Source Book in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): Devendramuni
Publisher: Tarak Guru Jain Granthalay
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001263/1

Page #1
CU A SOURCE BOOK Hv JAINA PHILOSOPHY Devendra Muni Shastri

Page #2
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Tito [An Exhaustive and Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy] hodu mizar num sibnova ) By Devendra Muni Shastri subschine nisbomiso 8.0.10 estbsM io vierevia solleonoro-bit Translated into English by ns subtie Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, M.A., Ph.D. 1.10 Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Jainology & Prakrits University of Mysore slentriailpna E seobava0.2.1. nojaiva A 2009 3 22103 English Translation Edited by Subtitle Dr. T. S. Devodoss, M.A., B.L., Ph.D., D.P. & P.A. Reader in Philosophys The Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advance Study in Philosophy University of Madras sve . A eser VEM noielvequaninpias 0 ning Published by sb bride bisa SRI TARAK GURU JAIN GRANTHALAYA SHASTRI CIRCLE a swipA 212 UDAIPUR (Raj.)

Page #3
O A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (An Exhaustive & Authoritative Book in Jaina Philosophy) D Author Devendra Muni Shastri Foreword subritenuM sibroved Dr. G. R. Damodaran Vice-Chancellor, University of Madras English Translator on a betul Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi joustol a English Translation Editor televin Dr. T. S. Devodoss Eng. Mss. & Proof Revision Solhe Dr. Brij Mohan Jain noisette olavad .7.10 First Edition Soltitte AM Vir Nirvana Samvat 2509 Akshaya Tritiya, Vikram Samvat 2040 May. 1983 A.D. Printing & Designing Supervision subtie Srichand Surana 'Saras'ladig Printed by sublinieAL URUSANAT 182 S. S. Agarwal, Dinesh Printers, Agra [Price : Rs. As. Sono anly

Page #4
VIIT AGAVAMSA O 002-11 g os 2A: bevis BARAZACEAVA COW H10 H1OZOFT SHT BIC-COC CONTENTS Beasingozolins part 12220 d bbua sint og Part 1 Bol o s srist NATURE OF DARSANA & DARSANIKA LITERATURE 1-34 W do gozo snel love 3-15 Darsana : a Synoptic Study 16-34 Jaina Canonical Literature and its Development DIG Part II b lood sona DISCUSSION OF PRAMEYA amet logo- T35-236 To A bes o zoid 27.63 Lokavada (Cosmology) noitsioneertio 64-72 Jaina Metaphysics 73-124 Atmayada : An Analysis Ajivatattva : A Study 125-148 Pudgala (Matter): A Study 149-182 Principle of Punya (Merit) & Papa (Demerit) : A Study 183-188 Principle of Asrava (Influx) : A Study 189-193 Principle of Samvara & Nirjara : A Study 194-216 Principle of Bandha & Moksa : A Discussion 217-236 Part III 237-408 PRAMANAVADA Syadvada : The Basis of Jaina Philosophy Saptabhangi : A Discussion Niksepavada : A Study Nayavada : A Study Jnanavada : A Study Pramana : A Study 237-258 259-290 291-299 300-334 335-378 379-408

Page #5
Part IV KARMAVADA 409-500 Karmavada : A Synopsis 411-500 Part V JAINA DARSANA & THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD 501-544 Philosophies of the world : A Study 503-518 Jaina & Buddhist Philosophy 519-524 Jaina & Sankhya Philosophies : A Comparison 525-529 Jaina & Vedanta Philosophies C S 5 30-535 Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought 536-541 Dengan Part VI APPENDICES 545-567 Reference Books Index 545-551 Index of Technical Terms AKAOA190 552 559 Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors 560-567 Scheme of Pronunciation colorazo) by 568 ASI-ET ICS but A BETA vb2 A M ) sinobus ( g ) E D M to slab 881-28 set-981 but A nl) E 10 slot A 2 S V 20 satamine de cauza A M are lo stato SOTEE STES ALAAM Tabeba ped anino in

Page #6
BENEDICTION-BLESSINGS Human mind can be compared to a vast ocean. As the ocean never becomes calm, so is the condition of human mind. In it the waves of inquisitiveness always remain in existence. The different questionnaires regarding life and universe, mundane soul and living and non-living substances, either the universe is a chaos or a cosmos, how the activities of the world are going on, etc., perturbs human mind. The Philosophy reconciles all the queries of human mind by logic, by intelligence and with the medium of insight. The philosophy removes all such doubts of human mind. So the philosophy can be recognised as 'Divine Eye'. Philosophy is divided into numerous currents. But all those currents can be classified into two distinctions, viz., (1) Materialism and (2) Spiritualism. Jaina philosophy is spiritualistic by its nature. Jaina philosophy maintains its unique and magnificent position, not only among Indian philosophies but also among the world philosophies. The vast canvas of Jaina philosophy is woven by four elements, viz., (i) Non-violence in conduct, (ii) Many-sidedness in views, thinking and mind, (iii) stand-point-based speech, and (iv) Nonpossessiveness in social life. These are the four strong pillars upon which the magnificent building is standing of Jaina metaphysics and philosophy. It is neither a fool's paradise, nor irrelevent imagination, but based on sound footings and solid ground of life and that is why it gives due force to right conduct in the light of holy thinking. I wished that at the auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, two books should be prepared, one should be biography of Bhagavana Mahavira and the other should be about his Philosophy and Metaphysics. I desired that the style may be comparative but the language should be easy

Page #7
( 10 ) and simple ; so every man can be benefitted and know ins and outs about Jainism by this one and single volume. I expressed the wish to my worthy disciple Devendra Muni. He prepared both the precious volumes with full zeal, enthusiasm and hardship. The present volume discusses the Jaina Philosophy. The typical and rough subjects, like-theory of karman, theory of knowledge, intuition, many-sided approach to the reality, noumenal and phenomenal points of view, conception of soul, consciousnessunconsciousness, theory of valid knowledge, the objects of knowledge, theory of auspicious and inauspicious activities, inflow and bondage, checking the inflow and annihilation of karmans, state of liberation of soul bave been discussed with openmindedness and giving the views of other philosophies--Eastern and Western. So it became a complete book of philosophy. Due to the rare qualities of this work, I liked it much and am sure that every and any inquisitive, who wishes to know about Jaina philosophy can quench his thirst by this one single volume. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi has rendered English translation of the book with keen interest and due labour. So he fulfilled a great gap in the field of philosophy. I am hopeful that this English version will also be cordially welcomed. It is my hearty desire that my favourite and worthy pupil Devendra Muni may enrich the treasure of literature by deep creative intelligence and knowledge and with his ever-flowing pen. He may create new mile-stones in the field of literature and serve the Jainology and flag it. These are my heartiest blessings ! Adinath Jayanti April 5, 1983. - Upadhyaya Pushkar Muni 000

Page #8
PUBLISHER'S NOTE Subtitle It would be apt to say that without understanding Jaina Philosophy, the study of Indian philosophy and metaphysics would remain incomplete; not only this, but the philosophic and metaphysical background of Indian thinking would remain unclear and un-understood. Not only among Indian philosophies, but among the philosophies of the world, only the Jaina philosophy darefully advocates the limitless power and energy of human soul and its independency; and bestows full responsibility upon the man and man himself to attain the highest goal of his life--the infinite bliss, without the help of any God or supreme being. The non-violence (ahimsa) is the back-bone of Jaina Philosophy. Non-violence is the base of Jaina religion and philosophy. It is all and all of Jainism. Complete thinking and conduct of Jainas are spread on the vast canvas of non-violence. So the Jainas presented deep and vivid study of non-violence. For this purpose, the exhaustive study of non-violence, Jaina thinkers pierced sufficiently deep into the material sciences like-Physics, Chemistry, and specially Zoology, Botany and Biology. By the deep study of these sciences, the minutest details which were presented by the Jaina thinkers, proved true to such a high degree, that even the greatest scientists of to-day are astonished. They highly esteem those consequences, by saying that it is wonderful how such consequences obtained milleniums ago while there were no laboratories, etc. These results proved very much beneficial to Jainas. On the one side, they could follow the path of non-violence, in their thought and behaviour; and on the other Jainism is standing upright in the modern science-effected world. While other orthodox religions and isms are either in clash or they slink away and hesitate to face the new researches of the modern science; the Jaina metaphy.

Page #9
( 12 ) sics, philosophy and religion are proved true. The scientificality of Jainism is coming into light as the scientific researches are enhancing. This is the open proof of highest thinking of Jainas. Though there are many books to get through the Jaina religion and philosophy. An inquisitive can understand the subject with the help of those books, yet the necessity of such a single volume, by which the authoritative knowledge can be got, is keenly felt by the scholars and general inquisitives alike. The present volume will fulfil the need. On the one hand, it will prove an authentic book regarding Jaina philosophy and on the other it will be a reference book to the scholars. This book came out from the pen of Sri Devendra Muniji Shastri. Munisri is a great scholar of Jaina religion, philosophy and agam literature. He is a learned man. Many ancient and modern languages, like-Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrit, Gujrati, Marathi, Hindi etc. are at hand to him. He has been devoting his precious time since thirty years in the comparative study of the different currents of Indian culture and literature, like-religions, philosophies, yoga etc. He had gone through thousands of works of reputed authors-ancient and modern and himself have written hundreds of books. Because of his extra-ordinary genius Munisri now gained the fame as the 'Vizard of comparative study' of different philosophies, religions and literature. The present volume is the result of Munisri's three years' continuous study. In this volume Munisri has impartially presented the exhaustive study of Jaina philosophy. This volume (Hindi) was published at the auspicious occasion of 25th centenary of Vir Nirvana. It got appraisal from every corner. Everyone liked it and gave warm welcome. The year 1977 proved lucky to Madras citizens. His Holiness, Reverend Gurudeva, Rajasthan Kesari, Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj stayed there for four rainy months. At that time the intelligentia, mainly the Gujrati speaking inquisitives earnestly requested to the Maharaj Sahib, for the English version of the book. Those people pleaded that the English version would be more beneficial for the English speaking people and also those persons whose mother tongue is not Hindi. Non-Hindi areas would also be able to know about Jaina religion and philosophy.

Page #10
( 13 ) The members of Gujrati Swetambara Sthanakvasi Jaina Association of Madras, were so enthusiastic to see the book in English, that they became pre-publication customers and gave financial cooperation in this way. This enthusiasm instigated Dr. Kalghatgi and he accepted happily the burden of English translation. Dr. Kalghatgi is a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy and specially Jainology. He has translated the book in English with full zeal and great effort. Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, The University of Madras, took great pains to edit the English translation. Honourable Dr. G. R. Damodaran, Vice Chancellor, The University of Madras, has encouraged us by giving 'Foreword' to the book. Our affectionate companion and renowned literary man Sriyut Srichand Surana 'Saras' took the responsibility of printing of the book with due intimacy. Dr. Brij Mohan Jain, has very keenly and carefully carried out the tough work of Mss. & proof-revision exerting his full zeal. We are grateful to all our aforesaid companions for the heartjest co-operation which they have rendered us. We planned to give the book, three years before, in the hands of the readers; but due to unavoidable circumstances--the difficulty of press, the printing of book become undesirably late. Consequently, our inquisitive readers and financial co-operators have to wait long. We apologise for the inconvenience. But, lastly, we have a satisfaction, that we could give this long awaited precious work in he hands of our readers. -Secretary Sri Taruk Guru Granthalaya, Udaipur.

Page #11
FOREWORD The cultural heritage of India is pre-eminently represented by the Brahmanic and Sramanic traditions. Jainism and Buddhism are the chief representatives of the latter tradition. Lord Mahavira is the greatest exponent of Jaina thought. Among the path-finders to the Supreme Reality, Bhagavan Mahavira stands pre-eminent. Vardhamana, universally known as Mahavira, the last of the twenty four Tirthar karas of the Jainas, represents the ancient Jaina tradition of India, that of ahimsa, renunciation, sacrifice and asceticism. Though Mahavira's teachings are primarily followed by the Jainas, they are in fact applicable mutatis mutandis to the followers of other religious faiths. In essence, Lord Mahavira is a Jagadguru-a World Teacher whose teachings are meant for the entire mankind. Far from being a recluse concerned only with an inner spiritual experience, Lo'd Mahavira also associated himself closely in uplifting the social life of the people. He was instrumental for codifying all unsystematic mass of beliefs into a set of rigid rules of conduct for munis, i. e., monks and shravakas i. e., house-holders. The essence of Lord's teaching is embodied in the three-fold code known as ratna-traya. By following the three-fold path of Right Belief, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct, as ordained by the Jainas, the soul is released from the cycles of birth and rebirth and attains the pure and blissful abode of the liberated souls. Jainism is uniqe in the history of religious philosophy. Jainism, although usually referred to as a religion, is basically a way of life. The Jainas have always stood for the dignity of man and equality of all, and have preached the elevated ideal of ahimsa which is considered central to the Jaina ethical thought. As rightly observed by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "The Jainas were first to make ahimsa, non-violence, into a rule of life. The present book is a classical work on Jaina Philosophy, rendered into English by Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi from the original

Page #12
( 15 ) text-Jaina Darshana : Swaroo? aur Visleshana written by the venerated monk Devendra Muni who belongs to the Svetambara Sthankawasi order. The author of the book is a renowned scholar and outstanding exponent of Jaina Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's scholarship is astounding and deeply penetrating as is evident in his numerous writings and books written in Hindi, Gujarati and Rajasthani languages. As the author of more than hundred books, Devendra Muni ranks among the world's greatest exponents of Jaina thought. The present work shows great mastery of the author over not only the doctrine he is expounding but also the realm of Indian thought. The book though primarly concerned with Jaina Darshana, Logic and Metaphysics, allude in the course of explaining its distinctive features to nearly all the other systems of Indian Philosophy. The book contains frequent references to Contemporary Western Philosophical thought. Devendra Muni's exposition is throughout admirable. The book is divided into six parts dealiog with discussions of Pameya, Pramana and a synoptic study of Jaina Darshana. The Introductory chapter will serve as an excellent aid to the study of the book. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi, Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakrits in the University of Mysore has done a great job by translating into English, Devendra Muni's classical book-Jaina Darshana : Swaroop aur Visleshana written in Hindi, thereby drawing the attention of scholars over the globe to the fascinating domain of Jaina thought. It is a high standard of editorial competence that is set here in this book by Dr. T. S. Devodoss, Reader in Philosophy at University of Madras. Devendra Muni's admiration for Lord Mahavira and his teachings and for the civilization which embodied it makes this not only a learned but also a stimulating book. The world of scholars owe a debt of gratitude to Devendra Muni's monumental contribution to Jaina philosophical thought. 25th January, 1979 G. R. DAMODARAN Vice-Chancellor The University of Madras

Page #13
PREFACE Philosophy is the 'Divine Eye' of man. What man cannot see by his physical eyes, can see by the eye of philosophy. So, the philosophy is the vision of insight. In other words, philosophy is the medium to get into the inner core of reality. The aim of philosophy is to discuss the nature of life and world. It also reconciles the problems, like-.what are living and non-living realities, the elements constituting the world and how many are they, what are the effects of living and non-living substances on the different activities of the universe. As these and such other questions are eternal and had disturbed the human brain since his invent, and the human mind remain always active to solve these problems, so it would be apt to say that the current of philosophy is as old as man itself or prehistoric. When we come to historic period, we find that the systematic knowledge of philosophy came into existence. The first such country is India and the second is Greece. All the Eastern philosophies are effected by Indian philosophy and the Western by Greek philosophy. All the Indian philosophies aim at the quest of soul and its nature. Indian philosophers are found crazy to know the nature of soul and God, in detail. Such tendency we do not find in Greek philosophers. Though they also have tried to know about the soul but could not go so deep as Indian philosophers. Though their style is charming, yet the outlook was mainly material. And because the European and American, i. e., all the Western philosophers are influenced by Greek philosophy so the western philosophy became material in outlook. But the trend of Indian thinkers always remained towards the soul, so Indian philosophy became spiritualistic by nature. Though Indian thinkers also discussed the pature and material reality, but to the extent it was pertaining to

Page #14
( 17 ) soul. The complete treatise of matter was to understand the nature of soul more clearly. Being the main aim the quest of the soul Indian philosophers never neglected the life and activities of the physical world. In true sense, Indian philosophers have posited their faith in life and enhanced their continued steady foot-steps toward the attainment of ultimate truth. Philosophy has logic and cogitation as its bases. It tries to understand the nature of reality and ultimate reality by reason and then induces to believe the accuracy and legitimacy of them. In this way, the faith and reason are in harmony in Indian philosophy. Western philosophy is based on free thinking. It is theoretical in nature and its main characteristic is intelligence. It avoids authoritative valid knowledge. The demarcation line between the Eastern and Western philosophy is the conception of salvation. All the main currents of Indian thinking merge in the ocean of salvation while western philosophy neglects this subject. The various happenings and changes in nature leave man in astonishment. He desires to search and know the causes of these happenings ; and so is the aim of western philosophy to investigate and understand the real nature of this visible physical world. Hence it can be said that the western philosophy is the mental exercise. It does not do much to remove the miseries of mankind It suggests no pathway to the ultimate good of man. But according to Indian philosophers, misery is responsible for the origination of philosophy and they posit its aim the removal of misery. The prominency of Indian philosophy resides in the fact that it is helpful to us to attain the highest goal, i.e., salvation. The nature of elements is considered only due to the cause that such knowledge helps to remove misery. Indian philosophy is not only a method of thinking but also a method of life. It has a specific view-point regarding the life and visible world. It is not only the science of reasoning, but an art of life. Indian philosophy does not satisfy itself by the search and

Page #15
( 18 ) knowledge of Truth ; but it induces everyone to lead truthful life. Because of this, the philosophy and religion remained hand-in-band in India. There is neither variance nor separation between the two. Philosophy thoroughly examines the reality and then accepts it by logic and reasoning so that soul can get salvation ; and the religion is the practical way to obtain the spiritual truth. Thus philosophy ascertains our highest goal and religion is the way to attain it. Philosopby purifies the method of thinking while religion is the purification of living-method. Philosophy demonstrates the fundamental principles and religion brings them into action. It gives up the forbidable and follows the beneficial. Hence philosophy and religion are complement to one-another. . In Indian philosophy conduct also found its valuable position along with cogitation. Thinking and reasoning find its culmination in conduct-right conduct. Jaina philosophy bears in itself some salient features which place it at the foremost position among the world philosophies. On the one hand, Jaina philosophy dipped in the fathomless depth of ocean of spiritual science and solved the unriddle problems of spiritualism by the medium of different view-points and deep piercing reasoning; and on the other hand it demonstrates some specially astonishing maxims and principles in the science of matter long before modern scientific world. It had very minutely considered the conscious powers and energies ; and also a thorough analysis of the sciences, like-Zoology, Botany, Biology etc. It gave the unique theory of many-sided approach to understand from all directions the reality and the fundamental principles. Its style of truth-demonstration by the theory of relativity (syadvad) is a greatest acquisition. The maxims ascertained by Jaina philosophy about 'atom', 'sound' fulcrum of motion etc., are proved true by the modern science. Really Jaina philosophy is unique and holds an out-topping place in the philosophic sphere of the world. In present volume light have been thrown on the special characteristics of this pbilosophy. Vast literature has been published in Sanskrit, Prakrit and other languages pertaining to Jainology. This literature is of both types--simple and complex. It is a matter of bappiness that the

Page #16
( 19 ) different branches of Jaina literature are being published in National language-Hindi as well. Many important volumes also have been published dealing with Jainology. The present volume is also an attempt in the same direction. The vigilant readers would be the true judge of this work and they will estimate that how much I am successful in my this attempt. But I have no hesitation to say that religion, philosophy, literature, culture, agam, purana are my favourite subjects. Wbile I wrote on these subjects, I get the indescribable joy, therefore, I am confident that readers will also obtain the same joy at the occasion of perusal of the book. I got the commandment of reverend Gurudeva, an spiritual ascetic of highest order, Rajasthan Kasari, Upadhyaya Pushkar Muniji Maharaja that at the great auspicious occasion of 25th Nirvana centenary of Bhagavana Mahavira, such type of unique and original literature should be prepared which must be of ever-lasting value and by the perusal of that literature the vigilant readers should get instigation towards their spiritual upliftment beside increasing their knowledge. According to the desire of reverend gurudeva, I determined to prepare two books : one-comparative study of life of Bhagvana Mahavira. I devoted ten precious years in the perusal of pertaining literature and consequently a volume came into light entitled Bhagavana Mhavira : Ek Anushilana'. In this voluminous research work the critical study of the life history of Bhagavana Mahavira has been described in the light of literature from the period of agamas i. e., 6th century B. C. to the modern times. The other volume I prepared pertaining to philosopby. For this I studied more than bundred books and invested many years. The book was published in 1975. In the year 1975 we stayed for four rainy months in Poona (Maharashtra). At the inauguration occasion of the book entitled 'Jaina Darshana : Svaroopa aur Vishleshana' (Hipdi) the dignitaries, like-Dr. S. Barlingay (Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona), Dr. Anand Prasad Dixit (Head of the Deptt. of Hindi), Dr. A. D. Batra etc. etc., were present and they appraised the book with full zeal. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi (Head of the department of Philosophy and Jainology, University of Mysore, Mysore) expressed his earnest feclings that this book should be translated into Epglish so that the

Page #17
( 20 ) readers and scholars of Eastern and Western philosopbies by English medium may also be benefitted and English speaking world would become aware of Jaina Philosophy. Dr. Kalghatgi expressed his desire to translate the book in English to the renowned citizen of Mysore Rikhaba Chand Ji Chhallani and Sri Chhallani informed me accordingly I consented joyfully. Dr. Kalghatgi is regarded as an authority in Jaina philosophy. He has good command on English language. Many merit works came out of his pen. He had fulfilled the job with due labour and vigilence. Dr. T. S. Derodoss (Professor, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Madras) has edited the manuscript (English translation) taking full pains. I am grateful to both the learned persons. Words cannot express the pains they took. Manuscript was given in the press for printing in 1978. It was estimated that two to three months would be sufficient time for printing the whole book ; but since then a chain of difficulties enveloped the fate of book. Unavoidable and ultra wire circumstances regarding the printing press continually hindered the publication of the book, even to say that due to the negligence and hostility of press management some pages of the manuscript were missed. A tedious problem aroused to face. Dr. Brij Mohan Jain (Agra) solved this problem. He also took the burden of tedious work of proof-c. rrection. Inspite of hillarious efforts of Dr. Kalghatgi and Dr. Devodoss to give the manuscript quite correct, the description at some places could not be clear, due to the ignorance and negligence of typist, as the typist was unaware of philosophy and philospbic words and technical terms, so mistakes have been created. This was a hard nut to crack. Dr. Brij Mohan Jain also did this work with ability and to my satisfaction. The cordial co-operation of Srichand Surana Saras' to get the book printed eye soothing and beautiful, will also be remembered. The tremendous efforts of Sri Surendrabhai President of Sthanakvasi Jaina Gujrati Association, Madras, and Sri Balwantbhai, ease the path of publication of this book, as due to their attempts some of the main members of the association became the pre-publica

Page #18
( 21 ) tion customers of this volume and so created financial co-operation. Renowned social worker C.L, Mehta, Indrachandji Mehta, Madhukarbhai Mehta etc., also rendered valuable co-operation Whatever good is in this volume, it is due to the kind mercy of my Gurudeva Upadhyaya Sri Pushkar Muniji Maharaj, who is always like a light house to me. Words cannot express his mercy, Respected mother Mahasati Prabhavatiji Maharaj is the greatest energy to me. Alas ! she has gone to the father's abode on 27th January, 1982. It would be a matter of more joy if she could see this book printed by her own eyes ; but nothing can be done. Which cannot be cured must be endured. It is my solemn wish that in the rememberance of Holy mother I may enrich the treasure of literature. It would not be proper at this occasion to forget my elder sister Mahasati Pushpavatiji Maharaj ; because she is a perenneal source of instigation to me to step forward in the field of knowledge. The serviceful co-operation of my sramana companionsRamesh Mun, Rajendra Muni, Naresh Muri is of great importance in my writing work. It would be negligence on my part, if I donot remember their polite behaviour and co-operation. Lastly, I am grateful to all the writers, whose books are referred in preparing the present volume. Devendra Muni Shastri Rishabh Janma Jayanti 5th April, 1983 Harakhachanda Kothari Bhavan 2 Chopasni Road Jodhpur. 000

Page #19

Page #20
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Page #21

Page #22
Part 1 Nature of Darsana and H-1 Darsanika Literature 1. DARSANA: A SYNOPTIC STUDY H.2 2. JAINA CANONICAL LITERATURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

Page #23

Page #24
1.2 Darsana : A Synoptic Study Darsana is an expression of man's inherent capacity for intellectual discrimination. The word darsana is derived from the root term drs, to see. Drsyate anena iti darsanam, signifies the meaning that it is perception. Perception may be of different types like senseperception, logical enquiry or insight of the nature of soul. However, darsana in its true sense would refer to the intuitive experience. aided by intellectual discrimination. Dargana would mean the perception of Atman and not merely knowledge of the physical world. It enables one to gain the inner meaning of life and the world. Dardana means direct knowledge'. "intuitive experience'. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan holds the view that "dargana is not an intuition, however much it may be allied to it. Perhaps the word is advisedly used, to indicate a thought system acquired by intuitive experience and sustained by logical argument." The seer who has darsana gains a wider perspective of the view of the life and the world than the scientist and the poet. The scientist looks at reality from a particular aspect and from agalytical point of view, although he draws certain conclusions guided by flashes of intuitive knowledge. The poet has, as his subject, infinite beauty of the whole world in all its manifestations. But the seer, who is a philosopher, looks at life and the world from the synoptic point of view. His outlook is much wider in its scope and includes diverse points of view. He is not bound by the 1 Allen & Unwin Limited, Indian Philosophy, (London: George 1966), Vol. I, p. 43.

Page #25
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY limitations of particular aspects of the subject as the scientist is. He views life steadily and sees it in all its comprehensiveness. As Plato observes, a philosopher (darganika) is "the spectator of all time and existence". Darsana is the whole-view as revealed to the soul-sense. Man is a rational animal and rationality is the chief differentia which distinguishes him from others. He thinks about the nature of the different things of the world. Darsana originated from the moment when man began to think and cogitate. The antiquity of darsana could be traced to man himself. There have been divergent approaches to the understanding of the origin of darsana, based on the prevailing circumstances. Some have laid emphasis upon the intellectual exercise, while others have given primary importance to the aspect of wisdom. Darsana stands for a philosophical perspective, a Wel. tanschauung. It means the view of the world. There are some thinkers who contend that darsana is the perception of the self. Thus, the varied viewpoints may be traced to the circumstances which prevailed during particular periods of time. ORIGIN OF DARsANA H 3 Faithill Some thinkers say that the origin of darsana lies in intellectual enquiry. It is believed that darsana begins from the exact moment, one asks the question : Why ?'. Before the commencement of the age of darsana, there was the age of faith (Sraddha). Statements of an authority, like a prophet, were implicitly accepted as true in nature. For instance, we find in recorded history, utterances of great piophets like The Buddha and Mahavira and the statements of Manu were accepted implicitly as ipso facto Truths. It may be noted in the context, that faith marks the starting-point of one's journey towards the ultimate goal. It also indicates the first vision of truth. It is considered as a great moral virtue and absolutely essential for a spiritual aspirant for his realisation of the Supreme, according to the Indian tradition. For instance, the Rgveda praises faith. The Gita proclaims that only the faithful gains knowledge. 1 Rgveda, 10.151, 1-5. 2 Gita, 4.39.

Page #26
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Logic This gave way to the place of reason. In the process of intellectual enquiry, man began to get hold on the understanding of the phenomena of nature. The cardinal dictum in this age was the question : "What is the nature of Reality ?". The criterion of the origin of philosophy lies in the inquiry into the nature of reality. HL Wonder Some philosophers contend that philosophy had its origin in curiosity to understand Nature's phenomena which was baffling to the finite mind. The World of Nature thwarted the imaginations of the poet and the seer. The sublimity of nature's beauty, the grandeur and the fragrance of blooming flowers, the fierce wind blowing, the sunshine, the rapturous scenes of the flowing of rivers and the roaring of seas, the dazzling-twinkling stars in the sky amidst the encircling beauty of moon's light-all the aspects of nature's delight were the subjects of philosophical enquiry into the nature of its origin and creation. The Greek philosophers hold the view that the origin of philosophy lies in 'wonder'. To think and to wonder by looking at the vicissitudes of life is philosophy. Hill Doubt The origin of modern philosophy is to be traced to this early tendency of doubting spirit and also to the questioning attitude, Francis Bacon, for instance, began to doubt the teachings of the Church. He aimed at bringing about a synthesis between science and philosophy on the basis of integration, and he ended with founding philosophy on the solid foundation of intuitive experience. It may be noted here that science gives us knowledge, but only philosophy alone gives us wisdom. Science is analytical description while philosophy is synthetic interpretation. "Men are not animals erect," said Francis Bacon, "but immortal gods." He contended that man must war only on the obstacles that nature offers to the triumph of man. Descartes too stressed the need of 'methodic doubt' as the cobweb-clearing prerequisite of honest thought. He built his super-structure of mathematical philosophy based on the notion of 'doubt'. Immanuel Kant based his philosophy on the critique of

Page #27
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY knowledge and gave a formalistic philosophy of the 'Noumenon'. Similarly, the rationalistic pluralism was based on the methods used by Descartes. Thus, we find that Western philosophers adopted the method of "doubt in analysing the verities of life. Indian philosophers have based their development of philosopbical thought on the aspect of the innate curiosity' of man to comprehend the nature of Reality. DARSANA AND PHILOSOPHY 7.3 Darsana and philosophy are often referred to as synonyms. However, there is a primary Distincuion in the connotation of the me Darsana leads to the kuowledge of the seit. The ultimate end of darsana is to know oncself. The starung-point of Indian thought is its emphasis on man himself. If we take the utterances of the important philosophers of each tradition into consideration, Man know thyseli' may be said to be the chiet advice of all the four traditions. Socrates said it in so many words. The Upanisada did the same when they exported man: atmanam viddhi (know thyself). Philosophy is the intellectual pursuit on the understanding of the ultimate reality. It is, as a philosopher puts it, an unusually rigorous effort to think consistently. It is an intellectual gymnastic, a luxury of the mind. But darsana has a practical purpose-in one's efforts to free oneseli from the bondage of worldly existence. It aims at seeking solace in the eternal bliss free from the empirical adjuncts of this lite. lo ibis Sense, darsana expresses the lony grandeur of intuition. Dursund, according to the Indian tradition, has not remained restiicted to the acadernic pursuits of understaudin the nature of the ultimate reality to be sought in philosophy. It has uanscended the narrow empirical barriers and seeks to realise the highest truth. In the West, philosophy is considered merely as an academic pursuit of knowledge for knowledge sake. In India; the seers have gained the vision of reality. Hence, the term 'darsana' as applied to Indian thought becomes significant. DARSANA AND SCIENCE 3 In this scientific and materialistic age, we find that men are generally drawn towards gaining materialistic pleasures in life and seem to neglect the spiritual values of life. Perhaps the reason lies in this that men are caught in the web of sarhsara and fail to realize the deeper significance of life beyond this mundane world. Darsana

Page #28
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY enables one to seek Truth through meditation while science tries to understand the mysteries of the world through experimental investigation. Science is analytic, while philosophy and darsana are synthetic in approach. The conclusions of science are only intellectual shorthands and are provisional, Scientific hypothesis are liable to be rejected. In fact, science proceeds to develop on the basis of the rejection of earlier hypothesis in favour of more acceptable forms. The Newton's law is no longer accepted today. Einstein's Theory of Relativity may also be overshadowed by a more cogent bypothesis at a later date. Dargana is centred round the understanding and realisation of the self, while the main task of science is to comprehend the mysteries of nature. Dargana meditates on the Atman and Paratman. Science analyses the intricacies of nature and discovers the uniformities of the laws of nature. Darsana looks at the universe as a integrated whole. Scienc: attempts to comprehend the diverse aspects of the universe. Science looks at reality piecemeal. Darsana gives prominence to reason, meditation and intuition. On the contrary, science lays emphasis on analytical experience, experimental observation and deductive analysis. The conclusions of science are tentative in nature because they are subject to further investigations. Darsana gives a synoptic picture of reality and, therefore, it discloses the aspects of truth and not mere probabilities. Yet modern thinkers in their enthusiasm for understanding the nature have given exclusive importance to scientific investigations and analyses. Darjana can be said to be the vision. It is the higher intuition by which realisation of the supreme reality becomes true. A scientist looks at reality through the external eye, although he uses reason and intuition to understand the nature of reality. A seer (darsanika) transcends the ordinary perceptions of the outer eye and sees the highest reality through the inner eye. Darsana really enables one to understand the world and life in its entirety. As Matthew Arnold said : "Dargana looks at life steadity and looks at it as a whole." Thus, we find, Darsana embraces in its fold the manifold aspects of scientific knowledge and investigations and philosophical pursuits as well. Bertrand Russell observes "the utility of science is twofold-one is that it understands everything that falls within the field of its experimentation ; the other is that whatever is under

Page #29
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY stood should be brought within the scope of rules." Russell's analysis shows that science can be understood from two angles--one is with reference to its methodology, and the other with reference to the subject-matter. The methodological approaches of science and Darsana stand on different footings. While science uses empirical tools of observation and experimentation, darsana adopis the transcendental modes of meditation and vision. Science studies the universe in its various aspects. It is therefore analytic. Each science studies a particular aspect of life. For instance, Biology studies life, Physics studies matter, wbie Psychology studies the mind. Each science has its own limited field of experience as its subject matter. The physical sciences study the physical matter and its modifications. Biological Sciences study life and its expressions. Behavioural Sciences like Psychology study mind and its states. The fundamental approach of all these sciences is empirical in nature. But darsana uses the synthetic method in which reason and intuition are synthesised and harmonised, in order to present a comprehensive picture of reality. 4.3 DARSANA AND RELIGION We have earlier noted that Darsana is one of the most character. istic and fundamental thoughts of Indian philosophy-the meditative and mystical attitude of mind towards an idealistic conception of the universe. Manu, the famous Hindu Law-giver, gives a clear perception of the notion of darsana thus : "He who is possessed of true insight (darsanasampanna) is not bound by deeds, But the man destitute of insight (darsanenayihina) is involved in the cycle of existence." f. H. Bradley observes ; "Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being." It is also contended by philosophers that religion is 'natural' because the ultimate realities must be a 'natural part of the universe of which man becomes conscious. Religion enables every man what he is, and helps him to say, 'Here is reality': As Stanley Cook 1 Manusmrti; VI. 74.

Page #30
A SOURCE-ROOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY observes : "Religion primarily involves some immediate consciousness of transcendent realities of supreme personal worth, v tally influencing life and thought, expressing themselves in forms which are conditioned by the entire stage of development reached by the individual and his environment, and tending to become more explicit and static in mythologies, theologies, pbilosopbies, and scientific doctrines."1 Against this background, let us now compare and contrast the roles of darsana and religion in all spheres of human activity. Darsana and religion are both essential for man to gain selfrealisation or God-realisation. Divergent views have been stated by scholars in regard to their mutual relationships. There are some who hold the view that they are identical. Some others say that they are entirely different, two poles set asunder. Whatever may be the opposing viewpoints, we cannot deny the fact that both are fundamentally essential for inan to reach higher heights of spiritual progress. Considered thus, they are supplementary to each oiher. Reason, as we know, is the differentia of man. It is the prerogative of man. When reason looks within itself, when man introspects, darsana is born : but when reason projects into the external world and translates thoughts into action, then religion arises. When religion and darsana have in common is the they are fundamental to the way of life of an individual or of a society, and it is not surprising that they should be closely connected. It is generally said that "religion is morality tinged with emotion." Indeed, it has often been held that morality is wholly dependent on religion, that a man who has no religion cannot have any morality. Whatever may be the theories of the origin of religion, religion is born when the Truth arrived at by reason is translated into action in the form of moral codes. For instance, mere knowledge that it is good to tell the Truth' is not sufficient unless it is translated into action. Truth-speaking, would then have mere academic interest. Unless we practice speaking Truth, it will not have any meaning. However, philosophers like Socrates said, "Virtue is knowledge" and "to know virtue is to be virtuous." According to Socrates, "Knowledge is not mere collection of informations nor academic facts, it is realisation. To know is to 1 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics edited by James Hastings. (New York! T & T Claik, 1956) Vol. 10, p. 693.

Page #31
10 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY realise." In this sense again, darsana and religion are two main aspects of the experience. Without religion, darsana would be merely delusive. Darsana becomes divine when it is strongly backed by religion. In other words, dargana and religion are two inseparable entities of life. Besides, they are complementary to each other. Religion without darsana is blind and darsana without religion is heretic. Bereft of darsana which gives the rational and intuitional basis for its belief and practice, religion would degenerate into mere blind belief and become only a collection of superstitious practices without any rational and intuitional basis. The early primitive forms of religion are blind and have no rational or intuitional basis. On the other hand, darsana without the fervour of religion would be empty as it would not flow with emotion and noble sentiments. The two are necessary for the realisation of the divine nature of man. Human life would be meaningless and devoid of the higher values of life, without the harmonious blending of darsana and religion in man's life and activity. A synthesis of the two would bring about a harmonious development in man's personality and endow him with a balanced view of life. H. DARSANA AND LIFE It may be asked: What is the relation of darsana with life as such? The answer to it, is suggestive of the fact that man is given to thinking. Man continues to think and thinks constantly. As Aristotle said, "Man is a rational animal." Rationality is his chief characteristic. Reasoning is his prerogative and through it combined with his intuitive power, man seeks to build a structure of philosophy and darsana. Sankara sums up the unique nature of man thus: "Karma-jnanadhikarat." He is one who is capable of both knowledge and moral freedom. When man ceases to think and to intuit, he falls down to the status of an animal. In short, it is impossible for a human being to live without darsana or faith. Man's life is a saga of constant and coherent thinking. First, the knowledge of the 'self' dawns on him and then of the 'other' as related to him. The knowledge, in fact, the realisation of the relation of the self with the other, is necessary for the realisation of one's highest goal of perfection. To meditate on the fundamental facts and values of life, to put them to the test of reason and to act up to the ideals and values of life, is the expression of the relation of darsana to life.

Page #32
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 11 Life compels man to live in society. He is gregarious, selfish and yet a rational and moral animal. Self-develoment is possible only through his active social participation which implies the observance of ethical codes of life. Man's true destiny is not the conquest of his external nature but the conquest of his own self because atmanigraha or the suppression of the lower self alone indicates the greatness of the human spirit. Man is not a 'lost' creature. He is ever capable of self development. Self-development is possible only through gaining philosophical truths. This is made possible only through darsana. Thus, we find the inseparability of darsana to life. DARSANA AND THE WORLD +1.3 Having analysed the relation between darsana and life, let us now attempt to understand the significance of the relation of darsana to the external world. Knowledge of the relation between life and the external world would give us the idea of the extent to which darsana values the relation and the extent to which man understands his relation to the values of life as such. The world is as much the subject-matter of darsana as life is. It studies life and the world alike. In the analysis of philosophical thought, there are two fundamental streams-the idealistic and the realistic. The two are opposed to each other in their thoughtstructure. The realist affirms the reality of the external world, independent of cognitive consciousness. The idealist affirins the priority of cognitive consciousness and the reality of idea independent of the external world. In other words, the realist posits the existence and reality of the external object independent of our knowledge of it. The idealist posits the reality of an idea because we know the external object and we considered it to be real. The different trends of idealistic thought are-Subjective Idealism, Objective Idealism and Absolute Idealism. Similarly, there are different types of realism, such as Naive Realism and Critical Realism. Materialism would claim its relation to realism. Some contend that realism leads to philosophy of matter and idealism leads to the philosophy of spirit. In Indian thought, Advaita of Sankara, Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu and Sunyavada of Nagarjuna are forms of idealism. Advaita affirms the identity of Atman and Brahman, and the external world as an apVasubandhu states that the world and its modifications are pearance. the forms of vijnana and the real can be described as the alayavijnana

Page #33
12 " A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (store-house of consciousness). Nagarjuna goes further than the Vijnanavadins and Advaitvadins by affirming that everything including the external world, the self and God, is unreal. Even dharma and buddhi are unreal. The real is the sunya. The philosophy of Nagar. juna is intricate in nature and poses problems to understand it. It is difficult to understand the philosophy of Nagarjuna. Some have interpreted the sunya in the absolutist sense of the term. Some others have interpreted the sunya in the nihilist sense as the 'void'. Like the idealist tendencies, we have the realist schools of thought expressed in the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of thought. Sankhya thought may be considered to be realistic in a sense, because it posits the reality of two fundamental principles ---Prakrti and Purusa. In these philosopbies, the empirical as well as the transcendental spiritual reality have been accepted. The Jaina gives the anekanta point of view. It is realistic and empirical in approach to the understanding of reality. A study of Western philosophy shows that in the Fifth century B. C., Parmenides affirmed that real is the Being and not becoming. Being is. In this sense, knowledge and the known are identical. This is the beginning of idealist thought in the West. Socrates was primary a moral philosopher. His main object was to make man good. Plato emphasised the primacy of the spirit. But, he built a structure of philosophy which may be more realistic than idealistic. Plato raised the ideas of Socrates to the metaphysical level and placed them in the world of ideas. Ideas are real, objective, eternal and perfect. They live in the world of ideas. Aristotle was more earthly than Plato. He affirmed that 'Form' and 'Matter' are the two ultimate principles and ultimate realities. Pure Form and pure Matter do not exist in the world, but they are real. The world consists of form and matter. In European philosophy, Descartes is considered to be the father of modern philosophy. He started with the method of doubt and built a philosophy on the soild foundation of mathematics: With him commenced the Rationalist School of Thought in modern pbilosophy. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY (DARSANA) It has been alleged by Western thinkers that Indian philosophy

Page #34
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 13 is pessimistic and because of its emphasis on renunciation and selfdenial, it has lost the status of an academic pursuit and cannot be aptly called philosophy. The primary object of philosophy in India is practical. It aims at freeing man from the bondage of this world which is full of misery. In this, it may be argued that Indian thought is pessimistic. But pessimism in Indian thought is only used as a means and never as an end in itself. In this sense again, all philosophy is pessimistic. If we consider the ultimate end of Indian philosophy, we can say that it is not pessimistic at all, because the aim of Indian thought is to free one from the misery of this .ife and to lea: bim to transcend the misery and to attain the highest bliss. Misery is a fact of life. But the highest bliss is also the fact of experience which can be attained by every one who transcends the misery of this world. This can be achieved by jnana-marga (the path of know ledge), bhakti-marga (the path of devotion), and Karma marga (the path of action). The Jainas affirm ibat the way to self-realisation is the synthesis of right intuition (samyag-darsana), right knowledge (samyag-jnana) and right conduct (samyag-caritra). In this sense, Indian thought is not pessimistic but on the contrary, higbly optimistic. It is melioristic. Indian philosopbers aimed at divination of man. Their main object was to impress upon the people that enjoyment of the pleasures of life should not be the primary end of life. They exhorted the people to give up indulgence in worldly or sensual pleasure and adopt an attitude of renunciation. Whether it was the Advaitavada of sankaracarya, Vigistadvaita of Ramanujacarya, Sunyavada of Nagarjuna, Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu or Ahimsa and Anekantavada of Mahavira, all of them inspired the people of their age to give up enjoyment of pleasures and to adopt the spirit of renunciation and penance. The ultimate object of philosophy, as we have seen earlier, is the attainment of bliss. Bliss is not to be confused with sense-pleasure, nor with happiness of this world. It is pure bliss, which the soul in its pure state can enjoy without any obstruction from the empirical adjuncts of this world because the enjoyment of bliss is the pure state or characteristic of the soul. Pleasures of the world are fleeting and ephemeral ; they lead to misery. The ultimate state of bliss is the pure state which the Indian philosophers stressed. Freedom from misery was considered by some, like the Buddha, as the state of nirvana. Some others, like the Vedantins and also the Jainas, gave a positive

Page #35
14 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY import to the state of perfection expressing pure bliss. They called this moksa. Indian philosophers gave importance to the path of self-denial and rejection of the pleasures of this world not out of the sense of frustration but with the supreme object of the attainment of the highest state of peace and bliss. The outlook of the ancient Indian thought was, therefore, practical and pragmatic. Its aim, as we have said earlier, is to lead men to the highest end of perfection, not of the worldly existence but of the pure nature of the soul. The Indian Weltanschauung' was, therefore, primarily spiritual and the translation of the spiritual attitude to the worldly activity. Thus, the stress in Indian thought is on 'inwardness' which has often been wrongly understood as an emphasis on 'other worldliness'. But it is unjust to regard the Indian attitude towards this world and its people as one of indifference or hatred. Some critics of Indian thought believe that the Indian pursuit of spirituality is a selfish quest and that the saint and the sage are concerned with their own salvation. "This criticism," observes Dr T.M P. Mahadevan, "is the result of a gross misunderstanding of the Indian ideal of spirituality...... God-realisation or self-realisation is a state of perfection where there can be no room for even the least trace of selfishness. For the man of wisdom there is not the distinction of 'mine' and 'not-mine'. He regards the whole world as his household." Thus, in India, philosophy is to be lived and it is not merely an academic pursuit. In the West, philosophy was primarily an academic pursuit to be studied in class-room. Indian seers did not merely get to know the reality, but they experienced the reality and they lived the spirit of reality. Siddhasena Divakara, Dharmakirti, etc., did not toy with the idea of knowing the nature of Truth in the academic sense, but the realisation of the Truth permeated every fibre of their being. Theirs was the realisation of Truth. The Westerner remained in his ivory tower without any conscious effort to translate the truth in everyday life. It remained far from the madding crowd. But the supreme aim of Indian philosophical tradition was the kindly light that led men from untruth to truth, from darkness to 1 Ayam nijah paroveti ganana laghucetsam. Udaracaritanam tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam.

Page #36
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY light and from death to immortality. It has led us from indulgence in worldly pleasures to renunciation of pleasures. It is not merely a piece of antiquarian investigation that Indian thought deserves study. It is of immense value to the student of philosophy and the study of Indian philosophy alone can give a right perspective about the past of India. A study of Indian philosophy will enable us to adopt a balanced view of life and healthy perspective of the situations in life. It is the synthetic vision of India that has made philosophy comprehend several sciences which have become differentiated in modern time." 15 Swami Vivekananda describes India as "the blessed punya-bhumi and as the land from where came the founders of religions from the ancient times, deluging the earth again and again with the pure and perennial waters of spiritual truth."3 Spiritual life is the true genius of India. She has stood like a 'Rock of Ages', and has survived the ravages of time because her civilization, which is inspired by the spiritual insight of holy men, is marked by a certain moral integrity, a fundamental loyalty, a fine balance of individual desires and social demands. It is the emphasis on spiritual freedom as the summum bonum that makes the message of Indian culture supremely significant. to the modern man who is afflicted with the malady of excessive outwardness.4 The men of God have felt that the salvation of India did not lie in imitating the West but in holding fast to Indian ideas and institutions and in purifying and elevating them. Their world-view had an undeniable influence as a practical guide to life, individual and collective national and transcendental." It should be noted that India did make the first attempt to solve the most vital problem, the problem of harmony between life and spirit, of which the vision came to her seers almost at the very dawn of her spiritual history. Besides, the application of moral truths to the facts of social life is the essence of Indian philosophical tradition. 1 Chandogya Upanisad. 2 S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, (Allen & Unwin: London, 1961), Vol. I, p. 31. 3 Swami Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Part III, 1922, p. 105. 4 T.S. Devadoss, Sarvodaya and the Problem of Political Sovereignty, (University of Madras, 1974) p. 9, 5 Ibid., p. 30.

Page #37
Jaina Canonical Literature And Its Development The Jaina pbilosophical literature is classified into five broad divisions, and it is possible on the basis of this division to understand the nature of Jaina philosophical literature from the time of Bhagavan Mahavira--the twenty-fourth Tirthahkara to the present day. The five divisions are as follows: 1. The Age of Agamas." 2. The Age of the Anekanta view. 3. The Age of the establishment of Pramanasastra. 4. The Age of the Neo Nyaya. 5 The Modern Age of collection and editing. H3 THE AGE OF AGAMAS The period of the Agamas may be considered to begin with the time of parinirvana of tirthunkari Mahavira (Vikrama-purva 470) and extended for thousand years. The teachings of Mabavira were collated by the Ganadharas. Mahavira gave the conceptual content of the Jain-sastras (in the form of artharupa) and the same has been presented in the form of literature expressed in language by Ganadharas. These works are called "Sutragama'. The Agama literature is, therefore, of two forms: 1. Arthagama, and 2. Sutragama. The Agama literature has been presented for the sake of the study by Acaryas, and therefore, it has also been called, 'Ganipitakas'. The collection of the teachings of Bhagavan Mahavira has been made into 12 works and has been called Dvadasakgi. They are 1 (1)

Page #38
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 17 Acaranga, (2) Sutrak rtarga, (3) Sthananga, (4) Samavayanga, (5) Bhagavati, (6) Jnatadharmakatha, (7) Upasakadasa, (8) Antak rtdasa, (9) Anuttaraupapatikadasa, (10) Prasnavyakarana, (11) Vipaka, and (12) Drstivada. From the point of view of structure, the Agama literature has been divided into two types : (1) Anga-pravisga and (2) Anangapravista. The collection and systematic arrangements of the original teachings of Bhagvan Mahavira by the Ganadharas are considered as Anga-pravista. The writings of the later elder munis are called Ananga-pravista. The entire canonical literature, except the twelve angas (Dvadasanga), has been called Ananga-pravista. It has al been suggested that literature which comprised the dialogues between Tirthankara Mahavira and his disciples concerning the fundamental questions relating to the triple function of generation or origination,' 'destruction' and 'permanence' of a thing is called "Anga-pravista'. It was on the basis of the teachings of Bhagavan Mahavira that the elder munis wrote works explaining his teachings. These works constitute Ananga-pravista'. The former is the Anga literature and the latter can be considered as sacred literature constituting the fringe of the Anga literature. The twelvefold Dvadasanga occupies the most prominent place in the Jain canonical literature. Dvadasangi is valid by its own inherent nature. It is self-valid. The validity of other canonical writings forming the Ananga-pravista is determined to the extent of its consistency with the contents of the Dvadasanga. Anangapravista is also valid because its statements are consistent with the truths formulated in the Anga literature. Ananga-pravisga Agama literature can again be divided into two types : (a) the writings of the Sthaviras (Elders) and (b) the writings which have come down from the original teachings and from tradition. It is called 'Niryudha'. Niryudha Agamas are extracts from Dvadasangi or Purvas. They are classified as follows : (1) Dasavaikalika (2) the Second Srutaskandha of Acaranga (3) Nisitha (4) Vyavahara (5) Brhatkalpa, and (6) Dasasruta-skandha. Dasavaikalika was preached by Arya Sayyambhava to his son Manaka. The other Agamas were taught by Kevali Bhadrabahu. 1 Sahitya Aur Samskrti, pp. 29-30.

Page #39
18 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Syamarya was the author of Prajnapana. Anuyogadvara was of Arvaraksita and Nandi was written by Devavachak. From the point of view of language, the canonical literature can be classified into two eras : the first era is from 400 B.c. to 100 A.D. The Agamas written during this period have been written in Ardhamagadhi. The second era can be stated to be from 100 A.D. to 500 A.D. and the writings in this period are in Jaina Maharastri Prak rt. In Sthananga and Nandisutra we get two types of division : 1, Anga-pravista and 2. Anga-bahya. We get similar distinctions in the Digambara literature also. Agama literature has been described on the basis of the analogy of purusa, the human personality having different organs. Agama literature has, therefore, been referred to as 'Agama purusa'. Anga-pravista literature was considered as Anga-sthaniya and the twelve sutras were given the status of Upanga (Upanga-sthaniya). As the human body has organs like, two legs, shoulders, neck and the head, similarly the Agama purusa can be considered on that analogy as having organs of this type. The twelve angas are considered to be the organs of the Sruta-purusa and therefore they have been called "Angapravista'. The ears and eyes etc., have been considered as upangas. Similarly, the twelve upangas are mentioned as 'Upangas'. ANGA Acaranga Sutrakrtanga Sthananga Samavayanga Bhagavati Jnatadharmakatha Upasakadasa Antak rtdasa Anuttaraupapatikadasa Prasnavyakarana Vipaka Drstivada UPANGA Aupapatika Rajaprasniya Jivabhigama Prajnapana Jambudvipaprajnapti Suryaprajnapti Candraprajnapti Kalpika Kalpavatamsika Puspika Puspa-culika Vrsnidasa

Page #40
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The term 'Upanga' was first used by Acarya Umasvati in his Tattvartha-bhasya.1 The term 'Chedasutra' was first used in the Avasyakaniryukti? and later in the commentaries (Bhasyas). There are four Chedasutras : (i) Vyavahara., (ii) Brhatkalpa, (iii) Nisitha and (iv) Dasasrutaskandha. The use of the term 'Mula' is of very later date. Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana have been considered to be the 'Mulasutras'. Nandi and Anuyogadvara are the Culika-sutras. In this way, the Angabahya-sruta literature has been classified in different ways from time to time. An elaborate discussion on this question has been given in the work entitled Sahitya aur Samskrti which may be referred to for a detailed study. The canonical literature available today has been scribed by Devardhigani Ksamasramana. Agama literature was not in the written form before this time. In the second century after the Parinirvana of Bhagavan Mahavira, a severe famine struck for over twelve years. Soon after the famine, a Council was organised in which the Agamas were for the first time recited. The second attempt at crystallising the Agamas was made during the period between Vira Nirvana Samvat 827 to 840. Two recitations were held during this periodone at Mathura and the other at Vallabhi. The Council at Mathura was presided over by Arya Skandila and the second Council at Vallabhi was presided over by Acarya Nagarjuna. These recitations have been referred to as Mathuri and Vallabhi recitations. But during all these three recitations the Agamas were not put in writing. The work of writing the Agamas was done in Vallabhi after Vira Nirvana 980 under the guidance of Devardhigaai Ksamasramana. The period upto this were full of obstacles due to effects of many severe famines. Much of the Sruta which had been handed down by oral tradition was forgotten ; but whatever was possible to be revived by memory was recited and written down. The Agamas were collected in fragments. Whatever was available, was systematically organised and presented in the form of Agamic works. 1 2 Tattvartha-bhasya, Tika, p. 23. Avasyaka-niryukti, 777.

Page #41
20 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The present form of Agamas is to be, therefore, traced to the work done by Devardhigani. He collected the Anga and the Angabahya literature and edited them. He is, therefore, considered as the editor of the Agama literature in the present form. Philosophical Discussions in the Agamas +! 4 There is a good deal of philosophical discussion in the Agamas : (i) Sutrakrtanga. (ii) Prajnapana, (iii) Bhagavati, (iv) Nandi, (v) Sthananga, (vi) Samavayanga and (vii) Anuyogadvara. Sutrakrtanga refutes the prevailing philosophical schools of thought. In this work, Naturalistic Monism(Bhutadvaitavada) has been refuted, and the doctrine of separate and independent soul is established. The God and Soul Monism (Brahmadvaitvada) is also refuted. In its place, the doctrine of the plurality of souls is established. The doctrine of karma and its effects have been proved. The theistic concept of God has been rejected. It is established that the world (samsara) is beginningless (anadi) and endless (ananta). Several other theories of philosophy prevailing at that time, like Akriyavada, Vinayavada, Ajnanavada were refuted and the validity of Kriyavada (activism) was propounded. In the Prajnapana we get a detailed discussion about the nature of the soul (jiva) from various points of view. In the Rajaprasaniya, after an elaborate refutation of the atheistic thought, there is an exposition of the Atman and the other world with copious illustrations and expositions of different concepts. In the Bhagavati we get a beautiful study of the topics like, Naya, Pramana, Saptabhangi, and Anekantavada. Nandisutra discusses the nature and types of knowledge. 1 Sri Devardhigaai Ksamasramanena srivirad asityadhikanavasata (980) varse jatena dvadasavarsiya durbhiksavasad bahutarasadhuvyapattau bahusrutavicchittau ca jataya.....bhavyalokopakaraya srutavyaktaye ca srisanghagrahat motavasisgatadakalina sarvasadhun Vallabhyamakarya tanmukhad vicchinnavasistan nyun dhikan trutitaatrutitan agamalapakan anukramena svamatya sarkalayya pustakarudhah krtah. Tato mulato Ganadharabhasitanamapi tatsankalanantaram sarvesamapi Agamanam karta Sri Devardhigani Ksamasramana eva jatah -Samacari sataka.

Page #42
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the Stananga, there is discussion of the important topics like, Atman, Pudgala (matter), Jnana and other topics, In the philosophical doctrines of Mahavira. there are references to Nihnavavada which refers to the single point of approach or view of ekanta. Samavayanga contains discussions on topics like, Jnana, Naya and Pramana etc., etc. The Anuyogadvara has a discussion of the connotation of the term and incidental references to pramana and naya and other principles. In the commentaries (Tikas) of these Agamas we find vivid discussions on philosophical topics. Among the commentators the names of Sanghadasagani and Jinabhadragani are frequently mentioned. They lived in the 7th century of vikrama era. Jinabhadragaai has written an important commentary called Visesavasyakabhasya. Sanghadasagani's Brhatkalpabhasya is a classical work, which contains an exposition of the codes of conduct of sramana from the philosophical as well as argumentative points of view. We cannot easily forget the name of Acarya Haribhadra, a renowned Sansket commentator. He has written his commentary in Sanskst on the basis of the ancient curnis. In these commentaries he has made special use of philosophical discussions. We find the same feature in Malayagiri's commentary ; philosophical discourses have been employed in the work. In the agama literature, prominence has been accorded to epistemological and scientific discussions ; however the philosophical aspects has not received much attention as in religious literature other than the agamas. The primary reason for this is that the agama literature is mainly meant for sadhakas (seekers of truth). For the edification of the sadhakas, there are frequent repititions at many places. These agamic works make special mention of the injunctions regarding the codes of conduct for the sadhakas. But in the later literature, importance has been been given to discussion of philosophical topics. Tattvarthasutra is the most important work of Acarya Umasvati. It is a comprehensive philosophical work which discusses various

Page #43
22 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY subjects including philosophy and science. Here, we find most enlightened discussions of subjects like Philosophy, Ethics, Geography, Cosmology, Natural Philosophy and the karma theory. Acarya Umasvati has also written a commentary (Bhasya) on his TattvarthaSutra. In the 6th century A. D. Acarya Pujyapada has written a commentary on Tattvarthasutra. It is called Sar varthasiddhi. Akalarka and Vidyanandi have also written commentaries on this work. Akalanka's Rajavarttika and Vidyanandi's Slokavarttika are important works. These acaryas belonged to the Digambara tradition. In these works, we get very thought-provoking discussions of the philosophical topics. In the Svetambara tradition, Acarya Siddhasena and Haribhadra have also written commentaries on the Tattvarthasutra. This was in the 8th or 9th century A. D. We find in these works evidence of a distinct development of Jaina logic and philosophy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that just as Dharmakirti's commentary Pramanavarttika on Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya became the centre of the development of Buddhist logic. so also the commentaries on Tattvarthasutra became the central base for the development of Jaina logic. We get important commentaries on Tattvarthasutra in the later period, as for instance, Malayagiri's commentary in the 12th century A. D., Cirantanamuni's in the 14th century A. D. and the commentary of the great logician Yasovijayaji in the 18th century A. D. In addition to these, there are several other writers of the Digambara tradition who have written commentaries on Tattvarthasutra. We have commentaries of Srutasagara and Vibudhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmideva and Abhayanki. In the 20th century also we have several commentaries on the Tattvarthasutra in Hindi and Gujarati languages. The Tattvarthasutra nearly marks the end of agamayuga (age of agamas). ANEKANTA YUGA-AGE OF ANEKANTA In the Buddhist literature in India, the great scholar Nagarjuna, by his intellectual discussions and writings, created a stir in the philosophical climate of his time and he gave impetus to the development of philosophical thought. Nagarjuna's writings are to be found in all fields of Buddhist thought. But his special field was logic and metaphysics. He gave a new turn to the development of logic and metaphysics. Prior to him, philosophy was primarily based on faith 1.3

Page #44
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 23 and its elucidation. But with Nagarjuna we find a new turn to philosophical development which gave emphasis on rational and critical studies. The Sunyavada of Nagarjuna was the turning point for philosophy; and philosophy was brought to a systematic level. This type of intellectual development was not merely restricted to the development of Buddhist thought, but it influenced the development of other systems of Indian philosophy. As a result of this, Jainism was also influenced to some extent with the Nagarjuna's philosophical wave. The great logicians Acarya Siddhasena Divakara and Samantabhadra gave a systematic turn to the development of Jaina Philosophy. This was during the 5th and 6th centuries A. D. These Acaryas brought about a systematic development of the Anekantavada, whose roots could be found in the teachings of Bhagavan Mahavira. On the basis of this study, we can call this age as the age of the establishment of Anekanta doctrine-Anekanta Sthapana Yuga. In this age, we find great scholars like Acarya Siddhasena Divakara, Samantabhadra, Mallavadi, Acarya Singhagani and Acarya Patrakesari who built up Jaina philosophy on rational and logical foundations. During this period of hectic intellectual activity, these Acaryas had triple duties to perform--(1) They had to present Jaina thought in a systematic way on sound logical basis ; (2) To answer effectively the objections and difficulties raised by the Buddhist scholars ; (3) To present the Jaina thought effectively and vigorously by answering the objections of the philosophers of the Vedic school of thought. This period is regarded as the golden age (Svarnima yuga) in the Jaina philosophical literature. In this age, Indian philosophical thought had three prominent theories which were being frequently discussed. They are (i) Sunyavada of Nagarjuna, (ii) Vijnanavada of Vasubandhu and (iii) Advaitavada of Vedanta. Jaina acaryas thought that exposition of Anekantavada and Syadvada, in the face of the three theories prevailing in Indian thought at that time, would give both validity and strength to Jaina philosophy and that Jaina thought could be ably defended with the help of Anekantavada and Syadvada. On this account, this age is considered to be the Anekanta Sthapana yuga or Anekantavadi yuga. H3 PRAMANA SASTRA-VYAVASTHA YUGA According to logic, knowledge of a thing could be established by means of valid sources of knowledge. In Sanskst literature the

Page #45
24 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Pramanasastra became an important subject. In this age Jaina acaryas turned their attention from discussion of anekanta to the pramanasastra. In Indian philosophy we find the influence of rigorous logical discussions of Dignaga on the pramanasastra and Nyayasastra. Dignaga provided inspiration to the development of Indian logic. He was the interpreter of a very strong and systematic theory of logic and pramanasastra. Dignaga was the father of the pramanasastra and Dharmakirti is to be considered as the promoter of Indian logic. The intense and rapid development of logical thought due to the inspiration of Dignaga had its influence on the development of logic in other Darsanas also. In the Vedic tradition, eminent logicians like Vyomasiva, Jayanta, Udyotakara and Kumarila helped the development of logic in a systematic way. During this period (i.e., 8th and 9th centuries A. D.) there were many Jaina acaryas who were great logicians. Among them may be mentioned, the names of Haribhadra and Akalanka. Haribhadra did not write any independent work on Pramanasastra. However his works, Anekanta Jayapataka, Sastravartasamuccaya and Saddarsanasamuccaya influenced the development of Jaina logic to a great extent. Akalanka has given an eloborate and critical discussion of Jaina logic and metaphysics in his works Pramanasangraha, Nyaya-viniscaya and Laghiyastraya. Vidyanandi wrote a commentary entitled Astasahasri, on the work Astasati of Akalanka which was a commentary on Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra. By this work Vidyanandi gave a firm status to the Jaina pramanasastra. During this period Prabhacandra wrote Prameyakamalamartanda and Nyaya-kumudacandra. These works give an elaborate and critical discussion of the Jaina pramanasastra. Vaedidevasuri wrote a commentary on his own work Pramanatattvanayaloka. This commentary is called Syadvadaratnakara and it is really a crest jewel (ratnakara) of Jaina logic. It gives a comprehensive view of Jaina logic. Ratnaprabhasuri, disciple of Vadidevasuri, has written Ratnakaravatarika and in this work he has given the salient features of the problems discussed in Syadvadaratnakara. Acarya Hemacandra has made a unique contribution by his book Pramanamimamsa. Similarly, Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari is a significant contribution to Jaina logic of this age. All these acaryas have given an able and logical refutation of the Dignaga's position concerning Jaina logic. The special feature of the writers of this age is to be found in their twofold object-(i) refutation of the rival schools of thought; and

Page #46
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 25 (ii) presentation of own school of thought in a systematic way. This dual function of refutation and presentation (Khandana-mandana) of the logical discussion is the most important contribution of this age of pramanasastra. AGE OF THE NEO-NYAYA (NAVYA-NYAYA) +3 In the development of the Indian logic, the appearance of the book Tattvacintamani gave a new turn to the development of logic which may be called Neo-logic. The credit for this revolutionary change from logic to Neo-logic goes to a brilliant writer of the 13th century, a Naiyayika, named Gangesa. In Tattvacintamani, the author has used new terminology of logic and written in a new style This work is the most prominent work in the Indian logic and meta physics of this age. Tattvacintamani discusses the naiyayika theory of pramanas mentioning four pramanas beginning with pratyaksa. The language and the style used for discussing logical problems in this work by Gangesa are entirely new. He has discussed the problems which are very terse and purely academic in a language which attracts and appeals even to the common man. Many scholars have written commentaries on Gangesa's Tattvacintamani. Tattvacintamani brought about a new turn in the development of Indian logic. The Buddhist scholars were influenced by this new wave. The Jaina scholars also could not escape from the powerful trend of this thought. The style of navya-nyaya made a profound influence on the Jaina acaryas. The books on Jaina logic were, however, being written in the earlier style and tradition up to the end of the 17th century A. D. It was only in the beginning of the 18th century that Upadhyaya Yasovijaya wrote his work on Nyaya in the navya-nyaya style. His work anekanta vyavastha written in the Neo-nyaya style helped the re-establishment of the Anekantavada. Similarly, Jainatarkabhasya and Jnanabindu were two important contributions to the Jaina pramanasastra. Nayapradipa, Nayarahasya and Nayopadista were important works on nayavada. A commentary on Nayopadesa called Nayamrtatarangini is an important work. An explanatory work on Astasahasri was also written. Similarly, a commentary on Sastravartasamuccaya of Haribhadra was written. It is called Syadvadakalpalata. Several other books like Bhasarahasya, Vadarahasya helped the dual function of refuting the naiyayika logic and presenting the Neo-logic of the Jainas. Apart from Yasovijayji, we find that Yasasvatasagara

Page #47
26 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY and Vimalada sa wrote works on logic in the new style of navya putshua. MODERN AGE--THE AGE OF ECLECTICISM The trend of thought and writing which was started by Yasovijayii continued to influence for over a century. Some scholars did write commentaries and notes on the classical texts on logic ; but there was no substantial change in the trend of thought. There was also no substantial contribution to the development of logic. During the British period, however, a fundamental change took place in the outlook in dealing with the problems of logic and philosophy. But the scientific outlook and the empirical approach towards looking at the philosophical problems became prominent. Very few works in Sanskst and Praket were written during this period. The study of western thought created a profound influence on looking at the problems of Indian philosophy. The ancient Indian literature began to be studied in a new perspective under the influence of western ght. Three important characteristics of the change can be mentioned :-(1) Comparative study of the Indian thought in the light of the western thought ; (2) Collection of and editing ancient classics in the new perspective; and (3) Critical notings on the problems of ancient Indian thought. There was another trend that developed during this period, and that was, to give copious references while editing the works. In the Jaina tradition of writing, the credit of giving new interpretation while editing the ancient texts goes to Pandit Sukhalalji Sanghavi. In his edited works, we find critical notes of these books, a new outlook and profound scholarship. Two more great scholars Pandit Mahendrakumarji Jain and Pandit Dalsukha Malvaniya continued the tradition of Sukhalalji Sanghvi. Professors A. N. Upadhye, Chakravarti and Hiralal Jain have also contributed immensely to the development of Jaina thought by editing many ancient texts with critical notes. At present, many scholars have been writing research articles on the problems of Jaina logic and philosophy. Everyday the work of editing the ancient texts and writing critical papers is fast progressing and it would be difficult to give an exhaustive assessment of the enormous work being turned out in the recent past. Editing and

Page #48
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 27 interpretation are the special features of this age. In this way, we can classify Jaina literature into five divisions, and it is clear that the Jaina literature is most comprehensive in all its aspects-philosophical or otherwise. Every age has something special to contribute to scholarship and literature. The school which absorbs the contributions of the age enhances itself regularly and without pause ; but which does not absorb these contributions becomes static and less prominent. The fundamental value of writing remains constant in all ages. It is only looked from new angles of thought every time. The inner core is the same, but the outer expressions may differ.] JAINISM IN THE AGE OF AGAMAS y 3 The question how the Jaina philosophy was presented in the Agamas cannot be easily answered unless we develop a catholic outlook and a historical sense. As the Upanisadic philosophy developed in greater breadth and depth and more so through the Bhagavadgita, we can say that the development of Jaina philosophy was from the Agamic age to the later stages of logical and critical development. The Agamic thought became broader and richer in depth during the age of Commentaries while the philosophic development became rich and varied at the time of Tattvarthasutra. We have now to see what were the characteristics of Jaina philosophy at the Agama stage of thought. Philosophical problems of the Agamas can be studied under two heads :-(1) Prameya or Jneya (object of knowledge), and (2) Pramana or Jnana (valid sources of knowledge). The former is the ontological and the latter is epistemological in nature. The Jaina Agama literature gives prominence to the discussion of the following problems : (i) Anekanta attitude, (ii) Saptabhangi, (iii) Naya, (iv) Niksepa, (v) Dravya, (vi) Guna, (vii) Paryaya, (viii) Padartha, (ix) Ksetra, (x) 1 Jaina Dar sana (a) Jaina Darsanika Sahitya Ka Simhavalokana-Sri Dalsukha Bhai Malavaniya. (b) Visva Darsana Ki Ruparekha--Pandit Vijaya Muni (c) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha. *

Page #49
28 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Kala and Bhava, (xi) Niscaya and Vyavahara, (xii) Nimitta and Upadana, (xiii) Niyati and Purusartha, (xiv) Karma and its effects, (xv) Acara and Yoga and other subjects. The problems of Jnana and pramana were discussed with reference to the nature and various forms of knowledge exhaustively. Similarly, in the Agama literature, we get a discussion of the various forms of pramanas and their characteristics. Pramana has been classified into : pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect). Similarly, we find that there is a discussion of other pramanas like anumana (inference), upamana (comparison) and sabda pramana (testimony). In the early Agamas we get the interpretation of the term naya as point of view (Adesa) and outlook or attitude (drsti). Similarly, we find the distinction between dravyarthika (substance point of view) and paryayarthika naya (point of view of modifications). The word Pradesarthika naya has also been used for Paryayarthika naya. Discussions from the complete (sakaladesa) and partial (vikaladesa) points of view about the problems of pramana saptabhangi (sevenfold approach to the valid sources of knowledge) and naya saptabhangi (sevenfold points of view) are to be found in the early Agamas. There are also descriptions of the four types of nik sepa. We find a beautiful description of the doctrines of Syadvada and Anekantvada by the dream of a cuckoo. The eternal and the non-eternal nature of Jiva (soul) has been discussed. The problems of logic like, vitanda and jalpa found their way in the discussion in the Agama literature. In this way, by the exhaustive discussion of epistemological and ontological problems the nature and the problems of validity of pramana was presented in the Agama literature in a lucid way. Besides, we get a critical study of the nature of six substances (satdrayya) and nine padarthas (categories). It is clear from this that the Jaina philosophical practices was more developed and mature than the philosophical thought of the Vedic seers. THE PROBLEM OF PRAMEYA (OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OR ONTOLOGY) The terms prameya and jneya have been used as synonyms in sense in the Darsana literature. That which is the object of knowledge is called prameya. "Samyag jnana' (right knowledge) is knowledge and it has for its object the highest reality. That which can be comprehended by knowledge is called joeya. The object of knowledge (Jneya or prameya) whatever it may be, can be known accord

Page #50
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 29 ing to Jainism from different points of view. Jainism affirms that we have to consider the nature of an object from the point of view of anekanta (many-sided approach to understanding of a thing). According to the Jaina history, Bhagavan Mahavira carried on the tradition of Jaina thought from the earlier Tirthankaras without making any material modifications. In epistomological subjects Bhagayan Mahavira taught the distinction between five kinds of knowledge as was taught by the earlier Tirthankaras. Similarly, the doctrines of four nik sepas, seven tattvas, nine padarthas, five astikayas, karma, Gunasthana, lesya and dhyana were taught by Mahavira in the same way in which the previous Tirthankaras like Parsvanatha and all the Tirthankaras have taught. He did not deviate from the earlier path in these respects. But in the case of moral codes Bhagavan Mahavira did introduce some modification in the tradition of Tirthankara Parsvanatha, that he preached the vow of Brahmacarya separately to the four vows preached by Parsvanatha. Though the vow of Brahmacarya, in the tradition of Bhagvan Parsvanatha, was amalgmated in the fourth vow of Aparigraha. We get references about this in the dialogue between Kesi, a follower of Parsvanatha, and Gautama, a disciple of Mahavira. During the Chadmastha stage and soon after the harassment given to him by Sulapani, Bhagvan Mahavira had a dream in which he saw a male cuckoo with varieagated wings. This dream was interpreted to mean that Bhagavan Mahavira would preach the multivalued theory through the Dvadasanga. Later on his disciples went about preaching the doctrine of Anekanta to the followers of Buddha and Nyaya-Vaisesika. Mahavira preached the doctrine of anekanta and he eschewed dogmatic approach to the problems under discussions. In the Sutrak rtanga we get a reference to Bhagavan Mahavira being asked in what terms the monks should talk to the people and to his telling them that they should teach Vibhajjavada. The concept of Vibhajjavada could be better understood, if we study the Jaina as well as the Buddhist literatures. In the Majjhimanikaya we find a reference to Tathagata Buddha answering the question of Subha-Manavaka thus : 'Oh ! Manavaka, I am vaibhajjavadi and not ekamsavadi'. From this, it appears that the Buddha accepted the Jaina concept of Anekantavada which may also be referred to as Vibhajjavada. In fact, Vibhajjavada expresses

Page #51
30 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the spirit of anekanta in the discussion of the problems of things of the world. It would now be necessary to understand the implications of the doctrine of Syadvada. Syadvada is the logical expression of the anekanta spirit in propositional forms. It expresses the possibility of predicating other aspects of the Truth. When one aspect is predicated, a full and comprehensive picture of reality would not be possible. And, therefore, the Syad is prefixed to all the seven predications. Anekanta and Syadvada are the unique and significant contributions of Jainism to the Indian logic. We get descriptions of the concept of dravya (substance) in the Agama literature. We often find three terms : dravya (substance), guna (quality) and paryaya (modification) in these works. Dravya (substance) has qualities (gunas) and the expression of quality is paryaya (modification). The three are inherent, yet differe is primarily a dichotomous division of dravya (substance) into : Jiva (living) and ajiva (non-living) substance or the same can be classified as conscious substance and unconscious substance. There is the six-fold classification of dravya : (i) Jiva (living), (ii) Pudgala (matter), (ii) Dharma (fulcrum of motion), (iv) Adharma (fulcrum of rest), (v) Akasa (space) and (vi) Kala (time). Excepting Kala (time), the other five dravyas are multi-dimensional. Therefore, they are called 'astikaya', a technical word used by the Jainas for describing the substance with multi-dimensions. Kala (time) is uni-dimensional and, therefore, it is not 'astikaya.' Every substance (dravya) has infinite qualities and every quality (guna) expresses itself in infinite modes. We get the description of niksepa in Agama literature. There is detailed analysis of the concept of niksepa in Anuyogadvara. It is not however the work of a Ganadhara. We find a reference in the Sthanangasutra regarding this concept (Sthananga 4 : 299) and by the discussion of 'Sarva' in that work, it is clear that Bhagavan Mahivira himself taught the doctrine of niksepa. This term nik sepa has been very often used but, if the exact connotation of the term is not understood, there would be confusion of thought. Niksepa denotes the method of explaining the exact meaning of a term. Bhagavan Mahavira said that a term can be used in four contexts : (i) nama (its name), (ii) sthapana (its context), (iii) dravya (the object connoting the name) and (iv) bhava (its conceptual meaning). This

Page #52
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 31 concept of niksepa signifying the methodology of use of the term has been discussed in the earliest canonical literature as also in the modern works on logic. In the literature other than the Agamic. there is a new approach to the understanding of this doctrine from the point of view of Neo-logic. Yasovijayaji has given all elaborate discussion of the problem of niksepa along with the other problems of pramana and naya. Agama literature gives an exhaustive study of the concepts of dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. They have been studied from the points of view of intrinsic four-fold distinctions (svacatustaya) and the extrinsic four-fold distinctions (paracatustaya). A thing in its inherent nature (svadravya), in its own place (sva-ksetra), in its own time (svakala) and in its own inherent connotation (svabhava) can be said to have been considered in its fourfold aspects (svacatustaya). A thing can also be considered from the extrinsic points of view which would be described as from the points of view of para-dravya (extrinsic substance), paraksetra (extrinsic place), parakala (extrinsic time) and parabhava (accidental characteristics). We find that the same object can be looked at from different points of view. Consequently, we get different presentations of the nature of the same object. This is due to the differences arising out of the attitude of the person which may consider as subjective, the ability of the person, sources of knowledge of the object, the existing state of the object at a particular place and time. According to the extent of the influences of these factors, the cognition of the object differs. In fact, every moment there are fleeting changes in the subjective and objective factors influencing and determining the nature of the cognition of the object. It would be difficult to present exhaustively the entire canvas of the various factors operating at the time of the cognition of an object. That is the reason why we find enormous diversity in the presentation of the view of different individuals and schools of thought. Keeping this point in view, Bhagavan Mahavira presented the concept of niksepa and emphasised that it is possible to view an object from different fourfold angles : dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. CONCEPT OF PRAMANA There is abundant discussion about the nature of pramana and jnana as epistemological problems. Pramana and jnana have been

Page #53
32 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY considered as the sources of cognising objects. In the Agama literature, we find that there is greater emphasis on the discussion of the topic of jnana than on pramana. We come to know from the Rajaprasniya that the discussion about five-fold division of jnana (knowledge) was there to be found much earlier than of Mahavira's time. In the Agama literature we get discussion of the divisions and subdivisions of knowledge. In the analysis of the doctrine of karma we find a critical study of the distinctions in the Jnanavaraniya karma (karma which obscures knowledge). Similarly, we also find description of the five-fold distinction in knowledge as also the distinctions of Jiva Marganas (distinctions in the varying character of selves) in the Purva literature. Similarly, we have a separate part of the Purva literature called Jnana-pravada which gives an exhaustive discussion about the nature and the five-fold division of knowledge. It is clear from these evidences that the five-fold division of knowledge with their nature and sub-divisions was known to Jaina long before Vardhamana Mahavira, the last of the Tirthankaras. On the basis of the study of Agama literature, we can say that there were three basic divisions in the analysis of the nature of jnana (knowledge)---(i) in the first division, knowledge has been divided into five types, (ii) the second division makes a distinction in knowledge into (a) separate direct (pratyaksa) and (b) indirect (paroksa). Mati and Sruta jnana are considered as paroksa because the self gets the knowledge indirectly through the sense-organs. The sense-organs do not give us direct knowledge as they are impediments to the realisation of cognition by the pure nature of self. Avadhi (clairvoyance), Manahparyava (telepathy) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) are considered as pratyaksa jnana, as the self gets direct knowledge. (iii) In the third division, the sense-knowledge is considered both as pratyaksa and paroksa. Discussion of the nature and types of knowledge in the Agama literature has been so important and extensive that references to the pramanasastra and comparative study of the theory of knowledge in the light of the epistemological problems in other systems of Indian philosophy have been neglected. Writers of Agamas have made a distinction between the samyaktva (right or valid) and mithyatva (wrong or invalid knowledge) on the lines of the distinction between the pramana (valid knowledge) and apramana (invalid knowledge) in other schools of Indian thought. The first three types of knowledgemati (sense knowledge) sruta (indirect and knowledge through other

Page #54
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY sources) and avadhi (clairvoyant knowledge) have their valid and their invalid aspects (kumati, kusruta and kuavadhi). But in the case of the next two types of knowledge, manahparyava (telepathic) and kevala (omniscient knowledge) there is no possibility of invalid form of knowledge. In this way, in describing the various types of knowledge, distinctions have been suggested without using the term invalid knowledge (apramana). 33 There is not much discussion on the concept of pramana in the Agamas, as we get abundant description of the nature and types of jnana (knowledge). The Anuyogadvara and Nandisutra have used the term pramana in a wider sense and have made distinction between (i) indriya pratyaksa (direct cognition through the sense-organs) and (ii) no-indriya-pratyaksa (direct cognition by other sources than the sense-organs). Indriya-pratyaksa has been distinguished into five types based on the five sense-organs. No-indriya-pratyaksa includes avadhi (clairvoyance), manah paryava (telepathy) and kevala (omniscience). In this place the prefix 'no' denotes absence of 'sense-organs.' The three types of knowledge coming under the category of 'noindriya' are cognitions without the help of the sense-organs as directly obtained by the self. Jaina theory makes sense-knowledge as indirect (paroksa). But here it has been considered as pratyaksa in order to correlate the discussion about this problem in the other schools of Indian thought. Anumana (inference) has been distinguished into: (i) purvavat, (ii) sesavat and (iii) drstasadharmyavat, but the distinction of inference as svartha (for one's sake) and parartha) for the sake of others) has not been mentioned. In the Agama and its commentaries we find description of anumana (inference) and its divisions and sub-divisions. There is also a discussion of the constituent proposition of inference as expressed in the syllogism. form of CONCEPT OF NAYA # 3 In the Agama literature we find that there is discussion about naya also which is an aspect of pramana. We get a description of the general nature of naya in Sthanamga, Bhagavati and Anuyogadvara. The terms like drsti and adesa have been used as synonyms of naya. The cognition of a particular aspect of an object out of the varied aspects may be called naya. Many schools of thought present their view-points from a specific point of view. They refuse the view-points of others.

Page #55
34 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY This means of refutation of other points of view is likely to lead to dogmatic and one sided approach to the understanding of the nature of reality. Bhagavan Mabavira said that such one-sided approach to problems is ekanta (one-sided) and perverse. He presented a synoptic approach to the understanding of the problem of reality and that is a many-sided view, anekanta. It is nayavada. Nayavada has also been considered as a drstivada, adegavada and apeksavada. The essence of these concepts is one and the same. We have already discussed about the implications of the naya and its sub-divisions in the last chapter, Naya is a specific point of view, it is a specific method of approach. ing reality and it is the expression of anekanta view. In the Agama sahitya we get a description of the problems of logic according to the contexts. Basic problems of logic and epistemology have been discussed in the Agama literature. Habe POST-AGAMIC JAINISM The Jaina philosophy that developed after the Agama literature and before the systematic preiod may be called post. Agamic Jainism, This presents a systematic development of the philosophical problems of Jainisin including epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. We get here the doctrine of karma, the ethics of Jainas, metaphysical problems, the concept of dravyas and the theory of yoga systematically formulated and discussed. Enormous literature has been written on these topics. Karma-doctrine has been discussed in a brilliant and systematic way in Gommatasara-Karmakandu of Nemicandra and Karmagrantha of Devendrasuri, A systematic study of ethical problems is to be found in Mulacara, Bhagavati Aradhuna, Anagara Dharmamrta, Dharmabindu Prakarana, Yogasastra, Ratnakaranda Sravakacara, Sravakacara of Vasunandi, and sagara-dharmam sta of Pandit Asadhara. The philosophical concepts of Jainism have been ably and critically presented in Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati and the commentary thereon, as also in Dravyasangraha of Nemicandra. Kundakundacarya has presented philosophical problems in his famous works like Pravacanasara, Samayasara, Niyamsara and Pancastikaya. sara. Yogavimsika, Yogasataka, Yagad rstisamuccaya and Yogabindu Prakarana of Haribhadra are representative works of this age. The Acaryas of this age concentrated on the study and discussion of the conceptual aspects of Jainisin.

Page #56
Part II Discussion of Prameya 1. LOKAVADA-COSMOLOGY 2. TATTVAVADA (METAPHYSICS) BACK BONE OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY ATMAVADA-AN ANALYSIS(CONCEPT OF ATMAN) AJT VATATTVA-A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE 3. PUDGALA (MATTER): A STUDY 6. PUNYA AND PAPA--MERIT AND DEMERIT-A STUDY 7. ASRAVATATTVA --PRINCIPLE OF INFLUX OF KARM 4-A STUDY S. SAMVARA ANO NIRJARA--PRIN CIPLES OF STOPPAGE AND DES TRUCTION OF KARMAS-A STUDY 9. BANDHA AND MOKSA-BOND AGE AND LIBERATION--A DISCUSSION

Page #57

Page #58
Lokavada (Cosmology) We see the vast universe before us. Naturally some fundamental questions regarding the orgin and the nature of the universe arise. We ask ourselves the questions: When did the universe originate? Would there be the end of the universe? What are its ultimate principles? Many similar questions may be asked; and answers to these questions have varied according to the philosophical perdilections of different schools of thought. It would be necessary to study these questions in the light of modern researches in philosophy and science. There were discussions on these questions during Mahavira's period. Gautama, the Buddha, considered these questions un-answerable, (avyakrta)1 but Sramana Bhagavan Mahavira has attempted to answer these questions satisfactorily. Bhagavan Mahavira had a disciple called Arya Roha. He asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! Of the Loka and Aloka, is Aloka first and then came Loka?" Mahavira said to Arya Roha thus: Loka and Aloka were both there and will continue to be there. They are beginningless (anadi) and endless (ananta). Both of them are eternal (sasvata) and none of them is later or earlier.2 1 Tathagata Buddha said that the following ten questions are unanswerable--(1) Is the world eternal ? (2) Is it non-eternal ? (3) Has it an end? (4) Is it endless? (5) Are the soul and body one? (6) Are they different ? (7) Does the Tathagata exist after death? (3) Does he not exist after death? (9) Does he exist and not exist after death? (10) Does he neither exist nor not-exist after death ?-Majjhimanikaya, culamalunkya sutta-63; 2 Bhagavati i 1, 6.

Page #59
38 A SOURCB-ROOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE ? We live in this world. The entire cosmus including our world is Loka. It is the stellar universe. Beyond this, is the vast un-limited. This is Aloko. It is beyond and infinite. Therefore, we have the Universe and the beyond, the limited and unlimited, the Loka and Aloka. In the vast unlimited bcyond, in the Aloka, the fundamental substances like Dharma, Adharma, Kala, Pud gala and Jiva have no relevance. They have their relevance and they exist in the Loka, the limited universe. It is also said that the Loka is a cosmos which gives subsistence for the five Astikayas (multi-dimensional substances). In the Uttaradhyayana, the Loka is described as that which sustains jiva and ajiva. 2 The distinction between Loka and Aloka, the limited and the unlimited is an eternal distinction and it was not made at any particular time ; because it is not possible to divide the eternal and the non-eternal on some one principle. Substances (saddravya) are also eternal. Space can be divided but the division is only artificial and is meant for practical purposes. There is no fundamental division in space. Time is the basis of change and this can be considered from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. From the noumenal point of view. time is the basis of the modifications of jiva and ajiva (living and the non-living substances). Time is the fundamental principle which is present in Loka and Aloka. From the phenomenal point of view, time is measured for practical purposes on the basis of the revolutions of the sun and the moon, and this measurement bas relevance only to the human world. Jiva and Pudgala (living substance and matter) are characterised by activity and have their madhyama-parinama (phenomenal activity). The distinction between Laka and Aloka and their limits are to be determined by the Ddarma and the Adharma astikayas. They divide the space into two parts- the limited and the limitless. The limited sustains the universe ; the limitless is the beyond: It is Aloka. In the limitless Alokakasa, the principles of Dharma and Adhurma (motion and rest) do not operate. Therefore, Liva and Pudgala are located in the limited universe (Lokakasa). 1 Bhagavati i 13, 4. 2 Uttaradhyayana : 36, 2.

Page #60
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 39 LOKA AND ALOKA (UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND) H. 3 The Universe (Loka) is bounded and limited, while Aloka, the limitless akasa, is unbounded. It has no boundaries. Lokakasa (bounded space) has innumerable pradesas (asankhyeya pradesa) while the boundless space has infinite pradesas. The universe consists of 14 rajjus, but Aloka (limitless space) cannot be measured at all. In the Bhagavati we get a dialogue between Bhagavan Mahavira and Arya Skandaka. Bhagavan Mahavira said, "The universe is limited with reference to the aspect of matter and also with reference to the measurable space, because the universe occupies a limited portion of space. From the point of view of time, Kala, the universe is endless and eternal because there is no point of time in which the universe does not exist. From the point of view of essence (bhava) and modes (paryaya) the universe is endless, because the modes of substance are endless.1 The great scientist Albert Einstein has given a picture of the four dimensional reality of space and time which comes nearer to the Jaina description of space and time. He says that the universe is limited while the limitless space is unbounded. The universe is limited because matter and energy do not exist beyond the universe. They have no relevance beyond the universe: THE LOCATION OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE BEYOND 193 (LOKA AND ALOKA) The universe is flat at the bottom (vist rta), narrow in the middle and globular on the top like the form of musical instrument 'mrdanga'. Of the three parts one is curved, the second is straight and the third is placed on the top so as to give a shape of a 'mrdanga'. It is said to be of the shape of trisarava samputa'. In other words, It is difficult to give the the shape of the universe is well defined. shape of the Aloka although it is sometimes suggested that it is It is one. Lokakasa has globular in shape. Aloka has no parts. been divided into three parts-(1) the Lower Universe (Adholoka), (2) the Middle Universe (madhyaloka) and (3) the Upper Universe (Urdhvaloka). The universe in all the three parts measures 14 rajjus in length i. e., from the lowest point to the uppermost point. The 1 Bhagavati i 2. 1, 90. 2 Bhagavati 11, 10.

Page #61
A SOURCH-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY upper universe measures little less than seven rajjus, the middle part of the universe measures 1800 yojanas and the lower part of the universe measures a little more than seven rajjus. Akasa is one and indivisibl'. Still, we make a distinction between the Lokakasa and Alokak isa on the basis of the operation of the cosmic principles of Dharma and Adharma (motion and rest). On the basis of the operation of these principles, a division is further made between the lower, middle and the upper part of the universe. In some parts, the two principles are extended and in some others their extension is limited. In the upper part of the universe the two principles of motion and rest are extended and for this reason, the shape of the upper part of the universe is of the shape of the musical instrument 'mrdanga'. The shape of the middle part of the universe is narrow. Its shape is like a curtain without the borders. The lower part of the universe is again extended. Its shape is like the bow attuned. The limitless space (alokakaga) has no substance subsisting in it. Therefore, it has no form and is limitless. The thickness of the limited universe is of seven rajjus. The vastness of the universe is so great that it cannot be easily measured. In order to explain the vastness of the universe, Bhagavan Mahavira made use of an analogical parable. Suppose a god (Deva) is standing on the top of the mount Meru, which is one lakh yojanas in height. Suppose again, that at the foot of the Mount Meru six goddes. ses of directions (dik-kumurikas of East, West, North, South, Up and Down directions) are standing facing the opposite direction of the Mount. Granting that they throw balls of rice of oblation (balipinda). At this point of time, the god starts running, and he catches hold of the balls of rice in the mid air before they touch the ground. This is called fast running (Sighra-gati). The analogy is extended in order to explain the extent of the vastness of the Universe. Suppose again, at the same time a child is born in a merchant's house His span of life is one thousand years. He completes one thousand years of his age. And after him, a son is born with one thousand years of age as bis span of life. In this way, the cycle continues for seven generations i and memory of their family and the status etc., are obliterated from the minds. Still the god continues to run and he 1 Bhagavati , 11, 9.

Page #62
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY does not reach the end of the universe. It may be that he has covered the major portion of the distance of the universe, still the remaining part might measure innumerable' parts (asankhyeya bhaga). Dr. Einstein says that the diameter of the universe can be measured as consisting of one crore and eighty lakhs of light-years. The distance of light year is measurable in terms of the movement of a light-ray in terms of time. A ray of light of the sun travels at a speed of 1,86,000 miles per second. URDHVALOKA (THE UPPER UNIVERSE) 41 1.3 That part of the universe which is 900 yojanas above the world that we live in, is called the upper universe (Urdhvaloka). The gods live in this part of the world. It is therefore called 'Brahmaloka', 'Devaloka', 'Yaksaloka', and 'Svargaloka'.' The uppermost part of this world is called 'Sarvartha-siddhi'. Siddha-gila is situated twelve yojanas above 'Sarvartha-siddha'. It measures 45 lakh yojanas in length and breadth. The circumference of 'Siddhasila' measures a little more than the breadth by three times. In the centre it measures 8 yojanas. It gets narrowed down from all the four sides. It appears like an open umbrella. It is white and pure, like the conch, the pearl and, therefore it is called 'Sita'. Another name for it is Tsatpragbhara'. One yojana above this is end of the universe. In the uppermost one-sixth portion of this one yojana space, the liberated souls reside. 'Lokanta' has been called 'Lokagra' in the Uttaradhyayanasutra.4 The gods are not born of wombs. They are born in a special form and a divine bed called upapat saiyya. They do not suffer premature death. They are extremely brave. They could be classified into four categories on the basis of their residence: (i) 'Bhavanavasi', (ii) 'Vyantara', (iii) 'Jyotiska' and (iv) 'Vaimanika'. The svargas having the status of Indra etc., are considered to be named as Kalpa and the gods taking birth there are referred to as 'kalpotpanna'. Those who are above the Kalpa are called 'Kalpatita'. In this part of the 1 Uttaradhyayana : 19, 8; 18, 29; 5, 24; 14, 41. 2 Uttaradhyayana tika : Acarya Atmarain, p. 1668. 3 Uttaradhyayana 1 36, 57-62. 4 Uttaradhyayana 1 36, 56.

Page #63
42 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPAY heaven there are no distinctions between individual gods in status. They are all equal. They are called 'ahamindra' as they have the same status as Indra. If gods have to descend to the earth where human beings reside, it is only the gods born in the Kalpa who can come down to the earth. The gods residing above the Kalpa does not come to the earth. The 'Bhavanavasi' and the gods residing upto the heaven Esana Kalpa' experience erotic pleasures as human beings does. The gods of the "Sanatkumara' and 'Mahendrakalpa' enjoy sex-pleasures merely by the touch of the bodies of the goddesses. The gods of the Brahma and Lantaka Kalpa get sense-pleasures by the sight of the beautiful bodies of the goddesses. The gods of Maha sukra' and 'Sahasrarakalpa' experience the erotic pleasures by listening to the melodious music of the goddesses. And the gods residing in the *Anata', 'Pranata', 'Arana' and 'Acyuta Kalpa' get sensual satisfaction by the mere memory of their beloved goddesses. The other gods are free from sex-impulses. Lokantika gods are also free from the bonds of sex-instinct. Therefore, they are called 'deva-rsi' (the godsaints). MADHYALOKA (THB MIDDLE UNIVERSE) His The Madhyaloka (the middle universe) measures 1800 yojanas. In the Uttaradhyayana it is referred to as 'Tiryak loka'.' In this part of the universe, there are innumerable islands and seas surrounding each other. In the vast expanse of this part of the universe, it is only two and half islauds (dvipa) where there is habitation of human beings. It is called 'samaya ksetra'.3 The structure of each of these two and half islands is similar in form with only this difference that each gets extended by double. There is the Mount Manusottara' in the centre of the island called "Puskaradvipa', and therefore only half the portion of "Puskaradvipa', is inhabited by human beings. There are seven important divisions in the island called .Jambu-dvipa': (1) Bharata, (2) Haimavata, (3) Hari, (4) Videha, (5) Ramyaka, (6) Hairanyavata and (7) Airavata, 4 Videha ksetra is further divided into two parts: (i) Devakuru and (ii) Uttarakuru i.e., 1 Uttaradhyayana : 36, 50; 36, 54. 2 Tattvarthasutra : 3, 35. : Prang Manusottaranmanusyak. 3 Uttaradhyayana : 36, 7. 4 Tattvarthasutra 3, 10 Bharata-Haimavata-Hari-Videha-Ramyaka Hairanyavata- Airavata ksetrani.

Page #64
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 43 Purvavideha and Uttaravideha respectively. In the Dhatakikhanda dvipa and in Puskarardhadvipa there are double than that of Jambudvipa. All these islands have been divided into three parts on the basis of the functional importance as : (i) Karmabhumi, (ii) Akarmabhumi, and (iii) Antaradvipa.' Karmabhumi' is that part of the "Madhyaloka' in which human beings are engaged in activities like agriculture, commerce, art, architecture etc. In this part, human beings are capable of earning the highest merit (punya) and the most intense demerit (papa). Bharata, Airavata and Mahavidela are karmabhumis. It has been suggested that there is one each of Bharata, Airavata and Mahavideha and two each of the same in Jambudvipa and Dhatakikhanda respectively. Similarly, in Puskarardha Dvipa, there are two Bharata, two Airavata and two Mahavideha countries. In this way there are fifteen Karma-bhumis in the two and a half dvipas (islands).2 All the continents that we have today are covered by a small portion of the Bharataksetra in the Jambudvipa. From this, we can just imagine the vastness of the Madhyaloka and specially the three worlds of the universe. That part of the universe in which there is no need to work for maintenance by following any occupation like agriculture etc., is called 'Akarmabhumi'. In this part, the enjoyment of life is possible without any work. It is also called "Bhoga-bhumi' as there is predominence of enjoyment only. There is constant pleasure in that part, as the gods enjoy life without effort. There are six places of Bh (places of enjoyment) in the Jambudvipa--(i) Haimavata, (ii) Hari, (iii) Ramyaka, (iv) Hairanyavata, (v) Devakuru and (vi) Uttarakuru. In this way, we find that there are double countries in Dhatakikhanda dvipa and Puskarardha dvipa. There are twelve countries in each of the two dvipas i,e, in the Dhatakikhanda dvipa and Puskarardha. dvipa. So, in all, there are thirty Akarmabhumis (lands of pleasure). * Apart from the Karma and Akarma bhumis, there are islands among the seas. They are called 'Antaradvipa. There are twentyeight islands in the 'Lavana samudra', the sea that encircles the Jambu-dvipa alround, and at the fringe of the Himavana Mountain. The islands in the sea are spread over in seven quadrangles (Catuska). 1 Uttaradhyayana : 36, 195-196. 2 Uttaradhyayana i 36, 196.

Page #65
44 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY They can be mentioned in the following order 1-First Quadrangle : Ekoruk, Abhasika, Langulika and Vaibhanika. Second: Hayakarna, Gajakarna, Gokarna and Saskulikarna. Third Adarsamukha, Mesamukha, Hayamukha, and Gajamukha. Fourth Asvamukha, Hastimukha, Simhamukha and Vyaghramukha. Fifth : Asvakarna, Simhakarna, Gajakarna and Karnapravarana. Sixth Ulkamukha, Vidyunmukha, Jivhamukha and Meghamukha. Seventh Ghanadanta, Gudhadanta, Sresthadanta and Suddhadanta. 6 In this way, there are twenty eight 'Antaradvipas' in relation to the 'Sikhari' mountains, and the total of fifty six Antard ipas' (islands) can be mentioned. These are considered to be the places of habitation of human beings. Thus we find the Mid-universe (Madhyaloka) is vast and extensive. Still, compared with the vastness and extensiveness of the Upper Universe, and of the lower, the extension of the Mid-universe amounts to a negligible portions of the two, almost amounting to zero. 1.3 ADHOLOKA (THE LOWER PART OF THE UNIVERSE) The part of the universe which is below the mid-universe is called 'Adho-loka' (the lower Universe). There are seven worlds, one below the other. They are known as seven 'Narakas' (hells). Mostly, the hell-beings reside in these worlds. The measurements of these seven worlds are not uniform. The lower ones are more extensive than the But they immediately preceding upper world in order of succession. are not very close to each other. They are separated by the thick coating of liquid, air, and space.1 Each world has below it the quantity of thick liquid, dense air, thin air and space." The seven worlds of the nether region universe have been named as : i. Ratnaprabha, 2. Sarkaraprabha, 3. Balukaprabha, 4. Pankaprabha, 5. Dhumaprabha, 6. Tamahprabha and 7. Mahatamahprabha. The suffix 'prabhas' to each of the name connotes the characteristic colour of the place. Ratnaprabha has three parts and the upper part has the colour of ratna (diamond). It measures 16,000 It is covered by mud, and yojanas. Just below, is the second part. measures 48,000 yojanas. The third part below, is covered by water, and it measures 80,000 yojanas. Thus the total measurement of the 1 Tattvarthasutra : 3, 1-2. 2 Sarvarthasiddhi 1 3, 1.

Page #66
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 45 extension of Ratnaprabha comes to about 1,80,000 yojanas. From the second to the seventh worlds in the nether universe, there are no parts as we get in the Ratnaprabha. All the matter they have is of the same kind. The second nether world measures 1,32,000 yojanas. The third measures 1,28,000 yojanas. The fourth world extends for 1,20,000 yojanas. The fifth world measures 1,10,000 yojanas. The sixth and the seventh measures 1,16,000 and 1,08,000 yojanas respectively. The thick layer of liquid below the seven nether worlds also varies in quantity and measurements. The beings in hell reside in the different nether worlds just in the middle of each part leaving one thousand yojanas on the upper and the lower parts. For instance, in the Ratnaprabha measuring 1,80,000 yojanas in dimension, the hellish beings reside in the central part leaving aside 1,000 yojanas on the upper and 1,000 yojanas on the lower portions of the world. Similarly, in the other six nether worlds there is habitation of the hellish beings in the central parts leaving aside one thousand yojanas each on the upper and the lower parts of each world. Beings living in these nether worlds are considered to be hellish beings (Naraki Jiva). The lower we go in the stages of the nether worlds, we find beings suffering and infected with ugliness, they are frightful in appearance and nature, and they suffer from various disabilities in increasing degrees. In these places, there are extremes of heat and cold. The residents of these hellish worlds suffer untold misery, though they seek to get some pleasure. Their lot is one of never-ending misery. They see others with extreme anger and with bloodshot eyes. They fight with each other like cats and dogs remembering their animosity in the previous lives. They cut each other mercilessly with their weapons and even with hands, feet and teeth. Their bodies become deformed and cut asunder into pieces. But like mercury, the parts of the body join again and form a whole. The hellish beings suffer indescribable pain when they are subjected to drink hot boiling lead. The devilish gods make them embrace the red-hot iron-bars and force them to climb the trees brimming with sharpest thorns. The devil-gods torturing them are most cruel. They are found to be going upto the first three nether worlds. They 1 Sarvarthasiddhi 1 3, 1.

Page #67
46 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY are technically named as Paramadharmika and are also called 'asuras' (demons). They are very cruel and they get sadistic pleasure in torturing other inmates of hell. The hellish beings are constantly in the grip of suffering and they have no possibility of escape till the expiry the course of their alloted life in the nether world, as they have no possibility of premature death.1 There is the limitless space (Akasa) beyond the boundaries of the universe. The expanse of this universe is so vast that it would not be possible to gauge even the smallest portion of the extensive vastness of this universe by the modern techniques of the modern science.2 LOKASTHITI (THE POSITION OF THE UNIVERSE) n-z Brhadaranyaka Upanisad has a dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Gargeyi regarding the position the universe. Gargeyi wanted to know the fundamental principle of the universe. She asked: What is the ultimate substance of the universe? as Yajnavalkya! It comes from air. Gargeyi: And where does the air come from? Yajnavalkya: It is from space. And space is from Gandharvaloka; Gandharvaloka from Adityaloka (the sun); Adityaloka from Candraloka (the moon); Candraloka from Naksatraloka (the stars); Naksatraloka from devaloka (the heavens); Devaloka from Indraloka (abode of Indra); Indraloka from Prajapati-loka (abode of Prajapati) and Prajapatiloka from Brahmaloka. Gargeyi: And where does the Brahma-loka come from? Yajnavalkya Gargi ! Do not ask such question, otherwise your head will fall down,s In the Jaina philosophy, we do not reach such a situation where one reaches the dead end of intellectual curiosity. Bhagavan Mahavira never flinched from answering any question. He answered all questions and gave full intellectual satisfaction to his disciples. In the 1 Tattvarthasutra: 2, 52; 3, 3-5. 2 Uttaradhyayanasutra--eka Parisilana : p. 61. 3 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad: 3, 6, 1.

Page #68
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 47 Bhagayatisutra, Mahavira has explained the problem of the nature and the ultimate substance of the universel. He said that the basis of the universe could be presented in eight forms : 1. Air is in Akasa. 2. The sea has its basis in the air. 3. The earth is in the sea. 4. The moving and the non-moving beings are on the earth. 5. Ajiva is based on Jiva. 6. Jiva encrusted with karman is dependent on karman. 7. Ajiva is comprehended with the help of Jiva. 8. Jiva comprehends the nature of karman and is covered by karmic particles. The primary elements of the universe are earth, water, air and space. On the basis of these elements, the constitution of the universe is found. The fundamental substances of matter (ajiva) and life (jiva) are inter-related and inter-dependent on each other. Jiva is the support of ajiva, in a sense, and ajiva is dependent on jiva. Karman is the matrix of mundane souls (sarhsari jiva) and jiva gets involved in the wheel of samsara due to the influx of karman. Similarly, body is the abode of the soul. The soul when bound by karmic matter gets embodied and becomes involved in the wheel of life and death. Karman is responsible for the embodiinent of the soul and thereby all the physical activities arise. .? THE THEORY OF CREATION (SRSTIVADA) Considered from the point of view of the end, we can say that the universe is beginningless and endless froin the point of view of substance ; it has a beginning and an end from the point of view of its modes (Paryaya). There are two fundamental substances in the universe : the jiva (living substance) and ajiva (non-living substance) This is the dichotomous division of the substances. Both the sub. stances are beginningless and eternal. There is no relation between them as to the prior and posterior. From the point of view of modifications, the universe is constantly changing. The changes are of | Bhagavati : 1, 6.

Page #69
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY two types i natural and artificial. There are constant changes taking place in the substances by their very nature. But the modification of a mundane being (sarhsari jiva) is due to the encrustations of karman to the soul ; and this is not the natural condition of the soul. In the Vedic philosophy, there are two prominent views of thought : Advaitavada (Non-dualism or Monism) and Dvaitavada (dualism). Regarding the nature of the Universe, Advaita philosophy presents three views : (i) Jadadvaitavada (Naturalistic Monism), (ii) Caitanyadvaitavada (Idealistic Monism) and (iii) Jada-caitanyadvaitavada (Naturalistic and Spiritualistic Monism). The Jadadvaitavada (Naturalistic Monism) maintains that consciousness is a product of matter. It is the by-product of the chemical changes in the body of an individual. It is an epiphenomenon. The Carvaka-Materialism and the Materialism of the modern science hold this view. According to Caitanyadvaitvada, the Brahman is the ultimate reality and the fundamental principle of the universe. The Brahman is transcendent of the three worlds. In the Satupatha Brahmana, it ' has been said that the Brahman is beyond the three worlds. He thought : 'how can I express myself in the three worlds ?' Then He showed himself in the forms of nama and rupa (name and form). Jada-caitanyadvaitvada maintains that the universe is a product of the synthesis of spirit and matter (cetana and acetana). But, the Naturalistic Monists (Jaladvaitavadin) and the Absolute Idealism (Caitanyadvaitavada) do not accept the view presented by the Jadacaitanyavadin because the effect cannot proceed from the cause which is dis simliar. The Naturalistic Monism maintains that the mind arises out of matter, and the Ideal Monistic Idealism maintains that matter is the expression of the spirit. Thus, the Monist does not accept the independent reality of matter and spirit. The priority of cognitive consciousness is the cardinal principle of the Idealist and reality of the objective world independent of consciousness is the assertion of the Realist. Matter is primary for the Materialist and spirit is primary for the Idealist. 1 Satapatha Brahmana 1, 1, 2, 3. Tad dvabhyameva pratyvaida rupena calva namna ca.

Page #70
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY But the Dualist (dvaitavadin) posits the reality of spirit and matter independent of each other. One does not come from the other nor are they subordinate as reality to each other. The universe is the effect of the union of matter and spirit. 49 The Nyaya, Vallesika and Mimamsa systems of thought contend that God brings together the atoms, and the universe is formed. The universe is the creation of such combination of the atoms. This is the union of the spirit and the matter. As the creation of the universe is based on the combination of atom, the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory is called Arambhavada. Sankhya and Yoga philosophies give importance to the concept of Prakrti with three gunas. According to the Sankhya, the evolution of the universe begins when Prakrti comes in contact with Purusa and there is disturbance in the balance of the gunas in the Prakrti. Prakyti is unconscious, Purusa is conscious. Prakrti is unconscious but active while Purusa is inactive. In the presence of the Purusa, disturbance in the three gunas is created and the evolution starts. The need for a Creator God is not felt for explaining the evolution of the universe. The consequent modifications and effect exhibited in the universe are due to the activities of the Prakrti. In the Yoga philosophy, the concept of God is brought, although indirectly, for explaining the process of reality. Therefore, the Yoga system is called theistic Sankhya. The causal theory accepted by the Sankhya-Yoga and the Vedantin is the identity theory of cause and effect. Effect is potentially present in the cause and when the cause expresses itself in the modifications, the effects show themselves. This causal theory of potentiality and actuality, as Aristotle mentions, can be considered in two parts: (i) Gunaparinamavada (expression of the modifications of gunas) and (ii) Brahmaparinamavada (expression of the modifications of the Brahman). Sahkhya philosophy and Madhvacarya accepts the theory of Gunaparinamavada while Visistadaita of Ramanuja advocates the theory of Brahmaparinamavada for explaining the evolution of the universe. They maintain that Prakrti, Jiva and Isvara are the three principles which are real and they are all the expressions of the Brahman. Brahman expresses itself in the aspect of Prakrti and that results in the evolution of the universe. Jainism and Buddhism do not accept the theory of creation. They believe in the theory of modifications (parivartanavada).

