Source Book in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001263
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Devendramuni
Publisher: Tarak Guru Jain Granthalay
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 590
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 10 MB

Page 412

A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
391
THE VALIDITY OF COGNITION We have seen that pramāņa refers to samyagjñāna (correct knowledge). But it is necessary to distinguish between the correct knowledge samyagjñāna and mithyājñāna. The Jaina logicians have given the criterion of validity of knowledge on the basis of the two-fold functions (i) the self-cognition of the cognition and the cognition of
the object. Sometime cognition becomes valid by itself and some time it has to be verified by means of some other cognition.
Therefore, the words svataḥ and parataḥ are used. If cognition is self-valid, it is true to itself and it is a pramāņa. But in some cases, cognition has to be verified through some other mearis. The Naiyyāyikas do not accept the validity of knowledge. According to them the validity or other wise of cognition has to be determined by some other criteria outside cognition. Therefore, it is praratch pramānya.
· The Mimāṁsakas maintain the view of the self-validity of knowledge. The invalid knowledge is due to external circumstances and differences. It is not necessary to have any external criteria for determining the validity of knowledge. This is the svataḥ prāmānyavāda. The Naiyyāyikas do not accept the svatah pramāṇyavāda (self-validity of knowledge). According to them validity of knowledge can be determined by circumstances whith are eternal to knowledge. That knowledge is valid which corresponds to the facts or the external objects. That which is contrary to the fact is invalid knowledge. This is the criterion of correspondence to determining the truth or the falsity. of knowledge. Sänkha darśana is of the opinion that the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both determined by self. There is no necessity of an external condition to determine the validity or otherwise of knowledge. The Jainas are against the three views mentioned above. According to the Jainas, the validity of knowledge can be determined by the self or by the external circumstances according to the situation. They accept both the theories of svatan pramānya and parataḥ prāmāṇya of the validity of cognition. But they say
1 (a) Pramāṇanayatattvāloka 1, 18
(b) Pramānamimārsā-1, 1, 8.