇa Tattvadipika1
Vādanaya

Page #584

APPENDIX It
563
Author
Time Laghu Samitabhadra V. 13th cen. MāHadhavala
V. 1lth cen. Malayagiri
V. 13th cen. Mallavadi
do
Mallavadi
V. 6th cen.
V. 14th cen.
Mallisena Manikanta Māgikyanandi Mayācandra
V. 1lth cen. V. 19th cen.
Merutunga Municandra sūri
V. 15th cen. V. 12th cen.
V. 13th cen.
Naracandra sūri Narendrasena Nemicandra Padmavijayagani
Work "Aştasahasri-tippai: 15 Dravyasvabhāva prakāśa Dharmasangrahani fika Dharmottara ţippanaka (with Pt. Dalsukhbhāi) Nayacakra Sanmatitarka tīkā Syādvāda mañjari Nyāyaratna Parikşāmukha Jñanakriyāvāda (in Jaina Grantha-Granthakāra) Saddarsana nirnaya? Anekānta jayapatākā vstti tippana Nyāyakandali tikā? Pramāna-prameya kalikai Pravacana parikşā Tarkasangraha phakkikā (In Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Kevala Mukti prakarana Trilaksanaka darsana Prameyakamalamārtanda (parīkşāmukhatikā) Nyāyakumudacandra (laghiyastrayaţikā) Paramatajhañjhāmila Vādasthala2 Tattvaniscaya? Vyatireka dvātritsikā Syadvāda kārikäs Ratnākarāvatārikā panjikā Saddarsana samuccaya Nyāyakandali panjikā? Syādväda ranavatärika
V. 19th cen.
Pālya kirti Patrakesari Prabhācandra
V. 9th cen. V. 6th cen. V. 11th cen.
V. 13th cen.
Pradyumna sūri Pravarakirti Ramaçandra sūri Rājagekbara
V. 13th cen: V. 15th cen.
Ratnaprabha sūri
y
. 13th cen,

Page #585

564
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Author Rddhisāgara
Time V. 20th cen.
Sādhuvijaya
V. 16th cen.
Śakațāyana Samantabhadra
V. 4-5 cen.
V. 11th cen.
śānti sūri
(Purpatallagacchiya) Satyarāja
V, 16th cen.
śāntisena śāntivarpi
śubhacandra
Work Nirnaya prabhākara (le Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Vadavijaya prakarana : (... do ...) Strimukti prakarana Aptamilãnh sẽ Brhatsvayambhūstotra Jīvasiddhi Nyāyāvatāravārtika. savstti Jalpamañjari (In Jaina Grantha: Granthakāra) Prameya ratnākaraa Prameyakanthikā (parikşāmukhavrtti) Sarśayavadana vidārana Saddarśanapramāna prameya sangraha Pariksāmukha vrtiil Nyāyāvatāra-ţikā Darsana ratnākara (In Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Nyāyāvatāra Dvātrinsikā Sanmati tarka Syādvädo panişad Saņdarśana tika Nyāya praveśa Haribhadra vrtti pañjikā Nyāyamakaranda vivecanal Tarkabhāşāvārtika (in Jai. na Grantha. Granthakara) Syādvdād mālā Nyāyadipāvali ţikā
Subbacandra deva Siddhargi Siddhāntasāra
V. 10th cen. V. 16th cen.
V. Sth cen.
Siddhasena Divākara
Somadeva Soma tilaka Śricandra sūri
V. 11th cen, V. s 1392 V. 12th cen.
Subhaprakāša Subhavijaya
V. 17th cen,
Sukhaprakāga Muni

Page #586

APPENDIX III
565
Author
Time
Sumati
V. 6th cen:
Umāsvāmi
V. 3rd cen. V. 3rd cen.
Umāsvāti
Vādībhasimha
v. 8th cen.
Vadideva sūriy Vādirāja sūri
. 12th cen. v. 11th cen.
Vajranandi Vasunandi Vidyānanda'
Work Sanmatitarka tikāli Sumati saptaka Tattvārtha sütra Tattvārthasūtra svopajña bhāşya Syādvādasiddhi Navapadārtha niscaya Pramānanayatattvälokālahkāra Syädvāda ratnākara Nyāya viniscaya vivarana Pramāna nirnaya Pramānagrantha 1 Atmamīmārsā vrtti Aştasahasri Aptaparīksā Pramanapariksa Patra parikşā Satyaśāsana pariksā Tattvārthaßlokavārtika Vidyānanda mahodaya Saptabhangītarangini Sad trimsadjalpa sarkṣepai
Jaina sapta padarthi Pramāna vādārtha (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Syādvāda muktāvali) Vädärtha nirūpana (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra)
V. 10-11 cen.
Vimaladasa
Vinaya vijaya Yasastava sāgara
V. 17th cen. V. 18th cen.

Page #587

566
Author
Yasovijaya (upadhyāya)

A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
Time
V. 17th cen.
Work
Anekanta pravesa
Aşṭasahasri vivaraṇa, Anekantavyavasthā Atmakhyāti (in Grantha Granthakāra)
Bhāṣā rahasya Devadharmaparīkşā Dharma parikşä Dravyaloka vivaraṇa
Dravya paryaya yukti (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Dvatrimsat dvātriṁśatikā
Gurutattva viniścaya
Jñānabindu (In Navya şaili) Jñānārṇava
Jaina
Jainatarkabhāṣā
(in Jaina
Mangalavāda Grantha and Granthakāra) Nyāya bindu
Nyayakhanda khādya (navy
saili)
Nyāyāloka ( do)
Naya rahasya
Nayapradipa
Nayopadesa
Pramāņa rahasya (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Śāstravārtāsamuccaya
Siddhanta mañjarī tīkā (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Siddhanta tarka parişkāra (-do)
Syādvāda mañjūşă (com
mentary on syādvāda mañjarī (—do—)

Page #588

Author
APPENDIX II

Time
Work Tattvaloka vivaraṇa (-do-) Trisūtryaloka (-do-) Utpadavyayadhrauyasiddhi
Note These books are available in different bhaṇḍāras.
"Not published,
567
tīkā
Vādamahārṇava (in Jaina Grantha Granthakāra) Vādamālā (-do-)
Vedanta nirṇaya (-do-) Vidhivāda (-do )

Page #589

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Page #590
Shri Devendra Muni Shastri. the author of this voluminous work is a Jaina monk of higher order. He is a great thinker and reputed scholar of the various branches of literature -philosophy, logic, religion, metaphysics etc. He has written more than 60 books. This voluminous work is Jaina weltanschauung-the outlook on world philosophy. Philosophy is a deep insight It enables man to know the noumenal and phenomenal nature of the things. It discloses the mystery of the sufferings of mundane soul and shows the way to get rid of them. So, the philosophy is called a 'Divine Eye . ENSEN M This book will also prove a Divine Eye for you.