Page #71
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Buddhist theory of the world and its evolution depends on the doctrine of pratityasamutpada. The Buddhists advocate the theory of aggregate and continuity and not permanence. In Jaina philosophy, whatever modifications are to be found in the universe, they are to be explained in terms of the combined co-operation of the jiva (living substance) and pudgala. These modifications can be considered into two parts : (i) natural (svabhavika) and (ii) pracitcal (prayogika) or phenomenal. The natural modifications are very subtle. They are not visible to the eyes. But the phenomenal changes are gross (sthula) and they are visible to the eyes. The universe is, therefore, the result of the combined operation of matter and spirit. The Vedic seers were perplexed about the origin of the creation of the universe. In the Nasadiya sukta of the Rgveda, the fundamental question of creation and origin of Creation has been raised. A series of questions have been asked. They are : What is the first principle of the universe ? Who can describe it? How did it originate and what is the cause of varieties in the universe ? Were gods created after the creation of the universe ? Who can explain the origin of this universe ? What is the cause of the creation ? Finally, who created the Creation and who did not? One who knows this, is beyond us, and it is possible that he also does not know.1 The Jaina philosophy is clear about the problem of the universe and its reality. Jainism inaintains that matter does not arise from spirit nor does spirit arise from matter. Both are beginningless and real: BHEDABHEDAVADA (THE DOCTRINE OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE) The problem of identity and difference in explaining the reality has given rise to four schools of thought. One school of thought gives primacy to difference (bheda), and the second gives to non-difference 1.3 1 Rgveda : 10, 129 Nasadiya sukta. Nasadasinnosadasittadani nasidrajo no vyoma paro yat. Ko addha veda ka iha pravocat kuta ajata kuta iyam vis rstih. Arvag deva asya visarjnernaha ko veda mata ababhuva. "Iyam vislstiryata ababhuva yadi va dadhe yadi va na. Yo asyadhyaksah parame vyomantosonga veda yadi va na veda',

Page #72
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 31 or identity (abheda). The third school of thought gives importance to both as of equal reality and the fourth school maintains that there is the qualified distinction of bheda and abheda (bhedavisista-abheda). The school emphasising difference (bhedavada) maintains that nothing is permanent. Everything is changing. Difference is the only reality while oneness or identity is an appearance. Where there is bheda (difference), there is reality. Sautrantika and Vaibhasika schools of Buddhism advocate this theory. Everything is momentary (ksanika). Every moment there is the origination and destruction. Nothing is permanent. Where there is no permanence, there is no non-difference. Jnara and padartha both are momentary. What we call the Atman is merely an aggregate of five skandhas (physical and mental states) : vijnana, vedana, samjna, samskara and rupa. These are the aggregate of the skandhas and what we call the self. 1 This theory is called sanghatavada (the theory of aggregates). This is also the theory of anatmavada and it is also called pudgalanairatmyavada. From the point of time, the theory of self and the world does not express the reality of permanence but only of the stream or a continuity (santana) without anything permanent to continue. We find that all our empirical thinking implies the process of thought leading to the theory of impermanence. The identity and oneness are the expressions of the aggregate or collection, and it is merely with reference to time and space. In fact, things and cognition are different and there is only a stream or continuity of the things and cognitions which are discrete. Change is the fundamental principle of the universe and permanence is only the appearance. The wheel of the chariot moves on one point of axle and also stops with that point. Similarly, every jiva lives in moment as a thought is fleeting, so also the jiva is temporary and fleeting2 The Greek philosopher Heraclitus said that everything is changing and nothing is permanent. Permanence is only appearance, We cannot step into the same river-water twice. Every moment there is change, and change is the very essence of thing. One moment, it is and the next moment, it is not. It does not, however, mean that there is modification of a thing because modification requires a substance to modify but there is no permanent substance. One who 1 Saddarsana samuccaya. 2 Visuddhimaggo,

Page #73
$2 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY trusts his reasons and not the essence knows that everything flies and nothing is. Considered from the rational point of view we can say, impermanence is the essence of reality. David Hume also maintained that permanence is an appearance and change is reality. The illusion of permanence is due to the senses but reason knows that nothing is permanent. Whenever I try to catch 'myself', I stumble upon this or that perception. I do not find myself as permanent substance. Williams James propounded a theory of the stream of consciousness. Every passing thought is itself a thinker.3 Bergson enunciated the doctrine of Elan vital as the very essence of life and the universe. The Elan is the very source of the world and everything is the manifestation of the Elan.4 The abhedavadin affirms that reality is one, and difference is an illusion. The diversity and difference in life are due to our ignorance. The fundamental principle of the universe is one. It is; and the diversifications of the One are only an appearance. This view-point has been presented in the Upanisadas and by the thinkers of the Advaita Vedanta. The Absolutists, as they are called, posit the One as the uitimate reality because that is the consummation and the limit of the gradual process of the synthetic approach. The one is the perfection and duality is imperfection. This is the cardinal principle of the Advaita Vedantu. Vijnanavada and Sunyavada have presented similar points of view. In the Western thought, we get traces of the development of monistic philosophy from the time of Greek thinkers like Permenides. Permenides said that reality is and it does not become. That which becomes, that which changes, is not real. There must be something that changes. It is the eternal principle. It is the one principle which remains the central point of the changes. It is the sat in the language of Indian philosophy and change is the asat. He said, 'Ex nihilo nihil fit.' From the sat, you cannot get another sat, because it is the reality. That which becomes, must come out of that wbich it was not. If it were, it would not become and there is no problem of The illusion of permanence is ascribed to the senses. It is by reason that we arise to the knowledge of the law of becoming." 2 David Hume, Ibid. 3 William James : Principles of Psychology, 4 Bergson, Henry : Creative Evolution. -

Page #74
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 53 diversification of being. Therefore, being is, and all difference, multiplicity and change are mere illusion. As Permenides tried to establish the theory of being, Heraclites attempted to advance the theory of change on similar grounds. Jaina philosophers refuted the argument of those who tried to establish the reality as a change and flux, and established the theory of the reality of the Identity and Difference. The third view presents a theory of identity and difference. According to this theory, identity or oneness is as real as difference and multiplicity. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory, we find that there is equal emphasis on the universal and the particular (samanya and visesa). The substance and its modifications are based on the universality and the differentia of a thing. The universal and the particular are both important, for instance, the concept of cow as a universal, is as much derived from the generality of particulars, as particulars derive their identity from the universality of the universal. Therefore, the universal and particular are both independent and real. This is clear from the example mentioned above regarding the relation of the particular cow to the universal 'cow in general'. This view tries to reconcile the two theories which apparently contradict each other and affirm the reality of the universal or the particular as the case may be. The Syadvadamanjari mentions that the universal and the particular are equally real and complementary to each other and yet different from each other.1 Next, we come to the theory of qualified monistic theory (visistadvaita). There are two forms of this theory. One gives prominence to the unity for the oneness making multiplicity only as an expression of the unity. Ramanuja presented a Qualified Monism in wbich the one expresses itself into the many. The Brahman and the world are real. The soul merges itself into the Brahman as the waters of tbe river merge into the waters of the sea. The triple principle of cit, acit and Tsvara are real. The Reality is one and the self and the world are the expressions of the reality. The world is considered to be the body of Tsvara and Tsvara is the soul of the world. fsvara is, therefore, considered to be the one with the cit and acit as its 1 Syadvadamanjari-7. Ayuta siddhanamadharyadharabhutanarh iha pratyayahetuh sambandhah sa samavayah.

Page #75
54 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY qualified expression. Cit and acit are derived from Ivara as they are the body of Isvara. His philosophy has, therefore, been called Visistadvaita (Qualified Monism). The primacy of unity is recognised and multiplicity is explained as emanating from the unity. the other. The Jainas have made a specific and significant contribution to this problem of the relation between the one and the many. According to the Jainas, the one and the many are equally real and ontological realities. As the multiplicity and difference are the facts of life, so is the unity. However, the two are not separate and independent realities. One implies the other: One cannot be expressed without Where there is difference, there is identity, and where there is identity there is difference. Jaina philosophy co-ordinates both identity and difference. Every object is characterised by the very nature of its generality and particularity (samanya-visesa), identity and difference (bhedabheda) and permanence and change (nityanityatva). Evpry object expresses the generality of its class and particularity of the individual object. It would not be proper to say that an object expresses the substantiality and the unity only, because it also expresses as the inherent characteristic, the particularity and diversity as the form of modification (paryaya). Similarly it would not be correct to consider the unity and oneness an appearance and not real, because modifications are not possible without a permneont object which changes. Similarly, the identity and difference cannot be considered as independent entities because they do not express themselves independently of each other, and there is no third substance which unites them. Therefore, identity and difference should be considered as complementary and as simpling each other, though both are real. A thing can be described as similar, and dis-similar according to the point of view of and the context. Identity and difference are both applicable to a thing. It is identical, as well as, different from the different points of view. For instance, a thing is identical when considered from the point of view of similarity and genus, while it is different, looked at from the context of differentia and other species and individuals belonging to other species. Therefore, to say that identity and unity are real, and difference and change are unreal would be a logical and metaphysical fallacy. Further, identity and 1 Sri Bhasya of Ramanuja 3, 1, 9. "Sarvam paramapurusena sarvatmana,"

Page #76
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY difference cannot also be considered as separate and independent realities. They imply each other. Therefore, it would be apter to say, a thing is characterised by the performance and change, identity and difference. These are categories of judgement. It has, therefore, been said that reality is similar in a particular context kathancit, is dis-similar from another point of view, it is describable from a still different context and indescribable from another point of view. It is real and also not-real considered from different contexts. 1 A thing has all these chasacteristics inherent in it. A thing is permanent and changing, general and particular, similar and different, one and the many and eternal and non-eternal. Aristotle expressed a similar view. A thing is characterised both by generality and particularity. It cannot be comprehended without the categories of generality and particularity, and nothing can exist without the categories of generality and particularity.2 Jaina thought has tried to comperhend the essence of a thing in its complex and comprehensive form. This view is, in a way, the expression of the anekanta point of view. It is possible to predicate contradictory attributes to a thing at the same time on the basis of the point of view (naya) and the contextual reference (niksepa). This is the approach of the Bhedabhedavada, (the theory of identity and difference). The prediction of the attribute of identity and difference at the same time does not nullify the comprehension of the nature of a thing, but it gives a clearer and synthetic picture of the object. Substanes is characterised by permanence and the modes by mutations and change. Substance and modifications are not different. It is the substance that undergoes modifications. They imply each other. DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE) Jainism has presented the six-fold substances. They are: (1) Jiva (living substance or soul), (2) Pudgala (non-living matter), (3) Dharma (principle responsible for the motion in the world), (4) Adharma (principle of rest), (5) Akasa (space) and (6) Kala (time). 1 Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika-25. "Syannasi nityam sadrsam virupam Vacyam na vacyam sadasattadeva". 2 A Critical History of Greek Philosophy-W. T. Stace. 3 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : Jainadharma aur Darsana. 55

Page #77
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Excepting Kala (time), all other substances are called "astikayaso, because they have multi-dimensional forms : while Kala is not considered as 'astikaya', as it has linear dimension only. Time moves in linear dimension. It never looks back. Nor can we measure time in the three dimensional categories. Dharma, Adharmu, Akasa and Kala are indivisible substances. They cannot be divided into parts although Akasa and Kala in their empirical contexts are practically measurable. But they are considered as 'avayavi' in the sense, conceptually they have innumerable points comparable to atoms (paramanus). The Pudgala (matter) alone is divisible. The ultimate indivisible point of Pudgala is an atom (parumanu). It cannot be further divided. When atoms combine they form an aggregate called 'skandha'. The skandha' has as many spacial points as it has atoms. aggregate of two atoms would called 'Dwi-anuka skandha' (two-atomed molecule). The molecule (skundha) consisting of infinite atoms (anantanu) would be characterised by the infinite points of space. Division of the molecule brings back the atoms to their original single atoms. Molecule is not permanent. In this sense, the matter (Pudgala) is divisible. From the point of view of number, jivas are infinite. Looked at from the angle of spacial positions, we could say that jiva is characterised as occupying innumerable pradesas (points of space). Dharma. Adharma and Lokakasa (empirical space) have innumerable pradesas. Dharmo, Adharma, Lokakasa and Jiva occupy equal pradesus (points of space). Kala (time) has no spacial point nor is it considered an atomic substance. As it has not the multi-dimensional spacial characteristic, it cannot to considered an astikaya. It is included in the category of substance (dravya) because it functions as substance and change, in the empirical existence which is always in time. Acaryas have made a distinction in time as : (a) real time and (b) phenomenal time (vyavahara kala). Pancastikayasara mentions that the constant change expresses the real time, while time measured by astronomical phenomena would be considered as phenomenal time (vyavahara kala). It can be considered from another point of view : a point of time in the present is the real time, and the time measuring the past and the future points of time are the phenomenal time. A point of time which has passed cannot come back, and the point of time yet to come is not present at all. Therefore, past and present do not exist; they are only empirical and conventional measurements of time. The division of time into samaya, muhurta, day and night etc., are only

Page #78
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 57 practical and conventional measurements of time. Similarly, the conventional and practical distincition and division in Akasa is considered as measurable space called "Dik' (direction) and it is not an independent substance. The present synthesises the past and the future. The past and the future have their importance on account of the present. Whenever we accept the existence of a thing. we have to admit that it existed in the past and will continue to exist in future. It is not possible to say that the object would exist in original state for all time. It undergoes modifications ; still modifications do not affect the real and substantial nature of the object. In the Tattvarthasutra, dravya (substance) has been defined as that which has undergone modifications, which undergoes and which will continue to do so in future also.1 The real nature of the object remains unchanged in and through all modifications. If it were not so, the substantial nature of the object would not remain and the past and the future changes would not have relation wbatever. The object does express the identity in mcdifications. The substance does imply the reality, Acarya Umasvati says that dravya expresses the attributes of origination, permanence and destruction. He also says that substance is that which has modifications. He has in this connection, used the word paryaya (modification) in the place of utpada (origination) and vyaya (destruction) and the dhrauvya in place of guna. Utpada (origination) and vyaya (destruction) imply the concept of change. Every object has two aspects i identity and difference, permanence and change. Similarly, it exhibits the qualities of similarity and dis-similarity. The core is the permanent nature of the object and that which changes and undergoes modification. We find that the qualities are expressed in modifications. In the substantiality of the object, there is permanence, and in modifications we get change. Permanence and change, therefore, are equally real. The origination and destruction express modifications of the substances, but the substance remains permanent, it is not destroyed. For purposes of explaining this, Umasvati calls it "Tadbhavavyaya'.3 This is the characteristic of permanence. Acarya Kundkunda defines dravya (substance) as that 1 Tattvarthasutra, 5, 29. 2 Tattvarthasutra, 5, 37. 3 Tattvarthasutra, 5, 30.

Page #79
Sg A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 'it is itself'. Aparityakta has the characteristics of origin, continuity and has qualities (utpada, dhrauvya and vyayayukta) and bas modifications (paryaya). 1 In this, we get the real definition of dravya. Pancastikayasara describes the reality in similar way. In this sense, the Jaina thought does not consider reality from one point of view only (ekanta) eternal or non-eternal. It is both eternal in one sense and non-eternal in another sense. It is eternal from the point of view of its essential nature, but non-eternal from the point of view of the modifications (paryayas). By presenting the nature of reality either as eternal in the language of Nyaya-Vaisesika and Vedic thought, or as flux and non-eternal in the language of the Buddbist thought, we would not be giving a comprehensive and synoptic view of reality. It would be one-sided view (ekanta). Therefore, it is necessary to give a synoptic picture of the nature of reality in the manysided approach as the Jainas do. The Reality has to be considered as both eternal and non-eternal; eternal from the point of view of substance and non-eternal from the point of view of modes. An object is, it gets modifications and it is also destroyed. It does not lose its identity in the changes. Change is not mere discrete flow of independent points. It is the thing that changes. Change and permanence are, therefore, equally real. We experience a thing as permanent only when there is substantiality in the changing modes. This theory of the Jainas of identity and change has been compared to the chemical change. In 1789, Lawosier, an eminent scientist, propounded a theory of conservation of matter. According to this theory, matter is constant. Its modifications are only expressions. The modifications do not destroy matter nor do they add to the quantity of matter. Just as the coal when burnt becomes ash, the matter is not altogether destroyed. It is only converted into ash. Similarly, in the universe, oxygen and carbon dioxide are being continuously combined and dis-integrated without ever. affecting quantity of the gas. Nothing 1 Pravacanasara : 2, 3. Apariccattasahavenuppadavvayadhuvattasarjuttarh. Gunavar ca sapajjayar, jam tam davvar ti buccanti. 2 Pancastikayasara, gatha 8. Satta savvapayattha, savissaruva anantapajjaya. Bhanguppadadhuvatta, sappadivakkha havadi ekka.

Page #80
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 59 new comes out, it is only transformation or the modification of matter. For instance, if we keep a metal pot unused for a long time, it gets rusted. But the rust is not a new substance. It is only a chemical action on the matter due to its contact, and it forms as oxy-hydrate. The qualitative aspects of matter gets transformed into its different inodifications due to certain physical and chemical actions. The mass of matter remains constant and there is no change in the essential function and the nature of matter. Similarly, light-energy may be transformed into heat-energy. Magnetic attraction will not anyway fundamentally alter the quantity of matter or energy. They are only paryayas, modifications, without affecting the quantum of matter. The Jainas have affirmed the same point when they say that in the modifications of dravya the quantum of dravya does not change. It expresses itself in different forms. Dravya is eternal, modifications express change without affecting the quantum of dravya. Therefore, dravya is constant in all its modifications. The Sankhya philosophers have propounded a theory of permanence and change (nityanityavada). Purusa is eternal. Prakrti is also eternal, but it expresses itself in the form of its evolutes. The Nyaya-Vaieesika says that atoms and souls are eternal and the objects of the world like a pot and a piece of cloth (Ghata-pata) are non-eternal. The aggregates of the atoms are eternal. But unlike the Jainas, they do not accept the eternity involved in the paryayas also. Patanjali, Kumarila Bhatta; Parthasarathi and others do not accept the functional theory of eternity parinaninityatvavada ; but they accept the concept of the ultimate reality. ? * 1 (a) Patanjala Yogadarsana : "Dravyam nityamak rtiranitya. Suvarnam kadacidak rtya yuktah pinao bhavati, pindak stimupamrdya rucakah kriyante, rucakakrtimupam ydya kajakah kriyante, katakak stimujamydya spustikah kriyante. Punaravrtah suvarna pindah...... Akstiranya canya ca bhavati, dravyar punastadeva. Akrtyupabhedena dravyamevavasisyate. (b) Mimamsa slokavartika : 1-3 p. 619. Vardhamanakabhange, ca rucakah kriyate yada Tadaparvarthinah sokahpraptiscapyuttararthinah. Hemarthinastu madhyastham tasmadvastu trayatmakam. (Contd.)

Page #81
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ) DRAVYA AND PARYAYA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES) The term Dravya has many meanings. In its substantial sense it is eternal (Nitya). It is also used in the sense of a principle. Very often Dravya refers to the universal and paryaya refers to its modes. The concept of the universal bas been considered by the Jainas in two respects : First, the universal in the sense of referring to the jivas. For instance, jivas, whether empirical individuals or the liberated souls, all are considered as jivas. Empirical individuals have their distinctions on the basis of various principles like the place of residence, the number of sense-organs, etc. Liberated souls are the siddhas. They are also jivas. This reference of the univeral (samanya) to the jivas is called tiryak samanya. The second distinction in the meaning of the concept of the universal refers to the verticular distinction of generality. This is called urdhvatasamanya. For instance, an object may undergo modifications, all its modifications are its particulars and the object in its generality is constant. It refers to the universal. The Jiva, from the point of view of substance is the universal referring to the substantiality urdhvatasamanya. Again, if we describe the different stages of jiva in its various forms of existence, It would also be called urdhvatasamanya. Bhagavan Mahavira was once asked by a disciple : How many jiva paryayas (modifications of jiva) are there ? Mahavira said i There are endless forms of jiva paryaya. "How is it?" asked the disciple. Mahavira said : There are innumerable denizens of hell. There are numberless Asurakumaras and Stanitakumaras. There are innumerable earth-bodies and air-bodies (prthvikaya and vayukaya). There are numberless vegetable-bodies (vanaspatikayas). Similarly, there are innumerable two-sense organism and in this order there are innumerable men. There are Vyantara beings. There are innumerable siddha jivas (liberated souls). Therefore, the substance of jiva is infinite in Norpadasthitibhanganamabhave syanmatitrayam. Na nasena vina soko, notpadena vina sukham. Sthitya vina na madhyasthyar, tena samanyanityata. Bhagavati sutra : 7-2-273. Bhagavatt satra 1 7-3-279. 1 2

Page #82
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY its variety of modifications. In this dialogue, we find the expression of a specific form of distinction based on certain criteria. The modifications of the substances of jiva are to be found in infinite forms in this universe. Among the jivas are also included the perfected souls. Therefore, this concept of generality or universality as applied to the jiva may be considered as tiryaksamanya paryaya. So far, we have considered the modifications of jiva at a particular point of time. But there would be infinite varieties of modifications within a span of many points of time. In this sense, a jiva has its infinite variations in point of time and space considered from the point of view of its modifications. While thinking about the various modes of a particular jiva we are looking at it from the point of view urdhvatavisesa (verticular particularity). The description of the different modifications of jiva has reference to generality in the sense that jivas assume various forms. Similarly, denizens of hell can also be described in terms of the various states of existence in hell that they undergo. This type of the infinite variety of existence of the denizens of hell who are of the same nature has been ably described in Prajnapana. One resident of hell is similar in its substantiality with another resident. But considered from the point of view of status, nature, place and time we can make distinction between the different types of hellish beings. From the point of view of the residence, colour, smell, etc., for instance, there are innumerable variations in the complexity of the hellish beings. The distinctions are numerous and various. Therefore, as has been described in the Prajnapana, we can classify the bellish beings into different varieties on the basis of the distinctions in their capacity of understanding and possession of various forms of knowledge like, matijnana, frutajnana and also on the basis of their colour and smell, etc. In this sense, we hav numerous types of denizens of hell. Even considered from their bodily forms, there are innumerable types of the beings. Some are tall, some are very short, measurements beings judged from one 'angula' to five hundred dhanusya. In between there are innumerable varieties. Similar distinctions could be made on the basis of their | 2 Bhagavati sutra 25, 5. Prahapana, 5, 48,

Page #83
62 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY span of life. Therefore, the jivas can be considered from various points of view and can be classified on the basis of different criteria. These distinctions are referred to as urdhvatasamanyasrita visesa (particularity from the cross-sectional point of view). Bhagavati sutra and Prajnapana sutra have given detailed study of jiva from the point of view of substance and also from the point of view of its modes. The changes and modifications imply the distinction of time and the modes and particularity imply the distinction in space. In this sense, words paryaya, visesa, parinama, utpada and vyaya have similar meanings. In the analysis of dravya, these words have been used in various contexts. A question has been asked whether substance and mode are different or identical. The Agama literature has considered the modes as different from substance. It has also been considered in some respects as identical. Bhagavati sutra points out that modes are changing and not eternal and even after the destruction of the mode, the substance remains. Therefore, mode has to be considered different from substance. Otherwise, when modes are destroyed substance also will be destroyed. It implies that substance is not to be considered a s mode and mode is not identical with the substance. The attributes of a substance cannot be destroyed, but its variations and modifications may change. The disciples of Bhagavan Parsvanatha had, presumably, some doubts about the question whether the disciples of Mahavira understood the concepts of samayika. Bhagavan Mahavira said: The soul is samayika, and samayika is the essence of the soul. Here the soul is the substance and the universality and the equality are its essential features. They are expressed in the form of modes. In this sense, the modes are not different from the substance. The soul is identical with its attributes of universality, equality and omniscience. Bhagavati sutra1 and Sthanangaa have mentioned eight types of the jiva or Atman : (1) dravyatma (soul as substance), (2) kasayatma (soul in the affective state), (3) yogatma (the soul as active), (4) upa 1 Bhagavati sutra 12, 10, 466. 2 Sthananga 8,

Page #84
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 63 yogatma (hermic energy of the soul), (5) jnanatma (soul as knowledge) (6) darsanatma (intuitive experience of the soul (7) caritratma (soul as an ethical being) and (8) viryatma (the inherent energy of the soul). These distinctions have been made from the points of view of substance and modifications: The description of soul as a substance has been made from the point of view of substance, and the remaining descriptions of the seven states have been made from the point of view of modifications. The substance (dravya) and modifications (paryaya) are both mutually complementary to each other. One cannot exist without the other. Substance without modifications and similarly modifications without substance, are not possible. Where there is substance, there must be modes (paryayas).1 1 Dr. Mohanlal Mehta : Jainadharma aur Darsana (Hindi) pp. 123-129.

Page #85
Jaina Metaphysics THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES The Indian philosophical literature has made an exhaustive study of the concepts of Tattva (the first principle). Tattva comes from the word tat, and tat is a Sanskrt pronoun. By the suffix of the word tvu it connotes the meaning of this (tasya bhavah tattvam). Tattva, therefore, refers to the first principle. In philosophical literature, there has been a very elaborate and deep study of the concept of the tartva. From the practical point of view, tattva refers to the existing status (vastavika sthiti), the essence (saravastu) and the summary (sararsa) of a thing. In the philosophical thought the common sense point of view of tattva is accepted but transcended and given a richer content from the ultimate point of view. It means the nature of the substance, pure principle or the ultimate principle. In the Vedic literature, Brahman and Paramatma have been referred to as tattva. In the Sankhya thought the first principle of the universe is described as tattva, Different schools of philosophy bave given the description of the tattva from different points of view. But all of them emphasise that the tattva is very important in life. The life and thought are intimately connected with each other, and they cannot be separated. 1 Brhatnayacakra 4. Tattar taha paramatpham davvasahavar taheva paramaparam. Dheyam suddham parama eyatha hunti abhihana. - Tattva, paramartha, dravya svabhava, par-apara, dhyeya, suddha parama - all these are synonyms.

Page #86
65 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY They also emphasise that without the first principles or tattva, the life cannot be dynamic, it would be still. So to isolate the contemplation of the first principles from the process of life could be to deny the reality of the atman. The entire Indian philosophy is based on the study of the first principles. The orthodox systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the concept of ultimate principles according to their philosophical predilections. The Carvaka philosophy has also accepted the first principles. It says that earth (prthvi), water (jala), air (vayu) and fire (agni) are the four ultimate principles of the universe.1 Akasa is not the ultimate principle because it cannot be apprehended by senseexperience, but it can only be known through inference. Vaisesika philosophers first gave six principles : (1) Dravya (substance), (2) Guna (quality), (3) Karma (activity), (4) Samanya (generality), (5) Visesa (particularity) and (6) Samayaya (inherence). Later, the principle of abhava (non-existence) was added. Thus, there are seven fundamental principles of the universe. The Naiyayikas have given 16 principles (padarthas) of the universe. They are: (1) pramana, (2) prameya, (3) sarsaya, (4) prayojana, (5) drstanta, (6) siddhanta, (7) avayava, (8) tarka, (9) nirnaya, (10) vada, (11) jalpa, (12) vitanda, (13) hetvabhava, (14) chala, (15) jati and (16) nigrahasthana. They are primarily logical categories. Samkhya darsana has enunciated 25 principles in the evolution of the universe. They are : prakrti, mahat, aharhkara, panca jnanendriyas (5 sense-organs), panca karmendriyas (5 motor organs), panca tanmatras (5 elements) and panca mahabhutas (5 basic substances) and purusa, the self. Yoga philosophers have accepted the Samkhya enunciation of the 25 principles. Purya Mimarnsa has advocated that the injunctions of the Vedas are primary and they are the first principles. The Advaitavedanta is monistic philosophy and has postulated the first principle of the universe Brahman-all else is its appearance. The Buddha has formulated the 4 noble truths : (1) duhkha (misery), (2) duhkhasamudaya (cause of misery), (?) duhkhanirodha (cessation of misery), (4) duhkha-nirodha-marga (way to the cessation of the misery). In Jaina thought the concept of tattva has been considered from two aspects : (1) saddravya aspect (the six substances) and (2) seven tattvas or nine padarthas. The terms Dravya, Tattva and Padartha are sometime considered as equivalent. 1 Bihaspati : Prthivyapastejovayuriti tattvani.

Page #87
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Hs TERMINOLOGY OF TATTVA In Jaina metaphysics the terms sat, sattva, tattva, tattvartha, artha, padartha and dravya have been used in various contexts as equivalent terms. However, these terms have their variations of uses. Acarya Umasvati in his Tattvarthasutra has used the word tattvartha, sat and dravya in a similar way, in the context to reference to substance. These concepts have only linguistic variations, but there is no difference between the uses of the words conceptually. Acarya Nemicandra has mentioned a dychotomous division of the tattva into jiva and ajiva (living and the non-living) as dravyas. The universe is constituted of these two fundamental substances. The Buddhist philosophers have propounded a theory of the impermanence of things. Everything is transitory, everything is a flux. Therefore, reality is only fleeting and transitory. But Vedantins, on the other hand, have formulated a theory of the absolute as the ultimate truth which is permanent and unchanging. The changing universe is an appearance. In this way, the Buddhists and the Vedantins have approached the theory of reality from their different points of view : one from the synthetic point of view and the other from the momentary point of view. The Jainas say that these two points of view are one-sided, partial and ekanta. To assert their point of view is to commit the fallacy of exclusive "affirmation (ekanta). According to Jainism the reality is comprehensive and complex. Both the synthetic and momentary points of view are partial approaches to the understanding of the real. Both these approaches are partial truths. Because permanence and change are both real and without permanence there is no change. It is the permanent which changes. Therefore, the Jainas believe that they are equally real. We cannot assert exclusive truth in any one of them. Everything in the universe would be permanent if it is looked at from the point of view of substance and it will be a change and impermanent if it is looked at from the point of view of modes. Let us consider, now, the Jaina analysis of the theory of the reality. THE NUMBER OF TATTVAS The question regarding the number of the tattvas has been answered by the Jaipa philosophers in different ways in different contextual references. There are three fundamental approaches to this problem. From the point of view of the cosmic order, it can be said that the universe consists of two fundamental principles :

Page #88
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 67 jiva (living substance) and ajiva (non-living substance). From ontological point of view, with the element of the spiritual considerations, we can say that there are 7 tattvas : Jiva, Ajiva, Asrava, Bandha, Sarnvara, Nirjara and Moksa. If we include the ethical and religious overtones to these considerations, we have nine principles which includes the seven principles mentioned above and two more are added i.e., Papa and Punya. In the philosophical literature there appears to be a general agreement on the usage of the second tradition of the looking at reality from metaphysical and spiritual points of view and they give seven principles. In the Agama literature, the third tradition is used. The Bhagavati?, Prajna pana", Uttaradhyayanasutra: have mentioned nine principles. The Sthananga4 mentioned two-fold classification : Jiva and Ajiva. Acarya Nemicandra has stated in the Dravyasangraha that there are two-fold distinctions in the Tattvas : Jiva and Ajiva on the basis of the Agamas, mentioned above. Acarya Umasvati has included, in the Tattvarthasutra, the principles of Punya (merit) and Papa (demerit) in the principles of Asrava or Bandha and mentioned the seven distinctions of the tattvas (principles).5. Acarya Malayagiri has followed the enunciation the principles as given by Acarya Umasvati, in his commentary on the Prajnapana. THE ORDER OF THE TATTVAS 4.3 A relevant question has been asked as to why the Jiva dravya has been given the first place and other dravyas are mentioned later. The answer to that would be that Jiva dravya is fundamental for the following reasons although other principles are equally important. The essence of Jiva is consciousness. As such, jiva knows, it experiences the modes of Pudgala. It experiences the fruits of good and bad karmas. Each jiva is aware of the tendency of experiencing the pleasure of the world and also it has a craving for the realisation of the self. The principle of ajiva is useful for the soul to realise the highest end of Moksa. It is like the ladder with the help of asaya sar 1 Bhagavati : Abhigama jivajiva uyaladdha punnapava vara nijjara kiriyahigarana bandha mokkha kusala. 2 Prajnapana. 3 Uttaradhyayana, 28, 14. 4 Sthananga, 2. 5 Tattvarthasutra, 1, 4. 6 Prajnapanavetti.

Page #89
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY which, we can ascend to the other floor. It is like the boat by means of which we can cross the ocean of life. Similarly, the external world (ajiva) is a canvas on which the activities of the jiva are to be developed. In this sense, Ajiva is the next category in importance of the seven tattyas. Similarly, jiva in contact with ajiva will bring about the influx of karma (asrava) and bandha (the bondage). The empirical individual (sarsari jiva) experiences merit (punya) and papa (demerit) due to the influx of karma (asrava) and bondage (bandha). Therefore, in some Agamic books, punya and papa have been mentioned before the categories of asrava and bandha; and in some books they have been included after the categories of asrava and bandha. The separation of jiva and pudgala leads to moksa. Samvara and nirjara are the means for the attainment of moksa. When the karmic particles are entirely removed from the jiva, moksa is possible. The order of the principles in many works has been Sarvara, nirjara, bandha and moksa. WS PRESENTATION AND ELABORATION The Acaryas present the philosophical problems to the disciples keeping in view the degree of their capability of understanding the intricacies of the problems. If the disciple is sharp-witted, the presentation becomes brief and sometimes even suggestive. Elaboration in simple language should be necessary to persons who are rather slowwitted. If the seven-fold principles are crystallised in a brief presentation, then the principles are to be expressed in the two-fold distinction of jiva and ajiva, because these two principles incorporate the other five principles in the form of expressions of the jiva and ajiva. The ways of the forms of tattvas are different. Asrava, bandha, punya and papa are principles mainly concerned with ethical and empirical considerations. They are called "samyogi'. But sanyara, nirjara and moksa do not have their eyes towards the worldly attainments. One is based on the secular activity and the other turns towards spiritual salvation. The latter is therefore called "viyogi'. Asrava is the influx of karma into the soul. The soul gets karmic particles encrusted and it is vitiated by the influx of karma. This causes the bondage (bandha). Where there is asrava, there is bandha. The soul gets entangled in the wheel of life and death due to the influx of the karmic particles and vitiating the psychic states of the soul, through passions (kasayas). Auspicious bandha is punya and inauspicious bondage is papa. In this way, the four principles of asrava, bandha,

Page #90
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY sainvara and nirjara are closely associated with the principles of jiva and ajiva. Sarvara is to prevent the influx of karma, and that is possible by stoppage of the inlet of karma, just as we close the inlets of water in a tank for the sake of obstructing the flow of water inside. The function of nirjara is to remove the karma, which is there associated with the soul, just as we remove the accummulated water from the tank for cleaning the tank. When all the karmas is removed, the soul becomes pure and free from karmic tinge. It reaches the state of perfection. The function of the three principles is to remove the karmic particles which are foreign to the soul. * THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES ,H3 (TATTVAS) FROM THE SPIRITUAL POINT OF VIEW The tattvas can be classified into three forms from the spiritual point of view of the tattvas which will be known (jne ya), those that should be discarded and those that should be grasped and accepted. Jiva and ajiva are principles which need to be understood in the proper way (samyagjnana). One who wants to realise himself would have the right knowledge of the principles of jiva and ajiva, otherwise, he would noi be able to develop self-control. For the sake of salvation, one should avoid bandha and samsara. Moksa is to be realised. Sarvara and nirjara are the means for the realisation of moksa. Asraya, punya and papa will bring the bondage (bandha) and they have to be discarded. If the merit (punya) is related to the good activity that leads to self-realisation, it has its functions for the path of realisation. In the chadmastha stage of gunasthana the self is associated with punya along with the realisation of the triple jewels (samyagdarsana, jnana and caritra). In the lower stages there are emotional upsets. Those who are seeking to realise the self, but because they rely on the noble words of the munis and arhantas (tirtharkaras), would attain the state of righteousness. In short, punya considered from a particular point of view (ekanta drsti) may be worthy of being discarded, but from other points of view, it has the characteristics of jneya, heya (to be discarded) and upadeya (to be accepted). In the fourteenth gunasthana, which is the highest stage, punya has also been discarded, because punya (merit) as well as papa (demerit) have no relevance in that stage. From the 11th to 13th stages of gunasthanas, it is only knowable (ineya) and in other gunasthanas, the seeker after truth has need of the punya (merit)

Page #91
10 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY because with the help of the punya he will have tred his way to selfrealisation. In this sense, jiva and ajiva are jneya (worthy to be known); asrava (influx of karma), bandha (bondage) and papa (demerit) are to be discarded and nirjara and moksa are worthy to be pursued. Punya can be considered from various points of view. It is worthy of knowledge (jneya), it is heya (to be discarded) from another view and punya needs to accepted in the earlier stages of self-realisation. It has all the three characteristics. 3 RUPI AND ARUPI (WITH FORM AND THE FORMLESS) Jiva is formless. Moksa is also formless. There are 5 types of ajiva category : Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, Kala and Pudgala. Dharma, adharma, akasa and kala are formless (arupi). Pudgala (matter) has form. The modes of pudgala can be found in the forms of karma, asrava, bandha, punya and papa. Those which have form are characterised by the qualities of varna (colour), gandha (smell) rasa (taste) and sparsa (touch). That which is characterised by the absence of these qualities is formless (arupi). 3 JIVA AND AJIVA The question arise out of the nine principles, how many are jivas (living substances) and how many are ajivas (non-living substances). This question has been considered with reference to principle of samvara, nirjara and moksa. These are expressions of function of jiva. So these are also called jivas. Asrava, bandha, punya and papa are expressions of non-living substances. Hence, these are also called ajivas. Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, Kala and Pudgala are nonliving substances. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WITH REFERENCE TO DRAVYA Jainism makes a two-fold distinction in the study of tattvas as follows: (1) from the point of view of the ontological categories and (2) from the point of view of substances. We have already seen the classification of the substances from the ontological point of view. From the point of view of substance (drayya), tattvas have been classified into two : jiva and ajiva. On the one hand, there is the jiva category and on the others the ajiva. Ajiva has been further classified into different types as : (1) Dharma (principle of motion), (2) Adharma (principle of rest), (3) Akasa (space), (4) Kala (time), and (5) Pudgala H3 CLA

Page #92
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 71 (matter). Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Akasa are called Astikayas because they have three dimensional extensions. Astikaya connotes the characteristic of multi-dimensional extension, but Kala (time) is not considered as astikaya, because it is not multi-dimensional. It has only linear dimension. DRAVYA AND BHAVA (SUBSTANCE AND MODES) # 3 If we want to understand the nature of a thing, we have to consider the nature of the object from the point of view of its substance and its characteristic. Dray ya refers to the original matter and bhava has reference to its modes. Dravya and bhava can be considered from another point of view, i. e., drayya has reference to the material aspect and bhava refers to the psychic state. The seven tattvas can be analysed from the point of view of substance and the modes. The jiva as a substance is eternal, beginningless and endless. This is considered from the point of view of substance. But from the point of view of psychic state, jiva can be considered a substance expressing itself in various psychic ways like desires and other mental activities. Similarly, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa are non-living substances. The modifications are also non-living (ajiva) substances. Punya can be considered from both dravya and bhava points of view and punya affects the soul in its activity and the encrustations of karma. Similarly, papa also has two aspects : the material aspect and the psychic aspect. Jainism considered the various principles from the two fundamental aspects, i. e., from the point of view of material aspect and the psychic point of view. In this way, we get the drayyasrava; and dravyasrava expresses itself in mithyatva (perversity), avrata (violation of vows), pramada (negligence), kasaya (passions) and yoga (activity). In the same way, we have bhavasrava with reference to the same forms of expression like mithyatva, avrata etc. These are psychic states of the self. Samvara can also be considered from the material and psychic points of view. Samvara expresses itself in activities which are wholesome and which are meant to arrest the influx of karma. These activities may be expressed in the forms of practice of vratas, samiti and in three forms of gupti. By means of these activities, the influx of karma can be arrested and the karmic particles are held in abeyance. There is the psychic aspects of sarvara which expresses itself in the psychic states of the self which are helpful for

Page #93
12 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY enabling us to stop the influx of the karmas. Nirjara has two aspects : dravyanirjara which expresses itself in ta pa (austerities) and bhavanirjara which is the psychic foundation for the practice of austerities. The bandha (bondage) has also been considered from two points of view i.e., dravyabandha which is the karmic bondage and bhavabandha which is expressed in the psychic expressions like emotions etc. The highest state of dravyamoksa is a state where all the karmas are removed and bhavamoksa is a state of perfect bliss and perfect peace of atman.

Page #94
Atmavada : An Analysis (Concept of Atman) VARIOUS THEORIES OF SOUL ht: 3 Sutrakartanga discusses different theories of soul.1 Some philosophical theories postulate the ultimate elements as the highest reality of the universe. The earth, water, air, fire and space have been considered to be the ultimate elements of the universe, and soul is a product of the combination of these elements. In the Buddhist literature, we find references to these theories of the soul and there is mention of a theory that the soul as a thing consisted of the four elements excepting space. The Rigvedic seers speculated over the nature of the soul and they were perplexed to discover the real and the ultimate nature of the soul. They asked the question : "Who am I ?" "I do not know." In the philosophic discussions about the nature of the soul, several views have been presented which mention the nature of the soul in the materialistic and the idealistic strain. Some have said that the soul is composition of matter, some identify it with an aspect of praksti, some make the soul the essence of life (prana) and still others give an idealistic picture of the soul as a person (purusa). THE MATERIALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOUL Hos Considered from the historical point of view, the materialistic view of reality is very ancient. We find mention of this view as a 1 Sutrak stanga, 1, 1, 1, 7-8. 2 Sutrak rtanga, 1, 1, 1, 7. Santi panca mahbbhuya ihamegesimahiya. Pudhavi au teu va vau agasa pancaya. 3 Brahmajalasutta. 4 Rigveda-1, 164, 37.--Na va janami yadiva idava idamasmi. .

Page #95
74 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY polimic in the Upanisads, the Buddhist and the Jaina literature. In the Svetasvatara Upanisad, the problem of the ultimate source of the universe has been discussed; and mention has been made the matter is the ultimate source of the universe. In the Brhadaran yaka Upanisad, there is discussion about the ultimate source of the universe. It has been suggested that matter is the ultimate source of the material things, and consciousness in this universe. There is no consciousness in the dead body (na pretyasasjna asti). Jayanta, the Naiyayika philosopher, has suggested that the materialistic theory is to be found in ancient Indian thought in the Carvaka philosophy. In the Visesavas yakabhasya we get references to the materialistic theory of the soul.4 Sutrak rtanga makes mention of the Carvaka theory of soul as the combination of the five physical elements. In the Digghanikaya, there is a discussion of the view of Ajitakesakambalin, who said that the soul is a product of the combination of the four elements except space. It is clear from the discussion of the materialistic theories, that they maintain the view of the soul as a product of the combination of the basic elements and consciousness is also a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. This view is called "Lokayatamata'. This has been criticised by other systems of pbilosophy in India. In the ancient philosophical literature, we also get references to the theory called tajjivatacchariravada as we get the materialistic conception of the soul. In the Upanisads, the theory has not been mentioned in this terminology, but in other philosophical works like Sutrak rtanga,? Visesavasyakabhasyae and Majjhimanikaya we get references of this view. 1 Svetasvatara Upanisad, 1, 2. 2 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 2, 4, 12. 3 Visesavasyakabhasya, gatha 1553. 4 Nyayamanjari-Vijayanagaram series, p. 472. 5 Sutrak rtanga, 1, 1, 17-18. 6 Digghanikaya-Samanna phalasutta. 7 Sutrak rtanga, 2, 9-10 (a) iti padhame purisaja ye tajjivataccharirae tti ahie (b) docce purisajaye pancamahabbhuie tti ahie (c) Sutrak rtanga-nir yukti, gatha 30 8 Visesavasyakabhasya--doubts of Vayubhuti 9 Majjhimanikaya-culamalunk ya sutta

Page #96
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Pandit Sukhalal Sanghvi etc., has suggested that "Bhutacaitanyavada" and "tajjivatacchariravada" are two different theories. If they were identical theories, there would not have been separate mention and separate discussion of these theories.1 Tajjivatacchariravada maintains that body and soul are one. Tathagata Buddha has mentioned this problem as one of the unanswerable questions (avyak rta prasna). In the Sutrakrtanga, we get discussion about this theory. "The soul and the body are one and identical. If they are different, they could have been shown as separate entities as we can show the sword from its case, a nut from the bag and as we can get the butter from the curds, but we cannot show the soul as different from the body.""" These two schools of thought can be found discussed in the ancient Indian philosophical literature. It has been described that the fundamental substance of the universe is constituted of the fundamental elements like the earth, water, air and fire (prrthvi, apah, teja and vayu).3 According to this thought, the consciousness has been described as a product of the combination of the elements.4 Just described. There is no other source except this. Just as we get alcohol from the combination of jaggery and ghataki flowers, so also we get consciousness from the metabolic changes in the body. This type of materialistic theory or epiphenonomical theory of consciousness and also the materialistic theory of reality could be found in the Carvaka philosophers in India and in the Greek philosophers like Thales, Aneximander and Aneximanes. They were monistic materialists. Democratus was a Pluralistic materialist. He propounded the theory of atoms. Similarly, in the Tattvasangraha we get the mention of a theory of Kambalasvatara which mentions that consciousness is only body (kayadeva caitanyam). According to the Tattvasangraha tajjivataccharira is a theory of Kambalasvatara. Digghanikaya mentions the name of Ajitakesakambalin as a propounder of this theory. It is possible that Ajitakesakambalin and Kambalasvatara are the same persons. 75 In the Buddhistic iterature there is a part in the Digghanikaya called payasisutta. In the Jaina literature we have Rajaprasniyasutra. 1 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 77. 2 Sutrak rtanga, Pundarika adhyayana. 3 Tattvopaplavasimha, p.1. 4 Tattvasangrahapanjika, p. 205

Page #97
76 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In both these works there is a similar discussion about the questions of the king Payasi or Pradesi regarding the nature of the soul. The king Payasi did not consider the body and the soul as separate. In order to prove this theory he demonstrated that there is nothing that remains after the destrution of the body after death. He carried some observations in this respect and made some experiments. Perhaps, these were the first primitive forms of experiments. He had asked some persons that they should come and report as to where they were after death, but none came to report to him. He locked a man in a box and sealed it in order to show that after the death of the man, there would be nothing in the box except the body. He cut asunder the limb of the body of the person in order to locate the soul but he could not locate the soul. A youth, for instance, can discharge many arrows with his strength, but a young child cannot do so. This is because the strength is in the body, and if the body is destroyed the energy is also destroyed. Raja Pradesi carried these investigations and was sure that the soul is nothing but the product of the body. Apart from the body there would be no soul. His father was also of the same view. This materialistic conception of the soul as belonging to the organism was discussed in the Upanisads and in some cases it has been supported for the sake of presenting theories to the people of different abilities. In the Chandogya Upanisad, there is a story of Virocana and Indra going to Prajapati for getting a clarification regarding the nature of the atman. Prajapati asked them to look into the pond of water and he said "you are that" i.e.. the body i.e.. the atman. Virocana was satisfied with this view and he went on preaching the materialistic conception of the soul as identical with the body. ATMAN AS PRANA (PRANMAYA ATMA) But Indra had bis doubts. He could not let be convinced of the view that the soul is the body. Then a different view possibly came to his mind that atman is prana (the vital or life force). This view was held by many philosophers. They argued that without this life force, sense-experience would not be possible and sense-organs would not function. Take away the life-force and the sense-organs would be dead. The life force has sometimes been associated with breath because after death, breath would not function. Therefore, 1 Taittiriya Upanisad, 2, 1, 2. 2 Chandogya Upanisad, 9, 9.

Page #98
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 77 atman is the prana and all functions of the life are possible because of atman.1 In the Chandog ya Upanisad it has been said that prana is life force in the universe.?. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad describe that prana is the god of gods3 But Nagasena has refuted the theory of prana as the soul in the Milindapanha. The sense-organs have an important function in the body. Some identify the atman with the sense-organs, but philosophers have criticised this theory of identifying the atman with sense-organs. In the Chandog ya Upanisad also there is a criticism of the theory as the story of Indra and Prajapati continues. In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, it has been said that at death, the sense-organs cease to unction, but prana which is the source of the energy of the senseorgans is not destroyed. Therefore, indriyas function because of the pranas and indriyas have been described as pranas 5 In the Jaina literature, there is the mention of ten pranas (life forces), in which the sense-organs are also included. Vacaspati, while discussing the vaik stika bandha, as accepted by the Samkhya, has suggested that there are views which mention that indriyas are the purusa. These are the views which identify purusa with indriya. They are Indriyatmavadins. In this way, there have been several views which may be considered as materialistic in nature as they identify the atman either with the body or the sense-organs. This is one of the views which is equally important in Indian thought. The materialistic view of the atman as presented by the Carvaka has been recognised as a separate darsana in the current of Indian philosophy. 5 ATMAN AS MIND (MANOMAYA ATMA) It has been observed that the sense-organs do not function in the absence of the mind. The body may remain in a place resting for sometime, but the mind moves about. Therefore, the mind is more important than the sense-organs and some have suggested the theory that mind is the atman. Pandit Dalsukha Malavania says that 1 Tattiriya Upanisad, 2, 2, 3; Kausitaki, 3, 2. 2 Chandog ya Upanisad, 3, 15, 4. 3 Brhadaranyaka, 1, 5, 21. 4 Aimamimarnsa, edt. Dalsukh Malavania, p. 13. 5 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 1, 5, 21. Si mkhyakarika, 44

Page #99
78 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY there was first the view of atman as prana and later came the theory of atman as the mind. Mind is subtler than the sense-organs and the prana. The philosophers do not uniformly agree as to the nature of the mind, whether it is material or immaterial. Some have suggested that the mind is immaterial, but the Naiyayikasa and Vaisesikas3 have considered mind as atomic in nature. It is different from the material substances like earth, water, etc. Samkhya darsana maintains that the mind evolved out of ahamkara before the evolution of the pancabhutas and therefore the mind is subtler than the bhutas (elements). Vaibhasika school of Buddhism maintains that mind is of the nature of vijnana and it is an expression of vijnana.4 Nyaya philosophers have sometimes considered mind as atman5 because mind is different from the body as we make a distinction between the body and soul. Mind is all-pervasive. Mind comprehends all that the sepse-organs grasp. Therefore, mind is considered to be atman and it is not necessary to make a distinction between the atman and mind. 6 Taittiriya Upanisad also says that mind is the atman (anyoantaratina manoma yah).? The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad discusses the nature of the mind from different aspects. Mind is considered to be the highest truth (paramabrahma samrat).8 Shandog ya Upanisad makes mind the Brahman.9 Tejobindu Upanisad describes mind in various ways and gives supreme importance to mind. Mind is the whole universe. Mind is the greatest enemy and due to mind we suffer untold misery. Mind is Kala (time). Mind is sarnkalpa (will). Mind is jiva (soul). Mind is citta (consciousness). Mind is ahamkara (indivi vijnanam yaddhi tan 1 Atmamimamsa, p. 15. 2 Nyayasutra, 3, 2, 61. 3 Vaisesikasutra, 7, 1, 23. 4 Abhidharma Koka-sannamanantaratitan manah. 5 (a) Nyayasutra, 3, 1, 16. (6) Nyayavartika, p. 336. 6 Taittiriya, Up., 2, 3. 7 Brhadaranyaka, Up., 1, 5, 3. 8 Brhadaranyaka, Up., 4, 1, 6. 9 Chandogya, Up., 7, 3, 1,

Page #100
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY duality). Mind is antahkarana (inner sense). Mind is prthvi (the earth). Mind is jala (water). Mind is agni (fire). Mind is pavana (wind). Mind is akasa (space). Mind is sabda (sound). Mind is sparsa (touch). Rupa (form), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and pancakosa (five sheaths) arise out of mind. The states of waking ((jagrti), dream (svapna), and sleep (susupti) are all expressions of the function of the mind. Similarly, the deities of direction (dikpala), vasu, rudra, aditya and others are all forms of mind. In this way, mind is the very source of universe. It is the very essence of the universe. PRAJNATMA-PRAJNANATMA-VIJNANATMA (ATMAN AS PRAJNA AND VIJNANA) 79 The philosopher transcending the speculations of atman as mind, reaches a stage when he finds atman as identical with prajna (psyche). This is the later stage of development of the theory of atman, in the heirarchy of thought. The mind and the sense-organs cannot function in the absence of the psyche (prajna). Prajna is much more important than the sense-organs and the mind." In the Taittriya Upanisad, prajna has been described as antaratma and vijnanatma as manomaya. In the Aitareya Upanisad, prajna is considered as ultimate truth and it is an aspect of Brahman and mind is one of the aspect of the prajna. Prajna and prajnana are considered as identical. The word vijnana is considered a mode of prajna." 1 Tejobindu Up., 5, 98, 104. 2 Kausitaki Up., 3, 6, 7. 3 Taittiriya Up., 2, 4. 4 Aitareya Up., 3, 2. 5 Aitareya Up., 3, 3. 6 Aitareya Up., 3, 2. Vijnana, Prajna and prajnana have the same meaning. In this sense atman is described as vijnanatma, prajnatma and prajnanatma. We have already discussed about the views which have considered mind as material and those views which say that mind is immaterial. Transcending these views we come to a realm of views where atman is considered as psyche and the higher aspect of function of psyche. This is expressed in the self as a cogniser. Cognition by mind is # 3

Page #101
80 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY possible only if there is a cogniser and that is considered to be, according to this theory, the prajna. Indriyas are to be the means of cognising an object by the prajna. We should bear in mind that in Kausitaki Upanisad, the sense-organs and mind have been included in the psyche as the man in the sleeping or in an unconscious state does not cognise anything even if the sense-organs are there because the prajna does not function. Therefore, the functions of these asceceries like the sense-organs and the mind are dependent on the prajna or the psyche. The man gets up from sleep and he get awake and begins to recognise things. Similarly, if a man is reborn, his experience starts. In these cases, the senseorgans begin to operate and get experiences as fire is born from the spark.%. Man begins to get knowledge. The sense-organs, there. fore, are an aspect and function of the prajna.3 Without the association with prajna, sense-organs and the mind cannot function, Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the psyche is distinct from the sense-organs and mind. In the Katha Upanisad,5 we have a description of the grades of reality, one higher than the other. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than mind (manas), mahat (the great) is greater than buddhi, avyakta prakrti (undifferentiated prakrti) is higher than mahat and purusa is the highest of all; because according to Sarkh ya, the mere presence of purusa is sufficient to create disturbance in the equilibrium of the three gunas in the prakrti and then the evolution starts. From this, it is clear that the intellect (Vijnana) is not the characteristic of the attribute of consciousness but it is the attribute of prakrti. From this we can say that in the search for vijnanatma (i.e., atman is identical with the jnana) we arrive at the truth that the atman is consciousness (cetanamaya). The consummation of the hierarchy in experience will be the bliss (ananda) which is the highest point of experience. It is very often suggested that atman is ananda. It is anandamaya. 1 Kausitaki, 3, 8. 2 Ibid., 3, 2. 3 Ibid., 3, 5. 4 Ibid., 3, 7. 5 Katha Up., 1, 3, 10-11.

Page #102
81 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY CIDATMA (ATMAN AS CIT) 6.2 The Indian philosophers have described the different levels of the self in its experiences starting from annamaya to anandmaya. These may be considered as the sheaths of atman. In all these discussions, the outer encrustations of the atman have been described, but the real nature of the atman has not been mentioned. The contemplations and the nature of these aspects of atman have led the philosophers to the conclusion that these different sheaths of atman are also to be considered as the stages or the states of the self ; for instance annamaya atma is the bodily self. It is the instrument of experience. It is like the chariot. The charioteer who drives the chariot is that atman. Without the atman, the bodily functions cannot exist. The body and the self are two different principles. According to the Prasna Upanisad, the prana is an expression of the atman. It arises out of the atman, as the shadow of the man is due to the man, because he is a physical being, so also prana depends on the atman. Therefore, atman and the prana have to be considered as two different entities although prana is an expression of the atman. Kenopanisads makes it clear that atman is distinct from the sense-organs (indriyas) and the mind (manas). In the absence of the atman they cannot function. As the essence of vijnanatma (intellect) is to be found in the anandatma (the bliss). The essence of anandatma (bliss) is in the antaratma, and that is the Brahman. In this sense, the Brahman is the highest reality distinct from the vijnana and ananda. Brahman and the atman are not different, they are identical.5 The names are only different. The Brahman is sometimes described as the highest reality and the Purusa, and it is the ultimate essence (Guohatma) of all that is in the universe. The Katha Upanisad considers Buddhi-vijnana (intellect) as a product of prakrti and there. 1 (a) Maitreyi Up., 2, 3, 4. (b) Katha Up., 1, 3, 3. 2 Prasnopanisad, 3, 3. 3 Kena Upanisad, 1, 4, 6. 4 Taittiriya Up., 2, 6. 5. Mandukya Up., - Sarvam hi etadbrahma ayamatma brahma, 6 Kasha Up., 1, 3, 10-12.

Page #103
82 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY fore, jada (unconscious). It is possible that the seers of the Upanisads were not satisfied with this aspect of vijnana, unconscious principle as an aspect of prakrti and proceeded further to find out the ultimate reality. They realised that the highest reality is the Brahman and Brahman is pure conscious. It is atman and the identity of the Brahman and atman is the consummation of the monistic theory of thought. We have also seen that vijnanatman is not self-luminating (svatahprakasita). It is a product of prakrti, but it gets illumined in the presence of the purusa and pursua is self-illumined. It cognises even intellect also. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, describes atman as the higher reality and says that atman is the cogniser It is aparoksa i.e., it gets direct experience. It grasps the prana. It experiences through the sense-organs like the eyes and ears. It reflects with the mind. It cognises the knowledge. The self is the seer (drasta), the hearer, the thinker and the knower. It is cinmatra (pure conscious). It is illuminating (sarva prakasarupa) and and it is all-shining (jyotisvarupa).5 The first seekers after the knowledge of the atman were concerned with understanding the nature of the atman in materialistic terms. Later the meditation of the atman lead to the conception that the atman is the immaterial and spiritual substance. The atman cannot be grasped by senses. It is possible to know the atman, if we transcend sense-experience and reach the state of the knowledge of the atman through the direct experience of intuition. Deep contemplation on atman is necessary and that is why we find Naciketa went to Yama and sought to know the nature of the self. Yama offerred him the pleasures of the world, but Naciketa was not tempted by the worldly pleasures because his aim was to know the self.6 Maitreyi gave up all wealth that her husband offerred for the sake of 1 Brhadaranyaka, 4, 3, 6-9. Vijnanatma and prajnanaghana (4, 5, 13) are distinct. The former is prak rt and later is Purusa-cetana. 2 Brhadaranyaka, 3, 7, 22. 3 Ibid, 3, 4, 1-2. 4 Ibid, 3, 7, 23; 3, 8, 11. 5 Maitreyi Up., 3, 16, 21. 6 Katha Up., 1, 1, 23-29,

Page #104
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY knowledge of the self.1 Yajnavalkya said that all things of this world, all the animals, all the wealth, the son, the wife and the husband are all because of the atman. It is therefore, necessary to know the atman. We should meditate on the atman.2 PRE-VEDIC TRADITION : SRAMANA CURRENT OF THOUGHT +3 In this way, the discussion about the nature of the atman has been copious and all the theories regarding the nature of the atman have been discussed in the Upanisads. However, before the composition of the Upanisads, there was, in India the Sramana current of thought which was prevailing much before the Aryans came to India. The Sramana current of thought was full developed and had its own philosophy and it was primarily spiritual and secondarily worldly in outlook. This was the pre-vedic and non-vedic current of the thought. But we find that sufficient attention has not been given to the study of the pre-vedic Sramana current of thought, although the prominent conceptions of this current of thought like nirvana and karma and ascetic life have been assimilated in the general stream of Indian thought. 83 JANMANTARAVADA (THEORY OF RE-BIRTH) fal.3 There are many schools of philosophy which advocated the reality of infinite number of individual souls. Each of them presented its thought from a specific point of view. All our activities have their after-effects. These after-effects constitute the karma. The karma has to be exhausted or experienced and there is no escape from it. If it is not possible to exhaust the karma in order to be pure-self in this life, we have to postulate the existence of life after death and a series of life as a consequence of the necessity of explaining the bondage and the destruction of the continuing karma that affects the soul. This has given rise to the theory of rebirth and of the other world. The question was very often asked: 'What would be the nature of the self after the destruction of the body and where would the self go?" On this difficult problem, there 1 Brhadaranyaka Up., 2, 4, 3, 2 Ibid, 4, 5, 6,

Page #105
84 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY have been different theories of philosophy explaining the needs for the postulate of rebirth and the nature of the self in the cycle of birth and death. NATURE OF SOUL ACCORDING TO JAINISM Pandit Sukhalalji says that among those who believe that there are infinite number of independent souls which are all pure and perfect in their original nature the Jaina tradition is first and foremost. Jaina theory of soul is prominent and it has a special contribution to make to the theories of souls propounded in Indian thought. The reasons for this are twofold: (1) Jaina view is based on rationalistic ground and is very much amenable to reason, and (2) The Jaina theory of self has already established itself by the time of the 23rd Tirthaukara Parsvanatha in the 8th century B. C. The theory crystalised during that period has largely remained the same in its But the Buddhist and Vedic theories were of non-self and have undergone major changes in the centuries that went by. core. According to Sramana tradition the nature of soul may be described as follows: +1.3 1. Jiva is beginngless and endless. It has no beginning nor end. It is indestructible. It is eternal. From the point of view of substance the nature of jiva is pure and perfect and the same in all three phases of time-past, present and future. Therefore, it is eternal (nitya). From the point of view of modification jiva is anitya (temporary) because it undergoes various forms of empirical modifications. Therefore jiva is eternal but jiva as an empirical individual is not eternal. 2. Regarding the description of the empirical self (the samsari jiva), we can say though milk and water, sesamum and the oil, and flower and its fragrance are related, as it seems the relation between the soul and body, but really the position of the soul is like a bird in the cage, like the sword in the sheath and like the sugar in a pitcher. The soul can become independent of the body. 3. One of the characteristic of jiva is contraction and expansion, that it pervades the body that it occupies whether big or small. In the body of the elephant, the soul pervades entire body of the elephant and if it is in the body of ant, it pervades the body of the

Page #106
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 85 entire ant. However, this characteristic of pervasion in a body, big or small, does not affect the fundamental nature and the number of pradesas of the soul. 4. As space is formless and as it can be comprehended by its space-giving function, so also jiva is formless, yet we can comprehend the nature of the soul by means of intellect (vijnana). 5. As time is beginningless and indestructible so is jiva which is bginningless and indestructible. 6. As the earth is the very basis of all things, so is jiva which is the basis of knowledge and experience. 7. As space is undiminishing and constant in all the three times, so is jiva which is indestructible, endless and beyond measure. 8. As the gold can get the form of garland, head-dress (crown) ear-rings, ring etc., but still as the substance of the gold is so also the jiva is the same although it wanders about in the wheel of samsara, in the four forms of existence--the heavenly, the human, lower animal and the hellish stage. 9. As the sun spreads its rays and objects illumined and as the sun moves elsewhere at night and the light is not seen so also the soul that exists with a particular body experiences the life in this existence, and as it leaves this body, and enter another, this experience is no more. 10. As the fragrance of saffron and the lotus flower can be experienced by smell and not by sight so also jiva cannot be seen by the eyes yet we can know the existence of the self through the attribute of knowledge. 11. The music of the instrument can be heard but cannot be seen. In the same way, the jiva in its form cannot be seen. We can also understand the nature of the jiva by means of its characteristics and effects. 12. The ghost and the devils can enter the bodies but they cannot be seen. We can only infer the presence of these by the bodily activities. Similarly, we can know that there is self by observing the psycho-physical activities like laughter, pleasure and pain and bodily activities like dances etc. 13. The food we take is transformed into seven basic elements through chemical composition. Similarly, the particles of matter

Page #107
86 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY which are fit to be karmic particle are transformed into karmic particles (karmavargana) which obscure the free function of the soul. 14. Jiva is a source of different forms of energy like knowledge energy (jnanasakti), the energy of the basic power (viryasakti) and will-power (samkalpasakti). 15. Jiva, through its activity in the empirical world, accumulates sarskara (mnemic traces) and through the samskara a suksmasarira (subtle body) constituted of material particles. This is called paudgalikasarira. When the soul gives up one body and enters another in the next life the suksmasarira will be there with it, with the load of mnemic traces of the previous life.? 16. Jiva is formless, but by its accumulated karmas it has acquired a body and through this body it also becomes with form. 17. All jivas have the same qualities and capacity of development. Yet each jiva develops in different ways owing to several factors like the purusartha and other causes. 18. There is nowhere in the world, a place where subtlebodied and gross-bodied souls are not present. 19. Just as the particles of gold are mixed up with the earth in the form of ore, this mixed form of ore has been beginningless. It gets purified and pure gold is extracted with the help of fire. So also the jiva gets purified and reaches the state of perfection through sarvara and ta pasya etc. 20. Just as it is not possible to decide whether the egg is prior or the hen, so also it is not possible to determine the priority or otherwise of jiva and karma. Both of them co-exist from beginning. less time. COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH THE SAMKHYA-YOGA VIEW We have so far discussed the characteristics of jiva from the point of view of Jaina philosophy. We shall now consider the comparative picture of Jaina view with the Samkhya-Yoga view.s 1 Uttaradhyayanasutra, 28, 11. 2 Tattvarthasutra, 2, 26. 3 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 81.

Page #108
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 87 1. Jiva from the Jaina point of view is beginningless and endless and it is characterised by consciousness (cetana rupa). SamkhyaYoga also presents a similar view. 2. According to Jainism, jiva pervades the body that it occupies. It had a characteristic of expansion and contraction according to the size of the body. Therefore, it expresses itself in modes. But according to the Samkhya-Yoga, jiva is all-pervading and in its characteristic of consciousness, there is no possibility of parina. mitya of expressing in the form of modes. 3. According to Jainism there are infinite number of souls and each occupies a particular body. The Samkhya-Yoga tradition also accepts this view.? 4. The Jaina conception of the soul accepts the characteristics of activity and enjoyment (kart stva and bhokt stva) as belonging to the soul. It also says that the pure and the impure forms of attributes are possible due to activity, but the Samkhya-Yoga tradition does not accept the inherent activity of the soul. According to the Sankhya-Yoga, the purusa is passive, but it is conscious. Similarly, experiences and enjoyments and substantiality and attributes are not acceptible to the Samkhya-Yoga.3 5. The Jainas have advocated a theory that jiva acquires in its empirical, existence the mnemic traces (samskaras), which form the subtle body in terms of material particles. This subtle body moves along with the jiva into the next life. In the same way, in the Samkhya-Yoga tradition, purusa itself has no attachments nor the consequential attributes of cetana. It is pure, unattached and it is not directly involved in the activity and the enjoyment. For the sake of explaining the continuity in the future life, the Samkhya-Yoga also posits a subtle body (Suksmasarira) which moves with the soul and which has the characteristic of pervading the body and experiencing the fruits of the karmas. This is pratipurusa In short, as the Jainas maintain the variety of expression of cetana in the empirical form so also the Samkhya-Yoga accepts the subtle modes embodied in the principle of buddhi or linga sarira which is a product of prakrti. 1 Samkhyakarika 10, 1, 17, 2 Ibid, 18 3 Samkh yakarika 19, 20. 4 (a) Samkhyakarika 40. () Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 83.

Page #109
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 6. The Jaina view of the soul is that the soul ls formless. But it appears to have form due to karmic encrustations and the subtle body. But the Samkhya-Yoga thinks that the soul is formless and the forms of the individual soul are due to the subtle and the gross bodies which are products of prakrti. The illusion of a form arises due to the fact that the impressions received through the sense-organs are reflected in the soul and the soul therefore reflects it back. Just as space has no form, yet we, through our reflection, imagine the form of space. Similarly, the soul expresses the relection that give rise to forms.1 7. According to Jainism, the soul is the source of infinite energy, and the energy of knowledge, of will and of power, but in the Samkhya-Yoga we find these forces are attributed not to consciousness which is the essence of the soul, but to the subtle body which is the form of buddhi and buddhi is the product of prakrti.2 88 8. According to Jainism all the jivas have the same capacity and the same energy, but personality distinctions are due to the differences in the purusartha and other causes. In the Samkhya-Yoga also the difference in the personality development are traced to the Suksma sarira which is the form of buddhi and the buddhi is the propuct of prakrti. In its real nature each soul is equal. COMPARISON OF JAINA VIEW WITH NYAYA-VAISESIKA VIEW The Jainas and the Samkhya-Yoga tradition have presented a theory of the soul in which we find the nature of the soul as independent and consciousness. Consciousness is the essence of the soul. Similarly Nyaya-Vaisesika theory has given an independent view of the soul. Nyaya-Vaisesika, like the Samkhya-Yoga, accept the reality of the soul and its independence from the body. Souls are infinite in number and they are beginningless. They are eternal. They are spiritual substances. However, Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accepts the Jaina characteristic of the soul as pervading the body, but it maintains that soul is all-pervasive like the views of the Samkhya.1 The Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accept the characteristic of the expansion and contraction according to the needs of the body that the 1 Samkhyakarika 62. 2 Samkhyakarika 40. 3 Vaisesika Darsana 3, 2, 20; 3, 2, 21. 4 Vaisesika Darsana 7, 1, 22-Vibhavanmahanakasastatha catma. *

Page #110
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 89 soul possesses, but like the Samkhya-Yoga it says that from the substance point of view, the soul is kutastha nityal. However, in some points regarding the characteristic of the soul like the substance, attributes and characteristics, the Nyaya-Yaisesika comes nearer Jaina view. The Sarkhya-Yoga says that soul is consciousness and has no attributes. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika like the Jainas accepts the possibility in the empirical sense. The soul is receptacle of many butes and modes. In the Jaina point of view the soul is considered to be a source of many powers but in the Nyaya-Vaisesika, we do not find this view. However, the psychic states like knowledge, pleasure, pain, will, desire, hatred, dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) are all considered to be the attributes of the soul. These attributes are operative and they exist as long as the body exists. They arise and they are destroyed. However, these qualities are inherent in the psychic states of the jiva as expressed in the jnana and darsana. According to the Jainas the predominent theory is that in the state of perfection jiva is consciousness, and has the characteristic of bliss (ananda) and power (virya) and knowledge (jnana), but in the NyayaVaieesika the consciousness is only an attribute of the soul and as such in the highest state of perfection consciousness cannot exist with the soul. It is analogus to unconscious states. Nor has the soul any other characteristic in the perfect state. The fundamental reason is that the Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accept consciousness as the essence of the soul. It is only a quality, but the view of Jainas and of the Sarkhya-Yoga maintain that consciousness is the essence of the soul and according to them the soul is characterised by consci. ousness. The soul is consciousness. But according to Nyaya-Vaisesika, consciousness is the quality of the soul. Soul has consciousness; and hence in the highest state of perfection, the soul is unconsciousness 1 Prasasta padabhasya, Dravyasadharmya Prakarana "Anasritattvanityattve canyatrava yavidravyebhyah." 2 (a) Vaisesika darsana 3, 2, 4 ; 5, 3, 5; 9, 3, 6. (6) Prasastapadabhasyagata Atmanirupana. 3 (a) Nyayabhasya 1, 22. (b) Introduction to Ganadharavada p. 105, Dalsukha Malavania. (c) Bharatiya Tattvavidya--Pandit Sukhalalji, p. 86.

Page #111
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Nyaya-Veisesika darsana has certain differences in the consideration about the nature of consciousness with the Samkhya-Yoga, as there are some similarities also. Samkhya maintains that self is consciousness, pure and simple, it is self-illuminating. It is free from the modifications like the modes of consciousness which do not really affect the true nature of consciousness. The modes of mental states are due to the reflection of the states in consciousness and in the self. In the highest state of perfection consciousness is free from the states like knowledge and feeling etc., which are mere modes without affecting the consciousness. Similarly, Nyaya-Vaisesika considers consciousness and modes as qualities of the self and self as only a substratum of the qualities. In the highest state, self is free from consciousness. Therefore, in the state of liberation (Mukti), the self is free from any attributes or modes. The same interpretation could be given in the case of Samkhya-Yoga, although the Sarnkhya-Yoga believes that consciousness is the essence of the soul. In this sense, the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of self in the state of liberation could be considered free from any qualities like space (akasa) with this difference that akasa is formless but it belongs to the empirical world. While soul is amurta (formless) but not belonging to the empirical existence (bhautika). There appears to be no difference between the liberated soul and akasa, as there is absence of any quality or mode of consciousness in both. However, akasa is a substance (dravya) and mukta jiva (liberated soul) is endless (ananta). There is only the denominational difference. There is no other difference between akasa and jiva. Nyaya-Vaisesika thought has similarities and differences with the Jaina and Sankhya-Yoga systems of thought. The Jainas maintain that jiva has the inherent characteristics of enjoyment (bhokt stva) and activity (kart rtva). According to the Jaina view, these characteristics are very much present even in the liberated state. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika does not accept the presence of the characteristics of enjoyment (Bhokt rtva) and activity (Kart rtva) in the state of liberation, although they do admit the presence of these characteristics in the empirical state of the jiva. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the states of consciousness like knowledge, will, etc., take their origin and are destroyed when in contact with the body (sarira) and the jiva 1 Sanmatitarka, 3, 55.

Page #112
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY expresses the characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktrtva) and activity (kartrtva) only in relation to the body. In the liberated state these characteristics are absent. In this respect, the Nyaya-Vaisesika comes nearer to the Samkhya conception of self as consciousness. 91 tent. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, the characteristics of enjoyment (bhoktrtva) and activity (kartrtva) of the soul are different in conThe jiva is eternal but is characterised in its very nature by the attributes of enjoyment and activity. The attributes of enjoyment and activity have association with the phenomena of origin and destruction. The jiva expresses modes of knowledge (jnana), will (iccha) and activity (prayatna), and with the presence of these modes the jiva is considered as possessing the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. But in the liberated state, there is the total absence of the modes of knowledge, will and activity and, therefore, the jiva is not characterised by the characteristics of enjoyment and activity. These are totally absent in the liberated state. In this sense, the Nyaya-Vaisesika makes a distinction between the jiva as substance and jiva in the empirical state as expressing the mental modes. From the point of view of ultimate existence jiva is nitya (eternal) but from the empirical point of view, jiva is active and is the enjoyer of the experiences. In this sense, they differ from the Jaina conception of jiva as having the inherent characteristics of enjoyment and activity. The fundamental principle involved would be the consideration of the Nyaya-Vaisesika view that the substance is different from the The Samkhya-Yoga darsana does not accept the presence of attributes in the purusa. Purusa is consciousness, but consciousness is not a quality of jiva as the Nyaya-Vaisesika considers it to be. Consciousness is the essence of purusa and does possesses the attributes. However, in both the systems of thought, the eternity of the soul is established from different stand-points. The Samkhya-Yoga takes the stand that the soul is eternal because it is pure consciousness and the mental states are only modes not connected as essential characteristics of the soul. The Nyaya-Vaisesika considers the soul to be eternal because it is the substance and in this eternal sense as the substratum of qualities. Consciousness and its modes are only qualities of the soul and hence different from the soul. attributes. 1 Nyayavartika, 3, 1, 6.

Page #113
92 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Nyaya-Vaisesika, like the Jainas accept the view that jiva is affected by the auspicious and inauspicious effects of activity through samskara (the mnemic mass). The Jainas maintain that the after-effects are absorbed by the subtle body (the suksma sarira) which is empirical in existence. But the Nyaya-Vaisesika considers the manas as atomic in nature. The jiva being all-pervasive is not able to grasp the knowledge. It is the mind, which is atomic in nature, functions as the instrument of knowledge. The jiva has this atomic mind (paramanu manas) when the jiva gives up one body and takes into another in the succeedining life, takes the other body also. According to the Jainas, it is, the suksma sarira (the subtle body) which goes with soul and enters into the body in the next life. Samkhya-Yoga darsana postulates a suksma-linga-sarira (subtle body) which is the repository of the good and evil and their effects. It has the capacity of pervading the body it occupies. It is this Suksma-linga-sarira which goes along with the pure soul from one body into another in the next life.1 The Nyaya-Vaisesika presents its theory of after-life (punarjanma) in terms of its conception of the atomic view mind (paramanu manas). The Jainas say thal jiva moves into the next life with the suksmasarira with its characteristics of enjoyment and activity. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, as also Samkhya-Yoga, there is no possibility of activity in the pure soul, these are accidental qualities and modes. But in the Nyaya-Vaisesika, we find that there is the conception of the effect of the good and evil on the rise and fall of the states of jiva. It does not accept the Samkhya-Yoga conception of the impact of the good and evil on the Suksma-lingasarira and is only, as the Samkhya-Yoga says that we attribute the direct effect of these characteristics on soul. THE BUDDHIST VIEW OF NATURE OF THE SOUL Inh order to understand the views of the Buddha about the nature of soul, we should analyse the Buddhist view of the concept of non-self in the historical perspective. Prior to the Buddha and during his time, there were two views regarding the nature of the soul: (i) The Atman is eternal and is not 1 (a) Nyayavartika 3, 2, 68. (b) Ganadharavada, p. 121 (Introduction) (c) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 89 (footnote) Pandit Sukhalalji.

Page #114
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 93 affected by any modes of time and empirical adjuncts; (ii) The second view was that the Atman although permanent is affected by the empirical adjuncts. According to first view, the Atman remains pure and perfect, unaffected by any psycho-physical modes in time - past, future and present. The second view, while accepting the Atman as the eternal principle, does accept the possible influences on the nature of the Atman by the empirical modes. Both these views, have one common factor of accepting the conception of Atman as the permanent substance The Buddha was against the views of the eternity tman. What you call self is merely an aggregate of physical and mental states. It is the sanghata (aggregate) of the nama (mental) and the rupa (the physical states). It is nama-rupa. We have seen that the physical and mental states forming the ego (nama-rupa) are constituted of rupa (physical states), sarskara (mnemic mass), samjna (congnition), vedana (affective states) and vijnana (psychic energy). There is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Every moment, there is change. What I am this moment, next moment I am not. This kind of description of the Buddha's view of the soul was considered Anatmavada. It is difficult to say whether he denied the existence of a permanent self as the eternal or whether he refused to accept the empirical personality as a permanent entity. There has been a controversy over this problem. However, it is necessary to note that the basic attitude of the Buddha was 'sarvam Prahak'-everything is fleeting. The Buddha was considered as the "Nairatm yavadin' one who denied the existence of a permanent soul. The Buddha did not however accept the materialistic conception of pul, as constituted if the material elements as presented by the 'lokayata' view. He followed the middle path (madhyama marga). He accepted the concepts of rebirth, (punarjanma), karma, purusartha (fundamental values) and moksa (liberation). In this sense, the Buddha did recognise that the concepts of Atman, jiva and consciousness (cetana) have important place in the system of thought, that he preached. However, it would be a truism to say the schools of philosophy like, the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga and Jainism presented a definite view-point on the concept of the Atman. But Buddhism did not give a definite view of the self. Careful study of the development of Buddhist thought shows that there were five different streams of thought in the Buddhist view of the nature of soul

Page #115
94 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 1. Pudgala-nairatmyavada (materialistic conception of non soul) 2. Pudgalastivada (the materialistic view of the soul) 3. Traikalika dharmavada (theory of elements) and Vartamanika dharmavada (the theory of momentary elements). 4. Dharmanairat nya-nihsvabhavata or Sunyavada (theory of Sunya). 5. Vijnaptimatratavada (theory of consciousess as soul.)1 All these theories have been fundamentally based on the important tenets that the Buddha preached in his conceptions of the four Noble Truths and the eight-fold path. They draw their inspiration from the Buddha's primary concern for freedom, misery and the spiritual values. PUDGALA NAIRATMYAVADA A. In the Tripitakas there is the mention of the clear view that atman is merely an aggregate of the skandha of physical and mental states. The mental states are constituted of vedana (feeling), samjna (congnition), samskara (mnemic mass) and vijnana (the psychic energy). These undergo modifications and the chain of modification is called sanghata. It is the flow of the modes of mental phenomena. All these are called nama. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad3 mentions the term namarupa and there, it is suggested that the very nature of the principle expresses its nature and its modes. According to Buddha, however, there is no basic principle like nama-rupa and rupa-nama are the expressions of physical and psychic states. The Buddha says that there is a constant flow of the mental states like the vedana, samjna, and vijnana. For this flow, there is neither the beginning nor the end. This is based upon and centred round the conception of the pudgala and therefore it is called nairatmyavada. 1 Refer for the three views of Buddhistic Metaphysics-Buddhist Logic, Vol. 1, pp. 3-14, also Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 26. 2 Visuddhimaggo-khandhaniddesa, 14. 3 Brhadaranyaka Up., 1, 4, 7.-tadvedam tarhya vyak rtamasit tannamarupabhyameva vyakriyata.

Page #116
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 4.3 PUDGALASTIVADA The Buddhist sangha was against the conception of the permanence of the soul and the philosopher refuted the argument for the conception of the permanence of the soul, but after sometime those who believed in the permanence of the soul coming from the Brahmanic tradition joined the Buddhist sangha. They gave a new orientation to the Buddhist conception of nairatmyavada in the light of their original predilections of the sasvata atmavada. They based their conception on the materialistic theory of the self. Kathavatthu and Tattvasangraha have mentioned this kind of a theory of the permanence of the soul as a polemic against the Buddhist view of atmavada.1 These pudgalvadins maintain that the jiva is of a material nature. When they were asked whether the jiva has form like the material objects they were not able to accept this view. The Pudgalastivada entered the Buddhist sangha but as it was not consistent with the main concept of the Buddhist view as expressed in the atmavada, this theory lost its importance and remained only in name. 11 3 TRAIKALIKA DHARMAVADA & VARTMANIKA DHARMAVADA 95 The Pudgalaniratmyavadins had to perform a two-fold function: (1) It had to defend itself against the atmavadins and to show that there is no permanent self. (ii) Yet this theory had to accommodate the conception of the rebirth, bandha (bondage) and moska (liberation). This gave rise to the theory of sarvastivada. According to this theory, the mental states designed as nama were referred to as 'citta' and it expresses itself in vedana, samjna, samskara and vijnana. These constitute the aggregate and the aggregate is in flux. These are included as dharma (elements). This theory had to defend on the basic stand of ksanikavada. Accordingly, the sarvastivadins presented the modes of 'citta' as flowing in three durations of time and presented the traikalikata 2 But there appeared to be 1 Abhidharmadipa & notes, p. 254 ff. (a) kah punaratra samyujyate? (p. 254),...paudgalisyapi avyakrtavastuvadinah pudgaloapi dravyatoastiti (p. 258)...nagnatapakse prakseptavyah (p. 259). (b) Tattvasan graha, karika 336. 2 (a) Tattvasangraha me Traikalika Pariksa, karika 1786, p. 503. (b) Abhidharmdipa-tippana sahita karika 299, p. 250.

Page #117
96 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY inconsistency with the original Buddhist conception of reality as impermanent and fleeting and is consigned to present only (vartamanika). By introducing the conception of vartmanika to the moments of the present. The efforts to reconcile these views gave rise to the theory of sautrantikavada. The sautrantikavada accepted the sarvastivada conception of "citta' (mental) and caitasika (mental states). But they made them referring to the present moments only (vartumanika). In this way, they tried to make the reality a flux, yet accepting tbe mental states of sarvastikavadin as elements. DHARMANAIRATMAYANIHSVABHAVATA OR SUNYAVADA I This was the age of vigorous philosophical discussions. Philosophical disputations were very prominent in this age. Some philosophers propounded the theory of being (sat); others refuted the arguments of this theory and enunciated the theory of nonbeing (asar). Still others presented the theory of the being and the non-being. In this way the permanent, the imperinanent, the one and the many and similar problems were discussed vigorously by the philosophers in this age. Nagarjuna came to realise that the Buddha's catuskoti (four-fold predications) was not very useful for providing the philosophical basis for nairatmyavada. Therefore, he presented a theory of Suyavada. The interpretation of the osun ya' has been various. Some have suggested that sunya is the void. But some others have suggested that Nagarjuna could not have considered the reality as the void because he was originally trained in the dvaitic conception of reality, as he was brought up in the upanisadic tradition. Therefore, they say that Nagarjuna's sunya is not the void, it is the ultimate reality which is unspeakable and inexpressible. However, as Nagarjuna was converted to Buddhism and as he became the vigorous exponent of the nairatmyavada and the theory of reality as momentary, it cannot be said that Nagarjuna presented the absolutist view-point. Nagarjuna's Sunyavada did not in anyway refute the rationalistic and a spiritualistic conception of reality and the theory of evolution. VIJNAPTIMATRATAVADA V After sunyavada, comes Yogacara. According to the Yogacara school, Sunyavada does not systematically consider any of the Buddhistic theory, but the Buddha's conception of nama was primarily concerned with mental states. It is centred round vijnana. There

Page #118
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 97 fore, according to the Yogacara, reality is mostly mental in nature. It is vijnana, and atman is the expression of vijnana, although there is no permanent Atma. Vijnanavadins are generally considered to be a subjective idealists who give prominence to mental states and to the external works. The mental states are real and external world is only an expression of mental states. Vijnanavadins had to posit an objective conception of the storehouse of consciousness. It is alayavijnana. In this way, we find discussion of the conception of self from different stages and gradually it has reached the idealistic position of the conception of the self as we find in the vijnanavada. In this, the self is primarily mental and expressing mental states. Eminent philosophers like Dharmakirti, santaraksita and Kamalasila tried to present this idealistic conception of the self in terms of vijnana, yet not deviating from the original stand of Ksanikavada.1 In the Buddhist tradition, all the schools of thought have presented their own views concerning the soul as cittasantana' (the stream of consciousness). The vijnana-advaitavadins maintain that there is nothing except vijnana and the self is considered as a stream of mental states and self that is real. The physical states are subsummed under the general conception of vijnana.2 In the Buddhist philosophy there is no discussion about the specific relation of citta vijnanasantati or Jiva. We cannot, therefore, say whether self have any reference to the states of bodily existence, however in some of the works like Visuddhimaggo there are reference to the bodily states and it is possible that the mental states like the pleasure and pain have relation to bodily states, We have already said that in the Samkhya-Yoga, Jaina thought and others there is a view that in the rebirth the Suksmasarira moves from one body to the other. Similar description we find in the Digghaknikaya about the gandharya. The description goes th who wants to go from one life to the other after death, has to wait for seven days with gandharva. In the kathavatthu there is a discu. 1 (a) Pramanavartika 2, 327. (b) Tattvasangraha ki hahirarthapariksa, pp. 550-82. 2 Santanantara Siddhi Dharmakirti has discussed it in this book, 3 Visuddhimaggo-14, 60; 17, 163,

Page #119
" 98 ssion about the inner life in relation to the conception of gandharva. Similarly, in some other works and in the writings of Vasubandhu and other Vaibhasikas there is mention of transmigration from one body to the other1. It is like the subtle body. In Theravadi Buddhaghosa there is no mention of the subtle body (antarabhavasarira). He has given certain examples of the movement of consciousness from one body to the other.2 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 3 UPANISADIC THOUGHT In the Upanisadic tradition we do not get a uniformity of views regarding the nature of the self. Sometimes even in one Upanisad, we find the mention of different views, regarding the conception of the self. For this reason, those who have speculated on the nature of the self have presented various views. Badarayana wrote the Brahmasutra and in the Brahmasutra, we find the mention of various views of the self as presented by the ancient seers. Brahmasutra became a very important work like the Upanisads and several commentaries on that were written. But unfortunately all the commentaries are not available today. Samkracarya wrote a commentary on the Brahmasutra and presented Mayavada (theory of Appearance). But those who did not accept Mayavada wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra and presented their own interpretations of the Brahmasutra refuting the Mayavada. Among them may be mentioned the Acaryas like Bhaskara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka. These Acaryas presented different views in their commentaries but the basic uniformity of their presentation was that they all refuted the argument of mayavada and said that jiva is real as the Brahman is real. Jiva is different from the body. It is eternal and is imperishable. Samkaracarya while presenting his mayavada based his argument on the Upanisadic teachings. Pandit Sukhalalji has analysed the Upanisadic streams of thought as presented by these writers into three states, as 1. Samkara's Advaita. 2. Madhvacaryas Dvaita and 3. the Vedic interpretations of other Acaryas.3 Samkara said Brahman is real. It is the ultimate reality and all other things are appearances. The differentiations of Jivas in the 1 Abhidharmadipa, p. 142 with notes. 2 (a) Visuddhimaggo, 17-163 (b) Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 99. 3 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 100.

Page #120
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 99 empirical existence are not real but are only appearance caused due to avidya. Everything is Brahman, and jiva and the distinctions between the jivas are not real distinctions. The Brahman and the atman are identical, 'Ahar brahmasmi'.1 Madhvacarya's conception of reality was different from that of Samkaracarya. His was dualistic conception of reality. Brahman is real, jiva is also real. Jiva is not merely an appearance. Brahman and Atman are both equally real. There are innumerable jivas. They are all eternal. Bhaskara and other Acaryas have maintained that jivas are real. They are the consequential expressions of the Brahman. It may be said that they are the products of the Brahman. They are expressions of the Brahman, therefore, they cannot become an appearance. In the Mahabharata, there are three views of the conception of the jivas based on the Sarirkhya philosophy: (1) There are of 24 principles (24 tartvaradi) (2) those who maintain an independent eternal Purusa still belonging to the 24 principles theory, i.e., 25 tattyavadi, and (3) those who maintain that purusa is different from Brahman and belonging to the chavvisatartvavada' i. e. 26 Tattvavadi. It appears that ancient philosophers discussed these three streams of thought and the discussions were mainly based on the Upanisadic thought. In brief, the philosophical discussions concerning the trature of the self based on the Upanisadic tradition can be summari. sed into some forms of philosophy as (1) kevaladvaita (2) sat yopadhi. advaita (3) visistadvaita (4) dvaitadvaita (5) avibhagadvaita (6) suddhadvaita (7) Acintya bhedabheda and such other various forms. In general, we have exponents of the Advaita and Dvaitavada including Ramanuja's Visistadvaita. Samkara presented kevaladvaita. According to him, Brahman is the only reality. All else is appearance. The world is an appearance. Brahman is the ultimate reality and phenomenal world is only an appearance. According to him, the empirical individual soul is not an independent reality. It is only the phenomenal state of the atman. Aman and the Brahman are identical and the phenomenal reality of the atman is due to avidya and abhasa. Samkara takes recourse to the conceptions of maya, avidya aad abhasa for explaining the pheno 1 (a) Brahma Siddhi, p. 9-Jivobrahmiva na parah.' (b) Dr. C.D. Sharma : Bauddhadarsana and Vedanta, p. 234,

Page #121
100 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY menal world. He makes a distinction between the different levels of thought like the dream state, the waking state, the dreamless sleep and the turiya. These views are based on the upanisadic concept. Appaya Diksita has written a commentary called Siddhanta LesaSangraha on Vedanta Siddhanta Suktimanjari. In this, he has given a commentary of the various views regarding the relation of the Brahman and atman according to the kevaladvaita (pure advaita) strain of thought. Some of the views may be mentioned as follows: PRATIBIMBAVADA + .5 Swami Vidyaranya and the commentators have given explanations about the relation between the Brahman and the jiva according to their stand-points. One of the prominent views is that the jiva is the reflection of the Brahman (the image of the Brahman)... This reflection is considered by some as un-understandable (avidyagata), as the inner sense (antahkarana) by others and as based upon ignorance (ajnanagata) by still others.1 AVACCHEDAVADA + 3 Some commentators have used the term avaccheda in place of pratibimba and they maintain that the Brahman is not reflected in the antahkarana (inner sense), but jiva is an expression of the antahkarana.2 BRAHMA-JIVAVADA +3 According to this view, Jiva is neither the reflection of the Brahman nor its avaccheda', but the reality of the Jiva is due to avidya and the Brahman is due to vidya.3 In this way, there are important conceptions regarding the relation of the Jiva to the Brahman in the kevaladvaita as: (1) pratibimbavada (2) Avacchedavada and (3) Brahmabhedavada. Regarding the number of jivas, there is no unanimity among 1 Vedantasuktimanjari, I paricheda, karika, 28-40. 2 Ibid. 41. 3 Ibid, 42. 4 Bharatiya Tattvavidya, p. 104.

Page #122
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the kevaladvaitins. According to some jiva is considered to be and the body with the jiva is living-body and others are non-living. Some others maintain that jiva is one, still other bodies are equally living and still other thinkers say that there are many jivas.1 These views have been briefly mentioned by Sadananda in the Vedantasara and Madhusudana Sarasvati in the Siddhantab indu. 101 According to Bhaskara, Brahman due to infinite variety of energy, expresses itself in the form of jivas as also in the form of the world. Jiva is the effect of the Brahman and as such it has functional truth. The Brahman is one, but its effects are many. There is no inconsistency between the concepts of unity and diversity. Just as the one ocean manifests itself into infinite number of waves, so also one Brahman manifests himself into the infinite soul jivas. With removal of ignorance one realises that Brahman is one and the jivas which appear to be atomic in nature are the same as Brahman. one Ramanuja has presented the Visistadvaita theory. He said that the Brahman is real and the jivas are equally real. Jivas are like the world which is the manifested Brahman, are also manifested in form. The unmanifested Brahman is manifested as the world and as the jivas. The unmanifested psychic energy (citsakti) expresses itself in the form of manifested jivas and the source is the unmanifested Brahman which is Brahmanarayana. Acarya Nimbarka said that the Brahman is one and undivided, simple and perfect, yet the jivas are the effects of the Brahman. Nimbarka has presented the theory of Bhedabheda (identity and difference). It is therefore called Dvaitadvaita, (the one and the dual). The one wind expresses itself in many forms, similarly, the one Brahman manifests itself into many jivas. These jivas are equally real. Vijnanabhiksu says that purusa is independent and beginningless like prakriti but not different from the Brahman, This view is called "avibhagadvaita" (undifferentiated advaita). Acarya Vallabha presents the pure Suddhadvaita. According to him, the world and the jiva are the phenomenal effects of the BrahThese effects are due to lila (magic or play). And the Brahman is pure and simple. It is a reality. man. 1 Vedanta sukti manjari, karika, 43-44

Page #123
102 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Caitanya accepts the "acintyabhedabheda". The Brahman manjfests in different jivas due to the inherent jiva sakti (the inherent energy of the soul). Jivas are both identical to and also different from the Brahman. This relation is beyond the speculation (acix. taniya). Philosophers from Bhaskara to Caitanya bave considered jiva as atomic in pature. When the jiva removes ignorance by means of jnana (kpowledge) and bhakti (devotion), then the jiva attains liberation. All these acaryas are believers in the atomic nature of the soul (apujivavadi.) They maintain that rebirth is possible by means of the subtle bodies (Suksmasarira). Madhya is Vedantin, but he does not believe in the theory of non-dualism (advaita) and non-difference (abheda). He maintains, on the authority of upanisadic tradition, that jiva is atomic in nature. There are infinite number of jivas. They are eternal and real. They are not the effects of the Parabrahman, nor are they part of Brahman. When the jiva removes the ignorance, it realises the authority (sva. mitva) of the Brahman or Visni. The Saiva's do not accept the authority of the Veda or the Vedanta. They accept the pratyabhijna darsana. They base their arguments on the pratyabhijna. According to them, parabrahma is Siva. Nothing else is greater than Siva. The parabrahma or Siva is the highest reality and by his will, he creates infinite number of jivas and the world. From the point of view tattva (principles) jiva and siva are not different. According to the upanisads and Bhagavadgita, atman is different from the body different from the manas. It pervades entire universe. It is not the effect of anything (avikarya)" and it is indescribable in words 6 The things (avikaryas) and the description of the 1 Kathopanisad 2, 15, 18-"na hanyate hanyamane sarire" 2 (a) Kathopanisad, 2, 3, 7, 80--The mind is superior to the sepse organs, buddhi superior to the manas, mahat greater than byddhi, avaykta greater than mahat and puruga greater than ayyakta, Purusa is pervasive (vyapaka) and alinga (without sex). (b) Kathopanisad 1, 3, 10, 11-There is nothing greater than purusa. 3 Isa Upanisad-- savasyamidam sarvam yatkinca jagatyam jagat. 4 Bhagavadgita, 2-25, 5 Taittiriya Upanisd, 2, 4

Page #124
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 103 Brahman can only be in the negative as "neti-neti'.1 The Brahman is neither gross nor atomic, neither small nor large, neither water nor any liquid, neither shadow por darkness, neither wind nor akasa, neither the aggregate nor having qualities like taste, smell, neither eye nor speech nor mind. It is neither light nor prana (life force). It is not mouth. It is neither in or out. t 5 SIZE OF THE SOUL (PARIMANA) In the Upanisads we get different views regarding the size of the soul. It has been said that the atman which is manomaya is within the heart and is of the size of grain of rice. There is a view which says at the size of atman is equal to the distance of the top of thumb to ihu tip of fore-finger. 4 The atman is considered to be pervading the body.5 There is another view which says that atman is all pervading. There is another view which says that the atman as residing in the heart and which is greater than the earth, than the space, than the world and in fact greater than all the universe.? According to the Jainas, the jiva is eternal and has no end. Every jiva pervades infinite points of space. It has the capacity of pervasion. At the time of Kerali samudghata the atman pervades the entire universe for some time and at the time of the death of mundane soul pervades partially, and has infinite pradesas. The dharma, adharma, lokakasa and jiva occupy equal number of space, points but from the point of view of measurement they do not occupy the equal number of space-points. Dharma, Adharma and Lokakasa, are receptive and they do not express any qualities of action and reaction and there is no effect of any type. Sansari jivas 1 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4, 5, 15-Sa Esa Neti-Neti. 2 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 3, 9, 8. 3 Ibid, 5 6. 4 Chandogya Up. 5, 18, 1-Pradesa matram. 5 Kausitaki Up. 35, 4, 20 Esa prajnatma idam-sariramanu pravistah. 6 Mundaka Up. 1, 1, 6.-Sarvagatah 7 Chandog ya Up. 3, 14, 3. 8 Bhagavati 2, 10-Jivatthikaye-loye, loyamette, loyappamane. 9 Bhaghavati 6, 6, 17.

Page #125
104 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY receive pudgala, they show activity and their effects are not uniform. Due to the accrusion of material particles like the karmic particles, jivas express expansion and contraction. Yet they are atomic jp nature also and except in the case of the state of kevalin samudghata, they do not become all-pervasive. Therefore, the jivas are called as of madhyama-parimana in the sense they have intermediate size. It should be noted that the attributes of expansion and contraction do not really belong to the nature of the soul. The attributes are ascribed to the karmic bodies. Due to the accretion of karmic particles jivas occupy a particular size of the body. And the effects of this type of pervasion of the body in a particular size is due to the karmic body. The largeness or smallness of the karmic body is due to the four directions (gati). In the liberated state these characteristics are absent. The capacity of the jiva of pervading the entire body that it occupies is likened to the capacity of the light of the lamp which pervades the entire room big or small. As the light of the lamp illu. mines the room which is big or small, so the jiva pervades the entire hody big or small. This pervasion is possible due to the karmic body. The jiva which occupies the body of a small child, occupies the body of a youth, and also the body of an old man. The soul which pervades a huge body can also contain itself in smallest of the bodies, the body of an insect. x? CHARACTERISTIC OF JIVA From the noumenal point of view, jiva has the characteristic of cetana (the light of consciousness). All jivas have this characteristic of cetana (the light of consciousness), and it is the inherent characteristic of the jiva. But the development of the jiva differ in each individual case according to its capacity and on the basis of the intensity of the karmic encrustations. Similarly, the development of jiva depends on the extent of knowledge based on the removal of knowledge-obscuring karma. In describing the distinction between jiva and ajiva it has been said that all the jivas, however in the lowest Possible stage of development, possess an infinite part of kevalajnana

Page #126
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 105 (omniscient knowledge). If that part of omniscience is also covered by the karmic particles, it would become ajiva, but such a contingency never arise. From the phenomenal point of view, jiva has the characteristic of growih, of intelligence and a state of existence like animal state etc. A machine can be made to eat food but it cannot make use of the digested food for its own development. There may be some machines which are self-controlled; for instance, a tarpedo has the capacity of moving on its own energy, but these machines cannot be produced by other machines nor do they produce such machines. They can be used. There is not a single machine which is self-skilled and self-producing. A railway train, for instance, can take tonnes of luggage and move, but it cannot fly like a bird. A bird has psychic energy which train or the machine does not possess. Therefore, the psychic energy is the criterion of distinguishing a living soul from non-living object. MUKTA AND SAMSARI JIVA H 3 Jivas have been classified into two types as (1) mukta (liberated) and (2) samsari (empirical jivas). Both the types of jivas are infinite in number. The sarsari jivas are to be classified into six types on the basis of the nature of the body they possess, as (1) Prthvikaya (earth-bodied), (2) apkaya (water-bodied), (3) Tejaskaya (fire-bodied) (4) vayukaya (air-bodied), (5) vanaspatikaya (vegetable kingdom) and (6) trasakaya (beings can move). Except the trasakaya jivas the other 5 types of jivas can be distinguished into (1) gross (badara) and (2) subtle (suksma). The universe is filled with subtle jivas. The gross-bodied beings cannot live without any support like the body and they reside in some parts of the universe. The number of the living beings which are earthbodied has been described with an analogy. If the living beings, contained in a lump of earth of the size of a fruit (avala), and if each living being were to get the body of the size of the dove, then the population of all the living beings in the lump will overflow the one lakh yojana of the jambudvipa.? 1 Nandisutra. 2 Addaamalagupamane pudhavikae havanti je jiva. Te parevayamitta jambudive na mainti.

Page #127
106 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY If the living beings contained in a drop of water were each to get a body of the size of a grain of sesamum, then they will overflow the jambudvipa.1 The living beings contained in a spark (cingari) were each to get the body of the size of a small egg of louse (likha) then the jambudvipa will be over-populated.2 The living beings contained in a fraction of air which moves a leaf of a margosa tree were to get the body of a tiny grain of khasakhasa then jambudvipa will be over-populated. BODY AND SELF (SARIRA AND ATMAN) The problem of the relation of the body and soul has been an important problem in philosophy. Three theories explaining the relation between the two have been presented : 1. Materialistic view which may be described as "Epiphenomenalism' used in describing the relation between body and mind. 2. Parallelism, and 3. Interactionalism. Epiphenomenalism tried to dispense with mind and soul as an independent reality and make them a by-product of the metabolic changes in the body. Consciousness (Cetana) is the product of the metabolic changes in the brain cells. As the function of intestines is is digestion, the function of the lungs is breathing so is the function of cerebrum is consciousness. It is also considered as function a by. product of the chemical changes in the cerebrum. There is nothing like Atman or the consciousness as a separate reality. The Atmavadins, i.e., those who advocate the reality of the Atman as different from the body or the mind refute the arguments of the epiphenomenalists by showing that the use of the term action (kriya) is ambiguous. It is one thing to say that the action or function of the intestines is to digest food and the lungs to breathe, yet another 1 2 Egammi dagabindummi je jina varehim, pannatta. Te jas sarisavamitta jambudive na mainti. Varattitandulamitta teu, jiva jinehim pannatta. Mattha palikkha pamana; jambudive na mainti Je limyapatta pharisa vau jiva jinehimpannatta. Te jas khasakhasamitta, jambudive na mainti. 3

Page #128
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 107 thing to say that the function of the brain cells is to get consciousness. The consciousness and the cerebrum belongs to two different realms, qualitatively different. When we think of consciousness, we do not normally think of cerebrum, though we may associate the two. Different organs of the body have by themselves no active or creative function. Intestines do not digest the food, lungs do not breathe, but we digest and we breathe through the intestines and lungs. Similarly, it is the self that thinks and that is conscious, although the function may be operated through the cerebrum. Consciousness cannot be produced out of the un-conscious matter. The organs of the body are lifeless and without conscious energy, it is the self that gives consciousness. Without the self the body has no life, it is a dead-matter. The bodily organs by themselves do not function, Father Butler wrote "that the brain is formed of the dead hydrogen atoms, oxygen atoms, nitrogen atoms and phosphorous atoms. Imagine them separate and senseless. Observe them running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This is purely a mechanical process which can be seen by the mind. But can you see or dream or in any way imagine how out of that mechanical act and from these individually dead atoms, sensation, thought and emotion are to arise? We cannot create Homer out of the rattling of dice or differential calculus' out of the clash of billiard ball... You cannot satisfy the human understanding in its demand for logical continuity between molecular process and the phenomena of consciousness." It would be futile to compare the functions of digestion and respiration with the consciousness, because, the functions of digestion and respiration are unconscious It is indebatable fact that conscious, ness and psychic energy are an independent force not produced out of the bodily functions. Those who consider consciousness as the effect of the bodily functions have to face a different question : 'Am I acting on my self-will or am I influenced by the bodily functions ? Psycho-physical parallelism is another theory which has been propounded to explain the relation between body and mind or in a sense the soul. Psychical and physical forces run parallel to each other without ever affecting each other. A physical state is correlated to a mental state, point by point, without affecting the other. Parallel occurance is the point common to both the states. The third theory of the relation between the body and mind

Page #129
108 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY is the theory of interactionism. According to this view, the bodily and the mental states affect each other. There is interaction between each other. For instance, physical ailments like the stomach ache and other ailments do affect the mental states like the cognitive ability the emotional upset and the conative urge. Ill health does affect the mental energy adversely, while health will bring wholesome effect on mental life. For instance, particular type of food and drink would bring about mental states due to the toxic effects. Memory capacity can be improved by certain types of food. Injury to a particular part of the brain-cells would impair the power of memory. Similarly, if the certain parts of the brain-cells are adversely affected, there would be impairment to the mental energy. 13 EFFECT OF THINKING ON THE MIND Body and mind are intimately related to each other. They interact on each other. Cognitive, affective and conative activity do affect the bodily condition. Vigorous process of thinking brings about bodily fatigue. Emotions do create certain metabolic changes in the body like, secretion of glucose in the blood, coagulation of the blood and other chemical effects. The bodily and mental energy affect each other. The body and the mind are two qualitatively different substances. Still they influence each other. How this interaction is possible has been a difficult problem to solve. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ATMAN AND THE BODY The Atman and the body are different substances. One is a spiritual substance, while the body belongs to the material realm. Atman is the psychic energy (Cetana), it is formless. Body is meterial, it is unconscious. It has form. Then problem is how the two diffeJainism tried to solve this rent principles interact on each other. problem of interaction between two qualitatively different principles by means of the concept of the gross (badara) and subtle (suksma) body (sarira). Every soul in this samsara is encased in the gross and subtle bodies. At the time of death, gross body is left here and the subtle body continues to be encrusted with the soul. When the soul enters the next birth it carries the subtle body with it. It enters another gross body with the subtle body. The subtle body is constantly being formed, like the snow-ball which adds particles of snow on its downward journey. The relation between the soul and the subtle body could be considered to be beginningless. It is always with the

Page #130
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 109 soul as long as soul remains in the samsara. In this sense, it is possible to say that the soul from the point of view of phenomepal existence has a certain form. It is in its pure state formless. And in this sense the samsari jiva takes the form of the gross body, by means of "suksma sarira'. In this way, the body and soul are intimately associated with each other; and form and the formless can have associations with contradictions. When the soul attains its purity, it would have no connection with the body which has form. The relation between the body which has form and the soul which has no form is beginningless, but it has an end, as the soul, by its own efforts can free itself from the association with the body. SOUL AND MODERN SCIENCE 1.3 Some scientists do not distinguish between mind and soul. Mind is considered as expression of the modes of the brain. Pavlov regarded the memory as merely the expressions of the metabolic changes in the numerous cerebral cells. Even Bergson, who established the reality of the self by rational arguments, did consider the memory is due to the physiological changes in the cerebral cells. As the photoplate receives the negative of photograph, so also the cerebra! cells do receive and preserve the impressions of the past. This could be described as the physical memory. The memory traces are revived due to appropriate stimulations. Therefore, the mind is not something separate qualitatively from the cerebrum. It is physical, Pavlov's theory has been described as muscle twich psychology. In this way, some scientists have tried to prove that there is nothing which is immaterial and spiritual. Everything can be explained, including mind and thought, through the operation of the bodily processes. How. ever, mind is both material and immaterial, the physiological basis is material and psychic functions are immaterial. Otherwise, we cannot explain the higher values of life. It cannot be said that Shakespeare wrote the Hamlet by mere movements of the muscles and nerves, by hands and with the brain. In the yrtti of the Sutrak rtanga, it has been described that the cognitive, affective and conative mental functions like thinking, memory, emotions and will are due to the function of the mind which is immaterial. The means of getting the mental states is 1 Sutrakstangavrtti, 1, 8.

Page #131
110 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY primarily physiological based on the function of the brain cells. Bat the mental states are not physical. They are immaterial. Brain is physiological and the brain cells are often called knowledge cells. (Jnana tantu). It is true to say that body affects the mental states; but the mental states are not the bodily states. Some modern scientists have emphasised this point of view of the distinction of the mental and bodily states. It would not be possible to explain the qualitative distinction of the mental state from the body by merely asserting that the mental states are nothing but bodily. We find prominent qualitative difference in the mental states and the bodily states. Yet in a sense, we can say that they are also similar in some respects, beacuse the mental states are based on the physiological states in the brain. It is clear from this discussion, that modern science is not clear about the nature of mind and body, whether there are prominent distinctions between the two. Even supposing that the cerebrum is the repository of the mental states, cognition and memory, it does not disprove the possibility of the presence of psyche (cetana) as the prime-mover of the psychic states. Like the photo-plate, the cerebrum revives the impressions, preserves them and facilitates their revival on appropriate occasions. It is difficult to explain the 'why' of such processes and how the co-relation takes place. It is possible to explain the insoluble problem by positing the presence of psyche (cetana) which is not physical in nature, but which is inscrutably associated with the bodily functions. The phenomenal progress of science in the modern age is possible only because of the function of the psyche which is different from the brain rather bodily, although they are necessary as instrument or media. Modern science says that there are 102 elements. They are material in nature and have from. All the experiments in science so far carried are on the empirical and the material aspects of things. The immaterial is beyond sense observation and is not amenable 10 experimental investigation. In the mental states we find characteristic which are not to be found in the physical states. Therefore, it can be said that the mental and physical states are qualitatively different, although they are not discreet as not to interact on each other. Modern science has not been able to find a satisfactory solution

Page #132
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY to the problem of relation of body and mind. Even if we consider that cerebrum is the seat of memory and is an instrument for the revival of memory, it cannot be said that psyche (cetana) is not there at all. Like the negative of the photo-plate, the cerebral cells do function as repositaries of past events in the form of memory. But the cerebral part cannot function as a guarantee of the future events. The problems regarding the 'how' and the 'why' of the cognitive function can only be understood if we posit independent of the cerebrum. In the case of the mechanical retention of the negative in the photoplate there is no variation nor novelty. It is a necessary mechanical and routine process, which can be explained by means of the rules of mechanical science. But in the case of human mind, we find there is variation and unpresentability based upon the relation of the past impression. There would be individual variation in the expression of mental states and the revival of past impressions on the basis of the retention of the past impressions. However, this can be explained only with the help of the function of a psychic energy which is distinct from the physical function. 111 There has been rapid and phenomenal progress in the field of empirical sciences. This has been possible due to the enormous amount of systematic thinking and imagination which are expressions of the psychic energy (cetana sakti). This proves the presence of the independent psychic energy. The Russian Scientist Pavlov carried extensive experiments concerning the study of the physiological problems of conditioned reflexes. He carried experiments on the dogs and the experiments are called 'the dog and the saliva experiments'. In these experiments, he first rang the bell and then presented food to the animals. After some time he rang the bell but did not give food. He showed, by the quantity of saliva collected after ringing the bell, that the animals were conditioned by stimulus response to the bell and the food. There is no question of any mental states like expecting food. It is merely a physiological response without any element of independent psychic states. However, it is also true that experiments shown that by operating on the animal and removing particular parts of the brain certain mental functions became inoperative. But the psychic was not lost. The animal behaved mechanical, ate food and other physiological processes like blood circulation and the respiration were also normal.

Page #133
112 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY These functions are not purely physiological. But they have the psyche as a spring cord. Experience is a criterion of the psychic energy and experience is neither to be identified with the physiological processes nor to be associated with them, although physiological processess are the basis of psychic activity. Even when certain physiological function do not operate, it cannot be said that the person does not experience the pleasures or pains, although he is not able to communicate his experiences to others. In the Agama literature it has been mentioned that a jiva does experience various experiences pleasant or unpleasant in the series of affix lives. One is blind, one is dumb, one is deaf and similarly one may be suffering from incurable diseases. If such a being is tortured by sharp instrument, he may not be able to communicate to others because of his dumbness and blindness etc., but he does suffer immeasurable feelings of pain. Such feeling of immeasurable pain is also experienced by Sthavarakaya Jivas, but having no sense-organ to express, they cannot express their misery. 3 ORIGINAL FORM OF CETANA Regarding the nature of cetana the philosophers have expressed two different views. According to one view, it is said that life cannot be produced from object. Life-force is equally real, independent and beginningless. Louis Pasture has shown by experimental investigation that life is a force by itself. Louis Pasture carried experiment in this connection. vaccum. He took a bowl of glass, and kept some inanimate objects in it. He saw to it that no animate object, not even an egg is kept in the glass. Then he gradually removed the air inside the glass, and made it into a In this state no minute organism accumulated there even after a very long time. But when same objects were kept in the open for some days and it was found that some animate infinite small organisms were deposited on the surface of the object. From this, it was clear that the atmosphere contains infinite number of minute organisms fleeting in the air and they are deposited on the objects. According to another view, it is maintained that life can be generated from inanimate objects. Some scientists like Freud, Russian lady scientist Lapesinskeya and the atomic scientist like Deraldure and his assistant Stanley Millar have suggested that life can be generated from the inanimate objects.

Page #134
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Marxist theory maintains that the psyche is the qualitative transformation of the physical objects. As water heated to a particular degree becomes vapour and cooled to the zero degree, it solidifies into ice, so is psyche produced from the changes in the physical objects. 113 But the question is, at what stage the changes in the physical things does consciousness arise? The cerebrum contains various forms of material particles and the gases like oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon and phosphorus. Is it possible to determine which of these gases or physical particles become the origin of consciousness? Is it due to one of them separately, or due to the combination of all of them or some of them ? So far empirical sciences have not been able to give any solution to the problem of the origin of psyche out of the physical changes. They have not been able to determine the original nature of cetana. It has sometimes been suggested that the atman can be identified with the sense-organs and the brain. This view is not correct because even when the sense-organs cease to function due to some defect, memory traces of previous experiences continue to be experienced without the functioning of the sense-organs. Similarly, it can be shown that atman cannot be identified with the brain. When the same function of the cerebral cell cease to work, even then mem ory may continue to be experienced. Therefore, it is not appropriate to identify the cerebrum with the atman although it is the source of knowledge. The sense-organs and the brain are only the instruments for getting experiences. As the sense-organs are the instruments of receiving external stimulations, so is the brain the instrument of retaining the sense-impressions. It has been pointed out that if the brain cells are injured, memory may be impaired. Yet we can say that in the mentally defective beings, consciousness does work, even though it may not function normally. But all other physiological and mental functions in some respects do work without impairing the normal physiological routine of the mentally defective. From this, can be shown that the psychic energy is different from the brain and its functionings, although brain cells are the respositories of the psychic functions. Tandula Veyaliya gives a description of the physiological functioning of the body. There are 160 urdhvagamini and 'rasavahini' veins in the human body. They start from the navel

Page #135
114 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY and terminate in the head. The sense-organs function normally as long as these veins are working in perfect harmony.1 According to Caraka, the cerebrum is the centre of the senseorgans and the vital life forces (prana). It is a truism that if a particular chord in the brain is cut, a particular psychic function is paralysed, but this does not mean that the brain cells are the psyche. ATMAN AND INFINITE PRADESAS We have already seen that atman has infinite number of pradesas. Finite number of pradesas cannot form the jiva. From the point of view of biological science, infinite number of cells form the individual life and the body (psycho-physical organism). Body is composed of infinite material particles, but life is formed of the protoplasmic units. From the noumenal point of view, it is said that the atman is a spiritual substance. It is simple and pure. It is eternal and perfect. And the description of atman as constituting of infinite pradesas is only to be looked at from the practical point of view. It is only an attempt, an imperfect attempt to find out the measurement of the atman, if it is possible to say so. A piece of cloth is woven with threads. Threads are the part of the cloth. But threads by themselves do not constitute the cloth, although threads are necessary for the cloth. Nor can we say that the aggregate of threads could be called cloth. It is the pattern that is important. Similarly, the atman has infinite number of pradesas. They constitute the pattern of the atman. Consciousness is the characteristic of the atman. This characteristic of consciousness is psychic energy and it is a differential of the atman. The non-living substances do not possess this characteristic. Therefore, arman is considered to be a pure substance, independent of other substances. The jiva expresses the charactertstics of sat (existence) and kriyakaritva (activity). Due to its characteris 1 Tandula Veyaliya. "Imammi sariraye sathisirasayam nabhippabhavanam uddhagamininam siram upagayanam jau rasaharniotti ccai. Vujasim nam niruvaghaenam cakkhusoyaghanajihabalam bhavai." Caraka Sarhita--- Pranah pranabhrtam yarta, tatha sarvendriyani ca. Yaduttamangamanganam girastadabhidhiyate. 2

Page #136
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 115 tic of sat it is a padartha (substance). Due to its characteristic of activity the jiva expresses modifications. But, in all these modifications it retains its essential nature and indentity. The stream of consciousness is the attribute of the atman, and the atman remains the same through the modifications constituted of origin and decay. THE VIEWS OF THE SCIENTISTS webshop Prof. Albert Einstein says, "I believe that intelligence is manifested throughout all nature."1 Sir A. S. Eddington said, "Something unknown is doing, we do not know what it is... ...I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness..... The old Atheism is gone. Religion belongs to the realm of the spirit and mind, and cannot be shaken." Herbert Spencer maintains that the teachers and founders of the religion taught, and many philosophers ancient and modern, Western and Eastern have perceived that this unknown and unknowable is our very life.3 J. B. S. Haldane expresses his view on the nature of the self as, "The truth is that, not matter, not forces, not any physical thing, but mind and personality is the central fact of the universe." Arthur H. Compton has written to say, "A conclusion which suggests ...... the possibility of consciousness after death......the flame is distinct from the log of wood which serves it temporarily as a fuel." In the book entitled 'The Great Design' there is a description of the views of many scientists regarding the nature of the self, and the design of the universe. According to their views, the universe is not merely a mechanical and unthinking process which roils its way with inexorible necessity, but there is a design and a plan. This postulates an intelligence which works behind the process of the universe and the designer, we may call this intelligence by any name we want. Rene Descartes has said, by giving a very simple example, that 'I think, therefore I am'. He based his arguments regarding the reality 1 The Modern Review of Calcutta, July 1936. 2 Ibid. 3 First Principles 1900 4 The Modern Review of Calcutt

Page #137
116 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY of the self on the indubitable fact of the process of thinking and reasoning. He doubted everything but he could not doubt the doubter. The doubter is a substance. Spinoza said that substance has infinite number of attributes, and among them consciousness and extension are prominent. Consciousness is a form of the attribute of thought. That is the Self. Similarly, extension has its infinite modes, they constitute the physical universe. John Locke said that Self is the object of direct experience. "I think, I argue, I experience pleasures and pains." The "l' is the substance, it is the substratum of experiences. Self is an object of knowledge. George Berkely has shown that the universe is constituted of three principles : (1) The self, (2) God (Ultimate self) and (3) The external world. The consciousness is the essential characteristic of the soul. Without consciousness soul cannot exist. The philosophers that we have just mentioned, Descartes, Locke and Berkely have shown that the reality of the self is self evident. No proofs are necessary, no arguments are necessary. But, David Hume denied the reality of the Self and said that it is only a fleeting collection of impressions. His view is nearer to the Buddhist concept of atman as not a real substance but merely an aggregate of physical and mental states. The scientists right from the beginning have been discussing the problem of the nature of the self but they have not come to any definite conclusion. The problem of the Self bas still remained a mystery. THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATMAN Attempts have been made to give positive proofs for the existence of the atman. On the contrary, there have been attempts to: argue against the existence of the atman. But on the whole, it can be said that arguments against the existence of the atman do not hold ground. Therefore, there is a possibility of maintaining that the atman is real. It is an independent substance It is a spiritual substance. We cannot get the knowledge of the atman through the senses. Still, this would not be a counter-argument against the exis

Page #138
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 117 tence of the atman. We see with our eyes and we see objects which are within the range of the sense-organ of sight. Similarly, there should also be a favourable circumstance of the presence of the light. Therefore, the function of sense-organ is limited by its physical capacity and environmental factors. But the experience of sight will be possible if there is a Self which perceive. Those who question and those who doubt the reality of the Self have no valid arguments to give. The Self is expressed through the experiences of the senses. The Self cannot directly be seen through the senses. It can be inferred through its effects. Consciousness cannot belong to the material and non-living object. Therefore, the Self is different from the non-living object. We have seen that those who argued that consciousness is the product of the physiological and chemical changes in the brain cells, have not been able to prove that the brain cells or the chemical effect is the soul. They have not been able to show that the physiological processes produce mental states, although some Naturalist Psychologist like Pavlov have tried to demonstrate that all activities of an organism are physiological. It is of the nature of stimulus response and conditioned reflex. Moreover, evolution of anything has to be from within its nature. Nothing can evolve from something which is not of its nature. Therefore, the development of life has to be from life only. It cannot be from nonliving to life. That would mean arising of something out a thing of a different nature, as the Asatkaryavadin would assert. Therefore, it would be proper to consider that the immaterial soul and the material body are qualitatively different. . CLASSIFICATIONS OF JIVAS Jivas have been classified into different types on the basis of the different principles. The foremost classifications of jivas is (1) Mukta jivas (liberated souls) and (2) Samsari jivas (soul involved in this world). This classification is based on the principle of the attainment of perfection. Of the Sarhsari jivas, there are different classifications again on the basis of different principles. For instance, on the basis of the principle of the capacity of movement jivas have been classified into :

Page #139
118 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (i) Sthavara jivas (beings which cannot move e. g. trees) (ii) Trasa jivas (beings which have the capacity of movement).1 Sthavara jivas are of three types : (1) Prthvi jivas (Earth-bodied) (2) Jala jivas (Water-bodied) and (3) Vanaspati (Vegetable kingdom).' Sometimes, the Sthavara jivas have been classified into five different types : (i) Prthvikaya (earth-bodied), (ii) jalakaya (waterbodied), (iii) tejaskaya (fire-bodied), (iv) vayukaya (air-bodied) and (v) vanaspatikaya (vegetable-kingdom). The jivas of the air and fire-body have movement as their nature and they are called gati-trasa (moving). They have been distinguished into : gross (badara) and subtle (suksma). The subtle-bodied beings are pervading the entire universe, while the gross-bodied beings live in specific places of the universe.3 Gross earth-bodied being are of two types : (1) mrdu (soft) and (2) kathina (hard). The soft earth-bodied beings are again classified into seven types on the basis of the colour of their bodies : krsna (black), nila (blue), lohita (red), harita (yellow), sukla (white) pandu (orange) and panakamrtika. This distinction may be considered to be more scientific. Similar distinction bas been made in the Prajna pana. The hard portion of the earth has been divided into bhutalavinyasa (terrain) and karambapalo. These too have parts and have been further classified into 36 parts :1. Suddha-prthvi (earth) 9. Upala (some type of rock) 2. Sarkara (sand) 10. Trapu (zinc) 3. Baluka 11. Sisaka (lead) 4. Sila (granite, rocks) 12. Rupya (silver) 5. Lavana (salt) 13. Suvarna (gold) 6. Osa (soft earth) 14. Vajra (diamond) 7. Ayasa (iron) 15. Haritala (emerald) 8. Tamra (copper) 16. Hinguluka 1 Uttaradhyayana Sutra, 36, 69. 2 Ibid, 36, 70. Pudhavi aujiva ya taheva ya vanassas Icceye thavara tiviha tesim bheye suneha me. 3 Ibid, 36, 78, 86, 100. 4 Ibid, 36, 72.

Page #140
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 119 17. Manahsila 27. Markata 18. Sasyaka (a variety of emerald) 28. Bhujamocaka 19. Anjana 29. Indranila 20. Pravalakal 30. Chandana 21. Abhraka Baluka 31. Pulaka 22. Abhrapatala 32. Saugandhika 23. Gomedaka 33. Chandraprabha 24. Rucaka 34. Vaidurya 25. Anka 35. Jalakanta 26. Sphatika 36. Suryakanta According to the Brhadvrtti commentary on the Uttaradhyayanasutra Lohitaksa and Masaragalla are species of sphatika and Marakata respectively.2 The gross water-bodied beings (sthula jala) can be divided into 5 types, as : (1) Suddha udaka (pure water), (2) Osa udaka (dew), (3) Haratanu (green bodied) (4) Kohara (fog) and (5) Hima (ice).3 The gross vegetable kingdom is of two types, as : (1) pratyeka sariri (having separate bodies) and (2) sadharana sariri (having one body). The being having one jiva in one body is called pratyeka sariri, but, if one body contains innumerable jivas (living cells) it is called sadharana sariri. Pratyekasariri being in the vegetable kingdom are of twelve types as : 1. Vrkna (tree) 8. Parvaga 2. Guccha 9. Kuhuna 3. Gulma 10. Jalaja 4. Lata (creeper) 11. Ausadhitrana (medicinal grass) 5. Valli (plant) 12. Haritakaya (green bodied 6. Trana (blade of grass) plant) 7. Latavalaya (encircling creepers) The beings of sadharana sarira have innumerable types like 1 Kautiliya Arthasastra, 11, 36. 2 Uttaradhyayana brhadyrtti, patra 689. 3 Uttaradhyayana, 36, 86. * 4 Uttaradhyayana, 36, 95-96.

Page #141
120 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY kanda and mula etc. So far we have considered the sthavara jivas i. e., the living beings who have not got the capacity of move. ment. Now we consider the trasa jivas (living beings who can move about) i.e. self-moving beings. The trasa jivas are of six types : 1. Agni (fire-bodied) . ti trasa 2. Vayu (air-bodied) " 3. Dvindriya (two-sensed organisms) 4. Trindriya (three-sensed organisms) 5. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms) 6. Pancendriya (five-sensed organisms) The fire-bodied and the air-bodied beings do not possess selfwilled movements. Therefore, they are called gati trasa. They move about randomly. The other jivas from two sense-organisms onwards have self-willed movements. The fire-bodied and air-bodied animals are gross and subtle. The subtle-bodied beings pervade the entire universe, while the grossbodied beings have a habitation in a particular place. The grossbodied fire beings have various forms like angara, murmura, suddha agni, archi, jwala, ulka, vidyut, etc.4 The gross air-bodied beings have the following types : (1) Utkalika, (2) Mandalika, (3) Ghanavata, (4) Gunjavata, (5) Suddhavata and (6) Sarvartakavata.5 Those beings who have the capacity of movement on their own account and being aware of the movement and those who can move forward and backward, expand and contract, create sound, express the feeling of fear and run about, all these are trasa jivas. According to the terminology of the trasa jivas, we can classify trasa jivas on the basis of the crieterion of the number of sense-organs they possess. There are four types or trasa jivas : 1. Uttaradhyanasutra, 36, 97-100. 2. Ibid, 36, 108-127. 3. Ibid, 36, 112-121. 4. Ibid, 36, 101-109. 5. Ibid, 36, 119-120. 6. Dasavaikalika, adhyayana 4, sutra 9.

Page #142
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 121 1. Dvindriya (two-sensed organisms) 2. Trindriya (three-sensed organisms) 3. Caturindriya (four-sensed organisms) 4. Pancendriya (five-sensed organisms).1 They are all gross-bodied and there is no distinctions of subtleand gross-bodied organism in this case. Two-sensed, three-sensed, and four-sensed organisms are sammurcchanaja i.e., they did not take their birth in a womb. They are self-born. The five-sensed organisms are of two types : (1) sammurchanaja (self-born) (2) Garbhaja (born of womb). From the point of view of the states of existence, the five sensed-organisms are of four types : (1) Nairayika (hellish), (2) Tiryanca (lower animals), (3) Manusya (human) and (4) Deva (heavenly beings). Among the five-sensed lower animals, there are three types, namely, (1) jalacara (moving in water) (2) sthalacara (moving on the earth) (3) Khecara (moving in the air).* The jalacara animals are of various types. Prominent among them are : (1) Matsya (fish), Kacchapa (tortoise), graha, magara (crocodile) and sursumara etc.3 The sthalacara animals are mainly of two types as : (1) catuspada (four footed) (2) parisar pa (crawling).* Catuspada animals are of four types as : 1. animals with one hoof-horses etc. 2. with two hoofs--oxen etc. 3. with round legs, like elephants. 4. with feet having claws and nails, like lions etc.5 Parisarpa animals are mainly of two types as : 1. Bhujaparisarpa (moving with shoulders) 2. Urah parisar pa (crawling with the stomach) reptiles, like snake etc. 1. Uttaradhyayanasutra, 36, 127. 2. Ibid, 36, 172. 3. Ibid, 36, 173. 4. Ibid, 36, 180. 5. Ibid, 36, 181. 6. Ibid, 36, 182.

Page #143
122 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Khecara animals are of four types as : 1. Carma paksi 2. romapaksi 3. samudgapaksi 4. vitatapaksii bat 3 SAMSARI AND MUKTA JIVAS According to Jainism, from the point of view of substance and energy all jivas are equal. There is no distinction between a jiva and I swara as a higher jiva. But from the point of view of modes, a distinction has been made among the jivas as those who are liberated (siddha jivas) and those who are in sarsara (samsari jivas). They are considered to be the freed souls and those who in bondage in this wheel of sarsara. When the soul is freed from the karmic matter, it becomes pure and is freed from the wheel of life and death. Uttaradhyayana and other agama books give various synonymous words for mukti which have been used in their books : moksa, nirvana,bahihvihara, siddhaloka,5 atmavasati,& anuttaragati,? pradhanagati,& varagati,' sugati.10 apunaravrtta,11 avyabadhal2 and lokottamottamals etc. The state of the soul in mukti condition is characterised by freedom from disease, without body, without experiences of misery, the enjoyment of the perfect bliss and peace, perfect purity and perfect holyness, without destruction and possessed 1. Uttaradhyayana sutra, 36, 188. 2. Ibid, 6, 10. 3. Ibid, 36, 269; 28, 30. 4. Ibid, 14, 4. 5. Ibid, 23, 83; 10, 35. 6. Ibid, 14, 48; 7, 25. 7. Ibid, 18, 38; 18, 39-40, 42, 43, 48. 8. Ibid, 19, 68. 9. Ibid, 36, 67. 10. Ibid, 28, 3 11. Ibid, 29, 44, 21, 24. 12. Ibid, 29, 3. 13. Ibid, 29, 58.

Page #144
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 123 of perfect knowledge and intuition. It is free from rebirth and is in the highest state of perfection. The atman in the highest stage of perfection is the paramatman and there is really speaking no distinction between the atman and the paramatman in the highest stage. In the highest stage of perfection, each atman retains its individuality, unlike the Vedantic conception of the identity or the merger of the atman with the Bhahman. The jiva has perfect knowledge and intuition (samyagjnana and darsana) and its inherent characteristics. When the karmic particles are completely destroyed atman becomes free from all the modes of the body like oldage, disease and death and is free from the rebirth. It has no empirical body attached to it. Therefore, it is considered to be ghanarupa. Moksa is not to be mistaken as a negative state of void. It is positive state of bliss. The size of the mukta jiva (freed soul) is of the dimension of the subtle body that it have been, last life minus one third of its form. This is because, during the sukladhyana state (deep peaceful meditation) vibrations of the suksma sarira are reduced to this form. Therefore, one-third portion of the earlier suksma sarira is eliminated. A question arises, when the atman is free from the body either it should be atomic in form or all-pervasive. Similarly, how can we explain the reduction of the suksma sarira to one-third sarira in the highest stage. ! The answer that has been suggested is that the jiva has been shown to be pervading the body that it occupies in a particular empirical life. The form of the soul was neither atomic nor allpervasive. In the freed state the soul is without body. Therefore, there is no question of pervading or expansion or contraction of the soul. It has no form and whatever description is given about the nature of the soul in the liberated state, it is only with reference to 1. Uttaradhyayanasutra 36, 66. (a) Aruvino jivaghana nanadarhsanasanniya. Aulam suhamsampatta uvama jassa natthi u. (b) Uttaradhyayana 29, 28; 9, 4; 29, 41. 2 Uttaradhyayana sutra 36, 64 Usseho jassa jo hoi bhavammi carimammi 2. Tibhagahino tatto ya siddhanogahana bhave.

Page #145
124 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the space points and not extensions. It is formless and therefore many siddhas can live together in the same space. The soul in its liberated state is freed from the bodily activities like birth and death. It is in its own nature. It is saccidananda (perefect reality, perfect consciousness and perfect bliss). Urdhvagati (tendency to go up) is the very characteristic of the atman and when the karmic encrustations are removed, it goes up freed from all karmas to the siddhasila. As long as the karma vitiated the soul, it is held down in the wheel of life and when the karma is destroyed, the ghanatva of the world i. e. the downward force of the world like the gravity does not affect the soul. It is freed from all the karmas. The freed soul is free from the body. The movement is the attribute of the body and therefore, in the state of freedom, the soul has no movement at all. It has no other types of vibrations. It is free from material and bodily modes of movement and variations.1 Therefore, the soul moves towards the upward path to the siddhasila. The Bhagavati sutra mentions the four causes for such state of urdhvagati, as (1) prayoga, (2) asangata (3) bandhaviccheda, (4) tathavidha svabhava.2 Due to the absence of the principle o motion (dharma) the soul does not go to aloka. The freed soul enjoy perfect bliss of itself. Next distinction of the jiva is the samsari jiva, i. e., the souls involved into the wheel of samsara. The sammsari jivas are being eternall y moving from one state to the other experiencing the karmic effects and in turn accruing more and more karma It is full of karma and therefore, it is embodied and not freed from bodily modes. But the freed souls are free from karma. They are omniscient and perfect. The liberated souls are not bound by any other state. They enjoy their own state without being affected by any other external or internal forces. There are no distinctions between the different individual souls in the free state although they retain their individuality. The liberated soul is completely free from the empirical adjuncts like the modes the of body and the mind. Therefore, there are no repetitions, revivals or reoccurence of the physical and psychic states because the karma is removed and the karma is the cause of all these modes. 154 Bhagavati 3, 3. 155 Bhagavati, 7, 1, 265- Nissangayae niranganae gatiparinamenam bandhana cheyanae. Nirindhanaye puvvappaogenam akammssa gati pannayati.

Page #146
Ajivatattva : A Study (A SURVEY OF NON-LIVING SUBSTANCE) Jivatuttva is opposite of ajivatartva.1 Celena is the characteristic of jiva and it has the attributes of upayoga i. e., jnana and darsana. The substance which is in a body and which sees, knows and experiences pleasure and pain is called jiva.? The body in which there is no cognising substance experiencing pleasure and pain is the ajiva (non-living substance.)3 Ajiva is of two kinds : (1) rupi ajiva (with form) and (2) arupi ajiva (formless).4 Pudgala has form. The other four substances (dravya) Dharma, Adharma, Akasa, and Kala are arupi (formless). In the agama literature the substances having form have been called "murta" while those substances which have no form are called "amurta." DHARMASTIKAYA Of the six dravyas, jiva and pudgala bave the capacity of movement. They have the capacity to move from one place other, but it does not mean that they are constantly moving every instant. It only means that they have motion as a capacity and possibility and are not absolutely stationary (sthitisila). The other four dravyas are having no motion. In Jainism, jiva and pudgala have been considered to be both gat isila (having movement) and sthitisila (being stationary)--and for this kind of movement they have 1. Sthananga, 2, 1, 57. 2. Panchastikaya, 2, 122, 3. Pancastikaya 2, 124-125. 4. (a) Uttaradhyayana sutra, 36. (b) Samavayanga, 149,

Page #147
126 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY a medium of motion and that is the principle of Dharma; and Adharma is the principle of rest. These two are the functional principles." In the Jaina literature the words dharma and adharma have also been used in the ethical sense as subha (auspicious) and asubha (inauspious). In the use of these words the Dharmadravya connoted assistance of movement, while Adharmadravya has a connotation of stagnation. Other Darsanas in Indian philosophy have not given thought to the conception of Dharma and Adharma in the sense of connoting the principle of motion and principle of rest. In modern science, Newton for the first time discovered the principle of motion. Albert Eienstein while advocating the principle of motion said that the universe is limited, similarly the space beyond the universe (aloka) is also limited. The universe is limited because the substance or energy is limited to the sphere of universe. Beyond this universe, there is neither substance nor energy which is responsible for the motion. What the scientists call Ether as the principle of motion, Jaina literature gives it the name of Dharmadravya (principle of motion.) 1. (a) Bhagavati, 18, 7; 7, 10. (b) Uttaradhyayana sutra 36, 6. 2. Hollywood, R. and T: Instruction Lesson No. 2, What is Ether ? I am quite sure that you have heard of Ether before now, but please do not confuse it with the Liquid Ether used by surgeons, to render a patient unconscious for an operation. If you should ask me just what the Ether is, that is, the Ether that conveys electromagnetic-waves. I would answer that I cannot accurately describe it. Neither can any one else. The best that anyone could do would be to say that Ether is invisible body and that through it electromagnetic waves can be propagated. But let us see from a practical standpoint the nature of the thing called Ether.' We are all quite familiar with the existence of solids, liquids and gases. Now suppose, that inside a glass vessel there are no solids, liquids or gases : that all of these things have been removed including the air as well. If I were to ask you to describe the condition that now exists within the glass-vessel, you would promptly reply that nothing exists within it, that a vacuum has been created. But I shall have to correct you, and explain that within this vessel there does exist Ether' nothing else.

Page #148
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 127 Bhagavana Mahavira said that the Dharmadravya is one. It pervades the entire universe. It is eternal. It has no colour, smell, nor touch and taste. It is the principle of motion by which matter moves. All the activities and movement of the jiva in both physiological and psychological sense like physical movement and mental states, are due to principle of motion. It has infinite number of pradesas (space points). It does not move although it is the principle of motion. It is indestructible. It is the principle by which the movement is possible although it does not contribute directly either in the material substance or as the energy which makes objects move. It is formless and therefore it has neither the attributes of the physical objects nor the attributes of mental states. Dharmadravya is one and whole and does not appear as parts. It pervades the entire universe and there is no place in the universe in which Dharmadraya is absent. Movement (gati) is the characteristic which refers to the move So we may say that 'Ether' is a something that is not a solid, nor liquid, nor gaseous, nor anything else which can be observed by us physically. Therefore, we may say that an absolute vaccum cannot be created, for Ether cannot be removed. We get our knowledge of Ether from experiments by observing results and deducing facts. For example, if within the glass-vessel, mentioned above, we place a bell and cause it to ring, no sound of any kind reaches our ears. Therefore, we deduce that in the absence of air, sound does not exist, and thus, that sound must be due to vibration in the air. Now let us place a radio transmitter inside the enclosure that is void of air. We find that radio signals are sent out exactly the same as when the transmitter was exposed to the air. So we are right in deducing that electro-magnetic waves or Radio-waves do not depend on air for their propagation that they are propagated through or by means of 'something' which remained inside the glass enclosure after the air had been exhausted. This something has been named 'Ether.' We believe that Ether exists throughout all space of the universe; in the most remote region of the stars, and at the same time within the earth, and in the seemingly impossible small space which exists between the atoms of all matter. That is to say, Ether is everywhere; and that electromagnetic wave can be propagated everywhere.

Page #149
128 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ment from one place to the another, and Dharma assists movement. Just as the movement of the fish is possible in water although the water does not or may not make it to move. Similarly, the principle of motion (Dharma) is the principle by which the movement is possible. Without this principle, motion is not possible, just as the fish cannot move outside the water. Likewise, the movement of pudgala (matter) is possible due to Dharmadravya. To give an example of modern life, we can say just as the movement of the train would be possible because of the rails, similarly Dharmadravya assists momement. Similarly iiva and pudgala have movement because of principle of motion (Dharmadravya). Motion and rest are the two states which are the characteristics of pudgala and jiva (matter and soul). They do not have mere motion nor mere rest, some time they move and some time they rest. In this world there are four states of movement and rest of a thing, as, (1) from rest to motion, (2) from motion to rest, (3) always at rest and (4) always in motion. Therefore, the movement and the rest are natural to the objects. And they have principles assisting them. They are the principles of Dharma and Adharma. It is necessary to postulate the Dharma and Adharma as principles of motion and rest, because we cannot explain the movement and the state of rest in the universe nor can we divide the cosmos into Loka and Aloka. We have already said that Jiva and Ajiva have primarily the state of movement as a characteristic. The immediate causes of movement and rest in Jiva and Pudgala are in the very nature of these substances, however the efficient causes are Dharma and Adharma, which are remote, and are causes for the movement and rest of the two. The states of motion and rest are to be found in the universe and these two are possible by the Dharma and Adharma dravyas which do not themselves possess, motion or rest, but which assists the motion and rest. It is therefore possible to understand, how 1. Prajnapana, Pada 1, Vrtti Dharmadharmavibhuttavat sarvatra ca jiva pudgalavicarat. Nalokah kaschit syanna ca sammatametadarthanam. Tasmaddharmadharmau, avagadhau vyapta lokakham sarvam. Evam hi paricchinnah siddhyati lokastad vibhuttvat.

Page #150
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 129 important are the substances of Dharma and Adharma in this universe. Acarya Malayagiri said that the order in the Loka and the Aloka (universe and the beyond) is not possible without these substances.1 This world is a fact, because it is experienced through the senses. But the beyond i. e., the Aloka is not subject to sense-experience. Therefore, the existence and the non-existence of the aloka has been a problem. But when we accept the existence of Loka, we have also to postulate the existence of the beyond, because the limited does imply the unlimited. The logic of our arguments would certainly show that if there is a beyond, there must be a limited as if there is the limited which implied the unlimited. These are relative terms.2 In The universe has all the six substances like the Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma and Adharma and Akasa and Kala. But where there is only Akasa, it is the beyond; the unlimited and it is called Aloka. the Aloka, jiva and ajiva cannot exist because Dharma and Adharma are the criteria of the distinctions between the two spheres of Loka and Aloka, where Dharma and Adharma operate that is Loka, and where these principles are not operative it is Aloka. Gautama Ganadhara asked Bhagavana Mahavira "What is the use of Dharmastikaya for the jivas ?" Mahavira said: "O Gautama, if the principle of motion were not to operate, where would be the motion? Who would come and who would go? How could the waves of the sound travel? How could eye lids open? Who would talk and who could move about? The whole world would have remained Dharmastikaya is the means to all the moving things.3 stationary. Gautama asked, "Bhagavan! What is the use of the Adharmastikaya for the Jivas ? Mahavira said, "O, Gautama, if the Adharmastikaya were not 1. Prajna pana, pada 1, vrtti-Lokalokavyavasthanupapatteh. 2. Nyayavatara-Yo yo vyuta pattimacchuddhapadabhidheyah sa sa ghatoaghata vipaksakah Yasca lokasya savipaksah. Yatha vipaksah soalokah. 3. Bhagavati, 13, 4,

Page #151
130 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY to operate as principle of rest who would stand and who would sit ? Who would sleep ? Who could concentrate ? Who could remain silent ? Who can remain inactive? Who could keep the eyelids steady? The world would have constant movement without break. All that is steady and at rest is due to the principle of rest, i. e., Adharma." COMPARISON WITH ETHER Many Indian and Western philosophers have recognised the reality of motion in the universe, but they have not found it necessary to postulate a principle by which the movement is possible. In the modern science Ether has been suggested to be the medium of movement. It is analogus to the Jaina conception of Dharma. The Ether is one of the outstanding discoveries of the modern science. The eminent scientist Dr. A. S. Edington writes "This does not mean that the Ether is abolished. We need an Ether... in the last century it was widely believed that Ether was a thing of matter having properties such as mass, rigidity, motion like ordinary matter. It would be difficult to say when this view died out...Now a days, it is agreed that Ether is not a kind of matter, being, non-material-- its properties are signaries (quite unique) characters such as mass and rigidity which we meet within matter will naturally be absent in Ether but the Ether will have new and definite characters of its own... non-material ocean of Ether." Albert Einstein has propounded the Theory of Relativity and he has shown that Ether is non-material, continuous, non-discrete and co-extensive with space. While discussing the comparative study of the Dharmadravya with Ether, Prof. G. R. Jain says "sthat it has been established that the Jaina philosophers and modern scientists agree regarding the principle of Ether and the Dharmadravya as synonymous because both of them are non-material, non-discrete, continuous whole and all-pervading like Akasa. They have no form, nor have they movement although they are the medium of movement." 1. Bhagavati, 13, 4. 2. The Nature of the Physical World, p. 31.

Page #152
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 131 ADHARMASTIKAYA !! As the Dharmadravya is necessary for movement in the world so is the Adharmadravya necessary for explaining rest and a static state of the objects. As in the absence of the Dharmastikaya we cannot explain the existence of motion, so also we cannot explain the state of rest without Adharmastikaya. Like the Dharma, Adharma also pervades the entire universe. It is whole, and nondiscrete. As the sesamum oil pervades the entire grain of sesamum, so also the principle of Adharma pervades the entire Lokakasa (the universe). Just as the shade of the tree provides coolness and possibility of rest for a traveller, similarly the Adharmastikaya enables the jiva and pudgala substance to experience the state of rest. The question, if the state of rest which is due to Adharmastikaya in what way does it help? For this, we can say, if the state of rest were not possible, then there would be continuous motion and there would not be any possibility of steadiness... This stage of steadiness and static existence is possible through Adharmastikaya. It has again been asked that if Dharma as a principle of motion and Adharma as the principle of rest, they are contrary, how can they co-exist ? Both of them are continuous, both of them are formless. They are ajiva and they are inferable. For this, it can be said that their functions are different. One helps motion and the other helps the static existence. Both these functions are different; they cannot be attributed to the same principle. The third question has been asked : Dharma and Adharma are formless. How can they assist motion and rest? The answer is, that the capacity to help not necessarily remains in those substances which have form, even the formless substances have this capacity. Just as Akasa (space) is formless, but still it accomodates infinite number of things so also Dharma and Adharma are formless, they are the basic principles of motion and rest. Akasa has the capacity of accommodating things, so also the Dharma and Adharma has the capacity to help the motion and rest. The next question is: if Dharma and Adharma are all-pervading, then they must inter-penetrate each other. And there will be no distinction between them.

Page #153
132 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY For this, it can be said that as substances they are all pervading but as to their functions they are different. Each does its own functions although they do co-exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and the light of each lamp pervades the entire room. It does not mean that the function of one is not distinct from the other and it is lost and has no existence. Similarly, Dharma and Adharma are all-pervading, yet their functions are different and there is no contradictions in their functional distinctions. Some thinkers have compared Adharma with the principle of gravitation and field. But Dr. Mohanlal Mehta is of view that the Dharmastikaya is quite different from the gravitational force and field and it is an independent principle. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara does not find it necessary that Dharma and Adharma be considered as independent substances (dravyas) He considers that both of them are not substances but they are modes of substances.1 T AKASASTIKAYA That substance which accommodates Jiva, Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Kala is called Akasadravya. It is the basis of all dravyas and therefore it has a special function.3 Gautama Ganadhara asked to Mahavira : "Bhagavan ! What is the use of substance of Akasa for the Jivas and the Ajivas ?" Bhagavana Mahavira said : 0 Gautama, if Akasa were not to be there, where would the jivas be? Where would the Dharma and Adharma astikayas pervade? Where would the Kala extend ? Where would the dance of Pudgala be possible? The whole world would be without foundation ? Akasa is not a solid thing, but it is empty space which accommodates all things. It is all-pervading (sarva-vyapi), formless (amurta) and it has infinite points of space (ananta pradesi). Akasa is divided 1 Niscayadvatrimsika, 24 Prayogavisrasakarma tadabhavasthistatha. Lokanubhavav rittantah kim dharmadharma yo falam: 2 Tattvarthasutra 5, 18--Akasasyavagahah. 3 Uttaradhyayana 28, 9-Bhayanam savvadavvanam naham ogahala kkhanam 4 Bhagavati 13, 4,

Page #154
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 133 into two parts: (1) Lokakasa (the limited universe i.e. the world) and (2) Al@kakasa (the limitless beyond). As a lake gives space to the water, similarly Akasa is a resting place for all the dravyas. A question has been asked that if Akasa were to be one and continuous, how could there be distinction between the Lokakasa and the Alokakasa? How can Akasa be divided into these two? But the answer is, this division is not on the basis of substance, it is with reference to the functions of the Dharma and Adharma dravyas. Akasa is really one and continuous without parts, but we make a distinction between Lokakasa and Alokakasa because we have to explain the distinction with reference to the accommodation to the other dravyas. That part of Akasa where substances like Jiva, Pudgala, Adharma, Dharma and Kala exists, is called Lokakasa and the beyond is called Alokakasa. Akasa is one and formless, it is all-pervading and even in the Lokakasa and Alokakasa, there is no distinction in substance. A question has been asked that it may be true that which accommodates things is the Akasa. Lokakasa accommodates the substances. We may call it Akasa. But the limitless and the beyond which is called Alokakasa does not accommodate anything, hence void. Still why is it called Akasa? The answer is that the very nature of Akasa is to accommodate things and Lokakasa accommodates dravyas, but in Alokakasa there is nothing. So, there is no question of accommodating. In the Alokakasa there are no substances at all. Substances are limited to the Loka, so Alokakasa does not accommodate but it does not mean that it looses its function of accommodation. The fact is this that due to the absence of Dharma and Adharma as the principles of motion and rest in the Alokakasa, it is completely free from any other substance. Therefore it is empty. It is the limitless. Therefore, it is called ananta (endless). It is the limitless beyond. In modern philosophy Dharma, Adharma and Akasa have been considered as the forces in Akasa. A question is asked: How does Akasa accommodate a thing? That which has no place prior it can be given a place or the thing which was not there could be kept there? 1 Uttaradhyayana, 36, 2.

Page #155
134 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The answer is, every object is in one place or the other. It moves from one place to the other. As Akasa is beginningless, so are other substances. A question is again asked : If all substances exist simultaneously and if Akasa accommodates all substances on the basis of Dharma and Adharma, how can these substances be considered as those which get accommodation (adheya). The answer is Akasa is more extensive than the other substances, It gives accommodation to all substances and so it is called base (adhara) and as the other substances take accommodation in it so they have been called adheya. Just as the hands and the body can be related as the part and the whole, or the organs and the body. The entire canvas of the objects depend on each other. According to Jainism, water is the support of the earth. Vayu is the support of water, and Akasa is the support of Vayu. But Akasa has no support outside itself. It is self-existent and it does not need the support of any other substance. Lokakasa has infinite number of pradesas (space points), while Alokakasa has limitless space. The wbole Akasa is limitless and endless. It is limitless because, infinite pradesas are taken out from the limitless Akasa, still infinite pradesas remain. Therefore, from the point of view of extension, Akasa has been considered to be of different as ananta (endless), paritananta (endless more) and yuktananta (still more endless) and anantananta (endlessly endless).1 All these are the forms of the endless. According to the Buddhists, Vaisesika, Sarkhya and Vedantins, Akasa is the substance. But we do not get an elaborate discussion of Akasa in these schools of thought as we get in the Jaina philosophy. In the Buddhist philosophy, Akasa is considered to have a characteristic of avaranabhava (absence of pervasion) and it is considered to be simple element (asanskrta dharma). But in the Jaina philosophy, Akasa is not considered in a negative connotation, in terms of abhava (non-existence), and also it is not considered as asamskrita dharma 1 2 Tattvartharajavartika, 5, 10, 2. Baldeva Upadhyaya : Bauddha Darsana, p. 239 (Hindi)

Page #156
135 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY because it has the characteristic in it of the origin, permanence and destruction (utpada, sthiti and vinasa). Vaisesikas have made Akasa as independent substance and it has a characteristic of producing sabda (sound). They have considered the directions different from Akasa.1 That which has the attribute of sabda is Akasa, and that which limits the external world by direction is called dik.? Nyaya-karikavals makes dik as that which has the attributes of the farness and nearness (duratva and sampiya) and which makes distinction between the one place and the other. Dik is one and nitya (eternal). By the phenomenal distinctions for practical purposes it is called the east and west and other directions.3 In the Jaina philosophy dik is not considered to be distinct from Akasa. Because in the variable measurable distinctions of Akasa, we find the dik i. e. , the direction. These are conventional measures. Akasa is not one which produces sound because sabda is produced by matter which has form and Akasa is formless. It is not possible to say that the formless Akasa produced substances with form. Similarly, we cannot say that Akasa is a product of prakrti nor is it an appearance of Brahman4 because Akasa is an independent substance. According to Jainism, Akasa as a substance has infinity number of pradesas. From the point of view of extension, it is endless and limitless extending from Loka to Aloka. From the point of time, Akasa is beginningless and endless and considered from the point of view of nature, Akasa is formless. Dik (direction) is a form of empirical measurement of Akasa with reference to the existence and location of the things. It is the masurable extent of Akasa, with reference to different locations. From the slanting loka (tir yak loka), we have the "disa and a anudisa." 1 Tarkasangraha p. 2, 9. Tatra dravyani prthivyaptejovayvakasakaladigatmamanansi navaiva ... Sabdagunakamakasam. tatryaikam vibhunityam ca...pracyadi vyavaharaheturdik. 2 Vaisesika Sutra, 2, 2, 13. 3 Nyayakarikavali 46, 47. Durantikadidhiheturika nityadigucyate. Upadhibhedadekapi pracyadi vyapadesabhak. 4 (a) Sadananda : Vedantasara, p. 32. b) Samkhyakarika, 3.

Page #157
136 A SOURC E-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Doh Disa commences with two points of space of Akasa, and increasing itself by two-two pradesas, it covers infinite number of pradesas. Anudisa is a part of Disa. Urdhva disa (upward direction) and adhodisa (downward direction) begin with four pradesas and in these, there are four pradesas till the end. There is no increase in the pradesas.1 The East is a direction which a man, where he is, considers as the direction from which sun rises. The direction in which the sun sets is for him the West. If a man faces the East and expands his both the hands, the direction to the right hand is South and the direction to the left is the North. These directions are conventional measurements based on the sunrise and sun's movement. These are also called tapadisas.2 In Acaranganiryukti we get another description of directions. It is for astrological purpose. The East would be in front of astrologer (prajnapaka) the West behind him, the North to his left hand and South to his right hand. This distinction is called Prajnapaka Disa.3 We should remember that Disa (direction) is not an independent substance. Disa has been conventionally formed for the sake of measuring space and determining directions. Akasa has infinite pradesas (points of space). Just as every point in a piece of cloth is necessary for giving pattern, similarly all the pradesas give a pattern for the empirical measurement of Akasa. Pradesa can be considered to be a point of space in which one parmanu exists. This is the primary limits of measurement. When we measure and determine the directions like East and West, they are only for practical purposes. They are not to be considered as separate entities and we cannot consider the countries, the districts and the other sub-divisions as independent space. It is all one, but it is measured for practical purposes. 1 Acaranganir yukti, 42, 44. 2 Ibid, 47, 48. 3 Ibid, 51. 4 Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain: Jaina Darsana, p. 174.

Page #158
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 137 In modern science Akasa (space) is not to be considered to possess the characteristic of producing sound. Matter has attributes of producing sound. Sound is experienced by the sense organs which are material in nature. Therefore, material particles come into contact with the other material particles and due to the resistance of the material particles, sound is produced. The stimulation of the sound is received by the sense-organ--the ear. Due to this contact, the sound is experienced We cannot consider Akasa as the substance having the attribute of sound. Akasa is not a product nor a mode of a material substance, nor is it extensible nor extendable due to the material substance. According to Samkhya, prakrti is the primordial substance and Prthyi and Akasa are the products of the prakrti But it is a question worth considering. The products of prak yti like prthvi, water and air and agni etc. have form and how can the product of Akasa which is also a product of prakrti cannot ha form. The prakrti evolve into a variety of complex of modes to form the universe. The evolution of the prakrti is based on the distru bance in the equilibrium of the three gunas--sattva, rajas and tamas. But the evolutes of prakrti will have different qualitative distinctions as some having form and some formless, if we accept Akasa as a product of praksti. It cannot be said that prakrti gives rise to Akasa and we cannot make Akasa, the product of prakrti. Because Akasa is inactive, formless, endless, and all pervasive. The products of a prakrti arises out of the disturbances in the three gunas and due to the presence of the purusa. Purusa is inactive and pure consciousness. Purusa is an independent reality and prakrti is to explain the evolution of the entire universe including Akasa. This appears to be difficult to understand. Water, earth and other substances have Akasa as the matrix. In the case of water, the particles are little apart and they are bound to be in-between. Therefore, Akasa accommodates all substances. BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF AKASA The Buddhist philosophers have considered Akasa to be a simple element (asarsak sta dharma). "They have described it as

Page #159
138 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY having the characteristic of anavrtti (non-covering) and avaranabhava (non-pervasion). It does not pervade anything nor is it covered by any object, those elements which have the attributes of origin and destruction are called samskrta dharma (composite elements). But the Sarvaksanikavadi Buddhists maintain that Akasa is a simple substance and not composite. But it is free from the characteristic of origin and destruction. Vaibhasikas describe the nature of Akasa as a non-pervasive element, but have its own characteristic." But the question is, is it possible to have an object with empirical characteristic and at the same time not produced? It is possible that we cannot describe the products of Akasa in the language of origin and destruction However, Akasa is eternal and not produced unlike the other four elements like prthvi, ap, teja, and vayu. So, abhidhammasangraha has described Akasa in terms of pariccheda (analysis), but Akasa cannot be purely described in terms of pariccheda, because it is one and continuous and also because in empirical characteristic like origin and destruction are applicable to composite objects (samskrta dharma). WESTERN CONCEPTION OE SPACE (AKASA) The western philosophers have given an elaborate discussion about the reality and nature of space. There are different views. There is the rationalistic approach presented by Descartes and Leibnitz and that is the idealistic view presented by Plato, Aristotle and even upto Kant. Descartes, Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space as a form of experience. Kant said that space is a form of perception. While Plato, Aristotle and others have said that space is an independent substance. The Jainas have given an independent reality to Akasa and have considered it as an astikaya because it has the dual characteristic of astitva (existence) and kayatva (extension). Regarding the nature of Akasa as sunya (empty) or otherwise, philosophers are not agreed. The idealistic philosophers like Kant and others have considered the empty space as possible. Descartes, 1 Abhidharma kosa 1, 5.-Tatrakasamanavrttih. 2 Ibid., 1, 28-Chidramakasadhatvakhyam alokatamasi kila.

Page #160
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Leibnitz and Plato and Aristotle have said that empty space without the content of objects is not possible. The Jainas have advocated the possibility of empty space in their concept of Alokakasa. But from the phenomenal point of view, Akasa is always filled. Regarding the nature of Akasa, there are different views. Kant and others, as we mentioned earlier, believe that space is a form of perception. It is the matrix on which perception is possible. All experience is possible because of the matrix and space and time. However, Akasa is not an independent substance. It is an intellectual construct. If it is considered to be an independent reality there would be no distinction between Tswara and Akasa.1 Akasa is jynatasapeksa (a product of intellect). It is a priori principle and it is cognitively priori which is a postulate. Observation : The idealist philosphers have considered space as only a product of understanding and that has no independent reality. It is made to be based on cognitive consciousness, it is not in-reality. Even the support of the things that is attributed to Akasa is a product of intellect. However, the things of the world requires some support and without the concept of Akasa, we cannot construct the order of the universe, yet it cannot be said to be a mere product of imagination. Because the facts of the world contradict it. The idealist contention that the all-pervasive nature of Akasa would lead to the identity of the Iswara and Akasa is not also correct. Thirdly, Kant said that space is a form of perception and it is intuitive perception. This view, appears to be inadequate, because space is a fact of experience and the things of the world do require a substance which give support to them.2 Euclidian Physiometry and the later mathematical development have proved contrary to the Kantian conception of space as a form of perception. Jainas and Kant agree in one point. In that, they accept the possibility of the empty space. 1 Cosmology, p. 101. 2 Cosmology, p. 97. 3 Refer to (a) Physics and Philosophy-Varanar Haisanavarg, 3 p. 81. (b) From Euclid to Edington, p. 16-17. (c) The Philosophy of Space and Time, Introduction, p. 60. 139

Page #161
140 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY According to Plato and Aristotle, space is considered as a substance. Plato has said that space is the blank principle. Aristotle would only accept the reality of space in the presence of physical objects. Descartes says that space cannot be considered as an attribute of the object. Observations: If Akasa has a reality of its own, it must be different from the physical objects, because physical objects are destructive while Akasa is endless. To occupy certain space and to obstruct of certain space are the characteristics of the physical objects, but to give space to these objects is a different thing. Many objects can exist together and the same object may exist in d objects at different times This makes it clear that the object occ occupying the space, and space accommodating the objects are different subjects. According to Jainas, the substance of Akasa can accommodate many objects in one space. Akasa is formless, but if it considered in relation to the objects occupying space, it can be described as having form. However, Akasa cannot inherit the qualities of the objects it accommodates. Leibnitz and other philosophers have considered space, a form of visible objects. Eienstein has considered space as a reality ; infact it is space-time reality. According to Gasendi, space is a reality independent of matter and the Self. This view is nearer to the Jaina conception of giving independent reality to Akasa. This has relevance to the scientific conception of space. Newton, like the Jainas, have accepted the reality of space with objects i.e., filled-space as having form. Space is considered to be without movement (agatisila), one and continuous. It is like the void. However, there is a difference between Newtonian and the Jaina conception of space. According to the Newtonian conception, space is indelibly connoted with ether and matter. This is meant to explain the principle of motion. But according to the Jainas the principles of motion and that of rest (Dharma-Adharina dravyas) are independent substances and they are the basis of motion and rest in the universe. These two principles and the Akasa are not inherent. In this sense, ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of Akasa. Betrand

Page #162
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Russell also comes to a similar view. He would like to distinguish the filled space, and empty space on the basis of rigours of logic? KALA (TIME) 1895 Jaina philosophers have presented two prominent views regarding the nature of Kala (time). According to one view, Kala is considered to be the mode of substances of Jiva and Ajiva. Kala is considered to be an independent tattva. According to the other view, Kala is an independent substance, just like Jiva and Ajiva. In the same sense Kala cannot become the expression of change in the objects although it is the medium of change, and Kala is an independent substance. It is a dravya although it is not an astikaya, because it is not multi-dimensional but it is only uni-dimensional. In the Svetambara Agama literature, there is the mention of both the views in Bhagavati,1 Uttaradhyayana, Jivabhigama3 and Prajnapana.4 Later Acarya Umasvati, Siddhasena Divakara, Jinabhadragani, Haribhadrasuri,a Acarya Hemachandra, Upadhyaya Yasovijaya,10 Vinayavijaya,11 Devacandra,12 and other Svetambara acaryas have mentioned both the views. Digambara acaryas like Kundakunda, 18 Pujyapada,14 Bhattaraka Akalamkadeva 15 and Vidyanandasvami16 have mentioned that Kala is an independent substance. 1 Bhagavati 25, 4, 734. 2 Uttaradhyayana, 28, 7-8, 3 Jivabhigama. 4 Prajnapana, pada 1, Sutra 3. 5 141 Tattvarthasutra 5, 38-39 and see its bhasya by Siddhasena. 6 Dvatrimsika. 7 Visesavasyaka bhasya 926 and 2068. 8 Dharmasangrahani, Gatha 32 tika by Malayagiri. 9 Yogasastra. 10 Dravyagunaparyaya rasa, see Prakarana Ratnakara, pt. I, Gatha 10, Lokaprakasa. 11 12 Nayacakrasara and Agamasara. 13 Pravacanasara, 2, gatha 46-47. 14 Tattvarthasarvarthasiddhi 5, 38-39. 15 Tattvartharajavartika, 5, 38-39. 16 Tattvarthaslokavartika, 5, 38-39.

Page #163
142 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY According to the first view of Kala, the measurable distance like samaya, muhurta, day and night are the modes of Kala from the practical point of view. The modes are special features of the substances jiva and ajiva. In the constitution of the world, Jiva and Ajiva are the constituent principles and both of them are expressed in the form of modification. These modifications and their clusters are considered as Kala. Kala by itself is not an independent substance.1 According to the second view, Kala is an independent substance. Just as Dharma and Adharma as principles of motion and rest are independent substances Jiva and Ajiva have their functions of movement and rest. But the movement and rest is possible in the medium of the principle of movement i. e. Dharma and the principle of rest. The two are independent substances. Similarly, time is a substance and change is possible in time.2 However, the two views mentioned above are not contrary to each other, but they are complement to each other. From noumenal point of view, Kala is abode of the Jiva and the Ajiva and not an independent substance. But from phenomenal point of view Kala is a substance. It is considered a substance because of its functions. The functions of Kala can be mentioned as change, effect, activity, the one and the other etc. For this reason, Kala is considered as dravya. The changes in the various objects are possible in time. The conventional measurements of time like samaya and avalika are not different from jiva and ajiva. They are the modes of these substances. From the noumenal point of view, Kala need not be considered as an independent substance. By making Kala the mode of the substances of Jiva and Ajiva, the phenomenal existence can be explained. But from practical point of view, Kala has been considered as an independent substance just as Jiva-Ajiva and their modes are considered. 1 Pandit Sukhalalji: Darsana aur Cintana, p. 331. 2 Pandit Sukhalalji : Darsan aur Cintana, p. 332. 3 (a) Bhagavati 2, 10, 120; 11, 11, 424; 13, 4, 482-483; 25, 4 etc. (b) Prajnapana, pada 1. (c) Uttaradhyayana 28, 10. 4 Sthanangasutra 95.

Page #164
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 143 If we survey the Jaina literature regarding the constitution of the Loka i. e., the universe, we find that there are two views mentioned. The first view maintains that the universe is constituted of six substances ($addravyas, and the other view advocates the constitution of the universe as made up of five principles, pancastikaya.2 However, according to Dalsukhabhai Malavania, the view of six dravyas mentioned in the Uttaradhyayana may be considered as an exception. In the Sverambara literature like Sthananga, Jivabhigama," Bhagavati, and Pancastikaya," in Digambara literature, it is suggested that the universe is constituted of 5 principles (panca. stikaya). Uttaradh yayanas and Dharmasangrahani have described Kaia as of the measure of two and a half dvipa (islands). In fact Kala has relevance in the world of men and also in the astronomical and astrological calculations. The rotations and evolutions of planets are possible in time. In this sense, Kala has relevance with reference to human intellect. In the Digambara literature Kala is not merely considered as an aspect of or an expression of human intellect with reference to human activity, but it is also pervading the entire universe. It may be noted that although Kala is a substance, it is not a substance like the other five substances having extensional dimensions. It is not a substance having the characteristics of skandha 1 Uttaradhyayana, 28, 7- Dhammo adhammo agasam kalo puggala-jantavo. Esa logo tti pannatto jinehim varadamsihi. 2 Bhagavati 13, 4, 481. (a) kimiyam bhante ! loyetti payuccas ? Goyama, pancatthikaya. (b) Pancastikaya, gatha 3. 3 Agama yug ka Jaina-darsana, p. 214. 4 Sthananga, 5, 3, 441. 5 Jivabhigama, 4. 6 Bhagavati 13, 4, 481. Pancastikaya, Gatha 3, 8 Uttaradhyayana, 36, 7, Dammadhamme ya do ceva logamitta viyahie. Logaloge ya agase, samaye samaya-khettie.

Page #165
144 It has no It is (aggregate of atoms), but it is of the nature of the anu. magnitude, therefore it has no kayatva. It is not an astikaya. non-dimensional. The time series are always in forward direction (urdhva pracaya). It is a linear series.1 The span of Kala is considered to be uni-dimensional. Dharma and Adharma and the panca dravyas except Kala have three dimensional forms. In these, there are aggregates of many points that Kala always moves in one direction, it is forward-looking. Every point of time is discrete and at a particular moment of time the present alone exists and the past has gone and the future has to come. Therefore, here is only one samaya every time. Therefore, there is no possibility of aggregate of time (skandha). As it is mono-dimensional, it cannot present a reverse direction i. e., tiryak pracaya. Therefore kala is not considered an astikaya. FORMS OF TIME (KALA) A SOURCE BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY } Sthananga2 mentions four types of Kala: 1. pramana kala, (measurable time), 2. Yathayunirvrttikala (life span time of a jiva) 3. Maranakala (moment of death) and 4. Addhakala (time relative to the movement of sun and moon). Conventional measurement of Kala is impossible and is possible through the changes in the objects. The life and death are two relative spans of time. The duration of life is considered as yathayunirvrtti kala and the cessation of the duration of life is death and is called the maranakala. The measurement of time based on the revolutions of the sun and the moon is called the addhakala. It is a primary distinction of measurement of time. The other distinctions are forms of this distinction. This is the phenomenal measurement of time with a practical purpose of determining the span of time. Therefore, this is restricted to the human world and it is meant to measure the various distinctions of time for human activities. We have already said that the real time i. e., niscaya kala, is the mode of jiva and ajiva. And it is all pervading both in the Loka and Aloka. There are no divisions in real time. All the divisions from samaya to 1 Dravyasangraha, 22. 2 Sthananga 4.

Page #166
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 145 pudgala-paravartana are made of the addhakala. The minutest division of kala is samaya. It is indivisible. It can be described on tbe analogy of a hole in the kamalapatra or a hole in a piece of cloth. If the 100 petals of lotus are kept one over another and if one is to pierce a needle so as to penetrate all the petals, it may appear that all of them have been penetrated simultaneously. But this does not happen. Every petal is pierced successively within the minutest fraction of time and that samaya which takes to pierce one petal is the unit. As a strong man, you may tear a piece of cloth at once. It may appear that the piercing was done simultaneously, but this was not so. Every thread is torn at every fraction of time and that is the smallest unit of time. In short, a piece of cloth is woven into large number of threads and each thread is constituted as the infinite points of cotton. When the piece of cloth is torn, every point of cotton and every thread needs to be torped separately and each requires an indivisible and minutest fraction of time and this is called samaya. We may now mention the conventional measurements of time for the purpose of human activities from samaya, the smallest unit, to the largest unit of anantakalacakra. The indivisible minutest fraction of time -one samaya Infinite number of samayas --one avalika 256 avalikas -one ksullaka bhava (the shortest life span) 2223 3773 avalikas -one breath (inhaling and exhaling) 4446 3779 avalikas | -one prana Sadhika 17 ksullaka bhava or-one breath 7 pranas -one stoka 7 stoka -one lava 381 lava. -one ghati (24 minutes) I Bhagavati, 11, 11.

Page #167
146 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 77 lavas -2 ghati or -65536 ksullaka bhava or 16777216 avalika or -3773 prana or -one muhurta (48 minutes) 30 muhurta - one day and a night 15 days -one paksa (fortnight) 2 paksas -one masa (month) 2 masa -one rtu (season) 3 rtu one ayana 2 a yana --one year 5 years -One yuga 70 crore-crores, 56 lakhs krore years -one purva Innumerable years -one palyopama 10 Crore-crore palyopama -one sagara 20 Crore-crore sagara -one kalacakra Anantakalacakra -one pudgala paravartana THE NATURE OF KALA IN THE VEDIC TRADITION The term Kala has been used at many places in the Vedas and Upanisads. But we do not get a clear picture of the exact meaning of the Kala in all these references. Kanada in the Vaisesika darsana has presented four sutras for describing the principle of Kala. He says that Kala is substance, it is eternal and it is the ground of all activities. In the Nyaya philosophy Gautama has not given an independent interpretation about the nature of Kala. Incidentally, he has described the nature of Kala as the ground of all activities. Just as Vaisesikas have done, the Nyaya-Vaiseskas have a similar view of Kala. In the Purva-mimamsa there is not much discussion about the nature of the Kala. Jaimini has not given specific references regarding 1 See-Upanisad vakya kosa. 2 Vaisesikadarsana 2, 2, 6-9. Aparasminnaparam ugapacciram ksi pramiti kalalingani. Dravyatva nityatve vayuna vyakhyatam. Tattvaw bhavana Nityes vabhavadanit yesu bhavatkarane kalakhyeti. 3 Pancadhyayi 2, 1, 23. Digdesakalakasesvapyevau prasangah.

Page #168
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 147 the nature of the Kala. However, the commentator like Parthasarathi and Pandit Ramakrisna, i have discussed this problem of time and have largely accepted the Vaisesika concept of time, with certain' modifications in that, Vaisesikas consider kala to be indirect in cognition, while mimamsakas make direct cognition. In this sense, we can say that Nyaya-Vaisesika and purva-mimarnsa maintain the time as an independent substance. According to Samkhya, purusa and the prakrti are the two fundamental principles, Akasa, disa (direction), mind etc. are nothing but the products of prakrti. There is no independent substance like time, but it is only an expression of prakrti. Prakrti is eternal, yet it has its changing aspects. The gross and subtle matter are expres. sions of praksti. In the Yoga philosophy, Patanjali has not discussed prominently the nature of time. But the commentator Vyasa, in his commentary, has made specific mention of the time. He says that measurable units of time like muhurta, prahara, day etc. are phenominal measurements of time and for practical purposes they are products of intellectual discrimination. We make distinctions in the different spans of time on the basis of minutest units of a ksana (moment). Ksana is real but it is not the fundamental substance. It is the ground of change, and the minutest unit on which change is measured is ksana He shows that ksana can be measured by the time-span taken by an atom to reverse form from one point to the other. In the Yoga philosophy, also like the Samkhya, prakrti is considered to be unconscious, but active. Activity is the inherent characteristic of prakrti and therefore it does not need any other force to bring activity in prak yti. But the ground of activity and not the cause can be considered to be the principle of time. It is only an efficient cause, it is to be understood as a principle on account of which change can be 1 Yuktisnehaprapurani siddhantacandrika, 1, 1, 5, 5. Nasmakam vaisesika devada pratyaksah kalah, kintu prat yaksa evaw, asminksane mayopalabdha it yanubhavat. arupas yaapyakasavat prat yaksatvam bhavisyati. Sarnkhya pravacana 2, 12-Dikkalavakasadibhyah. 2

Page #169
148 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY measured. However, unlike Vaisesikas, Sankhya and Yoga darsanas, do not make Kala as an independent substance. Vedanta darsana is also called Uttaramimarnsa or aupanisdika darsana. The propounder of this school of thought was Badarayana. Badarayana has not discussed the naiure of time but sankaracarya has presented his theory of absolutism. According to him, Brahman is the only reality. Atman is the Brahman, all else is appearance. According to this theory, substances like akasa, atoms, etc. are not independent reality. However, as we have seen earlier other Vedantins like the Visistadvaitins, of Ramanuja school of thought and other forms of Vedantins like Nimbarka, Madhva, Vallabha, etc. have given their interpretation of the relation of the Brahman and the Atman although the foundational principle of the Brahman as the sole reality continues to determine their interpretations of the Brahman. They have not considered Kala as an independent substance. All the Vedantins along with the Samkhya and the Yoga are agreed that the Kala is a form of perception and is not an independent substance. Thus we have two views regarding the substance Kala in the Jaina philosophy. Similarly in the Vedic tradition, we have also two views, the one advocating the time as an independent substance and the other denying the independent substantially to Kala (time). THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KALA (TIME) The Buddhists consider time as a mental construct for the sake of the practical purpose. Time is not an independent substance. It is an only experience. It is a cognition. The past, the present, the future are all phenomenal distinctions of time made for practical purposes and they are not real time. 1 Darsana ane Cintana, part 2, p. 1028-Bhasya of Yogadarsana, pada 3, sutra 52. Atthsalini 1, 3, 16. 2

Page #170
li.. Pudgala (Matter): A Study WHAT IS MATTER What the scientists call matter and what Nyaya-Valgesika call the physical universe (jada), the Jainas call it Pudgala. In the Buddhist philosophy, the word pudgala has been used to connote alaya, vijiana, cetanasantati etc. In the Jaina agamas, atman embodied and associated with matter is also sometimes called Pudgala, but primarily the word pudgala refers to the substance with form. Of the six substances, five of them, except Kala, are called Astikaya, because they have extension and astitva. Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, and Akasa do not possess characteristics of integration (saryoga) and disintegration (vibhaga). Its distinctions are denoted by means of atoms. If we imagine the extension, if possible of the four substances, we can find that Jiva, Dharma and Adharma ave innumerable parts, while Akasa is indivisible and endless. ala is not indivisible. The minutest part of Pudgala is paramanu i. e, atom, and the biggest part of the Pudgala is the entire cosmos. Atom can be considered as micro-cosm and cosmos can be looked at as macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as mahaskandha and as pervading the entire universe. For this reason also, Pudgala is considered to have the characteristics of integration and disintegration (purana-galana). TERMINOLOGY OF PUDGALA The term Pudgala has two parts-pud and gala. Pud refers to 1 Bhagayati 8, 10, 361- Jivenam ! poggali, poggale ? Jive poggalivi, poggalevi. Sabdakalpadruma kosa-In the fifth temporal stage (sama ya) of kevalinasamudghata the matter that is separated from the atman pervades the entire universe and it is called "acittamahaskandha."

Page #171
150 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY completing or joining, 'gala' refers to dropping or finishing. The substance which has the characteristic of constantly integrating and disintegrating i.e, joining and separating, forming and separating is called pudgala, Tattvartharajavartika2, Tattvarthavrtti of Siddhasena,3 Dhavala and the Harivamsapurana have stated that due to the characteristic of integration and disintegration, the substance Pudgala is considered to be matter. Pudgala is that substance which can be divided and also combined. Pudgala has the attributes such as sparsa (touch), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and varna (colour). PUDGALA IS RUPI In this sense, Pudgala is an object of sense-experience. As it has the attributes of rasa, gandha, etc. it is called rupi or rupavan (having form). The objects with form can be experienced and cognised through the sense-organs. Objects without form cannot be experienced through the sense-organs. For instance, substances like Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, Akasa and Kala are formless and we cannot get the experience of these through the sense-organs. A question arises, namely, that as the Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha etc. can we say that these attributes are inherent attributes of the substance Pudgala or are they products of experience and imposed by the mind on substance? The answer is, Pudgala has the attributes of rasa, gandha, etc. The sense-organs do not impose these attributes on matter. Matter has the inherent characteristics of these varna, rasa, etc. Without 1 Sabdakalpadrumkosa-Puranat pud galayatiti galah. Tattvartharajavartika 5, 1, 24 2 Puranagalananyarthasamjnatvat pudgalah. 3 (a) Tattvarthavrtti 5, 1-Puranad galanacca pudgalah. (a) Nyayakosa, p. 502-Puranad galanad iti pudgalah. 4 Dhavala-Chavihasanthanam bahuvihi dehehi puraditti galaditti poggala. 5 Harivamsapurana 7, 36 Varna-gandha-rasa-sparsah-puranam galanam ca yat. Kurvanti skandhavat tasmat pudgalah paramanavah. 6 (a) Tattvarthasutra 5, 23-Sparsarasagandhavarnavantah pudgalah. (b) Bhagavati, 2, 10.

Page #172
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 151 these attributes, matter has no existence at all. It is true that experience of these qualities is due to the contact of matter with the sense-organs. But it does not mean that these attributes are not in the matter. The relation is between the sense-organs and varnna-rasa is not between the cause and effect, but between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. Similarly, sense-organs are not the products of varna and rasa. Both of them have independent existence. They, however, interact on each other. There is another question regarding the experience of illusions. If colour and taste are inherent attributes of substance, how is it that experiences of these attributes with different individuals differ and how is it that there are illusions, concerning the colour, taste, etc ? How is it that there are differences in the experience of taste and colour according to the differences in individual capacities, place and time etc ? The answer is, it is true that these experiences of colour, taste, etc., may be different with different individuals and also in different circumstances. The causes are twofold (1) internal and (2) external The internal cause refers to the differences in the sense-organs, and the external causes are concerned with external stimulations. Due to these two types of causes, we experience diffences in the experience of rasa, gandha, etc. For instance, a person suffering from jaundice sees everything yellow. A colour-blind man will see everything grey. Similarly, our experiences of the melody and the music depend upon our mental get up. If we are in a bad mood, the music drags on. Such differences of experiences are also possible due to the differences in the intensity and the extent of the stimulations that the sense-organs receive from the external world. For instance, bright light may give different stimulations and discordant music may also give different stimulations for the harmonious music. Due to these differences in the external stimulations, we experience objects differently. These differences in experience are therefore due to the internal and external causes. However, the attributes of rasa, gandha etc. are inherently present in the substance. Without these attributes, substance cannot exist. Substance is the substratum of the attributes and the attributes are equally real and independent. The Jainas maintain the distinct relationship between the substance and the attributes.

Page #173
I 152 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY S THE FOUR TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER) Matter (Pudgala) is a substance and it is of four divisions (bheda) : (1) aggregate (skandha), (2) skandha desa (aggregate occupying space), (3) skandha pradesa (aggregate occupying limited space), (4) paramanu (atoms).1 SKANDHA: y V1 The unit of formed matter (murta dravya) is skandha. It is the aggregate of atoms, i.e., from two atoms to infinite number of atoms arise. In the skandha, we find the integration and disintegration of paramanus. Similarly, the aggregates also may join with atoms, and that would be one skandha. If two atoms combine, the aggregate is called dvi-pradesi. And if the dvi-pradesi skandha is divided, we get two atoms. If three atoms are combined we get three-pradesi skandha. If they are separated, we get either three paramanus or one paramanu and dyi-pradesi skandha. If four atoms are combined, it is called Catuhpradesi skandha. If they are separated we get the following forms : 1. One atom and one three-atomed aggregate (three pradesi skandha). 2. Two dvi-pradesi skandhas (aggregates of two atoms each). 3. Two atoms each separate and one dvi-pradesi skandha. 4. Four atoms separate each. Sometimes, infinite number of atoms combine and they form the cosmos. The aggregates of atoms are called skandha. Skandha formation is of three types: (1) bhedapurvaka (having distinctions) (2) sanghata purvaka (collection), (3) Bheda and sanghata parraka (with distinctions and collection.) The distinctions are possible due to internal and external causes. The internal causes, for the distinction between the one skandha and the other do not depend on any external factors. The 1 (a) Bhagavati, 2, 10, 66. (b) Uttaradhyayana, 36, 10. 2 Tattvarthasutra 5, 26--Bhedasanghatebhya utpadyante. 3 Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 26.

Page #174
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 153 causes are inherent in the skandhas themselves. The external causes are due to some external factors, and these are called skandhas formed due to external causes. Formation of unity of different elements is called sanghata. This is due to the external causes or the internal causes. Two different atoms combine and they form a sanghata. The aggregates formed due to the distinctions (bheda) and sanghata (union) are called bheda-sanghata purvaka skandha. For instance, at a particular moment one part of the skandha gets separated and at the same time another skandha comes and joins it and forms a new skandha then this skandha is called the skandha due to distinction and union. In this way, the skandhas are formed in three different ways. The aggregate may be formed only by bheda or only by sanghata or sometimes due to both the processes. In modern science, the concept of aggregate has been designated as molecule and it is very much discussed in the physical sciences. It has been pointed out that physical objects are formed due to the aggregates. These molecules have tremendous velocity in various directions in the gases and in the aggregate skandha. For instance, a piece of chalk is considered to be an aggregate of atoms and molecules. If it is divided into two parts and further divided into two parts and in this way if we divide the piece of atoms into infinite parts, the nature of the chalk remains essentially as chalk. The minutest part of the chalk-piece is also skandha. But as we go on dividing a piece of object, we may reach a point where it cannot be further divided. That is the indivisible unit of the object and that is also an aggregate skandha. In this sense, the Jaina concept of skandha and the modern concept of aggregate (molecule) have some similarities although there are some differences. According to Jainism, one unit or collection of units of atoms is called skandha : it may be a pot or a table or a book. If the pot is broken into two pieces, then also there are two skandhas and if it is broken into thousand pieces, there are thousand skandhas. Similarly, if we grind the pot into powder, each particle of the powder is a skandha. Modern science considers such a particle as one skandha also, It is a molecule. But, if we go further, the indivisible part looses its characteristics of a pot and may form as a part of something else. According

Page #175
154 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY to Jainism, however, the minutest part of the pot is also a skandha. It does not change the characteristic of a pot in the skandha, as long it does not reach the stage of an atom. The minutest parts of an aggregate are aggregate. SKANDHA-DESA: Skandha (aggregate of atoms) may be considered as one unit. This unit can be measured intellectually as one unit (through out our intellect) and is called skandha-desa. If we imagine that this is a part of one pencil or a book it is considered to be ekadesa skandha. It means that desa and skandha are not separate. They are only discriminations made due to intellect. If they actually are separated, then they become separate skandhas. SKANDHA-PRADESA :: The inseparable unit of a skandha is called skandha-pradesa. It means the paramanu having the capacity to combine may be considered as skandha-pradesa. It is the indivisible part, most subtle and which cannot be further divided. PARAMANU : The indivisible unit of a skandha is called paramanu. As long as it has the tendency to combine, it is considered to be pradesa and if it becomes separate and remains separate, it is called paramanu. The commentators on Jaina sastra have explained the nature of paramanu in different ways. Paramauu pudgalai (matter), is indivisible (avibhajya), is indestructible (acchedya), cannot be pierced (abhedya), adahya (cannot be burnt), agrahya (cannot be grasped). We cannot have divisions of paramanu by any means even with the sharpest of the instruments. It can remain on the tip of a sharp sword and remain uncut. Fire cannot burn it. The rains cannot make it wet. The great Ganges cannot wash it away. The paramauu as the minutest particle has no parts, does not occupy definite space and has neither beginning nor end. It is neither long nor short, neither big nor small. It has one definite form. As it is subtle, it is 12 Bhagavati 5, 7. 13 Bhagavati 5, 7--Paramanu poggale nam bhante ! kim sa-addhe, samajjhe, sapaese udahu-anaddhe amajjhe apaese ? Goyama! anadahe, amajjhe, apaese, no sa-addhe, no samajjhe, no sapaese.

Page #176
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 155 filhlit. itself the middle, the beginning and the end. It occupies a point oi space. That which has the beginning, the end, and the middle in itself and is not possible to grasp it through the sense-experience, has no parts and that minutest particle is paramanu. In the Pancastikaya sara,8 we get the description of some of the characteristics of paramanu. Paramanu is that particle of matter which has one colour (varna), one smell (gandha), one taste (rasa) and two sparsa. A paramanu is the cause of producing the sound, but by itself it has no sound. It is different from aggregate of paramanu. In the paramanu, the senses of colour, smell, taste and touch are present in specific degrees. But it does not have the sense of space (ksetrendriya). The sabda or word is an expression of the aggregate (skandha) in the form of sound. Paramanu is the cause of sabda, but it is not possible to say that one atom is the object of the sense of sight, smell, and other indriyas. Yet these senses coming from the sense-organs are the basic characteristics of paramanu. The distinction of pradesa and paramanu from skandha can be explained with reference to the non-differentiation (aprthakbhava) and differentiation (Prthakbhava). THE FIRST DISCUSSION OF PARAMANU IN INDIA In the Jaina agama literature, is given an elaborate discussion about the nature of paramanu. According to the Jaina pbilosophers, whatever differentiations and non-differentiation, integration and disintegration in the things take place--all these are possible due to the coming together and separation of jiva and paramanu. Some of the western philosophers are of the opinion that the atomic theory mentioned in some school of Indian philosophy has been borrowed from the ancient Greek thought. But this view does not appear to be satisfactory. There is no evidence for this. In Greek philosophy Democrates was the founder of the atomic theory, and he appears to have lived in the 5th century B. c. i.e. 460 to 1 Rajavartika 5, 25, 1-Sauksmyadyah atmamadhyah atmantasca. 2 Sarvarthasiddhi, commentary, Sutra 5, 25. 3 Pancastikayasara Ek rasa, varna, gandha, dvispa sa sabdakaranamasabdam. Skandhantaritam dravyam, paramanu tam vijanihi.

Page #177
156 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 371 B. C.1 The Greek theory of atomism has certain similarities with the Jaina theory of atomism. But there are certain fundamental differences between the two. According to the Jainas, the nature of atom is unconscious. But Democrates and Carvaka in Indian thought have mentioned that what we call atman or self is only the subtlest form of atom. It has been mentioned by Sivadatta Jnani that atomism is the speciality of only the Vaisesikas. The roots of atomic theory as propounded by Vaisesika system can be traced to the Upanisads. Jainas and Ajivakas have given references to the atomic theory, but it was Kanada who gave a systematic explanation of the doctrine of atomic theory. But considered from subjective point of view, it can be said that Vaisesika atomic theory was not prior to the Jaina theory of atomism and unlike the Jaina theory, Vaisesikas have given specific details about the nature of the atomic theory. The term anu was used in the Upanisads. It reads "Anoraniyan, mahato mahiyan", but there is no mention of paramanu in the Upanisads, nor is there any discussion about the paramanu theory. Dr. Jacobi is of the opinion that the mention of the atomic theory in the Upanisads and also in the philosophical literature of the Upanisads is very little and therefore in the Vedantic literature, there is a refutation of the atomic theory as supposed to have been mentioned in the Upanisads. In the Samkhya-Yogadarsana, atomic theory has not been accepted. And Samkhya-Yogadarsanas claim to be as old as the Vedas. But the atomic theory is an integral part of the Vaisesikas, and the Nyaya philosophers have accepted Vaisesika theory of atomism. Both these schools of philosophy, the Vedantic and the Nyaya-Vaisesikas belong to the Vedic tradition. Jainas and Ajivakas are considered to be non-Vedic in tradition. Jacobi says that he considered that Jaina theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism has its theory of atomism on the theory of matter. Modern philosophers have accepted the view that the atomic theory was first presented in a systematic form by the Jainas.1 1 Paschimi Darsana by Divanchand. 2 Bharatiya Samskrti, p. 229. 3 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Part II, p. 199-200. 4 Darsanasastra ka Itihasa, (Hindi), p. 129.

Page #178
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 157 TWO FORMS OF PARAMANU We have already seen that paramanu is indivisible, indestructible, inaccessible to senses and it cannot be burnt, nor can it be divided into parts. The description of these characteristics might trace some difficulty in the minds of modern scientists, because modern science has shown that paramanu is not indivisible, it can be split, If it is to be said that paramanu is not indivisible, we cannot call it "Parama-anu". Modern science has shown that what we call paramanu, can be split. We do not deny this aspect of the nature of the paramanu as that which can be split. What we need is the recognition of the view that the Paramanu is the ultimate indivisible unit and it can be split. A satisfactory answer for this can be found in the Anuyogadvara. There it has been suggested that paramanu has two forms: 1. suksma paramanu (subtle), and vyavahara paramanu (paramanu from the practical sense). The description of the paramanu as indivisible, indestructible etc. refers to suksma paramanu. Vyavaharika paramanu consists of aggregate of endless suksma paramanus. Really speaking the aggregate of suksma paramanu is the nucleus of paramanu (paramanupinqa). This cannot be grasped from ordinary or normal sense as it is subtle. And it cannot be split by ordinary instrument or weapon. As it is suksma in effect, it is considered to be paramanu from the practical point of view. And what the science calls 'atom' is the vyavaharika paramanu (paramanu from the practical sense). Therefore, Jainas also consider that if it is to split, it is practical paramanu. CHARACTERISTICS OF PUDGALA Pudgala has four primary characteristics : (1) sparsa (touch), (2) rasa (taste), (3) gandha (smell) and (4) varna (colour). In every paramanu of the matter these four characteristics are present. These 1 Anuyogadvara (pramanadvara) --Paramanu duvihe pannatte, tam jaha-suhumeya, vavahariyeya. 2 Anuyogadvara (pramanadvara). Anantanam suhumaparamanu pog galanam samudayasamiti samagayenam vavahariye paramanupoggale nipphajjanti,

Page #179
158 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY characteristics express themselves to twenty qualities. They are (1) Sparsa (touch)-(i) sita (cold), (ii) usna (hot), (iii) ruksa (rough), (iv) snigdha (oily or viscouse nature), (v) laghu (light), (vi) guru (heavy), (vii) mrdu (soft) and (viii) kathora (hard). (2) Rasa (taste)-(i) amla (acid), (ii) madhura (sweet), (iii) kazu (sour) (iv) kasaya (bitter), (v) tikta (astringent). (3) Gandha (smell)-(i) Sugandha (fragrance), (ii) durgandha (foul smell). (4) Varna (colour)--(i) Krisna(black), (ii) nila (blue), (iii) rakta (red), (iv) pita (yellow) and (v) sveta (white). We find the Samsthana (formation), parimandala (globular), vrtta (circular), tryamsa (triangular) caturarsa (square) and ayata (rectangular) in Pudgala. Still these are not the real characteristics of the paramanu.1 These are the modes or form of paramanu. The twenty characteristics of Pudgala mentioned above, can be considered in respect of its measurement and intensity into three distinctions, as (1) sankhyata (measureable), asankhyata immeasurable) and (3) ananta (endless). From the point of view of substance, paramanu is partless and indivisible, but from the point of the view of modes, it is not so. Considered from the point of view of modes, the four characteristics of varna, rasa, gandha and sparsa have their infinite modifications.3 We have already seen that paramanu has the four characteristics as mentioned with its sub-divisions like sita, usna and snigdha, ruksa etc. Considered from the point of view of modes, we find a paramanu with infinite modes can become a paramanu of one mode. And paramanu with one mode can express iiself into many modes. And paramanu, according to the Jaina theory one paramanu can transform itself from one attribute of varna to rasa and to gandha to sparsa. The same is the case with the others. The matter with one quality can remain in that stage approximately from one samaya to a sankhyata kala (innumerable points 1 Bhagavati, 25, 3. 2 Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 23. 3 Sthananga 4, 135-Cauvvihe poggalapariname pannate, tam jaha vannapariname, gandhapariname, rasapariname, phasapariname.

Page #180
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 159 of time). The same is the case in the case of transformation of paramanus of two qualities to ananta qualities. All the modifications in the paramanu on the basis of qualities are natural expressions of the modifications. THE FOUR TYPES OF PARAMANU We have already seen that paramanu is indivisible and without parts. But it has been suggested that other substances have their minutest parts which are intellectual constructs and they are also called paramanus. In this sense, we can say that there four types of paramanu as: (substance paramanu) -pudgala (1) Dravya paramanu paramanu (material paramanu). (2) Ksetra paramanu (space paramanu) --akasa paramanu. (3) Kala paramanu (time)--samaya (definite span of time). (4) Bhava paramanu-attribute. Bhava paramanu is of four types as varna-guna, gandha-guna, rasa-guna, sparsa-guna (colour, smell, taste and touch). There are 16 sub-divisions of these qualities like Madhura (sweet) Katuka (sour) 10. 11. Kasaya (bitter) 1. Krsna (black) 2. Nila (blue) 3. Rakta (red) 4. Pita (yellow) 5. Sveta (white) 9. 12. Tiksna (sharp) 13. 14. 6. Sugandha (fragrant) 7. Durgandha (foul smell) 15. 8. Tikta (astringent) 16. Usna (hot) Sita (cold) Ruksa (rough) Snigdha (oily or viscouse nature) These sub-divisions are one quality divisions (Ek-guna). In short we can say according to the Jaina conception of paramanu the paramanu possess the four qualities mentioned above. PARAMANU INACCESSIBLE TO SENSES (ATINDRIYATA) Paramanu is not accessible to sense experience through the sense-organs, but it is not formless. It has form. It is so subtle that even when it has form, it cannot be grasped by the senses. It can only be seen through intuition or the higher perception. 1 Bhagavati 5, 7,

Page #181
160 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The omniscient souls (kevalajnani) can see the all substances, having form and formless. In the chadmastha stage of gunasthana where there is the destruction-cum-subsidence of karma and which is partial, one can know the paramanu and also may not know it. One who has clairvoyant knowledge (avadhijnana) can see the objects with form upto a particular distance, can know the paramanu but one who can see only through the sense-organs cannot see the paramanu.1 FORMATION OF SKANDHA Imagine for a moment that each paramanu is independent, isolated like a brick, then the problem arises how the combination of paramanus and their integration bring the formation of mahakayaskandha, the cosmos. When we construct a house, we keep the bricks one upon the other plastered with cement etc. But the cosmos is formed by its own principles of necessities and not by any external agency or intelligence. As the sky becomes laden with clouds and again becomes clear so also the skandhas are formed and are separated by their own nature. Still the problem remains-what is the object of such combination and disintegration of skandhas and atoms? The universe as we see is material in nature and is due to the integration of the paramanus. Paramanus combine into skandha, and skandhas combine to form the visible and gross objects. In Pudgala we find the inherent forces of integration and disintegration. When paramanus integrate skandhas are formed and by the integration and disintegration of the skandhas different objects are formed. These forces of disintegration and integration are natural to matter and these forces are also operative due to the jivas, as jivas are active. If the Pudgala has not possessed the inherent attribute of integration, paramanus would have remained isolated, and if the force of disintegration were not in operation then the paramanus, would have been found in an unorganised cluster. The cosmos would not be possible and there would be no use of the paramanus and skandhas for the jivas. 1 Bhagavati: 18, 8. 2 Sthananga 2, 221-225, Dohim thanehim poggala sahannanti-sayam va poggala sahannanti parena va poggala sahannanti, evam bhijjanti parisadanti, parivadanti viddhansanti.

Page #182
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 161 - According to the Jaina science, the formation of skandha has been explained in the scientific way on the basis of the principle of chemical composition. The formation of skandha can be explained in the following process : 1. The paramanus combine themselves into due to their characterstics of viscousity. The separation of the atoms out of the skandhas is due to the attribute of roughness. 2. The paramanus which are alike having snigdha come together and form into skandha. (If the two paramanus have the viscousity to a degree less than two, then the combination is not possible). 3. A paramanu which is viscous and the paramanu which is dried, if they come together it is possible to form skandha. (In these cases the intensity of dryness should be more than two degrees). 4. Viscous and the dry paramanus form skandha even when they belong to different categories. In all these, there is one point of exception i.e., that paramanus cannot form skandha if the dryness and the viscousity are of one degree difference. In other words, (i) The parts which have different characteristics (jaghanya guna) do not form into a combination. (ii) The paramanus with identical attributes like either the viscous or dry cannot form a combination. (iii) The two coming together would form a combination.1 The Svetambaras and the Digambaras have expressed difference of opinion regarding the formation or combination of skandhas. According to the Svetambara tradition, if two paramanus with viscous nature having abonimable attributes (jaghanya guna) comes together there would be no bandha (combination), but if one paramanu consisting abonimable attributes and the other of unabominable attributes (ajaghanya guna) there would be a combination form; but the Digambaras maintain even if one paramanu is of (jaghanya guna) there would be no bandha. According to Svetambaras in the formation of parts and from one part to the other the attributes of vis1 Tattvarthasutra, 5, 32-35.

Page #183
162 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY cousity and the dryness vary in increasing degrees from two, three, four, upto endless gunas, then also, the combination is possible; but by the increase of one degree only bandha is not possible. But according to the Digambara tradition by the increase of attributes of two degrees only the combination would be possible. The parts having the degrees of intensity of viscousity and dryness from one unit to the infinite units in ascending order the combination would not be possible. The Svetambara version says the two, three or more qualities in the paramanus would lead to the process of combination and this is possible if the qualities are of similar nature and not dissimilar; but the Digambaras say, the formation of combinations would be possible in both the cases where there are similar or dissimilar qualities. In short, the Digambara and Svetambara version of the combinations would be as follows : 1 SVETAMBARA TRADITION Sadrsa Visadrsa (similar) (dissimilar) 1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya no 2. Jaghanya plus ekadhika (one addition) no yes 3. Jaghanya plus dvyadhika (two addition) yes yes 4. Jaghanya plus triadhika yes yes 5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara no yes 6. Jaghanyetara plus ekadhika jaghan yetara no 7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika jaghynyetara yes yes 8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikadi jaghanyetara yes DIGAMBARA TRADITION 1. Jaghanya plus jaghanya no 2. Jaghanya plus ekadhika no no 3. Jaghanya plus dvyadhika no no 4. Jaghanya plus tryadhika no 5. Jaghanyetara plus samajaghanyetara no 6. Jaghanyetara plus ekadhika jaghanyetara no 1. (a) Tattvarthasutra, Pt. Sukhalalji Sanghavi, pp. 202-203. (b) Jaina Dharma Darsana, p. 195. no yes po no no no .

Page #184
no A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 163 7. Jaghanyetara plus dvyadhika jaghanyetara yes yes 8. Jaghanyetara plus tryadhikadi jaghanyetara no After the combination of the atoms which of the paramanus effect combination with what type of paramanus, is a question that has been asked very often. Similarly, another question has been asked very often, of the similar and the dissimilar paramanus which of them combine together. The answer is, the paramanus of similar qualities do not form combination. If the paramanus are of dissimilar nature, they combine in the formation of the similar paramanus collecting together, or sometimes similar paramanus in two degrees combine with similar paramanus of one degree. The combinations are formed according to the substance and the place etc. The combinations are formed according to the integration of paramanus. These types of combinations are considered as madhyamabandha. The combinations of paramanus with higher intensity and qualities absorb the combinations of the paramanus with lower intensity and qualities. In the tradition, similar qualities do not come together and the more intense qualities absorb the less intense qualities. DIVISIONS AND SUB-DIVISIONS OF PUDGALA 5 The two major distinctions of Pudgala can be stated to be anu (atom) and skandha (aggregate). On the basis of this distinction, we can classify the matter (pudgala) into 6 types. (1) Sthula-sthula (very gross)--It contains the gross objects like, --earth, stones, wood etc. (2) Sthula (gross)-- It has the following varieties, like-milk, curds, butter, water, oil and other fluid material. (3) Sthula-suksma (gross subtle)- It has the following forms, like-light, electricity, etc. (4) Suksma-sthula-Wind, vapour etc., belong to this category. 1. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 36. 2. Tattvarthasutra 5, 37. 3. (a) Niyamasara, 21-Kundakundacarya. (b) Gommatasara, Jivakanda, 602.

Page #185
164 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (5) Suksma-The objects belong to this category cannot be experienced by the senses e. g., Manovargana (atoms of mental structure), etc. They are called Acaksusa skandha. (6) Suksma-suksma-The minutest paramanu is the subtlest form of atom. That part of matter which is the aggregate of paramanus due to the combination and disintegration is unaccessible to sense experience. If the aggregate of atoms becomes bigger and coarse (sthula) then the aggregate becomes accessible to sense-experience. The combination and disintegration of atoms is considered to be the coming-together of atoms and separation. The degree of the combinations so as to enable the aggregate to be coarser and coarsest will make the aggregate accessible to sense-experience. THREE TYPES OF PUDGALA (MATTER) Pudgala (matter) can be considered into three types on the basis of the distinctions on the types of combinations of paramanus.1 1. Prayoga parinata--The collection of atoms processed by the jiva in the formation of the body is called prayoga-parinata-senseorgans, body, blood, flesh, etc. 2. Misra parinata-In this, the atoms are brought together by the jiva and they are again discharged, e.g., nails which are cut, hair, cough and excretion etc., 3. Visrasa parinata-In this, we find aggregate of atoms without the help of the jiva. The atoms come together by themselves, e. g., rainbow, clouds, etc., ORIGINATION, CHANGE & PERMANENCE IN MATTER Matter is both permanent and impermanent.2 From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modifications, it is impermanent. From the point of view of substance, a thing is permanent because the atoms that form the aggregate are permanent, although the objects that are formed due to the combination of atoms change their nature and structure, and as 1. Bhagavati, 8, 1, 1. 2. Bhagavati, 14, 4.

Page #186
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 165 such, from the point of view of modifications of the substance due to the integration and is integration of atoms, it is impermanent. Due to the combinations of atoms, the substance is not considered to be permanent, but from the point of view of the original nature of atoms and from the points of view of place and the time of the combination, it may be considered to be relatively permanent,1 ::.. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MATTER Matter may be considered to be of two forms on the basis of the manner of the integration and disintegration of atoms. The two combinations are :(1) Badara (gross), (2) Suksma (subtle). Infinite number of atoms combine together to form objects. Sometimes the aggregates so formed are subtle and they are not accessible to the sense-organs. The subtle forms of aggregate of atoms have fourfold attributes of touch, like-(1) sita, usna, snigdha and ruksa. If the atoms are combined to form gross objects, the objects have four forms of touch, like--guru-lughu, mrdu-kathinu. If dry atoms are combined together, then the object has the quality of laghu sparsa, but if the combination of snigdha paramanus (viscous atoms) then the object gets the quality of guru sparsa. When molecules are affected by quality of softness and viscousity they combine into producing the quality of soft touch. Similarly, when heat and dryness are combined quality of roughness is expressed. In short, when the transformation is from the subtle qualities to the gross qualities then there would increase four types of touch. ii; THE EXTENT OF MATTER The molecules (skandha) and paramanu (atoms) are considered from the point of view of flow, are beginningless and without any change. Considered from the point of view of effects, it has a beginning and it is characterised by change. Paramanus form themselves into skandhas and skandhas disintegrate into paramanus. The paramanus can remain in their original states for atleast a period of one samaya or at the most upto asankhyata kala (innumerable points of time). In the same way, if the molecule remains 1. Bhagavati 14, 4. 2. Jainadarsana : Manana aur Mi mamsa, p. 175.

Page #187
166 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAJNA PHILOSOPHY in its nature of molecule, it can do so atleast for one samaya and at the most for innumerable kala. After this period, transformation is inevitable. From the point of view of ksetra (place), we can say the paramanu and skandha can remain in a particular point of space for a samaya or at the latest for innumerable points of time (kala.) If a paramanu joins to form a molecule and again gets disinte. grated to its original nature of paramanu it might take one samaya or at the most asankhyata kala.? The molecule with two atoms or the molecule with three atoms can come back to its original position paramanus and that would take one samaya at least or ananta kala (endless time) at the most.3 If a paramanu or a molecule moves from one point of space (akasa pradesa) and returns to that very point of sapce, it might take one samaya or at the most ananta kala. A paramanu occupies one point of space, but a molecule may occupy one point of space, two, innumerable or numberless points of space. It may also pervade the entire lokakasa. We have already seen that the aggregate paramanus pervading the entire universe is called acittamahaskandha. It is cosmos. APRADESITVA (NON-SPACIAL POSITION) AND SAPRADESITVA (SPACIAL POSITION) Paramanu considered from the point of view of substance and spacial position can be considered as apradesi, as it does not occupy an extended point of space. But from the point of view of temporal extension, it is considered to be apradesi, because it is in one samaya, but if it is in more than one samaya, it is called sapradesi, as it covers extended space. From the point of view of bhava, (nature) a paramanu is apradesi (non-spacial), if it is one guna (quality) but if it is characterised by many qualities it is sapradesi (spacial). 1. Bhagavati, 5, 8. 2. Bhagavati, 5, 8. 3. Ibid, 5, 8. 4. Ibid, 5, 8.

Page #188
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 167 Considered from the point of view of substance, a molecule is sapradesi (extensive in spacial extension). The molecule's extension is determined by the number of paramanus it has. From the point of ksetra (space), skandha (molecule) is sapradesi (extensive) and also apradesi. A molecule which covers one point of space is apradesi, but if covers more than one point of space, it becomes sapradesi. From the point of view of kala (time), a molecule which has a duration of one samaya is apradesi. But if it remains for more than one samaya, it is sapradesc. From the point of view of bhava (nature), a molecule is characterised by one quality it is apradesi. But if has more than one quality, it is sapradesc.1 MOTION OF MATTER !! Paramanu is jada (unconscious) still it is characterised by motion. The motion of the paramanu is sometimes due to some cause and sometime without any cause. In fact, a paramanu is not always in motion. It is sometimes in motion and sometimes not. In one samaya, it can travel from one point of space in the universe to another point of space in the farthest point which is at a distance of innumerable yojanas. The characteristic of motion is inherent in the atom, although it may not always move. So, the principle of movement (Dharma) is the principle due to which motion in paramanu is possible. But the principle of Dharma is not the cause of the motion, it is only an efficient condition.? A question arises, whether the motion in paramanu is due to itself or is caused by jiva. The answer is that paramanu does not move because of jiva, as paramanu is not transformed or combined into molecules, due to jiva. It is material in nature. And the cause is material only. Jiva has no power to move the paramanus. 1. Bhagavati, 5, 8. 2. Bhagavati, 16, 8.

Page #189
168 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Paramanu can be described as being vibratory (sakampa)1 and non-vibrate (akampa). It is not unsteady, and not constantly vibrating. A molecule with two atoms has both the characteristics, and expresses both the characteristics like-vibration and non-vibration. It being composed of two atoms it has spacial vibration and also absence of spacial vibration. Molecules with three atoms express similar forms of vibration and non-vibration. For instance, in the molecule one atom may vibrate and the other may not, the two atoms may vibrate and the one may not, and two atoms may remain non-vibratory while the one atom may not. Molecules with four atoms may express all forms of permutations of vibration and non-vibration. One spacial point may express vibration while others may not. While the other points of space may express vibration and the one point may not and so on. Molecules of five atoms and molecules upto the infinite number of atoms have similar characteristics of vibration and non-vibration. LIMITS OF MOTION OF PARAMANU The motion in paramanu has certain limits. The natural motion is always in straight lines. If there are some cross-effects of other paramanus and material particles, the motion gets curved. Jiva is not directly responsible for the motion in a paramanu as it is extremely subtle. But jiva can influence the motion of moleculesbig or small. As the maximum form of motion has been described, so has the minimum form of motion been described. A paramanu can move from one point of space to the other in slow motion in one samaya. The extension of the point of space is of the same extension as of paramanu. The motion in paramanu, as we have seen earlier, may be due to more inherent causes or due to some other external factors present in matter. When the motion in the paramanu say, but one thing is certain that after infinite number of points of time, paramanu acts. Similarly, a paramanu may stop movement within starts, is difficult to 1. Bhagavati, 5, 7.

Page #190
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 169 one samaya or at the most within infinite part of avalika.1 And after the infinite number of points of avalika the paramanu will definitely start motion. The atoms are unobstructible (apratighali) and they can penetrate any object of any type. For instance, atoms can penetrate a thick wall built of cast iron. Even the mountain like Sumeru cannot obstruct the movement of paramanu. Sometimes the movement of the paramanu may be arrested by the particles of matter due to its contact with matter. But at that time paramanu also affects the matter to which it has come in contact. THE SUBTLE NATURE OF PARAMANU The special characteristic of paramanu is that it can occupy a point of space and the same point of sapce can be occupied by another paramanu without any resistance. Similarly, the subtle form of molecule consisting infinite paramanus can occupy the same point without any resistance. This is the special characteristic of paramanil. In this connection Acarya Pujyapada has pointed out that there is no difficulty in atoms and molecules in occupying same point of space without friction or resistance because they have no visible extension and they are subtle in nature. For this reason, infinite number of atoms and molecules can remain in one pradesa without any difficulty. For instance, a lamp lights a room to the fullest extent and this room can also merge the light of many other lamps. Similarly, the light of the lamp illumines the room fully; but if it is covered by a small pot, it restricts its illumination to the pervasion of that very pot. It is clear from this, that the material aspect of the atoms of matter have the characteristics of contraction and expansion. For this reason and because of the power of contraction etc., 1. Avalika is 16777216th part of 48 minutes. 2. Jainadarsana aur Adhunika Vijnana, (Hindi), p. 37. 3. Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 16. Pujyapada. 4. Tattvarthasutra, 5, 16.

Page #191
170 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY a paramanu can remain along with molecules in the same point of space... The subtle transformation is contraction neformation is contraction of a paramanu and in this it is reduced in its mass and effect. ,, THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF PARAMANU If we study paramanu in a scientific way, we find that anu (atom) is of two parts. The central part is a nucleus in which there are two functions--the protons and the neutrons. The external part is the orbital shell. It contains electrons which move constantly with the velocity which is unimaginable. The volume of a nucleus is much smaller than that of an atom. If the orbital shell splits, then the circumference of an atom becomes smaller. These splitatoms are called stripped-atoms. In the language of the astronomical science that some stars have density which is two hundred times more than the densest object on our earth. Edington bas said that if one ton (28 maunds) of nuclear matter is taken, it can be contained in a basket or in our pocket. A star has been discovered whose density is 620 tons (17360 maunds) for every cubic inch. This heavy weight of the stars is due to the stripped atoms and the atoms in these, are primarily nuclear and they baye no orbital shells. The Jaina theory of atoms explains these phenomenon by means of the subtle process of movement in atoms.? Modern science has shown that atoms are very subtle in extension and the subtlety can be explained that 50,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (50 sankhas) of atoms weigh 2 tolas and occupy only one tenth crore of an inch space. In the thickness of a cigarette-paper lakh of atoms may stay. A mole of dust in the air contains more than 10,00,00,00,00,00,00,000 (ten nila) paramanus. The form of the atom orbits extension can also be measured if compared with the magnified size of a small drop of blood coming out of the head, if we pull one hair. The drop of blood may be magnified in size to the extent of 7 feet in diametre. Even then the atoms inside it will have the diametre of 1/1000 of an inch.3 1. Dravyasangraha. 2. Munisri Hazarimal Smrli Grantha, p. 374. 3. Jainadarsana aur Adhunika Vijnana, p. 47.

Page #192
A SOURCE-BOCK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 171 THE SIZE AND FORM OF THE MATTER The material-atom is one, without parts, without middle and without space. A molecule with two atoms is with parts, but without middle and it has spacial extension, A molecule with three atoms is without parts, it is with middle and has spacial extension. Molecules with even number of atoms have characteristics like the molecules with two atoms. And molecules with odd number of atoms express the characteristics possessed by molecules with three atoms. In the Bhagavati sutra we get description of the four forms of the existence of atoms.1 (1) Dravya-sthanayu : It is the state when paramanu remains as paranianu and skandhas as skandhas i. e. molecules as molecules. (2) Ksetra-sthanayu : This is the akasa pradesa, in which paramanus and skandhas exists. (3) Avagahana-sthanayu : The specified form and size of paramanus and skandha. The differences between ksetra and avagahana is that the first is pertaining to space while the second to the pudgala (matter) itself. (4) Bhava-sthanayu : In this form paramanus express the attributes of touch, taste, smell and colour, either in the form of paramanus or in the form of skandha. EIGHT COMBINATIONS (VARGANAS) OF PUDGALA Paramanus have been classified into 8 forms of combinations on the basis of the intensity and extension. They are called varganas. (1) Audarika vargana : It is gross matter. This consists of the combination of paramanus to form gross bodies for the jivas, vegetable, earth, water, fire and air. (2) Vaikriya vargana : In this, we get the aggregates of matter which have the capacity of expressing the qualities, like-short and large, light and heavy, visible and non-visible, etc, 1. Bhagavati, 5, 7.

Page #193
172 A SOURCE-BOOK JN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (3) Aharaka vargana: This is the aggregate of matter formed by the paramanus and molecules with a capacity of forming body by Yoga-sakti. (4) Taijasa vargana: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the paramanus with energy. (5) Karmana vargana: It is the aggregate of matter formed of the minutest particles of matter which are responsible for the formation of karma, like--jnanavaraniya etc. This forms the subtle body. (6) Svasocchvasa vargana: This is the aggregate of matter which enables the function of breathing. (7) Vacana vargana: The collection of matter which is responsible for speech. (8) Mano-vargana: This is the collection of minutest particle which are very subtle and which forms the mind for the sake of reflection and thinking. Matter is of infinite variety. Among them, the eight varieties mentioned above are prominent. These types of matter have graded existence forming from the gross matter which we get in earth, water, etc., to the subtlest form of matter in mind. One form of matter can be transformed into another form of matter due to the formation of molecules and the integration of paramanus in different intensities. According to the Jainas varganas of one type may also be transformed into another. The varganas like audarika, vaikriya, aharaka and taijasa have the qualities of eight types of touch and they are of the form of gross molecules. They possess the qualities-light or heavy, smooth and rough, etc. The varganas like karmana varganas, bhasa and manovarganas have four types of qualities of touch. They are sublte molecules and they have the qualities of cold and heat, viscouse and dry. Svasocchvasa vargana has four types of touch and also eight types of touch.1 1. Bhagavati 2, 1.

Page #194
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 173 EIGHT DISTINCTIONS OF PUDGALA The Jaina philosophers have studied the pudgala (matter) with its various distinctions, the like of wbich we do not get in other systems of philosophy. In modern science, we find recognition to large extent of the Jaina view of matter. According to Jainism the function of pudgala is ten-fold. (1) sabda (sound), (2) bandha (combination), (3) sauksmya (subtlety), (4) sthaulya (grossness), (5) samsthana (formation), (6) bheda (distinctions), (7) tama (darkness), (8) chaya (shade), (9) atapa (heat), (10) Udyota (cool-light).1 (1) SABDA (SOUND) Sabda (sound) is produced due to the friction of one molecule with the other. The sound is the object of sense of hearing i. e., ears. Vaisesikas do not consider sabda as a mode of matter. But they make it an attribute of akasa. Sankhya-darsana considers the formation of sabda as the sense cause of akasa. Jainas differ fundamentally from the Vaisesikas and Sankhya philosophers. They maintain that sabda (sound) is material in nature, because it becomes an object of sense-organ. Akasa is not material in nature. And it cannot produce sound. Similarly, akasa is not a product of sound as the Sankhya philosophers say. Because sabda (sound) is material in nature and hence sabda (tanmatra) the subtle elements should also become material in nature. If sabdatanmara were to be material in nature its product akasa should also be considered as material. But akasa is not material in nature. Therefore akasa is not a product of sabdatanmatra. Secondly, akasa is a substance which is formless. It has no qualities like touch etc. But sabda has form and it has qualities of touch etc. It can be grasped. The substance which is formless must have qualities which would also be formless. And then it cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form. The objects which 1. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 5, 24. (b) Dravyasangraha, gatba 16. 2. Pancastikaya, 71.

Page #195
174 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY are formless cannot be grasped by the sense-organs which have form. Thirdly, sound is produced by the friction of molecules and due to the friction there would be echo and sound production. If sound were to be the qualities of akasa which is formless such interruption of atoms and molecules would not be possible. Fourthly, sabda can be arrested and checked. If it were the quality of akasa how could it be possible to check the sabda. Fifthly, sabda has velocity (gatimanata), but akasa is without any motion and is passive. Sixthly, argument would be considered from scientific point of view, sabda cannot traverse in space if there were no matter. If sabda were the quality of akasa it would have penetrated into every point of akasa. Because quality pervades the substance having that quality and there is no question whether there is the need of the presence or not.1 Jaina agama literature has elaborately discussed the nature of sabda as material in nature and also the characteristics of sabda in its various aspects, like the production (utpatti), velocity (sighragati), pervasion in the universe (lokavyapitva), stationary nature (sthititva) and other forms.2 According to Jambudvipaprajnapti the ringing of the bell (sughosa ghanta) in a particular region will be echoed in a bell in a far of place even though there is no medium of transmission like the wires except the medium of air. This can explain the function of a radio. The sabda pervade the entire universe in a fraction of moment. This phenomenon was recognised and explained by Bhagavana Mahavira 2,500 years ago.3 - We have already seen that sound is produced due to contact, friction and inter-action of the molecules formed by paramanus. Sabda is of two types (1) prayogika (practical, artificial) (2) vaisrasika (natural). 1. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha, p. 381. 2. Prajnapana, pada 11 3. Jambudvipaprajnapti.

Page #196
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 175 Prayogika--The production of the sound in this form is possible due to efforts and these efforts are of two types--due to speech and due to efforts without speech. (1) Bhasatmaka expresses some meaning. Therefore, it is called arthapratipadaka vani. (2) Abhasatmaka does not convey any meaning. Abhasatmaka sound is of four types-- (i) tata, (ii) vitata, (iii) ghana, (iv) sausira. The tata form of sound is produced by a musical instrument made of leather (carma) like mrdanga, pataha etc. The vitata sound is produced by musical instrument having streams, like-vina. The ghana type of sound is produced by musical instruments like tala, bell etc. And sausira form of sound is produced by musical instruments which are to be blown through mouth, e. 8., conch (sankha), flute, etc. 1 The vaisrasika sabda is all sounds produced without any effort on the part of an individual, for instance, the thunder of the clouds is vaisrasika sound. An individual grasps a sound and communicates it through language. The moment it is communicated through sound to other individuals, it passes on to other individuals. The sound so produced spreads in the akasu and the waves of the sound travel throughout space. If the intensity of the sound produced is low, the sound travels like the waves of the water for quite sometime for several yojanas and then the waves of the sound fade away. If the intensity of the sound produced is high, the waves of the sound travel to farther distances even upto the end of the world. The sound that we hear spoken by a particular person is not the original word of the person speaking. It is the sound waves that travels through akasa in the form of sabda. The sound waves so produced spread in all the six directions-east, west, north, south, up and down. If the waves of the sound spread in even combination (samasreni) then we hear the misra sabda (combined). It implies that we hear the 1. (a) Tattvartharajavarttika, 5, 24, 2-6. (b) Sarvarthasiddhi, 5, 24. .

Page #197
176 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY sabdadravy a that is uttered by an individual and the sabdadravya i. e., contained the waves of the sounds. But if the waves of the sound are received in odd combination (visreni) we hear the sabda in the waves of the sound only.1 (2) BANDHA (COMBINATION) Bandha means tieing, joining and combination (samyojana). Two paramanus or more than two paramanus can come together and become bound together. Similarly, two or more molecules can also come together. In this way, the combination or the aggregate can be of two or more paramanus or two or more molecules. In samyoga (joining together), there is the combination without any distance (antara rahita avasthana) but in bandha there is the identity or unision of the aggregate. Bandha is of two types-(1) vaisrasika (natural) and (2) prayogika (artificial). Taisrasika bandha is of two types-(a) sadi (with beginning) and (b) anadi (without beginning). Dharma, Adharma and Akasa have bandha which is without beginning, but in the case of matter the bandha has beginning. The paramanus may join together in a group of two or more and form molecules. These are formed at a parti. cular time and they have a beginning. They may also be disintegrated. The lightening, meteors, the flow of water, fire and rain-bow, etc. have a beginning. Therefore their formation is sadi. Prayogika bandha is of two types-(a) ajivavisayaka i. e., connected with non-living matter and (b) combination which is connected with the living and the non-living substance (jivajivavisayaka). The bandha or union of paramanu in the case of wood and wax is of the ajivavisayaka types. The jivajivavisayaka which is connected with the combination of the paramanus in association with jiva and ajiva may be referred to those of karmic and quasi-karmic (no-karma). The bondage of the soul with 8 types of karmas is called karma-bandha. The association of the soul with the bodily 1. (a) Prajnapana, pada 11, (b) Nandi sutra

Page #198
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 177 forms like audarika body etc., is called nokarma-bandha. That is, it is associated with quasi-karmic material.1 (3) SAUKSMYA (FINENESS) V. Suksmata is related to fineness. It is of two types-(1) antya suksmata (the ultimate fineness) and, (2) apeksika suksmata (relative fineness). The ultimate fineness to be found in the paramanu. The relative fineness has a reference to relative extension of the objects. One object is finer and smaller in size than another object. For instance, the sizes of the fruits like the lemon and the mangoes vary in form. One is smaller than the other. (4) STHAULYA (GROSSNESS) !!! Sihulata refers to the largeness in size. It is of two forms: (1) antya sthulata which is all-pervasive. It is mahaskandha. It is the cosmos. (2) Apeksika sthulata is relative largeness of the size. It is concerned with determining the size of the objects. One object would appear larger than the others, if we compare the sizes of the objects, for instance as we have seen earlier the size of a mango is larger than the size of betel nut. (5) SAMSTHANA (FORMATION) Samsthana connotes form or structural design. Samsthana is of two types. The first type of samsthana has been divided into two types as : (a) it is called ittham samsthana which related to geometrical forms like triangle, rectangle, circle, etc. (b) anittham sarnsthana refers to irregular forms. It has no specific form. However it has various structural designs --- regular or irregular and it has been classified into different types, utkara, curna, khanda, curnika, pratara and anucatana The second type of samsthana bas reference to the different forms of the bodies which embody the jiva. It has also been classified into different types of : (1) samacaturasra, nyagrodhu, sadika, 1. Tattvartharajavarttika 5, 24, 10, 13. 2. Ibid 5, 24, 14. 3. Tativartharajavartrika 5, 24, 15. 4. Ibid 5, 24, 16.

Page #199
178 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY vamana, kubja and hundaka. For instance, vamana refers to a dwarfish body and kubja refers to hunch-backed body. (6) BHEDA (DISTINCTION) Bheda refers the disintegration of the molecules into different atoms or separation of some atoms from a molecule. (7) TAMA (DARKNESS): Tama is darkness. It is that which obstructs vision and which is opposite of light.1 The Indian philosophers like naiyayikas do not consider darkness (andhakara) as a substance, referring to characteristics (bhavat. maka dravya), but these philosophers give a negative interpretation of darkness implying absence of light. But if light is a substance conception in nature (bhavatmaka in nature), it is necessary to consider darkness also as a substance. Because light has form so also the darkness has form. . Modern science does not give a negative interpretation of darkness. It is considered to be a positive substance, because darkness is possible due to infra-red heat rays. These rays could be found in the eyes of some of the animals like cats, owls, etc. The negative of the photographic plates expresses similar phenomenon. It shows that in addition to the visible light, we have the invisible light which may be considered as darkness.2 (8) CHAYA (SHADE); That which covers the light is called chaya (shade). If light is obstructed by opaque bodies we get shade. Shade may be considered as a form akin to darkness. But it is not absence of light, it is to be considered as modification of matter. According to modern science, the visibility produced by the various combinatios of parmanus can also be considered in the light reflections and these reflections are of two types : (1) vastavika (natural) and the other (2) avastavika (unnatural). Similarly, chaya 1. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24. 2. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha, p. 385. 3. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24.

Page #200
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 179 or shade can have reflections in these two types. We find that due to interferance bands of the counting machine when worked, give dark band. These are like the electronic effects. The dark band is not merely the absence of light, but it is the electronic effect, in the form of a dark band. The light can function through reflection (darpana) and the refraction. These two functions can be natural or artificial. They also may be expressing different types of reflections and images. Inverted images would help formation of the correct images, if reflected upon. (9) ATAPA (HEAT) Atapa is heat. It is the heat rays of light, By itself, it is cool but its light is hot. (10) UDYOTA (COOL*LIGHT) Udyota refers to the rays of the light which give a cooling effect. It also gets cooled and its effect would be coolness. It is different from the heat of the fire. The Jainas have considered the cooling and heating effect as the forms of light. This is a scientific approah to the problem and it shows remarkable insight and discriminating power into the phenomenon of light. Scientists have considered light as the continuous process of movement. They say that the cosmos contains the light rays which are moving with a velocity which is un-imaginable. Earlier it was considered that light has no mass, but recent scientists have begun to realise that light has also mass (bhara). It is characterised by electrical magnetism and every minute the light travels from the sun with unimaginable speed. Heat is considered to be a quality of the matter. From the scientific point of view, paramanus have distinctions like dhananu and rnanu and they are constantly in motion, and inter-penetration. Then they express themselves in the form of heat. Ordinarily, we find that electrical energy may be seen in two forms as ghana vidyut (electricity produced from the friction of 1. Sarvarthasiddhi 5, 24.

Page #201
180 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PAILOSOPHY particles) and jala vidyut (electricity produced from water particles). These two are the modes of matter. Scientifically considered, ghana and usna are two forms of electrical energy. The basis of ghana is protons and the source of vidyutkanas is electron. When we find the lightning and the thunder produced, we find that there is friction of the proton and the electron particles and they produce electrical energy. This energy is accompanied by the sound. This process of radiation is called radio-active process. In ancient Indian science, the paramanu were not considered to be as capable of splitting. But modern science has shown that the ancient conception is wrong. It has been shown that when atom is split, infinite energy released. This is the principle for the manufacture of atom-bomb. We find that the principle of manufacturing the radiotransistors, telegraph is based on the fundamental conception of the material nature of the sound. Sound is a mode of matter. Just as the electrical energy transmits the sound-waves to far distance, so also the light waves transmit images to far off distances, so we find expressed in television. In Jaina literature, it has been described that every moment the objects in the universe are receiving reflections and spreading far and wide. These are caught and crystallied in mirrors and water, and other forms of matter. Television is based on this principle. Modern science has discovered the function of the X-rays. They are very subtle rays creating invisible effects. Therefore, we can say that the light as former mode of matter is expressed in such phenomena like X-rays etc. Thus we find all the sense-experience arising out of touch, taste, smell, etc., are nothing but modes of matter. FUNCTIONS OF PUDGALA The primary functions of jiva are six like ahara (food), sarira (body), indriya (sense-organs) svasochhvasa (breathing), bhasa (speech) and manas (mind). These express fundamental functions of the cetana in various forms; and these are material in aspect. 1. Munisri Hazarimal Smrti Grantha.

Page #202
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 181 Acarya Nemicandra has pointed out that matter is responsible for the production of the body. Audarika sarira is due to audarika varganas (clusters of paramanus). Vaikriya sarira is formed by vaikriya varganas. Similarly aharaka sarira is formed by aharaka varganas. We can describe the svasochhvasa (breathing) based on aharaka varganas in the same way. Taijasa body is formed due taijasa var ganas. The same can be said about bhasa and manas, and they are formed by the respective vargunas (fine particles of matter). It is not necessary to give a detailed description about the ahara, indriya, svasochlvasa and bhasa. Jaina philosophers have made distinctions of sariras in the audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa and karmana into five types. We can experience the audarika sarira through the indriyas. The other forms of body cannot be seen through the sense-organs. They gradually become finer and finer.? Taijasa and karmana bodies do not interact with other bodies. They can move in lokasasa according to their capacities. They do not suffer from any external bonds. These two forms of bodies are associated with samsari jivas from beginningless times. They are with every jiva. Every jiva can have at the most four bodies at a time. But all the five bodies cannot co-exist because the vaikriya and the aharaka functions do not simultaneously express themselves. The vaikriya funciion is generally possible in the pramatta dasa (in the uncontrolled state), but such is not the case of aharaka function. Formation of aharaka body is possible in the pramatta dasa. But when the aharaka body is formed during the pure state of mind, apramati a avasi ha is inevitable. Therefore, vaikriya and aharaka functions do not take place simultaneously. The mental functions are not possible without the material basis. While we think, thoughts emanate from the mind through the 1. Gommatasara jivakanda 606-608. 2. Tattvarthasutra 2, 38. 3. Ibid 2, 41-44. 4. Tativarthabhasya vytti 2, 44.

Page #203
182 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY molecules of mano-varganas. Tbe thought forms gets shape through mano-varganas and these flit across leaving behind their traces in the form of thought-processes. These thought-processes have their different types of durations. Some continue to remain in the mind, some flash across the mind and some create impact in the mind as mental traces through the mano-varganas. These mano-varganas, therefore, leave the mnemic traces on the cerebral and have their effect on body. In short, a samsari jiva is very closely associated with various forms as in the form of gross bodies and the subtle body and in the mental functions. In this sense, we can say the matter has a tremendous influence on the functions of the jiva and the formation of the universe as such.

Page #204
Principle of Punya (Merit) and Papa (Demerit) : a Study PRINCIPLES OF PUNYA AND PAPA Punya (merit) is auspicious karma-pudgalas and papa (demerit) is inauspicious karma-pudgalas. Both are ajivatattva. A question may arise that the auspicious and inauspicious karmas, which are enumerated under principle of ajiva are the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of atman; and the tendencies of atman should be jiva, i, e., jiva-rupa, they cannot be ajiva. Why merit and demerit are enumerated under ajivatattva? are The question is answered as the auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of atman are mental, physical and vocal. These enumerated under the influx (asravatattva). 1 Here the punya and papa, only means that the karma-pudgalas which are attractated by the psychological, physiological and vocal tendencies of atman and are connected with jiva; if they are auspicious, they are punya and if inauspicious, they are papa. The auspicious and inauspicious tendencies of atman are bhava-punya and bhava-papa. As the result of atmic tendencies, the karma-pudgalas gets connected with the atman, they are called as dravya-punya and dravya-papa. Hence the tendencies of atman are bhava-punya and bhava-papa, while the dravya-punya and dravya-papa are pudgalas-ajivatattva. As the atmic tendencies are of innumerable types so the cause of punya and papa (merit and demerit) are also innumerable. Still 1. Tattvarthasutru, 6/1-2

Page #205
184 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY due to behavioural point of view, many causes are enumerated of these are described in agamas like Sthananga etc. TYPES OF PUNYA AND PAPA Auspicious karma-pudgalas are called punya. It can be acquired by the auspicious deeds, like--to have sympathy and kindness towards the poor and distressed people and serve them, philanthropic deeds, to be glad to see good charactered people etc. Agamas have told that jiva can acquire punya by the nine deeds. These are (1) Anna punya-to give food to the hungry ones keeping kindness and with faith and devotion to saints. (2) Pana punya-to give drinking water to the thirsty people. (3) Layana punya-Layana means shelter. Everybody should give shelter (i.e., place for living) to the needy persons. (4) sayana punya-sayana means to give space for sleeping. (5) Vastra punya-to give cloths to the needy persons. (6) Mana-punya-to think that every body should be happy, none should be sorrowful, etc. (7) Vacana punya-It means to acquire punya by sympathetic and sweet words. (8) Kaya punya-A man may acquire punya, if he serves others by his boby. This type of punya can be acquired by physical auspicious activities. (9) Namaskara Punya-This type of punya is acquired by vinaya. To bow to the elders, virtuous and meritorious people is the cause of this type of punya. In other words, it can be said that the punya can be acquired by giving food, drinking water, medicine, etc., and to give place to rest to the needy persons, to have good feelings to every one, to speak sweet and advantageous words and to do good deeds by body. To bow,

Page #206
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY keeping devotion and faith in heart towards the deva, guru and dharma is also the cause of acquiring punya. Acarya Umaswati tells, the auspicious mental, bodily and vocal activities are punya. 1 Auspicious and meritorious karma-pudgalas are called punya.2 Demeritorious karmas are papas. In other words, due to papa atman could not do auspicious deeds.1 There many causes of papa, yet, briefly, eighteen causes are described in the agamas. These are also called papa-sthana (the homes of papa). These are enumerated as under : 1. Himsa (violence) 2. Mrsa (to tell a lie) 3. Caurya (theft) 4. Abrahmacarya (non-celibacy) 5. Parigraha (covetuousness) 6. Krodha (anger) 7. Mana (pride) 8. Maya (deceit) 9. Lobha (lust or greed) 10. Raga (attachment) 11. Dvesa (detachment) 12. Kalaha (to make dispute) 13. Abhyakhyana (to nickname anybody, to call bad names) 14. Paisunya (back-biting) 185 1. Tattvarthsutra, 6/3. 2. (a) Sutrakrtanga, Silanka-Vrtti, 2/5/16 p. 127. (b) Mulacara-Vrtti-acarya Vasunandi, 5/6. (c) Samavayanga-Abhayadeva-Vrtti, 1, p. 6. (d) Saddarsana Samuccaya, Guna-Vrtti, p. 137. 3. (a) Pancastikaya-Vrtti--Amrtcandracarya, 108. (b) Samavayanga-Abhayadeva-Vrtti, 1, p. 6. (c) Saddarsana Samuccaya, Guna-Vrtti, 47, p. 4. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 6/3. 137. (b) Tattvartha-Srutsagariya-Vrtti, 6/3.

Page #207
186 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 15. Para-ninda (to blame) 16. Rati-Arati (Rati means inclination towards demerit and arati denotes non-inclination towards auspicious deeds.) 17. Maya Mrsavada (deceitful lie) 18. Mithyadarsana (delusion). From the spiritual point of view, merit and demerits both are bondages. Indian thinkers have widely discussed these merits and demerits. Mimansakas gave too much force to acquire merits. They regarded punya (merit) as the aim of life. But Jain philosophy, by the different points of view, regarded punya as heya (abandonable), jnye ya (knowable jand upadeya (acceptable). By the noumenal point of view, punya and papa-both are abandonable. Pun ya is charming while pa pa reverse to it, i.e., uncharming. Punya is golden fetters while papa is iron fetters. Being sparkling and charming, the golden fetters is a bondage to atman. It also bounds the atman, as that of iron-fetters. There is no difference, if a sword is made of gold or iron. Both can be used equally to kill anybody. In the modern language, punya can be termed as first class imprisonment, while papa as rigorous imprisonment. But, for getting salvation, both are to be discarded. According to behavioural point, punya can be called better than papa. Due to papa, jiva has to bear the agonies of hell, and many kinds of miseries and pains, disfame etc., in this world. While as the result of punya, jiva gets the joyful heaven-life and fame, pleasure etc., in this world. The punya is like a shadow of tree. A traveller, after a long journey, under sharp sun-light, gets relief in the shadow of a tree; so jiva, during the long-long rigorous journey of his mundane life, gets rest and relief by the punya. Hence punya is regarded better and self-soothing. > TWO KINDS OF PUNYA Acaryas described two kinds of punya. These are (1) Punyanubandhi punya-This type of punya (merit) is virtuous both in operation (udaya) and result (phala-bhoga). It also paves the way to salvation to jiva. (2) Papanubandhi punya-This is a punya, which gives joy to

Page #208
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 187 jiva, during operation; but leads it towards the wrong deeds. During this type of merit jiva earns papas. For example, a man gets all types of worldly luxuries by his previously acquired meritorious deeds and in this life also he becomes virtuous, does philanthropic deeds, he keenly absorbs himself in such activities which may lead to the salvation, he acquires new punyas, while enjoying the consequences of previously acquired punyas. It is called punyanubandhi punya. On the other hand, a man gets all means of happiness in world; but he leads a sinful life and earns new papas as the result of his bad activities. This kind of punya is called papanubadhi punya; because it is a cause of new papas. In the Jaina literature, punyanubandhi punya is described like a guide, who leads atman to his ultimate goal, i.e., salvation. Quite reverse to it, papanubandhi punya is like a robber, who robs everything and makes man a beggar. So, this type of punya robs all the previously earned punyas; and becomes a cause of downfall of jiva. Hence, punyanubandhi punya is regarded acceptable (upadeya) and papanubandhi as abandonable (heya). .!'. TWO KINDS OF PAPA Like punya, papa is also of two kinds. These are (1) Papanubandhi papa--Troublesome in present experience and also acquires sinful karmas for future. (2) Punyanubandhi papa--Troublesome in present experience but acquires meritorious karmas for future. The first kind of papa is troublesome both for present and future. Because, due to this type of papa, jiva experiences agonies, pains, disfame etc., in this life and also absorbs himself in sinful activities, so he acquires papa-karmas for future also. For example, butcher, fisherman are the men of this type. The second type of papa is troublesome; but it acquires merits (punyas) for future. Because, due to this papa, though man experien

Page #209
188 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ces miseries in present, but he absorbs himself in auspicious activities, so he earns punyas for future. Such persons are called as papanu. bandhi punya jivas. Hence, the principle of papa and punya is described in the Jaina literature with various points of view. By the noumenal point of view, being the fetters for atman, regarded abandonable and kept in one category. While by behavioural point of view, papa is outrightly abandonable; but punya is acceptable upto some extent. Because, on account of this, atman may progress and get the path of salvation, which is the ultimate goal and real home of mundane soul.

Page #210
Principle of Asrava (Influx) : a Study PRINCIPLE OF ASRAVA (INFLUX) The asraya, in Jain agamas and philosophy is defined thus the thoughts, words and activities, by which the pudgalas of karmavarganas flow-in, to get connected with atma-pradesas, is asrava. In other words, psychological, vocal and physiological activitiesvibrations (yoga) of atman, is asrava. 1 Atman and pudgala, both are of opposite nature. The qualities of atman are--knowledge, consciousness and bliss; while that of pudgala are--touch,taste, smell and colour i. e., rupi; it is also totally senseless, without consciousness and any kind of feeling. Pudgala is rupi while atman is arupi. Until and unless atman remains in his own self nature, karmas do not inflow; but as soon as atman, due to delusion, attracts towards other objects i. e., para-bhava or vibhava, the pudgalas of karmanavargana, which are called as karmas, flow-in. The way of flowing-in of karmas is called asrava. Aiman gets karmas through asrava. As in a pond, water comes through a channel so the karmas come to the atman through asrava. Hence, asrava or influx means the way of karmas to come to atman. FIVE TYPES OF ASRAVA: The causes of bondage are five, viz., mithyatva (wrong-belief), 1. (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 6/2. (b) Sutrak rtanga-Silanka-vrtti, 2/5/17, p. 128. (C) Avasyaka-Haribhadriya-V rtti, Mal. Hem. Hi. p. 84. (d) Adhyatmasara, 18/131.

Page #211
190 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY avirati (vowlessness), pramada (negligence), kasaya (passion) and yoga (psychophysical activities). The thoughts of atman by which karmas flow-in, is called bhavasrava, and flowing-in of karmic matter is dravyasrava. The emergence of karma-paryaya in the matter and coming upto atman is dravyasrava. Though wrong belief etc., five causes are called as thought-influx (bhavasrava); but really at the first moment these are the efficient causes of psycho-physical activities, which is the immediate cause of attracting the karmic matter. So these (wrongbelief etc.,) are called thought-influx. The next momentary thoughts are bondage. According to the varying intensity of thought-influx, the karmic matter is attracted and attached with the soul. The description of the five causes, i. e., wrong belief etc., is, briefly, as under 1. WRONG BELIEF (MITHYATVA) It means reverse or contrary belief; or lack of metaphysical knowledge. Due to wrong belief, a person considers non-living as living matter and vice-versa, he also cannot differentiate between dharma (path of salvation) and adharma (cause of bondage). He remains in illusory state. Wrong belief is of two types: (1) natural (naisargika or sahaja) and (2) grasped (grhita). Due to both of these wrong beliefs, the truth-seeking tendency cannot arise in the jiva. He exposes his belief in pseudo deities (ku-deva), pseudo-religion (ku-dharma), pseudosaints (ku-guru) and public follies (loka-mudhata). Wrong belief is the root cause of the infinite samsara. 2. VOWLESSNESS (AVIRATI) Vowlessness means lack of control over five senses and mind. In this state, jiva does not renounce the sensual pleasures, even he has no wish to do so. He wants to enjoy sensual pleasures and has no inclination towards renunciation. Due to the intensive passions atman cannot accept the vows of a monk (sramana-caritra) and not even householder's vows. 3. NEGLIGENCE (PRAMADA) Negligence is the lack of enthusiasm towards the spiritual progress. It is of fifteen kinds, viz; (1-4) talks about food (bhojankatha), women (stri-katha), ruler (raja-katha) and state (desa-katha),

Page #212
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 191 (5-8) four passions --anger, pride, hyrocrisy and greed (9-13) five kinds of sensual enjoyments, (14) sleep (15) affection. Being indulged in these fifteen kinds of worldy activities, the jiva forgets his own welfare and gives no preference to salvation-path (moksa-marg.) Consequently, jiva begins to acquire papa-karmas. Whether he does or does not the sinful deeds, yet, on account of negligence, papas are acquired. This is why, Bhagawana Mahavira said to his first disciple Ganadhara Gautama "Gautama! Always be careful and do not be negligent for a single moment." 4. PASSIONS (KASAYA) Passions (kasaya) are the root cause of misery, pain and agony etc., to jiva. Thse are the main causes of transmigration of the jiva.1 Really the velocity of passions is very great. These are passions, which moves the jiva in the circle of life and death. As the passions extinguish, the circle of life and death stops. The passions keep the tree of transmigration green. Sayyambhava Suri said -- The uncontrolled passions keep the root of transmigration fresh, due to them it can not dry." Passions are spiritual defects. May these be manifest or not, yet they make defective the inherent qualities of atman. On account of these, atman gets the pains, miseries and agonies etc., upto long-long time in this world. Acarya Virasena in Dhavla, says that passions make the karma-field fertile. Passions are four in number, viz., anger (krodhu), pride (manu), deceitfulness (maya) and greed (lobha). These are classified into two categories, i. e., attachment (raga) and aversion (dvesa). Anger and pride are dvesa, while deceitfulness and greed are raga. The four types of passions are fundamental passions. Besides these there are nine types of passions more. These are called no-kasayas (quasi-passions). 1. Pratikramanasutra-Vrtti-Acarya Nami 2. Dasavaikalika, 8.

Page #213
192 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Some acaryas have also classified four fundamental passions in many other ways, in raga and dvesa. These raga-dvesas (attachment and aversion) are the main asravas (influx). Nyaya-sutra, Gita and Pali Tripitaka literature also ascertain the raga-dvesas the root of demerit or sin. 5. PSYCHO-PHYSICAL VIBRATIONS (YOGA) The vibrations caused in atma-pradesas, due to mental, vocal and bodily movements, is called yoga. In Yogabhasya etc., yoga is described as the check of mental activities; but Jaina philosophy differs at this point. In Jaina philosophy yoga signifies the mental, vocal and physical activities. These activities make the contact of karma-pudgalas with the atma-pradesas, so these activities are called yoga and to check-up or control these yogas is termed as dhyana (meditation). Literally the word yoga means to add, to join, to contact. Jaina philosophy uses this term in the meaning-to contact the karmapudgalas with atma-pradesas; while yoga philosophy means to join atma with paramatma. Really, atman is an active substance. Due to mental, vocal, physical movements, the vibrations in atma-pradeses are caused. This activity continues upto 13th gunasthana (soul stage) i. e., kevalin state. The complete check up of yogas is possible only in 14th gunasthana. In this stage of soul the jiva becomes quite pure. According to Jaina philosophy, jiva can attain nirvana (salvation) only after the destruction of karmic filth and yogic movements. Yoga is influx (asrava). Auspicious mental, vocal and physical activities causes auspicious influx (subha-asrava); while inauspicious activities becomes the cause of inauspicious influx (asubha-asrava). Inauspicious influx is also called meritorious (Punya-asrava); while inauspicious influx denotes demeritorious (papasrava). TWO-FOLD DISTINCTIONS OF INFLUX (ASRAVA) Influx (asrava) is of two kinds-(1) Subtle influx (Tryapathic asrava) and (2) Samparayika asrava (activities backed by passions). Considered by the point of view of bondage, iryapathic asrava, is

Page #214
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 193 is not the cause of bandha. Due to this kind of influx karmic pudgalas flow in; but they does not combine with atma-pradesas; because the cause of bondage are passions and in this type of inflow, there is no existence of passions. Saparayika asrava being backed by passions, is the cause of bondage. So, it is abandonable, for getting salvation. INFLUX (ASRAVA) IN BUDDHIST LITERATURE !". The original Buddhist literature is written in Pali language and in Pali word asrava' is transformed as asava. "Discussing asava in Pali literature, it is said--Avidya is the cause of accepting any thing stable; while really it is unstable. A sava is the cause of this avidya (delusion). : Asava is distinguished into four types : . (1) Kamasava-Desire to get sensual pleasures. (2) Bhavasava--Desire of life, i. e., non-desire towards death. Due to this asaya, man wishes to live in the same body for a long time. (3) Drsyasava-Opposite point of view that of Buddha philosophy. (4) Avidyasava--To accept unstable things as stable etc. A sava is the general result of avid ya; while sorrow, pain etc., are special results. Professor Jacobi holds the view that "all the three words astava, samvara and nirjara are as old as Jainism itself. Bauddhas have borrowed the word asrava from Jainas, which is the most important among all the three. The Bauddhas use this word in the same meaning, as that of Jainas; but they make difference in literal usage. The cause of this difference is--they do not accept karmas as real entity and also does not accept atman; and the existence of asrava is only possible in atman. This also proves that karmavada (theory of karmas) is the original thing of Jainas and it is much more ancient than the beginning of Buddhism."? 1. (a) In Anguttaranikaya (3/58, 6, 63), three kinds of asravas are described-(1) kamasrava (2) bhavasrava and (3) avidyasrava. (6) Jinadharma-sar (Hindi), p. 121. 2. Encylopedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 472.

Page #215
Principles of Samvara and Nirjara : A Study PRINCIPLE OF SAVARA To check the influx (asrava) is sarvara. It is the principle, opposite to influx (asrava). It checks the inflow of karmic matter. Asrava (influx) is like a channel through which the karmic matter flow-in. By checking the same channel to stop the inflow of karmic matter is sarvara. The main function of samvara, is to check the impure activities of atman, which are due to attachment and a version (raga-dvesa). Samvara is the activity of checking inflow (asrava).1 On account of samvara new karmas could not come and get contact with atmapradesas. There are two types or divisions and kinds of Sanvara(1) Dravya Samvara (material check-up of influx) and (2) Bhavasamvara (thought check-up of influx).2 1. (a) Tattvarthasutra, 9/1 (6) Yogasastra, 79 2. (a) Yogasastra, 79-80 (6) Sthananga, 1/14 (Tika) (c) Saptatattra.prakarana-Heracandra Suri, 112 (d) Tattartha-sarvarthasiddhi, 9/1 (e) Dravyasangraha, 2/34 (1) Pancastikaya, 2/142, Amstcandra-Vrtti. (g) Pancastikaya, 2/142, Jayasena-Vrtti.

Page #216
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 195 Dravyasarnvara (material check-up of influx) means the checkup of receiving the karma-pudgalas ; while bhavasamvara (thought check-up of influx) includes to give up the activities which are cause of increasing the circle of life and death, and to indulge himself in bis own spiritual suddhopayoga (natural conscious attentiveness). So, samiti (vigilance), gupti (self-restraince) etc., are regarded as bhava-samvara (thought check up of influx). An example will be sufficient to clearly understand the subject. Suppose, a man is throwing off water so that the pond may be empty. He is working hard ; but the water of pond is as much as before was. What is the reason ? The reason is that the water is regularly flowing in through the channels. How the pond may be empty ? He should first of all check-up the channels so that water may not flow in. Then he should throw off the water. By this process the pond will be empty. So is the position of samvara. Now let us express the above example. The atman is a pond. The karma is like a water, which is filled in. Asravas are the channels though the medium, new karmas regularly coming, as water flows in through channels. A devotee is throwing off karmas by meditation and penances; but he does not check-up the channels through which newly bound karmas are regularly flowing in. Imagine, how could he accomplish his goal of mukti or to be free from the ties of karmas ? Hence, samvara or to check-up the inflow of karmas is too much essential to get salvation. TYPES OF SAVARA Gupti (self-restraince), samiti (vigilance), uttama ksama (excellent forgiveness) etc. ten sramana dharmas, anupreksa (reflection), parisaha-jaya (victory over the hinderances during penances) and charitra (right conduct) are the ingredients of sarvara, according to Tattvarthasutra.' By all these, the samvara becomes complete. The 1. Tattvarihasutra, 9/2.

Page #217
196 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY same view is adopted in Navatattvaprakarana,1 with slight difference in order. But the ingredients are the same as described by Umaswati in his Tattvarthasutra. Regarding the number of ingredients of samvara, there are many traditions. But mainly there are five types of samvara?-- 1. Samyaktva-to be free from wrong faith (mithyatva). 2. I rata-To renounce all the eighteen kinds of sinful activities. 3. Apramada-to have a keen desire towards auspicious deeds or dharma. 4. Akasaya-subsidence (upasama) of anger, pride, greed, hypocrisy etc. 5. Ayoga-stopping all the mental, vocal and bodily activities. Besides these, to give up all the sins, like-violence, falseness, stealing, cohabitation or sexual desire, hallucination (marcha) of possessions; to control all the five senses and to control the mental, vocal and physical activities are also samvara. In this way, there are 20 types of Samvara.s Sri Devendra Suri tells 57 types of Samvara, viz., 5 Samiti (vigilance), 3 gupti (self-restraince), 10 sramana dharmas (excellent forgiveness etc.) 12 Anupreksas (reflections), 22 parisaha-jaya (victory over the hinderances during penances) and 5 caritra (right conduct). Swami Kartikeya in his Dvadasanupreksa tells only four kinds of samvara. These are- -(1) Samyaktva-samvara. (2) Virati samvara. It is of two kinds-(i) partial or small vows (Desa-virati) and (ii) great vows or complete vows (mahavrata). Partial vows are for 1. Navatativa-prakarana 25. 2. (a) Sthananga, 5/2/418. (b) Samavayamga, 5. 3. There is the description of 5 great vows in-Prasna-Vyakarana, samvara dvara; Sthananga 5/2/418 and 10/1/79. 4. Nava-tattva-prakarana, 42. 5. Dvadasanupreksa-samvaranupreksa, 95.

Page #218
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY house-holder and great vows for a monk. (3) Kasaya samvara (passions), and (4) Yogabhava samvara, i.e., stopping the activities of of mind, body and speech. Acarya Kundakunda in Samaysara1 tells four types of Samvara, (1) mithyatva (wrong faith) (2) ajnana (nescience), (3) avirati (vowlessness) and (4) yoga (activities of mind, speech and body)these are asravas; and to stop all these is samvara. Hence, samvara is also of four types. 197 As far as there is asrava, due to it, the atma-pradesas (the spacepoints of atman) always remain vibrating. This vibration stops only when the inflow of karmas checked up. So, it can be said that the restlessness of atma-pradesas is asrava and the calmness is samvara. The restlessness of atma-pradesas, which is due to asrava turns into calmness, as soon as the asrava or influx of karmas is stopped. Due to asrava there is regular inflow of karma-pudgalas in atma-pradesas and this inflow is stopped by samvara. Therefore it is definite that the main cause of transmigration (samsara) are asrava (influx) and bandha (bondage) while that of salvation are samvara (stopping of influx) and nirjara (shedding or annihilation of karmas).3 BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF SAMVARA -3 Tathagata Buddha also accepts samvara. In Anguitaranikaya, he tells that asrava can be checked up by samvara. There the division of samvara is as follows: (1) By senses (indriyas)-By the samvara (checking up) of senses, the type of asrava, which is possible due to senses, extinguishes. (2) By pratisevana-If a man does not eat food, drink water, wear clothes and take medicine, etc., then his mind can not be happy and due to unhappiness he is bounded with karmic ties. Therefore, to keep the mind happy, he should take all these things. By this the inflow of karmas is checked up. 1. Sumayasara, 190-191. 2. Tattvartha-sarvarthasiddhi, 9/1 3. Tattvartha-sarvarthasiddhi, 1/4

Page #219
198 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY But here he (Tathagata) warns that if food is taken for tastefulness than it would be the cause of asrava (inflow of karmas). (3) By adhivasana (tolerance)-A man, who wants to tolerate the physical hardship then he does not like bodily pleasures. For such a man, the tolerance of bodily hardships is the cause of checking up the inflow of karmas (asrava-nirodha) (4) By parivarjana (forbearance)-Fierce animals, like-elephant, lion, tiger etc., and poisonous creatures, like-scorpion, snake etc., the places full of thorns, the meantype friends etc.,-all these are painful to a man. Therefore, all of these should be forbidden. By it, also, the asrava could be checked-up. Here, it can be said that the Tathagata Buddha does not believe in Kayaklesa tapa (mortification of the body). He wants that the devotees and monks should forbid all the painful circumstances and should live in peaceful places, so that the external causes of karmabandha (bondage of karmas) may not arise. (5) By vinodana-A devotee and a monk and even a layman should not indulge in the vain discussions, like-himsa-Viturka (violentdiscussions), papa-vitarka (discussions regarding sins), kama-vitarka (discussions regarding mean and false desires, sensual pleasures etc.,); because all of these are bandhaka-vitarkas (bounding discussions for atman). By forbidding these bandhaka-vitarkas, this type of asrava can be checked up. (6) By bhavana (reflection)-Asrava is also possible due to inauspicious reflections. If a man does not indulge himself in the auspicious reflections then the reverse, i. e., inauspicious karmas may flow in. For stopping these inauspicious karmas or asrava, a man should always keep auspicious thoughts in his heart and head.1 Anguttaranikaya also asserts that the checking up of avidya (hallucination) is the checking up of asrava.2 1. Anguttaranikaya, 6|58. 2. Ibid, 6/63

Page #220
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY PRINCIPLE OF NIRJARA Nirjara means the annihilation or shedding off the karmas. In the order of sapta tattvas (seven essential elements), it comes after samvara. Samvara stops the inflow of new karmas; while nirjara means the destruction of previous bound karmas. As the water of a pond dries up by the sharp sun-light, air, etc., if the inflow channels have been stopped. So the karmas, previously bound with the atma-pradesas are annihilated gradually, if the inflow of new karmas have been stopped by samvara. By this point of view nirjara means the partial separation of karma-varganas from the atma-pradesas.1 According to Dvadasanupreksa, nirjara means the separation of karma-varganas or aggregate of karmic matter from atma-pradesas. Umaswati says in his Tattvarthabhasya, being ripen by penances etc., the separation of karmas is called nirjara.3 Suppose, a man is washing his dirty coat with washing powder or soap; but the dirt does not come out at the very moment. It comes out gradually as the soap enters through the threads of the coat. As much as the soap enters through the threads, the filth comes out. This can be an example of nirjara. The ascetic or devotee as much indulges himself in penances, so much the karma-varganas separate from atma pradesas. Here we may take coat or cloth as atman, the threads of which it is made as pradesas and filth as the karmavarganas or the karmic matter. The ascetic has checked the inflow of new karmas by samvara and began the penances; but the filth of previously accumulated karmic matter takes time to separate. As much as the filth of karmas removed from atman, so much the spirit or soul becomes pure. Complete exhaustion of karmas is the pure state of soul and this is the salvation. Nirjara is like the ladders for getting the pure state of soul. As a man reaches the upper storey by step by step and every step should be firm and steady. So to get salvation atman also have to march forward by steady steps. 1. Tattvartha-sarvarthsiddhi, 1/4 2. Kartikeya-dvadasanupreksa, 66. 3. Tattvartha-bhasya, Haribhadriya-vritti, 1/4. 199

Page #221
200 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Nirjara is of two kinds, viz., (i) sakama nirjara and (ii) akama nir jara. The shedding of karmas on account of vrata (vows) etc., is called sakama nirjara and the annihilation of karmic matter, ripen itself is a niriara.1 In akama niriara, karmic matter separates itself after fruition and giving effects. Vacbaka Umaswati gives two types of nirjara, as (i) abuddhipurvaka (without the use of intellect) and (2) kusalamula (with intellect). The karmic experience which the jiva gets unintellectually in the narak gatis etc., is called abuddhipurvaka nirjara. The nirjara or shedding off karmas by pepances, vows etc., is kusalamula. Swami Kartikeya also describes two types of nirjara. He says that the fruition power (the power by which the atman experiences the effects of the karmans) of knowledge obscuring karmans etc., (jnanavaranija karma etc.) eight karmans is called their intensity (anubhaga or rasa or vipaka.) After the operation (udaya) of karmas and giving their fruits to atman the karma pudgalas are separated from atma-pradesas. It is called nirjara (shedding off the karmas). It is of two kinds-(1) swa-kala-prapta (at the completion of duration of time), and (2) tapah-k rta (by penances etc.). The first type of nirjara or the exhaustion of previously accumulated karmas i. e., swa-kalaprapta nirjara is always in existence of all the jivas of four gatis. It is regular, without any interruption. The second type nirjara, tapah-krta nirjara can be done only the vowful (vratayukta) jivas, i. e., the jivas who have accepted the vows.3 The Candraprbhacarita states--the exbaustion of karmas i. e., nirjara is of two types, viz., (1) Kala-krta (by the completion of duration of time) and (2) u pakrama-k rta. After experiencing the effects of karmas, the shedding off the karma- pudgalas is kalaja nirjara 1. Dharmasarmabhyudayam 21/122-23. 2. Taltvartha-bhas ya 917 3. Dvadasanu preksa-Nirjaranupreksa, 103-104,

Page #222
* A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (separation of karmas on the completion of the duration of time). The upkrama-krta nirjara takes place by penances etc. 1 The Tattvarthasara states-after the experience of effects, the annihilation of karmas, is vipakaja nirjara, and to experience the karmas, which are not in operation, bringing in operation avalika (udayavalik a) is avipakaja nirjara. " 201 Really, akama-nirjara is automatic. It needs ro efforts on the part of atman. The other names swakalaprapta, abuddhipurvaka, kala-k rta, etc., also denotes the same fact. All the thinkers have the same opinion about this type of nirjara; but they differ regarding sakama-nirjara. Some of the differences of great thinkers are given here. Sakama-nirjara is possible only by those who have adopted vows (anuvratas and mahavratas) and self-control (samyama) and the akama nirjara takes place with all the rest samsari jivas-says Hemacandra Suri.3 In the opinion of Swami Kartikeya-akama nirjara is the regular formality of all the mundane souls residing in four gatis and sakama nirjara is possible only by the souls who have adopted Vows.4 Generally prevailed phrase 'avipaka munindranam savipakakhilatmanam' (avipaka nirjara is possible only by the Jaina monks, who have adopted mahavratas and savipaka nirjara pertains to all the mundane souls) shows the above mentioned phantom. A general view also prevails that only the souls having right faith (Samyag-drsti jiva) can do sakama nirjara; while the souls deluded in wrong faith (mithyadrsti jiva) can not do it. Pandit Kbu bacandra Siddhantsastri gives his conviction in the following words-yathakala nirjara (shedding off karma pudgalas 1. Candra prabhacaritam 18/109-110. 2. Tattvarthas ara 7/2-4. 3. Sapta-tativa prakarana, gatha 128. 4. Dvadasanupreksa-Nirjaranupreksa, 104.

Page #223
202 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY after completing the duration time) is the regular process, and it pertains to all the mundane souls; because all the previously accumulated karma-pudgalas sheds off themselves after the specified duration of time, giving their effects (good or bad) to the jiva. So this type of nirjara should not be regarded as the element of nirjara; because it does not help jiva to get salvation. The other type of nirjara. i.e., shedding cff the karmas by effort, is possible by penances, vows etc. Really, this must be called as principle of nirjara; because it is the cause of salvation. Thus there is basic difference in the cause and effect of both types of niriara 1 Hence it may be concluded that the annihilation of karmas due to penances, vows etc., is sakama nirjara. The wet cloth dries up sooner, when we spread it under sharp sun-light ; and if do not do so, then it would take too much time to dry. The same position is with nirjara. When a person (devotee or ascetic) indulges himself wisely and with discrimination in penances and vows, keeping only the aim of karma-nirjara in bis mind, then the sakama nirjara takes place. While akama nirjara is the result of unwise and without owning mahavratas, penances etc., and the shedding off the karmas on the completion of their specified period. Undiscriminatory and without self-control (samyama) the penances etc., are called unwise hardships (Balatapa). Though Balatapa is also a cause of karma-nirjara and by it jiva can get worldly and sensenal pleasures; but it cannot be the cause of sell-purification. The one and only goal of the devotee is to break all the ties of karmas, which are accumlated in the atman from the times beginningless (anadikala), and attain salvation. So, it is suggested in Dasavaikalika- 'a devotee should never practise penance, meditation etc., to get worldly pleasures, like-fame, immense riches, wealth, majesty, grandeur etc., during other life etc., but he should practise penances etc., only with the aim of nirjara. : 1. Subhasya Tattvarthasutra, p. 378. 2. Dasavaikalika 9/3

Page #224
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 203 TYPES OF NIRJARA Pin The covering of karmas around atman, is destructed by penances. So the penances are also regarded as nirjara.? The Sthanangasatra ascerts as ege nijjara--one nirjara? There we get only these general wordings; but elsewhere twelve types of nirjara are described. As the fire has no distinctions, while we consider its nature; but due to instrumental causes (nimitta karana), it has distinctions, like--wood-fire, stone-fire etc. So being nirjara as one, with the point of view of its nature; but due to instrumental causes it is divided in twelve types.? There are innumerable kinds of penances ! tapa), like-kanakavali etc., so nirjara may also be of innumerable types. Acarya Abhayadeva writes in his yrtti of Sthananga~Considered from the point of view of karmans, nirjara is of eight types; because karmans (knowledge obscuring karnian etc.) are also of eight types. Being a produce of twelve types sf penances, nirjara is also of twelve kinds. As nirjara is the result of many causes, like-akama (without any desire) tolerating hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc., and the vow of celibacy etc., it (nir jara) is also of many types.5 But mainly, there are twelve types of nirjara, on account of twelve types of penances. All the thinkers are one-minded on this point. These twelve types of nirjara or tapas (austerities) are as follow: 1. Fasting (anasana) 2. Eating less than one's fill or hunger (unodari) 3. Taking a definite vow secretly to accept food from a householder only if certain condition is fulfilled (bhiksacari). 1. Navatattva-prakarana, 11, bhasya 90, by Devagupta Suri 2. Sthananga 9/16- Ege nijjara. 3. santasudharasa-Nirjara Bhavana, 2-3, Vina yavijayaji. 4. Navatattva-prakarana, 11, Devagupta Suri. 5. Sthananga, 1/16, Tika.

Page #225
204 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 4. Abstinence from one or more of the six objects of taste (rasa-parityaga). These rasas or tastes are-1. Kasu (sour), 2. Madhura (sweet), 3. Amla (acidic), 4. Tikta (bitter) 5. Kasaya (astringent) and 6. Lavana (saltish). 5. Mortification of the body or to tolerate the pains, griefs given by other beings or aroused by previously accumulated demeritorious karmas (kayaklesa). 6. To be static in self-nature (pratisamlinata). 7. Expiation (prayascitta). 8. Modesty (vina ya) 9. Servitude (vaiyyav rtya). 10. Self-study (swadhyaya). 11. Meditation (dhyana). 12. Giving up through non-attachment (vyutsarga). Among these twelve tapas (penances), first six are external penances or austerities (bahya tapas) and the last six are internal austerities (antaranga tapas). ANASANA (FASTING) Fasting (anasana) is the first of the external austerities. It is much more difficult to practise in comparison to other austerities. In this type of austerity a devotee has to win victory on hunger, and it is well known to all that hunger is too difficult to win. In other words, it can be said that huoger has got victory over every jiva of the world. It is a hero, who can be termed as world-victorious. Every type of sin is the consequence of hunger. But a devotee has to win this world-famous hero. To win hunger and control the mind is anasana austerity. Only to remain hungry cannot be regarded anasana austerity. Many man and animals, creatures etc., have to remain hungry when they could not get food and drinking water. But their being hungry can not be regarded as austerity. It would be austerity when a devotee can get food easily, but he wilfully keeps fast and

Page #226
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY controls his mind and indulges himself in auspicious and religious activities. Considering from medicinal point of view, fasting is a cause of bodily-purification. It is the maxim of vaidyaka sastra-to keep fast is the best medicine (Langhanam paramausadham). The fast does not only purify the body but it also purifies the mind even. Gita says, by giving up to eat food the senses become pure and consequently mind also becomes pure. That is why, a Vedic saint has said-'there is no hardship greater than fast. But generally it is very difficult to practise, nay only difficult but most difficult to the superlative degree.2 205 Really, to keep fast and observe anasana tapa is a fire-bath. One, who can practise it, will be capable to burn all the filth of body and mind. He will shine like a sparkling star. what? Ganadhara Gautama once asked humbly to Bhagawana Mabavira-Venerable! By keeping fast (anasana) jiva accomplishes Venerable Bhagawana Mahavira replied thus-O Gautama ! By practising anasana tapa, jiva is bereaved from the desire of living, alias his attachment towards the body and vital forces (prana).3 Consequently the ascetic gets bereavement from the attachment towards his vital forces and body. One thinker warned the person, while keeping fast, not to do three deeds, viz., (1) anger (2) pride and (3) negligence (pramada). He as well suggested to do three deeds viz., (1) to observe celibacy (2) study the holy scriptures and (3) self-realisation. The word anasana means forbearance of food. It may be at least for one day and at the most of six months and in special circumstances life-long. 1. Bhagavadgita 2/59. 2. Maitrayani Aranyaka 10/62. 3. Uttaradhyayana 29/35.

Page #227
206 There are two distinctions of anasana-(1) Itwarika (for specified period) and (2) Yavat-kathika-life long or upto death.1 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY During itwarika tapa, there remains the limit of specified period and after this period, the fast-keeper has the desire of getting food in his mind. So it is called as the austerity with desire (savakanksa tapa); while during yavat-kathika tapa, there is no existence of desire regarding getting food. So it called as austerity without desire (niravakanksa tapa).' There are innumerable kinds of itwarika tapa, i. e., to keep fast like-Navakarasi (for 48 minutes), porasi (for 3 hours), purvardha (for beginning half of the day, i. e., for six hours from rising the sun) divasa-carima (for full day, it begins from the sun-set of the previous day and completes in the morning of the day-after) caturtha-bhakta (a full day-night fast), ratribhojanatyaga (not to eat and drink any thing after sunset upto the sun-rise the next day, i. e. full night) chattha-bhakta (two full day-night) etc. etc.3 Yavat-kathika anasana is of two types-(1) padapopagamana and (2) bhakta-pratyakhyana.1 During bhakta pratyakhyana, besides giving up the food, it is necessary for a devotee to pass every moment in studying holy scriptures, meditation and self-realisation. Pada popagamana is harder than bhakta-pratyakhyana. During this type of anasana, the devotee becomes static like a stalk. He does not even change his posture and remains in the same posture, in which he has accepted the vow of anasana. For example, if he is standing then he will not sit, nor will lie or vice versa. If his eyes were open, he will not shut them and vice versa. 1. Bhagavati 25/7 2. Uttaradhyayana 30/9 3. Jainadharma me Tapa: Swarup and Vislesana, pp. 181-199 by Munisri Misrimalaji. 4. Uvavai sutra

Page #228
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 207 For padapopagmana anasana and santhara, it is quite necessary that man must have vajra-rsabha narach sanghananal of his body, otherwise it is impossible to be static like a mountain. Therefore it is not possible for other or general men. Agamas definitely ascerts that with the dispersion (vicheda) of 14 purvas the padapopagamana santhara also disjuncts. UNODARI la The next type of nirjara is unodari (eating less than one's hunger). It is second external austerity. It is also called avamaudarya. It can be said as to eat little food or limited food. Like food, unudari also pertains to passions and possessions as well. There are two division of unodari-(1) Dravya (regarding matter or external) and (2) Bhava (thought or internal). Dravya unodari is of many kinds. Bhava unodari means to subside the passions, like-anger, pride, hypocrisy, greed and to speak as little as possible, not to come into conflict with any body, etc. Really speaking Dravya-unodari (external) makes the external life of an ascetic light and easy; while internal (bhava) unodari paves the way for attaining mental and internal happiness and the evolution of good qualities. BHIKSACARI In general sense bhiksacari is to get food from a house-holder, but for Jaina mouks it is an external austerity, because he accepts food and drinking water only when his secretly adopted vow and certain conditions are fulfilled. He is not a general beggar who can accept every and any kind of food. He accepts it according to his vows and limitations. Acarya Haribhadra Suri describes three kinds of bhiksa(1) Dina-rriti, (2) Paurusagini, and (3) Sarvasampatkari.? 1. It is the special type of bondage of the bones. It is such a strong, that cannot be broken or cut by the sharpest weapons. 2. Astaka-prakarana 5/1

Page #229
208 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The poor, orphans, oppressed, down-trodden, grief-stricken, and deef-dumb-blind-maim etc., who takes food by begging is called beggary or Dina-vrtti bhiksa. Strong, sturdy, healthy persons capable to earn their livelihood, when beg to get food, it is called paursaghni bhiksa. This type of beggary depresses the manhood and vigour of a person, so it is regarded the meanest type of beggary. The non-violent and content saints take food according to their limitations from a house-holder only for giving dose (diet) to the belly is called sarva-sampatkari bhiksa. By it both the taker and giver gets auspicious gatis. In the agamas, there is the description of many kinds of bhiksacari.1 Jaina monk accepts the alms only when it is completely faultless and without any kind of shortcomings." RASA-PARITYAGA Rasa literally means-enjoyment increasing ingredients. The ingredients, which inspires attachment towards any thing, like-food etc., is called rasa. There are six kinds of rasas regarding food. These are--(1) Katu (sour) (2) Madhura (sweet) (3) Amla (acidic) (4) Tikta (bitter) (5) Kasaya (astringent) and (6) Lavana (saltish). By these rasas the food becomes tasty and delicious; and being so it is eaten more than hunger. So the rasas are also called inspiring elements." Vigayas, like-Milk, curd, ghee, etc., are also called rasas. Why these milk etc., are called vigaya? This question is answered by Acarya Siddhasena. He says-by eating or taking these the perversion (vikara) arouses in the tendency of atman. So 1. (a) Uttaradhyayana 30/25 (b) Sthananga, 6 2. (a) Uttaradhyayana 24/11-12 (b) Pindaniryukti 92-93. 3. Uttaradhyayana 32/10.

Page #230
A SOURCE-ROOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 209 the person falls down from the highest altar of Sarhyama (self-control) and consequently he has to go to vigati or durgati (downward conditions of mundane soul). Therefore, these things are the causes of sad effects (vik rti) and bad or inauspicious gati (vigati). Hence, things are called vigaz.? But it should be remembered that the healthy diet is not altogether denied to monk. He can take vigaya, according to his needs, but he does not take it for the sake of taste only. For taste-sake even to chew and suck the food is also regarded as defect. Different types are described of rasas also. KAYAKLESA . Kayaklesa literally means to give turmoil to the body. The turmoil or trouble are of two types--(1) swa-k rta (done by own-self) and (2) para-k sta (done by others). The ascetic keeps no inclination or attachment towards his body. He firmly believes that atman and body both are quite separate from each other. Acarya Bhadrabahu wrote in his Avasyaka-niryukti-'atman and body are quite different -by this type of pure intelligence, the ascetic renounces the attachment towards his body, which is the cause of grief and ain.3 The thinking of spiritual thinker is thus - the pains, troubles and miseries are all to the body; not to me (self). The pain may be to body through trouble and turmoil. The body may be destroyed by the strokes of weapons. But utman can never be destroyed, it can never be destructed (natthi jivassa nasu tti). He think that I, i. e., my soul is full of conscience, cognition and bliss etc. No power of the world is capable to destroy it. It can never be destructed. Fire cannot burn it and water cannot drench it It is pure and blissful and this is my own nature. | (a) Pravacanasaroddhara Vrtti-Pratyakhyanadvura. (6) Yogasasatra, 3 Prakasa-Vrtti. 2 (a) Bhagavati 7, 1 (b) Acaranga 8, 6 3 Avasyaka-niryukti 1547 4 Uttaradhyayana 2, 27

Page #231
210 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY By the dint of this thinking and having deep faith to the core about atma-svarupa (nature of self) the ascetic tolerates all the agonies peacefully. Sthanangasutra describes the type of Kaya-klesa-Kayotsarga, meditation by utkatuka posture, to accept pratima (a special type of vow); vir asana, sitting in palathi posture for the study of holy scriptures, stand erect (Dandayat) posture, meditation in standing posture.1 Fourteen types of Kavaklesa are described in uvavai sutra.2 This shows that Kayaklesa tapa is the mortification of body. PATISAMLI NATA The process of bringing soul to its own nature, by taking off from external thoughts, is called Pratisamlinata. So samlinata is svalinata (to remain in own nature). To restraint internally, the passions, senses and yogas, bringing back from external tendencies, is samlinata. Bhagavati sutra has given four distinctions of pratisamlinata. These are: (1) indriya (sense) pratisamlinanta, (2) kasaya (passions) pratisamlinata, (3) yoga samlinata, and (4) vivikta saiyyasana (sitting and stopping in a lonely place).3 PRAYASCITTA Prayascitta is the formation of two words-'prayah' and 'citta'. The word 'Prayah' denotes sin and the word 'citta' denote visodhana (purification). So prayascitta (expiation) is the process of purifying the sinful activities.4 According to Acarya Akalanka offence is 'prayah' and 'citta' means purification. Hence prayascitta is the process by which crimes or offences are get purified.5 1 Sthananga 7, 544 2 Uvavai-Samavasarana adhikara, 3 Bhagavati 25, 7 4 Dharmasangraha 3, adhikara. 5 Tattvartha-rajavarttika, 9, 22, 1

Page #232
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 211 In the Praksta language word 'prayascitta' is termed as payacchitta'. The origination of word 'payacchitta' has been described thus'paya' means papa (sin or demerit) and 'cchitta' means destruction. In this way, the process which destroys sin, is 'payacchitta (expiation).1 There is a vast difference between expiation and punishment. Suppose, a man has done a wrong deed due to negligence. After it he repents heartily for this wrong deed. He goes to his elders and clearly tells them all about his wrong activity and prays them to give any kind of punishment for the purification of that misdeed. He accepts the punishment told by the elders and practises the hardships etc., then it is expiation. Now we take punishment. The ruler gives punishment to a criminal. First of all, he doe; not confess his guilt. He tells thousands of lies to escape himself from punishment. The judge or ruler needs proofs and witnesses to ascribe crime. If anyhow the crime is proved and he sentenced a legal punishment. Still there is no repentence in his mind and heart. He accuses judge, advocates and witnesses. So there is no chance of reform of the criminal by punishment. Another difference is that, when expiation is self-punishment; while punishment is external. First is internal and second is external. Ten types of prayasciita are described in Sthananga sutra.? By prayascitta (expiation) the defects are removed and the heart becomes pure. The simple hearted man can practise prayascitta (expiation). VINAYA Vinaya (modesty) is directly related to heart. It is a spiritu il quality. The word Vinaya (modesty) has been used in three different meanings, in the Jaina litera ture. These are 1 Pancasaka satika, Vivarana 16-3 ? (a) Sthananga, 10 (b) Bhagavati, 25, 7

Page #233
212 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (1) Vinaya-discipline (2) Vinaya-self-control, sila, good conduct. (3) Vinaya---namrata (modesty) good behaviour. Acarya Abhayadeva wrote in Sthananga-vrtti --Vinaya removes all the eight type of karmans and by it soul gets salvation.' In the vrtti of the Pravacanasaroddhara, it has been suggested that Vinaya refers to the removal of the karmas which lead to affliciions and which are enemies of the soul. In the agama literature like the Bhagavati, distinctions have been made of the Vinaya : (1) Darsana Vinaya (2) Jnana Vinaya (3) Caritra Vinaya (4) Mana Vinaya (5) Vacana Vinaya (6) Kaya Vinaya and () Lokopacara Vinaya. Vinaya (modesty) and formal courtesy or flattery (capalusi) are diametrically opposed to each other. In the vinaya there is sincerity and the openness of the heart, but courtesy expresses only formality. It may not have sincerity. On the contrary, it may have veiled hypocrisy. ) VAIYYAVRTYA (SERVETUDE) Vaiyyavrtya refers to protection and service of things and individuals leading to the attainment of the righteousness. Through service, it is possible to be free from the Nama and Gotra karma.3 Service to the diseased persons, the sadhus and the acaryas leads us towards Nirjara. Real and devoted service leads us to the freedom from the wheel of samsara.4 Sthananga mentions eight commandments and out of these two refer to the service to humanity,5 In the Bhagavati sutras ten types of vaiyyavrtya has been suggested. 1 Sthananga, 6, Tika. 2 (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthananga 7 (c) Aupapatika, tapuvarnana. 3 Uttaradhyayana 29, 3 4 Sthananga 5, 1 5 Sthananga 8 6 (a) Bhagavati 35, 7 (b) Sthananga 10

Page #234
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 213 A poet has praised the qualities of the Vaiyyav rtya and says that the excellence of service is so great that even the yogis cannot easily understand its importance. SVADHYAYA (SELF-STUDY) Svadhyaya refers to self-study. It is a systematic study of the sastras.1 Svadhyaya also means introspection on the nature of self. The self-study increases the capacity of intellect. As food is necessary for the development of the body, self-study is absolutely necessary for the development of the mind. Self-study and contemplation, lead us towards creative thinking and towards the development of the mental capacity. Wrong types of physical excercises are harmful to the body. Unwholesome food is injurious to the body. Similarly, study of literature like-sex literature, would be very harmful to the purification and to the development of the mental states in the proper direction. Mental activities become distorted and one loses the power of discrimination. It would, therefore, be necessary that we always study wholesome literature, although we may study less. It is possible to be free from misery, through svadhyaya. The accumulated karma coming from a chain of previous life can be annihilated by svadhyaya. Svadhyaya, itself is a form of important tapas. Acarya Sanghadasagani says, that svadhyaya, is unique and the austerity of svadhyaya is unparallel because such noble type of austerity has not been experienced in the past, nothing so great in the present and nothing similar to it in future.5 The Vedic seers have also said that svadhyaya is a form of the tapas. We should not be negligent of svadhyaya.? Just as the wall becomes shining by constant rubbing and polishing, it reflects the i Sthananga, Abhayadeva vrtti 5, 3, 465 2 Svasya svasmin adhyayah-adhyaynam-svadhyayah. 3 Uttaradhyayana 26, 10 4 Chandraprajnapti 91 5 (a) Brhatkalpa bhasya 1169 (b) Candraprajnapti sutra 89 6 Taittiriya aranyaka 2, 14 7 Taittiriyopanisad 1, 11, 1 For, Private & Personal Use Only

Page #235
214 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY : image of the persons standing in front of it, so also svadhyaya if done carefully and seriously and without fault, becomes transparent and it reflects the essence of all the satras. Patanjali has said that it is possible to get the direct experience of the deities through svadhyaya. Svadhyaya can be distinguished into five types as (1) Vacana (reading), (2) Pracchana (in.errogation), (3) Parivartana (rotating or repeating loudly), (4) Anupreksa (psychic preparation through meditat. ion) and (5) Dharmakatha (listening to religious stories). I DHYANA (MEDITATION) Dhyana is concentration of mind. Acarya Hemacandra says that Dhyana is the concentration of mind on a particular subject. Bhadrabahu also says, that Dhyana refers to the concentration of the mind on a particular subject and fixing the mind on that subject.4 Dhyana is of two types : (1) auspicious and (2) inauspicious. Inauspicious Dhyana (aprasasta) is of two types : (i) Artadhyana (concentration of mind on things of the world) and (ii) Raudradhyana (revengeful concentration). Acarya Siddhasena Divakara has said "Subhaika' pratyayo dhyanan." It means auspicious dhyana is concentration of mind on an auspicious object. It is suggested that the one who aims at the highest from of self-concentration which is called samadhi must avoid Arta and Raudradhyana and he must practise righteous concentration (Dharmadhyana) and pure concentration (Sukladhyana).6 Dharmadhyana consists in the concentration of the mind on the auspicious and righteous objects. It is also been described as self-concentration i. e., concentration on the self by the self.? In this "Subject. 1 Yogadarsana 2,944 2 (a) Bhagavati 25, 7 (b) Sthananga 5 3 Abhidhana cintamani kosa 1, 48 4 Avasyakaniryukti 1456 5 Dvatrimsad dvatrimsika 18, 11 6 Atta ruddani vajjitta jhaejja susamahie. Dhamma sukkaim jhanaim jhanam tam tu buhavae, 7 Tattvanusasana 74

Page #236
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 215 way, the atman withdraws itself from the external objects and concentrates on its own nature. Through Dhyana, karma is destroyed, just as in fire, pieces of wood are burnt away. VYUTSARGA (GIVING UP THROUGH NON-ATTACHMENT) Vyutsarga has two elements--vi' which means specific and 'utsarga' which means giving up, or renunciation. Vyutsarga, therefore, means' giving up or renunciation in a specific way. Acarya Akalanka says that vyutsarga may be referred as renunciation, non-attachment, fearlessness and giving up of hunger and thirst for things of the world. For the sake of self realisation and for the sake of righteousness, vyutsarga aims at self-denial and renunciation. Vyutsarga is of four types, like-(1) Gana Vyutsarga (renunciation of group), (2) Sarira Vyutsarga (mortification of the body), (3) Upadhi Vyutsarga (giving up of the things connected with activities) and (4) Bhakta-pana Vyutsarga (giving up of food and drink) Sarira Vyutsarga is considered to be Kayotsarga. It refers to the affliction through the body. The seeker after self-realisation practises prayascitta for all the ills that he has done. He gives up attachment for the body and resolves to by free from all faults. With this firm resolution and with a repentent heart the weight of the karma becomes lighter. The stream of auspicious concentration of mind flows freely. It gives peace and tranquility. The atman enjoys the pure bliss. In the practice of kayotsarga, it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and obstructions from the gods, from men and from the lower animals too. But one who is engaged in the practice of Dhyana accepts these troubles with equanimity of mind and by this process the kayotsarga gets purified. 3 Kayotsarga is a routine procedure of everyday, and it is absolutely necessary for everyone to practise. In this, every moment, the mental preparation for kayotsarga goes on. Bhagavana Mahavira 1 2 3 Tattvartha-rajavartika 9, 26, 10 Bhagavati sutra 25, 7 Avasyakaniryukti 1549

Page #237
216 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY says : "abhikkhanam kaussaggakari'' - the seeker practises kayotsarga very often. Kayotsarga has been distinguished into two types : (1) Dravya-Kayotsarga is concerned with the bodily aspect of self-control and (2) Bhava-Kayotsarga is concerned with the psychic accompaniments of vyutsarga.Dravya-Kayotsarga refers to the control of the bodily states and Bhava Kayotsarga is involved in the Dhar madhyana. and sukladhyana. Kayotsarga is one of the important forms of tapas and for this reason we get in the agamic literature the description that kayotsarga is in fact a full form of the vyutsarga. The seeker after self-realisation will attain full vyutsarga if he is successful in the practice of kayotsarga.3 There is a regular procedure and the graded process of the practice of tapas from Anasana (fasting) to Vyutsarga (renunciation). There is a steady flow of austerities in these graded processes. From the discussions above, we may conclude that the Jaina description of tapas does not merely refer to the physical austerity, but it has also reference to mental austerity which consists of control and practice of mental states and events, which lead to the purity of the mind and soul. 1 3 Avasyakacurni Jainadharma me Tapa - Svarupa aur Vislesana (Hindi), p. 523

Page #238
The Principles of BANDHA and MOKSA : A Discussion THE PRINCIPLE OF BANDHA The association of two things with each other is called Bandha. There are two types of Bandha: (1) Dravyabandha (the association or contact of the material things) and (2) Bhavabandha coming together or joining of the psychic states and events). The Karmic particles coming in contact with the soul and creating the veil of obscuration, is called the Dravyabandha. The psychic states accompanying the physical activity and also those psychic states which are the causes of the physical activity and which come together and vitiate the Karmic particles associated with a soul is Bhavabandha. In the Dravyabandha the atman is connected with the Karmic particles. In the Bhavabandha the psychic states are associated with the soul leading to the Karmic bondage. These two are complementary to each other and the one is intimately conected with the other. If the particles of the matter are brought together, there would be the specific form of binding or association. It may create chemical action. For instance, if the viscousity and dryness are combined in the particles of matter, a new chemical action will be created and new properties are formed. The atoms come together to form molecules and when they are combined in different degrees, chemical reaction is possible. Similarly, if the Karmic particles are formed into the aggreagates of Karmic particles, those will have some effect and association with the soul, although there is no chemical action in this activity. This is because the jiva and the karmic particles are qualitatively different. The manifestation of the jiva is to be found in the psychic and the conscious states while the modes of matter are unconscious. The manifestation of jiva is

Page #239
218 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY through the expression of caitanya (consciousness) and its states, while modes of matter are expressed in the qualities like taste, smell and touch etc. THE TYPES OF BANDHA The Bandha has been distinguished into four types such as : (1) Prak rtibandha, sthitibandha, anubhagabandha and pradesabandha. Tattvarthasutra uses the word anubhava in place of anubhaga. Prakrti karma refers to the nature of karma, Sthiti-karma has reference to the state and the limitation of the karmic particles with the soul, Anubhaga is the in intensity of the experience of karma, while Pradesa karma has reference to aggregates of karmic partiles associated with the soul. Detailed discussion of this problem can be found in the theory of Karma as presented by the Jaina philosophers. Philosophical literature on the Karma theory of the Jainas gives the analogical example of a pudding (modaka) with its medicinal properties. A pudding may be used for the sake of gastric trouble, some other puddings may be used for curing the diseases of phlegm and other types of intestinal disorders. Similarly, some form of Karma is responsible for obscuring knowledge, some other forms of Karma would obscure intuition, and still others would be responsible for limiting the inherent energy of the soul etc. There are some forms of Karma which create the deluding effects on the soul. This, we can say refers to the Prakrti-karma and Prakrtibandha. Some puddings last for a day, while some others may last for a week and so on and after which the efficacy of the pudding will be lost. Similarly, the karmic particles affecting the soul have their duration of the effect in varied degrees. As some puddings are sweet and some sour, similarly the experiencing effect of the Karma will be different in intensity. Just as a pudding may be half in size or full in size, similar description can be given about the Karmic Pradesa. Praksti and Pradesabandha are caused by activity (Yoga). Sthiti and Rasa-bandha are caused by Kasayas (passions). The intensity of passions depends on the nature, and the potency of the Karmic

Page #240
219 particles. This is called by the expression of Sthitibandha and Anubhagabandha. These types of Bandha are due to passions and emotional disturbances. In the case of those in whom the passions are subdued, and in the case of those, the passions are destroyed and similarly in the case of Kevalins, the kasayas (passions) have no effects. There is no rise of kasayas in the Kevalin. Even if the karmic particles are encrued in the soud of a Kevalin due to activity, they are immediately washed away in the next moment because the soul has reached the state of purity. In these cases, Sthitibandha and Anubhagabandha are not possible in these cases. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Bandha is of two types: (i) subha and (ii) asubha. Subhabandha (auspicious bondage) brings in merit and asubha bandha (inauspicious bondage) brings in demerit. As long as Karma does not fructify in the form of an effect, it remains potential, and it is called the satta state of Karma. The moment the Karma fructifies Punya and Papa flow in. The potential form of Karma is Bandha and the frucitification of Karma refers to the acquisition of Punya and Papa. MOKSA AND THE PATHWAY TO MOKSA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY There are three great philosophies of the world-Greek philosphy, Modern Western philosophy and Indian philosophy. Aristotle, a great Greek philosopher said that philosophy begins in wonder. Plato also held the same view. Modern western philosophers like Descartes, Kant and Hegel hold a similar view expresed. It is said that the philosophical speculations are rooted in curiousity1 and curiousity results in misery. Birth, old age, disease and death have to be overcome for the sake of self-realisation. (This is possible through the arousal of the metaphysical curiousity). Indian philosophy does not merely aim at the achievement of the knowledge of the reality, but it has a dual purpose of knowledge and virtue. The main purpose of philo 1 (a) Athato dharmajijnasa-Vaisesika darsana (b) Sankhya karika 1. (c) Mimamsa sutra-Athato dharmajijnasa. (d) Brahma sutra 1/1-Athato Brahmajijnasa.

Page #241
220 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY sophy in India is to free oneself from the misery of this life. In this sense, we can say that in the western thought, the aim is purely academic, while Indian philosophy is practical and it aims at self-realisation. It is not merely an academic pursuit of knowledge of reality, but it has the highest aim of the realisation of the truth in life. Moksa is the highest ideal of Indian philosophy. Sri Auro. bindo considers the concept of Moksa to be the central point of Indian thought. This is the distinguishing feature of Indian thought. In the description of the Purusartha, Moksa is considered to be the supreme (parama purusartha). Moksa is the highest ideal to be achieved and dharma is the means of achieving this supreme end. In Indian philosophy the concept of Moksa may be considered from four different points of view; viz. Vedic, Jaina, Baudhha Ajivaka. Ajivaka has not remained as important philosophy. It is, therefore, not necessary here to consider the concept of Moksa from the point of view of Ajivakas. The vedic tradition gives six darsanas like Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa and UttaraMimamsa, Parva Mimamsa was primarily considered to be Karma Mimamsa. It was mainly concerned with the study of Moska. But in the other five darsanas, the concept of Moksa is important. We should remember that as there are differences in the presentation of the nature of self, so are there differences regarding their speculation on the nature of Moksa. Sometimes the concepts of Moksa are not only different but also contrary. Those systems of philosophy which have based their thought on the Upanisads and Brahmasutra also differ regarding the nature of Moksa. Some philosphies make a distinction between the Atman and Paramatman, some others consider them to be identical and still other philosophies consider the distinction and the identity to be equally real. Similarly, some philosophies have considered the Atman to be all-pervading, 3 and 1 Jaina agama Bhagavati etc. 2 Panait Sukhalal Sanghavi-- Adhyatma Vicarana. (Gujarat Vidya * Sabha, Ahmedabad) p. 74. 3 (a) Mundaka up. 1, 1, 6 (b) Vaisesiku Sutra 7, 1, 22. (c) Nyayamanjari (Vijayanagaram) p. 468 (d) Prakarana pan p-158

Page #242
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA FHILOSOPHY 221 soine others make Atman to be atomic. Some philosophic traditions have acceped the plurality of Atman while others consider it to be one. However, all the philosophies mentioned above have accepted to primacy of the concept of the Atman in one from or the other. NYAYA-VAISESIKA The Nyaya-Vaisesika darsanas have generally a common view-point of the nature of Atman. They consider Atman to be the ultimate and eternal substance. The Atman is not one. They believe in the plurality of the Atmans. There are as many souls as there are bodies. If the Atman were one, there would be no possibility of diversity in life. Nyaya-Vaisesika darsanas maintained that Atman has consciousness. But consciousness is not the essense of the Atman, it is its attribute. The association of body, sense-organ and central function of mind give rise to cognition. This cognition is possible d consciousness. But consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is only a quality. Therefore, it can be said that the self as consciousness and not that the self is consciousness. This view of the nature of the self is different from the view of the nature of self presented by the philosophical systems like Sankhya-Yoga and Vedanta. These systems do not accept the conception that consciousness is an attribute of the self. They consider it to be the essence of the self.In the highest state of Moksa, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, self does not have any experience nor consciousness; it is pure satta (reality). It does not experience pure consciousness or pure bliss, because in the sa Moksa, the accidental quality of consciousness of the soul is absent. It is qualityless, and therefore in a sense, we can say it is free from consciousness and also because consciousness is an empirical adjunct of the relational categories. The Nyaya-Vaisesika says that the highest state of Moksa is 1 (a) Brhadaranyaka up. 5, 6, 1. (b) Chandogya Up. 5, 18, 1, (c) Maitrei Up. 2 Adhyatma Vicarana.

Page #243
222 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY absolute freedom from miseryl and there is no possibility of the recurrence of misery in any from. Vatsyayana the commentator on Nyayasutr:1 says that when perversity of knowledge is removed through philosophy, all imperfections are removed. When imperfection are removed, then the tendency to perform karma also ceases. With the cessation of the tendency to do karma, the cycle of birth and death also stops. The commentators on the Nyayasutra have pointed out that in the state of perfection there is absolute cessation of misery. In the state of Moksa the nine attributes like intellect, happiness, misery, desire, hatred, will (sarnkalpa), punya (merit) and papa (demerit) do not exist.5 In the final state of Moksa the Nyaya-Vaisesika lays emphasis on the absolute cessation of misery and the cause of misery. Mallisena in the Syadvadamanjari says that considered from the point of view of the Nyaya-Vaisesika the worldly experience would be superior to the state of Moksa, because in the worldly experience, we sometimes get happiness, but in the highest state of Moksa, there is absolute cessation of happiness also. There is the absence of consciousness. A disciple of lord Krisna says that instead of the state of Moksa as described by Nyaya-Vaisesika, the description of life in Brndavana is much better.? Sri Harsa says that the state of Moksa described by the Nyaya-Vaisesika presents a bloodless category since consciousness and sang happiness.8 Nyaya-Vaisesika have analysed the concept | (a) Atyantika dukkhaniv yttih moksah. (b) Carama dukkha dhvamsah-Tarkadipika 2 Bhasya on Nyayasutra 3 Vaisesikasutra 3, 2, 18 4 Atyantiko dukhabhavah- Nyayavartika 5 (a) Nyayamanjari (b) Tadatyanta Vimoksopavargah-Sabhasya Nyayasutram. 6 Syadvadamanjari, p. 6?. 7 Syadvadamanjari, p. 63. 8 Bharatiya darsana me moksa cintan : ek tulanatmaka ahyayana (17, Malaviya nagar. 1973.)

Page #244
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 223 of Moksa from the empirical point of view. According to them, one who wants to realise the highest end must aim at the removal of the misery and the unholesome and unrighteous states of existence. There is no evidence to show that in the highest state of Moksa, there is the presence of either the consciousness of bliss. In the highest state of Moksa the self subsists in itself without any attributes of knowledge (jnana), and bliss (ananda). SANKHYA AND YOGA DARSANAS Sankhya and Yoga darsanas are compelmentary to each other. The Sankhya presents the metaphysical aspect of reality, while Yoga is practical, in the sense, it presents the pathway to the realisation of the highest end. The Sankhya gives the metaphysical foundations to Yoga and Yoga presents the practical pathway to the realisation of the highest end of perfection (Kaivalya). Sankhya presents the dualistic principles of Purusa (self) and Praksti (matter). Purusa and Prakrti are the ultimate realities. Prakrti is the primordial matter and it is the expression of the equilibrated state of the gunas - sattva, rajas and tamas. The presence of the purusa disturbs the equilibrium in the gun.is and the activity of the Prakrti. The activity of the Prak rti through the disturbance of the guna due to the presence of the Purusa gives rise to the evolution of the universe. The modes, both physical and mental in the world are the expression of Prakrti. Prakrti evolves but it is not the product of any other higher principle. The things of the world are the products of Prakrti. But Purusa does not produce anything nor it is produced by anything else. Purusa is uncaused, eternal and is a spiritual substance. Consciousness is the essence of Purusa. In this sense, we can say Purusa is consciousness. The Bandha (bondage) and Moksa (the self realisation) are due to the states of Prakrti. Purusa in its real nature is unaffected by the evolutes of the Prak rti.1 But through neiscience (avidya) Purusa falsely identifies itself with the evolutes of Praksti. Just as the image of a bird flying in the air is reflected in the waters of the pond below, so also the states of Bandha and Moksa are reflected in the Purusa. 1 Sahkhyakarika 62.

Page #245
224 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Sankhya and Yoga philosophies have posited the plurality of self. This concept of plurality is not qualitative, but numerical. The Sankhya-Yoga contends that if the Purusa were one, then with the death of the Purusa all individual selves would have cease to exist. Similarly, if one Purusa were to be in bondage or if a Purusa were to be free from bondage and reach the Moksa state, the same conditions would have been experienced by all the individual selves. Therefore, there are many selves. The Sankhya-Yoga maintains that consciousness is the essence of the self and not a quality of the self as the Naiyayikas contend. Purusa is a subject and the congniser. The Sankhya-Yoga concept of the nature of Purusa is similar to the Vedantic conception of the Atman, the Jaina conception of jiva and the monad of Leibnitz. According to Sankhya, nescience (avidya) is the cause of bondage. The self does not know its real nature. It forgets its real nature and indentifies itsels with the Prakrti and its evolutes. This is due to avidya. But with the awakening of the real knowledge and discrimination, Purusa realises that it is different from Prak sti. Then ignorance is destroyed, and the self becomes free from the bondage (Bandha). Kapila does not elaborately discuss about the nature of Moksa. Like the Buddha, he also says that this world is full of misery and the main object is to be free from misery. However, later Sankhya philosophers have given description of the nature of Moksa. The main cause of bondag- is ignorance and the false indentification of Purusa with Prak rti and its evolutes. This is the bondage. The self, when it gets enlightenment, realises that it is free from Prak rti and this realisation leads to the freedom from the bondage. In the Sankhya darsana Moksa is also described as Kaivalya. The conception of Moksa of the Sankhya-Yoga is different from the conception that the Nyaya-Vuisesika presents. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, although the self is a spiritual substance, it is not consciousness. In the highest state of Mugti there is no consciousness nor the mental states expressed in the self. In the state of Mukti, the states like intellect, happiness and other mental states are no longe:

Page #246
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 225 present and there is no scope for any activity of consciousness. According to Sankhya-Yoga the self is free from any attributes (nirguna), self-luminous and consciousness is the essence of the self. Unlike the Nyaya-Vaisesika the Sankhya-Yoga contends that in the highest state of Mukti, there is pure consciousness and bliss. This is the cardinal distinction between the two different schools of philosophy. The Nyaya-Vaieesika considers that mental states experiences are due to the contact of the body, mind and the states like intellect, misery and happiness, desires and other forms of psychic states are coinpletely absent in the state of Mukti. But Sankhya-Yoga maintains that the mental states and experiences are not due to the self, but due to the antahkarana (the inner organs). These states arising due to the antahkarana are reflected in the self the self falsely identifies itself with varied mental states and experiences. The self falsely believes that it is experiencing all the empirical experiences. And that is samsara. In the highest state of Mukti, the self realises that it is not the agent of the experiences but these experiences are reflected in it, and it is different from the Prak rti and its evolutes. In the highest state of Mukti,the emprical experiences are absent, but pure conscious. ness is its real essence. The earlier Sankhya propounding twenty-four principles is different from the Sankhya propounds twenty-five principles of evolution. According to this school, the empirical experiences like happiness and misery and knowledge and ignorance are primarily due to the Prak rti and its attributes. In the highest state of Mukti, these empirical experiences are absent. But the Sankhya propounding twenty-four principles does not say that the self which is consciousness is completely different from the empirical consciousness due to the dance of Prak rti. In this sense, we can say to some extent that the Sankhya with twenty-four principles presents similar view with the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The former view of the Sankhya points out that in the state of Moksa the activities of Prak rti are differentiated from the pure nature of the self. While the later schools of thought show that in the state of Moksa there is the complete absence of the states of experience associated with the activity of Prakrti. The first view eriented towards the karya prapanca (empirical activities) and the socond emphasises guna prapanca (the attributes of Prakrti).The differences in the presentation of the nature of the self in the two schools

Page #247
226 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY of thought are only due to terminological differences and not due to to real differences. The Nyaya-Vaisesika says that the empirical experiences like happiness, misery and desire are due to the states of consciousness which is the attribute of the self. Therefore, in the highest state there is absence of consciousness. The thing appears to be somewhat ideational strange, although its presentation depends in the ideational distinction between the self and consciousness. Nyaya-Vaisesika distinguishes between substance and quality. The attributes and the modes arising out of the attributes are not related to the substance which is the substratum of the attributes. The modifications and changes in the states donot adversely affect the nature of the substance. These modifications are related to the attributes only and not to the substance. In this sense, the Nyaya-Vaisesika accepts the empirical states of the Atman as doer, the enjoyer and that which is in the state of bondage. But the Sankhya-Yoga does not accept the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The Sankhya-Yoga posits the self as nirguna but consciousness as its essence. The Vedantic philosophers like Sankara, Ramanuja and Vallabha maintain that in the highest state of perfection there is the pure light of consciousness and bliss, although there are variations in their thoughts regarding the state of the Moksa in relation to the self and the Brahman. In this sense, again, we can say that the Upanisadic conception of Moksa is different from the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception in some form. The Sankhya-Yoga conception of the nature of the Moksa comes nearer to the Upanisadic view. The Upanisadic view of Moksa presents the self as in the state of pure consciousness and bliss and of the ultimate reality of the Brahman. THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA (Nirvana) The Buddhist refers to the conception of Moksa as nirvana. Nirvana is aboslute cessation from misery. There is nothing real. Everything is momentary. There is no atman as the permanent principle and Nirvana is a state of freedom and from misery, in fact freedom from everything. Nirvana is the most important conception

Page #248
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 227 in the Buddhist philosophy. Prof. Murthy says that the history of Buddhist philosophy is the history of the conception of Nirvana. In the Abhidhamma Mahavibhasa sastra the etymological meaning of Nirvana has been discussed. Vana refers to rebirth and Nirvana is freedom from rebirth. Vana also means bad smell and Nirvana would be freedom from bad smell of the karma. In the third sense, vana refers to the jungle and Nirvana would be escape from the thick jungle of karma. In another sense, Nirvana would be cutting of all the threads of empirical existence which are formed due to karma. The Pali Texts Society explains the meaning of the word Nirvana as extinction. It is extinction of all empirical existence. Amarakosa also presents the same view. Several philosophers like Rhys Davids, Thomas, Anandkumaraswamy, Dr. Radhakrsnan and others maintain that the state of Nirvana does not represent the denial of the self or personality. It has moral overtones. It is the highest state of moral perfection and it is full of bliss. Dr. Radhakrsnan maintains that the concept of Nirvana is negative in its content. It is nothingness. The Buddha said that Nirvana is freedom from misery and it is different from the adjuncts of empirical personality. The Buddha does not deny that highest state of perfection expresses bliss. He was only silent about it. According to the Buddha, some philosophers contend that Nirvana is the cessation of misery and the experience, but it is not the destruction of the Atman. It is the destruction of the desire, the passions and the craving for life due to ignorance.2 Maxmuller maintains that there is no version in the Dhammapada which gives the negative meaning of Nirvana i. e.. Nirvana is absolute cessation. Wherever there is reference to the Nirvana as cessation or destruction, there is ambiguity in the interpretation. Nagasena has given the interpretation of Nirvana as positive in content the discussions with king Milinda.3 In this sense, the Buddhist conception of Nirvana is different from the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of Moksa as a state in which there is no consciousness. 1 History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 212. 2 (a) Dhammapada 154. (b) Sarh yuttanikaya, Oghataracna sukta, 3 Saryuttanikaya Kematheri sutta,

Page #249
228 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Tathagata Buddha said that Nirvana is 'avyak sta', indescribable in words and inexpressible in thought. Nirvana cannot be described in words nor its nature can be comprehended by thought. The nun Khema, while explaining the concepts to Prasenajit, says that just as the sands on the banks of the Ganges cannot be counted, just as the waters of the sea are immeasurable, so also the Nirvana is incomprehensible. It is beyond comprehension in thought and description in words. The disciples of the Buddha however, took two different paths The Hinayana and the Mahayana ways They give different conceptions of the Nirvana. The question arose about the nature of Nirvana whether it pertains to individual existence or to the existence in general. Some say that Nirvana refers to the individual freedom from misery, while some others have emphasised the cessation of existence in general as Nirvana. The first is the individualistic and the second is the universal content. The first is called the Hinayana conception while the second refers to the Mahayana conception in its broad content. The Buddha did not discuss the nature of Nirvana and other metaphysical problems, because he was averse to metaphysical discussions. The metaphysical questions like Nirvana are avyak sta, inaccessible for speculation. The result was his disciples followed different paths of interpretation. Some adduced negative interpretation of Nirvana as absolute cessation of existence, it is Sunyata. The others gave a positive content to Nirvana as a state with the bliss as its category.? >> JAINA CONCEPTION OF MOKSA There are varied interpretations regarding the nature of Moksa in the Buddhist and Vedic traditions. But the Jaina conception of Moksa does not accept differences of opinion. This is possible because the Vedic seers did not discuss the nature of Moksa. The later 1 (a) N. K. Bhagat : Patna University Lectures, 1924-25, p. 165. (b) Samyuttanikaya Khematheri sutta. 2 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 416-17,

Page #250
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 229 philosophers of the Vedic tradition gave their own interpretations of the nature of Moksa when the concepts were introduced in the Vedic tradition. The Buddha never claimed to be an omniscient being. He did not impose his views on his disciples. He said to his disciples that they should accept whatever stands the test of reason and should not accept any view because the Tathagata has said. This is one of the reasons why there developed differences of opinion regarding the nature of Nirvana in the Buddhist philosophy. Moreover, the Buddha was silent over the nature of metaphysical problems like Nirvana and the self. But this is not so with the development of Jaina thought. The Tirtharkara Mahavira was an omniscient, a Kevalin. And the word; of the Kevalin had absolute authority. Therefore, there did not appear to have differences regarding the inetaphysical problems like the nature of the Moksu. The Jaina conception of the universal and the particular, the identity and difference and the permanent substances and its changing modes as equally reil has influenced the Jaina conception of Moksa. The principle of permanence, however, is not like the eternal principle of Purusa and Prak rti in the Sarkhya philosophy. The Jaina conception of the Atman is a synthesis of the principles of permanence and modes. From the noumenal point of view, the soul is perinanent as a substance. From the phenomenal point of view, there are modes. Considered from the point of view of modes, the self is changing. The Jainas do not consider the Atman as all-pervading like the Nyaya-Vaisesika or atomic in nature like Ramanuja's standpoint. They say, that Atman is madhyama parinami, pervading the body that it occupies. It has the characteristics of both expansion and contraction in order to pervade the entire body, whether small or big. This is the empirical description of the soul from the empirical point of view. From the noumenal point of view the soul is eternal as a substance. It is non-eternal from the point of view of modifications. The Jainas have accepted the principle of the co-reality of substance and its modifications. For this reason, the Jainas contend that at the time of attainment of Moksa the pervasion of the soul becomes less

Page #251
230 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY by one-third of the body of the soul just previously occupied by it at the time of Moksa.1 It should be remembered that though the quality of the contraction and the expansion is inherent in the soul but it gets expression due to the karmic body formed by the accumulations of particles of karma. The liberated soul has no body and therefore there is no question of contraction or expansion. The conception of the ultimate size of the soul just at the time of Moksa is based on the conception of the size of the body that it last occupied. The soul has no form but due to its extension in space, it is described as having form. The Jaina conception of Moksa is different from other conceptions in Indian thought. This theory is a special contribution of the Jainas. This is because, the Jaina conception implies the pervasive quality according to the body; while according to some thinkers the soul is described as atomic in nature. This also gives a clear picture of the nature of the soul in the state of Moksa. According to the Jainas, the liberated soul has infinite knowledge and bliss because of its inherent nature of consciousness and bliss. The eternity of the soul is not the static eternity as in some systems of Indian philosophy, but it expresses the inherent nature of infinite energy. This conception of the nature of the soul in Moksa is a special contribution of the Jainas. It agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of the eternity of the soul so far as it refers to the soul as substance. In regard to the inherent characteristics of the soul as infinite knowledge, bliss and infinite energy, it is nearer to the Sankhya conception of the Purusa. The Buddhist schools of philosophy of Yogacara posits the conception of Vijnana as a centre of self and in the state of Nirvana it is referred to the 'alaya vijnana' the storehouse of consciousness. In this sense of psychic energy of the soul, Jainas have a common point, but the Jainas do not accept the Ksanikavada of the Buddhists. THE STATE OF MUKTI (MUKTI-STHANA) There is a fundamental question regarding the state of the soul 1 Uttaradhyayana 36-65.

Page #252
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 231 at the time of Moksa : What is the state of the soul when it is liberated from the body? There are different interpretation on this question based on the different philosophical predilections. The Nyaya-Vaisesika and Sankhya-Yoga maintain that the soul is all-prevading. They also maintain that there are many souls. According to this interpretation, the liberated souls do not possess, different states from those that they possessed in the samsara. In the state of liberation the souls become free from the gross bodies and also from the subtle bodies which is due to a gross body. The Jivatman or a Purusa becomes different from the differentiated states and becomes all-pervading. The Kevaladvaitin maintains that the atman i. e., the Brahman has vyapakatva, but there is no plurality. According to this theory, in the liberated souls the soul becomes free from the subtle bodies which is antahkarana. As a consequence of this, freedom from the subtle body, the soul is free from all empirical adjuncts. It realises the state of the Brahman. The difference between the souls that are liberated and the souls that are in bondage is with reference to the freedom and the presence of the suksma sarira and the empirical adjuncts. The absence of the empirical adjuncts (upadhi) in the liberated state does not mean that the liberated soul is different from the empirical soul, it is the Brahmasvarupa in its pure form. The Madhva philosophy posits the souls as atomic in nature. They are different from Parabrahman. According to this school of thought, the liberated soul lives in the sannidhya of Visnu. Similarly, those who maintain the soul as atomic in nature like the Visistadvait in accept the plurality of souls. But in its real nature, the soul is not different from the Parabrahman. When the soul is liberated it reaches the Brahmaloka and gets merged in the Brahman. According to Vallabhacarya, souls are atomic in nature, but at the same time souls reach the state of Brahma in their state of merger with the Brahnan. Some souls get merged with the Brahma but some other souls, due to devotional preponderance enter the samsara in the state of practical liberation for the sake of expression of devotion.

Page #253
232 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF THE MUKTI-STHANA The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent. Everything is transitory and in flux. In the state of rebirth, there is no perma. nent self that emerges from the earlier birth to the next birth. It is only the psychic continuity of vijnana that projects itself into the next line. Just as a snow ball goes on accumulating, particles of snow in its movement, but it is not one substance, so also the vijnana the psychic energy, loaded with its samskara the anamic mass projects itself into the next life i. e., rebirth. Therefore, there is no permanent self that is reborn. The king Milinda asked to Nagasena: which of the states of life prior to Nirvana are nearer to the state of Nirvana? Acarya said that there is no analogy to explain the state of Nirvanna. We cannot say that in the state of Nirvana, the soul goes and settles in a sthana. King Milinda asked: "just as there are pearls in the sea, fragrance in the flower and the grains in the field, so also there must be a place for Nirvana which is permanent." Nag-isena replied: There is no state analogous to these which can be called Nirvana, in which we can say the self goes to settle there. However, the state of Nirvana is real. Nirvana is not something external. We have to realise the state of Nirvana in the purity of mind. Just as through the friction of two pieces of metal fire is created so also the Nirvana is a state of experience of the purtty of mind. We cannot say that there was first the fire or first the friction and then the fire. Similarly, we cannot distinguish between the state of Nirvana and the purity of experience. The king said: We may accept the view that there is no special state of Nirvana. However, there must be some state from which a pudgala experiences the state of Nirvana. The Acarya replied: Pudgala (the continuing self) is rooted in the Sila (righteousness), and can experience the state of Nirvana from any point of space. Therefore Nirvana is the realisation from the purity of the mind.1 1 Milindaprasna 4. 8. 62-64.

Page #254
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE JAINA VIEW OF THE MOKSA-STHANA The Jainas say that the Jiva has the characteristics of Urdhvagati (tendency to go upwards).1 When the karmic particles are removed and when the soul is free from karma, it moves upwards to the end of the Lokakasa and remains in its pure form in the Siddhaloka, at the end of Lokaska. It does not move further because there is the absence the Dharmastikaya in Alokakasa. This state of perfection at the end of the Lokakasa is called Siddhasila. The Jaina literature presents the extension of Siddhasila and such a description of the extension of the place where liberated souls reside is not stated in any other school of Indian thought. According to the Jainas the world where the human beings inhabit, has the extension of fortyfive lakhs of yojanas and the extension of the Siddhaksetra has also forty-five lakhs of yojanas. From the Karmabhumi of the human beings, men can attain perfection through their self-efforts. In this sense, we can say, that the state of moksa is the highest state of perfection to be attained. It is the state of freedom from misery. It is a state of self-realisation. MOKSA MARGA (THE PATH-WAY TO MOKSA) We may now consider the pathway to Moksa. Just as in the science of medicine, four factors are important for consideration, like: the disease, cause of the disease, the removal of the disease and means of the removal of the same; so also in the understanding self-realisation, and the spiritual with path for the salvation, we should also consider the four important principles like samsara, the cause of samsara, moksa, and the pathway to moksa.2 233 The different schools of Vedic traditions have given their interpretations of the pathway to Moksa. The Upanisads and Bhagavadgita are the foundational texts for the Vedic tradition. On the basis of the thoughts expressed in the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita, Patnjali has given as elaborate discussion about Moksa and pathway to 1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 19. 82 Uddham pakkamai disam (b) Prasamarati Prakarana 294-bhasya (c) Tattvartharajavarttika 2 Yogadarsana Bhasya 21. 25.

Page #255
234 Moksa. According to him the four cardinal principles are: (1) heya1 (misery), (2) heyahetu2, (cause of misery), (3) hana3 (cessation of misery) & (4) hanopayaa (the pathway to the cessation of the misery). Vatsyayana, the noted commentator of Nyayasutra has elaborated the four principles of the Moksa and pathway to Moksa. The Buddha enunciated, in his Sermon at Banares, the four noble truths (Aryasatya): (1) dukkha (misery), (2) dukkhasamudya (cause of misery), (3) dukkha-nirodha (cessation of misery) and dukkhanirodha marga (the pathway to the cessation of misery). In the Jaina darsana, the four fundamental truths have been enunciated : (1) bandha (bondage), (2) asrava (cause of bondage) (3) moksa (state of liberation) and (4) samvara (the way to the cessation to the bondage). A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ance. The Bandha(bondage)is due to the passions arising out of ignorThis creates misery. Asrava is the influx of karma. It is the cause of misery. It is due to the passions and the activity. Moksa is the complete freedom from karmic matter. It is the state absolutely free from misery. Samvara is the way to the cessation to the misery. This is possible if the influx of the karmic particles is obstructed. The next stage would be the removal of the accumulated karma. This is the nirjara. These two constitute the pathway to Moksa. In this sense, we can say that the Jainas have propounded the four fundamental and noble truths in the tradition of the Vedic and Upanisadic thought and similar to the Buddhist tradition too. Every school of Indian thought have emphasised the importance of the concept of Moksa as the highest stage of self-realisation. They have suggested that the root-cause of samsara and the misery in this life is due to avidya (neiscience). Avidya gives rise to passions (raga 1 Yogadarsana: sadhanapada 16 2 Ibid 27 3 Ibid 25 4 Ibid 26 5 Nyayabhasya 1, 1, 1. 6 Majjhimanikaya, bhasabheka sutta, 4.

Page #256
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY dvesa), attachment and hardship (klesa). Patanjali says avidya, asmita raga-dvesa and abhinivesa are the five obstacles or hardships which cause misery and which bring obstructions to the path of liberation. He has suggested that avidya is the root cause of all these things.1 Isvarkrisna' in the Sankhyakarika has elaborated the five obstacles in the way to self-realisation. Kanada has said avidya is the root cause which gives rise to all sorts of passions and difficulties. Kathopanisad and the Bhagavadgita have also empasised that avidya is the primary cause of all passions and difficulties. In the Buddhist literature, like the Majjhimanikaya it has been described that the Buddha has said that avidya is the root cause of misery because it leads to craving trsna and other blemishes." Jainism asserts that the root cause of samsara is darsanamoha & caritramoha. Darsanamoha refers ignorance or perversity of attitude in the sense of avidya used in other Indian thought. In the other system s of Indian philosophy, this has been referred to the cause of all blemishes. Caritramoha is perversity in conduct which has been referred to by other systems of Indian philosophy as asmita, raga, dvesa and trsna. In this sense, the Indian systems of philosophy, including the Jainas, have given prominence to avidya (nescience) as the root cause of misery. Kanada says that avidya can be removed by vidya (discriminative knowledge). Patanjali calls it vivekakhyati. Aksapada has used the term tattvajnana or samyagjnana (right knowledge). The Buddhist have suggested that 'vipassana' or prajna are analogous to vidya. The Jaina have used the word samyagjnana (right knowledge). It causes the destruction of kasayas and other blemishes. From the spiritual point of view, avidya is perversity of know 1 Yogadarsana 2, 3-4 2 Sankhyakarika 47-48. 14 235 3 Nyayasutra 1, 1, 2: Nyayasutra 4, 1, 3: 4. 1. 6. 4 Kathopanisad 1, 2, 5. 5 Bhagavadgita 5, 15. 6 Majjhimanikaya | mahatannesamkaya sutta 38,

Page #257
236 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ledge. It is the absence of the right knowledge regarding the nature of the pure self. In the Vedic tradition, the pathway to destruction of avidya and to the realisation of the Moksa has been suggested 10 be three-fold as : (1) jnana (knowledge) (2) bhakti (devotion) and (3) karma (action). The Buddha advocated the eight-fold path, for the realisation Nirvana : (1) samyagd rsti (right belief) (2) samyagsankalpa (right resolve) (3) samyagvak (right speech) (4) samyagkarma (right action) (5) samyag ajiva (right living) (6) samyag vyayama (right effort) (7) samyag smrti (right thought) and (8) samyag samadhi (right self-concentration). Buddhaghosa has enumerated three important ways, like sila, samadhi and prajna for the sake of realisation of Nirvana. Jainism has advocated the three-fold path for the attainment of perfection : (1) samyagdarsana (right faith), (2) samyagjnana (right knowledge) and (3) samyagcaritra (right conduct). In this way the Indian philosophers, both of the Vedic and the nonVedic traditions, have emphasised the importance of the realisation of Moksa or Nirvana, as the highest end of life. This has cxception only in the Carvaka school. The different schools of thought have used their terminologies to describe the stages in the pathway to perfection, and in explaining the concept of Moksa. The difference in terminology is mainly verbal and it does not effect the basic unity in the conception of state of perfection and pathway to the state of perfection. We find that there is a fundamental similarity of approach and a unity of thought in the description of the highest end of life, viz., self-realisation (Moksa) and pathway to the realisation of this end. 1 "Magganam ashangiko settho." 2 Tattvarthasutra 1, 1.

Page #258
Part III PRAMANAVADA 1. SYADVADA-THE BASIS OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY 2. SAPTABHANGT -DISCUSSION 3. NIKSEPAVADA-A STUDY 4. NAYAVADA-A STUDY 5. JNANAVADA-AN ANALYSIS 6. PRAMANA-A STUDY

Page #259

Page #260
SYADVADA: the basis of Jaina Philosophy WHAT IS SYADVADA? Anekantavada is a special contribution of the Jainas to the philosophical world. It is the unique contribution that the Jainas have made to the logic and epistemology. It is the foundational principle for philosophical position of the Jainas. Anekanta is the basic attitude of mind which expresses the fundamental principle that reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The points of view are the nayas and the naya is the psychological expression of the basic principle of anekanta. Syadvada is the logical expression of nayavada in predication from. It has the significance of expression and communication in the logical and predicational pattern. Syadvada is formed of the two words 'syat' and 'vada'. 'Syat' very often supposed to suggest the meaning of 'doubt' or 'perhaps' but 'syat' does not express doubt or uncertainty. It refers to a point of view or in a particular context, or in a particular sense.1 'Vada' presents a theory of logic and metaphysics. Syadvada means a theory of predication of the description of reality from different points of view, in different contexts or from different "Universes of discourse." Syadvada is the expression of the pictures of reality obtained from different points of view in definite and determinate logical predications. 1 (a) Astasahasri, p. 296. (b) Pancastikayatika--Sri Amrtacandra

Page #261
240 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Jaina acaryas have made Syadvada, the foundation of Jaina philosophy. Syadvada promotes catholic outlook of many-sided approach to the problem of knowledge of reality. It is anti-dogmatic and it presents a synoptic picture of reality from different points of view. Svadvada expresses a protest against one-sided, narrow, dogmatic and fanatical approach to the problein of Reality. It affirms that there are different facets of Reality and they have to be understood from various points of view by the predications of affirmation, negation and indescribability. The thinker having one-sided view in his mind can see only one facet of Reality, such thinker cannot realise reality in full. For this reason, Acarya Samantabhadra says that the word syat is a symbol of truth. And therefore, the Jaina Acaryas say that in some cases of predications, even if the term the syat is not used, it is to be considered as implicit in the predication.3 Syadvada presents a comprehensive and a synoptic picture of reality which expresses presence and co-existence with particular points of view, of the different characteristics like the permanance and impermanance, similarity and difference, expressibility and inexpressibility, reality and appearance. Generally Syadvada is identified with Anekantavada, bui considered from the logical distinctions inherent in two theories, we can say that Anekanta is the basic principle of the complexity of reality and the possibility of looking at reality from different points of view. Syadvada is the expression of the Anekantavada in logical and predicational form.5 In this sense, Anekantavada is the foundational principle and syadvada is the logical expression of the foundational principle. Acarya Samantabhadra says that Syadvada and kevalajnana (ominiscient knowledge) are the foundational facts of knowledge. 1 2 3 4 5 Eyante niravekkho no sijjhai vivihayavagam dayvan. Syatkarah satyalanchanah. Laghiyastraya, sl. 22. Anyayogavyavacched Dvatrimsika, sloka-25 Acarya Hemacandra. Laghiyastryaya, sl. 62. Akalanka

Page #262
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 241 The difference between the two is that kevalajnana expresses the comprehensible knowledge of reality while Syadvada expresses the predicational propositions of the experience of reality presented in kevalajnana. The first, is a direct experience, Syadvada is the indirect expression of the direct experience.1 SYADVADA : THE PRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE - 3 The different systems of philosophy have given different pictures of reality. As a result, there is ambiguity and metaphysical confusion, because the pictures of reality presented by different schools of thought sometimes contradict with each other, and we are at a loss to know which theory of reality should be accepted. This creates intellectual chaos. For instance, even in the concept of the Atman, there are different views expressed by different philosophies. Carvaka denies reality of the Atman as a perminent substance. Even in those schools of thought where there is agreement regarding the reality of the Atman, there are distinctions in the presentation of the nature of the Atman. Sankhya philosophy accepts the eternity and substantiality of the Atman. Consciousness is its essence. According to Sankhya atman is passive without attributes.? Nyaya-Vaisesika posit the reality of the Atman and say that Atman is a substance which has qualities. Mimarsakas maintain that Atman is a substance and is eternal, although it expresses modification in different forms of status. Buddha, refuses to discuss the metaphysical problems like the Atman and Nirvana. He said that Atman is a subject which is "avyak rta" (indescribable) and became silent. In this sense, different schools of thought have given different interpretations about the nature of the Atman. Some say, it is all-pervading like space (Akasa), some maintain that it is atomic in nature and some others say that Atman is of the size of the thumb. Regarding the nature of the Alman, some say that it is the product of the elements. Some others maintain that consciousness is not the characteristic of the Atm in, but it is produced by the meta 1. Aptamimamsa 105 2. aprachyutanutpannasthiraikarupam nityam. 3. Majjhimanikaya, cula malunkya sutta 63.

Page #263
242 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY bolic changes of the body. Still others say that consicousness is not a quality of the soul, but is inherent in the soul. In this way, there are basic differences between the different schools of philosophy regarding the nature of the Atman. The differences in the views regarding the nature of reality presented by different schools of thought are based on their basic outlook of, and their approach of looking at reality. Some take the synthetic point of view and present the picture of reality in a synthetic sense. They seek unity in diversity, and posit that the reality is one. It includes the consciousness and the unconsciousness as aspects of reality. Some other schools of thought look at reality from the empirical point of view. They seek to emphasise diversity as presented in the universe. Reality, for them, is not one nor a unity, but it is many and diverse. Some other schools of thought have said that reality is incomprehensible (ajneya). In this way, there is intellectual chaos in the study of the metaphysical problems. Anekantavada seeks to find out a solution out of this intellectual chaos. It seeks to find meaning in the diversity of opinions and tries to establish that these diverse views are neither completely false not completely true. They present partial truths from different points of view. The Anekanta seeks to determine the extent of reality present different schools of thought and gives a synoptic picture of reality. The eminent Acaryas, like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka and Haribhadra have presented the subtle logical distinctions and the metaphysical thought involving unity and diversity, the oneness and duality and other forms of philosophy on the basis of Anekanta. A comprehensive picture of reality is sought to be presented by the theory of Anekanta. And for this reason, the theory of Anekanta has become foundational for Jaina thought. In fact, the Anekanta outlook is the basis for other schools of Indian thought. The Jaina Acaryas have presented a synoptic outlook in undertanding the problems of philosophy on the basis of Anekanta. They say that Ekanta or dogmatism or one-sided approach to the problems of reality is not inherent in reality (vastugatadharma), but it is due to the working of the intellect. It is the product of intellectual discrimination. If the intellect is pure in its essence

Page #264
243 then Ekanta will disappear. The pure exercise of intellect will give rise to a synoptic view-point expressed in the Anekanta and the different partial view-points get merged in the Anekanta, just as the different rivers get merged in the sea. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Upadhyaya Yagovijaya says that one who has developed the Anekanta outlook does not dislike other view-points. He looks at other view-points with understanding and sympathy, just as a father looks at the activities of his son. One who believes in the Anekanta outlook looks at the conflicting and diverse theories of realities with equal respect. He does not look at the diverse theories of realities as one superior to the other. He has the spirit of equanimity in approaching for the understanding of the problems of other theories. In the absence of the spirit of equanimity, all knowledge would be fruitless, and any amount of reading the sacred texts would not lead to any fruitful results.1 Haribhadra Suri says, that one who develops the ekanta attitude and insists on his point of view is one-sided in his approach and would like to lead others also to his points of view. But the one who develops the synoptic outlook based on the anekanta attitude is always guided by objective and rational considerations in evaluating the theories of reality. Anekanta states that the nature of reality should be considered and studied purely from the rational point of view without prejudice or bias. The ekanta attitude is compelling and it drives us to accept its point of view and discourages us to accept the others' point of view. A milk-maid churns the butter milk, and while churning the buttermilk, she pulls the string on the side and loosens the string on the other. The consequence is butter is extracted from the buttermilk. Similarly, if we look at the different points of view of knowing reality in their proper perspective, considering the primary points of view as important and the secondary points of view with their due considere 1. Yasovijaya-Jnanasara

Page #265
244 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY tion, truth can be understood in the true perspective and in a comprehensive way. The intellectual confusion is created by ekant while the welter of confusion is cleared by Anekanta, The synoptic outlook of Syadvada gives a comprehensive and true picture of reality. THE IMPACT OF ANEKANTA ON OTHER DARSANAS The Anekanta attitude gives a comprehensive and synoptic view of life. Some of the systems of Indian thought have expressed their opposition to the Anekanta theory. Yet we can observe the impact of Anekanta on their theories also. It is not possible to disregard the Anekanta theory, as it is rational and objective in its outlook. In the Tsavasya Upanisada Atman has been described as a substance which moves and does not move, which is near and far, which is inside and outside. This is the expression of the Syadvada point. of view. Sankaracarya and Ramanujacarya have argued against the validity of Syadvada on the ground that contradictory attributes cannot co-exist at the same time. But in trying to refute the validity of Syadvada they seem to have adopted the Syada.la outlook only. The description of the Brahman as 'para and apara" and the analysis of the degrees of reality as expressed in the paramarthika, vyavaharika and pratibhasika satya, does express the spirit of Anekanta and Syadvada. Sankara mentions that there is nothing in the world which is purely without faults and without attributes--Istam kimapi lokeesmin na nirdosan na nirgunam". This would mean that everything has its good qualities and also its faults. Nothing is purely perfect and purely attributeless. This is the expression of the Anekanta. Swami Dayanada Sarasvati was once asked whether he was a wise man or not. He said that in the field of darsana he is wise, but with reference to the practical world, he is not wise. This is an expression of Anekanta. The Buddhist conception of the Vibhajyavada and Madhyama 1 Tsa. Up. tadejati tannaijati, taddure, tadantike, tadantarasyasaravasya tad sarvasyasya bahyatah.

Page #266
A SOURCE BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Marga express the Anekanta spirit. The Sankhya conception of prarkti as having the three attributes of sattva, rajas and tamas in the state of equilibrium in the original state of prakrti and as expressed in varied degrees in the process of evolution expressess the spirit of Anekanta. Among the Greek philosophers, Plato has presented the theory of the degrees of reality. The world of ideas is real and the physical world is real to the extent of the participation of the ideas in the physical objects. This is also the expression of the Anekanta. Eienstein's theory of relativity express the spirit of Syadvada. From this, it is clear that Anekanta expresses the synoptic point of view and gives a comprehensive picture of reality in which partial pictures from different points of view are synthesised and harmonised. This spirit of Anekanta cannot be ignored by any school of thought because of its intrinsic value. 245 Having considered the impact of Anekanta on the different schools of thought, it would now be necessary to understand the extent of the expression of the Anekanta in the different problems of philosophy like the problem of permanence and change, of the identity of self and the body etc. PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE (CHANGE) The Anekanta view presents a theory that every object is a synthesis of the attributes of permanence and change. From the point of view of substance, it is permanent and from the point of view of modes, it is changing. Substance and modes are inseparable and complementary. Without the one, the other does not exist. Without substance (dravya), modes(paryaya) are not possible and without modes substance cannot be understood. It is the thing that changes. Changes does not exist without a thing. A thing changes in its attribute. For insance, jiva is a substance and its various states are its modes. Jiva is necessary for the expression of the various states like man, lower animal and bird. These are the modes of the jiva. Jiva as a substance and the states of jiva in the empirical sense, are both necessary and complementary to each other. Substance is permanent, but modes are changing. Jiva is permanent and is indestructible. But the modes as expressed in the states of jiva are not permanent. In 92

Page #267
246 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY this sense, Syadvada expresses the synthesis of the theories of permanence and of change. Every substance is permanent but its modes are changing and in a flux. But it should be remembered that substance and its modes are not two different entities. There is not difference in essence, but the difference can be seen in expression. According to the Anekanta view, every object has the triple attributes of Origination, Destruction and Permanence. The modes originate and are destroyed but the substance remain permanent. This is true of every object and there are no exceptions to this. When we meet a person whom we have already met, we recognise him and say he is the same man that we met. Rain brings greenery on the land. We have camphor on the palm and anon it evaporates, and then we say it is not there. All these states express modifications of the substance but these different states taken independently for consideration express the theories of permanence, change and destruction. There are different theories of causation regarding the origination of the substance and objects. Some of the theories may be mentioned as Parinamavada, Arambhavada, Rupantaravada and Vichedavada. sankhya philosophers have presented parinamavada. According to them, cause and effect are not different events. Effect is in the cause. Cause has the potentiality of the effect is the actualisation of the cause. This is called Satkaryavada. According to Satkarmavada, that which is not, cannot originate and that which is, cannot be destroyed. It is only a transformation. It is the actualisation of the potential. Nyaya Vaisesika darsanas present the Arambhavada Theory. It is also called Asatkaryavada. According to this theory, cause and effects are different events. When the effect appears, cause disappears. According to the Naiyayikas s swara is eternal (non-changing reality) while the flames of a lamp are non-eternal. The Buddhists maintain that there is nothing permanent and what we call a thing appearing to be permanent is an aggregate of states which are fleeting. A philosophical system which maintains that reality is the permanent and the eternal cannot easily dispense with the facts of life, which 1. Tattvartha sutra, Adhyaya 5

Page #268
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 247 present the changing modes. Similarly, a philosophy which gives exclusive importance to the flux cannot ignore a thing that changes. In this sense, the Naiyayikas considered the perceptible objects as impermanent and the Buddhists considered everything as fleeting, as a vast continuum. The modern scientific view of reality accepts the fact of transformation. It has been suggested that nothing is destroyed, it is only that an object gets transformed. For instance, a candle burns, but in its process of burning the substance of the candle is not destroyed. It is transformed into some other element. Similarly, we find transformation of water into a different form like ice and water, the gases like hydrogen and oxygen. As we are aware, water is formed through the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in a definite proportion of 2:1. By the process of disintegration, the hydrogen and the oxygen can be separated of the water, and water expresses itself in the form of gases, of hydrogen and oxygen. This view is supported by actual scientific experiments. Modern science has shown that matter and energy are mutually convertible. The accepted principle of conservation of matter and energy has been a primary principle in the science of Physics and Chemistry. Therefore, matter and energy are convertible and conservable. From the stand-point of Syadvada Jainas affirm that a thing is never destroyed. That which is not, never comes into being. There is nothing which is free from the modes of coming into being and destruction. Substance has the modes of origination and destruction. Therefore, every substance has its modes. A substance without modes cannot exist, and modes must have a substance for its substratum. Therefore, the Jainas maintain that substance and modes are both real. In this world, there is nothing which is purely permanent without modes and there is no change which has not got a thing as a substratum of change. For instance, the jiva is a substance, but it expresses itself the empirical world in its various modifications and states in diffe 1. General Chemistry by Finus Pauling, pp. 4 and 5 2. Pancastikaya-15

Page #269
248 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY rent forms of life like men and lower animals. Just as a candle which is a substance changes in accordance with its flames which are suspectable to change. In this sense, the jiva and the chandle have both the characteristics of permanence and change. They are premanent in the form of substance, but changing in the form of modes.1 If a thing were to be purely permanent, it would have may remain in one static form only and there would not have been any states or changes. If there were only change and flux without any substance that changes, there would not have been any substratum and a support and any form. According to the Syadvda theory, permanence and change are equally real. It is thing that changes and has its modes. A thing as a substance is permanent, while the changing modes are not e manent. In this sense, a substance (dravya) has been considered a synthesis of pemanence and modifications. Substance is a substratum of change and changes take place in a substance. Modern science analyses an atom into its three constitutents (1) neutron which is its central and focal point, (2) electron which is moving with a velocity and (3) proton which is non-moving. THE IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ATMAN AND THE BODY. Hori ! The Atman and the body are both identical and different. Diffe. rent philosophical systems has given varied explanations about the relation between the Atman and the body. They consider consciouness to be a product of the metabolic changes of the body. With the destruction of the body, consciousness is also destroyed." Sutrak rta. nga has mentioned a similar theory of tatjiva tatsariravada. It is slightly different from the Carvaka philosophy, yet basically it does emphasis the identity of the jiva and the body,3 Some other darsanas have considered that Atman is different entirely from the body. While explaining this problem of relation of the body and the soul, Mahavira said to his main disciple Gautama that Atman is different from the body in one sense, it is identical with 1. Anya yoga Vyavacchedika sl. 5 2. Bhasmibhutasya dehasya punaragamanam kutah ? 3. Sutrak stanga, 1, 1. 11.

Page #270
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the body in a different sense. If Atman and body were considered to be identical, then the Atman will be destroyed with the destruction of the body. In this state, there is no possibility of the conceptions of the moksa and rebirth (punarjanma). But rational considerations and testimony of the Sastras do admit the possibility of mukti and rebirth. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the theory that the Atman and the body are different. At the same time, it is also necessary to postulate the relation between the Atman and the body as closely associated with each other from beginningless time. We experience pain if the body is hurt, but if the body of Devadatta is hurt, Jinadatta does not experience the pain, because the Atman of Jinadatta is not associated with the body of Devadatta. It is clear from this, that the Atman of Devadatta is not associated with body of Jinadatta, yet the Atman of Devadatta is associated with his own body. In this sense, they are very closely associated and in the empirical sense they may be considered to be identical. But in the real sense of jiva as a spiritual substance, the association of the iiva to a particular body is only external and temporary. SATTA AND ASATTA (The Real and The Unreal) 249 Reality of a thing and the reality of its modes can be considered from the point of view of Syadvada. In this sense, a comprehensive seven-fold predication of Syadvada presents the manifold aspects of reality in its affirmative and negative forms of predications. The affirmation and negation have to be predicated with reference to the identical nature of the four-fold aspects of consideration called 'svacatustaya' and with reference to the four-fold aspects of cther nature of a thing 'para-catustaya'. For instance, the four-fold aspects of understanding the nature of the objects will be (1) Dravya (substance) (2) Ksetra (place) (3) Kala (time) and (4) Bhava (its nature). Every thing can be considered from the point of view of its own substance, place, time and nature and it gives affirmations. It may also be considered from the four-fold aspects of the otherness of a thing in respect of substance, place, time and nature. This brings the negative predications.1 1. Aptamimamsa, sl. 16.

Page #271
280 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY We may take the example of a pot made up of gold. Its substance is gold. Therefore, from the point of view of substance, it is gold. Affirmative predications may also be made in respect of the place in which it is, the time at which it is and the real nature of the pot. For instance, its yellow colour and other modes are of its nature. But the same pot considered from the point of view of other material like the clay out of which the pots are made, may give a negative predication. Similarly, with reference to another place, another time and another nature, we may give negative predications. In this sense, the golden pot is a golden pot and it is not a pot made of clay. It is in a particular place and no: in any other place. It is at a particular time and not at other time and it is a golden pot with reference to its nature and characteristics like the yellowness of colour etc., and not a earthen pot with reference to the nature of the substance of clay. In this sense again, we may predicate affirmative predications with reference to its own four-fold aspects and negative predications make with reference to other four-fold aspects not belonging to it (paracatustaya). Some scholars consider that affirmation and negation at the same time contradict each other. But it has been recognised that affirmation and negation may be predicated of a thing from specific points of view in specific situations. There should be no contradiction between affirmation and negation as predicted from different point of view of the same thing. For example, we may affirm that a particular person is a man; and deny that he belongs to any other species than that of man. We may say that a particular person is an Indian and that he is not a Westerner; he is at present living, but he is not eternal; he is wise and is not unwise. These statements do not contradict each other and these statements are not only logically compatible, but are also compatible in fact. Such varied statements from different points of view are necessary to present a coherent and comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing with its many facets. These examples do emphasis the fact that it is possible to present a comprehensive picture of reality by predicating different aspects of reality in their negative and affirmative states. For this, the Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme presenting seven-fold predications. That is called Saptabhangi.

Page #272
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 251 SAPTABHANGT Every thing is complex in its nature and it expresses many facets of its characteristics. To give a comprehensive picture of a thing in all its varied aspects the Jainas have formulated seven-fold predications incorporating affirmation, negation and inexpressibility with their possible permutations. We shall discuss about this in the later chapter. It is necessary to note that Syadvada presents the predicational form of expressing the nature of reality in different aspects. The seven-fold predications are not fragments of imagination, but they are only expressions of the many facets of reality for the sake of comprehension. Herman Jacobi says that Syadvada opens the flood-gates of the comprehension of the nature of a thing in its different aspects. An American philosopher Prof. Archie J. Bahm has stated that Syadvada is the expression of non-violence in the intellectual form. This doctrine would be more effective to establish world-peace, if popularised. It is the foundational intellectual attitude of the Jainas. Mahatma Gandhi gave importance to non-violence and he emphasised the primacy of Syadvada as the intellectual basis of the ethical doctrine of non-violence. Acarya Vinobha Bhave has emphasised the need of understanding Syadvada for the sake of world peace. CLARIFICATION OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT SYADVADA It would not be out of place to mention some misconceptions regarding the validity of the theory of Saptabhangi In the earlier portion of the Agamas, roots of Saptabhangi have been mentioned briefly.2 Acayra Kundakunda has mentioned some predications of the Saptabhangi as affirmation, negation and affirmation-negation, Later philosophers like Samantabhadra, Siddhasena, Akalanka, Vidyanandi, Hemacandra, Vadideva etc., have developed the Saptabhangi doctrine in its fuller and detailed aspects of predications. Some 1 2 3 Syadvada manjari 23 tika. Bhagavati, 7, 2, 773 Pancastikaya, Pravacanasara :

Page #273
252 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY scholars have taken this as gradual development of the doctrine of Saptabhangi. According to them originally, the theory of Syadvada was formulated not in its full form and it was later developed in its sevenfold predications. But we should recognise that the Jaina darsana was first presented by Tirthankaras. The Ganadharas formulated and taught the same to their desciples. Later it was expressed in the form of written documents. This gradual presentation of the doctrine in an elaborate form from the Tirthankara to the Ganadharas and their t mean that the doctrine was not fully formulated at the time of the Tirthankaras. Tirthankara is an all-knowing Sarvadarsi. It is not possible to say that he did not know the Syadvada doctrine in all its aspects. It would be apt to say that the doctrine of Saptabhangi was only elucidated by the Ganadharas and the later philosophers and not that they developed the theory in an elaborate form. The first Tirthankara of this era is Rsabhadeva. His teachings were presented to people by the twenty three other Tirthankaras from time to time. These teachings were elaborated and crystalised in book forms by the disciples and philosophers of the later times. In the act of elaboration and presentation, certain factors like the capabality of the Acaryas who had elaborated and intellectual climate of the time when it was presented in a.fuller and detailed form have to be considered. It is possible that the personal factors and the intellectual achievements of the later philosophers have influenced the presentation of the doctrines. Therefore, we find that in the later presentations in the book-form the scholars have used the two-fold objects of first presenting the other systems of philosophy as a polemic for refutation and later presented their own doctrine in a positive and constructive form. This type of presentation has developed in dialectical forms too. But these factors have been ignored by scholars like Archie J. Bahm and they have misunderstood the elaborate presentation of the doctrines as the later developments. It has been suggested by scholars like him, that the Saptabhangi doctrine is the development from the Buddhist conception of Catuskoti nisedha. This is far from the truth. If we look at this problem from the historical perspective we can very well say that Saptabhangi could not have arisen and developed out of

Page #274
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 253 the Buddhist theory of Catuskoti, because Jainism prevailed much earlier to time of the Buddha. There were twenty three Tirthankaras before the Buddha. Tirthankara Parsvanatha lived two hundred and fifty years before the Buddha. He has presented the doctrine of Syadvada. Sanjaya Velathiputta lived much earlier to the Buddha. He had criticised the Syadvada as a from of sarsayavada (the theory of doubt). From this, it is clear that Syadvada was formulated before the time of the Buddha. The theory of Catuskoti was formulated much later than the Buddha. We may also point out that there are fundamental differences between the Catuskoti and Syadvada. The conceptual form of Catuskoti is formulated as follows : 1. it is not that a thing is; 2. it is not that a thing is not; 3. it is not that a thing is and is not; 4. it is not that a thing neither is nor is not. But Saptabhangi incorporates the predications of affirmation negation, and inexpressibility in their possible permutations. It is not merely an expresession of negation of a thing, it predicates the nature of a thing in its different aspects, in the form of affirmation and negation. The affirmation and negation are to be predicated with reference to the four-fold aspects of the self nature of the objects (sva-catustaya) and the four-fold aspects of the other nature of the objects (para catustaya). According to Saptabhangi, the predications of the nature of man would be that he is a man and he is not a non-man like other animals. But Catuskoti would express negative aspect of predications, as it is not that a man is a man, it is not that a man is other than the man. It is not that a man is and is not other than the man; and it is not that the man neither is nor is not other than the man. In this way, Catuskoti is neither the expression of the affirmation nor is it the presentation of the different aspects of the nature of a thing. Saptabhangi does not deny the possibility of the affirmative 1. Herman Jacobi : Jaina Sutras-introduction,

Page #275
254 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY predications about the existence of a thing. It points that a thing is and has affirmative predications about its nature from its self-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects and it denies the absence of the other-nature points of view in its four-fold aspects. As we have seen earlier the Budhhist doctrine of catuskoti is fundamentally negative in its predications. SYADVADA IS NOT A THEORY OF DOUBT * According to Jainism, the nature of a thing is complex. It has infinite number of characteristics. In describing the characteristics, one has to look at it from different points of view. Therefore, the comprehensive description of the varied nature of the objects is possible by different predications involving affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The word "syat" in the Syadvada has created a good deal of controversy. The word has been very much misunderstood. It is very often suggested that 'syad' means "perhaps" or "may be". This would lead to doubt and more probability. It would lead to scepticism. But the word 'syat' has to be taken in a proper perspective. It does not mean perhaps and it does not express any from of doubt in the seven-fold predications. "Syat means "in a particular context" or from one point-of-view. It refers to a particular 'universe of discourse' In this sense, 'Syat does not lead to any element of doubt. Syadvada would not present a theory of doubt. Prof. Baladeva Upadhyaya has also stated that Syadvada is not a theory of doubt. It is not scepticism. Sankaracarya in his Sankarabhasya has stated that Syadvada has the element of doubt and it gives an indefinite knowledge. The iilusioned conception began from Sarkaracarya is still prevailing to some what extent. But as we have already said, the confusion that arises due to the word 'syat is not to be taken as the final say regarding the value of Syadvada. But, it may be pointed that the conditions of doubt are not present in the predication of Syadvada, In the case of a man who is in doubt regarding his perception whether the object that he sees is the man or a tree, there is the elements of doubt and lack of determination. But in the case of seven-fold 1. Anyayogavyavacchedika, dvatrimsika.

Page #276
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY predication, the affirmation of existence and the predication of negation are well defined and certain from specific points-of-view. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible. Prof. Phanibhusana Adhikari has stated that there is no theory which has been as such misunderstood as the Jaina theory of Syadvada. It is possible that Sankaracarya did not go through the texts of the Jainas in their original form. 255 All It is evident that Syadavada is not the theroy of doubt. philosophies accept and utilise it in one way or other; but they hesitate to accept it by name. The western thinker, Thomas says that Syadvada theory has great depth and needs a keen intellect to understand. It gives a comprehensive picture of the varied aspects of reality. Syadvada presents a picture of reality in its many-coloured aspects. The Jaina theory of Syadvada is free from obscurations and inaccuracies of presentations. In philosophical world Syadvada is like an emperor. Once Bhagavana Mahavira was asked what form of language the sadhu should use. Mahavira replied that the sadhu (ascetic) should use the language of Vibhajyavada. Vibhajyavada is interpreted as syadvada. REFUTATION OF CONTRADICTIONS Sankaracarya has criticised the saptabhangi on the grounds of the impossiblity of contradictory attributes co-existing in the same thing. For instance, a thing cannot have the attributes of coldness and hotness at the same time. But to one who has understood the theory of Syadvada in its proper perspective of dialectical predication the charge of contradiction does not stand. If Sankaracarya were asked who he was, he would have replied that he was a sahnyasi. If he were again to be asked, if he was a "grhastha" (a housedolder), he would hove said that he was not. Therefore, there would be no contradiction if it were to be predicated that as a sannyasi Sankaracarya gives affirmative predications of his nature as a sannyasi he would negate the characteristics of a grhastha of his nature. These two opposite predications are consistent in their contexts and from their points-ofview. Thus we find syadvada presents the many-folded predication from the different points of-view in different contexts. It does

Page #277
256 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY not present two contradictory predications from the same point-ofview. For instance, if from the same point-of-view, were to say that he is a sannyasi and that he is not a sannyasi, there would be contradiction, but there is no such uni-contextual predications in the Syadvada. Therefore, Syadvada presents dialectical predications from different points-of-view, NAYAVADA Nayavada is the basis of Syadvada. It is the psychological aspect of anekanta. Nayavada presents the theory of different pointsof view. These points of view have to be expressed in predicational form for the sake of communication. That is done by Syadvada. Syadvada is the logical expression of Nayavada. Nayavada and Syadvada are varieties of Anekantavada. Nayavada is analytical in character and Syadvada is synthetic. Pramana expresses the different characteristics of an object. But naya presents the specific characteristics of an object. While presenting the characteristic of an object naya does not deny the possibility of other characteristics present in an object. If it were to deny the possibility of other characteristics, the denial would be dogmatic. That is "durnaya"1 Predications have a reference to pramana. Naya is different from and is an aspect of the pramana in a particular sense. Just as a part of the sea? is not the sea, nor is it non-sea. It is the part of the sea. The naya comprehends the aspect and the charcteristics of an object. The different systems of philosophy project a particular point of view, a particular naya but their presentation is always onesided. They cannot have a full and comprehensive picture of reality in all its aspects. But Nayavada demands us to look at reality from different points-of-view. That gives a fuller picture of reality. The Buddhist approach of looking at reality was from the point of view of momentariness. Therefore, they emphasise that there is nothing permanent in the world. Everything is in a flux. The Buddhist 1 2 Pramaninyatativaloka-Vadideva. slokavarttika-Vidyanandi.

Page #278
257 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY approach to the problems of reality, according to the Jainas is from the point of view of Rjusutranaya. This partial approach of looking at reality does not give a correct picture of the real. Similarly, the Advantin looks at reality from the synthetic point of view Sangrahanaya. The other points-of-view present only an appearance. But the Nayavada does not discard any point-of-view nor does it give exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. Nayavada, therefore, gives a synoptic picture of different doctrines, like - Dvaita and Advaita Niscaya (noumenal) and Vyavahara, yad rccha-purusarthavada etc. Nayavada is against dogmatism which gives exclusive importance to a particular point-of-view. Nayavada presents the catholic approach to the problems of reality. Acarya Samantabhadra had made obeiscience to Jinendra (Tirthankara) for presenting a synoptic approach to the understanding of reality in the Syadvada. It has been said that a thing has three characteristics origination (utpada), destruction (vyaya) substantiality (dhrauvya). For instance, a goldsmith prepares a crown after breaking up the pot made of gold. In this case, the first state of pot is destroyed and a new form of crown is made. But the substance out of which it is made and the material gold, is the same in both. Therefore a thing is permanent as a substance. But its modes change. Again, if a person only takes milk and refuses to take curds, he takes the substance, but he is not prepared to take its modification. Similarly, if a person takes curds, but does not take milk, he accepts the modifications and does not accept the substance out of which it is made. But one who does not accept the milk and its modes, has to give up milk and the curds also. The formation of curds involves the destruction of the state of milk and the production of the state of curds. But in both these, the substance of milk is constant. Therefore, a thing has its substantiality and modifications. One who looks at the objects from the substance point-of-view as a synthetic approach (dravyarthika naya) and one who looks at the objects from the point of view of its modes has paryayarthika naya. But the real nature of the object is complex. It has substance and its modes,

Page #279
258 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY both real. The substance point-of-view gives exclusive importance to the substance (dravya). This is called dravyarthikanaya, and the point of view which looks at reality from the side of its modifications is the paryayarthikanaya. There is enormous literature on this problem of nayavada in the Jaina philosophy. I do not propose to elaborate on this point for the fear of being lost in the woods.

Page #280
SAPTABHANGI : A Discussion Anekanta is the foundational principle of Jainism. It is the very essence of Jainism and it pervades the thought and philosophy of the Jainas. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a thorough understanding of Anekanta would give the key to the understadning of the Jaina darsana. For this reason, Siddhasena Divakara, in his Sanmati Prakarana, has stated that Anekanta is the very first and foundational principle which teaches us the first and the last lessons of the Jaina darsana. In everyday life, we find the spirit of Anekanta pervading the thought and life of the people. Therefore, he salutes the theory of anekanta.1 The Sarnkhya theory of evolution is expressed in the evolution of Prakrti in the presence of the Purusa. The Prak rti and the Purusa are the primary principles. The development of the Vedanta has culminated in the principle of Advaita. The development of Buddhism can be seen in the theory of Vijnanavada i. e., (theory of consciousness). In this sense, Anekantavada and Syadvada are the be all and the end all in Jaina philosophy. The concepts of pramana and naya can be properly understood if we know the essence of saptahhangi. Pramana and naya present the background of understanding of Anekanta and Anekanta is expressed in the form of Saptabhangi. SAPTABHANGT Question has been very often asked regarding the nature and the function of saptabhangi. The Jaina Acaryas have discussed these problems elaborately. The nature of a thing is complex having many characteristics and the nature of any one of characteristic can be des i Sanmati Prakarana, kanda 3 gatha 69

Page #281
260 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY cribed in seven types of words. This can be called as in seven different ways. Therefore, this is called seven-fold predication of saptabhangi.1 For understanding the nature of a thing, it is necessary to know the thing in the light of naya (point-of-view) and pramana (valid source of knowledge). Naya and Pramana do give a valid and comprehensive knowledge of the nature of the thing. The reasoning is of two types-svartha (for one's ownsake) and parartha (for the sake of communicating to others).2 Svarthadhigama aims at presenting the kno'vledge to oneself. While pararthadhigama is concerned with presenting the knowledge to others in the form of communication in language. This gives the predicational form of expressions. In the pararthadhigama we have 2 forms of expressions : (1) pramana vakya which is concerned with the predication of the validity of the knowledge and its source and (2) naya vakya which is concerned with predicating the nature of a thing from a particular of point-of-view (naya). On this basis, a distinction has been made in the saptabhangi as pramana saptabhangi and naya saptabhangi.3 Pramana vakya is comprehensive (sakaladesi) because it is more concerned with presenting the nature of the object as a whole in its various aspects through the valid source of knowledge. Naya vakya is considered to be vikaladesi (partial presentation) because it presents one aspect of the nature of reality from a particular point of view, although reality is complex and has infinite aspects. Mallisena in his Syadvadamanjari while describing the nature of an object, has stated that an object is constituted of the attributes and its modifications. Tattva, Padartha and Dravya are synonymous to a thing or reality. 1 (a) Syadvada manjari 23 tika. (b) Saptabhangitarangini p.{1. 2 Tattvarthasutra 1, 6. 3 Saptabhangitarangini p. 1. 4 Anyayogavyavacchedika, karika 22 5 Syadvadamanjari, karika 23 vstti

Page #282
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 261 . Acarya Akalarka has stated that in the presentation of the nature of the object in its infinite aspects we have to adopt predicational form in the seven-fold predication which may include the positive and negative predications also without contradicting each other. The nature of the object can be considered from seven points of view and their predications would be seven-fold. Similarly, it has been said that curiosity (jijnasa) may be analysed into seven forms; as a conse : quence there are seven-fold predications. Everything can be presented in seven-fold predications. These predications have been worked out on the basis of permutations of the fundamental three-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. Bhanga refers to the partial presentation (vikalpa) or a particular form of expression. SAPTABHANGT AND ANEKANTA Anekanta is the basic attitude of the Jainas. It is the foundational principle. It expresses itself in the theory of naya (points of view) and the points of view are primarily epistemological and psychological. Predications from these points of view give us the dialectical form of propositional expressions. Saptabhangi is primarily logical. It is the logical expression of the psychological basis in Nayavada. Anekantavada is the foundational attitude. Anekanta emphasises, as we have said earlier, that reality is complex and it has infinite aspects to be known and understood. These can be presented from different points of view. A particular point of view gives one aspect of reality and these various aspects have been classified into seven fundamental forms on the basis affirmation, negation and inexpressiblity. These predications are not absolute. They are related to each other. And all of them put together would give as a contradiction, if affirmational and negating propositions are presented. Again, we can say that Anekanta attitude gives a fuller picture absorbing all aspects of reality, Syadvada is the dialectical presentation of the Anekanta attitude. The first is the expression and the second is the basis. SYADVADA IN THE AGAMAS ! If we study the theory of Syadvada from the historical point of 1 Tattvartha Rajavartika 1, 6. 51

Page #283
262 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY view tracing its presentation in the Agamas, it is clear that Syadvada and its predicational forms are not later developments. We can find the presentations in the Agamas enunciated from the philosophical points of view. Gautama Ganadhara asked Bhagavana Mahavira whether the earth called Ratnaprabha is soul or not? Bhagavana Mahavira replied,(1) "from one point of view,Ratnaprabha is atma, (2) from another point of view it is no soul; (3) from still another point of view its nature is inexpressible." Having heard these predications, Gautama asked again-Lord ! How you are describing the same earth in such different ways ? Bhagavana Mahavira said (1) it is a soul from the point of view of the self nature of the soul. (2) it is no soul from the point of view of other aspect than the soul and(3) from the point of both the aspects its nature is indescribable. Then Gautama asked for clarifications on the same lines, regarding the nature of other earths, planets, the habitation of the gods (devaloka) and siddhasila (the place of the liberated souls). He received similar presentations from Mahavira. Then he asked about the nature of the Paramanu (atom) and he got similar precepts. He then asked about the description of the nature of molecules with two pradesas (having two space units) & he got the following answer. (1) Molecule with two space units (dvipradesika) is atman from one point of view. (2) Molecule with two space units is not atman from another point of view. (3) Molecule with two space units is (indescribable (avaktavya) from still other point of view. (4) Molecule with two space points is atman and is not atman from different points of view. (5) Molecule with two space points is aiman and is indescribable. | Bhagavati, sataka 12, 30, 10.

Page #284
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 263 (6) A molecule with two space points is not atman and is indescribable. Bhagavana Mahavira explained to Gautama Ganadhara when he was asked certain clarifications thus : (1) A molecule with two space points is atman from the point of view of its self-nature of atman. (2) From the point of view of its nature other than the atman (para-adesa) it is not atman. (3) From the point of view of both the self-nature (sva-adesa) and the other nature (para-adesa), it is indescribable. (4) From the points of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place unit (ege desi) and of the mode of non-existence of the same a molecule of two space points has the predications of affirmations and negation. (5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and non-existence of the other place unit, molecule of two space has the predications of affirmations and inexpressibility. (6) A molecule of one place unit having the modes of nonexistence and the other place unit the modes of existence and nonexistence a molecule of two space points has the predication of negation and inexpressibility. Then, Gautama asked clarifications about the predications regarding molecules of three space points. Mahavira replied thus: (1) A molecule of three space points is atman from one point of view. (2) A molecule with three space points is not atman from a different point of view. (3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable in nature from still another point of view. (4) A molecule with three space points is and is not atman from a different point of view. (5) A molecule with three space points is atman, but is not (two) atmans.

Page #285
264 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (6) A molecule with three space points from another point of view is (two) atman and is not atman. (7) A molecule with three space points is atman and is indescribable. (8) A molecule with three space points is atman and (two) indescribable. (9) A molecule with three space points from one point of view (two) atmans and is indescribable (10) A molecule with three space points is not atman and is indescribable. .. (11) A molecule with three space points is atman and (two) indescribable. (12) The molecule with three space points is not (two) atman and is indescribable. (13) A molecule with three space points is and is not atman and is indescribable. Gautama Ganadhara asked clarifications regarding the function of these different predications. Mahavira said thus : (1) A molecule with three space points is atman from the points of view of the self-nature of the atman. (2) A molecule with three space points is not atman from the other nature. (3) A molecule with three space points is indescribable from the points of view of both the natures. (4) A molecule with one space point can be considered from the points of view of the mode of existence and also of non-existence. From these points of view, a molecule with three place units (tripra. desis) is atman and is not atman. (5) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and also of the mode of non-existence of two place units and a molecule with three space points is atman and is not (two) atman. (6) From the point of view of the mode of existence of two

Page #286
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 265 place units and the mode of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is (two atman) and is not an atman. (7) From the points of the mode of existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of the second place unit a molecule with three space points is atman and is indescribable. (8) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of the two place units, a molecule with three space points is the atman and (two) indescribable. (9) From the points of view of mode of existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of three space points is (two atmans) and is indescribable. (10) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence from other place units, a molecule of three space points is not atman and is indescribable. (11) From the points of view the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of mode of both existence and non-existence of two place units a molecule of three space points is not atman and is (two) indescribable. (12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of wo place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one space point a molecule of three space points is not (two atman) and is indescribable. (13) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, and also the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of three space points is atman, is not atman and is indescribable. After this, Gautama asked explanation about the predication of the molecule of four space points. Bhagavana Mahavira enunciated nineteen predications (1) A molecule with four space points is not atman from the self-nature of the atman.

Page #287
266 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (2) A molecule with four space points is not atman from the nature other than the atman. (3) A molecule with four space points is indescribable from both the points of view. (4) From the view-point of the mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman and is not atman. (5) From the view-points of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of numerous place units, a molecule of four space points is atman and is not (numerous) atmans. (6) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) atmans and is not atman. (7) From the points of the view of modes of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) atmans and is not (two) atman. (8) From the points of view of mode of existence of one space point and the mode of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman and is indescribable. (9) From the point of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and the modes of existence and non-existence of numerous place units and molecule of four space points it is atman and is indescribable. (10) From the points of view the mode of existence of mumerous place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is (numerous) atmans and is indescribable. (11) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is (two) atman and is (two) indescribable. (12) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of one place unit and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one

Page #288
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 267 place unit, a molecule of four space points is not atman and is indescribable. (13) From the points of view of mode of non-existence of one place units and of existence and non-existence of numerous (place units) a molecule of four space points is not atman and (numerous) is indescribable. (14) From the points of view of the mode of non-existence of numerous place unit, a molecule of four space points is not (numerous) atmans and is indescribable. (15) From the points of view the modes of non-existence of two place units and of existence and non-existence of two ; lace units, a molecule of four space points is not (two) atmans and is (two) indescribable. (16) From the points of view of mode of existence of one place unit and of non-existence of one space point and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman, is not atman and is indescribable. (17) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of four space points is not atman and is (two) indescribable. (18) From the points of view of the mode of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of four space points is atman and (two) not atman and is inexpi esssible. (19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of both existence and non-existence of one place unit a molecule of four space points is (two) atmans, is not atman and is inexpressible. After this, the questions were asked regarding molecule of five space points, and Bhagavana replied by enunciating twenty-two predicational propositions from different points of view. They are : (1) A molecule of five space-points is atman from the point of view of the self-nature of the atman.

Page #289
268 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (2) A molecule of five space points is not atman from the point of view of other nature (paratva). (3) A molecule of five space points is indescribable from both the self and other nature. (4,5, and 6) These are similar to the predicational propositions of the molecule of four space points. (7) From the points of view of the modes of existence of two or three place units and of non-existence of two or three place units & of non-existence of two or three place units) a molecule of five space point is (two or three) atmans. (When we take the mode of existence of two place units, then we should take the mode of non-existence of three place units. When we take the mode of existence of three place units we should also take the mode of non-existence of two place unit.) (8), (9) and (10) These are similiar to the predicational forms similar to the molecule of four space points. (11) From the point of view of mode of existence of two or three place units and of existence and non-existence of two or three place units a molecule of five space points is (two or three) atmans and is (two or three) inexpressible. 12, 13 and 14 predicational forms are similar to the predicational forms of a molecule of four space points. (15) From the points of view of the modes of existence and nonexistence of two or three place units, and of non-existence of two or three place units, a molecule of five space points is not (two or three) atmans and is (two or three) indescribable. (16) This propositional form is similar to the propositional form of the molecule of four space points. (17) From the point of view of existence of one place unit, nonexistence of the one place unit of the modes of existence and non-existence of one of numerous place units, a molecule of space of five points is atman, is not atman and is indescribable.

Page #290
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 269 (18) From the points of view of the modes of existeuce of one place unit of non-existence of numerous place units and of existence and non-existence of one place units a molecule of five space points is atman, is not (numerous) atmans and is indescribable. (19) From the points of view of the modes of existence of one place unit, of non-existence of two place units of existence and nonexistence of two place units a molecule of five space points is atman, is not (two) atman and is (two) inexpressible. (20) From the points of view of the modes of existence of numerous place units, of non-existence of one place unit and of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is atman is not (two) atman and is (two) inexpressible. (21) Prom the points of view of the modes of existence of two place units of non-existence of one place unit and from the point of view of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a moleule of five space points is (two) atmans, is not atman and is (two) inexpressible. (22) From the points of view of the mode of existence of two place units and of non-existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of one place unit, a molecule of five space points is two atmans, is not (two) atmans and is avaktavya (inexpressible). In this way, various combinations and permutations of the propositional forms regarding the molecule of six place points has been presented. There are twenty three propositional forms. Twenty-two predicational forms are the same as described above and the twentythird is as follows: From the points of view of modes of existence of two place points of existence of two place units and of the modes of existence and non-existence of two place units, a molecule of six space points is (two) atmans, is not (two) atn ans and is (two) inexpressible. 1 From the discussions given above, it is clear that the seven-fold 1 Bhagavati 12, 10, 469,

Page #291
270 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY predicational school called saptabangi, is not a later development presented by the acaryas. Dalsukh Malavania 1 says that (1) The syadvada doctrine is based on the predication of affirmation and negation. (2) From the combinations and permutations of the two propositional forms, we get other predications, (3) The primary predicatons of affirmation and negation give rise to the possible logical combinations for the sake of presenting other forms of predications. Each predicational form must have its own view point. Each predicatonal form is accepted and is proved. It is valid from a particular point of view in a particular universe of discourse. (4) The word "syat" has been prefixed to every predicational form for the sake of expressing the implication of the point of view. Therefore, this theory is called Syadvada'. On the basis of these considerations it is clear that the syat is used for connoting a point of view or a specific situation. When this point of view is clear, the word 'syat need not be used. But when it is implied, the word 'syat has been used. Therefore, the word "syat has a preference to the point of view or the context in a particular situation in the background of the other situations as a rational presentation. (5) The third predicational form is "avaktavya" inexpressibility. Some Jaina philosophers have made it the fourth predication. But in the Agama literature, this predication has not got the fourth place. It is worth considering, how and when the predication of "avaktavya" was given the fourth place; and who gave it. O In the seven-fold predicational forms, there must be seven predications including the affirmation and negation, neither more nor less. Therefore, the doctrine of seven-fold predications has its roots in the Agamas. In the case of the predications regarding the nature of the molecules with three place units and in the case of more place 1 Agama yug ka Jaina darsana, (Hindi), pp. 112-113

Page #292
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 271 units the predicational forms are many. But these predicational forms are only permutations of the seven-fold predications based on the number of space only. It would be a fallacy to say that the saptabhangi doctrine is not restricted to seven-fold predications alone. (7) The conception of the partial place unit structure (vikaladesa) and complete place unit structure (sakaladesa) is also to be found in the Agama literature, for analysing the doctrine of saptabhangi. In the agamas, we find that the first three predications are "sakaladesi' and the remaining redications are "vikaladesi'. THE METHODOLOGY OF SEVEN-FOLD PREDICATIONS From the point of view of grammatical presentation of the propositions, there are two forms of predications (i) of affirmation and (ii) negation. These predications are complementary, because affirmation implies the negation of its opposite and negation implies affirmation of its contrary. From the absolute point of view there is relation between the affirmation and negation, but considered from relational point of view, the two forms of proposition of affirmation and negation are complementary to each other. These two propositional forms combine to give rise to seven-fold (predications. The sevenfold predications are; (1) Syad-asti-From a particular point of view "it is'. (2) Syad-nasti-From a different point of view "it is not'. (3) Syad-asti-nasti - From a still different approach to problem 'it is and is not. (4) Syad avaktavyam-From another point of view, "it is inexpressible.' (5) Syad astiavaktavyam-From a point of view, "it is and is inexpressible.' (6) Syad nasti-avaktavyam-From another] point of view "it is not and is inexpressible'. (7) Syad-asti-nasti avaktavyam-From a different point of view 'it is, it is not and is inexpressible'. In the seven-fold predications affirmation, negation, and inexpressibility are primary forms of predications. With the combinations of

Page #293
272 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY these three predications, we get the remaining four: asti-nasti (affirmation and negation), asti-avaktavyam (affirmation and inexpressibility), nasti-avaktavyam (negation and inexpressibility) and asti-nasti-avaktavyam (affirmation, negation and inexpressibilty). These seven-fold predications have been mentioned in the Agama literature. In the Bhagavati sutra, seven-fold predications are mentioned.1 Kundakundacarya, in the Pancastikayasara2 has mentioned the seven-fold predications. The predication of avaktavya (inexpre sibility) has been made the third predication in the Bhagavati sutra and in the Visesavasyakabhasya. In the Pancastikayasara, Kundakundacarya has made it the fourth predication, but in the Pravacanasara, he has placed it as the third predication. Later philosophers have used both the methods of predications according to their convenience. SYAD-ASTI (FIRST PREDICATION) 3 + 5 The first predication is syad-asti. It implies that from a particular point of view of nature, a pot exists as a pot-syad asti ghatah. The question of the relative approach to the problems from a particular point of view, has been given in this predication. For example, we affirm the existence of the pot, as pot, in the context of its nature, of the materia! out of which it is made like the clay, the place in which it is, the time of its existence and its nature as the pot. These refer to the self-nature of the pot. The affirmation as a predicate does imply the affirmation with reference to its self-nature which is expressed in the four-fold scheme of expression of dravya (matter) out of which it is made, the place of its existence, kala the time of its existence, and the nature of the function of the pot. The predication of affirmation also implies the predication of negation of its opposite. For instance, 1 Bhagavati sutra, sataka 12, 3010, p. 19-20. 2 Pancastikayasara-gatha 14 3 Bhagavati sutra, sataka12, 3010, p. 19-20 & Visesavsyakabhasya, gatha 2-32. 4 Pancastikaya 14. 5 Pravacanasara jneyadhikara gatha 115.

Page #294
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the pot is made up of clay or some metal like brass. It cannot be made out of sand. Similarly, the characteristic and function of the cloth would be a cover. If the pot is not able to perform its function of holding water, then it would no longer be called a pot. Similarly, if a piece of cloth does not possess the qualities of covering or the function that the cloth has to perform, it would be no longer be called a piece of cloth. These are the inherent characteristics. If these distinctions in the functions of different objects were not to be recognised, then there would be no difference between a quantity of manure and a similar quantity of jaggery. In this sense, the function of the predication of affirmation has its importance in presenting the selfidentity of the objects. 213 SECOND PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI) The second predication is the predication of negation. It is Syad-nasti. It expresses that in a particular context with reference of the other nature of the objects (para catustaya), there is the predication of negation. This predication has reference to the four-fold expression of the other forms and nature of the objects like the material out of which it is made, the place, the time and its nature. From the points of view of its nature, other than its own and its expression of other forms like place, time and the material out of which it is made, the pot is not a pot. For instance, the pot would be a pot and would function as a pot only, if it had its own characteristics. With reference to the other characteristics like its creation out of different materials like sand and its other place and time, it would not be pot, because it may not function as an object holding water. This predicition of negation from the other point of view is also important and the predicational forms would not be complete without the predication of negation. Vidyanadi says that the predication of negation has a reference to the other nature and the presence of opposite characteristics. If the negation were to be applied to the object with reference to its own nature, then the real nature of the pot would not be understood, and, infact, the nature of the pot as pot would no longer be existent. Similarly, if the negation were to be predicated 1 Tattvartha Slokavartika 1, 6, 52.

Page #295
274 - A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY absolutey without reference to the other nature of the objects then it would lead to nibili m. It is, therefore, necessary to have second predication of negation. - THIRD PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-N ASTI) The third predication is the composite predication of affirmation and negation. For instance, the pot is and is not. These predications are to be considered as presented successively from different points of view and not simultaneously. Otherwise, there would be contradiction. From the point of view of the four-fold scheme of expression of selfnature (svacatustaya), the pot exists as pot. And from the point of view of the expression of other nature (para catustaya) the pot does not exist as pot. In the first two predications, separate and independent expression of affirmation and negation have been made. But in the third predication the affirmation and negation are predicated of a thing successively for the sake of presenting the positive and the negative aspects of the thing. FOURTH PREDICATION (SYAD AVAKTAVYAM) The fourth predication presents the concept of inexpressibility. For instance, from a particular point of view and in a contextual situation the nature of the pot is inexpressible. The real nature of the pot in its pure form may not be expressible in terms of words, because a thing is complex and has infinite characteristics. All of them cannot be presented in words. This refers to the impossiblity of simultaneous affirmations and negations of the characteristics of the pot. This predication shows that we may understand the nature of the object in its various aspects, but it is difficult to predicate these characteristics in the form of language. But it should be realised that the predication of inexpressibility is not final. It has always reference to a particular point of view and the situation. Similarly, it is based on the acceptance of contradiction of the predication of affirmation and negation simultaneously. Otherwise, it would lead to agnosticism. FIFTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-AVAKTAVYAM) . This is the composite predication of affirmation and inexpressibility. For instance, it affirms the existence of the pot as a pot, but

Page #296
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 275 expresses the inability to express the full nature of the pot. These two predications are also to be considered as presented from two points of view in a situation. To make this as an absolute predication would lead to dogmatism and ultimately to agnosticism. SIXTH PREDICATION (SYAD-NASTI-AVAKTAVYAM) The sixth predication is a composite predication of negation and inexpressibility. In the first instance, from a particular point of view it is not a pot and in the second instance, from the point of view of simu taneous affirmation and negation, it is inexpressible. SEVENTH PREDICATION (SYAD-ASTI-NASTI-AVAKTAYAM) The seventh predication is a composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. These predications are considered as successive and not simultaneous, although in the case of the predication of inexpressibility it refers to the impossibility of affirmation and negation, simultaneously and consequently inexpressibility of its nature. Therefore, there should be no contradiction or ambiguity in the presentation of the composite predication of affirmation, negation and inexpresibility. The predications of the saptabhangi are dialectial presentations of the predications which are possible to express in their various forms of affirmation, negation and in xpressibility. The dialectics of logic has been an important contribution in the field of logic and metaphysics. Recent researches have shown that saptabhangi doctrine is very useful in understanding the dialectic of the theories of probabilities and quantum physics. Eminent scientists like J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalnobis hive recognised the importance of the doctrine of syadvada for the dialectic of probability and for discoveries of biological sciences. ," "CATUSTAYA" (EXPRESSION OF FOUR-FOLD ASPECTS) A thing is complex in its nature with infinite number of attributes. Understanding a thing requires the insight of analysing its various aspects, positive and negative. From the positive aspect of self-nature, we can predicate the existence of a thing affirmatively. From the point 1. Samkhya : Journal, Oct 1958.

Page #297
276 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY of view of the four-fold expression of the aspects other than its own, we can predicate the negation of the existence of the object. The fourfold aspects are: (1) the matter out of which a thing is made (dravya), (2) place of existence (ksetra) (3) time of its existence (kala) and (4) its nature (bhava). From the point of view of the nature of matter out of which a thing is made, we may predicate its existence if it is consistent with its nature. If we have to refer to its place, time and its function, and if they are consistent with its nature, then we can predicate its existence. For instance, the pot is a pot. if it is r out of clay, if it is in a particular determined place, at a particular time and in its own nature. But if the object is referred to the fourfold expressions of its aspects other than its real nature, then we predicate the negation. Syadvadananjari present the four-fold expression of the aspects of a thing from the phenomenal or the practical point of view (vyavaharanaya). For instance, from the point of view of the substance out of which it is made, we can affirm the existence of the pot as made up of clay, then affirm the existence of the pot in Pataliputra at a particular time, say winter and from the point of view of its nature as black.3 Every thing in the universe is complex in its nature with its infinite characteristics. Considered from points of view of its selfnature, in the four-fold expression of its aspects as mentioned above, we can predicate the affirmation of its existence as the object is considered from the point of view of the contrary nature with the objects with reference to the four-fold expression of its otherness of the aspects, we can predicate the negation of the object. In these predications there should be no contradiction at all, because as we have pointed earlier, a thing is not merely made up of positive qualities, it has also the negative qualities. Therefore, the Jaina conception of the seven-fold predication with reference to the four-fold expressions of the self-nature and the other nature is a coherent presentation of the analysis of the nature of the object. There is no inconsistency either logical or metaphysical in the seven-fold predications. 1. Pancadhyayi 1,263 2. Syadvadamanjari, karika 23.

Page #298
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 277 Again, there is no doubt or uncertainty in the seven-fold predications. We have seen that the word 'syat' is not an expression of uncertainty or mere probability. It is the expression of a particular context of a point of view. From a particular point of view the predication is always certain and never in doubt. Therefore, we find that the word 'eva' is suffixed to the predicate. For example, syat ghata asti eva'. It means that from a particular point of view of its selfnature the pot exists as a pot, and there is no doubt about it. +6 ) THE USE OF THE WORD SYAT Every predication of the seven-fold predications is characterised by the primacy of the self-nature of predication svadharma. The other nature of the predication (anyadharma) is secondary. The word 'syat' is used for the sake of giving emphasis on the distinction of the primary and secondary emphases of the self-nature and the other nature of the predications. The word 'syat' is primarily concerned with empha sising the specific nature of the objects from a particular point of view. It aims at distinguishing between the primary emphasis of the specific nature and the secondary emphasis of the other nature of the objects. In this, the function of denial is not contradictory, but is relational. The word 'syat, therefore, does give importance to the analysis of the specific nature of the object and not to doubt. This becomes necessary because the nature of the objects and the expression of the objects in the form of language will possibly be different, because words cannot express the full nature of the object of experience, but it becomes necessary to predicate the different aspects of nature from different points of view. If the words had the capacity of a full expresssion of the entire nature of the objects, then syat would not be necessary. The expression of anekanta would be also possible without the use of the word 'syat. For instance, in the proposition "aham asmi" (I exist), there are two terms : the subject and the predicate. These are the two terms which are consistent and are related intrinsically to each other. The proposition gives definite meaning of the existence of myself. In this proposition the use of 1. Laghiyastraya, pravacana pravesa 63.

Page #299
278 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY one of he words would be sufficient to give full meaning of the proposition, but for the sake of clarity and emphasis, the two words are used. Similarly, in the proposition--"partho dhanurdharah", gives a clear meaning of the nature and the state of Arjuna. It is not necessary to use the word 'eva' because the two words are self-explanatory. Therefore, the word 'eva' is not used. The proposition "asti ghatah" (the pot exists) gives a full and determinate meaning about the existence of the pot. But for the sake of clarification and emphasis the word "syat' is also used, as it clears doubts and discrepancies. Acarya Hemacandra says that the use of the word 'syat' implies the expression of anekanta attitude. Akalankadeva says that the function of the 'syat' is twofold, in giving emphasis on the validity of anekanta (samyakanekanta) & the validity & rightness of expression of one point of view (samyak ekanta). So he wishes to use the word syat in naya and pramana both types of saptabhangi.3 1.} SAPTABHANGT IN OTHER DARSANAS We have seen that the primary predications of saptabhangi are three-fold-affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. We find similar expressions in other schools of Indian philosophy like the Vedanta, Buddhism and Vaisesika. According to the Advaitavedanta, the reality is one. It is Brahman. It is inexpressible, still it is. Therefore, Brahman is real, but it is inexpressible (avaktavya). In the Buddhist philosophy, there is nothing permanent or real. Every thing is fleeting, and is inexpressible in words. Language is an indequate instrument for expression of the complex nature of the objects and depth of the experience. Therefore, the Buddhist expression of the negation of a permanent reality still leaves the possibility of the real as being inexpressible. Vaisesika school posits the seven-fold category and samanya (generality) and visesa (particularity) as the two are independent categories which are equally real. Generality and particularity are independent categories though 1. Tattvarthaslokavarttika 1, 6, 56. 2. SyadvadaNanjari, karika 5. 3. Laghiyastraya 62.

Page #300
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY related to each other and though expressing the affirmation and negation as predications. However, the real nature of the categories cannot be expressed in language. It is avaktavya'. In this way, the fundamental predications of the Jaina theory of Saptabhangi have been implied in the systems of philosophy like the Advaitavedanta, the Buddhists and the Vaisesika. PRAMANA SAPTABHANGI Pramana saptabhangi can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold predications with referene to the valid source of knowledge. It is comprehensive and all-covering, and it is called 'sakaladesa.' While a predication from a particular naya (poit of view) is the predication from a particular point, because it does not give a comprehensive presentation of reality from all aspects. Therefore, it is called 'vikaladesa' (partial presentation). The seven-fold predications from the saptabhangi are comprehensive gif they are exhaustive & cover the different points of view. If the partial presentation is there, it is called 'nayavakya'. The comprehensive presentation is called pramanavakya. 279 Every thing is complex in its nature and is characterised by infinite attributes. To give a comprehensive picture of the nature of a thing in all its aspects, it would require to present the predications in an infinite number of ways. But such infinite number of predications is neither possible nor practicable. It would require infinite time but life is short and it does not permit us in the short span of time to present the entire nature of an object. Therefore, it is necessary to use Significant words pregnant with comprehenesive meaning. This is possible by the comprehensive presentation of the nature of the object in a language which uses the valid sources of knowledge. The synthetic view of presentation (abheda upacara) is necessary for the comprehensive predication of reality. The synthetic and non-synthetic and non-dual presentation implies the diversity of expression also in giving the diverse nature of the object. This is 'pramana saptabhangi.' A question arises--what is the nature of 'abheda vrtti' (the approach of unity) & non-duality? What do we mean by the presentation, specially when there is abundant diversity in the things of the world? We can ask what is the basis of the oneness the comprehen

Page #301
280 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY siveness and oneness (aheda ?). The answer to this would be, that the real nature of the object does not express unity alone or diversity alone, it is complex and the predications have also to be complex. The predication of the unity does imply the expression of diversity though secondary & sometimes is mentioned as inexpressible. The unitary & synthetic approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing is expressed in the different predications as presenting the following aspects of the infinite nature of the object : (1) Kala (time) (2) utmarupa (self-nature) (3) artha (meaning) (4) sambandha (relation) (5) upakara (function) (6) gunidesa (existence in a place) (7) samsarga(association) and (8) sabda (expression in words). In this way, by presenting the synthetic and the synoptic picture of the objects in its various aspects like its nature, its substance, relation, causality etc., we get a comprehensive nature of the objects. This is 'sakaladesa', because it comprehends to the various attributes of the object in a synoptic way. In predicating the nature of the objects like jiva, we lay emphasis on the predication of existence (astitva) & this predication implies the predications of the other aspects of the objects like its nature, its relation, its function, the time and the place in which it is to be found. We analyse this with the reference to the eight aspects : (1) Kala : When we predicate the existence of a thing like a pot, we also predicate the existence of the other attributes like its colour, its size, its quality of hardness, etc. For this reason, with reference to the aspect of time the other attributes along with the existence are non-different and can be comprehensively apprehended. (2) Atma-rupa : It refers to the real nature of the objects. In predicating the real nature of the object, as for instance of a pot (ghata), we have also to predicate the other attributes lil colour, its hardness etc., by implication. These attributes are inherent in the very nature of the objects. Therefore, the description of the objects implies the description of the inherent qualities. (3) Artha : Existence is an attribute of the pot. Similarly, the attributes of blackness and hardness are related to the objects. All these attributes exists in the same place and therefore there is no difference between existence and other attributes with the view of (artha) meaning.

Page #302
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 281 (4) Sambandha: Just as the relation of the attributes of existence with the objects is that of inherence, so also the relation of the other attributes with the objects is that of inherence. There is no difference in their relation. (5) Upakara: Just as the attribute of existence implies the use and the function of the object like the pot, so also the other attributes imply the characteristics of that pot. In this sense, there is the relation of non-difference (abheda). (6) Gunidesa : The relation between the object and its attributes is intimate and inherent in a specific place and situation. So is the relation of the object with other inherent characteristics. This type of relation is the product of intellectual discrimination. (7) Samsarga: Just as the attribute of existence with the object is intimately connected, so also are the other attributes which are inherent. The distinction between the other attributes is not known through the senses. Therefore, the association of the objects with the inherent qualities can be considered to be one of non-difference. (8) Sabda: The existence is predicated by the word 'is'. Similarly, the other inherent attributes of the objects are predicated by the word 'is'. The objects like the pot exists, is black, is hard etc. In these prepositions, the verb 'is' is the copula which connects the object with the attributes. If this connecting link were not to be there, then the attributes would not be associated affirmatively with the objects. The association of the object with its attributes is through the verb 'Is'. Thus it expresses the relation of non-difference. In this sense, the relation of non-difference of the object with its essential attributes has to be considered in aspects of kala, desa etc. This is the characteristic of the pramana svarupa & pramana saptabhangi. The relation of the object with its qualities with reference to the modes is not to be considered as primary in this connection. NAYA SAPTABHANGI 14.3 Naya is a point of view that one takes in looking at an object. It presents a partial picture of the object, without denying the predication of other aspects of the same object. Naya can be considered from

Page #303
282 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY two points as "Sunaya' (valid point of view) and "Durnaya' (invalid point of view). Sunaya aims at presenting the picture of the object from a particular point of view, but it does not claim to say that it is the only and exclusive point of view. Naya saptabhangi (the seven-fold predications from the point of view of naya) is a valid presentation of the predications of the naya and hence it is 'sunaya'. Another consideration regarding the analysis of the naya would be that the predications of the naya imply the differentiations of predications and not the nondifference of presenting the attributes. It is essentially 'bhedad rsti' to see the differenciated qualities of the thing, from a particular point of view. From the Point of View of Kala Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The presentation of the inherent characteristics of the substance in a synihetic way is secondary of the Naya saptabhargi. In the pramana-saptabhangi, we find the effort at finding out the synthetic presentation in the diversified predications. But in the naya saptabhangi, we give prominence to the diversifications and to the analysis of the attributes from different points of view. This analysis may be considered from eight aspects like kala (time), atmarupa (self-nature), artha (object) etc as in the description in the Pramana saptabhangi. It is as follows : . (1) Kala (time) : The attributes of the objects undergo constant modifications every moment. The emphasis on modifications at different points of time is the primary consideration in the nayasaptabhangi. In this sense, from the point of view of time, there is differentiation in the expression of modes and not the non-difference as in the case of pramana saptabhangi. (2) Atmarupa (self-nature) : The attributes of an object express themselves in different modes. The different modes cannot be considered as identical and the distinction between attributes of an object cannot be eliminated. If there are differences in the attributes and modes, then there would be do distinction between an object and another object and in the same object in different times. Therefore

Page #304
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 283 from the point of view of the aspect of atmarupa also there is the expression of difference and non-difference. (3) Artha : From different points of view, the substratum of the attributes will have to be considered different, because if they were to be considered as one, then, there would be no distinction between objects, and the substratum will become one. The difference in the artha is an important characteristic of the naya-saptabhangi with reference to the artha of the substrum. (4) Sambandha : With reference to the relation of the objects and the attributes of the objects, we find that the characteristics of differentiation is primary. For instance, the relation of Gurudatta with his son will be different from that of his relation with his wife or his brother. (5) Upakara : Upakara refers to function or utility. This also implies differentiation in the context of the seven-fold predications of the naya. The functions of the different objects is different. (6) Gunidesa : The objects with different characteristics express differentiations in different situations and places. Otherwise, if they were to be considered as identical, then no distinction would be possible as for instance, in that case, the experiences of pleasure and pain of one man would not have been different from the experiences of another man. This is the essential characteristic of difference in the objects having different attributes and modes. (7) Samsarga : The relation between the different objects and their modes expresses the essential characteristics of differentiations and diversities. For instance, while eating the different condiments, the experiences of the different tastes have to be recognised although the ultimate experience of these will be a synthetic presentation of all the tastes together, as in the case of eating the beatle leaf, the beatle nut and cardamom. (8) Sabda : The predications of the nature of different objects will have to use different words. One word cannot express the differentiated functions of the different objects. If it were not so, then all experiences and the characteristics of objects would have been explained by one word only.

Page #305
284 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Thus we find that Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the differentiation of predicational aspect, while Pramana saptabhangi gives emphasis on the non-difference (abheda) of the predicational form, as it is synthetic in nature. Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between attributes and modes is one of the combination of non-difference and difference. When we study the object with reference to the different aspects of pramana, we look at the object in a comprehensive way, and the predications of pramana give the picture of the object in a synoptic way by emphasising the different aspects as a coherent whole. The differentiation is secondary. But in the sevenfold predications of naya, the emphasis is on presenting one aspect of an object from a particular point of view and the predications analyse the different aspects of an object. It does not give a synthetic picture. It is concerned with the analytic function of the predicational forms regarding the nature of object. In Naya saptabhangi, the nature of the object is analysed from different points of view with reference to its modes in different aspects of time, drayya etc. Therefore, the function of differentiation(Bhedopacara pramana) is sakaladesa (comprehensive) and coherent, while Naya is vikaladesa (partial) and analytic. | VYAPYA AND VYAPAKA BHAVA (PERVADED AND 13 PERVADING CHARACTERISTICS) The relation between the Syadvada and saptabhangi is of th@ relation of pervasive and pervading characteristics. Syadvada is pervasive while saptabhangi is pervading. Syadvada, when expressed in definite predicational forms, becomes Saptabhangi. But Saptabhangi may be considered to be a form of Syadvada or it may not be. Naya is not to be identified with Syadvada, but it has the characteristics of expressing itself in the forms of Saptabhangi. This is to be found as a characteristic in the Naya and the Syadvada doctrines. NO INFINITE PREDICATIONS (ANANTABANGY) We have seen that the nature of a thing is complex and it has infinite attributes. Therefore, a question has been asked that if the 1 Tattvartha slokavartika 1, 6, 54.

Page #306
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 285 attributes of a thing are infinite why should there not be infinite predications ? The answer jto this is, that it is true that there are infinite attributes of a thing, but each attribute can be expressed in the sevenfold predications, and hence there would be infinite number of sevenfold predications. If each attribute were to express one predication only, then there would have been infinite predications for infinite attributes, but that is not so. Each attribute or characteristic has its seven-fold predications and its nature can be expressed in the sevenfold predications. Thus there would be infinite number of seven-fold predications. Acarya Siddhasena and Abhayadevasuri maintain that the primary predications of the seven-fold predications would be affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. The other four predications are permutations of the same. They are "vikaladesi" (partial expressions). 2 Similarly, Acarya santisuri in his Nyayavatara-sutravartikas has also suggested that the primary predications of asti, nasti and avaktavya are "sakaladesi' and the remaining four predications are vikaladesi. But Upadhyaya Yasovijaya in his Jaintarkabhasa says that all the seven predications of the Saptabhangi are sakaladesi as well as vikaladesc. Akalanka and Vidyananda have said that the seven-fold predications are all 'sakaladesi and 'vikaladesi'. 4 Those Acaryas who have considered the primary predications of sat, asat and avaktavya as 'sakaladesi' and the remaining 'vikaladesi' are of the opinion that the first predication is of identity or non-difference from the substantial point of view and we get a full knowledge of the nature of the substance. The second predication refers to the paryayas, and from the point of view of non-difference in the case of the predication of negation, we may get the comprehensive picture of the object. The third predication of inexpressibility expresses the concept of difference (bheda) in an implicit way (avivaksita). In this 1 2 3 4 Tattvartha Slokavartika 1, 6, 52. Sanmati tarka, satika, p. 446 Pt. Dalsukh Malvania Ed. p. 94. Pujya Gurudeva Ratnamuni Smrti Grantha, p. 133,

Page #307
286 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY way, the knowledge of the full nature of the object is possible without much difficulty. From the point of view of the concept of non-difference (abhedarupa) the three predications comprehend the nature of the object in a fuller way (sakaladesi), while the other four predications comprehend the nature of the objects in partial aspects. Therefore they are vikaladesi. Some other philosophers do not give prominence to this way of thinking regarding the comprehensive or the partial understanding of the nature of an object. Understanding of the nature of an object can be covered from the affirmative side by emphasising the positive aspects of the object; and by negating the contrary or the negative aspects of the object, we can very well get a fuller comprehension. Therefore, all the seven predications of the saptabhangi can be considered as presenting fuller comprehension (sakaladesi) or partial comprehension (vikaladesi) according to the nature and the emphasis of the predications. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SAPTABHANGT The Indian philosophers in the past, have presented four-fold aspects of the predications for comprehending an object. The four-fold predications are (1) sat (affirmation), (2) asat (negation) and (3)ubhaya (affirmation and negation), (4) anubhaya (neither affirmation nor negation). In the 'Nasadiya sukta' of the Rgveda, two contradictory hypotheses of expression as affirmation and negation have been presented? It seems that before the seer of this sukta, there were two opinions regarding the creation of the universe. Some suggested that the primary cause of the universe is being, while others said it is nonbeing. The seers then presented the third view i. e.--it is neither being nor non-being, but it is both neither being nor non-being (anubhaya). In this way, the three forms of expression of being, non-being and neither being nor non-being were expressed in the Rigveda. Similar view is also to be found in the Upanisads, and there is the possibility of the 1 Rigveda 1, 164, 46 2. Rigveda 10, 129

Page #308
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 287 presentation of both the points of view. In this tradition three-fold forms of expression of being, non-being and being non-being (ubhaya) are also found. In the view, where there is negation of both sat and asat, we find the fourth predication of neither being nor non-being (anubhaya). In the Upanisads we get the four forms as expressions as sat (being), 2 asat (non-being), 8 sadasat (being and non-being) and neither both (anubhaya). Anubhaya may also be said to be avaktavya (inexpressible.)4 The predication of avaktayya has three meanings as (1) it is a negation of being and non-being (2) it is a negation of being,nonbeing and both (sadasat) and (3) sat and asat are to be considered as predicated simultaneously. The predication of avaktavya is very important in the Upanisads. 5 Avaktavya has been given the third place of predication, the first being sat and the second asat. In some places, the predications have been given the fourth place and in that case it expresses that the negation of the three predications of sat, asat and sa dasat. The predication of avaktavya can be considered as of two forms, as sapeksa (relative) and nirapeksa (absolute). Sapeksa avaktavyata expresses the concept of inexpressibility of the sat, asat and of both. Nagarjuna, the Buddhist philosopher, has presented the concept of inexpressibility of all the four predications of sat, asat, ubhaya, and anubhaya. This is the expression of catuskoti. In this way the sapeksa (inexpressibility) predication is based on the negation of the first, second and third or all the four aspects. It expresses, the negation of 1. (a) Tsopanisad-tadejati tannaijati (b) Kathopanisad 1, 2, 20-anoraniyan mahato mahiyan. (c) Mundakopanisad 2, 2, 1-sadsadvareryam 2. Chandogyopanisad 6, 2--sadeva saumyedamagra asit. 3. Chandogyo panisad 3, 19, 1-asadevedamagra asit. 4. Taittiriya Up. 2, 4-yato vaco nivartante. 5. (a) Kenopanisad, 1, 4-yadvacanabhyuditam. (b) Kathopanisad 2. 6, 12- naiva vaca na manasa praptum sakyoh. (c) Mangukyopanisad 7,

Page #309
288 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY being, non-being, being and non-being and, neither being and nonbeing. These predications may be simultaneous or successive. This presents inexpressibility as a category. The concept of inexpressibility with reference to the predications is considered to be sapekla avaktavyata (relative inexpressibility). Nirapeksa avaktavyata (non-relative inexpressibility) is that which presents the concept of inexpressibility regarding the description of the nature of the object, as the nature of the object is incomprehensible. The four-fold expressions mentioned above are to be found in the Buddha's concept of vibhajyavada, or avyak stavada. The Buddha described the problems regarding reality as presenting an end (or santata) or as endless. Similarly, reality as eternal or non-eternal are questions which are inexpressible and indescribable (avyak sta). The problem regarding the continuation or not of Tathagata after nirvana is a problem which is inexpressible and indescribable. When the Buddha was asked -(1) does the tathagatha exists after nirvana ? the Buddha was silent. (2) does he not exist after nirvana ? he was silent. (3) does he exist and not exist after death 2- the Buddha was again silent, the final question was (4) does he neither exist nor non-exist ?1 He did not reply. . For the Buddha, these problems were avyak sta. They were indescribale in words. The Buddha was silent about the metaphysical problems. Similarly, the problems regarding the fact of misery (dukkha) can be analysed in terms of catuskoti. The questions regarding the man who suffers, whether he suffers due to himself, due to others, due to both or due to neither, are all avyak sta problems. At the time of Mahavira, we find a similar four-fold approach to the problems in the Ajnanavada (theory of nesience) of Sanjaya Velatthiputta. Sanjaya Velatthiputta gave answers to such problems neither in the affirmation, nor in the negation and not in both. He was avdocating the theory of doubt and uncertainty. For him, such problems were neither vyak rta nor avyak rta. It is difficult to predicate anything about them. In this sense, we can say that his theory was 1. Samyuttanikaya

Page #310
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 289 primarily a theory of uncertainty and doubt. It is scepticism. In modern western philosophy, we find Hume's position similar to that of Sanjaya Velatthiputta. The theory of uncertainty was expressed by Sanjaya regarding some metaphysical problems like-(1) the existence of the other world, (2) the fruit of good or bad action and (3) the concept of immortality. According to him, it is difficult to say whether the world exists; whether it does not exist, whether it does and does not exist and whether it neither exists nor does not exist. Sanjaya's theory of doubt is quite different from the Syadvada of the Jainas. The theory of doubt presents uncertainty in any predication, while Syadvada stands from the foundation of certainty of expression of different points of view. There is no doubt in the predicational form regarding the nature of the object predicated from different points of view. From a particular point of view, the predi. cation is certain and not in doubt. Similarly, Syadvada does not advocate, as the Buddhists do, the theory of inexpressiblity as a final form of expression. The implication of the catuskoti of the Buddhists is that the nature of the problem is inexpressible in its fundamental aspect, but in the Jaina concept of inexpressibility (avaktavya) there is no uncertainty; it only says that the words cannot express the nature of the object in its different aspects. It is possible to predicate existence & non-existence simultaneously from a particular point of view, and therefore it is inexpressible. Syadvada is neither scepticism, nor nihilism, nor the theory of ignorance. It is the theory of certainty of expression with a certain knowledge from a particular point of view. Bhagavana Mahavira presented the synoptic appoach to the understanding of the problems in his Anekanta and Syadvada theories. Nature of a thing need not be analysed from the four aspects only as in the case of the predications in catuskoti. But the nature of a thing is complex, it has infinite aspects and each aspect can be predicated in infinite ways. Therefore, every aspect can be presented in the sevenfold predications, and there are infinite number of predications. In the Upanisadic period, the problem regarding the aspects of existence and non-existence (sat and asat) of the objects and their

Page #311
290 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY nature were discussed, but the discussion was not exhaustive. Sanjaya tried to explain away the problems by referring to the theory of ignorance and uncertainty. The Buddha presented the Vibhajyavada and said that certain problems which are metaphysical are inexpressible (avyak rta) but Mahavira was not satisfied with such partial solutions of the problems. He gave a dialectic of the predications by the help of rigorous logical exercise and presented Syadvada and Saptabhangivada.

Page #312
NIKSEPAVADA : A Study TERMINOLOGY OF NIKSEPA :) Man vses language for expressing bis ideas. Without the use of language, he cannot express his thoughts Man is different from animals in this that he has the power of expressing in a language, while animals cannot make use of the language for expressing their experiences. Without the use of language it is difficult to carry on the activities in this world. Language is the medium of communication. There are numerous languages and millions of words in these languages. Each language uses different words for explaining things. It is, therefore, necessary to have knowledge of the use of language and the definite content of the meaning of the words that we use. Language would be useful and it will serve its function properly if its words are replete with exact meaning. The function of Niksepavada is to understand the exact content of the words in terms of meaning and its usage. This is the theory of niksepa. The essence of the Niksepavada is to study the implications of the meanings in the words and in their definiteness and to try to find out the implications of the words in the meanings. In fact, the function of niksepa is to define words with reference of their content or the meaning and the usage.? The other sense in which niksepa is used is "nyasa" it is implication and clarification. In the Tattvarthasutra, the word 'nyasa' has been used.2 | Dhavala-satkhandagama, Book 1, p. 10. 2 Tattvarthasutra 1, 5.

Page #313
292 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the Tattvartharajavartika, it is described as nyaso niksepah, meaning the clarification and definitising of words. UTILITY OF NIKSEPA In the Anuyogadvara it is stated that the main function of niksepa is to clear the meaning of the word and to find a definite meaning of the words. This is its use.1 Laghiyastraya describes the function of niksepa as to remove the inadequate meaning of a word and to present the exact meaning. Upadhyaya Yasovijaya says that the function of niksepa is to present the correct meaning of the word by removing ambiguity and indeterminateness.3 The function of niksepa is to remove ignorance, doubt or perversity of meaning of a word. The primary function is to determine the exact meaning of the word used. A question has been raised regarding the necessity of niksepa in the logical analysis of the meaning of term, specially when pramana and naya give us the knowledge of the nature of the object. The answer is that, pramana and naya are concerned with presenting the knowledge of the object fully or partially. But niksepa is more concerned with linguistic use of the words and their meanings. The utterance of a word expresses the meaning that is intended by the person using it in addition to the meaning that accrues to the 'vord. The unintended meanings of the words are likely to create confusion and ambiguity in the use of words. For the purpose of understanding the nature of a thing, we have to depend upon the language that we use. Sometimes language presents difficulties in understanding the connotation of a word, because the real mening and the intended meaning may differ. Therefore, we have to consider two types of meanings of the word: (1) primary meaning and (2) the secondary. To make a distinction between the primary and secondary meaning, it is important to analyse the linguistic function of niksepa. The distinction between the primary and the secondary meanings is 1 Anuyogadvara vrtti. 2 Laghiyastraya svopajna vrtti. 7, 2. 3 Tarkabhasa 3rd pariccheda

Page #314
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY possible to be understood through the different varieties of niksepa like nama niksepa. So one cannot have the knowledge of object (tattvartha) without the help of niksepa.1 Bhattakalanka in his Siddhiviniscaya has described the function of niksepa as the act of knowing and determining the meaning of the word used for understanding the nature of the things through naya. There are numerous forms of niksepa, but four of them are prominent. The object of these different forms of niksepa is primarily to dispel errors and misunderstanding about the meaning of the words used for explaining the nature of a thing. Through dravyarthika (from the point of view of substance) and paryayarthika (from the point of view of modes) naya, we can understand the exact nature of the categories of jiva and ajiva etc. Niksepa does not only give us the knowledge of the category, but it removes doubts and indiscrepancies in the meaning. The primary importance of niksepa is to emphasise that we must use appropriate words mentioning the connotation of a term for explaining the nature of the objects. 293 THE BASIS OF NIKSEPA The basis of niksepa can be analysed into four aspects as (1) primary (pradhana), (2) secondary (apradhana), (3) imagined (kalpita) and (4) un-imagined (akalpita). Bhava is unimagined drsti. It is therefore primary. The other three niksepas are more concerned with the mental constructions. Therefore, they are not primary. Nama niksepa enables us to recognise an object. Sthapana niksepa does not give us the qualities, but it gives us the idea of form. Dravya niksepa enables us to know the meaning of the word with reference to its functions and also with reference to its prior and posterior characteristics. In this sense, the nama, sthapana and the dravya niksepas are expressions which are primarily concerned with grammatical and linguistic analysis of the statements and not so much with the expositions of the nature of the object. Therefore, they are not primary. 1 Lagihyastraya, p. 99 2 Siddhiviniscaya, niksepa paddhati 1.

Page #315
294 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE NIKSEPA METHODOLOGY Niksepa presents a harmonious blending of the word and its expression. It would be difficult to understand the significance of the meaning of the terms used without niksepa. The special characteristic of niksepa is that it gives clarity of expression and thought in analysing the meaning of the word as it is expressed by the word. The words signify the meanings and meaningful words are the primary considerations of the use of language. Words and their expressions convey the characteristics that the objects have. Sometimes, although the words do not convey the presence of attributes of an object, the implication of the presence of attributes is to be found in the use of the words. In this sense, the intention of the speaker is also important, otherwise the language will lead us astray and serious fallacies will arise. For example, a person who was a judge some time in the past, cannot be always considered to be a judge even at the present moment. It may be a false statement. This kind of a distinction in the use of the words and the significance of the meanings of the words in different situations is an importanat function of niksepa. Nama niksepa refers to the name, more specially the proper name, arbitrarily given to an object without considering the presence or the qualities suggested by the name. For example, the name of a very poor man may be Laxminarayana. A proper name has no connotation. Sthapana niksepa, the denotation of a thing and the connotation is implied and projected in the object, although it does not by itself have that connotation. For instance, a stone image is referred to as God. Dravya niksepa refers to the substance with its qualities implied in the word. For example, a pot which used to contain ghee in the past is even now called ghee-pot. Similarly, a pot purchased for keeping ghee, but which does not at present contain ghee, is also called a ghee-pot. A person who was an eminent lawyer gives up his practice as a lawyer and starts a business. Still he is called a lawyer. A person of wealth in this world is called Indra and a person who posse

Page #316
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 295 sses spiritual wealth of self-knowledge is called Indra in the spiritual sphere. In this sense, the practical way of expressing the nature of things through words in order to present adequate meanings is called niksepa methodology. NAYA AND NIKSEPA H.? The relation between naya and niksepa is that of the relation between the object and expression of its qualities. Naya is jnanatmaka (concerning knowledge). It is epistemological, while niksepa is concerned with the expression of the contents of knowledge through language. In is logical and linguistic. Nama and sthapana and dravya niksepa are all concerned with the substance and its attributes, while bhava niksepa has reference to its modes.1 NAMA NIKSEPA Nama niksepa refers to a proper name. It has no connotation. It is a name given to an object arbitrarily for the sake of recognising it for practical purposes. The proper name may have connotation when it gets an acquired connotation or it may be a meaningless name. For instance, in some cases we give a name to an object or an animal without consideration regarding its nature or qualities. An unlettered man may be called Vidyasagara. A poor man is named as Laxmipati. These names given to the two individuals are purely arbitrary and have no connotation. But if the names given to the individuals do acquire the connotations suggested by the name, it would be bhava niksepa. When one who is called Vidyasagara becomes a learned man, then it would not be merely a meaningless name. It would acquire a connotation. The names like Vidyasagara and Laxmipati do suggest the connotation of learning and possession of wealth; but a proper name need not imply these characteristics, as they are given arbitrarily to an individual. The expression of the content of the meaning is not important in the Nama niksepa, although the intention of the parents in giving these names to their children may be noble and filled with maud. 1 Sanmati prakarana 1, 6.

Page #317
296 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY line sentiments. But the function of the Nama niksepa is only to present a name without the content of the meaning. The Nama niksepa refers to proper names, but some proper names have their various modes of expressions suggesting different meanings. For instance, Indra is also called Devendra, Surendra, Purandara and Sakra etc. But a proper name given to an individual cannot be exchanged to any one of these modes. Indra is always called Indra. He cannot be called as Surendra, Sakra, etc. With reference to time, Nama niksepa has two aspects: one is permanent and the other is temporary. The names which are permanent for things which are eternal refer to 'sasvata-nama-niksepa'. The names like Surya, Candra, Mount Meru, Siddhasila, Loka, Aloka etc. refer to sasvata (permanent) namaniksepa. In the cases, where there are modifications and developments, the name may not remain appropriate for the object after sometime. This would be asasvata (temporary) namaniksepa. For example, a girl may be called Kamala in her parents' house and she may be called Vin.ala in her husband's house. This is a proper name without connotation and it is not a permanent name given to an individual. STHAPANA NIKSEPA Sthapana niksepa refers to the identification of the meaning of the word, although a meaning may not be identical. In this, we take a word and identify the meaning of the word with one object. Sthapana niksepa is of two types: (1) Tadakara (of the same form) and (2) Atadakara (of different form). In these sadbhava sthapana and asadbhava sthapana may also be distinguished. If the meaning of an object is fixed on the object of the same form, it is called tadakara sthapana. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called tadakara sthapana. But the signets of chess are also called as elephant or horse etc., but they are not identical with the shape of horses, elephants etc. Such identification of signets as elephants and horses is called ate dakara sthapana. Nama and sthapana niksepa are not very much significant with reference to the meaning of the objects in the practical life. DRAVYA NIKSEPA Dravya niksepa does not refer to the mental, the physical ele

Page #318
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 297 ment, like the intention as to the nature of the object; and its state in the past, present and the future does not depend on our intention and idea. Therefore it is called dravya niksepa, because it expresses the state of the object in one of the transferable forms, like, past as used in the present etc. For example, sometimes we use the description in the present context of the state although it may refer to the past state. Similarly, of the future state, we may refer in the present state. A pot which contained ghee in the past may still be called the ghee-pot. Similarly, if a pot is purchased for keeping ghee in future, the pot may still be called the ghee-pot. A person who was a judge in the past, but has since retired, may still be called a judge; or a person who is to be a king in future may be addressed as a king. The scope of dravya niksepa is very wide. It may cover the expressions relating to the past or the future as projected into the present tense. The future king is also called king. And when the king is dead, his body is also referred to the king. Dravya niksepa is of two types: (1) Agama dravya niksepa' and (2) "no-agama dravya niksepa". No-agama dravya niksepa is of three types: (1) jna-sarira, (2) bhavya sarira and (3) tad-vyatirikta. The Atman knows through a body and this is called jna-sarira or jnayaka sarira. Similarly, we see the dead body of a learned man, and then we say that he was a learned man. This is jna-sarira, no-agama dravya nik sepa. If the Atman is embodied and that atman will be a learned man in future, it is called bhavya sarira. For example, by observing the lustrous qualities of the body and other characteristics of a child we may say the child would become a learned man. This is a bhavya-sarira no-agama dravya niksepa. In the first two types of niksepa, the emphasis is on the body which is only the medium. In the third, the emphasis is not so much on the body, but it is on the bodily activities, like-movement of the hands etc. For example, when an ascetic is preaching, he may make gestures with the hands. These gestures are tad-vyatirikta no-agama dravya niksepa. Agama dravya niksepa refers to the implication of the meanings and the cognition content of the meaning, rather than the exact expre

Page #319
298 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ssed form of the knowledge. In the no-agama dravya niksepa there is the absence of both types of knowledge, expressed or implied. It only refers to the medium of knowledge i. e. the body. No-agama tadvyatirikta dravya niksepa does not possess any content of knowledge. Therefore, it is called dravya niksepa. This is of three types : (1) Laukika, for instance, according to the common parlance of language "Sriphala" is auspicious. (2) Kupravacanika, for example, according to this 'Vinayaka" (god Ganesa) is called auspicious. (3) Lokottara : From the ultimate point of view, religion with jnana (knowledge), darsana (faith) and earitra (conduct) is auspicious. In this way, bereft of the content of the meaning, and also bereft of the present state of the object, we recognise the other states as the present and we impose the present state and consider to be always there. This is dravya niksepa. 11.) BHAVA NIKSEPA Bhava niksepa refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word. The learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be said to be a teacher. This is Agama bhava nik sepa. In this sense, he is a real teacher. A teacher who is engaged in the activities of teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of "No-agama bhava niksepa". In these cases, the word has no reference to the aspect or the fun. ction in partial form. It has three forms : (1) Laukika, (2) Kupravacanika and (3) Lokottara. We have seen that there are similar distinctions in the no-agama tadvyatirikta dravya niksepa, but there is a primary difference in the emphasis of the two forms of niksepa. The word 'no' in the dravya niksepa implies the absence of the cognitive functions (agama). But in the bhava niksepa there is a partial absence of cognitive functions.1 The scope of dravya tadvyatirikta is primarily activity and not cognitive function. While the scope of bhava tadvyatirikta is two-fold : i. e., the expression of activity and also the cognition implied in the activity. 1. agama savva nisehe, no saddo ahava desa paaisehe.

Page #320
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 299 For example, a teacher makes some gestures by the hand and turns over the pages. These activities do not refer to the cognition. In this sense, the word 'no' in the bhava niksepa refers to the partial negation. The function of the bhava niksepa is primarily concerned with the expression of the present state and the mode of the object. In this expression of niksepa, there is the absence of the distinction of activity of the body as a medium of cognition. This is the difference between the two types of niksepa. Every thing is expressed through nik sepa. It is the linguistic expression, there are infinite number of expressions, but every thing has to be expressed in the form of four expressions of niksepa. Only one niksepa will not give a full picture of the state of the object. Every object has its name. It is nama niksepa. It has its state. It is sthapana niksepa. It is referred to with reference to its material, it is dravya nik sepa and there is the expression of its nature and its attributes. It is bhava niksepa, We give below the classification of niksepa as discussed in the earlier pages. NIKSEPA Nama Sthapana Dravya Bhava Tadakara Atadakara Agama Noagama Jna-Sarira Bhavya-sarira Tadvyatirikta Laukika Kupravacanika Lokottara Agma Noagama Laukika Kupravacanika Lokottara The concept of Niksopa is primarily linguistic in nature. It is aimed at giving the exact meaning of a term.

Page #321
NAYAVADA: sin A Study HOUGHT AND ITS BASIS Nayavada is a significant contribution of the Jaina logic and epistemology. If helps to understand the nature of an object in a comprehensive way. It is the basis of the principle of Anekanta. It would be necessary to understand the foundational processes of thought for the sake of our knowledge of the Nayavada. The empirical activities are of three types : 1. Concerned with knowledge and its effects. 2. Concerned with the objects and its modifications. 3. Concerned with the language and the use of the word. The process of thought in which there is the predominance of a purpose or a will, it is jnanasrayi, based on the knowledge. Naigamanaya is of this type. That which is based upon the object is arthasrayi. Sangraha, vyavahara and rjusutra nayas are arthasrayis as they primarily refer to the objects and there modification. In these nayas, there is the analysis of the varied aspects and distinctions of objects. The sangrahanaya is primarily concerned with finding out the unity in the diversity of the modes of the objects. Nyaya and Vaisesika system of philosophy are based upon vyavahara naya. Ksanikavada of the Buddhists is an expression of rjusutranaya. The nayas which are concerned with the analysis of words and the linguistic study are called sabdasrayi. Sabda, Samabhirudha and Evarbhuta nayas are pertaining to the words. These nayas are primarily concerned with the linguistic study and the persons who study these give importance to the science of language. On the basis of the considerations mentioned above we may analyse the characteristics of the nayas as :

Page #322
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 301 1. Naigamunaya refers to the purpose or the object in view that is in the mind of the person who is responding. 2. Sangrahanaya refers to the tendency to find unity among diversity. 3. Vyavaharanaya is very much concerned with particularity and the study of diversity. 4. Rjusutranaya aims at presenting the aspect of reality from the point of view of the momentary present. 5. Sabdanaya analyses the function of the word and its meaning. 6. Samabhiruohanaya refers to the etymological meaning of the word. 7. Evambhutanaya analyses the specific situations and the contexts in which a particular meaning is referred to the word. THE BASIS OF DISTICTIONS OF NAYA ... The primary consideration of sangrahanaya is the emphais on unity, while that of vyavaharanaya is on diversity. Sangrahanaya does not accept diversity as the basis and vyavahara ignores unity in its search for diversity. But the basis of naigamanaya is the synthesis of the diversity and unity. It asserts that unity and diversity are equally present in an object, but the emphasis may be on one or the other according to the purpose of the analysis. In some cases, the unity becomes primary and the diversity is secondary, while in some others diversity becomes primary and the unity is secondary. The varied emphasis on unity and diversity is primarily mental and is based upon the purpose and the predilection of the individual. Sometimes, an object, which has the diverse modifications becomes important, but sometimes the modifications which are diverse are prominent. Rjusutranaya is based on the principle of diversity only. It is concerned with the analysis of the nature of the object from the point of view momentary present. It does not find any relevance for the . 1. Anyadeva hi samanyamabhinnajnanakaranam. Visesoapyanya eveti, manyate naigamo nayah.

Page #323
302 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY past or the future modifications. Sabdanaya studies the meaning and function of the word. Its primary emphasis is on getting the exact meaning of the word. Samabhirudhanaya has reference to etymological meaning of the word. Evarbhutanaya is more specific and it aims at finding out the exact meaning of the word in a particular situation and in a particular context with reference to the present. These nayas are based upon the concepts of unity and diversity. The principles of unity and diversity are operative in these nayas in different forms as shown below : 1. Naigamanaya emphasises that the unity and diversity both are important. 2. Sangrahanaya gives prominence to unity and in that (a) parasangraha emphasises absolute unity while (6) apara-sangraha gives prominence to relative unity or oneness. 3. Vyavaharanaya is concerned primarily with the diversity and difference of both absolute and relative types. 4. Rijusutranaya gives importance to diversity and difference. 5. Sabdanaya similarly gives importance to difference. 6-7. Samabhiruaha and Evambhuta are also concerned with difference. In these nayas, sangrahanaya emphasises non-difference or unity. Those which give emphasis on difference or diversity are five in number and naigamanaya gives importance to both difference and unity. The Jainas have said that unity and diversity, oneness and manyness, and substantiality and modifications are equally important and real. There cannot be any diversity without unity and there cannot be any unity without diversity. Both are real, both are complementary. One without the other is not possible. - THE TWO TRADITIONS We have seen that the nayas can be classified into two types as (a) dravyarthika -- those concerned with the understanding of substance and (b) paryayarthika -- those concerned with the understanding of the modes. There are two traditions in understanding these nayas. One is the metaphysical tradition and the other is the logical tradition,

Page #324
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 303 Jinabhadragani Ksamasramana outlined the metaphysical tradition. According to him, naigama, sangrahe, vyavahara and rjusutranaya are dravyarthika nayas. While sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta nayas refer to the paryayas, therefore, they are paryayarthika nayas. hasena Divakara has given the logical tradition. According to him, the first three nayas are dravyarthika nayas and the remaining are paryayarthika nayas.1 Sidd The metaphysical tradition considers rjusutranaya as dravyarthika as it refers to the substance. This view is based on the 14th sutra of the Anuyogadvara. According to this view, in this with reference to this naya, an individual without the upayoga (harmonic energy) is to be considered as from the point of view of substance as an individual. From the metaphysical point of view, if rjusutranaya is not taken with reference to substance, it will contradict the statement in the Anuyogadvara. But the logical tradition maintains that the statement in the Anuyogadvara has reference to the modifications of an object at a particular point of time and reference to substance or object (dravya) is only formal. Therefore, there should be no contradiction in reading the statement of the Anuyogadvara with reference to the analysis of the modes of a thing. The metaphysical tradition has given importance to the substance (dravya) which is secondary. Therefore, they considered it as dravyarthikanaya. But really speaking, according to the logical tradition, reference to the substance (dravya) is only secondary, while the modes are primary. Therefore, rjusutranaya is primarily paryayarthika. The metaphysical tradition gives importance to dravya as primary, while the logical tradition looks at it from the point of view of paryaya. These two are only distinctions in the approaches to the problems, but there is fundamental difference in their analysis. One presents the object from the point of view of substance and the other presents the object from the point of view of view of modes. * NAIGAMANAYA L 3 Naigamanaya is the point of view by which the generality and 1 Nyayopadesa 18 2 Anuyogadvara 14 3 Naya-rahasya, p. 12

Page #325
304 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY particularity of the object is synthesised. It gives importance to the aspect of generality and particularity of an object and takes a synoptic view of the relative importance of generality and particulrity.1 Nyaya-Vaisesika2 darsanas maintain that generality and particularity are independent categories, but the Jainas do not accept this view, for the particular and general are inter-dependent. One cannot exist without the other. There is no particular without the reference to the general and there is nothing general without reference to the particular. A thing can be looked at from the points of view of generality or of the speciality of an object. When we want to distinguish one object from another, the emphasis is on particularity or differentia, although it has general nature in relation to other similar objects. We give secondary importance to general characteristics or the universlity. For instance, when we distinguish one man from the other, we consider them in particulars, but the general nature of man as such remains secondary. Similarly, when we look at objects from the point of view of generality as belonging to a class, its special characteristics or differentia remain secondary, although they are there in the objects. When we consider two different men as man, we make the distinguishing feature of the two men, as secondary. Naigamanaya is concerned with the synthetic approach to the problem of understanding the nature of the object and its qualities, the relational activity and the agent of the activity. The two aspects like the substance and activity, the relation and the objects of relation and activity and the objects of activity, have both the aspects of identity and difference. From a particular point of view, they can be considered as identical, because there is no absolute difference between the substance and its qualities etc. But from another point of view, i. e., from the point of view of looking at objects on the basis of distinctions and particularity, the differences are emphasised. In these cases, when the identity is emphasised differences are looked as 1 (a) Tattvarthabhasya 1, 35. (b) Nayakarnika (c) Anuyogadvara sutra tika. 2 Syalvalinanjari, sloka 14th tika

Page #326
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 305 secondary and while the differences are emphasised, identity is considered as secondary. This is the cardinal aspect of Naigamanaya. Akalarika says that when one considers identity (abheda) as primary, difference (bheda) is considered to be secondary. Similarly, while emphasising difference, identity is considered to be secondary. This is the main presumption of Naigamanaya. For instance, the object and its qualities are intimately related to each other. They cannot be considered as apart. Jiva has its attributes and happiness is one of its attributes. When we say jiva is happy, sometimes there is the primacy of the identity of jiva and happiness. The difference Letween the jiva and happiness is also emphasised, but happiness here becomes secondary. To comprehend both the aspects in their primary and secondary forms is the function of Naigamanaya. It may atso be noted that if the emphasis is given on oneness, then the diversity or manyness is secondary in its importance. Sometimes, identity gains primary importance and sometimes difference is emphasised upon. There is a distinction between Naigamanaya and the synthetic comprehensive approach of looking at a thing which may be called sakaladesa. In the sakaladesa, all the attributes are considered equally important and it gives a synthetic approach. But in Naigananaya, prominence is given to substance sometimes, and at other times its attributes gain secondary importance. Particularity is looked at from the relative point of view and the distinctions and entity are emphasised with the relative prominence. In the phenomenal approach to the understanding of the nature of a thing, naigamanaya gives importance to a relative appreciation of generality and particularity. The generality is a unifying characteristic while particularity presents the differentia. For instance, if a hundred wrist watches were considered to be wrist watches, in this the generalty is primary. But if each wrist watch is taken by individuals recognising it as his own, here particularity or its differentia or the special characteristics of the object as an individual object is emphasised. Thus both the aspects are present. The emphasis is mental and it depends upon the point of view that we take at a particular time. 1. Laghiyastraya 2, 5, 39

Page #327
306 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY When we again take up two individual men as distinct with their personality, we emphasise the particularity and the difference although the generality is secondary. But if we consider the two individual men as men essentially, we give importance to the generality particularity. If one is asked where he stays, he might reply that he stays in the world. If he is further asked to specify, he might go on partcularising by stating that he stays in Jambudvipa, in Bharatavarsa, in Rajasthan, in a particular lane in Udaipur and or in a particular room in a house in a lane in the Udaipur city. If he is still asked to further specify the particular location, he would say, "I live in my body". In this way, with reference to the habitation or residence, naigamanaya presents the specific characteristic in light of generality. Progressively, he goes on particularising the place of residence. The previous statements are more general than the succeeding statements.? Some philosophers have referred the function of naigamanaya to the purpose or the end which an action or an object implies, 9 It has reference to the purpose of action. A man who is going to a forest with an axe to cut the wood is asked what he is doing and he would reply he is cooking. This statement has a reference to the object or the purpose for which an action is being done.3 This is the point of the naigama. Naigamanaya is expressed in three forms : (1) Bhuta Naigama (2) Bhavisya Naigama (3) Vartamana Naigama. To impose the characteristic of the present tense to the past incident or a thing, is called bhuta naigama. On the Dewali festival day, we say, to-day Bhagawana Mahavira attained salvation. Though 2500 years before Bhagavana Mahavira attained nirvana, but in this, we impose the present tense to an incident which happened more than 2500 years ago. Bhavisya naigama imposes the present tense to a future incident. If a person is to attain kevalajnana, we say that he attains nirvana after a specific period. The Vartamana Naigama refers to the imposition of the present tense to 1 Haribhadriyaversyakatippane, nayadhikara. 2 Tattvartha Rajavartika 1, 35, 2 3 Haribhadriyavasyakatippane nayadhikara.

Page #328
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 307 an activity which has been started, but which has yet to be completed. For instance, if one starts preparing bread and if he were asked : what have you prepared ? she would say, 'I have prepared bread', although the bread is yet to be prepared and it is in the process of being prepared. Here we are imposing present perfect tense on the action that is yet to be completed. Naigamanaya is of three types.? :(1) Dravya Naigama, (2) Paryaya Naigama and (3) Dravya-Paryaya Naigama. The functions of these three are: (1) to apprehend two objects (2) to apprehend two conditions and (3) to apprehend one thing and one condition respectively. Naigamanaya expresses the Anekanta point of view. According to the Jajnas, the one and the many are equally real. Without the one, many cannot exist, and the many have reference to the one. The concept of cow (cowness) is the one referring to the many individual cows. Similarly, the concept of the animal is common to the cows and other animals. From the point of view of the concept of the substance, all animals and inanimate objects have reference to that one concept. Similaraly, existence is the one concept which refers to all that exists. The emphasis on the one or the many is a matter which has relation to the concept or is the intellectual construction. The unity and diversity are facts of life. The universe exists with its rich diversity. The diversity as considered from the point of multiplicity is a fact of life, which may express contrary qualities. The universe is constituted of the living and the non-living. From the point of view of looking at the universe as cetana the universe may be considered as one, although there are many forms of consciousness. From the point of view of consciousness and the unconsciousness there would be distinctions, but considered from the points of view of substantiality and inter activity, the diversity has one common element. Similarly, considered from different points of view, the on and the many are relational terms. Each refers to the other. Therefore, the Jainas said, the one and many are equally real. 1 Tattvarthaslokavartika, p. 269-270.

Page #329
308 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY S NAIGAMABHASA (FALLACY OF NAIGAMANAYA) Naigamabhasa is a fallacy which arises out of the mis-interpretation of Naigamanaya. Naigamabhasa consists in giving primary emphasis on the distinctions between the substance and its qualities, activities and the object of activities as absolute distinctions. 'But the object and its qualities and the action and the agent of activities cannot be distinguished in the absolute sense. If they were absolutely different then the relation of inference between the object and its qualities cannot be real. Therefore, the relation between the object and its qualities have to be considered a relational and equally real. The Nyaya-Vaisesika considers the object and its attribute as denoting essentially difference. That would be naigamabhasa. The Sankhya philosophers have considered knowledge and happiness which are qualities of the self as different from the self. According to the Sankhya philosophers, knowledge '(jnana) and bappiness (sukha) are inherently related to the tri-attributal (tri-gunatmaka pra. krti). They come out of Prakrti and also submerge in it. The self (purusa) due to contact with the prakrti believes that knowledge and happiness are experienced by him. But these experiences belong to the buddhi (intellect) which reflects the states due to its contact with praksti and its attributes. Intellect is also not the inherent essence of the self. In this way, the Sankhya philosophers consider knowledge, happiness and the self as distinct. This is Naigamabhasa, because really there is no difference between the self and the knowledge. Wherever there is self, there is knowledge.1 SANGRAHANAYA (SYNTHETIC POINT OF VIEW) Sangrahanaya is the synthetic point of view which seeks to find unity in diversity. It aims at finding out the common element in many objects. Every object is the synthesis of many qualities-generality and the particularity. It is the synthesis of the unity and the diversity. And to find out the unity in the diversity is the function of Sangrahanaya. Sangrahanaya seeks to establish the common point 1 Acaranga--je vinnaya se aya, je aya se vinnaya. 2 (a) Tattvarthabhasya 1,35 (b) Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 13

Page #330
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 309 between objects and bring them together as belonging to one category, although they have many differences, excepting the one characteristic of existence. To seek the general among the particulars is the object of sangrahanaya.1 Vedanta and the Sankhya darsanas look at reality from the synthetic point of view (sangrahanaya). Sangrahanaya seeks to find reality as one without distinction.2 Sangrahanaya finds unity and oneness in numerous modes of an object. Similarly, it finds the one common point in the many objects due to the similarities. According to the sangrahanaya the one is real, the substance is real and the modes cannot exist without the substance. The sangrahanaya is of two types : (1) 'parasangraha' and (2) 'aparasangraha. Parasangraha aims at finding out the oneness of the reality from its diversity in the world. And a parasangraha seeks to find the unity and the oneness in an object from its numerous modes. From the points of view of attributes it seeks to find out the common element among the many attributes. It finds out the 'cowness' from the all the cows. Similarly, amidst the many individual men, the concept of the man in general is presented. The limit of the aparasangrahanaya is up to the attainment of the unity in this world amidst diversity. This common point between the six dravyas has a reference to the aparasangrahanaya and the common point is referred to as apara-samanya. "It is the phenomenal generalty"? This leads to the conception of substance (dravya). It expresses the common characteristics of dravyatva in the sixsubstances. 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sangraha slokak Anuyogadvara Laghiyastraya sloka 32 Prainananayatattvaloka 7, 14 Ibid 7, 15 Ibid 7, 19 Ibid 7, 20.

Page #331
310 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 1.3 SANGRAHABHASA (FALLACY OF SANGRAHANAYA) Parasangrahanaya refers to the concept of the oneness as the ultimate reality and parasangrahanayabhasa also refers the ultimate oneness of the reality. But the difference between the two is parasangrahanaya does not deny the diversity and distinction in the phenomenal objects. But parasangrahanayabhasa denies the reality of the diversity of the phenomenal object. Hence it is called the nayabhasa. It emphasises the reality of the absolute which is one and the multiplicity as an appearance. Vedanta darsana is the example of parasangrahanayabhasa because it posits the reality of the absolute Brahman and considers the phenomenal world of diversity as an appearance. Aparasangrahanaya accepts the reality of the general concepts like substance etc. And it does not deny the distinctions between the substances like dharmadravya etc. But aparasangrahanayabhasa denies the reality of the distinctions between the substances. VYAVAHARANAYA (PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW) Vyavaharanaya is the practical point of view. It is the analytic point of view. It can be considered to be an empirical approach to the problems of grasping the object from the synthetic point.1 'Vyavaharanaya analyses the different aspects of the objects in a scientific way and it helps in understanding the phenomenal world. The sangrahanaya grasps the generality, the rjusutranaya looks at the moments and not to the continuum while the vya* vaharanaya attempts to understand the coherent relation between the substance and its attributes, general and the particular and also to the empirical significance of understanding the object. The general is comprehended through its specific nature. Therefore, this is called the practical point of view or the empirical point of view. In other words vyavaharanaya comprehends reality from the 1 (a) Tattvartha Rajayartika 1, 33, 6 (b) Tattvarthaslokavartika p. 271 (c) Laghiyastraya karika 42 and 70

Page #332
311 practical and the commonsense point of view.1 A thing can be understood in respect of its substance and its modifications. With reference to the substance, it has its forms like the matter (pudgala), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), akasa (space) and kala (time). With reference to the modifications as substance, we find various classifications of the jiva substances, like the siddha jivas and the samsari jivas. These classifications may be based on different principles like the presence of the attributes in different degrees at a particular time or the evolutionary process wherein the attributes are presented in a chronological order. This naya aims at analysing the nature of the object for practical purpose. When we know an object like a pot (ghata), we are more concerned with understanding the nature of the object in its modifications and attributes rather than in its generality i. e., potness or the pot in general (ghatatva). Similarly, if a patient is to be given medicine, we do not merely say that the medicine should be given, but we specify a particular medicine. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Vyavaharanaya is practical in outlook. Without its pragmatic nature for the empirical world vyavaharanaya has no value. Vyavaharanaya is of two types: (1) samanya bhedaka wherein we are concerned with presenting the general nature of the object. For example, in describing the dravya we try to present the distinction between the jiva dravya and ajiva drava (2) visesa bhedaka; gives the analysis of the specific nature of a thing and makes distinctions in the various types of the thing on the basis of differentia. For example, samsari jivas gie classified into naraki (living in hell), tiryak (lower animals), manusya (human beings) and deva (heavenly beings). This kind of distinction on the basis of specific nature of the object continues to be made till we reach the minimal point where we get the individual only and not a type of species. Below this point, there would be no distinction possible. The main use of this naya is to understand the phenomenal world in its details. It is consistent with the practical outlook of life. 1 Tattvarthabhasya 1, 35 2 Visesavasyakabhasyavrtti 3 Laghiyastraya 3, 6, 70

Page #333
312 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Vyavahara drsti (practical point of view) does not merely grasp the substance, but it also presents the particular distinctions of the object for the sake of understanding the nature of the object. In this sense, we can say although its function is analytic, it is not restricted to the analysis of modes only. It is more concerned with the presentation of a thing with its specific attributes and modes. Therefore, it is referred to as dravyarthika naya (concerning dravya). Naigama, sangraha and vyavahara nayas are forms of dravyarthika nayas.1 5 VYAVAHARANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF VYAVAHARANAYA) The point of view which is not consistent with the practical point of view and which presents a picture contrary the existing nature of the object is called vyavaharanayabhasa. It is a fallacy concerning vyavaharanaya.? Vyavaharanaya makes a distinction between substance (dravya) and its modifications (paryayas). But this distinction is not absolute. If the distinction were to be considered as absolute and not relative then it becomes inconsistent with the presenation of the object as it is. And that is vyavaharanayabhasa. Carvaka darsa make a distinction between substance and its modifications. It posits reality as consisting of the modes of the four elements-earth, water, fire, and air and nothing else. Consciousness also is a product of the modes of these elements i. e., due to the metabolic changes of the body. This is vyavaharanayabhasa. 5 RJUSUTRANAYA Rjustranaya is restricted to the understanding of the modes and he states of the momentary present, and not as a continuum. It looks at the object as a modification of the momentary present. The past modifications are destroyed, the future modifications are yet to come; the two cannot be comprehended. What we can get to know is the momentary present and the states and events in the present moment. Attempt to know the past modes or the future ones would be futile 1 2 3 4 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 6. Tattvarthaslokavartika p. 271 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 25 Pramananayatartvaloka 7, 26

Page #334
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 313 like seeing the sky-flower. It is not an object, it is only the state of the object in a particular moment. The object is merely an aggregate of the states in the present moment. According to the rjusutranaya, the object is from the real point of view not an object at all. It is only a state. When I say-I am happy, it only expresses the present state of my being Rjusutranaya gives importance to such modifications of the present moment, and considers that what is real is to be found in the present. For instance, the pleasure of the present moment and the possession of the wealth of the present moment are important and not their past and the future states. This does not mean that rjusutranava gives absolute emphasis on the present moment only. It only gives primary importance although the past and the future states are considered as secondary. It only says that they have no practical value, According to the rjusutranaya every state of an object is different. The first and second states and others are distinguishable. The state of an object at a particular moment lasts only for that moment. Next moment, it is different. In analysing the statement "the crow is black" rjusutranaya states that the crow is a crow and blackness is blackness. They are two different states. If both were considered as identical then the cuckoo and other black animals would be crow. The blackness of the crow does not exhaust the states of the crow, because it s other states present at the moment, like-its possession of blood. flesh, bone etc., which are of different colours, then how can we say that the crow is of black colour only. According to this naya a potter (kumbhakara) would not be con. sidered as a potter as long as he is engaged in preparing some other articles like the umbrella or a palanquin, but the moment he is engaged in preparing the pot, he may be called the potter. We cannot say that the wood is burning, because the act of burning requires a series of numerous moments. Innumerable moments are necessary in the process of burning. The moment the wood burns. it is no longer wood, it would have been destroyed as the wood and turned into coal. Again all wood is not burning, some of it is still un 1 (a) Anuyogadvara (6) Tattvarthabhasya 1, 35

Page #335
314 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY burnt. One can easily see that in the process of burning some portion of firewood is burnt, some is burning and still some of it is not burning. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the wood is burning. The wood can be described as burning and as not burning, as burning it is not wood and as wood it is not burning. The rjusutranaya in its suble form would also maintain that in the act of eating, we are not eating at all. Because the act of eating involves the series of moment, and each moment presents a particular action. When we take food in the hand in a particular moment, it is not eating. Next moment we keep it in the mouth, it is also an act in a particular moment and when we gulp the food it is not eating at all. The rjusutranaya does not accept the continuum of the actions in different moments. It looks at the object at a particular moment. It is not very much relevant for understanding the nature of the object from the practical point. The comprehension of the nature of objects from the practical point is possible from naigama and vyavahara nayas. In the rjusutra naya primary emphasis is given on modifications and that too of the moments, although there is the implicit acceptance of the substance which has modifications. But this is secondary. Rjusutranya has two forms (1) Suksma rjusutranaya and (2) sthula rjusutranaya. The suksma rjusutranaya comprehends the state of the object at a particular moment only, but the sthula rjusutranaya looks at the state of the object as it is presented in the series of moments constituting the present.? Akalanka has given copious examples of rjusutranaya. RJUSUTRANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF RJUSUTRANAYA) Rjusutranaya gives primary importance to the modifications (paryayas) considering the substance (dravya) secondary; but the rjusutranayabhasa (fallacy of rjusutranya) totally neglects the substance and considers the modifications the only redity. 8 The Buddhistic ksankavada is a clear example of the fallacy of 1 Nayacakra. 2 Tattvartha Rajavartika, p. 96-97. 3 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 30.

Page #336
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 315 rjusutranaya, because according to Buddhists, there is no existence of substance, only the modifications remain. Even in the state of salvation the continuance of consciousness extinguishes like a lamp. Thus it totally exhausts. And according to their view the substance of consciousness finally comes to an end. SABDANAYA !!! Sabdanaya has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the meaning of the word in the context of time, gender, number, case and prefixes that are attached to the word. According to various contexts of time, gender, number, etc, the meaning of the word changes. The aim of this naya is to determine the exact meaning of the word.2 This naya is primarily concerned with the linguistic part of the expression of thought. According to this naya, the meaning of the word is determined by its function, the use in the various contexts with reference to the number, gender and the prefixes etc. When we say the mountain Meru was, is and will remain, it has a reference to the time element in the expression of the word. But the difference in each expression emphasises the difference in the contexts of time, the past, the present and future and accordingly in the object as well. It recognises the difference in the state of mountion Meru, of present, past and future time. We may determine the meaning of the word with reference to the modifications of the word. When we say that he prepares the pot and the pot a contains water; in these statements the meanings emphasise different contexts with reference to the potter, and the function of the pot. Three genders of the word give different meanings. A word used in a masculine gender will have a different meaning from the same word used in feminine gender. The word tatah, tati and tatam have different meanings. 1 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 31. 2 (a) Laghiyastraya sloka 44. (b) Nyayakumudacandra, p. 794. (c) Tattvarthaslokavartika p. 272, 273. (d) Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 32. 3 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 33.

Page #337
316 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY With reference to the prefixes the words will have different meanings also. Prefixes 'a', 'vi', 'pra' and sam' for the word hara will give different meanings. Ahara means food, vihara is walking about, prahara is striking and samhara is destruction. Due to the different prefixes, words will have different meanings. Science of language presents innumerable details regarding the meaning and function of the word. The linguistics is a developing science and the Sabdanaya is the root cause of this development. It incorporates all the traditions which are responsible for the development of linguistic science. SABDANAYABHASA (FALLACY OF SABDANAYA) Sabdanayabhasa is a fallacy which consists in maintaining that the meaning of the word is not affected by the contextual situations and the different prefixes. Reference to different points of time may bring different modifications and these modifications have to be recognised as facts. But the sabdanayabhasa does not recognise this important fact that there is the possibility of changes in the meaning due to contextual changes. To emphasise and retain the same meaning even if the contextual emphasis and references are changed is called sabdanayabhasa.1 H-3 SAMABHIRUDHANAYA Samabhirudhanaya refers to the meaning of the word, within the contexts of its etymological analysis. It goes to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its origin. The evolution of the word may lead to various changes in the meaning. However, the origin of the word needs to be considered for understanding the exact meaning of the word. In the varied modifications of the word it would be necessary to understand the stages of the modifications, and the modifications will show different meanings. To show this, is the function of samabhirudhanaya. Samabhirudhanaya accepts the difference among the synonyms of the same word. In the sabdnaya we try to understand the meaning of the word with reference to its function 1 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 34 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 37

Page #338
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY in context of the number, the gender and the prefix, etc. But samabhirudhanaya is concerned with analysing the etymology of the word and on the basis of this analysis it distinguishes the meanings of the same word due to its varied modifications in different contexts, may there be no difference of number, gender etc.1 Words like Indra, Sakra, and Purandara are referred to the same person Indra. But they have different meanings.2 Words like Raja and Nrpa may apply to the same man, but they have different meanings with reference to the etymology of the words. Raja is one who shines and Nrpa is one who rules. Samabhirudhanaya, has given importance to the etymological sense of the word. On the basis of the roots of the word, its meaning differs. The words Indra and Sakra, although applicable to the same person, do not signify the same meaning. In the sabdanaya we do not make a distinction in the meaning of the word in the same gender, but samabhirudhanaya finds differences in the meaning of the same word with reference to its roots and its variations in modifications. The dictionary gives different meanings of the same word, but really speaking the same meanings of the different equivalents of the word about an object do not mean the same thing. They have different shades o meanings due to the contexts of the origin of the word. For example, the word cow (go) has eleven different meanings, but these different meanings are only expressions of different senses due to the different contexts of the origin. In this sense the word has the force of meaning with reference to the agent as well as the expression of the word by the agent. These differences in the meaning can be considered as potency of the word. In this way, samabhirudhanaya refers to the distinctions in the meaning of the word with reference to its varied modifications. 317 In the Jaina literature we talk of the universal spheres which have their galaxies. But in the scientific langauge we say that the universe consists of numerous stellar systems. Samabhirudhanaya gives 1 Slokavartika 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 37 3 Dr. Mahendrakumar Jain-Jaina darsana, p. 463-64 (Hindi)

Page #339
318 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY definite meaning of the term with reference to its roots although the different words are applicable to the same object. It is necessary to have a scientific study of the etymological function of the word. So this naya is very much useful in the scientific analysis of any object. In a general sense the words like ghata, kuta or kumbha refer to the same object i. e. the pot. But each word has different meanings, with reference to its roots. Ghata refers to that which contains, kuta refers to that which has uneven form. Both the words are etymologically different.1 With a view to avoiding confusion in the words it would be necessary to study the etymological s<Page #340
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 319 present meaning of the word when the word is actually expressed is the significant factor in evambhutanaya. We call Indra as Indra only when he is sitting on the throne. When he is not sitting on the throne he need not be called Indra. The name Purandara would be meaningful when Indra is in the act of destroying the town. We can call him sakra when he exhibits his powers. The meaning of the evambhutanaya has reference not so much to the individual as a name, but the name is applicable and is relevant in the present context of its function of meaning. A pujari (priest) would be called a priest and the name of the priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshipping the deity. This naya visualises the expression of powers and qualities at the present moment. Evambhutanayabhasa : (fallacy of evambhutanaya) Evambhutanayabhasa is a fallacy which consists in negating the relevance of the present function and its etymological meaning of a word. If a word were to be used in its etymological sense only sometimes the meaning may be relevant and sometimes the meaning may not be relevant, because its present function of the word may not connote the etymological sense. But to negate the present function only and trace it to the etymological sense and to apply to the individual is the fallacy called Evambhutanayabhasa.2 Evambhutanaya has reference to the meaning traceable to the etymological sense, but applicable to the present function. In this sense, to connote the general meaning of the word without reference to the present function would lead to the fallacy of evambhutana ya.3 To call a broken pot a pot, would lead to this fallacy, because the etymological sense of the pot (ghata) would be that which holds or which contains, but the broken pot, as it is broken, cannot contain or hold anything. Therefore, in the present context, it should not be called ghata. Otherwise, similar meaning will have to be applied to the objects which have ceased to function, as in the case of the cloth that is destroyed. If the word has its mean 1 Dravyanuyogatarkana 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 7, 42 3 Nayopadesa 39

Page #341
320 ing without reference to its function then any name would be appropriate to any object with any function. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict the meaning of the word to its function in the present context. Oherwise it loses its potency. +3 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF NAYAS We have considered the n yas in their different aspects from the Naigamanaya to Evambhutanaya. As we proceed from Naigamanaya to Evambhutanaya the scope of the meaning becomes restricted and narrower at every stage.1 Naigamanaya is wider in its content because it embraces the generality and particularity, and unity and diversity. In this naya sometimes generality is given primary importance and particularity becomes secondary. Sometimes particularity is comprehended with greater emphasis and generality becomes less important. Sangrahanaya is less comprehensive than naigamanaya because it grasps only the general, the unity and not the diversity. The vyavaharanaya is less extensive and narrower than sangrahanaya, because it refers to the particularity and it is analytic only. Rjusutranaya is restricted to a still narrower field, because it limits its understanding to the momentary present. It is more concerned with the modifications and not with the substance which has modifications. Sabdanaya is still narrower than rjusutranaya in the sense that it is concerned with the understanding of the meaning of the word of the moment. Samabhirudhanaya narrows down its scope still further, because it refers to the root of the word and presents the etymological sense. Then we come to the limited field of application of the point of view in the evambhutanaya. It refers to the meaning of the word in the present context and does not look before and after. There is a gradual narrowing down of the scope and the content of the naya from the naigama to the evambhuta. Because of this, the nayas in their various aspects have reference to each other and are related to each other in presenting the varied picture of the object in its content and meaning. 1 Tattvartharajavartika 1, 36.

Page #342
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 321 METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF NAYA 1 4.3 So far, we have studied the logical and epistemological interpretations or the concept of naya. Now, we may now try to understand the metaphysical implications and content of the concept or naya. From the metaphysical point of view, naya can be distinguished into two types: (1) Niscayanaya (the ultimate point of view) and (2) vyavaharanaya (the phenomenal point of view). Niscayanaya presents the picture of the object and its meaning from the ultimate point of view. We may call it the noumenal point of view, because reality can be looked at from the phenomenal and noumenal point of view. The noumenal point of view, goes to the source of the reality and finds out the ultimate meaning of reality. Vyavaharanaya is the phenomenal point of view, it is analytical in nature and it presents the picture of the object in its relation to other objects. It is relational in its aspect. Vyavaharanaya is sometimes considered to be secondary to the niscayanaya. It is called upa-naya also. Acarya Kundakunda says vyavahara naya is "abhutartha" (the relational thought) and niscayanaya refers to the bhutartha in the sense it is ultimate and pure (suddha).1 Niscayanaya, being suddhanaya, grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while vyavaharanaya is practical in its approach, and tries to understand the phenomenal nature of reality. In the Jaina Agamic literature, there is distinction of the niscaya and vyavaharanaya whose functions are to look at reality from two points of view. i, e., from the ultimate and the practical points of view, just as in the advaita philosophy, we have the ultimate and the practical points of view which are referred to as "Paramarthika and vayvaharika drsti". The Buddhist mention the paramartha and samvrtta points of view. The Upanisads mention the sthula and the suksmadrsti. But there is difference between the Jaina approach to the problems and the approaches of the other absolutistic philosophies. Jainas look at reality from the niscayanaya in order to find out the real nature of the object, with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to the distinctions and paryayas. But they do 1 Samayas ara gatha 11

Page #343
322 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY not deny reality of the distinctions and the paryayas, as do the Vedantins in considering the external world as an appearance. In the Buddhistic literature, a distinction has been made between paramartha satya (ultimate truth) and lokasamvrtti satya (the practical truth). What the Buddhist in the Vijnanavada and the Sunyavada call the paramartha satya and the Vedantins call the paramarthika drsti, the Jainas call it the bhutarthanaya or the niscayanaya. Vyavaharanaya has been distinguished into two types : (1) sad. bhuta vyavaharanaya and (2) asadbhutavyavaharanaya. Sadbhutayyavaharanaya refers to the analysis of substance and its qualities while describing a thing. This naya has two forms: (a) upacariti sadbhuta and (b) anupacarita sadbhuta. That vyavahara naya which grasps the nature of the objects with reference to its substance and its attributes in the relational and conditional form is called upacarita sadbhutavy:avahara naya. And the naya or a point of view which tries to understand the relation between substance and its attributes without their being essentially related, is called Anupcarita sadbhuta vyavaharanaya. Matijnana and srutajnana are attributes of jiva from the practical point of view. In the case of matijnana conditioned by empirical adjuncts due to the encrustations of karma is the jiva. It is considered to be a phenomenal approach to the understanding of the jnana, because it is not pure and free jnana. It is called upacarita. In the case of anupacarita sadbhuta vyavaharanaya there is the awareness of the distinction between the object and attributes. The soul and its attribute of jana are considered to be distinct and without any conditioning due to freedom from karma. Kevalajnana is the pure jnana of the soul and it is unconditioned. Kevalajnana is free from impurities and passions. In this, we are aware of the distinction between the substance and its attributes. Asadbhutayyayaharanaya can also be distinguished into two forms as (1) upacarita and(2) anupacarita. Anu pacurita asadhuta vyavaharanaya tries to understand the relation between the substance and its attributes as in the case of the body and the jiva. The relation is not inhe 1 Madhyamikakarika, aryasatyapariksa, sl. 8.

Page #344
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 323 rent in the jiva, but it is accidental due to conjunction. But this conjunction is inseparable as long as the empirical'life lasts. Therefore it is anupacarita. But upacarita asadbhuta vyayaharanaya understands the distinction between the substance and its attributes in the relation of accidents which are primarily separable as, in the case of Devadatta and his wealth. Relation between the Devadatta and his wealth is only acciden. tal and also separable. This type of comprehending the relation is upacarita asadbhuta vyavaharanaya. Niscaya naya is the pure point of view. It is the ultimate point of view. It is the noumenal point of view. In this, there is the fuller understanding of the distinction between the substance and its attributes. The self is known in its pure form and its qualities are considered to be distinct, though accidentally related. They are not the essence of the soul. For example, the effective and connotive states are the modifications which arise out of knowledge, feeling and connotation. These are not inherently related to the soul, although consicousness is the essence of the soul. This type of an attitude gives a clear and a synoptic view of the relation of the soul and its attributes. And there is a clear awareness that the self is not these attributes. From the noumenal point of view, self is seen not bound and it is also apprehended that the bondage of the self is not eternal. The self is seen as pure and perfect without the impurities of the karmic particles. The mind, body and the sense organs are considered as separate although they are related to the embodied soul. But this relation is not eternal. From the practical point of view the self appears to be bound and as having a shape. But from the niscaya point of view the self is pure and perfect and is uncontaminated, with the karmic matter. The yyavaharanaya is analytic and tries to find out the distinctions and differences, but suddhanaya or niscayanaya looks at the object in its pure nature and the fundamental aspect of the object. Niscayanaya comprehends the pure nature of the self as distinguished from its attributes and modifications, which are mainly looked at from the practical point of view. Vyavaharanaya is the point of distinction,

Page #345
324 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY while niscayanaya aims at getting the pure point of view of non-distinctions. When we say that knowledge is the essence of the Atman, we are saying this from the noumenal point of view. But when we say that knowledge is the quality of the soul, we are using the practical point of view. In these expressions, the Atman is considered to be the substance having attributes and knowledge is the attribute possessed by the Atman. This relation of the Atman and knowledge as substance and attributes is to be considered not as a relation of dependence, but as of inherence. When we consider the relation of the ghee that is in the pot and the pot, the relation is of conjunction because the two objects are separable. But when we consider the relation of jnana (knowledge) and the self there is the relation of inherence. According to Jainas, the relation between the substance and quality is neither that of exclusive difference nor of exclusive identity. It is the relation comprising of difference and identity. The attribute of knowledge cannot exist without the Atman. This understanding is due to sadbhutavyavaharanaya. In order to understand the distinction between niscaya and the vyavaharanaya, it is necessary to analyse the spatial concept of relation as in the case of jiva and the karmic particles. The jiva and the karmic particles are to be found in space. Both of them are to be found in the same space. This is the practical point of view. From the noumenal point of view each object lives in its spatial position and not in the spatial position of others. The Atman is in itself. Karma has its own spatial position. But from the practical point of view, we say that the bound soul is to be found in conjunction with the karmic particles in the same spatial position, just as from the practical point of view we say, when we mix water and milk, that it is milk. We do not make a distinction between water and milk from the point of view of spatial position. But from the real point of view, water is water and milk is milk. They are distinct. Similarly, the Atman and the karmic particles are considered to be together from the practical point of view. But in reality, they are distinct, as also their nature is distinct.

Page #346
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 325 It should be noted that the distinction made between the naigama and the other nayas and vyavahara and niscayanaya has been made with the purpose of emphasising the practical and the spiritual point of view. Naigama and other nayas are meant to analyse the nature of the object and to understand their implications in the empirical world. But the purpose of distinction between vyavahara and niscaya is to lead one to the spiritual world in understanding the real nature of the self. It aims at leading us from the facts to reality, from the world to the realisation of moksa. PRAMANA AND NAYA !!.? It was considered in the previous stages that naya is the point of view that a person takes in knowing the objects.1 It apprehends one specific feature of the object, but pramana has no such distinction of partial understanding of the objects in relation to its other aspects. It comprehends the object in its fullness. Pramana comprehends the nature of the pot (ghata) in all its aspects. But naya grasps its nature in one of its aspects. In this sense, it is partial comprehension. Pramana does not make a distinction between substance and its attributes but it grasps the object in its entirety. But Naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and gives emphasis on a particular aspect of the object. But both naya and pramana are forms of knowledge. We can say that pramana is sakaladesa (comprehensive and full), but naya is vikaladesa (partial). The comprehensive understanding of the object gives a synthetic picture of the object in all its asjects of substance in relation of its attributes. It is a comprehensive knowledge. Naya being vikaladesa need not however be considered as purely pratical and incomplete knowledge, because it looks at the object from a particular point of view and presents the picture of the object in some aspects, although the awareness of other aspects is in the background and is not ignored. Both the sakaladesa and the vikaladesa approaches to the understanding of nature of the object are equally important and complementary to each other. Both of 1 (a) Laghiyastraya, sl. 53, Akalanka (b) Siddhiviniscaya, tika p. 517, Akalanka (c) Nyayavatara tika 29, Siddhassigani.

Page #347
326 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY them are concerned with grasping the nature of the object in relation to its attributes. Sakaladesa grasps the objects with all its attributes while in vikaladesa it is restricted to the apprehension of one parti. cular quality. Sakaladesa may be considered to be the expression of the Syadvada, while vikaladesu expresses naya.? 2.3 DRAVYARTHIKA AND PARYAYARTHIKA POINTS OF VIEW Dravyarthika and paryayarthika drsti refers to the point of view of substance and that of modes. Dravyarthika drsti is a comprehensive point of view. It grasps the generality without ignoring the particularity of the modes. Paryayarthika drsti is analytic and is mainly concerned with the distinctions of the modes of an object. Acarya Siddhasena says that in the teachings of Mahalira we find a synthesis of dravyarthika and paryayarthika points of view. All other points of view are forms of these two points of view.2 When Mahavira was asked whether jiva residing in hell is eternal or noneternal, he said from the dravyarihika point of view jiva is eternal, but from the point of view of its modes existing in this world (paryayarthika or vyucchitti naya) the jiva is non-eternal.3 Dravyarthikad rsti is also called avyucchitti naya. From the point of view of substance (dravyarthika) every substance is permanent with its modes. From 'the point of view of the modes the object is impermanent, because here we look at the object from the points of view of changing modes. The dravyarthikanaya presents an outlook of comprehension and non-difference, while paryayarthika naya emphasises distinction and difference. In the Bhagawati sutra the word bhavarthika has been used in place of paryayarthika. DRAVYARTHIKA AND PRADESARTHIKA DRSTI Drayyarthika drsti refers to the point of view of substance, while pradesarthika drsti looks at the objects in its different modes and its analysis in its spatial distinctions. The distinction between paryaya and pradesa can be considered in respect the modes and the i Laghiyastraya 3, 6, 62. 2 Sanmati prakarana 1, 3. 3 Bhagavati 7, 2, 279. 4 Bhagavati 18, 10/25, 3/25, 4.

Page #348
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 327 spatial points. Paryaya refers to the different modes of an object, while pradega refers to the different parts of an object occupying the different spatial positions. A pradesa is the point of space occupied by the smallest point of pudgala (matter). According to Jainas, matter occupies different points of space and there is no definiteness about this. But the other substance like, dharma, adharma, lokakasa d jiva occupy determined space points. But in the case of matter there are variations according t) the nature of the aggregates of the atoms coming together. Mahavira gave the analysis of substance from the point of view of spatial positions also. He said from the point of view of substance, modes, pradesa and from the points of view of qualities, and bringing all these points of view in a synthetic sense "I am one". But from the point of view of paryaya, I am jnana and darsana as two modes. From the point of view of pradesa, I am permanent and is indestructible. From the point of upayoga I am changing (asthira) because I express myself into different mental states. Similarly, I express modes in the past and the present. In this he has used the pradesa drsti for expressing the permanence and indestructibility of the Atman. From the point of view of pudgalapradesa the self is not changeable and is eternal. These in no variation in the Atma pradesa (the spatial point of Atman). Pradesarthika drsti is useful in another way. From the point of view of substance, the object is one, but from the point of view of pridesarihika the object may be looked as many, because it occupies many space points. In the Prajnapana, dharmastikaya is considered to be understood from the drayyad rsti as one, while from the pradesarthika drsti it is many because of its numberless space points. The object which is comparable to other objects from the point of view of substance is not comparable from the point of pradesarthikadrsti, just as the dharma, adharama, and akasa astikayas are considered to be comparable (tulya) from the point of view of pradesarthika as they occupy numberless pradesas. But akasa being anantapradesi, it is incomparable. In this way, the objects may be considered from the i Bhagavati 18, 10.

Page #349
328 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY points of view of dravya and pradesa. They may also be considered as comparable and incomparable with reference to the points of space occupied by the objects. This gives a comprehensive picture of the objects.1 VYAVAHARIKA AND NAISCAYIKA DRSTI Philosophers have discussed about the problem of the reality of the objects. They have faced the question regarding the reality and have asked whether the sense-object is real or that which is beyond the sense experience and which can be gasped only by the intuition (Prajna) is real. The Cchandogya Upanisad presents the view that knowledge which is through intuition is real and that which we get through sense experience is only an appearance. The ultimate reality is one and non-dual. The diversity that we find in the phenomenal world which is known through sense experience is an appearance. But many philosophers held different views. The Carvaka holds that whatever is known to the sense experience is real and all the rest is unreal. The materialists maintain that matter alone is real. Different philosphers have emphasised the effusive reality of either things known to sense experience or reality apprehended through reason or intuition. But the Jaina does not find any contradiction in the assertions made by these philosophers. The Jainas take the stand on the basis of the nayas and on the methodology of syadvada. Reality is complex and it can be looked at from different points of view. The noumenal point of view gives us the ultimate thing of the world. The real is known through intuition and reason. But from the practical point of view of the phenomenal point of view, the things of the world are as much real as the ultimate things known through intuition. There is no contradiction in maintaining realities of both spheres from the different points of view. The practical point of view gives us the picture of reality which is sensible, and could be grasped. The ulimate point of view 1 (a) Prajnapana, pada 3, stra 54-56 (b) Bhagavati 25, 4. Cchandog yopanisad 6, 1, 4, 2

Page #350
329 (niscaya naya) leads us to the comprehension of reality which is the subtle essence of the phenomenal world. Both of them are equally real. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the Bhagavati there is a dialogue between Bhagavana Mahavira and Gautama Ganadhara regarding the different aspects of reality. Gautama asked Mahavira, there are how may colours, smell, taste and touch in treacle. Mahavira said, from the practical point of view it is sweet. But from the real or ultimate point of view it has five colours, two types of small, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. Similarly, Gautama asked the question regarding the qualities of a black-bee. Mahavira said that from the practical point of view the bee is black. But from the real point of view (niscayanaya), it has five colours, two types of smell, five types of tastes and eight types of touch. In this way, Mahavira gave answers to many questions from the practical and the real points of view. It is clear from this, that Mahavira understood that both the practical and the real points of view present the picture of reality which are equally real and valid. They do not contradict each other nor is one less real than the other. ARTHANAYA AND SABDANAYA seven Anuyogadvara, Sthananga3 and Prajnapana1 mention nayas. Among these seven nayas, sabda, samabhirudha, and evambhutanayas belong to the category of sabdanayas.5 Naigama, sangraha, vyavahara and rjusutra nayas have reference to the objects. Therefore, they are called dravyarthikanaya. TYPES OF NAYAS I Acarya Siddhasena maintains that there are as many nayas as there are statements. And there are as many views and theories as there are statements.1 In this sense there are numerous nayas and 1 Bhagavati 18, 9. 2 Anuyogadvara 156. 3 Sthananga 7, 552. 4 Prajnapana 16. 5 Anuyogadvara 148, 6 Sanmati prakarana 3, 47.

Page #351
330 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY they have been variously described. However, the Jainas have attempted the primary ways of the describing a thing and main points of view which are the basis of their description. The dravyanaya and paryayanaya include numerous forms of expressing the nature of a thing and the numerous points of view, although in theory there would be infinite ways of expression. In the agama literature, as well as according to the Digambara tradition,1 seven prominent nayas have been mentioned. Naigama, sangraha, vyavahara, rjusutra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhuta are the seven primary nayas. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara does not consider naigamanaya as an independent naya and he mentioned six nayas. Umasvati has in the earlier part mentioned five nayas: naigama, sangraha, vyavahara rjustutra has been and sabda are the five primary nayas.2 Naigama naya distinguished into two forms: despariksepi and sarvapariksepi. Sabdanaya has three forms: samprata, samabhirudha and evambhuta.3 NAYA AS PRAMANA OR APRAMANA Nayavada is a comprehensive and a special from of thought in the Jaina logic. Every object is looked from the points of view which are nayas. Jinabhadra ksa masramana says that the naya theory pervades the entire Jaina philosophy and thought." Jaina logicians were faced with a question regarding the validity of the nayavada. Is the naya a pramana or not was the primary question. If it were a pramana why are they differently mentioned ? And if it were not a pramana then it would be false knowledge and there is no scope of false knowledge in the philosophical world. The Jaina logicians say that naya is neither pramana nor apramana (not pramana). It is part of the pramana. A drop of water of the ocean can not be considered to be the ocean and also not the non-ocean, but a part of the ocean.5 Similarly, a soldier is neither 1 Tattvartha rajavartika 1, 33. 2 Tattvarthasutra 1, 34. 3 Tattvarthabhasya 1, 34-35, p. 314-315. 4 Visesavasyaka bhasya 5 Tattvarthaslokavarttika 1, 6 Naya Vivarana, sl. 6.

Page #352
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 331 ? an army, nor a non-army; but the part of army. The same argument is true in the case of describing the nayas. Pramana comprehends the nature of the objects in the different aspects, while naya looks at it from a particular point of view. It grasps one aspect of the object. In this sense, naya is the partial presentation of the nature of the object, while pramana is comprehensive in its presentation. But naya does not give false knowledge nor does it deny that the other aspects of knowledge of the nature of the object are true. In this sense it is synoptic in outlook and it is not invaid. SUNAYA AND DURNAYA: RIGHT NAYA AND WRONG NAYA We have seen that pramana comprehends objects in its various aspects and it is exhaustive in its presentation. But naya looks at the object from a particular point of view. However naya does not deny the possibility of looking at the object from other points of view and it accepts that the nature of the object is complex and the presentation from other points of view may also be valid. This is Sunaya, but if the naya for a point of view were to insist that its presentation is only valid and all other presentations from different nayas, are invalid, this is durnaya. We may also say that pramana comprehends the tat, (that) and the atat, while naya grasps only the tat. Naya is concerned with the presentation of 'tat' only. Durnaya has a negative function also. It aims at negating and denying the other aspects of presentation. Umasvati says that Durnaya is one-sided in its approach because it emphasises that the point of view taken by the naya is the only correct point of view and the other points of view are wrong. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara has also stated that Durnaya is a mithya drsti (perversity of attitude) because it is dogmatic in outlook. It asserts the truth of its point of view and rejects the other points of view.2 1 (a) Astasahasri. (b) Umasvatik sta Pancasaka. Sanmati prakarana 1, 21. 2

Page #353
332 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY But in order to understand the nature of the object in all its aspects, it is necessary to accept the presentation of the object in different points of view also. Otherwise, the picture would be one-sided, just as a garland of diamond can be called a garland only when the different individual diamonds are arranged and attached in a systematic way.1 Just as the garland of diamonds depends on its cohesion on the thread that weaves out the diamonds, so also nnyavada weaves out the right attitude and right knowledge (sa'nyagd rsti) and samyagjnana. Acarya Kundakunda says that the one who takes the stand of looking at the things from two different nayas understand the truth of the presentation of the two nayas. He does not reject the other point of view, because he knows that the other point of view has also its value. Everything is complex in its nature, presenting the many facets of its qualities. We cannot describe the entire nature of the objects from one point of view; that would give a partial and inadequate picture of the object. To understand the object in its various facets from different points of view, does not mean that we are presenting different views about the reality. There is no difference of opinion in presenting the different aspects of the objects from different points of view. Such a presentation would give a comprehensive picture of reality and not one-sided picture of reality.3 Everything can be looked at from the point of view of the knowledge about it, expression in words and the nature of the object itself. From the point of view of knowledge, we get different facets of understanding. From the point of view of the objects of knowledge, we can present different variations of the view. For instance, as the universe it is one. On the basis of the distinction between jiva and another jiva it is two. On the distinction of substances, there are six substances. Looked at from the point of view of astikaya, 1 2 3 Sanmati prakarana 1, 22-25. Samayasara 143. Tattvarthabhasya 1, 35.

Page #354
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 333 there are five astikayas. But these distinctions do not present different views, they only present different facets and variations of looking at the reality." UNIFORMITY AND CONTINUITY IN THE JAINA DARSANA'-. The study of different systems of Indian philosophy makes it clear that the Vedic tradition and the Buddhist philosophy present varied, and sometimes conflicting metaphysical theories among themselves. The vedic tradition gives the monistic, the dualistic and also the pluralistic theries of reality. Similarly, the Buddhist philosophy has been presented in various theories often conflicting with each other in their ultimate metaphysical stand-points. For instance, in the Buddhist philosophical systems there are divergent theories of realities like realism, subjective idealism, idealism and even nihilism. The Hsnayana schools of thought like Vaibhasika and Sautantrika presents the realistic approach to the understanding of the universe by positing the dharmas (elements). Mahayana schools of philosophy like vijnana. vada (Yogacara) and Madhyamika present the idealistic stand. The Madhyamika school is said to be nihilistic because according to this school everything is unreal, there is nothing real. The real is the sunya (void), although sunya has been interpreted by some as the absolute which is inexpressible. However, the Buddhist philosophy have a common current of thought expressed in the prthakada (doctrine of momentariness) and madhyamavada (the doctrine of middle path). Thus we find that the Vedic tradition and the Buddbist thought present a variety of philosophical school, very often diverting from each other, even to the point of being conflicting in the case of the realist and idealist schools of Hinayana and Mahayana sects. Similarly the vedic tradition also presents the realistic thought in the NyayaVaisesika and the idealistic stream in the vedanta. Seeing the vast differences in the various sects of vedic and Buddhistic traditions, it is hard to believe that these are the off-shoots of one current. But if we survey the development of the Jaina thought, we find there is uniformity and continuity in the Jaina tradition. There is 1 Jaina Darsana - Dr. Mahendra Kumar Jain, p. 446.

Page #355
334 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY consistency in their approach to philosophical problems. Jainism, realistic in its approach and empiricist in its methodology. The distinction between the syetambara and digambara tradition have shown certain differences which are only superficial pertaining primarily to religious practices. The fundamentals of Jaina philosophy have been accepted by both traditions. For instance, there is unanimity of thought in their acceptance of the doctrines like six substances (saddravya), nine categories (nava padartha) and seven tattvas (principles) and pancastikaya (five dimentional substances). This unanimity and consistency in the Jaina tradition has been possible due to the fundamental outlook of the Jainas expressed in the nayavada and syadvada. The nayavada gives scope for catholicity of outlook. It asserts that others may also be right and the rightness of each point of view is partial and it adds to the comprehensive picture of reality. In this sense, the Jainas have been tolerant in accepting the various points of view in order to present a coherent picture of reality. The nayavada and syadvada express the spi it of tolerance. They symboli e intellectual non-violence.

Page #356
JNANAVADA: A Study (THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE) THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SELF AND THE KNOWLEDGE The self and the knowledge are related to each other, not in any external way, but the relation is inherent. It is samavayi (inherent relation) and not conjunction, (samyoga) as external elements. Jnana is not external to self, it is the essential characteristic of the self. Self has Jnana and self cannot exist without Jnana, but this relation need not be construed as a relation of a thing and its quality in the sense that the Nyaya-Vaisesika maintain. Therefore, knowledge is inherently related to the self. From the practical point of view we may distinguish knowledge and self. But from the pure and noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between knowledge and self. Although jnana is the essential characteristic of the self, it cannot be considered to be externally related. Knowledge and self are very intimately connected as even to say that they are identical. Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (sva-para-prakasaka). Cognition illumines the object it cognises and also it illumines itself, cognises itself and this fact of self-cognition can be understood by an analogy. Just as the lamp illumines the object around it and it illumines itself, similarly the self has cognition as its essential quality and cognition cognises itself and cognises the object of cognition. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the nature of knowledge. 1 (a) Acaranga 5, 5 166-je aya se vinnaya, je vinnaya se aya (b) Samayasara gatha 7 (c) Bhagavati 12, 10 nana puna niyamam aya.

Page #357
336 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the Agama literature, the charaeteristics of knowledge have been presented from the points of view of identity and of difference. From the point of view of identity (abhe a), it has been said that self and knowledge are one and there are no differences. From the point of view of difference, knowledge is the quality of the soul. From the point of view of identity and difference (bhedabheda), self can be said to be neither completely different from knowledge, nor completely identical with knowledge.1 Knowledge is identical with the self. Therefere, it is not different. Knowledge is the quality of the atman. Therefore, it is different also. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE Knowledge and the object of knowledge are independent of each other. Knowledge is the quality of the self. Substance, quality and the modes are the objects of knowledge. Knowledge and its object do not produce each other. The object of knowledge may give us knowledge but it is not inherent with the act of cognition. It is related to the object when it is produced from the object, then it has the characteristics of the object. In that case, the identity of knowledge with the self would be remote. When we cognise an object the process of cognition involves the activity of the self. However, cognition depends on the object of cognition. The media through which we have to cognise an object are the body, sense-organs aud the mind. But they are not conscious. When the senses come in contact with the object through the stimulations, then the process of knowledge starts. The act of cognition is not some new creation. It is the process of the activity of the self to the media of the sense-organs and the mind in contact with the object. The process of cognition and the extent of knowledge depends upon the capacity of the knower. We have seen that knowledge is possible by the self through the sense-organs and the mind, but the function is limited. The mind also has a limited capacity. The mind comes in contact with a particular sense organ at a time. Therefore, we can cognise an object 1 Svarupa sambodhana, 4.

Page #358
337 through the operation of the sense-organs and through their limitation. But we also get knowledge without the media of the senseorgans. This knowledge need not be limited. Because the limitations of the sense-organs are not operative in the complete or uneneveloped knowledge. Through the complete knowledge all the objects can be cognised at a time moment. 1294 KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE The relation between the knowledge and the object of knowledge is like the object and its quality. The subject of knowledge is characterised by the possession of cognition. The object has a characteristic as the object of knowledge. Both these are independent. But both are intimately related in the sense that the object enters into relation with the cognition as the object of cognition and cognition has the relation of knowing the object. In this sense, we may say that there is no difference between the object and cognition. KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION The psychic energy that the soul possesses is expressed in cognition, perception, and experience. The eyes perceive. The other experiences are possible through the other sense-organs including the manas. According to the agamas the experience through the eyes as well the experience through the other organs may be considered as darsana. Avadhi (clairvoyance) and kevala (omniscience) may also be considered as darsana. In this analysis darsana does not mean only perception. But it means the experience of the universe and the nondifference. Knowledge (jnana) is analytic and it presents the varied characteristics of the object. Jnana is of five types, while darsana is of four types. Manahparyaya jnana (telepathy) is not considered as drasana, because it cognises difference only. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 1 The universe has diversity when considered with reference to attributes, modes, but considered from the point of substance, it is one and undifferentiated. Therefore, we cannot say that the universe is one only or diverse only. The capacity of empirical knowledge is limited. Therefore, we first know the generality of the substance and then we cognise the diversity to be founded in the attributes and modes, dr

Page #359
338 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The kevalajnana (omniscience) is not limited. Its capacity is infinite. It cognises everything including the substance and its modes. The omniscient knows everything in the moment of its experience, in the aspect of its universality. Then he cognises the diversity. This is the procedure of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana. The chadmastha who has reached the tenth gunasthana does not grasp everything in one moment of experience. He cognises the subtle nature of the cognition and after numerous moments he grasps the universality that is in the substance. The universality and the diversity of the object are progressively experienced. Jnana cognises particularities and is analytic, while darsana experiences the universality and is synthetic. Knowing the generality first and then cognising the diversity would involve the process of darsana and jnana. KNOWLEDGE AND THE AFFECTIVE STATES (VEDANA) Of the five sense-organs, the sense organs of touch, taste and smell are sensory. They cognise the objects and experience the senses of touch, taste and smell, but the sense-organs of sight and hearing are instruments of cognition only, because they cognise the objects, but do not experience the objects as there is no direct contact with them. We experience the external objects through the sense-organs, but the process of experience is not the same in all the sense-organs. The sense-organ of sight has a greater capacity of cognity of cognition. But it cognises the object without touching it. The sense-organ of hearing is less in its capacity to experience, because it can cognise the sounds which touch it, or come in contact. The senses-organs of touch, taste and sound are less in their capacity of experience as compared with the other two. Because they can experience the object when they come in direct contact with the objects and therefore they can cognise the objects and experience the experiences. But in the case of the eyes and the ears there is no direct contact with the objects of experience. Therefore, they can only get knowledge, but they do not directly get the experience. In the case of the mind it can have both knowledge and experience, although it does not come in direct contact with the object. This is because the mind transforms itself

Page #360
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 339 into the form of the object to be cognised. The mind can also have the higher type of experiences in the manahparyayajnana (telepathic knowledge). The cognition that we get without the contact with the object through the sense-organs is not sense-cognition, but it is extrasensory experience. It is neither completely free from the sense-organs and the mind nor is dependent on them. It is the state which happens between these two.1 AFFECTIVE STATES -- PLEASURE AND PAIN!. We exp:rience the external world through the sense-organs and mind exaggerates it. The qualites of touch, taste, smell and form are original characterstics of an object and the sound is the modification of the object. The sense-organs receive the stimulations and the mind organises and interprets the sense stimulation. The feelings of pleasure and pain are due to the conjunction and separation of the external objects in relation to the sense-organs. These affective states are not pure cognition. Its experiences cannot be had through the unconscious sense-organs. Nor can these feelings be considered to be ignorance or ajnana. The feelings of pleasure and pain are created due to the conjunction of cognition and the external objects. The pleasure and pain are experienced through the sense-organs and mind. The animals without the possession of mind experience organic sensation and not feelings, while animals who have minds experience sensations as well as feelings. Pleasure and pain cannot be experienced simultaneously. The self experiencing these feelings is not in its pure state and the experience of pure bliss is not to be considered as the experience of feeling. Bliss is the pure state of experience, the soul gets in its pure form. The self-experience cannot be named as self-feeling, it is called as self-realisation. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGAMAS!) The theory of knowledge in the agamas is very ancient. In the Rajaprasniyasutra, Kesikumara sramana explains to Raja Pradesi the theory of knowledge as presented in the agamas. The agama classify knowledge into five types : 1 Jnanasara astaka 2, sl. 15.

Page #361
340 1. Abhinibodhika jnana (sense experience) 2. Srutajnana (indirect knowledge) 3. Avadhijnana (clairvoyance) 4. Manahparyayajnana (telepathy) 5. Kevalajnana (omniscience)1 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Kesikumara Sramana belonged to the Parsvanatha tradition. The five types of knowledge mentioned in the Parsvanatha tradition have also been presented by Mahavira.2 In the Uttaradhyayana sutra there is a dialogue between Kesi and Gautama. From this, it is clear that there was no difference of opinion between them regarding the theory of knowledge and metaphysics although there were slight differences regarding the practice. If there were difference regarding metaphyics these would have been mentioned in this discourse. The Digambara and Svetambra traditions have the same theory of 5 types of knowledge, although there is some differences regarding the nature of kevalajnana and kevaldarsana. From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on the basis of the agamic theory of knowledge we get three stages.4 The first stage describes the 5 types of knowledge. It also mentions the distinctions in the abhinibodhika jnana (senseexperience) into 4 stages like avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana The first stage gives the following classification of knowledge. JNANA5 abhinibodhika T avagraha 1 sruta iha avaya The second stage makes a distinction in the knowledge as pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect) with its sub-divisions. There is 1 Rajaprasniya sutra 165. 2 Bhagavati 88, 2, 317. avadhi manahparyaya kevala I dharana 3 Uttaradhyayana sutra, adhayayana, 23. 4 Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, Agama yuga ka Jaina Darsana, p. 129. 5 Bhagavati 88, 2, 317.

Page #362
A SOURC#-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 341 no place in this for sense-experience as direct knowledge because according to this view direct knowledge is that which is obtained by the soul without the help of sense-organs. The sense-organs are obstructive to the acquisition of knowledge by the soul directly. The knowledge obtained through sense-organs and by other means like reason are considered to be indirect knowledge. The other systems of philosophy considered sense-experience as direct knowledge, but Sthananga has made a clear distinction between the direct knowledge obtained by the soul without the medium of the sense organs and indirect knowledge which is through the sense-organs and other means, Bhagavati sutra presents the classification of knowledge which is slightly different from the two traditions that we discussed. In this jnana has been distinguished into two types and not the 5 types. And these 2 types are pratyaksa and paroksa. It evidently shows that it is the first stage of the theory of knowledge. Bhagavati sutra gives the classification of knowledge as shown in the table-- JNANA Pratyaksa Paroksa Kevala No-Kevala Abhinibodhika srujtana Avadhi Avadhi Manahparyaya Mar Angapravista Angababya Bhavapra- Ksayopa- Rjumati iyayika samika Vipul- | Avasyaka mati Avasyakavya tirikta Kalika utkalika Srutanihsrta Asrutanishsta Arthavagraha Vyanjanavagraha Arthavagraha Vyanjanavagraha 1 Sthananga 71.

Page #363
342 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the third stage there is a slight modifications in the classification of the types of knowledge. This classification distinguishes the matijnana (sense-experience) into two types as pratyaksa and paroksa. This is considered to be (a) due to sense-organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs (no-indriya). We give below the classifications of (a) the sense organs and (b) due to quasi-sense organs as discussed. According to Nandi sutra,1 the gist of third stage of knowledge is as following: JNANA Abinibodh ka Sruta Pratyaksa Indriya Pratyaksa 1 1. Srotrendriya pratyaksa 2. Caksurindriya pratyaksa 3. Ghranendriya pratyaksa 4. Rasanendriya pratyaksa 5. Spargendriya pratyaksa Abhinibodhika Avadhi Manahparyaya Kevala No-indriya pratyaksa 1. Avadhi 2. Manahparyaya 3. Kevala Paroksa Srutnihsrta Asrutanihsrta 1 I Avagraha Tha Avaya Dharana Autpa- Vaina- Kar- Parinamiki tiki yiki maja Buddhi Sruta Arthava graha Vyanjanavagraha The analysis of the theory of knowledge as presented in the three stages gives a picture of knowledge as developed from first to the third stage and graduality imply metaphysical consideration. The 1 Dr. Mohanlal Metha Jaina Darsana, p. 209.

Page #364
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY first stage has no metaphysical basis. This is the earliest presentation of the theory of knowledge. It has five divisions of knowledge and matijnana has been distinguished into 4 different stages as avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana. The Bhagavati sutra carries the tradition of this stage. The second stage introduced metaphysical considerations with reference to the nature of the self. It distinguishes the knowledge into 2 types as pratyaksa (direct) and paroksa (indirect). The later philosophers have followed this distinction. The basis for the distinction between direct and indirect knowledge is to be found in the clarity and certainty on one side and indefiniteness and relative knowledge on the other side. Pratyaksa is the knowledge that the soul gets directly. Paroksa is the knowledge which is acquired through the sense-organs and other indirect media. Pratyaksa jnana has been distinguished into three types as 1. avadhi (clairvoyance) 2. Manahparyaya (telepathic cognition) and 3. kevalajnana (omniscence). From the point of view of the certainty and purity of knowledge there is the graduated excellence in the three types of knowledge. Kevalajnana is a pure and project knowledge par excellence. Abhinibodhika jnana and Sruta jnana are paroksa (indirect) knowledge. Abhinibodhika is also called mutijnana. Matijnana is knowledge acquired through the contact of the sense-organs and the mind by the soul. Srutajnana is arrived at through the functions of the mind. Mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya have distinctions regarding the nature and the degree of certainty. 343 The third stage takes into consideration the viewpoints of other systems of Indian philosophy and attempts to correlate the Jaina standpoint with that of the other The other systems of Indian philosophy consider sense experience as pratyaksa but the Jainas considered it as paroksa. With a view to avoiding ambiguity in the use of the terms the Jainas also adopted the term pratyaksa for sense-experience. But they called it samvyavaharika pratyaksa (direct knowledge from the practical point of view). Nija-pratyaksa or paramarthika pratyaksa is the knowledge which is arrived at not through the sense-organs, but which the self gets directly. Avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala would be nijapratyaksa according to the Jainas. Jinabhadragani Ksamasramana has elaborated this point in the Visesavasyakabhasya. From

Page #365
344 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY this stand-point the schematisism of the classification of the knowledge would be as follows: (1) Avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala is paramarthika pratya. ksa. (2) Srutajnana is paroksa. (3) Indriya-pratyaksa (sense-experience) is paroksa from the paramarthika point of view and pratyaksa from the practical point of view. (4) Knowledge arrived at by the mind only is paroksa. Acarya Akalanka and some other acaryas have distinguished pratyaksa into paramarthika and samvyavaharika. The distinction has its basis in the Nandisutra and Visesavasyakabhasya. The Abhinibodhika, jnana has been distinguished into the four different stages like avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana. These stages have been scientifically analysed and discussed by the Jaina acaryas. The mental states like memory (smarana) and recognition (pratyabhijna) have been defined with reference to their metaphysical implication by the later acaryas. But there is not much basis for definition of the concepts like smarana and pratyabhijna in the agamic literature. The main cause of this is, that there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation at the time of agamic literature. But later logicians has to compete with the scholars of other darsanas in interpreting their logical and psychological concepts. We may now consider the nature of five types of knowledge and also of memory (smarana), pratyabhijna (recognition) and anumana (inference) etc., from the point of view of pramana and also from the metaphysical implication. MATIJNANA Matijnana is sense experience. It is arrived at with the help of the sense-organs and the manas (mind).2 In the agamic literature 1 Visesayasyaka bhasya 95 and its svopajna vrtti. 2 Tattvarthasutra 1, 1".

Page #366
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 345 matijnana has also been called abhinibodhika jnana.1 Tattvartha sutra mentioned equivalent names like mati, smrti, samjna, cinta and abhinibhodha. These words are used synonymously. In the avasyakabhasya the following terms are mentioned as equivalents-iha, apoha, vimarsa, margana, gavesana, smrti, mati, prajna etc.8 Nandisutra also uses the same words. In the Tattavartha Sutra svopajnabhasya, a distinction has been made in the sarvyavaharikamatijnana, into two types, as (1) indriyajanya (sense contact experience) and anindriyajanya or manojanya (i, e. knowledge born of the contact with the mind alone).5 Siddhasenagani mentions three forms of same vyavaharika pratyaksa as indriyajanya, anindriyajanya (manojanya) and indriyanindriyajanya (born of the contact of the sense-organs and the manas both). That knowledge which is born of the sense-organs is indriyajanya and the knowledge which arises out of the contact with the mind alone is anindriyanjanya, while in the case of indriyanindriya - janya the mind and the sense-organs function jointly. INDRIYA (SENSE-ORGANS) '' The sense-organs is the distinguishing mark between the living organism and the non-living objects. Some acaryas like Pujyapada has used the terminology and alayses the meaning of the word indriya. The etymological meaning of the word would be one who has power and wealth-indratiti indrah. But here the word indra refers to the atman. Knowledge is possible through the means of indriya. According to this the meaning would be knowledge of the essence of the atman through the medium of the Indriya. Similarly, the word 1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 28, 4 (b) Nandisutra, sutra 59, Punyavijayaji-ed, p. 25. 2 Tativartha sutra 1, 13. 3 Visesavasyakabhasya 396. 4 Nandisutra satra 77, Ed. Punyavijayji, p. 27 5 Tattvarthabhasya 1, 14 6 Tattvarthasutra tika 1, 14.

Page #367
346 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Indra has a reference to activity. It means that the atman has the natural characteristic of activity, but due to the accretion of karma the self cannot get direct knowledge. Therefore, it requires a medium and that medium is the sepse-organ. Therefore, that through the medium or which the self gets the knowledge is called indriya. There are five sense-organs, the sense organ of touch (sparsa), the sense-organ of taste, the sense-organ of smell, the sense-organ of sight, the senseorgan of hearing. The five sense-organs have the five senses : Senses of touch, taste, smell, form and hearing. Therefore, these senseorgans have been considered as receptive of the stimulation. They are the means through which experiences are the possible. 1. The sense-organ receiving the stimulation of touch-the sense of touch. 2. The sense-organ of taste has sense of taste. 3. The sense-organ of smell has the sense of smell. 4. The sense-organ of form has (rupa) the sense of sight (eyes). 5. The sense organ of receiving sound has the sense of hearing. Every sense-organ has two forms (1) physical sense-organ (dravendriya) and (2) psychic sense-organs (bhavendriya).3 The dravyendriya is expressed in the form of a sense-organ with its basic meterial form like the retina in the eyes or the ear for hearing. The physical part of the sense-organs, therefore, is called Dravyendriya and the psychic part of the sense is bhavyedriya. The physical part of the sense-orgnas is created by the rise of the corresponding namakarina, the psychical part of the sense-organ is caused by the destruction and subsidence of knowledge obscuring karma (jnanavarniya karma) Dravyendriya is again sub-divided into (1) nirvstti and 1 (a) Sarvarthasiddhi 1, 14, 102, 3 Bharatiya Jnanapitha. (b) Rajavartika 1, 14, 1, 59 Bharatiya Jnanapitha. (c) Dhavala 1, 1, 1, 33; 7, 2, 6, 7. (d) Jainendra Siddhantakosa Part I, p. 316. 2 Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 21-23. 3 Sarvarthasiddhi 2, 16, 179.

Page #368
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 347 (2) upakarana." Nirvriti is the organ itself and upakarana is the protective physical cover like the eyelid in the case of the eye. Each of these two is again sub-divided into antaranga and bahiranga. Bhavendriya has its distinction from the point of view of its upayoga. Bhavendriya is a psychic part of the organ, it is also divided into two parts labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi is the manifestation of the specific sense-experience due to the destruction and subsidence of the knowledge obscuring karma. It may be referred to as the removal of psychic impediment which have to be eliminated if sense-experience is to be made possible. Upayoga is the psychic force determining the specific sense-experience coming out of the contact of the specific sense organs with the object of stimulation. Thus the Jainas make a distinction between the physical structure and the psychical element involved in the sense-organs. Jainas have given a detailed analysis of the structure of the sense-organ. PROCESS OF SENSE EXPERIENCE The development of the sense-organs is not uniform in all the animals. There are gradations in the animals according to the number of sense-organs posscssed by them. We have one-sensed organism two-sensed organisms, three-sensed, four-sensed, and five-sensed organisms according to the number of sense organ they possess. Similarly, the size of the sense-organs and its capacity to experience may also vary with different animals. The capacity of sense-experience determines the different gradations of animals. Therefore, it can be said that labdhi (the capacity) is the basic factors for the distinction between different sense-organs and their function. Without labdhi, nirvstti, upakarama and upayoga cannot exist. Next to Labdhi comes nirvytti as an important factor in the function of the sense-organs. Thus, we find that it is possible to have upakarana in the absence of upayoga, nirvstti in the absence of upakarana and labdhi in the absense of niryrtti. But it is not possible to have 1 2 Tattvarthasutra 2, 17. Tattvarthasutra 2, 18.

Page #369
348 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the functions as it is not possible to have nirvrtti without labdhi and upakarana without nirvrtti and upayoga without upakana. We give below the table of the functions of the sense organs : INDRIYA Paudgalika (dravyendriya) Atmika (bhavendriya) nirvytti upakarana Labdhi upayoga MIND (MANAS) Each organ is different. One sense-organ can not receive the stimulation connected with other sense-organs. It requires a subtle sense-organ which is called, mind. Mind grasps the sense stimulation of all the sense-organs. Therefore, it is called sarvarthagrahi.1 It is a quasi-sense-organ because, it is very subtle. It is sometimes called anindriya because of its subtlety and not because the absence of the sense-organ. The function of mind, which is inner-organ is knowing and thinking. The Jaina theory of mind, as developed by the Jaina acaryas, is a theory in which mind and nature are regarded as different in kind and as sharply separated and opposed. The analysis of the Jaina theory of mind shows there has been a conflict between the metaphysical and psychological approaches to the problems. It is predominently a realistic approach. The mind and its state are analysed at empirical level. The mind recollects the past impressions, grasps the present stimulations and imagines the future. Therefore, it is also referred to apprehending impressions of the long periods (dirghakalika sarjna). Jaina agamic literature mentions the word samjna with reference to the manas and the animals which possess mind have been called samjni. The functions of the mind can be anaysed as (1) analysis of the meaning of the impression-iha, (2) Apohadetermination,(3) margana-analysis and discrimination, (4) gavesana 1 Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 24. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.): Some Problems in Jaina Psychology (Karnataka University, Dharwar) 1961, p. 17.

Page #370
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 349 discrimination and distinctions, (5) cinta--obstructions and thinkings about the how and the why, (6) Vimarsa - analysis and appreciation. These constitutes the charateristics of samjna and the organism, who possesses the characterstics is called Samjni, i. e. having mind. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MIND a . That through which we think, is mind. We may distinguish two types of substances in this world--(1) Substances having form and (2) Subtances without form. The sense-organs are substances with form and they grasp the present stimulations only. Mind is a substance without form, and it grasps the present impressions, recollects the past impressions and imagines of the future ideas. Therefore, it has a reference to the past, present and the future. The mind also, like the indriyas has a reference to the material aspect in connection with the psychic force. Therefore, mind is distinguished into two phases---(1) the physical mind and the (2) psychic mind (dravya manas and bhava manas). In the Visesavasyaka bhasya; we get a description of the two phases of the mind. The material mind may be called the mental structure. It is composed of infinite, fine and coherent particles of the mind meant for the function of the mind. It is further described as a collection of fine particles, which are meant for exciting thought-processes due to the yoga arising out of the contact with the jiva with the body. In the Gommatasara jivakanda there is a description of the material mind as produced in the heart from the coming together of mind molecules like a full blownlotus with eight petals. The material composition of the mind consists of the subtle particles of matter which are called manovarganas. Therefore, it is different from the atman and the ajiva (non-living substance.) | Jainatarkabhasa--manah sarvendriya-pravartakam, antarendriyas svasamyogena bahyendriyanugrahakam. ataeva sarvopalabdhi karanam. 2 Visesavasyakabhasya 3525 A. Ma and Abhidhana rajendra Vol. p. 4 comm. 3 Gommatasara : jiva kanda. verse 443. | Bhagavati 13, 7, 494 ata bhante mane anne mane? Goyama, no ata mane anne mane mapijjamane......mane.

Page #371
350 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The bhava manas is the psychic function of the mind. It is the result of the activities of the dravya manas. It is expressed in mental processes like thinking. In this sense, bhavamanas is sometimes identified with self, because it is a thinking self. Therefore, the self is both manas and not-manas, in the sense it is a thinking self and the psychic function is a quality of the self. The bhavamanas is not therefore entirely distinct from the activity of the self, it is referred to as belonging to the activity of the self. As we said earlier, bhavamanas has two functions-labdhi and upayoga. First is the mental set and the second is the activity of the mind. Dhavala refers to the mind quasi-active (nokarma). The dravya manas is the result of the operation of certain forms of namakarma, while bhavamanas is due to the destruction and subsidence of the antarayakarma and the no-indriya-karma. The mind in its undeveloped form (aparyapta) consists of the material particles which are yet to cohere. Therefore, in this state the developed psychic functions are absent. FUNCTIONS OF MIND The function of mind, which is the inner organ, is knowing and thinking. Sthananga describes it a samkalpa vyaparavati. It is also referred to as cittamanovijnana. Visesavasyakabhasya defines manas in terms of mental processes. The mind grasps the sense-impressions received through the sense-organs.4 The mind gets knowledge for us through the sense-organs. But in all forms of knowledge, it is not necessary to have the instrument of sense-organs. The sense-knowledge is through the sense-organs and it is limited to the stimulations coming through the objects in this empirical world. But mind can also have its own function without the stimulation received through the sense-organs. They are knowledge through the mind only. It is nanojanya. Such psychic functions of the mind can be mentioned as tha (integration), 1 Sutrak rtanga vrtti 1, 12 2 Dhavala, sutra 36, p. 130 3 Visesavasyak ibhasya 3523 4 Caraka sutrasthana 1, 20.

Page #372
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 351 ;:.? E OF MIND avaya (association), dharana (retention), smrti (memory), pratyabhijna (recognition), tarka (implication), anumana (inference) and agama (knowledge from testimony). PLACE OF MIND The Vaisesikas,1 Naiyyayikas 2 and Mimamsakasa have considered mind as atomic in nature. Therefore, mind is not considered to be eternal, in its causes. Sarnkhya, Yoga and Vedanta drasana consider mind to be a product of prakrti and ahamkara and is atomic in nature. It is due to avidya. According to the Jainas and the Buddhists the mind is neither pervasive nor atomic in nature, it is madhyama parimana. It is finite in its cxtension. Nyaya, Vaisesika and the Buddhist philosophers consider mind as emanating from the heart. Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist systems consider that the manas is in the heart. According to the Samkhya-Yoga and Vedanta the place of the heart is all pervasive in the body because it is in the suksma sarira (gross). According to Jainsim, bhavamanas is in the atman, but regarding the place of the dravyamanas, there is no agreement. The Digambara tradition maintains that the place of the dravya manas is in the heart, while svetambara tradition does not give any specific inclination about this. Pandit Sukhalal says that the svetambara tradition maintains that the dravya manas is all-pervasive in the body. Although it is difficult to determine the exact location of the manas in the body, atleast there must be some centres of mind through which the mental function takes place. It may be located partly in the brain and functioning through the sense-organs. The sense-organs are functioning in one direction only, because these are receptive and they are functioning in particular part of the | Vaisesika sutra 7, 1, 23 2 Nyayasutra 3, 2, 61 3 Prakarana p. 151 4 Mathara karika 27 5 Yogasastra 5, 2 26 Darsan i aur Cintana, p. 140 (Hindi)

Page #373
352 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY body. But from the point of view of psychic energy the sense-organs function in the pervasive way. The function of the sense-organs depends on the subsidence and destruction of the karmic matter which gives rise to the removal of the obscurations connected with the point of sense-experience. This is all-pervasive in the body. From the point of view of grasping and understanding the subject, manas can be considered pervasive of the body. a) EXISTENCE OF THE MANAS Different philosophers have given arguments for the existence of the manas. The Nyayasutra says that we can infer the existence of the manas because without manas, knowledge is not possible. Vatsyayana says that the manas can be proved because certain mental functions like memory and cognition are not possible to be obtained through the sense-organs only.3 Annambhatta says that mental states like pleasure are possible through the medium of manas. Jainas" maintain that mental states like doubt, dream-cognition, pleasure and pain and connotive activity are not possible without the medium of manas. We may now analyse the different stages of avagraha, iha, dharana, avaya as stages of sense-perception. u AVAGRAHA Avagraha is a sensational stage where there is an awareness of the object without cognising the specific nature of the object. It only presents the general characteristic of the object in cognition. We cannot, in this, know the specific details about the nature of the object. This is the stage which may be considered to be the stage of sensation following the stage of darsana in the sense of the threshold of consciousness. In the avagraha we do not really get the general characteristics of the 1 Nyaya sutra 1, 1, 16. 2 Vatsyayana bhasya 1, 1, 16 3 Tarkasangraha 4 Sanmatiprakarana tika kanda 2 5 Bhagavati 1, 3. 6 Pramanamimarsa 1, 1, 26

Page #374
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 353 object, but only the awareness of the object that we get. In this sense, it would be different to make avagraha as determinate cognition coming after darsana. In that case darsana will become mere species of the jnana and it would be reduced to mere sensation. The higher form, of darsana like the kevaladarsana would be meaningless. Avagraha is therefore the stage of sensation. It is the first stage of experience. It is the given, it does not involve the stage of darsana which is qualitatively different from jnana. Avagraha is a species of jnana. It is immediate experience. STAGES IN THE AVAGRAHA :!:'>> Avagraha has been considered to be the stage of consideration. This has been further distinguished into 2 stages : (1) vyanjana avagraha and (2) artha avagruha. Vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage. In the Visesavasyakabhasya, we get the description of the vyanjanavagraha. It is a physiological stimulus condition of the sensation. It is only the reation of the sense-organs and the object in the form of sense stimulations. In the Nandisutra, we get the example of the earthen pot and the drops of water. It gives a description of the stage of vyanjanavagraha. A clay pot is to be filled with water. In the beginning when water is poured, a portion of the water is absorbed by the pot. And there is no sign of the existence of the water. If we go on pouring the water again, at a certain stage the water will be visible. Then the water begins to accumulate. The stage when the water begins to be visible in the threshold of saturation. The drops of water below the threshold get absorbed in the pot. Similarly, a person who is asleep receives the sound stimulation continuously for sometime. The sound atoms reach the ear. Innumerable instances have to occur before the ear becomes conscious of the sound. So far he was not aware of the sound athough the auditory stimulations were pouring in. We may call this, the stage of first awareness, "the threshold of awareness." The sound sensation begins to be experienced the moment 1 2 Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 15, 111 (a) Tattvarthasutra 1, 17-18 (b) Dhavala 1, 1, 1, 115, 354, 7. Visesavasyakabhasya, 191, 193. 3

Page #375
354 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the threshold is crossed. That stage is arthavagraha. Arthavagraha is the experience of sensation, while vyanjanavagraha is the earlier stage of physiological stimulus condition. The Nandisutra has beautifully explained this point in the example given above. The illustration is called mallaka drstanta. Vyanjanavagraha is a condition of arthav. agraha, which is the stage of sensation. The presence of vyanjanavagraha may be admitted as a condition of arthavagraha although it is explicit not because of its undeveloped existence, 8 Avagraha has also been distinguished from the logical point of view as vyavaharika avagraha and naisargika avagraha. Naisargika avagraha grasps as the generality without distinction. But vyavaharika avagraha experiences the generality with the distinctions implicit. Avagraha has been described with some equivalent expressing its modes like avagrahanata, upadharanata, sravanata, avalambanata and medha. Tattvarthabhasya mentions the following synonymous terms like avagraha, graha, grahana, alocana and avdharana.5 Satkhandagama mentions the following as the equivalents, avagraha, avadhana, sana, avalambana and medha. Avagraha is the sensational stage and that does not give the knowledge of the nature of the object. It only gives awareness of that and does not explain the "what'. The complete psychosis of perceptual cognition would be possible when we experience the other three stages of perceptual process than iha, avaya and dharana. In this sense, our empirical experience will not complete with avagraha. Avagraha is not self-sufficient. Arthavagraha is mere sensation which lasts only for only one instance. It immediately transforms itself into more specific cognition, i. e., iha. 1 Nandisutra 34 2 Jaina tarkabhasa, p. 3, 3 Visesavasyaka bhasya 196. 4 Nandisutra 51 p. 22, Punyavijayaji. 5 Tattvartha bhasya 1, 15. 6 Satkhandagama 13, 5. 5 sutra 37 p. 242

Page #376
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 355 THA Tha is the second stage of Matijnana. In it one cognises the nature of the sensation like the sound. Nandisutra gives synonyms of iha : abhoganata, marganata, gavesanata, cinta and vimarsa,1 Umasvati gives the synonyms as uha, tarka, vicarana and jijnasa.2 Vyanjanavagraha is the potential condition of awareness. Arthavagraha is the dawning of the awareness. Tha is the tendency twards cognising the specific features of the object. Tha has been very often translated as speculation. But it would be more appropriate to use the word associative integration. The Jainas thought that, as Tha is striving for determinate and specific cognition, it is possible to confuse it with doubt (sarsaya). But iha should not be confused with doubt (sarsaya) although it does involve a striving towards the determinate knowledge. In the case of doubt, the alternatives are equally pressing and they are not certain, which is to be accented. But in iha there is a tendency to determinate cognition. I ha is the mental state in which there is striving for the ascertainment of truth. It leads to the acceptance of the true and the avoidance of the untrue. Siddhasena Divakara also draws the same line of distinction between iha and samsaya. For instance, on receiving a sense impression of sound, there arises a doubt, whether the sound comes from the counch or horn. The mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference. The sound is perceived as a sweet and an aggreeable. This quality is attributed to the sound of the counch and not at the horn. In the Pramanamimamsa it is said that doubt crops up in the interval between sensation (avagraha) and associative integration (iha), even when the object is the matter of habitual perception. But the existence of the state of doubt is not easily detected owing to the rapidity of succession of mental event.5 1 Nandisutra 52 2 Ibid 31 3 Tattvarthasutra bhasya 1, 15 4 Visesavasyaka bhasya 1, 83-84. 5 Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 27

Page #377
356 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY AVAYA The third factor in matijnana is avaya. From the stage of associated integration (iha) we come to the stage of interpretation. The sensations of interpreted and the meaning is assigned to the organisation of sensation. Tha is integration of the sensations, avaya interpretes and determines the meaning of the sensation.1 In avaya there is a definite determination about the meaning of the perception. In this we come to the judgement about the nature of the object. This is therefore called perceptual judgement, still it is non-verbal. Avasyakaniryukti defines avaya as determinate cognition. In the Sarvarthasiddhi, we get the description of avaya as cognition of the true notion of the object through cognition of particular characteristics. Umasvati says that upagma, upanoda, apavyadha, apeta, apaviddha, apanuta and apagata are synonyms of avaya. They mean the determinate cognition. Nandisutra gives avartanata, pratyavartanata, buddhi, vijnana as synonyms. Tattvartha bhasya describes avaya as the stage of ascertainment of right and exclusion of wrong. For example, on hearing sound, a person determines that the sound must be of a counch and not of a horn, because it is sweet and not hard. This type of ascertainment of the existing specific features of the object is called avaya and it involves perceptual judgement. Some Jaina logicians say that avaya has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is only the exclusion of non-existing qualities. They ascribe the cognition of the existing quality to a later stage of experience called dharana. But Jinabhadra says that the view is not correct. Because avaya does not merely perform the negative function of excluding non-existing qualities. But it also determines the existing characteristics. Umasvati agrees with this view. Pujapada says that avaya cognises specific features of the objects cognised in the 1 Pramanamimamsa, 1, 1, 28. 2 Visesavasyaka bhasya, 1, 79. 3 Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 15. 4 Tattvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 15. 5 Nandisutra, 53. 6 Tattvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 15.

Page #378
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 357 stage of iha, in the final determination of the objects. Avaya can be used to be perceptual judgement and it can be compared to the apperception involved in the perceptual experience. But avaya need not be the final determination of the specific feature of the objects as it is the perceptual judgement. Therefore, in this characteristic of the describing the avaya the two traditions concerning the negative or the positive function of avaya are in agreement.? DHARANA Dharana is retention. It is essential of the perceptual experience. Nandisutra defines retention as the act of retaining a perceptual judgement for the number of instances or innumerable instances. It gives sthapana and pratistha as synonyms of dharana.3 Umasvati defines dharana as the final determination of the object, retention of the cognition thus formed, and recognition of the object on future occasions. According to Umasvati retention develops through three stages : (1) nature of the object is finally cognised, (2) the cognition so formed is retained, and (3) the object is recognised on future occasions. Avasyakaniryukti defines dharana as retention. Jinabhadra says that retention is the absence of the lapse of perpeptual cognition. Pujyapada Devanandi defines dharana as a condition of the absence of forgetting the what has been cognised by perceptual judgement, by avaya. Akalanka says that it is the absence of forgetting what has been cognised by perceptual judgement. Some logicians like Vadideva do not accept dharana as a condition of recall on a future occasion. Thus we find that some logicians make dharana merely retention of perceptual experience, while some others make it also the condition of recall, of that experience on a future occasion. Hemacandra reconciles his views of retention and the condition of recall with the view of retention as the absence of the lapse mentioned in Visesavasyakabhasya. He says that retention is 1 Dr. Mohanlal Metha : Jaina Darsana. 2 Nandisutra, sutra, 54. 3 Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 15. 4 Tattvartharajavartika.

Page #379
358 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the absence of the lapse of perception, but it is included in the perceptual judgement. The analysis of the perceptual experience shows that it involves the four stages of the development of the perceptual experience. The concrete psychosis does involve all these four stages of perceptual experience. Dharana has been distinguished into three types: (1) avichuti in which there is the retention for a long time and it is not washed away. (2) Vasana-It is the psychic condition of dharana after it ceases to function as dharana. This may be compared to the disposition that modern psychology uses. Dispositions are responsible for giving recollection. (3) Anusmarana is a mental condition which arises out of dharana and which retains the effects of dharana. It will facilitate recollection. This may be compared to the engram complexes described in modern psychology. Nandisutra gives the following synonyms of dharana - dharana, dharana, sthapana, pratistha and kostha. Umasvati mentions pratipatti, avadharana, avasthana, niscaya, avagama and avabodha as synonyms. 2 We have so far seen that matijnana is experienced through the stages of four factors like avagraha, iha, avaya, and dharana. Avagraha has been distinguished into two types: vyanjanavagraha and arthavagraha. Vyanjanavagraha is of four types, the sense of touch, ta te, smell and hearing. Vyanjana has three different meaning (1) sabda etc, pudgala dravya. (2) upakarana indriya (accessory meterial) and (3) visaya and upakarana conjuction i. e., the contact between the object and sense-organs. Vyanjanavagraha is implicit awareness or apter to say that it is the threshold of awareness. The sense-organ of sight (the eyes) and the quasi-sense organ of mind are aprapyakari as there is no contact with the object and these sense-organs. And therefore, vyanjanavagraha is not possible in these cases to experiences. The Buddhist consider the sense-organ of hearing also as aprapyakari. The Nyaya-Vaisesika do not consider the eyes and the manas as aprapyakari. 1 Nandisutra, 54 and 55 2 Tativarthabhasya 1, 15

Page #380
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 359 From the scientific point of view the eyes and the manas do not come into contact by physical contact with the object of stimulation. The eye is considered to be a sensitive lense which receives stimulations sent by the objects, through the rays of light. The image of the object is formed on the retina and the mind consolidates it by interpreting the stimulations so received. Therefore, 'that the Jaina view that the mind and the sense-organs of eye are aprapaykari, is consistent with the modern scientific analysis, of the visual perception. The four distinctions in matijnana as mentioned above are avagraha (with its division vyanjanavagraha and arthavagraha) iha, avaya and dharana. They have been further divided into different types : five sense-organs plus the manas. These six have the four stages of matijnana. i.e. they are 24. The sense-organs except the eyes and manas have vyanjan avagraha. Therefore, they are 4 so the total would be 24+4=28. According to the Svetambara tradition, each type of cognitive experience is further sub-divided into 12 types like (1) bahu (many) (2) bahubidha (different types) (3) alpa (less) (4) alpavidha (les intense) (5) ksipra (quick) (6) aksipra (slow) (7) aniscita (interminate) (8) niecita (determinate) (9) asandigdha (definite) (10) sandigdha (indefinite) (11) dhruva (certain) (12) adhruva (uncertain). The bahu means many and alpa means one. The cognition of many objects is bahugrahi and the cognition of one object is alpagrahi. The cognition of many types of object is bahuvidhagrahi. The cognition of one type of object is alpavidhagrahi. The relation between bahu and alpa has a reference to the number and the reference between the buhuvidha and alpavidha has reference to the types. Sighra (quick cognition) is called ksipra and that knowledge which is not quick is considered to be aksipra. The cognition which has been obtained without any motive is called aniscita. And that cognition which has been obtained due to certain motives and based on the previous cognition is called niscita. Niscita (definite) cognition is certain (asandigdha) and the indefinite knowledge is sandigha. Avagraha and iha can also be distinguished on the basis of the criterian of indefiniteness. In these cognitions, there is the awareness of the object. But the specific nature is not determined. The cognition which arises out of the

Page #381
360 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY definite stimulations (avasyambhavi) is certain (dhruva). But that cognition which arises casually undefined stin ulations is uncertain (adhruva). Out of the 12 types of cognition that we have seen, the 4 have reference to the object and the remaining have a reference to the subject cognising the aspect. The Digumbara tradition gives the classification of the distinction of the matijnana with slight variation. According to the Digambara tradition niscita and aniscita cognition have been considered and named anihsrta and nihsrta. Anihsrta cognition apprehends the stimulations partly and in the nihsrita cognition, we have the apprehension of the stimulations tully. In this sense the Digambara tradition also used the forms anukta (inexpressed) and ukta (expressed) in place of asandigdha and sandigdha. The anukta implies cognition through opinion and ukta implies cognition through the words.2 There are 336 kinds of matijnana. These are obtained by multiplying 28 (as previously described) kinds with these 12 types, i. e., 28 x 12=336. There is light difference regarding thc mames of these in Svetambara tradition also. 11.3 SRUTAJNANA Srutajnana is knowledge obtained through discursive reasoning subsequent to matijnana. It is necessary to have use of language for the srutajnana. In the case of mati the hearing of words is implicit, but when the words are uttered the meaning of the two words are remembered. Matijnana in this sense expresses the potentiality of the meaning as implied in the stimulations of the word. But in the case of srutajnana knowledge arises due to the explicit expression of the meaning signified by the word. In this sense srutajnana would not be possible without matijnana. The srutajnana would be possible when the karmic matter obscuring the srutajnana is removed. This is the internal cause of the srutajnana. The external condition of srutainana is matijnana. This is because even if we have sense knowledge 1 Tattvarthasutra 1, 16 2 (a) Sarvarthasiddhi, 1, 16. (b) Rajavartika 1, 16.

Page #382
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY it may be not possible to have knowledge through discursive reasoning as in the case of srutajnana, because the karmic encrustations obscuring the srutajnana are still operative. This may be interpreted as that unless the mental set is formed and psychic impediments are removed srutajnana is not possible. 361 In the early agamic literature srutajnana has been considered to be knowledge through the scriptures. It is knowledge obtained through the scriptures given by the authorities (Aptapurusa) and also the knowedge obtained through the words of omniscient. There are two types of srutajnana--angapravista and angabahya. Angapravista is of 12 types and angabahya has many types. Angapravista srutjanana may be referred to as knowledge obtained through the scriptures given to us in a codified form by the ganadharas of tirthankara. Tirthankaras have taught the doctrines. This is arthasruta. While the garnadharas have codified and presented in the form of sastras. This is arthasruti. Due to the deduction in age and the ability to grasp, the acaryas in a later stage, wrote books explaining the knowledge contained in the agamas on various subjects. This is angabahyasruta. In this, original meaning was given by the Tirthankaras. This is angapravista. Later the meanings are elaborated by the elder acaryas it is called Angabahya. The angabahya literature has various divisions like kalika and utkalika etc. The detailed description about this have been given in our work entitled Jaina Sahitya aur Samskrti. The srutajnana is primarily concerned with knowledge and the literature is called sruta because it gives knowledge. Acarya Bhadrabahu has stated that there are various distinctions in the srutajnana based on the words and their permutations. It is not possible to give the elaborate description of the permutations of the words. However, we can mention 14 types of srutajnana: (1) aksara (2) anaksara, (3) sam jni, (4) asamjni, (5) samyak, (6) mithya, (7) sadika, (8) anadika, (9) saparyavasita, (10) aparyavasita, (11) gamika, (12) agamika, (13) angapravista and (14) angabahya. 1 Tattvarthasutra 1, 20 2 Agama Sahitya: ek Paryaveksana, p. 1-54, Pub. Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, Varanasi-1.

Page #383
362 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The fourteen types of srtuajnana can be classified into different parts on the basis of the nature of the srutajnana (i) aksara sruta- it has three sub-divisions-(i) samjnaksara refering to the form of the letter (word) (ii) vyanjanaksara-sound of the letter, it is pertaining to phoneticism (iii) labdhyaksara-refering to the psychological maturation or the mental set of expressing the word. Samjnaksara and vyanjanaksara are considered to be dravya sruta, because they are concerned with the expression of the sruta, while labdhyaksara is considered to be bhavasruta, because it is psychological is nature. Coughing, respiration and sneezing are anaksara fruta because they do not involve the expression of any letter. Samjna is of three types, therefore those possessing samja are also classified into three types. It is called samni sruta and is of three types : (1) dirghakaliki-it covers the past, present and the future ideas. (2) hetupadesiki--in this we are primarily concerned with the thinking about the present circumstances with its consequences. (3) drstivadopadegiki - in this there is a right understanding and also the comprehension of the various apects of the thing. Those who have these samjnas are called somjni and those who do not possess these samjnas are called asamjnis. Asamjnis are of three types : (1) those who cannot think of the future and cannot have the perspective regarding the long duration of time are the first type of asam jni. (2) those who possess slight mental activity, although they are having mind are called amanaskasamjni and they are of the second type. (3) Those who are possessed of perversity of attitude are the third type of asamjni. The srutajnana which comprises of the knowledge of the twelve angas as presented by the Tirthankara and is called samyaksruta. And that knowledge which is contrary and which does not contain the knowledge presented by the Tirthankaras is called mithyasruta. That knowledge which has the beginning and which starts at a particular time is called sadika sruta. And that knowledge which has no beginning and which are eternal truths is called anadika sruta. The frutajnana may be considered to be anadika from the poin' of

Page #384
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 363 view of substance of knowledge and sadika from the point of view of its modes. That knowledge which comes to an end is called saparyavasita. And that which cannot be destroyed and which is eternal is called aparyavasita srutajnana. In this distinction also the criteria of points of view of substance and modes is operative. That srutajnana which is comprised of the similarity of teaching is called gamikasruta and that in which there is no harmony and similarity is called agamika sruta. We have already explained the distinction between the angapravista and the angabahya sruta. MATIJNANA AND SRUTAJNANA It is necessary to understand the relation between matijnana and srutajnana in certain respects. Every empirical individuals (samsari jivas) has mati and srutajnanas. But the question is regarding the upper limit of the possession of these two forms of knowledge in an individual. A question has been raised whether on the attainment of the kevalajnana, there still remains matijnana and does srutajnana operative. On this question, there is a controversy. Some Jaina scholars say that on the attainment of the kevalajnana (omniscience), there is no place for mati and srutajnana, because (1) mati and srutajnana are obtained due to partial destruction and subsidence of the jnanavaraniyakarma, and (2) in the case of the kevalajnana all the four karmas have been destroyed. But some other scholars maintain that on the attainment of the kevalajnana the matijnana and srutajnana are not ted. They are still present and operative although the effect is negligible and unascertainable. Just as in the bright sunshine, the light of the stars and the planet is not clearly visible and is dim because it is merged in the light of the sun. So also, the effect of the matijnana and the srutajnana are not discernible in the light of the kevaljnana. The second view appears to be consistent with Jaina stand point.1 Srutajnana is described as the knowledge accompanied by the expression in words and significant with meaning. Matijnana is know 1 Mohanlal Mehta : Jaina darsana, p. 229.

Page #385
364 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ledge which generally preceds srutajnana and is not accompanied by srutajnana. Matijnana is of two types: sabhilapa and anabhilapa. But srutajnana is only of sabhilapa type.1 Arthavagraha is not sabhilapa while all other forms of matijnana are sabhilapa. Srutajnana is sabhilapa but it should be noted that only sabhilapa jnana is not srutajnana. Because, knowledge which used words cannot be considered as srutajnana. The knowledge which uses words is meant for others (parartha) and it is meant to communicate the knowledge to the other individuals. It is used for explaining to others by means of lanugage. Matijnana can also be saksara as it uses certain expressions, but it is not meant for the sake of others and it does not serve the purpose of communicating to others. Srutajnana on the contrary is saksara and also it is primarily concerned with use of language for expressing the thoughts and experiences.s The function of matijnana is to experience the sensory experiences like touch, taste, smell, form, and sound and also to give meaning to these experiences. The function of srutajnana is to comprehend the meaning of these experiences to the use of words and sentences and to communicate to others. Therefore, mati is considered as arthajnana and sruta as sabdarthajnana. The relation of mati and srutu is that of the cause and the effect. Matijnana is the cause and srutajnana is the effect. Srutajnana is that knowledge which gives meaning through the use of the language and based on the memory. Srutajnana gives the possibility of acquiring meaning to the word and that meaning is retained after the knowledge is obtained. First, there is matijnana through the stages of avagraha, etc. and then we get Srutajnana. Dravyasruta becomes the effect of the matijnana (pertaining to the hearing sense-organ) but bhava sruta cannot be the effect of matijnana and therefore according to this viewpoint srutajnana is considered the effect of matijnana. From another point of view dravya sruta 1 Visesavasyka bhasya vrtti 100 2 I bid 170. 3 (a) Anuyogadvara 2 (b) Visesavasyakabhasya vrtti 100

Page #386
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 365 is not the consequence of the sense of hearing but it becomes the subject. This is because, knowledge is obtained through language; but language itself is not the essence of knowledge. Language is the medium through which knowledge is presented. Knowledge obtained through previous knowledge or convention in tradition can be considered as srutanihsrita matijnana, for instance, the knowledge that we get about the word 'cow' or the knowledge to the understanding of the nature of the cow on the perception of the animal is the srutanihsrita matijnana, because it based on the previous information and the sarskaras that we have already obtained. Matijnana is primarily concerned with the cognition of the object in the present while srutajnana comprehends the objects with reference to the present, past and the future. Therefore, with reference to the presentation, srutajnana is considered to be different from matijnana. In that case the srutajnana is primarily based on the use of language. The knowledge which is expressed through the language for the sake of understanding and also for communication is called srutajnana. In the case of matijnana, expression in the from the language is not primary.2 AVADHIJNANA Avadhilnana is a from of extra-sensory perception. It is pratyaksa or direct perception. In this, we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense-organs and the mind. However avadhi has limits, it can apprehend only such things which have form and shape. It cannot apprehend the things which have no shape and form. Of the six dravyas, pudgala becomes the object of avadhijnana, because the other dravyas do not have form. Similarly, there are limitation in the avadhijnana with reference to the substance (dravya), place (ksetra), time (kala) and nature (bhava) of the objects. Avadhi is that kind of extra-sensory perception which grasps the objects with 1 2 3 Visesavasyakabhasya vrtti 168 Tattvarthasutra-Pt. Sukhalalji pp. 35-36. Tattvarthasutra 1, 28.

Page #387
366 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY reference to its substance, place, time and nature and beyond the capacity of the normal sense-organs.? . OBJECT OF AVADHIJNANA The avadhijnana has limitations with reference to its objects in the light of the substance, place, time and nature. (1) With reference to the substance it can apprehend the minutest particle and also it can extend its knowledge to the cosmos. (2) With reference to space one can get avadhijnana from the smallest part of the finger to the knowlege o' the entire cosmos. . It is possible to get avadhijnana on the basis of the knowledge of the cosmos and imagine similar stellar universes, (3) With reference to time avadhijnina can cognise to the minutest part of the period called avalika. And for the duration of the entire innumerable avasarpini and utsarpini periods. (4) With reference to the nature of the object known through avadhijnana, we can say that one can have clairvoyance cognition with reference to the mildest psychic mode to the entire clustre of modes. L ELIGIBLE BEING FOR AVADHIJNANA The living beings in the four states of existence are eligible for getting avadhiinana. Gods (residents in heaven) and hellish beings get avadhijnana by birih. Therefore it is bhavapratyaya.2 Men and the animals get avadhijnana due to efforts, it is gunaprutyaya. In the case of the beings in heaven and hell avadhijnana is to be found n them by birth. They need not do any mental and moral practice for obtaining it. But this is not the case with human beings and the animals. In the case of human beings avadhijnana is possible through mental and moral discipline. Men have to practice vratas, and they get avadhijnana through the acquisition of merit. The avadhi of the human 1 Nan disutra, sutra 28, p. 13 edited by Punyavijayaji 2 (a) Tattvarthasutra 1, 21-22 (b) Sthananga 71 (c) Nandisutra, sutra 13, p. 10, Punyavijayaji.

Page #388
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 367 beings as well the five-sensed animals is due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmic veil. Therefore, it is called gunapratyaya avadhijnana. A question arises regarding the destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas in the case of the birth of the heavenly and the hellish beings. Sometimes a question is asked that if these beings possess avadhi as bhavapratyaya, then is it not necessary that there should be destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas in the case of these beings ? The answer to this is that in the case of heavenly and the hellish beings the destruction and subsidence of the relevant karmas would have taken place at the time of their birth, otherwise the possession would not be possible. Therefore, those beings in whom destruction and the subsidence takes place at the time of birth, they will have avadhi and so it would be bhavapratyaya. But in the case of those who have to acquire merit for the sake of obtaining avadhijnana it would be guna pratyaya. Gunapratyaya arvadhijnana has been classified into six types. (1) Anugami-It is that type of avadhi which continues to be present with the individual wherever he goes. (2) Ananugami-In this case the avadhi ceases to function, if the individual goes to another place, from the palce where avadhi was acquired. (3) Vardhamana-- In this avadhi inreases in intensity as it goes on developing. (4) Hiyamana-In this the avadhi goes on decreasing in intensty as the time passes. (5) Apratipati- This avadhi lasts up to the life or until one attains kevalajnana. (6) Pratipati- This avadhi does not last long. It vanishes after sometime. With reference to the spatial extension of the object cognised in avadhi Tattvartharajvartika distinguishes three types (1) desavadhi, (2) paramavadhi (3) sarvayadhi. 1 2 Nandisutra, sutra 15, p. 10 Rajavartika 1, 22, 5 (vrttisahita).

Page #389
368 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Desavadhi has been distinguished further into three types (a) jag. hanya desavadhi in which one can know only the smallest part of the finger. (b) utk rsta desavadhi the scope of the knowledge of the avadhi in this is the entire universe and (c) ajaghanya utk rsta desavadhi intuites the objects of the medium size neither of the highest nor of the minutest part. Similarly, raramavadhi also can be distinguished into three different types. But sarvavadhi is of one type. The uppermost limit of the intuition in this is the innumerable place-points beyond the scope of paramavadhi. The scope of this is the entire universe. And it cannot intuite anything outside the universe as there is nothing outside the universe. Desavadhi is possible to be obtained by the beings in the four states of existence, but paramavadhi and sarvavadhi are possible only for the munis. 2 Jinabhadragani ksamasramana says that it is possible to study avadhijnana with reference to the seven niksepas- dravya, ksetra, kala, bhava, bhava, sthapana and nama.8 MANAHPARYAYA JNANA Manahparyaya jnana is possible for human beings only; and only the human beings who are self-controlled and who acquire merits get the manahparyayajnana. In other words, only Sramanas can acquire manahparyaya jnana. The human beings who are without self-control Cannot possess manahparyayajnana. Manahparyaya is telepathic expression. In this one experiences and cognises the mental states of others. This !view of manahparyaya based on the Jaina conception of the nature of the mind as material in content consisting minute and fine particles of matter called ma'ovar ganas. Due to the infinite modes of the formation of the mind one understands the mental states operating in the minds of others. 1 The measurement of extension is possible with the criterion of a finger. 2 Tattvarthasara, Amotacandrasuri, p. 12. Ganesaprasad Varni granthamala I. 3 Visesavasyaka bhasya 4 Avagyaka niryukti 76.

Page #390
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Manahparyaya experience is not inferential knowledge, it is direct experience. This is not through the instrument of mind, but the soul gets it directly and mind and the mental states are the objects of knowledge of manahparyaya. THE TWO TRADITIONS OF THOUGHT There are two traditions for explaining the nature of manahparyayajnana. The first tradition is mentioned by acarya Pujyapada1 and Akalanka. According to this tradition, manahparyaya cognition reveals the meaning of thoughts expressed in others minds. There is no distinction between the thought and the content of thought. It is the material objects and the state of thought by the mind of others that are intuited in the manahparyaya. The mind undergoes the process of change while thinking and the objects content of this process are intuited in manahparyaya. 369 12. The second tradition is given by acarya Jinabhadragani. According to Jinabhadra, one possessed of manahparyayajnana intuites the states of the mind-substance directly, but knows the external objects of thought by the mind only by inference. Therefore, we can say according to Jinabhadra that one possessed of manahparyaya knowledge, object thought of by others only by way of inference. Manahparyaya implies that we know the modes of the mental states and The not the objects that are thought of by these mental states. objects are known by inference. 1 Sarvarthasiddhi 1, 9. 2 Tattvartharajavartika 1, 26, 6-7. 3 Visesavasyakabhasya 814. 4 Tattvarthasutra 1, 29, It seems that the second tradition propounded by Jinabhadragani is more consistent, because in manahparyaya it is not easy to get the intuition of the object thought of by the mind. The objects of thought are secondary and are not the main content of the thought. If manahparyayajnana were to intuite the mental states and objects, then this kind of intuition would have grasped the formed and the formless

Page #391
370 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY objects, but this does not happen. In this case of the avadhijnana, we can intuite objects having forms, but in the case of manah paryaya, we intuite the mental states. The objects of the mental states are known through inference and then because of this, the objects which have form and also formless can be known through manahparyaya by means of inference.1 Dis TWO TYPES OF MANAHPARYAYA Manahparyayajnana has been distinguished into two types : (1) rjumati and (2) vipulamati. Vipulamati intuites subtle forms of mental states, while rjumati is not able to grasp the subtle forms.* Rijumati is temporary and it may last for sometime and vanish but vipulamati once obtained will continue atleast till the attainment of kevalajnana.s THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE OF MANAHPARYAYA Manahparyayajnana intuites different aspects of the knowedge from the points of view. i. e. dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava. (1) From the point of view of substance (dravya) manahporyaya intuites mental statge and events, through the manovarganas (fine particles of atoms constituting mind). (2) From the point of view of place (ksetra) the scope of the manahparyaya jnana is restricted to the region, where the human beings live. (3) From the point of view of time (kala) it intuites mental states for innumerable moments of time and it can extend pto past and future. (4) From the point of view of nature (bhava), it can intuite the infinite states of manovarganas. AVADHI AND MANAHPARYAYA Avadhi and manahparyaya jnana are both extra-sensory perceptions which the self can get directly without the help of the sense-organs and the mind. But both these forms of intuition are restricted to the cognition of objects having form. Therefore, they are incomplete and not perfect forms of cognition. They are vikala pratyaksas. But kevala jnana is the complete and perfect. Therefore, it is sakalapratyaksa. 1 Jaina Darsana-Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. 2. Nandisutra, sutra 31. 3 Ibid 31.

Page #392
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 371 Avadhi and manahparyaya can be distinguished from each other on the basis of the clarity (visuddhi). The criterian of clarity (visuddha) is,here, not concerned with any inadequacy. But it has reference to the intensity of experience, and the subtlety of cognitive forms. Manahparyaya intuites the mental states and events of other individuals. The distinctions between the two forms of direct cognition can be presented in the form of an analogy. A physician knows and treats the patient in general. He is the doctor, which cures the diseases of whole body. But there are doctors who are specialists as of eye, ear, heart etc., the different parts of the whole body. In both types of the physicians there is a difference of generality & speciality. Similarly, avadhi and manahprayaya have the distinction of subtelty, and un-subtlety of perception. Manahparyaya intuites the objects in its subtlety. While avadhijnana gets a less subtle congnition of the objects. With reference to the ksetra, avadhijnana can intuite the objects from the minutest part of the finger in the entire cosmos. While manahparyaya is restricted to the human abode only. Avadhijnana is possible for obtaining in all the four states of existence. But manahparyaya is restricted to the human being of self-controlled character. The scope of Avadhijnana is to intuite the objects having form and not all of its modes. But the manahparyayajnana intuites mental states which are based on the finest particles of matter constituing mind. KEVALAJNANA (OMNISCIENCE) 1. Kevalajnana is direct cognition of everything in the universe. It has a reference to the knowledge which cognises without the help of sense-organs and the mind. The self intuites everything without the help of the sense-organs and the mind.1 With the destruction of the jnanavaraniya karma (knowedge obscuring karma) all distinctions disappear. And it is not necessary to have mind and sensory-organs as instruments for gaining the knowledge. According to the Jainas the soul in its pure form is pure consci 1 (a) Visesavasyakabhasya. (b) Visesavasyakabhasya vrtti 84

Page #393
372 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ousness and knowledge. It is omniscience. It is obscured by the karmas and the veil of karma is removed as omniscience dawns. In the Vyakhyaprajnapti Ganadhara Gautama asked Bhagavana Mahavira, "does the kevali (omniscient) knows through the indriyas or the manas ?" Mahavira replied, "he does not know the objects through the indriyas and mind." Then Gautama asked, how does he know? Mahavira replied, 'the omniscient knows the limited and the limitless. These cannot become objects of sense-organs'.1 Kevala also means pure.2 When the jnanavaraniya is removed, all impurities are removed and therefore it is called kevala (pure knowledge). Kevala also means full or complete. When the jnanavaraniya karma is removed one gets full or complete knowledge. Therefore, it is kevala. The other meaning of the word kevala is extraordinary or superior. When the jnanavaraniya karma is removed, the knowledge that we get is superior and nothing is comparable to the knowledge. Again kevala would also mean ananta (endless). When the jnanavaraniya karma is removed, knowledge that we get has no end, because all the veil that cover the knowledge have been removed. Kevala would mean omniscience (sarvajnata), although sarvajhana has to be taken in the right sense. When the impurities and obscurations of knowledge are removed, we get pure, super, normal and perfect knowledge. Therefore, there would be no deficiency or defect in that knowledge. Therefore, in this sense kevalajnana may be called perfect and pure knowledge and omniscience. The Jainas are agreed on the nature of the omniscience. Omniscience intuites all substances with all their modes of the world and the beyond. All substances and modes are intuited by kevalajnana(r). 1 Vyakhyaprajnapti 6, 10 2 Visesavasyakabhasyavrtti 84 3 Ibid 84 4 Ibid 84 5 Dasavaikalika 4, 22. 6 Tattvarthasutra I. 30.

Page #394
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 373 There is nothing to be known and nothing unknown. It is the knowledge of all substances and modes of the past, present and future, all in one. The fullest realisation of the capacity of the self when all the impediments are removed is to be found in the keyalajnana. When the kevalajnana is attained, all imperfect knowledge is washed away. THREE VIEWS ABOUT DARSANA AND JNANA _.? The Jainas make a distinction between anakara and sakara upayoga. They say that anakara upayoga is indeterminate cognition, it is darsana. It is intuitive in nature. While sakara upayoga is determinate cognition, it is jnana in nature. Sakara upayoga is specific cognition and cognises the specific qualities of the objects. Sakara & anakara are the distinctions made on the basis of determinate and indeterminate cognition. 2 The distinction between jnana and darsana in the Jaina epistemology has been very ancient. The karmic matter which obscures knowledge is linanavaraniya karma &that karmic inatter which obscures darsana is called darsanivaraniya karma. When the relevant karma is removed, we get jnana or darsana according to the intuition, where jnanavaraniya karma or darsanavaraniya karma has been removed. In the agama literature jnana has been referred as janai and darsana has been referred to as pasail". Digambara acaryas contend that the function of jnana is external and is meant to grasp the external objects. It is extroverted (bahirmukha). The function of darsana is introverted and is mainly concerned with intuiting and grasping through intuition. It is antarmukha, introverted. Acarya Virasena, in his commentary called Dhavala on satkhandagama of Puspadanta says "what comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is jnana and comprehension of the self of the same nature is darsana. Virasena says that the only difference between them is that jnana knows the external reality while the darsana intuites the internal self. The distinction between darsana and jnana has been made on the basis of the nature of cognition, whether the cognition is of general or 1 2 3 Tattvarthasutra bhasya 1, 9. Prajiapana sutra Safkhandagama, Dhayala sika 1, 1, 4

Page #395
374 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY particular. According to this view darsana intuite the general features of an object without analysing the particulars. While jnana gives the cognition based on the analysis of the specific features. According to the Jainas the universal and the particular are equally important and both of them are the essential charactertistics of the object. Without the one, the other cannot exit. Therefore, that cognition which grasps only the universal without understanding the specific features would not be a valid cognition. Similarly, the congnition which analyses the specific features of an object without grasping the universal aspect would also be not a true cognition.' Presenting this view point Brahmadeva, in his commentary on Dravyasangraha has suggested that the distinction between darsana and jnana also be studied from the points of view of naya, especially from the logical and metaphysical point of view. From the logical point of view,it would be better to say that darsana grasps the universal features of the object. But from the metaphysical point of view the self is to comprehend the general and the specific features of the object or the inner or the outer aspects.2 From the practical point of view darsana and jnanas can be distinguished but from the noumenal point of view, there is no distinction between darsana and jnana. The distinction between darsana and jnana made on the basis of the principles of generality and particularity has been refuted by the Jainas from another point of view. It is said that this distinction has been made with a view to adopting the phraseology and falling in line of the other systems for the sake of logical distinctions. But one who has understood the Jaina philosophy properly has grasped the agamic view of darsana and jnana. The agamic point of view emphasises that the aiman is distinct from the other objects, but darsana and jnana are aspects of the same upayoga of the soul." This type of the view of the non-distinction between darsana & jnana has however been held by a few philosophers. Many Jaina philo 2 3 4 Saskhandagama, Dhavalavrtti 1, 1, 4. Dravyasangraha vrtti gatha 44. Dravyasangraha vytti gatha 44. Dravyasangraha vrtti gatha 44.

Page #396
375 sophers do accept the distinction between the sakara and anakara upayoga. Their contention is that darsana is a expression of anakara upayoga which grasps the general features of the object. While jnana is an expression of the sakara upayoga which analyses the specific features because it is the expression of upayoga in its anakara form. Upayoga has these two forms sakara and anakara. But here there is no distinction of generality and particularity in the object. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY We may now consider the relation of darsana and jnana from the point of view of kala (time). Jaina philosophers are agreed that in the case of chadmastha (one who has reached upto the 10th gunasthana), he experiences darsana and jnana successively. But in the case of the kevalin regarding the experience of darsana and jnana there are different views. Three views have been mentioned. The first view says that the kevalin experiences darsana and jnana successively. The second view gives importance to the simultaneous cognition of darsana and jnana. According to the third view there is no difference between darsana and jnana. They are identical. In the Prajnapana, there is a dialogue between Bhagavana Mahavira & Ganadhara Gautama. Gautama asked Bhagavana Can we say that a kevalin who grasps the nature of the Ratnaprabha prthvi through forms, example, its colour and area etc., at the same time he intuites the object. Mahavira said, this interpretation is not correct. Gautama asked, does the kevalin not simultaneously grasp the general nature of the prthvi & understand the nature through various categories of cognition. What is the reason for this? Mahavira said, that the cognition of the kevalin is sakara and his intuition is nirakara. Therefore when he intuites (darsana), be does not cognise. But when he gets cognition, he does not inituite. They are successively possible. In this way up to the adhahsaptamiPrthvi, from Saudharmakalpa to Isatpagbhara prthvi, from the paramanu (atom) to the innumerable pradega skandhas, you should understand this order of cognition and intuition.1 1 Prajapana pada 30, sutra 319, p. 531.

Page #397
316 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Avasyakaniryukti and Vise savasyakaniryukti maintain that in the case of the kevalin the darsana & jnana upayoga cannot be present simultaneously. The Svetambara agamic tradition supports this view and maintains that jnana and darsana upayoga cannot be had simultaneously even in the case of the kevalin.8 The Digambara tradition however contends that in the case of the kevalin it is possible to have kevaladarsana and kevalajnana simultaneously. All the Digambara acaryas are agreed on this point." Acarya Umasvati also says in the case of mati and srutajnana e.c., there is the successive presentation of jnana and darsana, while in the case of the kevalin the intuition and cognition are simultaneous.5 Acarya Kundakunda, in the Niyamasara says just as the light and heat of the sun are simultaneously experienced, so also the kevalin experiences darsana and jnana simultaneously. The third tradition is presented by acarya Siddhasena Divakara, in the fourth century A. D. In his Sanmatitarka prakarana, he has stated that distinction between jnana and darsana could be made upto manahparyaya, but in the case of the kevaladarsana and kevalajnana it is difficult to distinguish between the two.? Jnanavaraniya and darsanavaranijya karmas are destroyed simultaneously. Therefore, expressions of upayoga as a result of the simultaneous destruction of jnanavaruniya and darsanavaraniya karmas, cannot be distinguished between jnana and darsana as successively experienced. 8 In the case of the keyalin when he attains kaivalya, mohaniya karma is first destroyed and then the jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya and antaraya 1 Arasyaka-nir yukti gatha 779 2 Visesavasyaka bhasya 3 Bhagava'i 18, 8; 14, 13. 4 (a) Gommatasara jivakanda 730 (b) Dravyasangraha 44. 5 Tartvarthasutra bhasya, 1, 31. 6 Niyamasara, gatha 159 7 Sanmati prakarana 2, 3. 8 Sanmati prakaraac ?,,

Page #398
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 377 karmas are destroyed simultaneously. When there is no succession of time in the destruction of jnanavarniya and darsanavarniya karmas there is no possibility of the successive presentation of the kevalajnana and kevaladarsana. They have to be presented simultaneously. And also because there is no distinction in the upayoga, although upayoga expresses itself in the anakara and sakara forms. In the case of the kevalin state there is no distinction between darsana and jnana. And to consider darsana and jnana as distinct would raise some other difficulties. If the kevalin is to know everything at one moment of experience, then for all times he will be knowing everything. In that case, his knowiedge would not be perfect because he would go on knowing and experiencing. In that case, how can it be omniscient. But in the case of omniscience, knowledge and experience are perfect and one. And there would we no distinction between jnana and darsana. Jnana is determinate (savikalpa) and darsana is indeterminate (nirvikalpa). This kind of distinction between the determinate and indeterminate cognition is not be found when the karmic matter obscuring knowledge and intuition are destroyed.2 As long as there is perfect, not but imperfect expression of upayoga there would be distinction between determinate and indeterminate cognition. But when upayoga is perfectly and fully expressed, there would be no distinction of this type. One more difficulty would be that darsana (intuition) would be without the element of jnana. But in the case of jnana, the element of darsana is involved.3 In the case of the kevalin when be gets omniscient knowledge, then darsana again would not be possible because darsana is not involved with jnana although jnana involves darsana. Therefore, the successive cognition of darsana and jnana in the case of the perfect knowledge would not be possible. The Digambara tradition accepts the simultaneous cognition of darsana and jnana. But in the Svetambara tradition there are three streams of thought : (a) successive cognition of the two, (b) simultaneous cognition and (c) non-difference of darsana and 1 2 3 Sanmati prakarana 2, 10 Sanmati prakarana 2, 11. Ibid. 2; 22.

Page #399
378 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY jnana in the case of the kevalin. These three streams of thought have been coordinated from the point of view of (naya) by the famous logician Yagovijaya in the vikrama 17th century. From the point of view rjusutranaya, successive presentation of darsana and jnana in the case of kevalin is acceptable, because the view-point is to look at the particular moment the present. Jnana and darsana in these moments can be considered as the cause and the effect. However, the relation of the cause and effect would be the view-point presented by rjusutranaya. From the point of view of vyavahara naya, the distinction between jnana and darsana is accepted so the simultaneous cognition of both would be the acceptable view. From the point of view of samgrahanaya the emphasis is on non-difference between jnana and darsana. It appears to be from the point of view of rational consideration that the non-difference point of view is more adequate. There is the agamic point of view which is based on the natural process of cognition and intuition. It is natural that in the first moment we experience the particulars as distinct and then we cognise the general among the particulars. The characteristic of cognition (jnana) is of this type. It is a synthesis of bheda (difference) and abheda (non-distinct) and bhedabheda. However, knowledge with its emphasis on distinction and darsana with its emphasis on non-distinction cannot occur simultaneously. Thus we have studied the problems of knowledge and intuition from the agama yuga to the darsanikayuga. Detailed discussion on these problems would be beyond the scope of this small book. 1 Jnanabindu.

Page #400
14. - PRAMANA : A Study PRAMANA IN THE AGAMIC LITERAUTURE HER In the agamic literature, we get elaborate discussion of pramana (valid source of knowledge). A good deal of discussion has been carried out on regarding the nature and types of pramana. In the Bhagavati sutral there is a dialogue between Gautama Gapadhara and Bhagavana Mahavira. Gautama asked Mahavira, :Bhagavan ! in the case of the kevalin who is to relinquish the body for the last time, his cognition and intuition are perfect. Similarly, can we say how a chadmastha, gets knowledge ? Mahavira said, in the case of the chadmasth1, knowledge is not spontaneous, it is through the valid sources of knowledge like sravana (bearing) and other pramanas. On this, Gautama asked a question on the basis of hearing? Mahavira replied, from the point of view of kevalin......... Gautama again asked by what pramana does the chadmastha get knowledge ? Mahavira replied, knowledge is possible through four pramanas : pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and agama. The description of the four pramanas has been given in the Anuyogadvara. In the Sthananga, the term pramana, and hetu has been used. From the point of view of niksepa pramana has been distinguished into : dravya pramana, ksetra pramana, kala pramana and bhava pramana. In the Sthananga where the word hetu is used the four-fold 1 2 Bhagavatt sutra 5, 3, 191, 192. Sthanaaga 321.

Page #401
380 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY distinction of pramana as pratyaksa (direct), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison) and agama (testimony) has been presented. In some places three-fold distinction of pramanas has been mentioned. In that case the word vyavasaya is used, meaning determined cognition. Vyavasaya is of three types, pratyaksa, pratyayika and anugamika. 2 There are different traditions regarding the distinctions in the types of pramanu, some have mentioned three pramanas and some other four pramanas. Samkhya philosophy mentions three pramanas and Nyaya mentions four pramanas. Both these traditions, are mentioned in Sthananga. In the Anuyogadvara there is an elaborate discussion of the pramana which is mentioned below. L. PRATYAKSA (DIRECT) Pratyaksa has been distinguished into two types as (1) indriya pratyaksa (sense-pratyaksa) and (2) no-indrija pratyaksu (knowledge without the help of the sense-organs). Indriya pratyaksa is of five types, as (1) auditory perception (Srotrendriya pratyaksa) (2) visual perception (caksurindriya pratyaksa) (3) alfactory experience (ghranendriya pratyaksa) (4) experience of taste (jivhendriya pratyaksa) and touch experience (sparsanendriya pratyaksa). No-indriya pratyaksa is of three types : (1) avadhi pratyaksa (clairvoyance) (2) manahparyaya pratyaksa (telepathy) and (3) kevala pratyaksa (omniscience). The cognition through mind (manasa pratyaksa) has been included in the sense-experience (indriya pratyaksa). Therefore, there is no separate mention of manasapratyaksa. The later pbilosophers have given a separate status for the cognition through mind. ANUMANA (INFERENCE) Anumana (inference) Ias been distinguished into three types as (1) purvavat (from cause to effect) (2) sesavat (from effect to cause) and (3) drstasadharmyavat (from universal to practicular). Nyaya', 1 Sthananga 338 2 (a) Sthananga 185 (b) Sthananga, Abhayadevavrtti 3Nyayasutra 1, 1, 5.

Page #402
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 381 Bauddhal and sankhya2 darsana have accepted these three forms of inference. Puryavat - Puryavat proceeds from the cause to the effect, from the antecedent event to the consequent. For instance, when there are clouds, we say it will rain. Similarly, a mother seeing her son after several years, when he returns from abroad. In the first few moments she could not recognise, but she sees a sign on his body and instantly she recognises him as her son. This is purvavat anumana.3 Sesavat-sesavat anumana is from effect to the cause, from cause to effect, from quality to the substance, which is the substratum of quality from constituent forms to the agent of constitutent forms and the source of dependence to the dependent. These are the five types of sesavat anumanas. From effect to the cause, we move from knowing the effect & we infer the cause. For example, from the sound of particular thing, we say it is a sound of particular instruments. We also proceed from cause to effect as in the case of, we infer the quality of a pot from the clay. We infer the nature of the substance having qualities on the basis of the qualities, as for example we infer the standard of gold by rubbing it; from the smell, we infer the nature of the type of the flower, from the taste, we infer the salt of any other object. In the case of inferenc: from the constitutents to its objects, we infer, for example, from the horns the type of buffalo, from the ivory the elephant, from the hood we infer the existence a horse and from mane we infer the existence of lion. When we infer the dependence of an object, from the object of dependence, we infer the presence of fire from the smoke; from the presence of a collection of swans, we infer the existence of water and from the good nature of a man we infer his family background. 1 Upayah sdaya p. 13. 2 Sarhkhyakarika 5-6. 3 Anuyogadvara sutra, pramana prakarana

Page #403
382 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY We infer from the cause to the effect in two types. But in the case of avayava and avayavi etc., there is no such distinction. Drstasadharmyavat-In this, the inference is from the general to the particular, on the basis of common points and similarity. For instance, on the perception of a particular object with its quality, we infer the nature of similar objects. In this, from the particular object we go to the species and gunas. For example, when we see a person we infer the existence of similar persons in that land. There is a form of inference called visesa, drsta anumana. In this, we distinguish one object from a large collection of objects and we infer the specific nature of that object. For instance, when we distinguish one man and recognise him from among the large crowd, we use this inference. Samanya drsta inference is like upamana (comparison) while visesa drsta upamana is analogue to pratyabhijna (recognition). Anuyogadvara has made a distinction in anumana as of three types on the basis of the consideration of time : (1) atita kala grahana-When we see the greenery all-round and the overflowing ponds, we infer that there has been good rain in that part. (2) pratyutpanna kala grahana-In this also, we infer the causes from the effect, although the causes may be remote causes. For instance, if an ascetic who goes for begging food, if he gets sufficient food, then he infers that there is plenty in this part. (3) anagata kala grahanaIt is from antecedent even to the consequent event. For instance, when we see thunder and lightning and when the sky is full of dark clouds, we infer that it would rain heavily. Apart from these three types of anumana based on the criterian of time we may infer wherein contrary situations might give negative inference. For instance, if we see the land very dry, we infer that there has been famine. When the ascetic does not get sufficient food during his begging round, he infers that there has been famine in that area. in THE CONSTITUENT PROPOSITIONS OF INFERENCE (Syllogism) Syllogism refers to the constituent propositions which are

Page #404
383 called avayavas. There is not much discussion about this problem in the original agamas. The syllogism is meant for the communication of one's thoughts to others. It presents the methodology and the procedure of expressing one's thoughts to others so as to it effective and valid. Dasavaikalikaniryukti has a discussion about this problem and it mentions various forms of syllogism from the syllogism with two propositions to the syllogism with ten propositions.1 The syllogism with two propositions has been mentioned with two specific functions. In the case of syllogism with only two propositions, hetu is not mentioned only udaharana is mentioned along with pratijna. We give below a schemata of the number of propositions involved in the various types of syllogisms based on the number of propositions. (1) a syllogism with two propositions mentions pratijna and udaharana (2)a syllogism with three constituent propositions mentions pratijna, hetu, udaharana, (3) a syllogism with five propositions mentions pratijna, hetu, drstanta, upasamhara and nigamana. A syllogism with ten propositions has been elaborated as follows pratijna, pratijnaviSSuddhi, hetu, hetuvisuddhi, drstanta, drstantavisuddhi upasamhara, upasamharaviSSuddhi and nigamana, nigamanavisuddhi. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The ten membered syllogism has also been mentioned in the following way: pratijna, pratijnavibhakti, hetu, hetuvibhakti, vipaksa, pratisedha, drstanta, asanka, tatpratisedha and nigamana, 2 It may be noted that there is sufficient discussions about the twomembered, three-membered and five-membered syllogism in the other darsanas. But Bhadrabahu alone has given an analysis of the tenmembered syllogism." 2.3 UPAMANA Upamana is comparison. It is nearer to analogy in the western logic. It is based on the points of similarity (sadharmya) and points of difference (vaidharmya). Accordingly, upamana is distinguished 1 Dajavaikalikaniryukti 50. 2. Dasavaikaalika niryukti 92. 3. Nyayasutra 1, 1, 32. 4. See Jaina Darsana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 250.

Page #405
384 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY into two types : sadharmya upamana and vaidharmya upamana. Sadharmya upamana is further distinguished into three types :-(a) Kincit sadharmyopanita. It consists of the similarity in terminology like aditya and khadyota, candra and kumuda. The terms applies to the similar objects on the basis of similarity of functions denoted by the words. (b) Prayah sadharmyopanita-This is based on the points of similarity perceived in two objects. For instance, when we see an animal in the forest which resembles the cow we say that this animal is like the cow. Because there is "sufficient similarity between the two. (c) Sarvasadhrmyopanita-In this there is complete similarity so as to deny the same quality to the other individuals and other objects. For instance, the object or the individual is unique because the qualities that one possess cannot be applied to others. For example, indra is Indra only, Tirthankara is tirthankara only and Chakravartin is chakravartin only. Vaidharmyopanita upamana is based on the points of difference. It is also of three types : (a) Kincit vaidharmyopunita-In it we express the distinction between the cow and the horse (b) Prayovaidharmyopanita-In this, there is emphasis on the distinctions on the contrary qualities. For instance, the black is not white. (c) Sarvavaidharmyopanita, In this, the specific and peculiar qualities have been specifically distinguished. For example, a good man did actions which are good only and bad man very often does action consistance with his character. Dr. Mohanlal Mehta says these examples are not adequate to explain this type of analogy. We may give examples of good and the bad, the servant and the master etc. s AGAMA Agama is testimony. It is the acceptance of an authority. It is of two type (i) Laukika agama and (il) Lokottara agama. Laukika agama refers to the expression regarding the empirical events and Lokottara agama refers to the philosophical and spiritual discussions 1. Jaina darsana Dr.-Mohanlal Mehta

Page #406
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 385 as given in the fastras. For instance, we can mention Mahabharata and Ramayana as laukika agamas while the ai gas like Acaranga, Sulrakrtanga, Samavayanga, Bhagavati, etc., coming from the omniscient tirthankara are lokottara agama. Lokottaragama has been distinguished into three types as sutragama, atthagama and tadubhayagama.' Agamas have also been distinguished into three types from another point of view : atmagama, anantaragama and paramparagama.. Agama has also been distinguished into two forms as artharupa and sutrarupa. The tirthankara preaches the doctrines to his disciples, i.e. artharupa agama. It is atmagama for tirthaikara because it comes from the omniscient only and not received from any other person. Ginadharas receive the teaching of the tirthankara directly. There is no third person in between them. Therefore this arthagama received by the ganadharas is anantaragama for themselves. But on the basis of this arthagama, ganadharas present it to the others in the forms of Sutra (aphorisms), therefore this sutragama for the ganadharas is atmagama. The disciples of the Ganadhara receive the teaching directly and there is no third person involved. Therefore, agama teaching received by the disciples from the Ganadharas direcly is called anataragama for the disciples. But from the point of view of the content of the teaching it is paramparagama, because it comes from the master to the teacher in succession. In this sense, the teachings received by the ganadharas cannot also be considered as atmagama because it was received from the tirtharkara. For the disciples of the ganadharas and their disciples in succession sutragami and arthagama are to be considered as parumparagama only. :. So far, we have discussed the nature of pramanas. The validity of the pramanis have been discussed in the agamas and on the basis of that discussion, the later acaryas have developed a system of logic 1. Anuyogadvara 49-50. p. 68-Punyavjayaji Ed. 2. Ibid, sutra 470, p. 179. 3. Ibid. 4. Avasyaka niryukti, gatha 92. 5. Anuyogadvara sutra 470, p. 170.

Page #407
386 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY presented in the methodology of the polemic (purva paksa) and the construction of the theory of logic on the basis of the polemic. In this, the later acaryas have made a significant contribution to the development of Indian logic. 3. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAMANA Pramana is characterised by valid knowledge. The relat on between jnana and pramana is one of pervaded and the pervasion. Jnana is pervasion (vyapaka) and pramana is vyapya, Jnana is of two types : Yatharatha (valid) and ayathartha (invalid). Valid knowledge is that which is consistent with the previous knowledge and is definite and certain. That knowledge which is expressed by doubt (sarsaya) and perversity (viparyaya) is invalid knowledge. The knowledge which is valid is free from doubt and is certain and well-defined. DE CAUSATION OF PRAMANA The general characteristic of pramana is--"pramayah karanam pramanan" It is the instrument of the prama. "Tadbhayati tatprakaranubhavah prama" that object which is known as it is, called prama. It is the object of valid cognition. For the cognition of an object several factors contribute, but all of them cannot be called karana (instruments of knowledge). Karana is that which is the instrument of knowledge and by which knowledge is cognised. The conditions for using an axe would be the hand and the blade. The hand would be a condition no doubt, it is the less essential condition than the blade. - The philosophers are agreed on the general nature of pramana, but there are differences of opinion regarding the sources of the instruments (karana) of valid cognition. In the Buddhist literature consistency and adequacy (yogyata) are the criteria or karana. In the case of the Naiyayayikas sannikarsa (contact) & jnana (cognition) are the criteria or karana of pramana. But in the Jaina darsana jnana is considered to be karana,2 Although Sannikarsa and adequacy 1 (a) Nyayabindu 1, 19, 20. (b) Pramana samuccaya, p. 24 (c) Tavttvarthaslokavaritika 1, 3, 44. 2. Nyayabhasya 1, 1, 3,

Page #408
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 387 etc., are useful for grasping the meaning of the cognition, but jnania is much more important for understanding the meaning. Jnana establishes the intimate contact between itself and the object. . DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF PRAMANA The acaryas have used different terminology for explaining pramana. According to the Jainas the essence of pramana is well-defined knowledge (nirnayaka jnana). Acarya Vidyanada in his Tattvarthaslokavarttika (1, 10, 77) says that pramana is that whicb establishes the correct and well-defined knowledge. This is the characteristic of knowledge. Pramana determines the exact meaning of a thing. This is the characteristic of pramana. The other characteristics mentioned about pramana are only variations of the descriptions of the determinateness of the meaning of the thing. The use of other characteristics mentioned are due to three reasons : (1) to differentiate between the description of the pramana given by one school from the description given by the others, (2) to refute the description of other characteristics of pramana mentioned by other schools of thought and (3) to refute the discrepancies and errors in the description of nature of pramana. Acarya Siddhasena in his Nyayavai ara says that the function of pramana is to illumine the self and also the object. Therefore, it is self and the other illuminating. The Mimarsakas do not accept the view that the pramana is self-illuminating. According to them pramana is to cognise the object in a definite way. We cognise the object and therefore, we are the subject of cognition and cognition is the knowledge. This is the 'paroksa jnanavada".1 Nyaya-Vaisesika consider cognition and the object of cognition as distinct. According to them, all knowledge except the divine knowledge is cognised by the other cogntion, Sankhya philosophers consider cognition as a product of prakrti and therefore, acetana (unconscious). According to them, cognition is the mode of prakrii, it is sometimes a perverse expression of the mode of praksti. There 1. Mimarhsa slokavartika 184-187.

Page #409
388 fore, it is unconscious. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this argument and has used the word sva-abhasi.1 According to Jainism, he says jnana is sva-abhasi.1 Its characteristic is cognition. The cognition is not the object of cognition nor is it the pramana, as in the case of the cognition of Iswara. Cognition is not unconscious and not the mode of prakrti. Knowledge is the characteristic of the soul.* A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The Buddhists consider cognition as real and the world of physical object as an appearance. Acarya Siddhasena has refuted this stand by using the word "para abhasi". He has shown that the objects have an independent existence and reality, independent of the cognition of the object. The Jainas maintain that knowledge and the object of knowledge both are real. Viparyaya (fallacious knowledge) is not a praman. Therefore, the term "badhavivarjita" has been used. In this way, acarya Siddhasena has attempted to distinguish the characteristics of pramana as described by the Jainas from jnana given by other schools of thought. Akalanka has used the term "anadhigatarthaka" and "avisamvadi''for explaining the characteristic of pramana. And he has justified the use of the word "sva-paravabhasaka" as the characteristic of pramana. Acarya Manikyanandi has followed the footsetps of Akalanka. He has suggested that pramana determines the exact nature and the real nature of the object. In this, he has followed the tradition established by acarya Samantabhadra and Siddhasena and developed by Akalanka.7 Vadidevasuri says that pramana is sva-para-vyavasayi jnana (cog 1. Syadvadamanjari, karika 12. 2. Ibid, karika 15. 3. Vasubandhuk rta vimsatika. 4. Syadvadamanjari, 16. 5. Astasati, 175. 6. Nyayaviniscaya tika, p. 63. 7. Pariksamukhamandana, 1, 1.

Page #410
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 389 nition of the self natured cognition and of the object.)' In this, he has not given importance to the word apurva used by Manikyanandi. During this time, two schools of thought were developed. Digambara acarya did not accept the knowledge which is received by stimulations and which is continuous (dharavahi) as pramana, while Svetamvara acaryas has considered the cognition also as pramana. Vidyanandi has made it clear that the cognition that determines the self-natured cognition and of the nature of the object as pramana, whether it is received and comprehended or not comprehended. Acarya Hemacandra has discussed this question in an elaborate way and had used very subtle and meaningful terminology, so we may say that the exposition of the Acarya Hemacandra had given the final picture of the nature of the pramana. He says pramana gives the correct knowledge of the object (samyak nirnaya).3 The Digambara and the Gretambara tradition bave used the different terminologies, but really there is not much of difference in the content of the meaning of the interpretations given by the two traditions. The development of the controversy regarding the nature of the pramana reflects the prevailing logical tendency and disputation of the time. KNOWLEDGE AND PRAMANA The analysis of the nature of pramana shows that there is no difference between the knowledge and pramana. Jnana means samyakjnana (right knowledge). Knowledge reveals itself and cognises the object. The Jainas hold the nature of cognition as sva-par-prakasaka. Just as a lamp reveals the objects and also reveals itself, similarly knowledge reveals itself and cognises the other objects. The Jainas have said that pramana is knowledge which is fruitful, determinate and certain. In the Nyayabindu. nirvikalpakojnana (indeterminate knowledge) has been considered to be a pramana' But the Jaina logicians 1. Pramananayatattvaloka 1, 2. 2. Slokavartika 1, 10, 78. 3. Pramanamimarasa 1, 1, 2. 4. Nyayabindu, prathama prakarana.

Page #411
390 refute this view and they say that nirvikalpa cognition cannot be a pramana nor even as apramana because if there is nothing determinate we cannot say whether it is pramana or not. Nirvikalpa can be attributed to darsana. Pramana cannot be valid cognition if it is not determined and determinate. d A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY THE CRITERION OF THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMANYA) Pramana is truth. There is no doubt about it, although different words have been used for describing the word pramana. Several words have been used to describe the nature of pramana yathartha, abadhitattva, arthakhyapana, apurva, arthaprapana etc. These words have been accepted by some schools and rejected by others. Acarya Vidyanandi explains the characteristics of abadhitattva as that wherein we find the absence of the badhita (discrepancies). The criterion of abadhitattva is its being incoherent and consistent.1 Acarya Abhayadeva has refuted this stand in the Sanmati tika.2 Acarya Akalanka, the Buddhists and the Mimamsakas maintain that the function of pramana is to make explicit the meaning of the word and to make the knowledge from the known to unknown. Vadideva suri and Hemacandra have refuted this stand." In this way, there has been a long controversy on the nature and function of pramana and the relation of pramana and jnana. It may be noted that the pramana has to point to the pragmatic test. Unless the valid cognition leads to the successful knowledge, the cognition cannot be considered to be valid. At the same time it should be noted that cognition and truth must be consistant and mutually related. 1. Tattvartha slokavartika 175. 2. Sanmati tika p. 614. 3 Tattvartha slokavartika 175. 4 (a) Pramananayatattvaratnakaravarika 1-2. (a) Pramanimimsa.

Page #412
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 391 THE VALIDITY OF COGNITION We have seen that pramana refers to samyagjnana (correct knowledge). But it is necessary to distinguish between the correct knowledge samyagjnana and mithyajnana. The Jaina logicians have given the criterion of validity of knowledge on the basis of the two-fold functions (i) the self-cognition of the cognition and the cognition of the object. Sometime cognition becomes valid by itself and some time it has to be verified by means of some other cognition. Therefore, the words svatah and paratah are used. If cognition is self-valid, it is true to itself and it is a pramana. But in some cases, cognition has to be verified through some other mearis. The Naiyyayikas do not accept the validity of knowledge. According to them the validity or other wise of cognition has to be determined by some other criteria outside cognition. Therefore, it is praratch pramanya. * The Mimamsakas maintain the view of the self-validity of knowledge. The invalid knowledge is due to external circumstances and differences. It is not necessary to have any external criteria for determining the validity of knowledge. This is the svatah pramanyavada. The Naiyyayikas do not accept the svatah pramanyavada (self-validity of knowledge). According to them validity of knowledge can be determined by circumstances whith are eternal to knowledge. That knowledge is valid which corresponds to the facts or the external objects. That which is contrary to the fact is invalid knowledge. This is the criterion of correspondence to determining the truth or the falsity. of knowledge. Sankha darsana is of the opinion that the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both determined by self. There is no necessity of an external condition to determine the validity or otherwise of knowledge. The Jainas are against the three views mentioned above. According to the Jainas, the validity of knowledge can be determined by the self or by the external circumstances according to the situation. They accept both the theories of svatan pramanya and paratah pramanya of the validity of cognition. But they say 1 (a) Pramananayatattvaloka 1, 18 (b) Pramanamimarsa-1, 1, 8.

Page #413
392 the validity or otherwise of congnition is determined by the situation, for instance, a man is thristy, he drinks water and he knows that the water has quenched his thrist. In this cognition, it is not necessary to have external circumstances for determining the validity of knowledge. Again, if we see light coming out from a closed room, and if we do not know from what source the light comes, whether it is from candle or an electric light, we have to open the door and see. In this case, the validity is determined by external circumstance. Therefore, in this situtation it is paratah.1 RESULT OF PRAMANA A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Now the question has been asked: what is the result of the effect of pramana. In the Pramanamimamsa (1,1,34) it has been suggested that the aim of pramana is to make the object clear. It is to illumine the object. Pramana enables to comprehend the two objects of the nature of the object. We cannot get a correct nature of the object unless we have the knowledge of the distinction between pramana and apramana. The direct result of pramana is to remove ignorance. This is the effect of all forms of pramanas. If we consider the effect of pramana in various degrees, we find that in the case of kevalajnana it leads to happiness and bliss. With this knowledge, one gets full comprehension, just as the rays of the sun's light make everything clear. The omniscient person wards away ignorance and enjoys eternal bliss. He develops an attitude of non-detachment for the things of the world. For those who have other forms knowledge except the kevalajnana they develop the capacity of comprehension and discrimination. Similarly, they develop tendency towards good action and a disgust towards evil actions." THE NUMBER OF PRAMANAS In Indian philosophy, there is no agreement between the different schools of Indian thought on the question of the number of pramanas. The Carvaka school maintains that sense-perception is the only valid source of knowledge (pramana). Vaisesikas recognise pratyaksa and anumana as pramana. Sankhya darsana mentions three pramanas; 1. Jaina Darsana-Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, p. 255-257, 2. Nyayavatara 28.

Page #414
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 393 pratyaksa, anumana and sabda. Nyaya darsana accepts four pramanas : pratyaksa, anuiana, upamana and sabda. Prabhakara school of Mima. msa has given five pramanas: pra'yaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda and arthapatti (implication). The Bhatta school of Mimamsa gives six pramanas by adding abhava or anupalabdhi (cognition of absence). Buddhists have mentioned only two pramanas : pratyaksa and anumana. In the Jaina epistemology, there are three different views regarding the number of pram inas. In the Anuyogadvara sutra four pramanas : pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and agama have been inentioned. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara mentions three pramanas : pratyaksa, anu'nana & agu.. Unasvati in his Tartvarthasutra, Vadidevasuri in his Promananayatattvaloka, and acarya Hemacandra in the Pramanamimamsa have recognised two prumanas : pratyaksa and paroksa. The Buddhists have recognised prtayaksa and anumana.2 The Jainas have mentioned that anumana is a form of paroksa pramana and there are ag ina etc., many forms of paroksa praman:. The Jainas maintain that the Buddhist classification of pramana is not exhaustive, because it does not mention agama etc. as a pramana. The contention of the Carvaka school that indriyapratyaksa is the only pramana is not correct because it ignores other forms of pratyaksa, which we can get without the help of the sense-organs directly by the soul. Our knowledge of the mental states of others on the basis of the observation of external behaviours cannot be considered to be pratyaksajn ina. It implies anumana. Similarly, without anumana it is difficult to get th: knowledge of the relation of the cause and effect. We may state that without anumina it is difficult to establish one's ova position on the basis of the refutation of the opposite position and also to establish the truth for otherwise of the existence of the other world.3 The criterion of the validity of knowledge is that cognition should be valid and it must correspond to the facts. For all the 1. (a) Pramananayatattvaloka 2. (b) Prainanainimamsa 1, 1,9 10, 2. Nyaya'indu 3. 3, Pramanamimamsa 1, 1, 11.

Page #415
394 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY forms of pramana, this is the primary criterion. The pramanas can be classified into pratyaksa and paroksa. The anumana, upamana and agama are considered to be paroksajnana. Arihapatti is the form of anumana, abhava or anupalabdhi is a form of pratyaksa. The object has its nature of existence or non-existence. We can apprehend the existence and non-existence and both these states are directly appreheded. Therefore, it is not necessary to enumerate abhava or anupalabdhi as a separate pramana. For example, we perceive the absence of the book on the table, in this, we perceive the table and in perceiving the table without the book which was there in the past, we perceive the absence of the book. This is a form of perception. Therefore abhava cannot be different from pratyaksa. .? THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRATYAKSA The Jainas contend that clearaess and distinctness (vaisadya) as the charactetistic of Pratyaksa.1 Siddhasena Divakara maintains that pratyaksa apprehends the meaning of the nature of the object directly without the medium of any other form of source of knowledge. % This criterion can be understood when we know the distinction between pra'yaksa and paroksa. Akalanka in the Nyayariniscaya states that clearness and distinctess (sp.stunanz) is a criterion of pratyak sa. He has used the terms "sikara" and anjasi to explain the criteria of clearness and distinctness for pra'yaksa. Jaina darsana does not accept sannikarsa as a crterion as having been used in the Vaisesikas and not do the Jainas accept "kalpanapod'a tra" as the criterion of pratyaksa. Vaisadya would mean that type of cognition which does not require any other forin of cognition to make the meaning clear. In the cas: of anu nara and other forms of puroksa jnana there are intermediary cognition and media like lingajnana (the knowledge of the middle terin), vyapti (universal concoinmitance of the middle 1 (a) Pramanimimarisa 1, 1, 13. (b) Pramananayatattvaloka 2 (c) Pariksamukha, 2, 3 2 Nyayavatara sloka 4, 3 Nyayaviniscaya sloka 3.

Page #416
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY major term) and smarana (memory etc). This is the differenciating term and the characteristics of pratyaksa. Pratyaksa, therefore, cognises the object directly and fully without any other media. But while in the case of anumana, we proceed from previous knowledge to some other knowledge based on the previous knowledge. That knowledge which is based on the previous knowledge, is paroksa jnana, it is not direct. TWO TYPES OF PRATYAKSA The Jainas have classified pratyaksa into (1) atmapratyaksa and (2) indriyanindriya pratyaksa. Atmapratyaksa is the knowledge that the soul gets directly without the help of sense-organs. The indriyanindriya pratyaksa is empirical knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs through the mind or knowledge obtained through other sources like reason and testimony. 395 Aimapratyaksa has been classified into two typeys: 1. Sakala pratyaksa which is kevalajnina, 2. Vikalapratyaksa which is nokevalajnina. It is partial knowledge short of omniscience. Nokevala jnana is of two types: (1) avadhijnana and (2) manahparyaya jnana. Indriya-anindriya pratyaksa has four stages (1) avagraha (2) iha, (3) avaya and (4) dharana. Atmapratyaksa is the direct knowledge that the soul gets without the help of indriyas, the manas, and other pramanas. This is paramarthika pratyaksa or no-indriyapratyaksa. In the indriya pratyaksa one gets direct cognition through the medium. of sense-organs and the manas, without the help of the middle term or the process of reasoning. Siddhasena Divakara1 says that direct knowledge is that knowledge which is obtained through the sense-organs without the medium of reasoning proceduce & the analysis of the meaning .In this analysis, he uses the word aparoksa and that is a significant word. Because Naiyyayikas consider pratyaksa jnana to be the knowledge which is obtained through the contact of sense-organs and the object. They do not use the word aparoksa because it would convey negative meaning 1 Nyayavatara 4.

Page #417
396 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY for them. But the knowledge obtained through the contact of the sense-organs and the object is not know ledge that the soul or the cog. niser gets directly, it is, therefore, not pratyaksa. This contention of Siddhasena Divakara has the support in the Bhagavati' & Sthananga? on the anlysis of pramana. Acarya Hemacandra, Akalanka and Manikyanandi have elaborated the nature of pratyaksa They have used the word "visada" as a characteristic of knowledge, in place of "aparoksa". From the practical point of view the use of this terminology has been mentioned and has the support of Nandisutra. According to them pratyaksa has been distinguished into two types as mukhya and sarivyavahara. The mukhya pratyaksa is the knowledge that the soul get directly with out the help of the sense-organs. The samvravahara pratyaksa is that knowledge which one gets through the sense-organs and the manas. In this analysis of the samvyavahara pratyaksa the words "aparoksataya" and 'arthagrahana" do not figure in as the criteria of pratyaksa. Therefore, the word visida has been used. The word visada is meant to clear the meaning of ihe cognition with reference to clarity and perceptual judgement. The meaning of the sarvyavahara pratyaksa and anumana would be clear with the use of visada. However, the word aparoksz is nearer to the concept of the Velan:ic anlaysis of pratyaksi, and the word visada has similarity with the description of the nature of pratyaksa, as given by the Bud. dhists. But considering the content of the meaning in the two verses there are some fundamental distinctions. The Vedantins maintain that pratyaksa jnana is possible through the medium of antahka. rana (inner sense-organs). The antahkarana takes the modfication of the object i.e., ceen & is reflected through the intellect to the soul and that is a pratyaksa jnana. But according to the Jainas, there is no other medium between the object and the cognition in the case of the pra. tyaksa jn ina. To consider that antahkarana is illumined by the suddhacaitanya (pure consciousness) and also to maintain that antalkarana gets modified to the size of the object is not very adequate explantion. 1 Bhagarati 4, 3. 2. Sthananga 5, 3. 3. Nandisutra 2, 3.

Page #418
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY It is, therefore, more appropriate to maintain that suddhacaitanya directly cognises the object without the help of any modifications or reflections. According to the Buddhists pratyaksa is nirvikalpa jnana. It is indeterminate cognition. But Jainas maintain that nirvikalpaka bodha cognition (dirsana) is not determinate cognition. Therefore, it is neither pratyaksa nor even praman.1 397 We have already seen that pratyaksa according to the Jainas have been distinguished from two points of view: (1) paramarthika (the ultimate point of view) and vyavaharika (phenomenal point of view). In the paramarthika pratyaksa we have mentioned two types: sakala and vikala. And vyavaharika pratyaksa has been distinguished into four stages: avagraha, iha, avaya and dharana. PAROKSA 2 That knowledge which is yathartha (adequate) and yet which has the characteristic of being unclear and distinct is called paroksa pramana. 8 Paroksa is opposite of pratyaksa. In this, there is the absence of clearness and distinctness (vaisadya and spastata). Paroksa is of five types (1) smarana-smrti (memory), (2) pratyabhijna (recognition) (3) tarka (logical discussion), (4) anumana (inference) and (5) agama (testimomy). * Most of the Jaina logicians have made these five distinctions in the paroksa pramana. But Vadiraja in his commentary on NyayaviniSScaya called Pramana nirnaya,5 that paroksa can be classified into two types (i) anumana and (ii) agama. Anumana is of two types: (1) primary (mukhya) and (2) secondary (gauna). Gauna anumina is 1. Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva (Hindi) Part I, 264-265 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 2, 4 3 (a) Pramanamimamsa 1, 2. (b) Pramananayatattvaloka_3, 1 4 Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 2. 5 Pramananirnaya p. 331.

Page #419
398 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY. of three types (1) smarana (2) pratyabhijna and tarka. Smarana is the cause of pratyabhijni and pratyabhijna is the caure of tarka. Hence these three are the instruments in the formation of anumana. Therefore he has considered these as gauna. There is another reason mentioned in tire Nyayaviniscaya, in that work pratyaksa, anumana and agama have been mentioned as prainanas, and other pramanas have been included as form of anumana. LB REFUTATION OF CARVAKA VIEW The Carvaka maintains that sense-percetion is the only valid sou. rce of knowledge, there is no other pramani. The criterion for determining the pramana suggested by Carvaka is avisamvada (non-contradiction with fact). And the other pramanas except the indriya pratya. ksa are based or do not possess these characteristics. Anumana and other pramanas are based on probability. And there would be distinctions and differentiations in the strength of probability on the basis of the time element and the element of form. In these cases, it would be difficult to find the characteristics of avinabhava and avyabhicara (unerring). For example, a sour and bitter fruit may be transformed into a sweet fruit through the passage of time and in a different place due to some material transformations also. Therefore, the inference regarding the fruit as bitter would not be adequate. Similarly, the case is with smarana and other pramanas. But this contention of the Carvaka is not satisfactory, because even to affirm the sweetness or otherwise of the fruit in the first instant would involve the process of inference and other forms of pramanas. Similarly, to make a distinction between pratyaksa pramana and other forms of pramanas as invalid source of knowledge on the basis of the criterion of avisamvada (non-contradiction) would involve the process of inference. Similarly, it is not possibl: to know the mind of the others without the help of the inference. Because through the indriyas we cannot know the mind of others. We can know the mental states of others by inference on the basis of the behaviour and their sppech.: The inference is based on 1 Dharmakirti, Pramanamimarisa

Page #420
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the universal relation between the middle term and the major term and the application of that universal relation to specific instance. If this application is inconsistent and incoherent, valid inference would not be possible. The Carvaka maintains that the other world is unreal. This conclusion of Carvaka is also based on inference. If we do not make use of the inference for getting knowledge, life would be difficult and knowledge impossible. It would be necessary to correlate the cause-effect relation for the sake of becoming valid conclusions in inference. Similarly, in practical life we have to depend on the testimony of others for the sake of knowledge. Otherwise the knowledge and the life would not be possible on surer foundation. Human knowledge has no limits. Therefore, knowledge obtained through othermeans than the direct cognition through sense-organs, like inference and testimony would not become inconsistent and invalid. 1 MEMORY (SMRTI) 3 The revival of the mental traces due to retention could be memory. Memory depends on recollection of the mental states retained in the mind of past experience. The recollection of the impressions received in the past is due to various causes, physical and the mental. The mental states of interest would be an important condition of memory. Jainas consider memory as a form of prajna. Other darganas in Indian philosophy do not give the status of prama a to memory. According to them memory cannot become a pramana because it has reference to the past events and the past events were perceived in the past and are no longer present the mind. At most, this is a form of revival of perceptual experience. But Jainas maintain that the correct knowledge of object with reference to the past, present or the future may be considered to be a pramana. Memory presents the valid cognition of the past event through recollection. Therefore, it is pramana. Knowledge received through memory is 1 (a) Pramanamimamsa 1, 2, 3 (b) Pariksamukha 3, 3. 2 Mahendra Kumar Jain, Jaina darsana, p. 294-295 399

Page #421
400 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY consistent and has a reference to the past event. Because the criterion of pramana would be correctness (patharihata) and correspondence to the fact of life. The other Darsanas maintain that the past experience is no longer present and therefore how can it generate a valid cognition. The Jainas contend that the object is not the cause of cognition and cogni. tion is possible through its own conditions of cognition. Cognition has its own capacity of expressing itself and revealing the object. Similarly, the thing can become the object of cognition. The relation between the cognition and the object is not to be considered as a relation between the effect and cause. The relation between the object and the cognition of the object can be expressed as the relation between the illumination and the illuminator. Therefore, the Jainas have rightly contended smrti (memory) as a pramani. If we do not accept smrti as a pramana, then anumana cannot be considered as a pramana. Because anumana depends on the linga (middle term) which is not based on pratyaksa. Similarly, the cognition of the major terni is not possible without the memory of the universal relation of the major term and the middle term. M:nory, therefore, is an essential condition of inference. V.3 PRATYABHIJNA (RECOGNITION) Pratyabhijnana is the valid cognition that we get through the synthesis of pratyaksa and smarana (memory). In this, we say this is Devadatta. We recognise that the cow at home is the animal that we see. We also say that the bufallo is different from the cow. These statements are expressions of recognition. The process of cognition in this would be, we see Devadatta, we recollect that we have seen him in the past and we recognise that Devadatta that we see, is the same Devadatta that we have seen earlier. We see an animal in the forest called gavaya. We remember the cow at home which is similar to this animal and we say, we recognise that this animal is like the cow at home. This 1 (a) Pariksamukha 3, 5. (b) Pramanamimarsa 1, 2, 4,

Page #422
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 401 is called sadrsa pratyabhijnana as it is based on similarity. But we can recognise the distinction between the buffalow and the cow. It would be recognition based on the point of dissimilarity. Therefore, it is "vaisadrsa pratyabhijnana''. Pratyabhijnana is recognition arrived at through the process of perceptional memory. Similarly, all relational cognition like the statements : this is near, this is far, he is taller, and the elderer etc., are all forms of recognition. The Buddhists maintain that nothing is permanent in the world. Everything is fleeting. Therefore, nothing continues to remain from the past. Pratyabhijnana cannot be considered as a pramana. Because, it is said to be cognition which proceeds from the past to the present. But as a thing is not possible and there is no continuity of thing, there cannot be a cognition of the past in the present. The past cognition has been destroyed. The present cognition has no reference to the past. Therefore, recognition cannot present the past cognition into the present. Pratyabhijnana would include two cognitions. One refers to "that which was experienced in the past", & the other cognition refers "this which is actually experienced now". These two cannot become one cognition. Therefore, the Buddhists do not consider recgonition as a pramana. The other systems of Indian philosophy like Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimarhsakas, say that pratyabhijnana is a valid cognition, but it is a form of perception and it can be included in the pratyaksa. But the Jainas contend that the Buddhist view of pratyabhijnana as two separate cognitions and therefore not a pramana and the view of other systems of philosophy making praryabhijnana as a from of perception are both inadequate. Pratyaksa has a reference to cognition of the present. Memory refers to the cognition of the past event, but pratyabhijnana gives a synthesis of the cognition of the present with the recollection of the past incident. Therefore, it is a pramana and is a valid source of knowledge. It is a paroksa pramana. TARKA (HYPOTHETICAL REASONING) -1 Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is conditioned reasoning.1 1. Pramanamimarsa 1, 2.

Page #423
402 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY It is also called uha. It has also been referred to as cinta in the Jaina sastras. It is inference based on the previous condition. It has two constitutent conditional propositions as the major premise. It can be stated as "if 'a' is 'b' then 'c' is 'd', and because 'a' is 'b' therefore 'c' is 'd'." For instance, if there is fire, there is smoke and if there is no fire there is no smoke. Vyapti is the universal relation between the middle term and the major term. Tarka is inference based on the positive and negative conditions of the universality of relation between the middle term and the major term. Generally all schools of Indian philosophy have accepted tarka as a pramana. The Naiyayikas maintain that tarka is a from of inference and not an independent pramana. It is an auxilliary pramana and is based on conditioned relation between the antecedent and the pramana. The knowledge that we get through tarka strengthens the validity of knowledge. Pramana is valid cognition and tarka strengthens and supports this cognition by hypothetical reasoing. Therefore, the Naiyayikas has considered tarka as secondary pramana. Logicians like Udayana and Vardhamana have considered that tarka has function of supporting the valid conclusion by presenting the universality of condition. Knowledge of vyapti is strengthened by tarka. But the Nyaya does not accept tarka as an independent pramana. The Buddhists have accepted that tarka is useful in the establishment or vyapti, but still they do not give the tarka the status of a pramana. But Jainas have recognised it as a paroksa pramana. According to the Jainas the knowledge of vyapti in its positive and negative aspect is possible through tarka. " Anumana (inference) cannot take the place of tarka, because it is based on tarka. The knowledge of vyapti is possible through tarka and inference is based on knowlege of vyapti. Therefore, anumana is possible because of tarka. And anumana cannot take place of the tarka. The two are different pramanas. in ANUMANA (INFERENCE) Anumana is knowledge which is arrived at through the means

Page #424
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 403 of other knowledge. It is possible through the middle term and therefore it is said that anumana is possible through linga.' Linga is the middle term which connects the major and minor terms. Just as we can infer the existence of fire through the perception of smoke. Smoke is the linga. It is the means through which inference is possible. Fire is the major term about which we infer. It is called Sadhya or lingi. Dhuma (smoke) is the attribute of fire. Without fire the existence of smoke is not possible. Therefore, the relation between fire and smoke is of avinabhavi (universal positive relation). The absence of fire will also be the absence of smoke. The relation is also universal considered form the negative sense. But the converse is not true. By the absence of smoke we cannot infer the absence of fire, because there may be fire without smoke, but there cannot be smoke without fire. The relation between the major term and the middle term will have to be universal, both positively and negatively. In the sense that the presence of the middle term will bring the presence of the major term. And the absence of the middle term will bring the absence of the major term. This type of relation is the basis of valid inference. Akalanka terms this relation as "sadhyavinabhavabhinibodhaikalaksana". This type of relalion is also called anyathanupapatti, as it presents the universality of relation of the negative sense. Sadhana or linga is called hetu. All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Carvaka, accept anumana as a pramana. Carvaka darsana does not give anuinana the status of pramana, because it is based on vyapti. And vyapti cannot be grasped by direct perception through perception. The Carvaka does not accept the phenomenon of extra-sense-perception or knowledge obtained not through the sense-organs, but through other means. The other systems of philosophy have distinguished it into 1 (a) Pramanamimarsa 1, 2, 7. (b) Pariksamukha 3, 14. 2 Laghiyastraya 3, 22

Page #425
404 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY two types : (1) Svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and (2) Pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others). SVARTHANUMANA (INFERENCE FOR ONESELF) Svarthanumana is inference for oneself in which we get valid inference on the basis of the vyapti. But this is not expressed in the verbal proposition. It is meant for oneself and the moment it is expressed in the form of proposition it becomes pararthanumana. The universal relation may refer to co-existence of succession. For instance, in the case of the invariable concommittance of mortality, and man, there is the universality of co-existence. But in the case of the presence of clouds and the consequent rain there would be succession. SADHANA In the Pramanamimarhsa, acarya Hemacandra mentions five forms of sadhana : (1) Syabhava, (2) karana, (3) karya, (4) ekarthasamavayi and (5) virodhi.1 Svabhava sadhana is the essential characteristics of the object. As for instance, heat is the characteristic of the fire. Sabda (sound) is non-eternal because it is not the cause (karuna), it is the effect (karya). When we see the collection of dark clouds in the sky, we infer the possiblity of rain and in this, the relation is between cause and effect (karana-karya). In the inference between cause and effect there must be necessary relation between cause and effect and not the contingent relation. Moreover, the absence of that cause should bring the absence of the effect. The inference from effect to cause is the type of inference in which we proceed from effect to the cause of that event. For instance, we see the open space outside wet, when we get up early in the morning, then we infer that it must have rained. In this, we proceed from effect to the cause. In some cases it is possible to have a conjunction of effect as in the case of juice of many fruits. To infer the nature of the juice from the fruit is the inference from cause to effect. But to infer from the juice, the nature of the fruit would be from effect to cause. This 1 Pramanamimarhsa 1; 2, 12

Page #426
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 405 type of inference, is called ekarthasamayayi inference, because there is the co-existence of the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object. Inference from the negative relation of universality would be virodhi sadhana. For instance, fire and cold are contrary to each other. If one exists, the other cannot exist. In the presence of the fire, there would be no cold. But a small portion of fire cannot - remove cold, therefore the relation between the cause and the effect or the attribute and the object of attribute has to be adeqdate (samyak). PARARTHANUMANA (INFERENCE FOR OTHERS) 1 Pararthanumana is inference meant for others. It is communicated for the sake of others. Svarthanumana is meant for self-expression. In the case of pararthanumana, a person communicates his reasoning or the methods of reasoning for the sake of coming to the conclusion to other person who does not know. It is communicated through the propositional form (avayava). This knowledge and inference is not meant for one who already knows and has the knowledge of the methodology or reasoning. In pararthanumana knowledge is obtained by the self (svayamjnanatmaka), and while it is communicated to others through the medium of communication in propositional forms. The conceptional content of pararthanumana has to be communicated in the propositional form for the sake of giving knowledge to others. This type of communication in pararthanumana may be considered in two forms : (1) affirmative and (2) negative. Both of them are based on the universal relation between the sadhya and sadhana. In the affirmative form of communication, the universal relation of the presence of the effect or the thing having attribute. For instance, the presence of smoke on the hill entails the inference of the presence of fire. The negative form of communication of universality of relation, gives the relation between the cause and the effect and the 1 Pramanamimarhsa 2, 1, 1 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 23

Page #427
406 .: A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY thing and its attributes in a negative way. The absence of the cause will entail the absence of the effect, Similarly, the absence of the essential attribute will entail the absence of the thing. The absence of fire on the hill will entalil the inference of the absence of smoke. AVAYAVA (CONSTITUENT PROPOSITION OF INFERENCE) ? Pararthanumana has to be communicated in propositional forms for the sake of giving knowledge to others. The question arises regarding the number of constitutent propositions forming pararthanumana. Logicians are not agreed on this point. Sankhya philosophers say that there are three constituent propositions (avayava) : (1) paksa, (2) hetu and (3) udaharana. Mimarnsakas mention four constituent propositions; (1) paksa, (2) hetu, (3) udaharana and (4) upanaya. The Nyaya mentions five constituent propositions like : (1) paksa, (2) hetu (3) udaharana (4) u panaya and (5) nigamuna, We have already discussed about the number of constituent propositions that the Jainas present, Generally for an intelligent man, two propositions mentioning the major term and middle term in one proposition and the second, the minor premise are sufficient for inferring the conclusion. But to men of dull intellect, ten propositions would be required for explaining the process of inference. Generally five constitutent propostions are accepted. PRATIJNA Pratijna is the first proposition. It expresses the statement regarding the major term, It is the statement of what is to be proved,1 For instance, we state there is fire on the bill. HETU Hetu is the statement of reason which mentions the presence of the middle term, It states--because there is smoke, the presence of the smoke is a symptom for the presence of the fire, although we can say the presence of the smoke does not entail the pesence of fire. 1 2 Pramunamimamsa 2, 1, 11 Ibid 2, 1, 12

Page #428
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY UDAHARANA Udaharana is the statement of the major premise containing the universal relation between the major and middle term, And also the examples. In the Aristotelian tense it is a major premise, which examples the universal proposition and in which there is the universal relation between the major and the middle term, But in the udaharana, there is also the example. For instance, the statement would be "where there is smoke there is fire as for example in the kitchen," Udaharana is, therefore, a combination of the deductive and inductive process. While Aristotelian major premise impurely deductive and formal,1 UPANAYA Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to a particular situation. It expresses the middle and minor term and says that this particular situation falls under the category of the major premise. For example, there is smoke in this hill, this is the application of a particular situation to the general proposition. NIGAMANA 407 Nigamana refers to the conclusion which we arrive at finally on the basis of the combination of minor and major premises. It is the result of the application of the vyapti and paksa dharmata. It is the restatement in a final form what was intended to be proved in the pratijna, For example, we say therefore there is fire on the hill. The inference based on five constituent propositions may be summarised as follows i (1) Pratijna-there is fire on the hill, (2) Hetu-because there is smoke. (3) Udaharana-where there is smoke there is fire, for example, in the kitchen. (4) Upanaya-this hill has smoke. 1 Pramanamimamsa 2, 1, 13 2 Pramananayatattvaloka 3, 49, 50 3 Ibid 3, 51, 52

Page #429
408 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (5) Nigamana--therefore this hill has fire. This form of inference is based on the universality or relation between the middle term and the major term in the positive sense of the existence of the relation, Therefore, it is called sadharana drstanta, which shows the universal relation in the absence as in the case of the absence of fire in the water. 3) AGAMA Agama is testimony, It is the acceptance of the truthful statements of worthy man. It is the aptayacana. Aptapurusa is the man of authority. He is the expert in the subject and he knows how to present his knowledge in a subject in a proper form. He is free from hatred and attachment. He is objective in his approach and has no prejudices or bias. He is not afflicted by mithyatva, From the practical point of view statement of such an aptapurusa is important, In the pararthanumana aptatva is not necessary while in the agama vould be necessary, The statements of an aptapurusa (the authority) are valid for all the time--past, present and the future. Tirthankaras are considered to be the aptapurusa par-excellence. We have already discussed about the agama as a pramana in the earlier chapter. it would be ne 1 Framapanayatattvaloka 4, 1

Page #430
Part IV -KARMAVADA KANAVADA DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Page #431

Page #432
KARMAVADA : A Synopsis THE IMPORTANCE OF KARMA THEORY The doctrine of karma is the most important doctrine in Indian thought. All the systems of Indian philosophy, except the Carvaka accept the doctrine of karma. Karma is the basic pre-supposition of Indian throught. In this world, there is evident inequality in the status and the experiences of individual men. Some are happy while others are miserable. Very often the virtuous lead miserable life. Bad men are happy. Several attempts have been made in the different philosophies of the world to find out an adequate solution to the problems of inequality in life. The Indian philosophers presented the theory of karma as a possible solution to the inequality in life. The Jainas have given a systematic study of karma theory based on rational considerations. They have infact built a science of karma theory. In the literature dealing with the theory of karma, we find that Jainas have made a substantial contributions to the literature of the karma theory. They are called as karma sastras or karma granthas, In addition to the specific writings on karma theory, we find abund. ant material scattered in various philosophical literauture both agamic and non-agamic on the doctrine of karma. LITREATURE ON KARMA THEORY Jaina Literature on karma theory is very vast & thought-provoking. If we study the Jaina literature on this subject, we can make three divisions of the karma literature : (1) purvatmaka karma sastras, originating from the sources of the purvas. (2) Purvoddhrta karma jastra which is based on purvas and elaborated on the basis of the doctrines given in the purvas. (3) Prakaranika karma scistra, it is an

Page #433
412 elaborate discussion about the development of the theory of karma as discussed in karma literature. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY If we study the Jaina cannonical literature, we find that 8th purva out of the 14 purvas relate to the discussion about the theory of karma and it is called Karma Pravada. Similarly, a part of the second purva is also called Karma Prabhrta. A part of the fifth purva is called Kasaya Prabhrta. There is a discussion on the karma theory in these works. The karma theory is elaborated in the purvoddhrta literature coming after the purvas and based upon original discussion in the purvas. The nature of the development cannot be easily explained as much of the purva literature is lost, according to both the traditions of the Jainas. Though some purvoddhrta karma sastras are available to us but there are slight variations in the presentation of the theory of karma in the two traditions. Digambara tradition gives importance to Satkhandagama and Kasayaprabhrta as the two important works dealing with karma theory. In the Svetambara tradition we have Karma Prakrti, Karma Sataka, Panca sangraha and Saptatika. These are the purvoddhrta granthas. In the prakaranika karma sastras, we have numerous works and they are based on the purvoddhrta karma literature. This form of literature was given during the periods from Vikrama 8th century to the 16th or 17th century. Later litereature of the karma literature is the elaboration of the karma theory. From the point of language in which the karma theory has been presented we find there is abundant literature in prakrt samskrt and regional languages. Purvatomaka and purvoddhrta literature is to be mainly found in Prakrt language. The prakaranika karma literature is also to be found in Prakrt literature along with its commentaries. Later writings on karma theories are generally in Samskrt. There is a good deal of literature on the karma theory in the regional languages like-Kannada, Hindi and Gujarati. Works in Kannada and Hindi mainly belong to the Digambara tradition and works in Gujarati refer to Svetambara tradition. On the whole, the literature on karma theory is very vast and we may estimate that the Digambara .

Page #434
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 413 writing constitute about 5 lakhs of slokas and Svetambara literature comes to about two lakhs of slokas. In the Svetambara tradition, the earliest independent work on the karma theory is the Karma Prakrti of sivasarma Suri. It has 475 gathas. Acarya has discussed in his work the eight processes of the karmic mechanism like bandhanakarana, sankramanakarana, udvartanakarana, apavartanakarana, udiranakarana, upasamnakarana, nidhattikarana and nikacunakarana. There is also a description of the concepts of udaya and satta of karmic matter, There is a commentary (Curni) on this book. There are other commentaries (tika) written on this work acaryas like Malayagiri and Yasovijaya. They are in sanskrt. Acarya Sivasarma has also written a sataka on karma theory and Malayagiri has written a commentary on this. Candrarsi Mahattara, a disciple of Parsvarsi has written pancasangraha and syopajnavrtti on the karma theory. There is also a Digambara 'vork called Prakst Pancasangraha which is earlier than this work. It appears that the Digambara work was not found to be consistent with the agamic version. Therefore, Candrarsi Mahattara wrote this (new) Paneasangraha. Acarya Malayagiri has written a samskst commentary on this. There are other works like Karmavipaka, Karma-stava, Bandba-svamitva, Saptatika and Sataka. There are svopajnabhasyas also on these works. Devendrasuri has written five works on karmi theory based on the early works on this subject. In this way, we find there is abundant literature in the Jaina sastras on the theories of karma. KARMA THEORY AND THE OTHER DOCTRINES Before we study the nature of the theory of karma, it would be necessary to examine the other theories which attempt to explain the inevitable equality among man. Several theories have been presented. We mention a few of them like Kalavada, Svabhavavada, Niyativada Yadschhavada, Bhutavads, Purusavada, Daivavada, & Purusarthavada.? 1 Svetasvataropanisad 1, 2

Page #435
414 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY There is a brief discussion about these theories in the works menti. oned below.) vis KALAVADA (THEORY OF TIME) According to the theory of Kalavada the various states of existence and happiness and misery of individual beings are determined by kala. Kala is the determining principle which creates and destroys. It determines the good and bad of actions. In the Atharvaveda, there is an independent sukta for describing the importance of kala (time). Kala has created the earth (prthvi), it is the basis of the sun and the heat of the sun. All the beings of the world depend on kala. The eyes perceive things due to kala. Kala is the T svara. It is the lord of Prajapati. Kala is the first of the gods. There is nothing more powerful than kala. In this sukta, kala has been described as the first cause of the universe. In the Mahabharata, there is the description of the importance of the kala as a first cause of the universe and is the basis of life and death and happiness and misery of all beings, let alone the human beings.8 In the sastravarta-samuccaya, it has been stated that time determines everything, living being entering into the womb of the mother, the childhood and all other incidents connected with life and experience, are determined by time. Kala is the destroyer of everyone. Kala is awake when everyone is asleep. It is not possible to transgress the limits of kala and it is not possible to have any events or experiences in the absence of kal1.4 The concept of 'Time' is so important in philosophy that the Naiyayikas gave time very important status equal to the creation of the universe.5 1. (a) See Atmaminamsa p. 86-94-lt. Dalsukh Malva nia. (b) Jaina Sahitya ka Brhad Itihas, part 4, p. 8 (c) Jaina Dharma aur Darsina, p. 416--424 Dr. Mobanlal Mehta 2 Atharvaveda 19, 53.-54 3 Mahabharata, santiparva 25, 28, 32 etc 4 Sastravartasamuccaya 165-168 5 Nyayasiddhanta muktavali 45

Page #436
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY SVABHAVAVADA (THEORY OF NATURE) According to this theory, everything takes place according to its nature. Nothing happens contrary to its nature. Svetasvatara upanisad mentions svabhavavada. The Bhagavadgitaa and Mahabharata have given a description of svabhavavada. In the Buddhacarita, we get the description of svabhavavada and it has been stated that according to this theory, the pointedness of the thorns and the variety in the birds and animals is due to the very nature of these things. Svabhavavada does not recognise the will or efforts of the individual. Acarya Haribhadra in his Sastravartasamuccaya, says that according to svabhavavada the events and experiences are determined by the very nature of the objects. For example, the various stages of life like the childhood and oldage are determined by the nature of the individual. There is no external force. Svabhava plays an important part in the life incident and experiences of individual beings. In fact, even pulses and rice can be cooked due to their very nature. For every action, the nature of the event or the object is the determining factor. This theory of svabhavavada does not recogaise the creator or the controller of the universe except the very nature of the objects and even ts. Niyati-vada (Theory of necessity-Necessarianism) According to this theory, everything happens out of necessity. What is to happen must happen, there is no chage in that. Everything is determined and there is nothing left to chance. Freedom of will has no place in the niyativada. The western philosopher Spinoza says that it is due to igonorance that we say that we are free and that freedom of the will is an impotrant factor. Whatever happens, must happen. We cannot change the past because the past has already gone. We do not know the future and it is not desirable to swing 1 Svetasvatara 1, 2 2 Bhagavadgita 5, 14 3 Mahabharata Santiparva 25, 16 4 Buddhacarita 52 5 $astravartasamuccaya 169-172 415

Page #437
416 from hopes and fears. Yesterday is dead and tomorrow is unborn. Everything is determined. It is therefore not proper to blame anyone for the failure nor to offer praises for the success. The first mention of the niyativada is to be found in the Svetasvatura upanisad. But the Buddhist tripitakas and the Jaina agamas have given exhaustive discussion about this theory of niyativada. In the Dighanikaya Samannaphila sutta, there is a description of niyativada as given by Mankhali Gosalaka. According to Mankhali Gosalaka the evil that living beings do, has no other reason except its very necessity. Similarly, the good is necessary and has no other external reasons. We cannot say that we change our destiny and that by our efforts we can build up our personality. The beings in this world experience the pain and sufferings through six types of resistance. Having gone through the 84 lakhs of mahakalpa and the wheel of life, the wise and ignorant are like to become free from misery.1 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY In the Jaina agamic literature also, we get beautiful description of niyativada and akriyavada. Sutrakrtanga, Vyakhyaprajnapti(r) and Upasakadasanga1 have given adequate description of niyativada. In the Buddhist literature, it has been suggested that Pakudha Katyayana, and Purana Kasyapa advocated niyativada. There is not much of a difference between niyativada and akriyavada. They agree in their fundamental principles. But later the disciples of Purana Kagyapa joined the fold of the disciples of ajivikas." Acarya Haribhadra while describing the nature of the niyativada states that everything is determined by the origination of a thing in a particular way, the states of a thing and its destruction are all deter 5 1 (a) Dighanikaya samannaphala sutta (b) Buddhacarita, p. 171-Dharmananda Kaugambi 2 Sutrakrtanga 2, 1, 12; 2, 6 3 Vyakhyaprajnapti, sataka 15 4 Upasakadasanga, adhyayana 6-7 5 Dighanikaya/samannphala sutta 6 Buddhacarita p. 179-Dharmananda Kaugambi

Page #438
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY its mined. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to refute theory because refutation would be a form of niyati according to them. Necessity devours everything.1 YADRCHHAVADA (ACCIDENTALISM) L According to Yadrchhavada, whatever happens, happens accidentally without any reason. There is neither the cause nor reason for happening of the event. Therefore, it is not necessary to explain the causal relation between the different things. Yadrchha means accident and without any reason.2 According to the Naiyayikas, Yadrchhavada refers to animittavada and according to this theory, no explanation can be given for any phenomenon, 3 417 We can find the mention of yidrchhavada in the Svetasvatara upanisad, Santiparva of Mahabharatas and NyayasutraR We can, therefore, say that the yadrchhavida is a very ancient theory. It has been referred to by various names like akasmatvada, animittavada, akaranavada, ahetuvada and yidrchhavada. In this theory, there is no relation between the cause and the effect, the reasons and ground of the reasons. Some philosophers identify svabhavavada with yadrchhavada but it would be apt to say that there are some differences in the sense that svabhavavada makes svabhava (nature), the cause of the event. But yadrchhavada altogether denies the causal relation." BHUTAVADA (THEORY OF ELEMENTS) The Bhutavada maintains that everything in the universe is due to primary elements like earth, water, fire and air. Material and mental phenomena are due to these four elements. There is nothing: 1 Sastravartasamuccaya 174 2 Nyayabhasya 3, 2, 3 3 Nyayasutra 4, 1, 22 4 Svetasvatara upanisad 1, 2 5 Mahabharata Santiparva 33, 33 6 Nyayasutra 4, 1, 22 7 Nyayabhasya-Translated by Phanibhusana 4, 1, 24

Page #439
418 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY outside these elements. Those philosophers who advocate the theory of atman are doing nothing, but expressing the materialistic approach of the atman in the sense that the atman is the product of the elements. There is no atman which is different from this element. There is nothing like a spiritual substance, the body is found due to the combination of the elements and when the body is destroyed the elements are separated and there is no trace of the atman at all. Just as the assembly of small parts of a machine, make a machine running in order. So also the organism disintegrates if the limbs are destroyed. Similarly, by mixing beatle nut, beatle leaves and lime we get red colour. So also the combination of different forms of the four element gives rise to consciousness. Consciousness is a by-product of the metabolic changes in the organism, if the body is destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. In the Sutrak stanga, there is the mention of tatjiva-latsariravada and pancabhutavada. It has been suggested that body and mind are not separated. This theory is also called anatmavada or nastikavada, because it denies the consciousness of mind or God. The theroy of pancabhutavada says that jiva is the product of the combination of the five bhutas (elements) prthvi (earth), jala (water), agni (fire), vayu (air) and akaga (space), There is a difference between tatjiva and tatsariravada and pancabhutavada in that the former maintains that the soul and body are identical while the later maintains that soul and consciousess are products of the combination of the five bhutas. When the body is destroyed, the soul is also destroyed. According to the theory of elements, whatever is amenable to sense is alone real. Whatever is not verifiable to sense-experience, is not real. In this sense, the other world, heaven and hell, the soul and god are unreal. Pratyaksa is the only pramana. The functionac utility is the only criterion or activity of reality. It is in this sens! materialistic and pragmatic in its approach. The Darwinian theory of evolution is an expression of this Bhautikavada. It advocates the possibility of the development of the mind through the evolution from 1 Sarva Darsana Sangraha, parichheda 1

Page #440
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 419 matter. In this sense, consciousness is a form of matter and evolute of matter. PURUSAVADA (THE THEORY OF CREATOR) According to this theory. I svara is the creator, sustainer and the destroyer of the universe. Tsvara is the person who is responsible for the origination, protection and the destruction of the universe. The intelligence and the power of Tfvara remain intact even at the time of pralaya (dissolution) of the universe. Purusavada is, therefore, theistic in approach.1 Purusavada can be distinguished into two forms, as brahmavada and I svaravada which is theistic. Brah navada maintains that just as the spider is the efficient cause of the web, and the banyan tree is the cause of the numerous roots branching dowi virds, so also purusabrahma is the efficient cause of the entire universe, in its creation, maintenance and destruction. Brahm in is, therefore, the basic principle of the universe. It is the upadana karana, in a sense, the primary or the material cause. T svaravadins maintain that matter and spirit are primordial and original substances. The interaction between matter and space and their association is due to Y svara. In this sense, I svara is the efficient cause, of the creation, sustenance and the destruction of the univ. erse. Without Tsvara, nothing is possible and nothing moves. He is the controller of the universe and he determines the nature of things and the movement of things. ... DAIVAVADA (THEORY OF FATE) Daiv.zvada emphasises the predominance of fate which is the determining factor in the activity of man. Everything is predetermined by fate or destiny. The moving finger writes and have written, moves on, not a word can be changed of it. We are children of fate, Man is a slave of fate. We have to suffer the onslaughts of destiny and experience the fruits of karma. Destiny shapes our end and we have to experience the karma determined by fate. There is a distin 1 Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 55 2 Atmamimarsa, karika 89-91

Page #441
420 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ction between daivavada and niyativada although they appear to be identical. Daivavada accepts the authority of karma as a determining factor in the prevalent inequality of status. But in the niyativada, fatalism and determinism are absolute and unexplainable and inexplicable. PURUSARTHAVADA (THEORY OF SELF EFFORT) According to the theory of self effort, individual jivais responsible for shaping its own destiny. There is nothing as fate or destiny which is supreme, Men are masters of their own destinies. Self effort is the main cause of the success of our work or the failure, as it may be. The principle of freedom of the will is the basis of this theory. La THE JAINA VIEW The Jaina view of karma presents a synthesis of determinism and free will, of kala, niyati, purusarth zvada etc. The Jainas maintain that the thing of this world and the activities are complex and as they are complex and we cannot explain the causes of the things and activities with reference to one or the other cause like : kala, niyati, svabhava and purusartha. We have to find out the causes and the predominance of one or the other in the complexity of things, it is necessary to introspect and find out the causes of happiness and misery within oneself. Acarya Siddhasena Divakara says, that it is not proper to give importance to one of the five causes like kala, svabhava, niyati, karma and purusartha and to involve the other. A phenomenon or an event is complex and all the cause may operate in various degree. Acarya Haribhadra also has supported this view.3 We have to take a synoptic view of things and look at these problems from the point of view of anekanta (manysided approach). Acarya Samantabhadra says that we have to seek the causes for the effect born without any individual efforts in fate or destiny. But self effort and conscious effort make towards attaining a goal makes us give importance to purusa for understanding the result in activities. 1 2 Sanmatiprakarana 3, 53 sastravartasamuccaya 191-192

Page #442
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 421 In some cases daiva (destiny) plays an important part and in some other way purusartha also plays an equally imporant role. We have to consider the purusartha and daiva as playing their dual roles in the explanation of things. The Jainas do not accept the predominance of I svara for explaining the living and the non-living substances of the universe. It would be fruit-less to believe that T svara or Brahman is the primary cause of the origination, maintenance and destruction of the universe. Karma is an important factor which cannot be ignored in explaining the inequality of the beings of the universe. Similarly, it would not be an adequate explanation to maintain the cause of the phenomena of the universe and also the states of the jivas, is to be found in some material source like the elements or the matter. It is necessary to posit a non-material substance like the pure consciousness for explaining the activities of the living beings. It is not possible to accept that a material substance becomes a cause of the immaterial or the mental. If that were to be soul, the very causal principle will have to be given out. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate the reality of the material and the imamaterial principle like matter and spirit for explaining the phenomena of the universe and giving an adequate explanation of the fruits of the karm KARMAVADA (A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE) The study of karmavada in the historical perspective would require us to look at the theory and its development from the Vedic times & onwards. The Vedas are ihe earliest records of the world. The question arises: Whether the Vedic seers were aware of the karma theory or not? This has raised a controversy. There are two views on this subject. The first view maintains that the Vedic seers were not aware of the karma theory. According to this view, there is no mention of the karma theory, in the Vedic literature, Vedic philosophers explained the variety and the unique value is the state of individual being with reference to external reality. Some said that the elements are 1 Aptamimarsa 88-91

Page #443
422 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the root causes of the diversity in the world. Some others maintain, that Prajapati Brahman is the ultimate source of this variety in this world. In this way, the cause has been referred as some divine destiny and we find the development of the thought in the Rgveda has been from polytheism, mono-theism and monism. But all of them looked outward to seek the causes of the complexity in the universe. Many gods like Mitra, Varuna were worshiped and invoked to give them happiness in this world. Yajna were performed and oblations like material objects and the living animals were offered in the yajnas. This stream of thought could be traced in the age of the samhita and the Brahmanas.1 But in the age of Aranyakas and Upanisads there is a shift in the emphasis in the philosophical speculation. The invocation to gods and the performance in the yajna become secondary. It is true that there is less discussion of karmavada in the Vedic literature before upanisads. But it is also true that the upanisads were not agreeing regarding the diversity in the world. Some accepted kala and others rarabaha, and some others mentioned the view of svabhava and niyativada. The emphasis on karma casually gains ground. The second view emphasised that although there is no specific and detailed discussion about the karma theory in the Vedic samhitas, there are mentions of the karma thory in the Vedas. In the Rgveda we get the following mantras: Subhaspatih (the protector of the subha karmas), Dhiyaspatih (the protector of good karmas), vicarsanih and visvacarsanih (the seer of the good and bad karmas) and visvasya karmano dharta (the basis of all karmas). These mantras show that there is mention of the karmic theory although in a brief way. The karma theory in its real form can be traced to Rgveda, although the development of the theory is to be found later. In the Rgveda it has also been suggested that one who does auspicions karma attains immortality (amaratva). Jiva continually takes birth and it dies in this world. Vamadeva has given a description of many of his previ 1 (a) Atmumime msa Dalsukh Malvania p 78-79-80 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, Mohanlal Mehta

Page #444
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 423 ous births. Men worship gods and pray to them for the sake of getting themselves away from the evil effects of karma and rebirth. In the Vedic samhitas, there is a description of sancita and prarabdha karma. There is also the description that those who do good karmas go to brahmaloka through the devayana and those who have sadharna karma go to candraloka through pitryana. It has also been described that the jiva due to its karma takes different forms in the different births like a tree or a creeper etc. It is clear from the following mantras "ma vo bhujemanya jatameno", ma vo eno anyakrtam bhujema" etc. It has also been suggested that one can reep the fruits of karma gained by others through their activities. Therefore, these mantras have been recited. Primarily, a jiva experiences the fuits of karma due to the activities performed by oneself, but sometimes through a peculiar influence of a peucliar power, one jiva can experience the fruits of the karma of the other jiva.1 From the discussion of the two views regarding the development of the karma theory in the Vedic literature, it may be noted that there has not been a full fledged discussion of the developed theory of karma in the Vedic literature, although there is mention of the concept of karma. But the concepts like theory of Fate and yajna have gained prominence and karma theory becomes secondary. We do not get adequate discussion about the nature of karma and the mechanism of the working of the karma. In the Vedic literature, there is emphasis on yajna karma and gradually gods have been invoked for the sake of cquitable distribution of karma. Attempts have also been made to integrate karma theory with the theory of yajna; This we find in the Purvamimamsa. We also find that the development of the yajna theory has also led to the development of the devavada (theory of deities). In the Brahmanas we find a gradual substitution of Prajapati in the place of many gods and there is suggestion that the dispensation of karma is done through Prajapati. Prajapati dispenses fruits according to different karmas acquired by individual beings, just like 1 (a) Bharatiya darsana: Umseha Misra, p. 39-41 (b) Jaina Dharma aur Darsana, p. 432

Page #445
424 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY a judge dispenses judgement. This current of thought is also to be found in the philosophical systems like Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sesvara Sankhya and Vedanta. The performance of yajna has also been referred to as karma. It is non-permanent and it exhausts itself the moment the fruits of yajna are dispensed with. But this dispensation needed an agency. Mimamsa darsana introduced the concept of apurva for the purpose of distribution of fruits of karmas with the help of which the gods dispense karma. In Vaisesika thought adrsta has been mentioned as an attribute and it has two forms of dharma and adharma. The Nyaya school consider dharma and adharma as sanskaras. The soul is affected by samskara through the effect of good and bad karmas, under the guidance of ad rsta. Adrsta is the attribute of soul and it remains with the soul as long as the effect of the karma is not dispensed. If I svara were not be dispense the fruits of karma to the jiva the fruits of karma would be meaningless. The Sankhya consider karma as a product of praksti. The good and evil tendencies are influenced by sarskara. Samskara is a disposition to the karmic effect. The Vedic tradition gives importance to the karma and its effects on the individual soul. BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF KARMA V The Buddhist and Jaina philosophies belong to the sramara current of thought which give emphasis on karma. The Buddhists have given elaborate discussion on the invisible effects of karma. The Buddhists say that the variety and inequality among living beings is due to karma. Due to the infatuation and the effect of emotion, the jiva acts through the body, speech and mind, and produces like attachment and hatred. In this way, the wheel of sarsara moves on 1 Nyayasutra 4,1 2 Sankhyasutra 5, 25 3 Milinda pragna 3, 2

Page #446
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 425 eternal.1 It is beginningless and endless. 2 It goes moving upto infinite times. Once, king Milinda asked Nagasena: What is the effect of karma according to the activity of the jiva? Acarya said, it cannot be shown, where the karma resides.3 In the Visuddhimagga, karma is described as formless (arupi).a * Abhidhammakosa describes karma as avijnapti (inexpressible).5 This type of description can be considered sapratigha and not apratigha.(r) The sautrantikas have considered karma as arupa (having no form). And they do not accept the avijnapta nature of karma.7 The Buddhists have considered karma as (subtle) suksma. Bodily, mental and speech activities are described with reference to karma and they are considered to be vijnapta and pratyaksa. In the Budhhist terminology, it is described as vasana and avijnapti. They considered mental samskaras as vasana and bodily and speech samskaras as avijnapti.8 The vijnanavadins have described karma as vasana. Prajnakara says that all activities whether it is of prakrti (pradhana), karma and of Isvara is due to vasana. Even if we consider Isvare to be the judge dispensing karma, therefore it is needed for postulating vasana for explaining variety in the universe. We can, therefore, say in other words, that the karma, activity which is primarily of Isvara also or of pradhana--all these are the streams of vasana, which merge into the ocean of vasana only. According to the Sunyavadins, the neissance (avidya) which is beginningless is to be considered as vasana. The Jainas have made a special contribution to the study of karma theory. The Jaina analysis of karma is scientific and they 1 Anguitaranikaya, tikanipata sutra 33, 1; p. 134 2 Samyuktanikaya 15, 5, 6 Part 2 pp. 181-182 3 Milindaprasna 3, 15 p. 75 4 Visuddhimagga 17, 110 5 Abhidharmakosa 1, 9 6 See Atmamimamsa p. 106 7 Naumi Oriental Conference p. 620 8 Abhidharmakosa 4th pariccheda

Page #447
426 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY have developed the science of karma. There is enormous literature in the study of Jaina theory of karma. Etymologically, considered, karma means activity, it refers to any activity in this tife. The grammarian Panini has defined karma as that which is palatable to the doer is karma.1 To the Mimamsakas, karma is considered to be the performance of the yajna. It is kriyakanda. According to the Vaisesikas, karma or activity is an inherent category of the substance. It is that which is not a quality nor conjunction or disjunction of objects. The Sankhya school describes karma as the expression of disposition (samskara) The Bhagavadgita mentions karma as "karm asilata", i. e, engrossment in action. The Nyayasastra refers to the activities like expansion and contraction, movement in general, movement upwards and movement downwards as forms of karma. In the smarta tradition, the duties of the four stages of life (asrama) and the four Varnas are referred to as karma. The Buddhists have traced the variety and the inequalities of the jivas to the karma. The Jainas have mentioned two forms of karma (bhava karma and dravya karma). Bhavakarma is psychic in nature, it refers to the psychic states responsible for the activities and dravya karma refers to the material particles of karma accruing to the soul and vitiating the pure nature of the soul. Acarya Amrtacandra says that the influx of karma is due to the activities (yoga) that the soul has in contact with the pudgala.5 Karma is material in nature according to the Jainas and it obscures the pure nature of the soul. KARMA IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS The Jainas have given the specific content for the conception of karma. The other systems of Indian philosophy have used different concepts like maya, avidya, prakrti, apurva, vasana asaya, dharmadharma, ad rsta, samskara, daiva, bhagya etc., for 1 Astadhyayi 1, 4, 79 2 Vaisesikadarsanabhasya 1, 17 p. 35 3 Sankhyatattvakaumudi 67 4 Gita 2, 50 5 Pravacanasara tika 2, 25

Page #448
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 427 explaining the phenomenal reality in the world and the consequent inequality in the world. In the Vedanta darsana, we find the use of the concepts like maya, avidya and prakrti. The Mimarsa uses the term apurva. The Buddhists have used the word vasana and avijnapti for explaining the varieties in the universe. Sankhya used the word asaya in a specific sense and we find the use of the words ad rsta samskara and dharmadharma in the Nyaya Vaisesika. In many of the schools of Indian philosophy the term daiva, bhagya, punya and papa have been freely used. In Indian thought it is only the Carvaka darsana which does not believe in the theory of karma and does not accept soul as a substance.. Carvaka does not also believe in the concepts like the past life, the other world and the other transcendental concepts.1 According to the Nyayaa school of thought, the three-fold acti. vity of the jiva (body, mental and speech) are affected by the passions and the emotional upsets like attachment and hatred etc., and it consequently gives rise to dharma and adharma. Dharma and adharma can be considered to be samskara, Vaisesikas have given 24 gunas and adrsta is one of the gunas. It is different from dharmadharma and sanskara.3 Dharma and adharma have been included in sarskara. But in the Vaisesika darsana, they have been included in adrsta. Raga and dvesa (attachinent and hatred) give rise to samskara, saiskara give rise to birth and janma is again responsible for raga and dosa. In this way, the root cause of sarskara is beginningless. According to Sankhya Yoga darsana, the variety and complexity and also resulting in inequality are due to the five Klesas., like avidya, raga, dvesa and abhinivesa. These complexities create sams 1 (a) Jaina Dharma our Darsana p. 443 (b) Karmavipaka ke hindi anuvada ki prastavana --Pt. Sukblalji p. 23 2 Nyayabhasya 1, 1, 2 etc 3 Prasastapadabrasja p. 47 (Choukbambha Sanskrit Series. Ben ares 1930)

Page #449
428 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY kara. Sarhskara has also been referred to as asaya, vasana, karma : and apurva. In this form of description, klesa and sarskara are the root causes of the wheel of life and they are beginningless. The Mimamsakas say that the various activities of men like the performance of yajna gives rise to apurva and apurva gives rise and gives the fruits of all the activities like the performance of yajna. Apurva is the potency born of the performance of duties mentioned in the injunction of the Vedas. The other forms of activities are not considered to be apurva.? The Vedantins have used the concept of avidya and maya for explaining the variety in the universe. Tovara is mayajanya (the product of maya). He dispenses the fruits of karma. In this sense, the experience of the fruits of karma is due to the agency of Iswara. The Buddhists maintain that the dispositions born out of mental crisis are vasana and the dispositions arising out of the speech and bodily activities are avijnapti. The lobha (greed) dvesa (hatred) and moha (infatuation) produce karma. Jiva gets engaged in activities in bodily, mental and speech due to these emotional disturbances, so also these disturbances and activities produce the lobha, dvesa and moha in turn. This is the wheel of life, which is beginningless. THE NATURE OF KARMA ACCORDING TO JAINISM The Jainas have considered karma as material in nature. The karmic particles envelope the soul but do not destroy the real nature of the soul. They have an obscuring function. Therefore, they affect the different paryayas of the soul. Man is in bondage due to handicuffs, he gets intoxicated by liquor and becomes unconscious by chloroform. These are material objects. Similarly, the soul gets obscured and its pure nature is obscured and not destroyed due to the influx of karma. 1 2 Yogadarsanabhasya 1, 5 etc (a) sabarbhasya 2, 1; 5 (b) Tantravartika 2, 1, 5 Sankarabhasya 2, 1, 14 Sankarabhasya 3, 2; 38--41 3 4

Page #450
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Karma is material in nature. The bondage by chain is material. It is of lesser strain that the bondage of jiva by karma. The karmic bondage is subtle, yet material in nature. The karmic particles enter the soul and vitiate its purity. The effect is very subtle and strong. The karmic particles affecting the soul are called karma-varganas. The particles of matter which are responsible for constituting the body are called 'Nokarma-varganas'. The two are the finest particles of matter and we can say that the atoms constituting karma are the material objects. The body is also material. The relation between the two is samavayi (inherent). The earth particles are physical in nature, so also objects formed out of earth particles. Palatable food brings the experience of pleasure. While injury by Sastra (weapons) brings dukha. These two are paudgalika (physical) and so are the experiences of karmas paudgalika. From the point of view of bondage (bandha), jiva and pudgala (matter) are not different, but are correlative. From the point of view of their nature they are different. Jiva is immaterial and formless and is characterised by cetana. While pudgala is material and is unconsciousness (acetana). 429 The objects of sense-organs are the experiences of touch, taste, smell, form and sound. They are murta (having form). So are the indriyas (sense organs) which are the medium of experiences and expressions. Similarly, the experience of pleasure and pain are murta and so are karmic particles which are the causes of these experiences.1 The murta experiences murta only, murta binds the murta. Jiva is amurta but it gives occasions for the bondage of karma. Therefore, jiva becomes occasion (avakasarupa) of the bondage of karma. fold In the Upanisads & the Bhagavadgita, the auspicious and inasuspicious activities have been referred to as karma. But the Jainas use the word karma in the sense of the after-effect of activities," Jiva attracts the karma-varganas by the activity which is threee., bodily, speech and mind. The karmic encrustations with 1 Pancastikaya 141 2 Ibid 142

Page #451
430 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the jiva is due to these activities and the activities are in turn specificated by the karmic enrcustations. In this way, the karmic particles of encrustations and the yoga of the jiva are mutually interactive. Karma and the tendency to activity are intimately related with each other with the mutually casual relation.1 In this way, karma is of two forms : (i) Dravyakarma and (ii) bhavakarma. Dravyakarma affects the bhavakarma and bhavakarma affects the dravyakarma. They are mutually interactive. Just as the seed becomes the tree and the tree gives the seeds. This has been the process for beginningless time. Similarly, interaction of dravyakarma and bhavakarma has been from beginningless time. While discussing the karma theory, we should note that the impact of karma on the soul which is immaterial has been studied in this perspective. Dravyakarma or the bhavakarma are both to be considered in material nature. And also has the characteristic of consciousness as synthesis. Dravya and bhava karma have the elements of the material nature and the element of consciousness is an aspect of soul are prominent, but the question of the presence or the absence of material or immaterial nature is not very important. The interaction of the material and the immaterial and the process of interaction has to be considered. In the hhavakarma there is the atmic aspect which is predominant, it is primarily psychologcial; while in the dravyakarma, the aspect of the material particles is prominent. The question has been asked that if karma is considered to be material particles, what would be the distinction between the pudgala and karma ? Similarly, if bhavakarma has the atmic aspect as predo. minent what is the difference between the soul and bhavakarma ? The answers to these questions can be found in the anlaysis of the nature of the soul as the doer (karta) and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (bhokta). Moreover, it is necessary to understand the distin. ction between the sarhsari jiva (mundane souls) and the mukta jivas. The mundane souls are in bondage of the karma. There is the mixture of the caitanya (consciousness) and the jadatva (material in nat 1 Karmapraksti-Nemicandracarya viracita 6 2 Dharma aur Darsana-Devendramuni (Hindi) p. 42

Page #452
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ure). The mukta jiva is free from this bondage. It is pure consciousness. It has no element of jadatva. The soul that is in bondage in this wheel of transmigration attracts the particles through the activities of speech, body and mind and the fusion' of the karmic particles with the soul takes place just as water mixes with milk. In this way, there is the synthesis of the consciousnes elements and the materiality of the body. 431 A further question arises regarding such synthesis of the material and the consciousness elements in the empirical jiva and also in the karma. If both have the same forms of combination, what is the difference in between the karma & the empirical soul? Answer to this may be given with reference to the nature of karma & jiva. The empirical jiva with reference to karma as jadatva, but same jiva with reference to the conscious aspects is consciousness. There is no possibility of pointing out the extent to which the jivatva and the karmatva could be distinguished in measureable distinctions. It is not possible to say that the jivatva and the jadatva are to be distinguished separately in the empirical existence. The distinction is not primary. But the fusion as apparent. The empirical soul is always engaged in activity and when it is free from empirical activity, it sheds off the karmic particles accruing to it. In such cases, the absolute distinction between karmic matter and the pure soul and consciousness, we can point out that there is absolute distinction. In the mundane soul and in the phenomenal existence these absolute distinctions are not amenable to empirical investigations. But in the highest stage of perfection, there is this distinction, between the pure jiva and pure karma as matter. Therefore, we can mention the three stages of the soul and pudgala karma: 1. suddha pudgala (pure karmic matter), 2. Suddha atman (pure soul) in the state of perfection and 3. the co-mingling of the karmic matter and the atomic element in the samsari jiva. The empirical nature of the individual soul has been referred to as having the characterisation of kart rtva aud bhokt rtva. RELATION BETWEEN ATMAN AND THE KARMAN Atman or soul is immaterial while karma is material in nature. How can there be relation between them? This is a natural question

Page #453
432 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY that has been asked. The answer to this question lies in the phenomenal nature of the jiva in the samsara. The empirical soul is involved in the wheel of tramsmigration from the beginningless time. It is bound by the karma from the beginningless time and has been affected thereby. The jiva that has been in bondage due to karma is considered to be having form. In this sense, the amurta jiva being involved in the wheel of life due to karma is murta and therefore the jiva has both the affects the rupi and the arupi aspects. The liberated jiva is arupi, i. e., having no form, while empirical soul has form. The souls which are free from the karmic matter are not in bondage. The souls that are bound by the karma get themselves further bound by the karma. The relation between the karma and the jiva has neither beginning and is neither prior nor the posterior. Just as the material objects like the jaggery and the flowers when mixed and collected give rise to the intoxicating quality, so also, the material aspects of karma is encrusted with the immaterial self. H.3 WHO BINDS THE KARMA? The karmic bondage is possible only to those who are in bondage. Jivas who are in bondage get the encrustation of karma more and more.1 Due to the rise of mohaniya karma, passions like ragadvesa (attachment and hatred) are produced. They give to the influx of asubha karma (inauspicious karma). The jivas which are free from attachment (moha) are called vitaragi and in their activity there is subhakarma. The new bondige of the soul by the karma is not dependent of the earlier bondage. And the souls which are free from bondage have no karmic bond, We can say that the soul that is bound gets itself involved in bondage. But the soul that is free has no bondage. Gautama asked Mahavira: Bhagavan! Is the jiva that is in misery, affected by misery? or the jiva that is not in misery affected by misery? 1 Prajnapana 23, 1, 292 2 Bhagavati 9 3 Bhagavati

Page #454
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 433 Mahavira said, "O Gautama! the jiva that suffers misery is involved to suffer more misery, but the jiva that is free from attachment and misery does not experience misery. The sorrows afflict those jivas which suffer from sorrow, through passion and the increase of misery. The souls that are free from misery do not attract sorrow. 1 Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! who binds the karma samyata (self-controlled), asam yata (non-self-controlled), samyata. samyata (partially self-controlled). Bhagavana replied, "Gautama! the self-controlled, the not self-controlled and the partial self-controlled, all of them attract the karmic particles. The empirical jiva which is active gets itselfbound by the karma, and it is affected by karma. CAUSE OF KARMIC BONDAGE The bondage of the soul with the karma is from the beginningless time, but the question arises what are the causes of these bondage and Gautama asked Mahavira, to explain the cause of the bondage. Mahavir replied, "Gautama! the rise of the jnanavaraniya karma brings the intensity of the darsanavaraniya karma. From the darsanavaraniya karma comes the darsanamoha karma, Due to darsanamoha karma arises mithyatva -perversity of attitude and from the mithyatva karmic influx arises. 2 The Sthananga3, Samavayanga 5th Samavaya and Umasvati have pointed out the five types of karmic bondage: 1. Mithyatva (perversity) 2. Avirati (lack of self-control), 3. Pramada (negligence), 4. Kasaya (passion) and 5. Yoga (activity).4 In short, the kar nic bondage is possible due to two prominent causes (1) Kassaya (passions) and (2) Yoga (activity).5 1 Bhagavati 7, 1, 266 2 Prajnapana 23, 1, 289 3 Sthananga 4, 8 4 Tattvarthasutra 8, 1 5 Samavayanga 2nd samavaya

Page #455
434 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The karmic bondage is of four parts depending on the processes of the karmic influx. They are prakrti--the nature of karma, sthitithe relation or duration, anubhaga (the intensity of the experience of karma), pradesa (the extension of karmic particles). The bondage based on prakrti and pradesa is possible due to yoga, while the sthiti and anubhaga are due to passions.2 Passions are a primary force for the bondage of karma. In the development of the stages of self-realisation, the two causes of passion and yoga work upto the 10th gunasthana and the bondage due to these two causes is considered to samparayika bandha i.e., the bondage having the force of passions.8 In the case of the souls that are free from passions, still the karmic flow may take place, but it is only due to the activity (yoga). It is temporary and it is called, iryapathika bandha (bondage without passions and have been described to be of two sama yas in the Uttaradhyayana sutra (29, 71) and Prajnapana (23, 13, 37). Pandit Sukhalalji says that according to Digambara tradition the duration of the bondage of the iryapathika karma is one sumaya. There is yoga (activity) in this stage, but there is the absence of passions. Therefore, the karmic bondage due to passion would not be possible. Passions bring the intensity and duration of karma. Kasaya is of four types : Krodha (anger), mana (egoity), maya (deceitfulness) and lobha (greed). Sthananga and Prajnapana have mentioned four causes of karmic bondage. In brief, passions can be considered of trvo types, (1) raga and (2) dvesa. Raga and dvesa 1 Tattvarthasutra 8, 4. 2 (a) Sthananga 4th sthana. (b) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 69 3 Tattvarthasutra 8, 2. 4 Tattvarthasutra 6, 5. 5 (a) Gommatasara karmakanda (b) Tattvarthasutra, Ed. Pt. Sukhlalji., p. 217 6 (a) Sutrak stanga 2, 26. (b) Sthananga 4, 1, 251. (c) Pranapana 23, 1, 290

Page #456
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 435 include all the four forms of passions.' In raga (attachment) deceitfulness, and greed and in dvesa, we find the anger and egoity included. 2 Raga and dvesa bring about the bondage of the eightfold of karma.8 Raga-dvesa are considered to be bhavakarma. The root-cause of raga-dvesa is mohu (infatuation). Acarya Haribhadra says that just as if a man anoints oil on his body and the anointed body attracts the particles of dust deposited on the anointed body. So also the karmic particles get glued to the soul due to raga-dvesa.6 We should remember, that the perversity which is the cause of the bondage of karma is developed by attachment and hatred. The intensity of attachment and hatred crowds the understanding, and brings the perversity of outlook. It clouds the capacity of discrimination. The Buddhists also, like the Jainas consider mithyajnana (perverse knowledge), moha (delusion factor) as causes of the karmic bondage. The Naiyyayikas say that mithyajnana is a cause of moha. Moha is not only responsible for deluding knowledge, but for creating a false identification of the self with the external object and with body, senseorgans, manis, feelings, etc. The atinan deludes itself to be all these, This is the cause of the karmic bondage.7 Vaisesikas support this view. 8 According to the Sarkhya philosophers perversity of outlook is 1. Uttaradhyayana 32, 7. 2. (a) Shanan ga 2, 3. (b) Prajnapana 23. (c) Pravacanasara, gatha 95 3. Pratikramanasutravstti--Acarya Nami. 4 (a) Uttaradhyayana 32, 7. (b) Sthananga 2, 2, (c) Samayasara, gatha 94, 96, 109, 177. (d) Pravacanasara, 84-88. 5 Avasyaka tika. 6 (a) Suttanipata 3, 12, 33. (b) Visuddhimagga 17, 302. (c) Majjhima nikaya mahatanhasankhayasutta 38. 7 (a) Nyayabhasya 4, 2, 1 (b) Nyayasutra 1, 1, 2; 4, 1; 3; 4, 1, 6. 8 (a) Prasistupada p. 538--Viparyaya nirupana (b) Prasistapada bhasya -samsarapavarga prakarana

Page #457
436 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the mithyajnanal and it is the cause of bondage. The Yoga darsana mentions that klesci (mental disturbances) are the causes of the karmic bondage and klesa is caused by avidya.8 Upanisads, Bhagavadgital and Brahmasutra have traced avidya to be the primary cause of bondage. In this way, the other Indian systems of thought are in broad agreement with the conceptual content of the Jaina theory of bondage although there is wide variation in the use of terminology. NISCAYA AND VYAVAHARA NAYA The Jainas have studied the karma theory from both niscaya naya and the vyavahara naya. Niscaya naya is the noumenal point of view in which we look at the ultimate nature of the objects in its inherent quality. Vyavaharanaya is the practical point of view which looks at the objects in relation to other objects. The question arises, whether karma can be described in terms of kart rtva (activity) and bhokt stva (enjoyment) from the points of view of niscaya and vyavahara nayas. Niscaya naya presents the real nature of the objects in its intrinsic value without reference to any other object. In this sense, we can distinguish between the pure self (suddha atman) and the pure matter (suddha pud. gala) and we cannot analyse the nature of the jiva which is embodied and which is mixed with the karmic particles. Therefore, vyavahara naya can present a description of the nature of the empirical indivi. dual ego in relation to the karmic encrustation. From the noumenal point of view, the self is described in its pure state and karma in its pure state. Therefore, there is no contradiction to say that the two descriptions vary without conflict. The subject matter of both are different. Their jurisdiction is limited and distinct. Niscaya naya presents the pure nature of the self and the karma so it connot describe the kart stva and bhokt rtva of karma by the soul. 1 Sahkhyakarika 44-47-48. 2 Matharvrtti 44 3 Yogadarsana 2, 3, 4. 4 Kathopanisad 1, 2, 5. 3 Bhagavadgita 5, 156. 6 Pancama Karmagrantha--prastavana; p. 11

Page #458
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY KARTRTVA (ACTIVITY) AND BHOKTRTVA OF THE KARMAN Some philosophers have ignored this distinction and have analysed the nature of the karma with reference to kartrtva and bhoktrtva from the noumenal point of view. This has created several problems, because in this, there is a confusion in the nature and the function of the suddha jiva and samsari jiva (empirical individual). Similarly, this view has also ignored the karma and the pure matter. According to this view, jiva is not the doer of the karma and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, because karma is essentially material in nature and is not very much concerned with the immaterial jiva. They ask a question regarding the relation between the immaterial jiva and the material karma. How can the immaterial jiva be related to the material karma? Therefore, they say the relation is farfetched and the karmic particles are due to the matter as originating from matter and the soul cannot act upon it.1 1 In this analysis, the jiva is not considered to be related with the material karma with reference and enjoyment, because the conscious jiva cannot be related to the un-conscious karma. Jiva (spiritual substance) cannot be intimately connected with karma which is unconscious and material. But we should realise that empirical soul is associated with the material karma and the material karma is the modification of the pure pudgala. This association of the jiva with the karmic particles is due to its activity (yoga) in body, mind and speech. If the self and the matter were to be in their pure state only, there would not be a question of the inter-mingling of the jiva and the karmic particles. The karmic particles get associated with and they enter into the self which is the empirical individual and not the pure self. In this sense, we can say that the karma is associated with the empirical jiva from the phenomenal point of view and not from the noumenal point of view. This inter-mingling of the karma with the soul is very often compared with the mixing of water and milk. Again matter which is pure does not transform itself into karmic particles on its own but this transformation is possible due to the soul's activity. Pancama Karmagrantha-prastavana, pp. 11-12 437

Page #459
438 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Again we have to determine the relation between the dravyakarma and bhavakarma. The relation between the two is considered to be mutual. Dravyakarma generates bhavakarma. The perfect souls, like the siddhas, are free from the dravyakarma and therefore the bhavakarma does not affect them. When the jiva attains the siddha-hood it is free from the certain material karma. In this sense, we can say that jiva which is empirical, i. e., the individual jiva in this world is the karta of the karmic particles and the bhokta of the fruits of karma. Those who do not accept the kartstva and bhokt rtva of the jiva give the analogy of handsome boy who attracts a beautiful girl. The girl gets attracted to the boy and runs after him. In this case, the girl is active and the boy is merely an occasion (nimitta) for her activity." In this way, the pudgala gets attracted to the jiva and gets transformed into karmic particles. In this, the jiva is not responsible for the activity and the jiva is the only occasion (nimitta). Activity is attributed to the pudgala. But this relation of the bhokt stva and kart stva can also be attributed to karma. If atman were neither the doer, nor the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, then he would neither be in bondage nor would be released from the bondage of karma. These terms of bondage and release are not relevant. It is only from the phenomenal point of view, we can speak of the bondage and the release. And from the noumenal point of view, the relation of the bondage and re the relation of the bondage and release of the soul from the shackles of karma and the karma description with reference to the kart stva and bhokt sva are not possible. But the analogy of the boy and the girl with reference to the karma and soul is not adequate. The facts are different. The pudgala that is matter becomes active then the pudgala at once get attracted towards the soul and they are transformed into karmic particles. The karmic particles and the self get mixed up and on proper occasions the karmic particles produce their effects and get separated again. This is due to the activity of the jiva. In this sense, this type of activity 1 Pancama Karmagrantha- prastavana, p. 12.

Page #460
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY is not possible for the jiva alone without the association of pudgala in the form of karmic particles and similarly, pudgala in its isolated state cannot get attracted to the soul. The co-mingling of the jiva and pudgala is responsible for the association of jiva reference karmic particles. Therefore, we cannot make a statement from the absolute point of view that jiva is pure cetana and karma is pure jada (unconscious). Jiva also has been intimately associated with the karmic particles can be considered as jada and karma because of its association with the jiva can be described as having consciousness. When the jiva and karma becomes separated completely in the highest state of perfection, then we can say that jiva is pure consciousness and pudgala is pure matter and unconsciousness. The samsari jiva (empirical individual) get associated with the karmic particles and due to the association, the bhavakarma in the form of raga-dvesa (attachment and hatred) are born. A question arises that if jiva in its pure form and pudgala in its pure form are active in their own pure nature, then how can the bhavakarmas be born and who would be responsible for these? The bhavakarmas are neither purely due to the self nor due to the pure pudgala. Therefore, what is the cause of the bhavakarma ? 439 The answer is, the individual ego is neither the pure atman, nor the pure pudgala. It is a mixture of the atman with the karmic particles which are modifications or expressions in the empirical sense of the karmic particles. We can say that it is an organism and not a pure soul. The passions like raga-dvesa are produced due to the association of the karmic particles with the conscious jiva through the activity of the jiva in the form of bodily, mental and speech. All this is due to the diversity and variety of the encrustations of the karmic particles in the soul. Those, who consider the relation of karma with the soul from the noumenal point of view, say that atman has its essential nature in jnana, darsana and caritra and the expressions of the essential nature are due to be found in the emotional set up like raga-dvesa. And due to this, the karmic particles pollute the soul. And therefore, the soul is not the karta of the karmic encrustations nor the bhokta.

Page #461
440 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY For instance, the potter is not the cause of the pot although he prepares the pot; In common sense of language, the potter is considered to be efficient cause of the pot. But in the real sense of the relation, the potter is only an occasion but the clay is the material cause of the pot. 1 But this analogical example is not adequate because the relation between the pot and the potter is neither inherent relation nor very intimate relation. But the relation between the self and karman is inti. mate like the mixing of the milk and the water. Therefore, the associa. tion of the karman with the self cannot be compared with the causal relation of the potter and the pot. The intimate combination of the karmic particles with the soul has an effect of synthesis and one neces. sarily affects the other. This does not happen in the case of the relation between the potter and the pot. The atman is not only an occasion, or the efficient cause of the karmic particles enter the soul, but it is the karta in the sense, due to its activity, in body, speech and mind karmic particles enter the soul. Similarly, atman is the bhokta, the enjoyer of the fruits of the karma. Due to the various activities of the atman in its empirical form, the karmic particles have attracted and they become intimately associated with the soul. There. fore, atman is considered to be the karta. And because the atman in its empirical sense has the experience of the fruits of the karma, it is also bhokta. LIMITS OF KARMA According to the Jaina theory of karma, karma is intimately associated with the body, mind and the atman (psychy), of the individual. These have their defined limitations and they function within these limitations. Similarly, the karma that is intimately associated with the individual self has to operate within these limitations. If we do not accept the limitations of the karma, then the karma would be all-pervasive like the akasa, We may also say that the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies and this is due to karma, Due to karma, the atman gets involved and associated with the body that it occupies in its full pervasion. When the soul 1 Pancama Karmagrantha - prastavana, p. 13.

Page #462
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 441 gets freed from the body it also gets freed from the karmas. But the sarhsari atman is somehow associated with one or the other body and, therefore, associated with the karmic particles within that limitations. Another question arises and has been asked : The karma associated with the body working in the limitation of the body--can it transcend the limitation and bear its fruits ? Is it responsible for the various types of the effects of karma expressed in the possessions like wealth and other external objects that a man gets which are not intimately associated with the body ? For such things also, is the karma responsible ? It is also possible that the self may not be directly or indirectly associated with the external objects and events although these objects have their impact of the experiences of the jiva. In such cases can we say that the karman is responsible for such type of association in bondage. The answer is, the Jaina theory of karma mentions eight types of karmas, which are intimately connected in some form or the other with the jiva. Jnanavarana, Darsanavarana, Mohaniya and Antaraya karmas are considered as ghatikarma because they effect the essential characteristics of the soul like jnana, darsana, happiness and virya (energy). Veduniya, Ayu, Nama and Gotra karmas produce different states of the body. In this way, all the eight karmas are intimately associated with jiya and the body and not directly associated with other external objects. From the point of view of the usage of the term (parampara) of the word, it can be said that karna can be somehow connected to the other objects external to the body and the self, if such a connection is proved. If the karmic particles are intimately associated with the body and the self, then the question arises how can we explain the possession of wealth and richness which give happiness due to merit (punyajanya)? The answer is, the possession of wealth and having relations who give happiness and other pleasant experience are due to the rise of karma, it is possible to say in such cases, that these are the upa-punya, i. e. kaima brings punya and punya gives rise to experiences of pleasure and bliss. In fact, the function of punya is to give the experiences of

Page #463
442 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY pleasure and punya is possible through subha karma. It is also true that the external objects and creations are the cause of experiences of pleasure. The experience of pleasure and pain and all bodily, mental and armic experiences are due to the internal causes. The association of karma is seen with the internal causes and not with the external objects. The external objects have their own causes of origination, duration and destruction, and they are not due to karma. The karma is limited to us only i. e., the embodied seif and the body, and not all-pervading. These external objects have nothing to do with karma. Karma is associated with the embodied individual soul and the jiva attracts the karmic particles in varying degrees according to its activi. ties. The external objects are only occasions by which the self gets experiences of pleasure and pain and therefore, on common parlance, it is said that the external objects are the results of punya and papa. The various physical and mental states of an individual are due to karma. The body, sense-organs, the functions of mind and body are all due to karma. But the possession of external objects like wife or the husband or the relation or the loss of these, famine or bumper crops, various natural calamities like the earth-quake etc. or the anger of the king-all these are not the effect of the karma. These are only the occasions, the experiences, that man gets because these are primarily mental states. It is true that some of them do affect the mental states. The possession of wealth and other relatives may become occasions for creating pleasure in our mind. The loss of wealth may bring pain, but these external things are not themselves due to karma. For instance, the birth of a son is not due to the punya of the father, nor the death of a relative is due to the papa of the individual soul. These are due to the karmas of those individuals affected and karma in their cases also is occasion by the external objects. It may be true that we get pleasure by the birth of a son. This experience of pleasu is due to the Mohaniya Karma, but the birth of a son is not due to Mohaniya Karma. The experiences of pleasure and pain on the occasion of birth of son or loss are due to the punya or papa of the father occasioned by the birth or the death of the son. In this sense, the son is not born due to the punya of the father, nor is loss of the son is due to the paja cf the father. In this way, the relation of the indi

Page #464
* A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY vidual self with other objects can be explained on the basis of personal experiences which are due to punya or papa occasioned by the events and individuals in the environment. The operation of the karma, the rise, the suppression (upasama) and destruction of the karma (karmaksaya) are all determined by the limits of the individual self or the body due to the activity of the organism through body, mind and speech. The rise of the karma is not possible beyond this. The crux of the problem is that external objects and events are due to their own causes and not due to the rise of the karma to the individual soul.. RISE OF KARMA (UDAYA) Udaya refers to the rise of the karma. It refers to the span of time of the operation of karma.1 The karmic particles bound to the soul get matured enough to express themselves (niseka)--and then they express themselves, i. e., the udaya of the karma. The rise of the karma is possible from two ways: 1. when the karma gets matured and fit to express itself it becomes praptakala udaya. 2. If it expresses itself prematurely, it is called apraptakala udaya. When the karma gets bound to the soul, it does not get the potency of getting expressed immediately, it requires a definite time to mature itself and till that time, it is in the potential stage. This is called abadhakala. During this period, the karma, in its potential form, not yet expressed. Abadha means the period of potency. 443 The period of potentiality of karma (abadhakala) can be divided into two forms of durations (sthiti): 1. avasthanakala and (2) anubhava or niseka kala. In the abadhakala, the karmic effect is not yet expressed. It is in the potential form. It is in the avasthana kala. But when the abadhakala is mature enough to express itself, we get the experiences of karma. The abadhakala and the anubhava kala have their own specific duration. If we exclude from consideration the concept of the abadhakala we can say that niseka and anubhava are of equal duration. The longer duration of the karma can be due to 1 Bhagavati 6, 3, 236 2 Bhagavati 6, 3, 236-vrtti.

Page #465
444 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the intensity of the experience of karma. This can be reduced in the duration and intensity of experience through the tapas. The soul can become free from the karma in a shorter time. The rise of the karma is possible after the completion of the duration of the time of potentiality and when the problem of actualisation comes. In the normal course when the time of karma arises, and is affected extranuous forces like ascetic practices, tapas and other sadhanas would not be possible. But due to apavartana the karmic variation through udirana would be possible. But if the karma-rise is yet to take place, then tapas and sadhanas would be useful for the premature realisation of the karmic effect. The rise and fruition of karma may be sahetuka (by means of willed effort) or nirhetuka (without willed effort). The rise and the fruition may take place naturally without any external pressure or due to some pressures like internal or the external pressure. For example, without any external cause one may get angry and vedaniya karmic particles may effect the soul. This is nirhetuka udaya.1 In the same way, experiences of laughter, fear and other forms of emotional upset may give rise to karmic particles to flow in.3 THE KARMA THAT ENTERS WITHOUT EFFORT (Svatah udaya hetu) The karmic particles that develop the soul may be due to some natural causes without any effort (conscious or unconscious). It is of different types: 1. Gatihetuka udaya - It refers to the karmic matter due to the state of the self (gati) at the particular time. For instance, in the state in the hell (naraka gati) there is the rise of asatavedaniya karma (pain producing karma). 2. Sthitihetuka-This refers to the state of an individual at a particular time. For example, at the time of the rise of the mohaniya 1 Sthananga 4, 76, vriti; p. 182. 2 Sthananga 4 3 Sthananga 4, 75-79. *

Page #466
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 445 karma in its intense form, it is possible to have perversity of outlook (mithyatva moha) and attachment. 3. Bhavahetuaka udaya-This refers to the rise of different types of karma in a particular life span. Though all the samsari jivas have rise of Darsanavarniya karma and this karma is the cause of sleep but manusya and lower animals are affected by sleep, while heavenly beings and the hellish beings do not get sleep. This is bhavahetuka udaya. These three types of karmic influx and bondage are due to svatah vipaka udaya (rising out of their own internal causes). THE RISE OF THE KARMA DUE TO EXTERNAL CAUSES The karmic rise may be due to external causes also. These may be considered as due to two causes as : (1) pudgala hetuka udaya. This is due to the karmic particles rising out of some material causes. For example, if a stone is thrown or if some one hits us, we get pain. This is to asatavedaniya karma, arising out of material causes. Similarly, experience of pain is possible due to some form of unpleasant exchange of words which give rise to anger. These are sahetuka vipaka udaya. (2) In the sense, that the karmic bondage arises due to some particular causes the bondage of the karmic particles due to the consequence of the material cause (pudgala parinama). For exam. ple, taking heavy meals or due to some diseases organic disturbances take place. This is also (hetuka udaya) rising out of the consequences of the material causes, giving rise to the bondage of karmic particles to the soul. Again, for example, intoxicating liquor affects the clarity of mental states. This is also pudgala parinamana hetuka. In this way, the rise and fruition of the karmic particles into the soul is due to various causes. If these causes are not operative the fruition of the karma is not possible. It is called pradejodaya vipaka. In this, the experience of karmic effect is not very clear. It is indistinct. However, the karmic bondage has ? to be experienced and exhausted. 1 Prajapana 23, 1, 293,

Page #467
446 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Gautama asked Mahavira: 'Bhagavan! can we say that one cannot be free from the experiences of the karma which are inauspicious.' Mahavira said; "Yes, it is true that we have to experience the papa karma'. Gautama asked Mahavira to explain the process. Mahavira said, 'O Gautama ! I have described two types of karma 1. Pradesa karma (extension of the karmic particles) and 2. anubhaga karma (experience of the karmic effect). Pradesa karma has to be exhausted, some may be exhausted through the experience of the intensity and some without experience in the intensity of the karmic particles,1 PURUSARTHA (SELF EFFORT) AS DETERMINING FACTOR What we call purusartha (self effort of an individual jiva), does play an important part in the intensity and experience of the karmic bondage. From the point of view of the past karmic bondage, we can say that it is both important and not an important factor in shaping the experiences of karma. If the efforts, made in the present time, are less than the efforts made in the past, then the present efforts will have less impact on the manner of experience of karma. If the present impact is greater, it is possible that it may modify the intensity and experience of the past bondage of the karma. Karma need not be considered only in two parts as bandha (bondage) and udaya rise of karma. There are other states of impact of karma. The karmic particles and the karmic experiences can be attributed and modified to particular processes like apavartana, udvartana, etc. These processes of the rise, experience and the exhaustion of karma may be mentioned as follows: 1. Apavartana-In this, the karmic intensity may be decreased in experience, it is rasaghata or mandikarana. 2. Udvartana --The intensity of the karmic experience may be increased. This is udvartana, or it is also called tivrikarana. 1 Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vrtti

Page #468
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 447 * 3. Udirana---In this the karmic states which is to fructified at a later date more intensely can be made to be fructified and experienced in a less intense way. 4. Sankramana - It is the transformation of karma in its different intensities of experiences. For instance, some part of karma is auspicious karma (subha karma) and its fruition (vipaka) is also auspicious. Some part of karma is auspicious, but fruition is inauspicious (asubha). Some forms of karma is inauspicious, but its fruition is auspicious. In some cases both the rise of the karma and its fruition are inauspicious. That type of karma which it binds inauspicious way and rises auspiciously it is called asubha-subha vipaka. But the karma which is in the form of auspicious bondage, but arises in an inauspicious way, it is subha-asubha vipaka. That karma whose rise is inauspicious, but fruition is auspicious is called asubha-subha vipaka. And that karma whose rise and fruition is both auspicious has been referred to subha-subhavipaka. The difference in duration between the karmic bondage and its rise is called sankramana. Sankramana is the transformation of the karma-praksti. In this, the transformation takes place between the substance of the same karma. For instance, in the dargunavaraniyakarma transformation between the caksu and acaksu darsanivaraniya is possible. Sankramana is of four types : 1. Praksti sankramana 2. Sthiti sankramana, 3. Anubhava sankramana and 4. Pradesasankramana. Praksti sankramana is a transformation of the karmic bondage already collected into the karmic experiences are at present being received. Similarly, sthiti (duration) and anubhaga (intensity of experience) also get transformed. Apavartana, udvartana, udirana and sankramana refer to the rise (udaya) of the karmic matter. In this rise and at the time of rising, there is no transformation. But the karmic matter that is yet to rise can be transformed by the individual efforts like sadhana. In this sense, we can say that the individual jiva is responsible for its own karma and for the exhaustion of the karma. If this freedom of the will in the process of the transformation of karma were not to be accepted, then we land ourselves in niyativada (the theory of necessity).

Page #469
448 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY IS THE ATMAN FREE, OR IS IT BOUND BY KARMA? We have seen that the individual states and its position are determined by the bondage of karma that the individual has acquired. Auspicious karma brings auspicious results and inauspicious karma gives inauspicious results.1 The karmic process has primarily two forms: bondage and the other rise and fruition. The individual jiva is free in the sense that it can do the karma and the bondage that he gets is due to his own activity. In this sense, he is free because he acts and gets the bondage. But the karmic bondage that he has already acquired due to his own activity has to be experienced and exhausted by him. In this sense, in the case of rise and fruition of karma that has already been bound to him, he has no choice, he has to experience the effects of the karma that he has accumulated. And therefore in the fruition of karma and experiences, he is not free. For instance, one is free to take opium, but once he takes the opium he cannot escape the effects of opium. Whether he wills it or not, the opium produces its effects on his organism. He has no choice in it. This does not mean that he completely dislaids of the fruition of the karma that he has already acquired. He can transform the karmic effect in its intensity of experience by reducing the intensity or increasing the intensity. For example, after having taken the opium he may try to reduce the effect of the same by taking the counter affecting medicine. By this, he can reduce the intensity of the opium. Similarly, he can reduce the intensity, as we have seen, of the experience of the karmic effect by means of certain processes and practices. In other words, the question of the dependence of the jiva and karma is difficult to be determined, because if the soul gets sufficient strength due to the maturity of its activity and duration of karma, the activity of soul becomes predominent, and the karma is subordinated. But if the karma becomes stronger the soul's activity becomes subjected to karmic particles. Therefore, in some cases soul predominates and in some others, karma predominates. The mechanism of the operation of the karma may be considered as of two types: 1 Dasasrutaskandha 6 2 Visesavasyaka bhasya 1, 3.

Page #470
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 449 * 1. Nikacita, in which the maturation of the karmic process will take its determined course. 2. Anikacita, in which the maturation of the karmic process may take different terms and may fructify in different ways. The same can be put in the different forms (a) Nirupakrama where the process of the operation of karma takes its determined course and there would be no resistance from the individual moral activities. (b) Sopakrama, in which the individual effort may deviate the karmic process. The jiva is subject to the karmic activity in the process of nikacita process of the rise of the karma. As long as the liva does not make effort to thwart or to deviate the fruition of the karmic activity, jiva will be in the hands of karma. But if the karmic process has to be channelised either in the direction of suppression or the destruction of the karmic process the jiva his to make consistent moral effort and observe tapasya (ascetic practice). In the Patanjala Yogabhasya, it has been suggested that the vedaniya karma born out of adrsta has three different forms of expression. One of them is that some karmas can be exhausted without fruition by the moral practices like pravascita (confession). In the Jaina terminology it is called pradesodaya. UDI RANA Gautama asked Mahavira : 'Bhagavan ! does the jiva in crease the intensity of karma when it has risen or does the jiva increase the intensity of karma when it has not risen ? Does the karma increase the intensity when the karma has risen and expressed itself in the form of karmic particles ? Mahavira replied, 1. The intensity of karma is not increased when the karma has not already risen or expressed itself. It does not increase the intensity when it has not risen. Only when the rise of the karma is possible because of the capacity of the rise of the karma although at the moment it is not expressed itself, in such cases the jiva | Patanjalayoga 2, 13 bhasya.

Page #471
450 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY assists the increase in the intensity of the karmic experience. Similarly, after the rise of the karma, it is not possible to increase the intensity of experience. The increase in the intensity of karma would not be possible if it is already increased, because if the increase of intensity is further increased, there would be no increase of intensity of karmic experience and there would be no end to the process of increase. 2. The increase in the intensity of karmic experience would not be possible in the cases where the increase in the intensity will take palace in future date. 3. The rise of the karmic particles will not give occasions to intensities, if the karmic particles are weak after its rise. 4. The rise and the intensity of karmic particles will be possible only in such cases where there is not yet the rise and increase of the intensity of karma, but where there is potentiality and capacity for the increase of the karmic intensity. THE CAUSATION OF UDI RANA Sometimes, the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself and in such cases there is no need to do self-effort. When the duration of karmic bondage is over, the rise of the karmic process takes place by itself. It is ripe for the rise and therefore no special efforts on the part of the jiva are necessary for effecting the rise. Gautama asked Mahavira, 'Bhagavan ! when the karmic process is about to rise, but which has not yet risen and which is capable of rising (udirana yogya) and increase, in such cases when the increase in the intensity of karmic process takes place and we say that individual effort, the strength of the individual jiva in these cfforts and the capacity (bala) and the near energy (virya) are necessary to operate or are not necessary. Mahavira said, that jiva helps the process of rise and increase of the karmic process which are not yet risen cannot be made to rise and increase in intensity, 2 In this process, the one's destiny and the efforts of the individual jiva are both necessary. Due to the individual efforts the jiva effects 1 Vyakhyaprajnapti 1, 3, 35, 2 Bhagavati 1, 3, 35.

Page #472
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 451 certain processes in the karmic particles. This is possible to the yoga (activity) of the jiva, which is of three types: body, speech and mental. If the activity is auspicious, that is subhayoga, if the activity is inauspicious which lead towards the obstruction of self-realisation, is inauspicious. Mithyatva (perversity), avrata (lack of self-control), pramada (negligence) are all instrumental to yoga. But the activity without the kasayas is subha while the activity that is accompanied or motivated by kasaya is asubha. Subhayoga brings auspicious tendency and asubhayoga brings inauspicious tendency. The two tendencies sat and asat bring about the process the udirana.1 VEDANA Gautama said to Mahavira "Bhagavan! some say that the jiva experiences vedana according to the type of bondage that it takes place. Would it be correct to say that ?" Mahavira said: "Gautama! the explanation given by these persons is one-sided and is not the whole truth. Some jivas experience the vedana (emotional states) according to their desserts earned through the type of karma acquired. But some other jivas 'experience different vedanas also. Gautama said: 'how is it?' Mahavira replied: "that jiva which experiences the vedana or affective states according to the type and intensity of karma can be said to experience evambhuta vedana and those jivas which experience different emotional experience from the desserts are said to experience unevambhuta vedana. Mahavira replied to another question stating that vedana (feeling) rises out of the karmic particles accrued in the past. The karmic particles flowing in into the soul at the present moment do not produce vedana. NIRJARA Atman and the atomic particles of matter are distinct and as long as they are distinct, both of them are pure. But when there is contact 1 Vyakhyaprajnapti 1, 3, 35.

Page #473
452 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY between the atman and the particles of matter, atman is considered to be rupi (having form) and atomic particles are converted into karmavarganas. When these karmic particles get glued to the soul, then they are considered to be the karma which have the capacity of producing effect. When the karmic effect gets exhausted the particles of karma is separated, and they become mere pudgala or matter. They become akarma and are separated from soul. This process of extraction of the karmic particles from the soul is called nirjara. In the common parlance it is said that nirjara is a process where the karma is separated from the soul, by the exhaustion of the effect of karma. The fruits on the tree become ripe in two ways. The fruits may become ripe on the tree only, after the period of maturity is over or they may be made ripe by plucking them from the trez and using artificial methods. In the later case, it may take lesser time for the fruits to be ripened. In the same way, karma becomes mature for expression of its effects either in its natural process or it may made to fructify prematurely by certain moral and spiritual process. If the fructification of karma takes its natural process, this is called karma paripaka. But if the karma is made to fructify prematurely by means of certain moral and spiritual practices, then we call it karma nirjara. Karma-paripaka is neither dharma nor adharma. Nirjara is a process of fructification of karmic effect, much earlier than it would have been possible for the karma to fructify in normal course. The fructification of karma is very auspicious also. Therefore, nirjara would be avipaki nirjara. It is also considered as sahetuka nirjara. And this is dharma. Subha nirjara is dharma. PRIORITY OF THE AIMAN OR THE KARMA A question has been asked regarding the priority of the karman or the atman which is earlier ? The answer is, both the karman and atman are anadi (beginningless) and the relation between them is also beginningless. However, there is the karma flow into the soul and new karmi enters into the soul every moment. There is not a single

Page #474
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 453 moment in an empirical jiva when the karma does not enter in. In this specific sense, we can say that the influx of the karma has a beginning and in the general sense of the relation of the karma to the soul." A question has been pertinently asked regarding the adequacy of explanation of the usual statement that the karmic influx is anadi (beginningless), but it has an end. How can that which is beginningless can have an end ? The answer is, in general sense that which has no beginning has no end, specifically with reference to the generic relation. But with reference to particulars this fact of relation need not be true. For instance, the relation between the gold and ore of the gold, between milk and ghee is anadi because gold is in the ore and ghee is in the milk. But they can be separated, in this sense, the relation has an end. But from the point of view of the relation of the specific karma to the soul, we can say that the association of karma with the jiva has a particular point of time and therefore, it had a beginning. Similarly, the karma that has accumulated in the soul can also be washed away at a particular time, and the new karma enters. And there is new bondage. But the flow of karma as such into the soul in its generic aspect is beginningless. Although from the point of view of specific karma, it has beginning and also an end. The karma that is flowing into the soul from the beginningless time can be exhausted by the self-control, tapas and other moral and spiritual activities. The accumulated karma gets destroyed and the atman becomes free from the karmic encrustation." 1.THE SUPREMACY OF THE KARMA OR OF THE ATMAN A question has been asked regarding the supremacy of the atman or of the karma which is supreme, which is more powerful ? 1 (a) Pancastikaya -- Acarya Kundakunda. (b) Paramatmaprakasa 1, 59-60. 2 (a) Pancadhyayi 2, 45, Pt. Rajamalla (b) Lokaprakasa-424 (c) Sthananga 1, 4, 9, tika 3 Uttaradhyayana 25, 45.

Page #475
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The answer is that both are supreme and both are powerful. Both have infinite energy. Sometimes jiva gets opportunate moments for the fruition of karma and by its activity in the righteous direction. It drives out the karmic bondage. But sometimes karma becomes predominent, and jiva has to suffer the effects of the karma and be under its control.1 From the point of view of looking at objects as an external reality, the karma appears to be more prominent. But if we introspect on ourselves we find the atman is equally important and powerful. Just as a spider weaves its web and gets into it, so also the jiva acquires karma and gets involved in the karmic bondage. If the jiva wills, the karmic bondage can be cut off. Therefore, it can be said that however, powerful the karma is, the jiva is more powerful than the karma. From the commonsense point of view, we find an experience that the stone which is hard is very often cut by the liquid water that flows over it. The flowing waters of the river cut through the hard and solid rocks. Similarly, the atman is more powerful than karma if it wills. As long as Hanumana did not know his real strength, he suffered indignities from Ravanu and from the Nagupasa. But once he realised his real strength, no body could control him. In the same way, the atman has infinite strength and energy and we do not know it. As long as we do not know it, we suffer the bondage of the karma. But the moment, we realise the inner strength of the atman, the shackles of the karma fall down one by one. THE FRUITS OF KARMA The empirical jiva experiences the fruits of karma. From the point of view of enjoyment of fruits of karma, the fruition has been distinguished into two types: (1) Subha karma, auspicious fruits of karma, which may also be considered as punya (merit) or kusala (auspicicus and gccd); and (2) osubha karma, the fruits are inauspicious, it may be referred papa, which is also akusala (inauspicious and evil). This distinction has been mentioned in various schools of Indian 454 1 Ganadharavada 2, 25.

Page #476
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 455 philosophy like Jaina', Bauddha", Sankhya?, Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisesikab and Upanisads. The fruits of the karma which are conducive to the spiritual realisation give rise to punya and those which are not conducive to self-realisation are inauspicious and they give rise to papa, All desire punya and do not want papa. However, one cannot escape the effects of punya and papa. The karmic bondage that the jiva has already acquired has to be experienced and exhausted in this life or in the succeeding life.? There is no escape for the atman from experiencing the fruits of the karma good or bad arising out of the karmic bondage. The Buddha said to his disciples that one cannot escape the fruits of the karma at any cost, whether you want to avoid it by various mcans, you may fly in the skies, you may enter the sea, or fall in the valley, wherever you go karma cannot be escaped and the effects of papa have to be experienced." Similar views has been expressed by the great poet Sihalana Misra belonging to the Vedic tradition. 10 According to acarya Amitagati, we experience the fruits of good and bad karmas, that we have acquired. If we have to experience the fruits of karma from other sources, the karma that we have acquired would be meaningless. 11 1 Tattvarthasutra 6, 3-4 2 Visuddhimaggo 17, 88. 3 Sankhyakarika 44 4 (a) Yogasutra 2, 14 (b) Yogabhasya 2, 12. 5 (a) Nyayamanjari, p. 472. (b) Prasastapada, pp. 637, 643. 6' Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 3, 2, 13. 7 (a) Bhagavati sutra (b) Sthanangasutra 77, 8 Uttaradhyayana 4, 3. 9 Dhammapada 9, 12. 10 santigatakam 82. 11 Dvatrirhsika 30

Page #477
456 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Acarya Kundakunda says that jiva and the karmic particles are mixed together and at appropriate occasions they get separated. But as long as they are mixed together, the karma continues to give its effects either auspicious or inauspicious way. We get pleasure or pain accordingly.1 The Buddha had his foot pricked by a thorn once. He said to his disciples that "in my ninety one previous life, a man was murdered by my sharp weapon therefore, the thorn has pricked me".2 Similarly, Bhagavana Mahavila had to suffer great physical and mental tortures during his period of sadhana. All this must have been due to the effect of karma that he bad acquired in the previous lives. TSVARA AND KARMAVADA The Jainas maintain that every individual jivu experiences the fruits of karma according to bis desserts. He does not accept Nyaya) conception of I svara as the dispenser of karma. Because Tswara has no place in the system of karma. Karma is associated with jiva. It envelops the jiva and produces the effect. The karmic effect is determined by the karmic matter, the extensity of karma, the time, the bhavakarma and other factors like the birth, the sihiti, (duration) 8 etc. All these determine the total karmic dispositions and shape the personality of the individual. The food ibat we take may be sweet or bitter, palatable or not, the food itself has not these characteristics, but these experiences come because of its association with the cogniser and the psychic effects and the individual consciousness. The individual self experiences these different types of food according to the variation in physical and psychic condition. 1 Pancastikaya 67 2 Sandarsana samuccaya tika 3 See; Bhagavana Mahavira : Ek anusilan by the author. 4 Uttaradhyayana 20, 37. 5 (a) Nyaya darsana, sutia 4, 1. (b) Gautamasulla, adbyaya, 4, a, 1, sutra 21. 6 Bhagavati 7, 10. 7 Pancasangraha. 8 Prajnapana, p. 23.

Page #478
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 457 The sramana Kalodayi asked Bhagavana Mahavira, "Bhagavan ! can we say that jiva experiences the bitter fruits of papa karma as bitter 71 Bhagavana Mabavira said, "Yes." Then Mahavira was asked to explain the process of experience the fruits of inauspicious karma. Mahavira said, 'just as if one were to eat the food well and cleanly prepared, yet mixed with poison, he may experience the taste of the food as good and tasteful, but the effect of the food, as it contains poison will be gradually harmful to the body. Similarly, the karmic effect due to the activities actuated by various kasayas and the eighteen types of inauspicious deeds from violence upto mithyadarsana may be pleasant in the beginning, but they do show inauspicious effect. Kalodayi asked further question, "Bhagavan ! if the jivas perform good karmas, will the fruits of those karma be good ?"' Mahavira said "Yes'. Then Kalodayi asked him the process of the fruition of auspicious kurma into merit. Mahavira said : just as actions performed due to auspicious merit, one who does not injure any living being and is free from all the 18 sinful acts from violence upto the mithyadarsana (perversity of attitude) will earn punya (auspicious fruits of karma). The auspicious work brings auspicious fruits of karma.3 Just as a machine like the electronic calculator having no intelligence, still makes complicated calculations, which in the case of a human being would require good deal of intelligence, so also karma, though material in nature consisting of karmic particles, works out the schemata of the effects of kaina. It is not necessary to postulate the presence of fsvara for the dispensing of karma. He is not free to distribute karma as he wants. One man's karma cannot be transformed to another. If this were possible, then freedom of the will have | 2 3. Bhagavatt 7, 10. Vyakhyaprajnapti 7; 10 Bhagavati 7, 10

Page #479
458 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY no meaning and the Tsvara would have been powerful and karma would be some commodity to be distributed at His will. But we find, that karma works his own way. There is a regulated mathematical and determined effects of karnia which works their own course. In this sense, Tswara has no place in the karma theory. ', TRANSFERENCE OF KARMA According to the Vedic tradition, the individual atman is at the mercy of the all powerful I svara. Without the grace of T svara the atman cannot do anything. I svara is the one who dispenses karma to different individuals, Who sends one to the hell or heaven. The Jaina theory of karma does not accept this view. There is no possibility of dispensation of karma by any external agency like I svara. Karma cannot be distributed like pieces of money. One man's karma cannot be transformed into other. The individual soul is free. It is by its own activity that it earns the karmic bondage in this empirical world. Each individual soul is responsible for its rise or fall. The atman which gets involved in the wheel is like the river vetarani or the tree kutasalmali. The soul expresses its two nature, gets the fruits of perception. The individual soul is the doer of its own karma and the enjoyer of the fruits of karma. The soul that follows the righteous path is its own friend, while the soul that goes astray and follows un-righteous path is its own enemy. The Jaina theory of karma maintains that the fruits of karma expressing in happiness and misery are the results of the activity of the soul. The soul gets the fruits according to its dessert. The Vedic tradition and the Buddhist view are refuted by the Jainas, regarding the distribution and the transform of karma.s 1 Mahabharata, Vanaparva, adhyaya 30, sl. 28. 2 Uttaradhyayana 20, 36 3 Uttaradhyayana 20, 37 4 Uttaradhyayana 4, 4; 6, 3 5 (a) Airamimithia - Pt. Dalsukh Malvania p. 131 (b) Sri Amara Bharati, Bharatiya dardano me karma virevcana - Upadhyaya Amaramuni

Page #480
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 459 . One man's karma cannot be transformed to another. If that were so, the efforts of the jiva would be futile because the jiva would not know that its good actions would give him good results. It would then be possible in such cases that one does good actions and someone else would enjoy the fruits of that karma. This would not be an adequate explanation for the distribution of karma. THE FUNCTION OF KARMA The function of karma is to get the soul involved in this wheel of life and death. As long as the flow of karmic bondage continues, the soul gets involved in this wheel and is not free. This is the general function of karmic action. In the specific sense different types of karma have their different functions, in creating the bondage, to the individual soul. TYPES OF KARMA Jaina karma theory has distinguished karma into eight types; 1. jnanavaraniya karma, 2. darsanavarana, 3. vedaniya, 4. mohaniya 5. nama, 6. ayu, 7. gotra and 8. antaraya.2 Out of these eight karmas - jnanavaraniya, darsanivarana, mohaniya and antaraya are gh iti karmas, because they obscure the inherent nature and capacity of the soul, like jnana and darsana.Vedaniya, ayu, nama and gotra karmis are aghati karmas because they do not affect the original capacity of the soul nor do they obscure the capacity. Therefore, they are called aghati karmas. The consciousness is the characterisation of the soul. The soul has infinite energy. Similarly, it is characterised by infinite knowledge (anantajnana), infinite intuition (ananta darsana), infinite bliss 1 Dvatrirsika, Acarya Amitagati, 30-31. 2 (8) Uttaradhyayana 33, 2-3. (b) Sihanah ga 8, 3, 596, (c) Prajma pana, 23, 1, (d) Bhagavati, sataka 6, uddesaka 9 p. 453 (e) Tattvarthasutra 8, 5 (f) Prathama karmagrantha, gatha 3, Pancasangraha 2, 2. 3 (a) Pancadhyayi 2, 998. (b) Gommatasara-karmakanda 9 4 (a) pancadhyayi 2, 999. (b) Gommatasara karmakanda 9

Page #481
460 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (ananta sukha) and infinite energy (ananta virya). Jnanavaraniya karma obscures the intellectual knowledge of the soul. Darsanavarana karma covers the darsana, mohaniya karma obscures the right attitude and faith and right conduct also. Therefore the atman will be bereft of the ananta sukha. Antaraya karma obscures the infinite energy of the soul, by which the soul will be temporarily incapacitated for expressing the energy which is inherent in the soul. In this way, the ghati karmas or obscuring karmas are basically responsible for the different states of the karma. Those types of karma which do not affect, the original nature of the jiva but which affect the fruits and the determining effect of the original nature of the jivas are called aghati karmas. Aghati karmas are directly connected with the karmic particles of matter and not directly with the jiva. By the rise of the aghati karmas, the soul gets mixed with the paudgalika dravya (material particles of karma). Because of this, the jiva which is amurta will be considered as murta. The jiva is bound with the sarira (body), and the inherent characteristics of jiva like infinite jnana, infinite sukha, a murtakarva (formlessness) and agurulaghutva (neither small nor big) do not get occasions to get express themselves. Vedaniya karma obscures the infinite happiness or bliss of the soul. Ayu karma obscures and obstructs the eternity of the soul. By nama karma, the jiva is limited in its expression of the status. And the gotra karma thwarts the expression of agurulaghutva. When the ghati karmas are removed, the atman attains omniscient knowledge (kevalajnana) and omniscient intuition (kevala darsana) and becomes Arihanta. But when the aghati karmas are also removed, the body is cast away, and the atman is freed from the material existence, and becomes siddha, buddha or muktu. Jnanavarana karma Jiva is characterised by pure consciousness. Upayoga is the essential characteristic of the jiva. Upayoga has been variously interpreted, sometimes as an expression of jnana and darsana and sometimes as the resultant of consciousness. Sakara upayoga expresses jnana 1 Tattvarthasutra 10, 1 2 Uttaradhyayana 28, 10 3 Niyamasara, 10

Page #482
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 461 and nirakara upayoga expresses darsana. Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi in his book, "Some Problems in Jaina Psychology" has interpreted upayoga in psychological term stating that upayoga may be referred to as the karmic energy which is primarily responsible for expression of jnana and darsana. He has used the world upayoga on the pattern of the Macdugallian sense with certain modifications.? Jnanopayoga is the expression of conscious energy which is associated with discriminative knowledge by which the self distinguishes between species, the attribute, action and other forms of distinguishing of the empirical jiva. Darsanopayoga apprehends the generality of the object in a concrete psychosis. Jnanayarana obscures such discriminative knowledge. Just as a piece of cloth tied round the eyes so as to obstruct the perception will obscure the sense perception through the eyes. The consequential expression of jnanavarana karma will be to obscure knowledge of the five types : matijnana (sense perception) 2. sruta jnana (inferential knowledge) 3. avadhijnana (clairovance perception) 4. manahparyayajnana (telepathic cognition) and 5. kevalajnana (omniscient cognition). 5 Matijnanavarana karma obscures sense experience, obtained through the contact of sense organs and the manas. The frutajnanavarana karma obscures knowledge obtained through inference and discriminative knowledge which is defective. Avadhijnanavarana karma obscures knowledge which may be considered as clairvoyance knowledge and which is mainly concerned with the perception of objects having form. Manahparyaya jnanavarana karma obscures the telepathic cognition. Kevalajnanavarana karma covers the omniscient knowledge which includes the simultaneity of knowledge-the substance and modes. 1 Tattvarthasutra 2-9 and its bhasya. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Some Problems in Jaina Psychology (Karnatak Uni. 1961) 3 Pramananayatattvaloka 2. 7. 4 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha 9 (b) Gommatsara (karmakanda) 21 (c) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika me uddhita 5 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 4 (b) Prahapana 23, 2 (c) Sthananga 5, 464 (d) Tattvartha sutra 8, 6-7. .

Page #483
462 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY The consequential expression of the jnanavarana karma may be either sarvaghati (complete) or desaghati which is partial.' Sarvaghati jnanavaraniya karma obscures the knowledge which is complete and which arises from the obscuration of knowledge, while dasaghati jnanavarana karma obscures partial knowledge obtained through the matijnana and other forms of jnanavarana. Mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya jnanavarana are desaghati, while kevalajnanavarana is sarvaghati, because the sarvaghati jnanavaranu karma is concerned with the total obscuration of knowledge. However although survaghati kevalajnanavarana karma obscures omniscience but the jnana of the atman is not wiped out of the essential. When the dark clouds cover the sky, the light of the sun percolates through the clouds and enables us to distinguish between the night and the day.2 Again, just as the light of the sun piercing through thick dark clouds obscuring the vision of the sun illumines different parts in the surroundings and the buildings according to the natures and the type of construction and colour pattern. So also the jnanavaraniya karma obscuring matijnana illumines various things with different intensities. There is no complete destruction of matijnana. If that were to take place, jiva would be considered to be ajiva. The maximum duration of this karma is 30 kotakoti sagaropama and minimum antarmuhurta" (less than 48 minutes).3 Darsanavarana kar na : Darsanavarana kurma obscures the intuitive experience. It obscures and inhibits the possibility of the cognition in which we apprehend the generality of an object without the discriminative knolwedge of the particulars. Due to the obscuration of the darsanavarana the 1 Sthananga sutra 2, 4, 105 2 (a) Sthananaga, 2, 4, 105 tika (b) Sthananga-samavayanga, pp. 94-95 Pt. Dalsukh Malvaniya (c) Nandisutra 43 3 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20 (b) Tattvarthasutra 8, 15 (c) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 26.

Page #484
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 463 avenues for knowledge are generally closed. Analogical example in this connection may be mentioned in that the darsanavarana may be compared to the watch man (dvarapala) at the door of a king. Without whose permission we cannot see the king himself. Similarly, if the darsanavarana karma obscures intuitive experience, we cannot get easily the jnana (discriminative knowledge).1 Darsanavarana karma is of nine varieties: 1. caksu darsanavarana 2. acaksu darsanavarana 3. Avadhi darsanavarana and 4. kevala darsanavarana 5. nidra (sleep) 6. nidra-nidra (deep sleep) 7. pracala 8. pracalapracala and 9. styanardhi. 2 Caksu darsanavaraniya obscures the visual experience. Acaksu darsanavaraniya obscures the forms of experience obtained through the sense-organs other than the eyes, and the mind. Avadhi darsanavaraniya obscures the clairvoyance intuition and kevala darsanavaraniya veils the omniscient experience. Nidra is a form of activity which is responsible for the obscuration of darsanavaraniya karma. It is sleep which is considered light sleep. Nidra-nidra is heavy sleep. Pracala is a form of stupor by which one gets sleep even sitting or standing. Pracala-Pracala is a heavy sleep which one gets even while walking. We may consider this as somnambulistic. Styanardhi is a very deep sleep where even activity is possible during sleep. It may be referred to hypnotic form of sleep. Darsanavarana karma may be partially affecting (desaghati) or totally affecting (sarvaghati). Caksu, acaksu, avadhi darsanavaraniya are desaghati while the remaining are sarvaghati. Kevaladarsanavaraniya karma, like kevalajnanavaraniya karma is sarvaghati. 1 (a) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika. (b) Prathama Karmagrantha 9 (c) Gommatas ara (karmakanda) 21, Nemicandra 2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 5-6 (b) Samavayanga sutra 9, (c) Sthananga 8, 3, 668, (d) Tattvarthasutra 8, 8, (e) Prajnapana 23, 1. 3 Thananga 2, 4, 10-darisanavaranjje kamme evam ceva. tika-desadarsanavarniyam caksuracaksuravadhidarsanavaraniyam ; sarvadarsanavaraniyam tu nidra pancakam kevaladarsanavaraniyam cetyarthah, bha vana tu purvavaditi,

Page #485
464 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY When darsanavaraniya karma is completely removed the jiva experiences infinite intuition. If the darsanavaraniya karma undergoes suppression and destruction, partial (ksayopasama), then caksu darsana and acaksu darsana and avadhi darsana experiences would be possible. The minimum duration of darsanavarana karma is one 'antarmuhurta' while the maximum duration will be 30 crores of crores sagaropama.1 Vedaniya karma Vedaniya karma causes experience of the pleasure and pain. It is of the two forms (i) satavedaniya which is responsbile for the experiences of pleasure concerning senses and the mind; while (ii) asatavedaniya brings about painful experience.2 These two experiences are concerned with the body and the mind. Vedaniya karma can be compared to a drawn out sword besmeared with honey. Satavedaniya is like the honey on the sword, while asatavedaniya is like cutting one's tongue while licking.* Satavedaniya karma is of eight types like: manojn1 sabda (pleasant words), manojna rupa (pleasant form), manojna gandha (pleasant smell), manojna risa (pleasant taste), manojna sparsa (pleasnt touch), sukhita mana (mind which is pleased), sukhita vani (pleasing speech) and sukhita kaya (pleasing body).5 Asatavedaniya is similarly of eight types associated with unpleasant experiences of sabda, rupa, gandha, rasa, sparsa, mana, vani and unpleasant body (dukhita kaya).o Asatavedaniya karma causes painful feelings through the senses and the mind, thereby bringing misery to the being." 1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 19-20 (b) Tattvarthasutra 8, 15 (c) Pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 26 (d) Prajnapana, pada 29 u. 2, su. 293 2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 7 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105. 3 Tattvartha 8,8 Sarvarthasiddhi 4 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, 12 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika 5 (a) Sthananga 8, 488 6 (a) Sthananga 8, 488 7 (a) Sthananga 8, 488 (b) Prajnapana 23, 2 (b) Prajnapana 23, 3, 15 (b) Prajnapana 23, 3, 15

Page #486
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 465 The shortest duration of the vedaniya karma has been mentioned as antarmuhurta in Uttaradhyayana sutrul and Prajnapana.: Bhagavati mentions two samayas as the minimum duration.: There is no contradiction between these different statements, because muhurta includes antarmuhurta which can be described as having the duration of two samayas. But Tattvarthasutra and Karmagrantha have mentioned twelve muhurtas as the minimum duration of this karma. This discrepancy may be explained with reference to the samparayika asrava and Tryapathika asrava. The maximum duration would be 30 crores of crores sagara. Mohaniya karma Mohaniya karma is deluding karma. It causes emotional disturbances and leads one astray, making him believe that this world is very much real and one clings strongly to the experiences of this world. In this sense, we may say it cause; "delusions". This is the most powerful of the eight karmas. Mohiniya karma is the primary form of karma which is responsible for the wheel of samsara.5 In this sense the real nature of the arman, which is purs and non-attached, free from the passions, is very much affected by the perversions of the emotional disturbances. By this karma, one ordinarily loses the power of dis. crimina:ion. The effects of this karina can be compared to the effects of alcoholic drinks in which one loses the power of thought and discrimination and the sense of discriminating good from bad.6 . i Uttaradhyayona 33, 19-20. 2 Projn ipana 23, 2, 21-29 3 Bhagavati 6, 3-Vedanijjam jaha do samaya I 4 (a) Tuttvarthasutra 8, 19. (b) Tattvarthabhasya (C) Navat ittva Sahitya Sangraha; Devananda Sutiksta, Saptatattva Prakarana (d) Jaina Darsina, p. 354 * Dr. Mohanlal Mehta. 5 Vinayacandra Caubisi 6 (a) Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 13 (b) Sthaninga 2, 4, 105 tika (c) Gom natis.ar.2 (k:irmikandu) 21,

Page #487
466 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Mohaniya karma is of two types : (1) Darsanamohaniya which affects the intuitive experience and (2) Caritramohaniya ; it affects good conduct.1 Darsana in this sense refers to the state of intuition of right tattras and the real nature of the atman.2 Just as the consuming of liquor stupifies, so also mohaniya karma causes stupification of the mind by which he looses the power of discrimination between right and wrong. In this, one identifies himself with all that is external to him. And without discriminating the righteous from the unrightcousness, one identifies himself with the uprighteous activity. Darsana mohaniya karma is of three4 types : 1. Samyakrva mohaniya, in this, the expression of samyaktra, if it is to come, cannot be obstructed, but it is slowed down and vitiated with numerous faults. 2. Mithyatva mohaniya, in this the faith in the righteous item is lost. 3. Misra mohaniya, in this one develops the mixed attitude in which righteous is also present along with wrong attitude. It is also called samyakmithyatva mohaniya.5 Mithyatva mohaniya is sarvaghati, while samyaktva mohaniya is desaghati as it partially affects discrimination. But misra mohaniya is saryaghati with reference to the relation of relative emphasis of the mithyatva and samyaktva. Second distinction in the mohaniya karma is the caritra mohaniya karma. It affects the right conduct of the soul. It thwarts activity leading to right conduct.? Caritra mohaniya is of two types : 1. kasaja mohaniya and 1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 8 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 (c) Prajiapana 23, 2 2 Tattvartha sutra 1, 2 3 Pancadhyayi 2, 93, 6-7 4 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 9. (b) Sthananga 2, 184. 5 Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 14-16 6 (a) Gommatasara (karmakanda) 39 (b) Sthananga 2, 4, 105, tika me uddbfta 7 Pancadhyayi 21, 6.

Page #488
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 467 2. nokasaya mohaniya. Kasaya refers to the passions and emotional upset. Kasaya mohaniya is of 16 types while nokasaya which refers to the quasi-passions or quasi-emotional upsets has seven or nine types. Kasaya mohaniya has reference to the emotional upsets. It etymologically comes from kasa and aya meaning attachment or attraction towards samsara which is kasa. These emotional upsets lead us to the attachments to the worldly things and empirical experiences and the consequent involvement in the wheel of life. Krodha (anger), mana (egoity), maya (deceitfulness) and lobha (greed)--these are four types of passions. Each of them has four different levels of intensity : 1. anantanubandhi, 2. apratyakhyanavarana, 3, pratyakhyanavarana and 4. samjvalana. In this way, there are sixteen variations of expression of emotional excitement. The rise of these mohi. niya karmas, i. e., kisayas or emotional upsets like anger, disturb the individual's mental activity. Anantanubandhi is of longer duration and because of this, the soul wanders into worldly life for endless time (anantakala). This is responsible for the destruction of samyaktva. Apratyakhyanavaraniya h is the effect of partial destruction and due to this atinan connot accept the fravaka vratas or anupratas and follow the righteous path.5 Pratyakhyanavarana obstructs the at'nan to become a monk or sramana. Due to the samjvalana kasaya it is difficult to get the opportuni. ties for practicing right conduct for a sraman2.? | (a) Uttara dhyayina 31, 10. (b) Prajnapana 23, 2. 2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 11. (b) Prajnapana 23, 2. (c) Sthananga 9, 700 (d) Sam avayanga 16. 3 (a) Avasvaka Malayagiri vrtti p. 116 (b) Visesavasyaka bhasya, gatha 1227. 4 Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya 5 Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya 6 Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya 7 Tattvarthasutra 8, 10 bhasya

Page #489
468 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Gommatasara also mentions these points. Anantanubandhi kasaya operates for the whole of life. Apratyakhyana has its effects for one year. Pratyakhyana kasaya produces its effects and continues its operation for four months, While sarjvalana has its effects for 15 days. In the Gommatasara karmakanda there is a description of the duration of the effects of kasayas with reference to the emotional experiences.3 No-kasaya Mohaniya-We now describe the intensity and duration of nok asaya mohaniya karma. Nokasaya refers to quasi-passions which arise due to the operation of kasayas, 4 They are also called as akasayas. Nokasaya does not mean absence of kasaya, but it is a quasi-passion in which there is the intensity of passion without the qualitative differences. There are nine types of nokasayas : 1. laughter (hasya), 2. rati (liking towards the other living or non-living things or dislike towards the samyama), 3. arati (disliking towards the worldly affairs and interest towards self-control samyama) 4. bhaya (fear), 5. soka (grief) 6. jugupsa (disgust)? 7, striveda (sensual desire with a man) 8. purusaveda (desire of intercourse with a woman), 9. napurhsakaveda (desire of sexual intercourse both with the man and woman). In the Uttaradhyayana seven distinctions have been mentioned. There the three types of vedas have been considered as one. In other words, by the single word veda all the three vedas have been denoted. It would be worth-while considering on the basis of psychological analysis, to be associated with somehow with instincts or the better word propensities in the sense that Mcdonell has used. This 1 Gommatasara, jivakanda, gatha 283. 2 Prathama karmagrantha, gatha 18 3 Gommatasara karmakanda. 4 Kasayasahavartitvat, kasayapreranadapi. Hasyadinavakasyokta nokasayakasayata. 5 Tattvartha Rajavartika 8, 9-10. 6 Sarvarthasiddhi 8,9 7 Acarya Pujyapada yadudayadatmadosasamvaranam paradosaviskarnam sa jugupsa.

Page #490
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 469 needs further psychological study. In this way, caritramohaniya karma has twenty-five varieties and among them four samjvalana kasaya and nine nokasaya i. e., thirteen varieties are the disturbances which affect partially. Therefore, they are called desaghati, while the others (i. c. remaining twelve varieties have their effects totally. Therefore, they are called sarvaghati.1 The duration of the mohaniya karma is for one antarmuhurta at the minimum and for 70 crores of crores sagara at the maximum.2 Ayuskarma (Age Determining Karma) Karma that determines the age of an individual jiva is called ayuskarma. When the age determined by the karma is over the individual jiva embraces death." This karma has been compared to the prison house. The udge sentences a prisoner to undergo punishment for a specific period and as soon as that period is over, he is released from the prison. Similarly, the individual jiva gets embodied in a particular body in a particular life for a specified period of time. For the determined period of time, the soul cannot be free from the bodily existence in that particular body. The oyuskarma is not concerned with giving pleasure or pain, but its function is to determine the age limit of a specific individual jiva.5 The consequential distinctions of ayuskarma is of 4 types: 1. one that determines like the life span in the hell (naraka ayu), 2. the one determines the life span in the lower animals (tiryanca 1 (a) Sthahanga 2, 4, 105, tika (b) Gommatasara, karmakanda 39 2 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 21 (b) Tattvarthasutra 8, 16 3 (a) Tattvartharajavartika 8, 10-2 (b) Prajnapana 23, 1 4 (a) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha; vrttyadisametam, Navatattva prakaranam 74. (b) Gommatasara, karmakanda 11. (c) Prathama Karmagrantha, gatha 23 5 Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika

Page #491
470 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ayu), 3. the life span determining karma in the case of human being (manusya ayu) and 4. that which determines the age of the residents of heaven (devayu).1 The age determination may be considered in two ways: 1. apavartaniya and 2. anapavartaniya. Apavartaniya refers the decrease in the age due to external condition. Anapavartaniya refers to the nondecrease under any circumstance of the duration of the ayu.2 Apavartaniya ayu does not however mean that it is possible to terminate the life of an individual jiva without exhausting the duration of the age as determined by the age determining karma. In only means that one can hasten the experience of the ayu karma which would have taken a longer time. This experience of karma can be reduced in antarmuhurta. In the common sense parlance, it is called premature death. But we should remember that in the case of the human being and the lower animals residing in karmabhumi it is possible to have such reduction in the experiences of the exhaustion of karma bringing about premature death. Eut there cannot be such reduction of age in the hellish beings, gods, tirthamkaras and even human beings and lower animals of bhogabhumi i. e., the land of enjoyment. Ayukarma extends in its duration to one antarmuhurta at the lowest and 33 crores of sagaropama at the highest. Bhagavati mentions the highest duration as a third part of the purvakoti and 33 sagaropama. This includes the period of time required for formation of the new life after the karmabandha in the previous life is out off, to the time when the germination of the new life starts. In other words this includes also the period of potentiality (abadhakala) of ayuskarma. Nama karma Nama karma is that type of karma which determines the 1 (a) Tattvarthasutra 8, 11 (b) Prajnapang 23-1 (c) Uttaradhyayana 33, 12 2 Tattvarthasutra 2, 52. Pt. Sukhalalji ka vivecan, pp. 112-116. 3 Uttaradhyayana 33, 22. 4 Bhagavati 6, 3

Page #492
A SOURCE-ROOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 471 status and other conditions of the individual jiva. 1 According to this theory, nama karma determines the different formulations of the bodily forms of the different individual status and the determining experiences." The nama karma has been very often compared to a painter who paints various pictures of men and animals. A good painter presents varieties of forms of animals and birds. Similarly, namakarma presents the determined life of individual soul in different stages like naraka, manava (human) or heavenly status. This karma determines the bodily form, the different limbs of the body, senseorgans and the general stature of the individual body. " Nama karma primarily is of two types: (1) Subhanama karma which gives auspicious presentations and (2) asubhanama karma which gives inauspicious presentation. The first is the consequence of punya (merit) and the second is determined by demerit (papa). Nama karma expresses itself into forty-two types of consequential forms.5 They are: 1. Gati nama-It determines the status of the individual soul in (a) hell, (b) lower animal states, (c) in the human states and (d) in the stage for the heavenly beings. 2. Jati nama-The nama karma that determines the form of the individual with reference to sense-organs and the species of the animals is called the jati nima. It has five forms: 1. one-sensed organism, 2. two-sensed organism, 3. three-sensed 4. four-sensed and 5. five-sensed organisms. These are determined by the nama karma. 3. Sarira namakarma-It determines the type and the form of the sarira that the jiva gets as the fruits of its karma. It has five 1 Prajnapand 23, 1, 288 tika 2 Gommatasa ra karmakanda 12. 3 (a) Sthananga 2, 4, 105 tika (b) Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha, avacurni vrttyadi same am, -Navatattvaprakaranam 74 (b) Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika. 4 Uttara 33, 13 5 (a) Samavayanga samavaya 42, (b) Prjanapana 23, 2-293. (c) Tattvarihasutra 8, 12.

Page #493
472 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY forms: (a) audarika sorira (b) vaikriyaka, (c) aharcka (d) taijasa and (e) karmana sarira (karmic body). 4. Sarira angopanga nama-lt determines the different parts of the bodies and also the limbs of the bcdies. It is of three forms: (1) audarika sarira angopanga (2) vakriyaka sarira angopanga and (3) aharaka sarira argopanga. Tuijasa and karmana sariics (bodies) have no limbs. 5. Sarira bandhana nama kurma is that body of the karmic particles which associates the karmic particles which were accrued previously and are being accrucd in present. It has five forms: 1. audarika sarira bandhana namu, 2. laikriya sarira bandhana nana, 3. aharaka sarira bandhana nama 4. taijasa sarira beandhaa nama, and 5. karmana sarira bandhana namo. In the Karmagrantia, fifteen distinctions have been made regarding the Sarira landhana nama kurma. We give below the same distinctions in their original form: 1. Audarika-audarika bandhananama 2. Audarika-laijasa bandhunanama 3. Audarika-karmana bandhananama 4. Vaikriya-vaikriya bandhunanama 5. Vaikriya-taijasa bandhancnama 6. Vaikriya-karmana bandhananama 7. Aharaka-aharaka bandhananama 8. Aharka-taijasa bandhananama 9. Aharaka-karmana bandhananama 10. Audarika-taijasa-karmana bandhananama 11. Vaikriya-taijasa--karmana bandhananama 12. Aharka--taijasa--karmana bandhananama 13. Taijasa--taijasa bandhananama 14. Taijasa--karmana bandhananama 15. Karmara--karmana bandhananama The audarika, vaikriya and nharaka karma particles are not directly connected with eath other. Therefore, their interconnected bondage has not been mentioned here. . 6. Sarira sanghata namakarma is concerned with the association and arrangement of the different karmas which have been accumula

Page #494
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 473 ted due to various factors and the karmic particles which are accruing due to the influx of karmas. It has five forms : (a) audarikasarira sanghata nama karma, where the karmic particles of similar nature accrued and accruing are arranged in a proper way, so as to determine the form of the body, etc. Similarly, the functions of other four allied karmas can be mentioned, like (b) raikriyasarira sanghata namakarma, (c) aharaka sarira (d) taijasa sarira and (e) karmana Sarira sanghata namakarma. 7. Samhanana nama karma is concerned with the formation and structure of the bone in the body. There are six forms in this : (a) vajra vrsabha naraca samhanana nama-karma (formation of hard and strong bones), (b) vrsabha naraca samhanana namo karma (c) naraca sarhhanana nama karma (flexible and not brittle bones). (d) ardha naraca samhanana nama karma, (e) kilika samhanana nama. karma (joint bones), (f) sevarta samhanana nama karma (auxilliary bones). 8. Samsthana nama karma is concerned with the determination of the size of the different parts of the body. It has also six forms like : (a) samacaturasra (even form), (b) nyagrodha parimandala sarnsthana (globular and round forms), (c) sadi samsthana (formation of the ends of the body), (d) vamana samsthana (formation of short bodies, (e) kubja sarhsthana (formation of dwarfish bodies and (f) hunda samsthana (unequal bodies). 9. Varna namakarma is that type of namakarma which is responsible for determining the colour of the individual organism. It is of five types : (1) krsnavarnanama (black), 2. nilavarnanama (indigo), 3. lohitavarninama (grey), 4. haridravarnanama (yellow) and 5. svetavarna nama (white) determining karma, 10. Gandha namakorma : This nama karma determines the smell of the individual organism. It is of two types : 1. surabhigandhanama (pleasant smell) and 2. durabhigandhanama (unpleasant smell). 11. Rasa namakarma is connected with determination of the taste of the individual experiencing it. It is of five types : 1. tiktarasa nama (pungant) 2. katurasanama (bitter) 3. kasayarasanama (astrin

Page #495
474 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY gent) 4. amlarasa nama (acidic) and 5. madhura rasa nama (sweet). ' 12. Spursanama karma determines the nature of the touch of the individual organism. These are of eight types : 1. karkasa spars 1 (hard) 2. mrdu sparsa (soft) 3. guru sparsa (weighty) 4. laghu sparsa (unextended and light) 5. snigdha (greasy and smooth) 6. rukna sparsa (hard and dry) 7. sita sparsa (cool touch) and 8. usna sparsa (warm). The sparsa nama karma determines them. 13. Agurulaghu nana : This karma determines the extent of the intensity neither too little nor too much in its intensity and duration. 14. Upaghata nama : With the rise of this karma the individual jiva suffers hardships and physical tortures due to physical deformation like pratijivha (defects in tongue or defects in teeth, etc.) 15. Paraghata nama : By the rise of this karma one can influence others even through his talk or appearance. It is also possible that due to this karma, the individual jiva would be able to harm other jivas. 16. Anupurvi nama : This type of karma enables an individual jiva to traverse a particular distance after it leaves its first body at the time of death and before it enters the other state of existence. It enables to cover some space so as to reach the next stage of existence. It has four types : 1. naraka anupurvi nama (leading towards hell) 2. tiryak anupurvinama (it has the capacity of leading the soul to a point which to enter the lower stage of animals) 3. manusya anupurvi nama (leading to the human existence) 4. devanupurvi nama (leads to the next type of heavenly being). 17. Ucchvasa nama : By this karma, one can breath properly. 18. Atapa nama : By this karma, an individual organism can get warm for the sake of life. Or, an organism, being himself cool, 1 This type of karma operates in the case of one-sensed organism, because the body of the one-sensed organism is first cold and then it can get hot.

Page #496
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 475 can expedite warm-light, e. g., the light of gross ankaratna fixed below the sun. 19. Udyotanama karma : By this karma the organism becomes cool and gets sufficient energy and light? or, expedites cool light. 20. Vihayogati nama : By this karma the individual jiva gets either the good or the bad gati (walk). It has two types : (prasasta (auspicious gati) and aprasasta (uncomfortable or inauspicious gati). 21. Trasanama karma : It enables an individual organism to get the capacity of motion. 22. Sthavara nama karma : By this karma individual jiva cannot move at his will. 23. Suksma nama : This karma determines the subtle body of the individual jiva. 24. Badara nama karma determines the individual to have a sthula sarira (gross body). 25. Paryapta nama : By this, the individual soul gets appropriate functions (paryaptis) suitable for its status. 26. Aparyaptanama : In this the individual soul may not get all the necessary and fitting functions of the organism. 27. Sadharana sariranama : By this karma the infinite livas get a common and normal body. 28. Pratyekasarira nama : It determines the specific body of the jiva. 29. Sthiranama karma : It determines the type of the bones, . the teeth and flesh that a body gets in the proper form and proper place. 30. Asthira nama is responsible for the disharmony and discardent arrangement of the bones, the flesh etc. 31. subhanama : By this karma one acquires a beautiful body and limbs. 1 The Sitaprakasa (the cool night) arises from the deva, labdhidhari muni, vaikriya sarira, the moon and the stars.

Page #497
476 A SOURCE-900* IN SAINA PHILOSOPHY 32. Asubha nama karma is responsible for the acquisition of ugly body and limbs. 33. Subhaga nama karma : By this karma one becomes populai and the impression on the others would be pleasant, even if he does nothing for the good of others, he becomes saubhagyasali i. e. he acquires good things of life. 34. Durbhaga nama karma is responsible for the unpleasant experiences of life and he becomes un popular. 35. Susvara nama karna : This type of karma is responsible for the melodius voice one gets. 36. Duhsvara nama karma : By this one gets an unpleasant voice. 37. Adeya n jina karma makes an individual jiva respected by his words. 33. Anadeya nama karma : By this, even the true words of the individual jiva are not respected. 39. Yasah n ima karina : This brings fame to the individual soul. 40. Ayasahkirti nama karma : By this karma one is unlucky and does not get success. He gets disfame. 41. Nirmana nama karma : By this the limbs of the body are properly arranged. 42. Tirthankara nama karma : By this karma one gets the opportunity and the capacity of establishing right path (dharma tirtha). Prajnapana? and Gommatasara. have given 93 types of nama. karma, and Karmavipaka mentions fifteen types of bandhananama and 103 types of na nakarma distinctions. The distinctions in the namakarma on the basis of 67 prakstis are to be considered from the point of view of distinctions of auspicious and inauspicious karma. And also 1 2 3 Prajnapana 23, 2, 293. Gommatasara karmakanda, 22. Karmavipaka (Hindi translation) Pt. Sukbalalji, pp. 48, 105.

Page #498
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 477 from the point of view of four-fold distinctions of varna. Elsewhere also, 71 distinctions have been made in the consequential effects (prakrti) in the same nama karma, by which subhanama karma has been distinguished, into thirty seven1; and thirty-four types of asubhanama karma. This is a brief analysis of the different types of namakarma. This analysis has no ideological difference. The duration of the namakarma is 8 muhurta in its lowest and 30 crores of crores sagaropama in the highest3. Gotrakarma That type of karma which determines the status of the individual in the family and the society is called gotra karma. This has reference to the higher status or the lower status of the family in society." Acarya Umasvati has given a description of the concept of gotra in terms of the higher and the lower status with reference to the desa (country), jati (community), kula (sub-section of the community), sthana (status), mana (respect in society), satkara (the type of honour in society) aitvarya (the extent of prosperity or otherwise). In the case of the individual in the lower state of society, Umasvati mentions some sections.5 Gotrakarma is primarily of two types: 1. Uccagotra karma which determines the higher status and the place of the individual in the family and in society. 2. Nicagotra karma which determines the lower status of individual in the family and the society." Uccagotra karma is of eight types: 1. Jati uccagotra associated with the high status of the family with reference to the mother side. 2. Kula uccagotra, high status of the family from the paterna] side. 1 Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha-Navatattvaprakarana 7, basya 37. 2 Navatattva Sahitya Sangraha: Navatattvaprakarana 8, bhasya 49. 3 (a) Uttaradhyayana 33, 23. (b) Tattvarthasutra, 8(17-20. 4 Prajnapana, 23/1288 Tika. 5 Tattvarthasutra, 8/13 Bhasya. 6 Uttaradhyayana 33, 14,

Page #499
478 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 3. Bala uccagotra, it concerns the power and strength of the individual with reference to his family also. 4. Rupa uccagotra concerning the form of his body with reference to the heredity of the family. 5. Tapa uccagotra, the quality of virtues etc., with reference to the family. 6. Sruta uccagotra with reference to the knowledge and learning for the family and the individual. 7. Labha uccagotra refers to the gains of the individual with reference to his family. 8. Aisvarya uccagotra is concerned with the prosperity of the individual and the family.1 Nicagotra karma is also of eight types" : 1. Jati nicagotra associated with the maternal side. 2. Kula nicagotra the lower state of the family from the paternal side. 3. Bala nicagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family with reference to the strength and power. 4. Rupa nicagotra, it connotes the lower status of the family and individual with reference to the form, beauty etc. 5. Tapa nicagatra, refers to the lack of self-control and higher virtues in the individual and with reference to the family. 6. Srutanicagotra, it refers to the lack of learning and intell igence. 7. Labha nicagotra, it refers to the loss of gains and profits for an individual with reference to the family. 8. Aisvarya nicagotra, it is absence of prosperity of the individual and family. This karma has been compared to a potter (kumbhakara). The potter makes a variety of pots out of the same clay. But some are 1 Uttara 33, 14. 2 Prajnapana 23, 1, 292; 23, 1, 293,

Page #500
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY used for the sake of making kumbha or kalasa for the worship of gods. They are aquainted with fragrant ointment like candana etc. But some others are used for keeping wines and alcoholic drinks. In the same way, individual jivas according to the type of karma get various types of existences with reference to their karmic deserts. Some are poor, some are rich, some are virtuous, and some are vicious. Some are born in rich families and some in poor families.1 Gotrakarma is of 8 muhurtas in the minimum and 20 crores of crores sagaropama as the maximum. In general, nama nnd gotra karmas are related to each other in the sense they are associated with the forms and the state of the body and the mental states. The various forms and mental states are due to these karmas. Namakarma determines the possession of subha and asubha sarira (body). And gotrakarma is considered for determining the status of the individual organism with reference to the high or low status. The subh (auspicious) sarira brings pleasure and asubha sarira (inauspicious body) brings pain. Similarly, the high or the lower status of the individual is determined by the gotrakarma. 479 A question arises whether it would be necessary to distinguish between the nama and gotra karma as separate, as they are closely associated with the same functioning regarding the form and the status and body and the mind. For answer to this, we will have to refer to the distinction connected with the association of the nama karma of the individual body while gotra karma with reference to the status of the individuals and their family status. A second question arises of the form and the status of the individual bodies and the family status, where to be determined by the heredity and the heritage of the parent status, why should it be necessary to have two types of karma as nama karma and gotra karma. Moreover, if the form and the status of the individual in the family are to be determined by heredity and family circumstances, individual karma will have very little place. 1 Thananga 2, 4, 105 tika.

Page #501
480 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY But it may please be noted that the determination of the individual status in the family and society is not only determined by the parents or the family, but this is possible with the karma that individual has earned in this respect. The individual is himself responsible for these; and he has earned it. The family and the society are only occasion and the environ'nental factors which enable the individual to be placed in good or bad comfort, in different status in society and family by his own karma. Namakarma determines the individual concerning his birth as man or gods in the heaven or in the animal kingdom. It is also connected in the formation of the types of sense-organs that he possesses and the types of bodies that he inherits like audarika, vaikriya etc. Gotra karma is also concerned with the status of the individual. Therefore, again a question is asked whether gotrakarma has anything to do with the determination of the types of sarira etc. But gotrakarma is not directly connected in the formation of the individual bodies and the sense-organs etc. Because the higher or the lower gotra of an individual is not relevant for the possession of a particular body, short or tall, particular colours - black or brown, particular types of sense-organs like healthy sense-organs or deformities. For instance, a man born in the higher family family may have deformities in the body, may be of dark chlour and may be also ugly. On the other hand, a man who is born in a lower family may be handsome and healthy. Therefore, gotra karma has nothing to do with the determination of the bodily forms in their various aspects. It is concerned with the status of the individuals with reference to his family and mental make up. However, namakarma and gotra karma are closely associated with each other regarding the formation of the indiv'dual personalities. Another question has been raised regarding the criteria of determining the lower and the higher status of an individual in the family and in society due to the operation of the gotrakarma. The answer to this, will have to refer to the biological and social heredity. We find that physical and mental poiss of an individual as determined in society in a dignified way is largely due to the family upbring

Page #502
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 481 ing. Just as a beautiful body is due to the biological heredity, similarly the status of the individual and upright behaviour and his character and personality are to a great extent influenced by the biological heredity and family up.bringing. Antaraya karma Antaraya karma obscures and also obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. By the rise of this karmi, constructions would be created for the enjoyment of the normal pleasures of life and the experience of an individual. This karma has been compared to the finance minister of the king. The king orders to give money to a person but the finance minister very *ften withholds and delays the disbursement, of what is given. He creates difficulty in the implementation of the king's order. So, also, is the function of antaraya karma. It obstructs the energy of alman regarding the act of giving dana (donation) and other forms of generous act. Antariya karma is of five types : 1. Dani antaraya karma -It creates obstructions in the giving of gifts and charity. 2. Labhantaraya karma-Due to the rise of this karma, one is prevented from enjoying the fruits of his labours. He does not get the profits that he earns. 3. Bhogantarayn karma -[t prevents the enjoyment of normal pleasures of life although the pleasures are at hand. For instance, one cannot eat delicious food kept on the table for dinner due to illhealth. 4. Upabhogantarava karma --This prevents the enjoyment of pleasures frequently available, as for instance, one is prevented from getting good house, wearing good clothes and ornaments. 5. Viryantaraya karma - It prevents an individual from performing actions and duties which require strength and drive. Antaraya karma can also be considered of two types : 1. Pratyutpanna vinasa antaraya karma-By the rise of this karma the objects which are acquired are either lost or destroyed. 2. Pihita agamipatha 1 2 Pancidhyayi 2, 1007. Tharahga 2, 4, 105 tika,

Page #503
482 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY antaraya karma-This refers to the obstructions created in the enjoy, ment of the forthcoming experiences and objects.1 Antaraya karma is of one antarmuhurta duration in the least and at the maximum it is of thirty crores of crores sagaropama. The soul has the inherent characteristics of moving upwards (urdhvagati), just as a gourd (tumba) has the capacity of floating on the surface of water. But if the gourd is smeared with clay it becomes heavy and it does not flow. Similarly, due to the encrustations of karmic particles the soul is prevented from going upwards and from purifications; so it gets involved in the wheel of empirical existence, it goes down. Antaraya karma is concerned with the obstructions of the possibility of getting enjoyment of the possession and the fruits of activity. The question arises whether antaraya karma is directly related to the external objects and the possession of enjoyment of external objects? For instance, in the possibility of giving charity etc. If there are obstructions these obstructions are due to antaraya karma. The possibilities of knowledge and other experiences and possessions depends upon the naturality and appropriateness of occasion which has reached the stage of maturity of experience. We may call this labdhi. Labdhi is the appropriateness of fructification. For instance, even when there is a donor to give charity and also when there is the preparedness of accepting charity, by an individual or an institution, it may not be possible that the act of charity may materialise due to some other external forces. But when all the forces are favourable for actualisation then charity is given. This is the labani with reference to time and other circumstances. Labdhi, therefore, may be referred to the capacity, the potency and the fructification of realisation. Just as jnanavaraniya karma obscures valid knowledge 1 Sthananga 2, 4, 105. 2 Uttaradhyayana 33, 19. 3 Jnata sutra,

Page #504
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 483 so also other forms of karma prevents the relevant experience. Antaraya karma refers to the inherent energy of the soul for knowledge experienced and action. Antaraya karma obstructs the energy to operate in the direction of getting experiences are external, for example the act of charity, the gains, the enjoyment of the objects and the objects connected with the inherent energy of the soul are external, but the acts connected with charity and experiences of their individual in experiencing the fruits of karma are internal in the sense that they are directly connected with the expression of soul energy. There may be external objects ready to be given as charity, the conditions for giving charity may also be favourable, but if there is no internal urge on the part of one who gives charity is not yet aroused, the act of charity would not be possible. Due to the rise of danantaraya karma, the person who wants to give dana is not mentally ready. This is as idbhava. When he is willing to it becomes sadbhava. But sometimes we find occasions when even in the absence of the desire to give charity the charity is given, while even with the best of intentions the desired charity, we may not give it. In these circumstances dinantaraya karma operates in different ways. But the external circunstances are not directy related to danantaraya karma. It has a reference to the internal urge, the psychic factor which is responsible for the act of giving charity. The external circumstances are only occasions which are indirectly responsible for the rise, suppression and destruction (keayopasamana) of the antarayakarma. The real cause is psychological. It is the inner urge which is the expression of anantavirya (the infinite and inherent energy of the soul). We also find that sometimes the circumstances are favourable, the objects are there, still we do not get the objects. This is due to the opesation of labhantaraya karma, which does not permit the rise of the desire of for getting the objects. Sometimes, we may have a desire to have the object, but circumstances may not be favourable. Similarly, in some situations all the three factors, the desire to give, the desire to take and the object that is desired are all present, but

Page #505
484 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY still we do not get the object due to some unfavourable and accidental circumstances. In this sense, we find that the operation of antaraya karma is directly connected with the internal factors of the individual and not with the objects which are external. The circumstances play an important part in the determination of the act of possession of the objects. Sometimes, the labhantaraya karma may not have origin to express itself, even then it is possible that we may not get the objects. In some situations even with the operation with the rise of the labhantaraya karma, we may get the objects. The bhogantaraya and upbhogantaraya karmas are also directly related to the inherent energy of atman and not with external things. The same position is true about viryantaraya. Therefore what is primarily important is that the antaraya karma obstructs the infinite energy of atman (ananta virya) and is not directly related to get or not get the external things. .." THE INTENSITY OF KARMIC EXPERIENCE The intensity of the experiences of karmic fruition is primarily dependent upon the emotional set and the operation of kasayas. If the kasayas (emotional set) is intense, the karmic experienc's will also be intense, it would give rise to papa karma and if the kasayas are not intense the karmic experiences would not be intense, it would give rise to punya karma. KARMA-PRADESA An empirical individual (jiva) is constantly engaged in activity through body, mind and speech. Due to these activities karmic particles flow into the soul and envelope the soul. The extent of the enveloping of obscuration of the karmic particles into the soul is referred to as karma-pradega. The influx of the karmic particles into the soul are distributed into'eight types of karmic particles and they envelope the soul in their own way. There is bondage. The ayu karma receives the least of the amount of the karmic particles among those which are glued to the soul. Nama karma and gotra karma have a little more share than that of ayu karma, but equal share of the karmic

Page #506
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 485 flow. Jnanavaraniya, darganavaraniya and antaraya have a little more quantity of karmic particles that flow in; but they have equal share. Mohaniya karma gets more quantity and the vedaniya karma bas still more, in other words vedaniya karina gets the greatest share. These pradegas are again distinguished on the basis of consequential effects (uttarapraksti) and these varying degrees of pradesakarma depend on the corresponding varying degrees of the influx of karmic particles of their nature. KARMA-BANDHA We have already seen that the karmic particles (karma varganas) pervade every point in the universe. Individual soul is constantly in activity through the mind, speech and body. Due to these activities motivated and accompanied by kasayas attract infinite number of particles of karma varganas into the soul. In the case of the ekendriyas (one-sensed organisms) influx is of six directions. But if there are obstructions it would have influxes from three, four or five directions. But in the case of all other jivas the influx of karma is from all directions. With reference to the ksetra (space), the jiva can attract the karmic particles from the area where it exists itself but the karmic particles outside this sphere of extension would not be attracted. We should realise that the variation in the quantity of the influx of karma depends on the variations in the types of activity. If the activity is slow, the influx of karmic particles also would be slow. This is called in the agamic language, pradesabandha. In other words, the atman has numberless pradesas (space points). On each pradesa, there would be glued infinite number of karmic particles and this karmi pradesa in the space point of a soul is called pradega 1 (a) Uttaradhyayana 32, 18. (b) Bhagavati, sataka 17, uddesa 4. 2 (a) Visesavasyaka bhasya, gatha 1941, p. 117, II Pt. (b) Pancasangraha 284.

Page #507
486 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY bandha. The bondage and the association of karmic particles to the soul pradesas is called pradesa bundha. Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan! Can we say that jiva and pudgala are intimately associated with each other in the form of bondage, close knit association as if they are one like the water and milk?" Bhagavana replied, Yes they are very closely bound together; and he explained the process of pradesa bandha. "O Gautama", he said, sjust as a lake is full of water overflowing with the waves dashing against the banks and suppose a boat with innumerable holes at the bottom and the sides is left in the water, the water perforates into the boat and is full of water, the boat sinks, so also the soul is bound with karmic particles and becomes one with each other. 2 The karmic encrustations of the soul due to the activities of the soul creates avarana (veil) and it obscures the knowledge, intuition, experiences of pleasure and pain and other types of experiences on the basis of the different capacities and original nature of the karmic particles. When the karmic particles which are material in nature get bound to the soul, they form themselves into different types. This is called prak stibandha. Prak rtibandha and pradesabandha are due to yoga and the diffe. rent forms of activity. The bondage of the karmic pariicles to the soul arising out of the yoga only and its forms of activity can be compared to the depositing of dust particles on a wall which is dry. They do not affect the wall and they can be blown away. Such types of karmic bondage takes plac: in the 11th and 12th and 13th 1 (a) Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vrtti. (b) Navatativasahityasangrala avacurni vrtyadisaine:ain navatalt raprakarana, gatba 71 ki vstti. (c) Navarattvasahity asangraha; Devanandasurik rta saptatattra prakarana adh, 4. 2 Bhagavati 1, 6, 3 (a) pancama Karmagrantha, gatha 96 -joga payadipaesam. (b) Thananga 2, 4, 96 tika.

Page #508
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 487 stages of gunasthanas. Because the normal human activity is in existence, but there is the total absence of the passions and emotional upsets (kasaya). By this, there is no bondage worth the name which leads to the furtherance of sarsara. Yoga and kasaya operating together would create bondage which is more endurable and whose effects have to experienced before their freedom. This type of bondage arising out of the yoga and passions (kasaya) is called sthitibandha. In other words, the karmic bondage that the soul gets through jnanavarana karma etc. and the duration the karmic bondage in the atma pradesa is called sthitibandha. 1 The soul by its activity and kasayas attracts karmic particles both of auspicious and inauspicious nature. If karmic particles give rise to auspicious results it is called auspicious karma (subhakarma); and the karmic particles giving rise to inauspicious results is called asubhakarma. After the rise of the karma, they experience the fruition of the karmic bondage may be in various intensities and duration according to the nature of the karmic particles. This type of variations is determined at the time of karmic bondage. This is called anubhagabandha. The karmic bondage expresses itself on appropriate occasions and at that time there is the udaya or the rise of the karmic experiences with various intensities. If the occasion is not appropriate the karmic particles may rise, but without giving any fruition may disintegrate themselves as material particles. As long as the appropriate occasion for fruition does not arise, the experience would not be possible. The rise of the karmic particles for fruition gives rise to the experiences of karma and the exhaustion of karma. The experiences of karma depend on the nature of the karmic particles. For 1 Sthitih kalavadharanam. 2 (a) Bhagavati 1, 4, 40 vytti. (b) Anubhago raso jaeyah. (c) Tattvarthasutra 8, 22-vipakoanubhavah I.

Page #509
488 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY instance, jnanavaraniya karma obscures the knowledge and darsaniva karma obscures intuition and faith according to their nature of the karmic particles and the strength. Similarly, the other types of karmic particles creates obscuration like the mohaniya and vedaniya and caritra karma according to the strength of the karmic particles and their original nature. There can be no alterations in the original nature of the karmic particles, But in the case of the consequential effects of the experiences of the one karma may be changed to the experiences and the consequential effects of the same original karma. In other words, the karmic consequential effects (uttaraprak sti) may be transferred and transformed. For instance, matijnanavaraniya karma may express itself in the obscruation of srutajnana. But this type of consequential transformation is possible in the case of similar types of karmic particles (sajatiya), and not of dissimilar types of karmic particles. As for instance, darsana mohaniya cannot be transformed into caritaramohaniya and vice-versa. Similarly, sanyaktva ve laniya (right form of feeling karma) and mithyalva vedaniya, consequential effects cannot be transformed. And also the consequential effect of (uttaraprakrti) of ayukarma cannot also be transformed, as for instance, the ayukarma of a lower animal cannot be transformed into the ayukarma of the human being. The same is the case with other forms of ayukarma. Just as there is transformation of the karmic effect on the basis of the nature of the karmic particles, so also there is possiblity of transformation of the various karmic bondage. The karma which has lower intensity may be transformed into the karma which is of higher intensity and vice-versa. Gautama asked Mahavira, "Bhagavan ! it is said by some that all the jivas experience the karmas according to the karmic bondage that has been earned by them. Is it true ?" 1 (a) Tattvarthasutra 8, 22 bhasya. (b) Tativartha; 8, 22 Sarvarthasiddhi. (c) Visesarasyaka bhasya, gatha 1938. (d) Tattvarthasutra Pt, Sukhlalji (Hindi) p. 293, 2nd edition.

Page #510
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 489 Mahavira said, "O Gautama ! this is not completely true, because all the jivas do not experience the karmic experiences exactly the same way according to the nature of the intensity of their karmic bondage. Some jivas do experience the karmic experiences exactly according to the nature and the intensity of the bondage. This I say, eambhutavedana. But in som cases there are possibilities of variation of experiences due to the activity of the jiva and due to the transformation of the bondage intensities. This is called "unevambhuta vedana.1 Sthananga mentions four types of consequential effects of karma with reference to its karmic particles (karmavipaka): (1) the karmic particles may be of subha karma (auspicious) and the consequential effects may also be subha (auspicious), (2) the karma may be subha but its consequential effects (vipaka) may be asubha, (3) karma may be asubha while the consequential effects inay be subha and (4) karma may be asubha and the consequential effects also may be asubha.2 Naturally a curiosity arises as to the causes of such consequential effects-why is it that the original karmic particles may be auspicious while the consequential effects may be different ? Jainas have attempted to give a solution to this problem by the processes of t ation, fruition, suppression and destruction of karmic particles. These have been called avastha (position) and there are eleven avasthas, of the relation between the nature of the karma and the nature of the fruition of karma in varied forms. These states are : 1. bandha 1 Bhagavati 5, 5. 2 (a) Sthananga 4, 4, 312. (b) In the Anguttaranikaya similar discussion regarding the trans formation of the auspicious and inauspicious into their effects is to be found - Anguttaranikaya 4, 232-233. 3 (a) Dravyasangraha tika, gatha 33 (b) Atmamimarnsa Pt. Dalsukha Malvania, p. 128. (c) Jaina Darsana. (d) Sri Amar Bharati, varsa I.

Page #511
490 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (bondage) 2. Sata (potential states) 3. udvartana (increase in the intensity) 4. apavartana (decrease in the intensity of fruition) 5. sankramana (transformation) 6. udaya (rise) 7. udirana (premature actualisation) 8. upasamana (suppression) 9. nidhatti (in which there is possiblity of increasing and decreasing the intensity of the fruition of karma but cannot be transformation and premature realisation of karmas) 10. nikacita (absence of increase or decrease or tansformation or premature realisation) 11. abadhakala, the period of potentiality before actualisation. 1. Bandha-Bandha is bondage in which the karmic particles envelops the soul and become almost one with the soul just as the mixture of water and milk is indistinguishable. We have already seen the four types of bandha,1 2. Satta-Satta is a state of the nature of the karmic particles attached to the soul and they are in the state of potentiality not yet expressed. It is a state of the soul with reference to the karma after the bondage and before the realisation of the karman. 3. Udvartana-It refers to the increase in the intensity of the experience in the fruits of karma. This variation and increase in the intensity of the fruits of karmi depends upon the variation in the intensity of the emotional states. 4. Apavartana-This refers to the process of decreased realisation and decrease in the intensity experienced with reference to the transformation of sthiti (duration) and anubhaga (intensity of fruition) of karma. Jainas have worked out a complicated scheme of transformation of sthiti and anubhaga of karma. The increased realisation 1 (a) Tattvarthasutra 1, 4, Sarvarthasiddhi. (b) Uttaradhyayana 28. 24 Nemicandriya tika. (c) Sthananga 1, 3, 9 tika. (d) Navatattvasahit yasangraha : saptatattvaprakarana, gatha 133 (e) Dravyasangrana 2, 32, Nemicandra Siddhanta Chakravarti. (f) Thananga 1, 4, 9 tika. (g) Navatattvasahityasangraha vrtyadisametar Navatattvaprakara nam, gaha 71, ki praksta avacurni.

Page #512
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 491 of ayukarma is however not possible with all the beings, with celestial and infernal beings and the human beings in their last existence, chakravarti and tirthink iras. The increase and the decrease in the realisation of the karma is based on the nature of suppression or the expression of karma. For instance, sometimes asubhakarma may be accompanied by actions which are subha or subhakarma may be followed by the actions which are inauspicious and the consequential effects of these karmic processes are therefore, affected by the nature of the karma and the later actions bring in different types of karma. 5. Sankramana-Sankramana is transformation of one type of karma into another in respect of (1) its nature (2) duration (3) intensity and (4) the strength of karmic matter. For example, asatavedaniya karma can be transformed into satavedaniyakarma. Similarly, a person having right faith (samyagd rsti) transforms the mithyatva karma into samyak-mithyatva karma and samyaktva. But any karma cannot be transformed into any other karma. Mutual transformation is not possible in the case of darsana mohaniya and caritramohaniva karma, nor between any two of the four sub-types of the ayukarma. Transformation is possible between the sub-types of the particular type of karma except in the cases mentioned above. A person having wrong belief (mithyatva) cannot easily transform the mithyatva into the mixed or samyaktva as it requires greater energy. Similarly, a person of right belief is pure and it is not easy for him to fall back into the karmic state of wrong belief. The four types of sankramana mentioned above are : (1) prak rti sankrunana, (2) sthiti sankramana, (3) anubhaga sankrumana and (4) pradesa sankramana, 6. Udaya - It is the rise of the karma in the process of fruition. When the karma rises and after giving its fruits becomes transformed into mere particles of matter. It is phalodaya. But sometimes without 1 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma aud Rebirth (L. D. Institutue of Indo. glogy, Ahmedabad) ch. 2. 2 Kalghatgi (T. G.) Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2. 3 Sthananga 4, 216.

Page #513
* 492 giving fruits, the karma gets disintegrated into particles of matter, and it is destroyed. It is called pradesodaya. A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 7. Udirana-It is a premature realisation of the karma. Karma does not immediately bear fruit as soon as it is bound. It arises after the period of potentiality or the period of non-production which is called abadhakala. And it continues to operate till it fructifies fully. But it is not possible to make a defined predicational rule about udirana. However, in the normal course of thing udirana is possible in the case of the same type of karma which is in operation. 8 Upasamana--This is the process of the suppression of karma, before it bears effect. Upasamana is possible where there is a possibility of udvartana and apavartana and transformation (sankramana). Upasamana is only suppression and not destruction of the karma in producing its effects, just as the burning embers of fire produced by coal are covered by ashes and they are prevented from giving their full effects of the fire. But as soon as the ashes covering the embers of fire are removed the effect of fire is felt in its intensity, so also the suppressed karma has to get itself exhausted and produce its effects in varying degrees after the process of suppression no longer ope rates, 9. Nidhatti-It is the process by which karma is made incapable of all processes except udvartana and apavartana-increased and decreased realisation. Under certain conditions the karmic particles are so intensely glued that it becomes impossible to affect them in any way except by increased or decreased realisation.1 10. In the Nikacita even these processes are impossible. In this case the duration, intensity and strength of the karma are deterJiva is bound to mined by the very time of the bondage of karma. suffer the fruition of this type of karma. 11. Abadhakala - Abadhakala is the duration of the karmic state from the time of its bondage to the time of fruition. The extent of the abadhakala has been measured with reference to the extent of 1 Kalghatgi (T. G.): Karma and Rebirth, ch. 2.

Page #514
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 493 the duration of the type of karma. Generally, the ratio is one hundred years to one sagaropama period of time of its fruition as the original karma. For example, maximum duration of the jnanavaraniya karma is thirty crores of crores sagaropama. And the abadhakala will be measured as three thousand years. In the Bhagavati, we get the calculations about the periods of abadhakala of the 8 types of karma. In the Prajnapana also there is the calculation about the extent of the abadhakala with reference to the consequential effects of the original karma, 2 The Jainas have made a systematic study of the theory of karma. The Jaina contribution to the theory of karma is unique. In the Yogasutra of Patanjali, there is the mention of the consequential _effects of the fruition of the different karmas. Yoga darsana mentions three such types, as : (1) niyatavipaki, in this the karma gets expression at a determined time, gives fruit and exhausts. (2) aniyatavipaki, the karma rises and is destroyed without giving fruit. (3) avayagamini, this refers to the process of the transformati type of karma with the similar type of karma or the sub-type of karma. These three concepts of Yogadarsana may be compared to the Jaina concepts nikacita, pradesodaya and sankramana. KARMA AND REBIRTH : The subject of rebirth is very closely associated with the doctrine of karma. The two are basal pre-supposition of Indian thought. They are postulates of Indian thought. Rebirth is a corrolory of the principle of karma. If karma is fully exhausted, the series of births will come to an end; but it is not possible to exhaust all the karma that has been accumulated in one single Ife. The karma that we have accumulated in the past gives rise to various births. It is a cycle of existence and rebirth.3 Rebirth is very closely associated with the karma and jiva. The karma of the past life is responsible for the 1 | 2 3 Bhagavati 2, 3. Prajnapana 23, 2, 21-29. Acaranga 12, 6.

Page #515
494 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY present life." Karma of the present life will be responsible for the future life. The accretion of karmi, as karmic particles of ayu karma enter the soul which is responsible in various ways for determining the states of existence in the succeeding life, the length of life and the status of the individual in all its different lives. 2 Bhagavana Mahavira said that passion like krodha (anger), mana (egoity), maya (deceit) and lobha (greed) are the root cause of the cycle of births, In the Bhagavadgita we get an analogical description about rebirth and the chain of birth. As a man takes out the old clothes and wears the new one, similarly the soul casts away the worn out body and takes on a new body, after death. This is possible through the process of "avartana" (transference).5 The Tathagata Buddha once explained that the pricks of the thorn that he suffered were due to the violence and injuries caused to a human being in his ninetyone previous life. The new born infant expresses various emotions like joy, fear and sorrow. These are primarily due to its memories in the past life. The new born infant, the moment it is born, starts sucking the milk from the mother's breast. This is due to its learning and habits that it had acquired in the past life. As the young boy grows into a youth si nilarly the jiva enters a new life and the body, and grows, into full stature. The new born in fact experiences pleasure and pain and expresses various emotions. All these can be traced to the dispositions (samskaras) acquired by the infant from its previous life due to the heritage of its kurinis, may call it collective uncon 1 Bhagavati 2, 5. 2 Sthananga 9, 40. 3 Dasavaikalika 8. 39. 4 Gita 2, 22. 5 Gita 8, 26. 6 Ita ekanavatik alpo siktya me puruso hatth. Tena karma vipakena pa le vidho smi biksavah. 7 Nyayasutra, 3, 1, 11. 8 Nyayasutra 3, 1, 12. 9 Vises avasyaka bhasya.

Page #516
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY scious, the ratial-unconscious as Jung has said as equivalent to karma. These are due to the samskaras dragged on from previous life. In this way, the Indian philosophers have adduced arguments and have tried to show that the rebirth is a fact of life. The soul gets involved in the wheel of life, (samsara) and is born and reborn in different existences. 495 As we said earlier, the karma and rebirth are basal pre-suppositions. If we do not accept the theory of karma, rebirth cannot be explained and rebirth can be explained only on the basis of the principle of karma. If rebirth were not to be accepted as a fact principle of life, it would be difficult to explain the prevalent inequality in this world and the experiences of various types of existences in this life and in this world without reference to karma. The western philosophers also were not unaware of doctrine of rebirth although this doctrine was largely ignored in the western thought. Pythogoras was aware of the principle of the rebirth. Plato said that the soul always weaves new garment. The soul has a natural strength which will hold out and is born many times. Schopenhaur explicitly mentions the doctrine of rebirth and said that the doctrine has relevance for explaining the concept of distribution. He said that it is at once obvious to everyone who hears of the rebirth for the first time. The Jainas have given an elaborate study of the doctrine of rebirth as based on the karma theory. There are four states of existence: the human, the lower animal, the heavenly being, and the infernal world. The soul moves one to the other according to its desserts. The karma that it has accumulated determines its existence and status in the next life. The time gap between the death in a particular life and rebirth in the next life is called antarakala, This duration of time varies from one, to three or four samayas. In the antarakala the gross phsycial body has already been left, jiva is without the gross physical body and is seeking to get into the new body. This process of movement from the old body to the new body is called "antarala gati". This may be "rju" (short and direct) and vakra (curved and indirect). The direction of the movement depends upon

Page #517
496 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY its previous performance. If the direction is straight and direct it is rjugati. If the direction of the movement is uneven and indirect, it is called vakragati. The direct movement (rjugati) requires one samaya and the least effort on the part of the jiva to enter from the previous to the next life. When the soul departs from the previous body it acquires the speed of that body and it darts of to its next destination like an arrow. In the case of the curved direction it has to make certain efforts. When the soul reaches the point of curve the previous body is to some extent arrested, then the jiva has to depend on the energy of the suksna (subtle) karmic body. The time required for traversing the distance from one birth to another birth in the next body depends on the number of curves in the direction of the next body. If there is only one curve it will require two samayas. If there are two curves it requires three samayas and if there are three curves, it requires four sanayas. Generally, the universe is extended in three directions like: upwards, downwads and crosswise. In the case of the residence of the heaven, hell and crosswise in the case of tiryak gati (lower animals). The soul requires two samayas in its movement the direction of the upper world to the lower world. world (urdhvaloka), it takes the direction of the eastern side and in the lower world it turns to the direction of the western world. In the case of the duration of the three samayas for the movement there are two turns. One is north-eastern direction and the other south-west direction. In the first samaya it moves in the direction of the lower world, in the second samaya it takes a turn towards the western and in the third samaya there is turn to the north-western side. In the case of the duration of the time in the movement upto four samaya there would be three turns. First, it moves towards the lower world, then turns towards the south-western side, then towards the western side and lastly north-western side. This movement in different directions is called "tri-vakra catuh samayiki". In all these cases the movement of the jiva is with the help of the suksma sarira (subtle body), as the gross body is no longer. But the gross body will be created in the next life with samskara and with the help of the subtle body and the energy available. According to the generally from In the upper

Page #518
497 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY karma there when the jiva casts off one body and moves towards the direction of assuming the next body it is guided and directed by anupurvinama karma. This type of karma is like the row that controls the movement of the bullock. However, in the case of the movement from the earlier to the next body in the straight direction (rjugati), there is no need for any guiding anupurvinamakarma. During the movement only the taijasa (electria) and karmana (karmic) body accompany. Audarika and vaikriya bodies are created freshly for the new life on the basis of its sarskaras. A pertinent question has been raised regarding the absence of the sense-organs during the movement of the jiva from the previous body towards the formation of the new life. The question is asked, if the gross body is not there, there would be no sense-organs and if the sense-organs are not there, there would be no cognition or sensing of the direction. In that case how can the jiva proceed its journey in proper way? The answer to this question has been given from the point of view of anekanta. Bhigivani Mahavira says it is true that there are no physical sense-orgins (dravyendriyas). But the functions of the sense-organs are not altogether lost. They are expressed through taijasa and karmana sarira, just as the modern machines like the aeroplane are controlled by electric motivations through the computors. We can, therefore, say during the movement of the jiva from one body to the other, there may not be the physical sense-organs, but there is the presence of the psychic sense-organs. THE PATH TOWARDS MOKSA ! ! The Indian philosophers, except the Carvakas, accept the moksa as the highest ideal and they have shown the way to moksa. The path to moksa given by different Indian philosophers may give different emphasis on one or the other aspect of the cognitive, the affective and the creative functions. For instance, Sankhya darsana and the Advait 1 Vedanta give emphasis on jnana marga, while Ramanuja and others emphasise the bhaktimarga. Caritra is also given importance, in the way to attain to moksa. However, all are agreed that the karmi has to be removed and the soul to be purified in order to

Page #519
498 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY attain moksa. The soul can be purified by penance and meditation etc., as the ore of the gold has to be purified through various processes, like-beating etc. But the Jainas have not given only exclusive importance to the jnanamarga as is done in the case of Sahkhya, Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism, nor it does emphasise exclusively the kriyakanda, the pathway through activity and ritualism, as is emphasised by the Parvamimarsa, But the Jainas say that jnana and kriya (caritra) are both necessary for the moksamarga. There should be a synthesis of both these. Jnana with caritra would be necessary. Even if the Jnana were less, but caritra were to be emp basised, then it would be a way to moksa. But knowledge without caritra, however great it may be, will not lead to the highest end of perfection. Acarya Bhadrabahu says that knowledge without good conduct may be compared to a donkey carrying sandle wood. The Jainas contend that the pathway to perfection lies in the synthesis and the harmony of the triple path of right intuition, right knowledge and right conduct. In the agamas, we find that the pathway to perfection is through sinyagjnana, samyagdargana, samyagcaritra and tapas. There are only terminological differences in the expression regarding the pathway to perfection. The perfection and the general contention is that right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct would be necessary as moksamarga. Gautama, the Buddha, gave importance to the stoppage of karmic bondage (sarvara) as the first step to Nirvana. Jaiq is also give importance to samvara. Acarya Hemacandra says that just as a house with many windows and doors kept open attracts dust from all the directions, so also activities of the jira bring about karmic 1 2 3 4 5 6 Avaiyakaniryukti, gatha 94 Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 99. Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 100 (a) Tattvarthasutra. 1 (b) Avasyakaniryukti, gatha 103. Uttaradhyayana 28/2-3. Tattvartha 1, 4. Sarvarthasiddhi

Page #520
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 499 particles. The first step therefore is to close these doors and windows so that the fresh karmic particles do not enter the jiva. This is, as we have already seon, the process of sarhvara. We have also seen that the process of samvara oan be compared to the stoppage of the inflow of water into the tank through the different inlets. For the sake of cleaning the tank we bave first to stop the water, so that the fresh inflow of water is not possible. Samvera is such a process of the stoppage of the influx of karma through varied channels. Once the influx of karma is stopped through the stoppage of the influx i, e., through sarkvara, next step would be to remove the karma that is already collected into the soul and that is process of nirjara. This process may be compared to the cleaning of the accumulated water in a tank. One who seeks to attain moksa had also to clean the accumulated karma,' and the removal of kur na from the jiva pradesa is called Nirjara. When all the karmas are removed the atman reaches perfection and the liberated. Once the karmas are remove i and the atman reaches perfection, fresh karma would not enter into the soul, just as the fried seeds do not sprout.5 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION * The Jaina contribution of the theory of karma is significant. It has developed a scientific theory of karma with its emphasis on the atomic nature of karma as karmavarganis and with its elaborate scientific description of the processes of karma. Maxmuller says that karma theory has influenced mankind to a great extent. When we know that our present actions are due to the effects performed in the past and that our present actions will be responsible for the future life, we become more conscious of the distinctions between the virtue and vice 1 Navatattvasahityasangraha : Sri Hemacandra Suriksta Saptatattva prakaranarh 118-122. 2 Uttara. 28, 35. 3 Tativartha 1, 4. Sarvarthasiddhi 4 (a) Tattvartha 10, 3, klisnakarmaksayo moksah. (h). Sivagita 13-32 s Tativarthabhasyagat i antima karika 8

Page #521
500 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY and we face the difficulties of life with equanimity of mind. We strive to become good.1 Karma is infact a striking answer to the fathomless injustice to the nature of things, and it appeals to the overpowering strength of the necessity of justice. The conception of an all controlling law of natural distribution which links together successive earth lives of each individual soul both satisfied by sense of justice and through light on the problem of seemingly unmeritted suffering. 2 Having discussed the arguments and counter-arguments of the logical justification of the doctrine of karma, we may say that from the real point of view (niscaya naya) logical justification of the doctrine of karma is not possible nor necessary. It is the expression of the highest knowledge and experience of the seers.3 Men 1 Darsana aur Cintana, khanda II, p. 216. 2 Warren (H.C): Buddhism in Transitions (1922) p. 48. 3 Kalghatgi (T.G.), Jaina View of Life (Jivaraja Granthamaka no. 20) 1969, pp. 110-11.

Page #522
PART V Jain Darasna and the Philosophies of the World 1. PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD-A STUDY. 2. JAINA AND BUDDHISTIC PHILOSOPHIES : A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3. JAINA AND SANKHYA PHILOSOPHIES : A COMPARISON 4. JAINA AND VEDANTA PHILOSOPHIES : COMPARISON & CONTRAST. 5. LEGACY OF THE JAINA DARSANA TO THE WORLD OF THOUGHT

Page #523

Page #524
Philosophies of the World: A Study INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Indian philosophy is a synthesis of the two traditions, i. e., the Vedic and the Sramana traditions. The Vedic tradition advocates the authority of the Vedas. It is traditionalistic and rationalistic in oach. The sramana tradition does not accept the authority of the Vedas. It is empriricist in outlook and analytic in its methodology. It is based upon the experiences of the secis for its fundamental truths and the empirical experiences for the understanding of the phenomenal world. The Jaina tradition advocates authority of the teachings of the Tirthankaras as presented through the agamas not because it is the fipal word of the Tirthankara but because of their omniscient experiences which have been transmitted to the disciples and which has been codified through the sutragamas. The Veda-darsana and the teachings of the Upanisads belong to the Vedic tradition. Later systems of philosophy like the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga; Purvamimarhsa and Vedanta belong to the Vedic tradition. The philosophy of the Vedic tradition is also considered to be orthodox systems of philosophy and are called "astika darsanas", primarily because they accept the authority of the Vedas and also because they believe in the creator God, and therefore atheistic. Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka darsinis belong to the sramanic tradition or avedic tradition (non-vedic). VEDIC THOUGHT 1.13 The earliest presentation of Indian thought can be traced to the Vedas. The Kgveda is the earliest document which is supposed to be

Page #525
504 A SOURCE-BOOK EN JAINA PHILOSOPHY philosophical in content. The main problems of Vedic aryans were concerned with the worldly problems. Their outlook was to live a happy life in this world. The Vedas contain hymns addressed to the gods for getting the benefits of the world. Occasionally, the Vedic seers have expressed flashes of philosophical insights. The main problem connected with philosophical study in the Vedic speculation was cosmic. A pertinent question was asked : 'What is the source of this Universe ? This was peresented with reference to the many Gods who were personalised forces of nature. In these discussions, we may however trace the philosophical development in the Rgveda in the direction of thought from 1. naturalistic polytheism to 2. monotheism in which the conception of benotheism as suggested by Maxmuller may also be included, and 3. monism. Naturalistic polytheism was the first current of philosophical thought. The phenomena of nature were symbolised as Gods and they were worshipped. For instance, Varuna was the sky God. Mitra his companion. Surya is the sun God. Savitra is the solar God and there were a host of many other Gods - about three hundred and thirty three were worshipped. There was the idea of Ria. It was the conception of the order in the universe. It is a cosmic principle. Varuna is considered to be the custodian of this principle and it has been suggested that the doctrine of karma developed from the principle of Rta. From the naturalistic polytheism, evolved the monotheistic tendency. As we have seen earlier, Maxmuller mentions little intermediate stage of henotheistic tendency, by which one God became prominent for sometime. The highest position was granted to Vigvakarman in the Rgveda at a later stage. Similarly, Prajapati attained the highest rank. Monotheism developed out of the tendency of the philosophic mood of the Vedic seers. In the contemplative mood, the seers asked some pertinent questions : What is the source of this universe ? and who has been the first born ?.' These questions lead to the philosopbic development of monotheism. The philosophers and the Rgveda presented the monistic thought in their one famous statement : The ultimate reality is one and the wise call it by many names,1 1 ekar sat vipra bahudha vadanti agaim, yamam matarisvam ahuh.

Page #526
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 505 The Upanisads developed contemplative philosophy and presented rich and varied philosophic theories. There are 108 Upanisads. Of them, eleven are important on which Sri Sankaracarya has written commentaries. The Upanisads state the divine and mystic contemplation about the ultimate principle of life. The idea of one God, a supreme and the principle of Rta were helpful in the development of philosophic thought in the monistic and absolutist direction. The fundamental philosophical concept of the Upanisads is the identity with the atman and the Brahman, all else is the appearance. This is the cardinal principle of the Upanisads. The idea of self has been discussed in different Upanisads in different aspects. In the dialogues between Yajaavalkya and Janaka and between Prajapati and Indra, we find the progressive development of the definition of the self. Similarly, in the Katha Upanisad we find the description of the self as the charioteer and the body as the chariot. Similar idea is to be found in Plato's conception of the soul. In the Bhagavadgita, we get a beautiful synthesis of the triple path of knowledge (jnana), performance of duty (karma marga) and devotion (bhaktimarga) for the attainment of the highest and selfrealisation. The Bhagavadgita also gives the encyclopaedic information about the duty and responsibilities of the secular life. It is, therefore, a compendium of the harmony of the secular and the spiritual. CARVAKA DARSANA . Carvaka darsana is non-Vedic in its tradition. It is materialistic in approach. It refutes the arguments for the existence of God and of the authority of the Vedas. Its fundamental approach is secular, as this is worldly. It is difficult to give a list of authentic documents of the Carvaka darsana, as the description of this school of thought is mainly found in other schools of Indian philosophy. The fundamental epistemological stand of the Carvaka is : Pratyaksa is the only pramana. Sense experience is the only source of knowledge. All other sources of knowledge are not valid. Therefore, what is available through the sense-organs and what can be verified through the sense experience is alone real. All else is illusion. Therefore, the

Page #527
505 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY cardinal injunction of the Car vaka is to seek pleasure, for tomorrow we die." "There is neither a permanent soul nor heaven nor helt; why fret about them, if today be sweet". "When the body is destroyed nothing remains. Therefore, we should seek pleasure as long as we live."1 ; JAINA DARSANA The Jaina philosophy is realistic and pluralistic. It is empiricist in its methodology. Jaina presents the seven categories which may be considered metaphysico-spiritual category. The Jiva and ajiva constitute the universe. Jiva is active and due to the activity of the jiva, the karmic particles enter into the soul and obscure right knowledge, right intuition and right conduct. This obscuration and association of karma with the jiva is beginningless, but it has an end. When the liva gets free from karmic matter, it gains its purity and perfection which is its real nature. That stage is the stage of perfection, the moksa stage. This stage can be attained by triple path, as samyagdarsana, jnana and carita. The doctrine of anekanta and ahimsa are the fundamental principles of metaphysics and ethics. The principle of atman, karmavada, nayavada, nik sepavada, pramanavada, saptabhangi and anekanta are the foundation pillars of Jaina philosophy. J. BAUDDHA DARSANA Buddhism also belongs to the framana current of thought. Buddhism is a religion preached by the Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama. In his first sermon at Varanasi, the Buddha presented his philosophy to his five disciples. That is called dharmacakra pravartana. He said that we should follow the madhyama marga (the middle path). The fundamental philosophy of the Buddha can be presented in two principles : the four noble truths and the eight-fold path. Dukha is the first noble truth, dukha samudaya is the second noble truth. It is the cause of suffering and explains this with reference to the theory of causation of pratityasamutpada. Dukhanirodha is the nirvana and 1 Yavatjivet sukham jivet, snam kltva ghstam pibet. Bhasmibbu tasya dehasya, punaragamanam kutah.

Page #528
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY $07 this is the third noble truth. Dukhanirodha marga is the fourth noble truth, it gives a transcendental self. The self, what we call the atman is not real and what we call the atman is only a collection or an aggregate of the five states; physical and mental. It is the skandha of these states : 1. vijnana, 2. vedana, 3, samjna 4. sanskara and 5. rupa. There is nothing more than this. This he calls the namarupa." Thus we find the foundational principle of Buddhism is dukha, and the ultimate aim is dukha nirodha or nirvana. It is difficult to say what he meant by nirvana, although it has very often been interpreted as a state of nothingness. The origin of suffering arises out of our attachment to the various things of life, craving for the things of life. Every thing is in a flux and nothing is permanent. It is all a temporary and in a flux. The highest end is the attainment of the state of nirvana which is freedom from the state of misery,8 SANKHYA & YOGA DARSANA ? Sankhya and Yoga philosophy are complementary to each other. Sankhya presents the metaphysical side while the Yoga according to Patanjali is the methodical effort to attain perfection, through the control of different elements of human nature, physical and psychical. Cittayrttini rodha is the cardinal principle of Yoga, The Sankhya metaphysics is accepted by Yoga and the Yoga methodology is largely accepted by Sankhya philosophers. The Sankhya is dualistic. It posits the two ultimate principles : 1. purusa and 2. praksti. Purusa is passive, it is pure consciousness. Prakiti is active, but unconscious. Praksti is the primordial matter and purusa is the self. Sankhya postulates the plurality of elf. The Sankhya theory of the evolution 1 dukha samsaripah skandbaste ca panca prakirtita". vijnanam, vedana, samjna, sanskaro, rupameva ca. 2 Saddarsana samuccaya, Bauddhadarsana - samudeti yato loke, ragadinam gaao khilah. atmamiya bhavakhyah samudayah sa udabstah. 3 ksnikah sarvasamskara, ityeva vasana mata. sa marga iba vijneyo, nirodho moksa ucyate.

Page #529
508 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY of the universe is presented in the light of the association of prakrti with purusa. When the prakrti is in the proximity or in contact with purusa, activity starts. Then there are disturbances in the equilibrium of the three gunas-sattva and rajas and tamas. These disturbances give rise to the various principles of the universe like mahat, ahamkara, manas, the five sense-organs and five motor-organs; the five elements (panca tanmatras). Thus evolution consists of the twenty-five principles including the purusa. The ultimate ideal for the purusa is to realise. The Yoga presents the practical path for this realisation of purusa to attain its own pure nature. The Yoga gives eight-fold practical path in which 1. yama and 2. niyama are the ethical background and 3. asana 4. pranayama and 5. pratyahara are the physicopsychological preparation, 6. dhyana and 7. dharana are psychic exercises, 8. Samadhi is the culmination and the psychic process of the highest realisation. This is the astanga marga. NYAYA-VAISESIKA DARSANA The Nyaya and Vaisesika darsanas are also complementary to each other. The Nyaya gives logic and epistemology; while Vaisesika presents metaphysics. The Nyaya is also called pramanasastra, because it presents the theory of pramanas. According to Gautama, there are four pramanas: 1. pratyaksa, 2. anumana, 3. upamana, and 4. sabda pramana. Nyaya is theistic in its approach. It accepts the creator God. The Vaisesika gives the theory of atomism and the fundamental self-category like 1. dravya (substance). 2. guna (attribute), 3. karma (activity) 4. samanya (generality) 5. visesa (particularity) 6. samavaya (inherence) and 7. abhava (non-existence). The Nyaya-Vaisesika ideal is also to attain moksa which is called apavarga. This is possible by the highest knowledge of the padarthas and by removing ignorance. MIMAMSA & VEDANTA DARSANA Mimamsa and Vedanta darsanas are also related to each other very closely. Mimamsa is considered to be karmakanda, while Vedanta is concerned with the knowledge of the Brahman. The object of the Purvamimamsa is to help and support the situations for the attainment of salvation in two ways: 1. by giving methodology of interpretation

Page #530
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 509 with the help of which complicated Vedic injunctions regarding the rituals may be understood and 2. by giving philosophical justifications of the beliefs on which ritualism depend. Radbakrisnan says that the aim of the Purvamimamsa is to examine the nature of dharma. It is practical in the sense. It prepares the ground for the performance of the Vedic injunction. This is based on the Purvamimathsa epistemology wherein six pramana have been mentioned ; the four as given by the Nyaya-Vaisesika and others are arthapatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi. The Vedanta darsana emphasises the identity of the Brahman and the self. The cardinal principle of Advaita Vedanta of Sankara is the identity of the Brahman and atman and the ultimate ideal is the merger of the Brahman and at nan. Ramanuja emphasises the merger of the atmin with the Brahman and not the identity. The dualistic Vedanta (dvaita) advocates the reality of the atman and Brahman even in the highest stage of moksa. Thus, we find the cardinal and the foundational principle of all Indian thought is 1. the fact of misery and 2. the ideal of attainment of the state of freedom from misery and attainment of perfection. The Carvaka systein alone is phenomenalistic in its approach, and does not accept the trans-empirical reality. The concept of atman is one of the cardinal principles of all Indian thought, except the Carvak is aad in a sense of the nihilistic aspect of Buddhism. Thus we find that there is much common ground between the various systems of Indian philosophy. We should also realise that the ancient Indian thought was catholic in outlook. This can be very clearly evidenced by the fact that Carvaka was the status of a darsana. GREEK PHILOSOPHY I ? B . Early Greek philosophy is also sufficiently ancient. We may consider the development of Greek philosophy from the seventh century B.C. to the 4th century B.C. The early beginning of Greek philosophers were still groping to find out the ultimate source of the universe in some physical phenomenon. When Mahavira and the Buddha were preaching in India, Greek philosophy was in its

Page #531
510 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY infancy. The early Greek philosophers were primarily concerned with the enquiry regarding the ultimate source of the universe. They sought to find out in some ultimate substance of this universe. The earliest philosopher Thales, said that water is the source of the universe. Aleximander traced it to the unlimited and Aleximander said that air is the source of the universe. There were two currents of thought which developed after the Ionic philosophers. They are the Electicus and the later philosophers who preached the doctrine of flux like Heraclitus. Permanedes said that reality "is". It is being and change is the appearance while Heraclitus advocated that change alone is real, and the being or permanence is unreal. He said we cannot step into the same water again. Heraclitus was called "Heraclitus the dark", because his sayings were obscure. Then came the philosophers like Democrates to preach the doctrine of elements and also the atomists. Pythagoras was a mystic. He was perhaps influenced by the Indian mystics. He talked of the rebirth and the influences of our action on the future life. This was a stage of naturalist philosophy. But intellectualists at that time were aware to seek the ultimate reality in some phenomenal source. Various theories, sometimes conflicting, created confusion in the minds of the thinkers. There was intellectual chaos. This was reflected in the philosophy of the sophists, who made knowledge relative and subjective. Protogoras said "Homo mensura"-"man is the measure of all things." We cannot get objective criteria of reality. The sophists brought philosophy to the brink of extinction when they said that nothing can be known and anything can be known, it cannot be communicated. This was the stage of intellectual chaos when Socrates came on the screen. From the period of Socrates onwards the search for the ultimate reality was inwards. Socrates was convinced that philosophy consists not in the knowledge of the external world, but in the knowledge of the self. "Know Thyself" was the cardinal principle of the Socratic teaching. Socrates said knowledge is virtue and virtue is knowledge. Knowledge and virtue are convertible terms. Socrates

Page #532
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 511 was a simple man. He did not write any book but he discussed philosophy with the intellectual of his time sitting in the market of the Athens. He had many great disciples and one of them was Plato. Plato was an aristocrat. He hated democracy. The ideal state is the 'Republic' in which the philosophers should be the king. The philosopher-king should have very simple and virtuous life and guide the destinies of the nation entirely for the good of the people. He made a distinction between the different classes on the basis of the function, like the guardian class, the soldier class and those whose function was to obey i. e., the workers class. Plato's political and social philosophy was based on metaphysical structure of the decrease of reality. The idea is real. It is perfect, it is eternal and it is simple. The things of the world are the imitations of the objects in the physical world. Ideas participate in the physical object and to the extent to which ideas participate, they are real. Aristotle was Plato's disciple. It can be said that Aristotle gave the first lessons of rationalistic philosophy which synthesise the idealism and rationalism to some extent. Aristotle said that there are two fundamental principles of the universe : 1. form and 2. matter. Both of them are abstract principles. The phenomenal world is the expression of form and matter. Form is potentiality and matter is actuality. Aristotle was a genius and he wrote books on many subjects like Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy, etc. It is said all the later philosophies are nothing but footnotes to the philosophy of Aristotle. After Aristotle, pbilosophy in the west declined. The authority of Aristotle was so great that he was referred to as the only greatest authority and no development in philosophy took place till the end of the middle age. The middle ages were the dark ages. Revival of philosophical speculation was to be found in the rationalist and empiricist schools in modern philosophy beginning with Descartes as a great rationalist and Locke as a great empiricist. In Kant, we get a synthesis again. Kant is considered to have brought a

Page #533
512 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Copernican revolution in philosophy and later philosophers like Bradley built a structure of the idealistic philosophy. Recent philosophy has gone off the taagent with logical positives and the anlaystical schools. in ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY Arabic philosophy can be considered to have started with prophet Mohamed. Before the birth of Hazarat Mohamed, there were three different deities : 1. Lat 2. Lajja and 3. Manat. There were three religious currents at that time. The Jews were the followers of Moses. The Christians were the followers of Jesus. These two religions were infact outside religions influencing the Arabic world. These religions were not indigenous to the Arabic world, The Arabs had their own religious practices. They worshipped different deities in Makka. In this way, the Arabic world was full of many religious currents and men were practising various faiths. The Arabs were neither united nor affluent at that time. Jewish people were known for their trade and the use of horses and camels and Arabia was famous for dates. There was trade with other countries which was carried through the seas from their ports. Hazarat Mohamed gave the Holy Kuran. It is simple but very significant. Even an uneducated man can understand and practise righteousness, following its teachings. When the people of Arabia came in contact with other countries because of their trade, there was the interaction of philosophical and religious thoughts. Because of that, different traditions developed like : 1. "Motajala tradition". 2. Karami tradition and 3. Asari tradition All the Arabic current of thoughts former to Motajala tradition were based on faith and does not permit differences of opinion and philosophic speculation. So this may be considered to be a religious tradition. But later the devotees of Motajala tradition introduced philosophical discussion and so Motajala tradition in Islam is the first philosophic tradition built on the basis of this new light. The cardinal principles of the Islamic philosophy can be mentioned in five principles : 1. The self (jiva), is free to do activity (karma). It need not bconsidered to be a slave of any other higher beings. To believe

Page #534
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 513 that the activities of living beings are determined by other higher being and to punish them would be injustice. 2. God is omnipotent and great and the world has good and evil alike. God is the symbol of the good and not of the evil. Therefore, God does not elevate his creatures to heaven or punish them to hell. 3. Like other Muslims the Motajala tradition considers this world as a creation of God. The creation is out of nothing (abhava). In this connection, it is against the Aristotelian conception of creation. 4. The Motajala tradition considers Kuran as the sacred book written at a particular time. In this sense, it has a beginning. Unlike the orthodox Muslims, it does not accept the beginningless nature of the Kuran. 5. The Motajala tradition brought about a synthesis between the orthodoxy as presented in the authority of the sacred texts and the function of reason. It also did not accept certain orthodox beliefs. :, THE SUFI TRADITION The term "Sufi' comes from the Greek word "Sophi". It means "Wisdom'. In the 8th century A.D., the works in Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic and the sufi tradition developed in the Arabia on the basis of the Greek philosophy concerning mysticism. For the first time, the Safi epithet was given to Abu Hasim who died in 770 A.D. At the time of Paigambar, and other philosophers who were preaching at that time were considered to be As phiasts (sahava or companion) and even after Paigamhar these were remembered by this name. The Muslim philosophers have used the term Sufi in different senses. It has been said that the Sufi philosophers were those who renounced everything for the sake of realising the God. It has also been said that life and death are all dependent on God. The Sufi philosophers were same and they spend their life for the practice of the self-realisation. According to the Sufi philosophy, man is a part of God or an aspect of God. The highest realisation consists in the merger of the self with God. It comes nearer to the Vedantic concep

Page #535
514 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY tion, specially of Ramanuja, where he advocates the merger of the self in the Brahman in the highest state of self-realisation. The Suft philosophers presented the practical path of self-realisation which contains elements of Patanjala Yoga. They say, that the realisation is possible through the practice of dhyana (contemplation) and absorption in the God. It is analogous to the stages in dhyana, dharana and samadhi of the Patanjala Yoga. Sufism is more a philosophy than a religion. Mansur is supposed to the founder and propagator of Sufism. He is to pronounce and repeat the prayer "Anal-huq" meaning, 'I am the God'. This concept is analogous to the Advaitic concept of the identity of the atman and the Brahman (ahim brahmasmi). As we have seen earlier, the word Sufi has its Greek origin and it also means "wool," and "standing in line". The ancient mystics practised the ascetic practices using wool directly touching the body. Since they were using suff (wool) they were known as Sufis. The other meaning which is popular is "standing in line". The Sufi mystics practised asceticism by standing and concentrating with other practices like pranayama. The Sufi mystic, Malik Mohammed Jayasi has given his famous discourse on the aspect of love in his Padmavata which is described as divine and is primarily spiritual. MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY We have seen that after Aristotle, philosophy was stagnant for sometime. The middle ages were dark ages and whatever philosophy developed was merely theological. Subsequently, philosophical enquiry started with the scientific spirit became prominent. In the middle ages, philosophy was sustaining itself under the shadow of theology and Aristotle's deductive methods. But in modern western philosophy, we find the revival of the spirit of enquiry. This spirit expressed itself in two directions: 1. deductive rationalistic enquiry bised on deductive and mathematical methods, and 2. empiricist enquiry which is founded on experience and analysis of common sense,

Page #536
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 515 In the modern age, Descartes ani Spinoza built systems of rationalism. From the Cozito, ergo, sum he went on to heaven and looked at the physical world with compliments, which is indeed, away from that of the common sense. Descartes split the world into two substances and postulated a God separate from each of them. He arrived at the conception of the self on the basis of his method of "doubt". He doubted everything but he could not doubt himself. However, his scepticism was only a means to an end and not an end in itself. Spinoza's task was to establish a connection between the God and the world on the basis of mathematical deduction. The result was Spinoza's substances became lion's den to which all the tracks lead and from which none returned. Leibnitz continued the rationalistic tradition and arrived at metaphysical fantacy, in presenting his theroy of monds. God was for him, the monadus-monadum. The empiricist philosopher used a posteriori and inductive methods. In the Theavatatus, Socrates explains the protogoran doctrine that knowledge is through sense-experience. English empiricism repeats the logical movement, but does not save itself from its own conclusion of scepticism. We can see the empiricist's method steadily marching from Locke, Berkeley to Hume. Berkeley denied matter and Hume denied everything except impressions and ideas. Reid, summing up the English Empiricist movement, states that ideas first introduced for explaining the operation of the human understanding, under mind, everything by themselves, pitifully nacked and destitute, "set adrift without a rag to cover them". Knowledge became impossible and philosophy could go no further without a radical reconsideration of its fundamental position. Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, claimed to have brought Copernical revolution in philosophy. Empiricism faced the blind wall of scepticism and phenomenalism while rationalistic philosophy built up a philosophical fantacy in the theory of spiritual monds. Kant's was a critical philosophy. He wanted to examine 1 Kant; Works, p. 105. a

Page #537
316 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY the instrument of understanding. And he came to the conclusion that categories of understanding can at best explain the phenomenal world. The noumenal can be understood by practical reason. His critique of Pure Reason led to his critique of practical reason and judgement. Hegel gave a dialectic of reason and for him the real, was the rational. Later philosophers like Bradley and Bosanguet built a structure of philosophy which can be called the absolutist philosophy. They rested in the absolute. But the Humean tendency has been recently revised by the Cambridge philosophers, to the brink of extinction. Widtgenstein's Tractatus discusses the problem of meaning, the nature of logic, facts and proposition and the task of philosophy. He states that all the truths of logic are tautologies and logical proofs are only mechanical devises for recognising the categories. Mathematics consist of equation and the proposition of Mathematics are without sense. The metaphysician talks non-sense in the fullest sense of the word, as he does not understand "the logic of our language". Metaphysical suggestion is like a composition of a new song. We are told that he made no essential change in his attitude towards the aim of philosophy,1 Bertrand Russell writes that the influence the Tractatus made on him "was not wholly good", and the philosophy of the "philosophical investigations" remains to him completely unintelligible. Logical positivism is the philosophical movement emanating from the "Vieana Circle". Logical positivists explain that they have completely overthrown speculative pbilosophy. Philosophy to them is only logical analysis ; not a theory, but an activity. Its function is analysis, logical classification of concepts, proposition and theories proper to empirical science. Thus philosophy was identified with the logical syntax, the higher level discussion of language and it is 1 Stenius (Eric) : Tractatus - A Critical Exposition of its Main Lires of Thought, (1960). p. 226. 2 Russell (B): My Philosophical Development (1959), pp. 216-217. 3 Ayer (A. J.) * Language, Truth and Logic, p. 48,

Page #538
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAIN) PHILOSOPHY 517 important non-sense. Philosophy classes are converted into supergrammar classes. Thus a survey of philosophy in the past shows that philosophy faced continually in past of the conflict between the consequences of the priori methods and empiricists faverish denial of metaphysics. To save philosophy from this impose we have to adopt a synoptic view towards the problem of philosophy. We should realise that reality is complex and life is a many-coloured door. Idealism was unable to see the trees in the wood while realism could not see the wood in the tree. These two ways of approaching the problems were exclusive and absolute ways and to realise this point that both these ways are partially view of the synoptic outlook. In this sense, philosophy is to see life steadily and to see the whole. In this sense, the Jaina view of anekanta comes nearer to the solution of the problems. Intellecutal tolerance is the foundation of the doctrine.2 The Jaina view of anekanta steers clear of the conflicting existence of extremes of empiricism which resulted in the metaphysical impossibility and of rationalism which resulted in the philosophical fantacies of absolutism. The Jaina view asserts that the truth is many-sided and it can be looked at different angles. The Whitehead's fundamental attitude of philosophy is essentially the same as the Jaina anekanta view when he presented the theory of coherence. THE NEW AGE IN THE INDIAN THOUGHT The culmination of the Vedantic philosophy is to be found in the age of Madhva. Later philosophy emphasise not so much the karma-marga, nor the jnana-marga, but the bhakti-marga. The influence of the Muslim conquest of India, brought a cultural impact on the philosophical traditions in India. The idol worship was gradually replaced by contemplation and devotional song. In the 15th 1 Broad (C.D.): Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. Muirhead, (J.H.) Vol. (1924), Critical and Speculative Philosophy. 2 Kalghatgi (T.G.) Jaina View of Life, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala 1969, p. 10.

Page #539
sig A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY century A.D., Kabirdas was against the idol worship. The influence of this tendency could be traced in the Jaina tradition also in the thought and practices of the Sthanakavasi tradition, Ia Saurastra, Dayananda Sarasvati was against the worship of idol and it developed into Arya Samaj. In Bengal, witnessed a renaissance in the Brahmasamaj and Prarthanasamaj. * Swami Vivekananda gave a new interpretation to the absolute idealism of Vedanta, with reference to the social and political problems. Dr. Radbakssoan adopts a synoptic interpretation of the universal application of the Vedantic conception to the problems of philosophy. Bala Gangadhara Tilak presented the karmayoga in his interpretation of the Bhagavadgita, in the Gita. rahasya. Sri Aurobindo built a super structure of mystic philosophy presenting the concept of superanuated consciousness and the evolution of the matter into spirit from men to supermen. Mahatma Gandbi spiritualised politics. We find fresh scholars like Pt. Sukhlalji and Dalsukh Malvania giving new interpretation of the Jaina philosophy.

Page #540
Jaina and Buddhist Philosophy COMMON POINTS BETWEEN THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES! Jaina and Buddhist darsanas have many common points between them. They belong to the sramana current of thought. They revolted against the Vedic ritualism of the Yajnas. Both the darsanas gave prominence to the principle of ahimsa, although other darsanas in Indian thought have also given importance to the principle of ahirsa, but Tathagata Buddha and Sramana Bhagavana Mahavira went against violence committed during Yajnas for the sake of oblations and preached the practice of ahimsa in the daily life. Mahavira gave a subtle analysis of the concept of ahimsa. The two darsanas were also against the classification and the distinction of society into the different types of jatis, like the brahmana, ksatriya, vaisya and sudra. The Vedic tradition is to believe that these distinctions were primarily concerned with the birth of the individuals into different classes. But the Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept such a distinction and they said that the distinctions are functional and have nothing to do with the high or the lowly character of the individuals. Mimamsakas consider the Vedic authority as apauruseya, but Jainas and the Buddhists gave the status of pauruseya to the authority of Vedas as well as to their agamas and tripitakas. The Jainas and the Buddhists did not accept the theistic conception of God. The Jaina philosophers have refuted the arguments of the Naiyyayikas about the belief in the creator God. This worldly life (samsara) is beginningless and the chain of action and reaction. Both of them accept the doctrine of karna and the good and evil fruits of karma.

Page #541
520 A SOURCE-POOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY > METAPHYSICAL DISTINCTIONS The Buddhists are phenomenalists and nibilists in their outlook. They advocate the transitoriness of the things of the world. They say everything is in a flux and nothing is permanent. The Jainas accept that though there is impermanence and flux in the world, but it is from the point of view of modes and paryayas. They say that the Buddhist approach is from the phenomenal point of view specially with reference to the momentary existence. It is the rjusutranaya. The Jainas say that reality is characterised by the origin (utpada), vyaya (destruction) and dhrauvya (permanence). Lut these have to be looked from different points of view. The Jaina conception of anekanta is the basic point of view. The Buddhist philosophy later developed into various schools both realistic and idealistic. The Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas were realist schools which posited the reality of external world and ultimate substances (elements) (dharma). The knowledge of these elements is possible, says Vaibhasika through perception while Sautrantika make it an object of inference. : Yogacara and Madhyamika are idealistic schools of philosophy. Yogacara advocated the reality of consciousness and the objective storehouse of consciousness (alaya vijnana) as the ultimate reality. The Madhyamikas bave denied reality except the sunya. The sunya has been interpreted in different ways, negatively as the white, but positively as the absolute which is anirvacaniya. Here it comes nearer to the advaitic conception of the Brahman. We should realise that the sunya of the Madhyamika need not be interpreted as the void or the nothingness. The Madhyamika darsana can be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism as the absolute which cannot be described either by negation or by affirmation or by the permutations of the two, i.e. through the catuskoti. So the absolute is indescribable. Hence it is called by the word "Sunya,'s 1 Mukhyo madhyamiko vivartamakhilam sunyasya mene jagata. 2 Madhyamika karika 1, 7.

Page #542
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 521 Jainism is dualistic. It posits the reality of jiva and ajiva. These have been considered from two points of view, from the noumenal (niscaya naya) and phenomenal (vyavahara naya). Similarly, in Buddhism we have two points of view which may be referred to as svalaksana which gives the noumenal point of view and samanya laksana which gives the phenomenal point of view. Similarly, things of the world can be looked at from these points of view. Logically considered also, we can see the general in the particular and the particular in the general. For instance, we can see the general concept of man in individual man and we can also see the differentiating individual man and we can also see the human characteristics in different individuals. To affirm that the one alone is real and the other is an appearance is dogmatic assertion. The Buddhists take the one point only and i.e., as we have seen rjusutranaya, the momentary point of view, Svalaksana has been interpreted as that which gives the functional meaning of a word or a thing. For instance, the function of a cloth is to cover and the function of the pot (ghata) is to hold the water. This is the arthakriya or the essential meaning of the word and the essential characteristic of a thing. CONCEPTION OF ATMAN The conception of the atman as a permanent substance bas been one of the problems of controversies and the difference between the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Buddhists advocate the conception of anatma. There is nothing permanent like the soul. For what we call the soul or the atman is merely the aggregate of the physical and mental states (nama rusa). Rupa is the physical state and nama expresses the mental states like l. vedana (feeling) 2. sam jna (cognition) 3. sarskara (disposition) and 4. vijnana (psychic energy.) These different states are not permanent, they are fleeting. Therefore, there is nothing like the permanent atman, yet the Buddhists believe in the cycle of birth and death and in the rebirth. CONCEPTION OF NIRVANA Similar differences would be found in the conception of nirvana

Page #543
522 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY and moksa. The Buddhist conception of nirvana is negative, it is the state of freedom of vision. It is a state of nothingness. It is the flowing out of the empirical states just like the blowing out the flame of the lamp. It is the Dukhanirodha. We have already seen that attempts have also been made to interprete the state of nirvana as a positive state of bliss. Some philosophers say that the Buddha carried the tradition of the Upanisads. Therefore his conception of nirvana is positive in content, as refering to the state of bliss (ananda). The Buddha very often refers to the attainment of the Brahmatva. This type of differing interpretations have been given due to the Buddha's silence on metaphysical problems. The way to the attainment of moksa or nirvana have also been presented by the Jainas. The Jainas say that the way to the highest realisation of moksa is possible through the synthesis of the triple path of samyagdarsana (right intuition), samyagnana (right knowledge) and samyagcaritra (right conduct). The Buddha enunciated the eight-fold path as the fourth noble truth which is mentioned as the dukhanirodha marga, the way to the cessation of the suffering. This path is the eight-fold path : samyagd rsti (right attitude), samyaksankalpa (right resolve), samyakvaca (right speech), samyak-karma (right effort), samyakajiva (right way of living), samyakvyayama (right action), samyaksmrti (right thoughts) and samyaksamadhi (right concentration). It is also called middle path (madhyama marga) :.? PRAMANAVADA There are variations in the emphasis on the importance of the different pramanas by the Buddhists and the Jainas. The Jainas consider valid cognition corresponding to the external reality as the pramana, (yatharthajnana). But the Buddhist philosophers refer to the pramana as that knowledge which is inconsistent, which is not incoherent and which leads to the knowledge of the unknowns. The 1 Saudarananda 16/28, 29 2 Pramagamavisamvadijfanamajfataithaprakaso va.

Page #544
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 523 Jainas have distinguished pratyaksa and paroksa pramanas. Pratyaksa is that knowledge which the soul gets directly without the help of the sense-organs; and the knowledge through the sense-organs and indirect knowledge through inference etc., are paroksa jnana. For instance, avadhi, manapparyaya, and kevala are pratyaksajnana while muti, sruta are paroksa jnanas. But later the Jainas have modified their terminology and say that the later was also praiyaksa pramana but it is vyavaharika pratyaksa. This knowledge arises through the cooperation of the indriyas and the manas. But according to the Buddhists coherent knowledge is pramana, knowledge which is inconsistent is not pramana. Similarly, pratyaksa is that type of knowledge which is free from intellectual discrimination or intellectual superimposition. Inteilectual super-imposition refers to the position refers to the categories of understanding like naina, jaii, guna kriya etc. The knowledge witbout the association of the activity of the mind (kalpanarahita) is indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpa). Praiyaksa has been distinguished into indriya praiyaksa, manusa pratyaksa, svasarhveaana pratyaksa and yogaja pratyaksa. Anumana is knowledge which is indirect and which is of samanya laksana, The Buddhists recognise pratyaksa and anumana as the pramana. The Jainas recognise agama pramana and this can be considered to be of two type as : (1) arthagama which is the direct teaching of the Tirthankara to his disciples. (2) Sutragama is the codification of the teaching the lirihunkuras in the form of sutras. In the case of the Buddhists contention regarding the distinction of the sabda and the artha, the word and he meaning is different. They find that the two may not cohere and be identical. There may be contradictions and opposition as in the case of the enmity between the snake and the mungoose. There is not much of a relation between the word and the meaning. The relation between the word and the meaning is to be considered as not clarifying the meaning of the word but only as giving the negative function of denying the contrary function for instance, the word cow does not signify the animal cow but it only 1. Kalpanapodhamabbrantam pratyaksan.

Page #545
$24 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY denies the possibility of other meanings of the objects other than the cow. THE DOCTRINE OF PERMANENCE AND IMPERMANENCE The Buddhists have advocated the doctrine of impermanence (ksanikavada). Their cardinal principle is sarvam ksanikam, sarvar prthak, everything is a flux, nothing is permanent. But the Jainas do not find out any contradiction in the two categories of permanence and change. A thing may be permanent and also it may change. Change and permanence are the two stages of existence considered from different points of view. For instance, a thing may be permanent from the point of view of substance, but from the point of view of modes, it is changing. For example, the gold may be turned into an ornament or an idol of God The same thing will be melted and turned into a necklace. In this example, gold as a substance does not change, but its modes are changing and therefore the modes and permanence are both real from different points of view. Thus we find that the Jaina and the Buddhist philosophers have many points of agreement although there are certain important differences. Primarily, the two currents of thought are the framanic currents of thought.

Page #546
Jaina and Sankhya Philosophies : a Comparison The Jaina and Sahkhya philosophies are very eminent. They belong to the framanic current of thought. Sankhya thought has no relation to the Vedic tradition. It is sometimes suggested that Kapila, the founder of Sahkhya thought was the disciple of Marici and Marici was the disciple of the first Tirthankara Rsabhadeva. This has been corroborated by scholars. We cannot say anything about it. The framanic tradition of Srnkhya thought has been accepted by other philosophies in India. Sankaracarya was very clear that sankhya thought was against the Vedic tradition, and also against the sruti and smrti coming from the Vedic tradition. The Padmapurana made it clear that Nyaya, Vaisesika and Patanjali's Yoga philosophies also are contrary to the fruti. Therefore, it was unacceptable. The composition of Nyaya sutra must have been in the second century or the third century B.C. Vaisesika sutra must have been written during the same time and also the Yoga sutra of Patanjali. The writers of these sutras were very much influenced by the gramanic current of thought and the framanic thought was very popular during that period. This is also clear from the fact that several terms like kevali, sukladhyana, jnanavaraniya karma, samyagdarsana etc., are to be found in the Patanjala-Yoga; and these terms are nowhere in Vedic tradition. Some scholars believe that the Sankhya is very ancient. Jainism must have been influenced by the Sankhya thought. If we glance at the Jaina agamas, we do not find such evidence that it was influenced by the Sankhya darsana. Perhaps, those scholars who maintained the view of the antiquity of Sankhya darsana to the Jaina darsana,

Page #547
526 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY may not have seen the Jaina agamas. They might not have been available to them. The Jainas darsana is dualistic. According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles. We may call them dravyas, the jiva and the ajiva. The jiva is pure and simple. It is characterised by consciousness and upayoga. It is also characterised by infinite knowledge and intuition, and infinite energy. It is active. Due to its activity it comes into contact with the material karma and gets involved in the wheel of sarhsara. This involvement is beginningless. But it has an end. One can attain moksa by removing the karmic particles. Just as Jainism is dualistic, Sankhya is also dualistic. According to the Sankhya philosophers, there are two ultimate principles-the purusa and prakrti. The purusz is pure consciousness, but it is passive. Prakrti is jadi, it is unconsciousness, but is active. When the prakrti comes into the proximity of the purusa, the disturbance in the gun as of the sattva, rajas and tamas takes place and the evolution of the universe starts. This entire universe is the product of prakrti, in the presence of purusa. Purusa is only a spectator of the dancedrami of prakrti through which the universe evolve. The Jaina darsana's ajiva tattva with reference to pudgala is alluded to prakrti of Sinkhya. The universe is the product of prakrti according to Sahkhya and according to Jainism the variegated universe is due to the infinite modes of the pudgala (matter). The major aspect of the praksti of the Sankhya can be compared to the Jaina conception of pudgala and akasa." The Sankhya philosophers say that the reality of purusa is self evident. There is no need to prove the existence of the self. Similarly, purusa is self-illuminative, just as the lamp illumines itself and illumines the surrounding area. It is not necessary to prove this essential characteristic of the purusa. Purusa is neither the indriyas nor the 1 (a) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha, Darsana aur Jaina darsana. Muni Sri Nathamalji p. 125. (b) Muni Nathamalji : Satya ki Khoj, Anekanta ke Aloka me.

Page #548
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 527 body nor the manas. It is different from these. It is characterised by caitanya; and caitanya (consciousness) is the essence of the purusa and not its quality. The Jainas consider the atman or the jiva chacacterised by bliss (anandamiya), but the Sankhya philosophers differ in this respect and say that ananda (bliss) is not a characteristic of the purusa, but it is the attribute of prakrti. And therefore, according to the Sahkhya, in the highest state of self-realisation there is no place for ananda. We have also seen that the purusa is only the spectator of the dance of the prak rti in its evolution of the world. The self is pure and simple and eternal. According to the Jainas the self has the characteristics of pervading the body that it occupies (dehamatra). This is from the point of its substance. The Vedantin considers the atman as the one with the Brahman. The Advaitin advocates the identity of the atman with Brahman and according to Visistadvaita the atman is the nature of the Brahman and in the highest stage of the atman merges with the Brahman, just as the waters of river merge with the sea-water. The Sinkhya philosophers postulate the plurality of selves (purusa). If the self were one, then certain logical difficulties would have arise, to explain the variety of experiences and status. If one self were to die, all the selves would have died. The experiences of the one self would have been the experiences of all other selves. But the facts of experiences are different. There are wide variety of individual experiences and the status of different individual self. Some are rich and some are poor. Some are happy and some are miserable. Therefore, it is clear that there are many selves. The Jainas have also advocated the reality of many selves. The Jainas say that an object can be studied from different points of view and permanence and impermanence can be predicated of individual self from two different points of view. From the point of view of substances the selves are permanent, but from the point of view of modes as expressed in infinite number of organism, the selves are changing and are impermanent. Origination and destruction are characteristics of the self, if viewed from the point of view of modes. But the self is permanent from the point of view of substance. What Jaina darsana calls paryaya (mode) Sankhya calls it asat

Page #549
528 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY (appearance or unreal). Dhrauvya or permanence is analogus to sat. According to the Sankhya philosophers, every object in action is asat but sat in its causation. The prakrti is constituted of three gunas : the sattva, rajas and tamas. These gun is get modified. But Jainas use the gunas as something permanent. There is no modification of the gunas. Sattva, rajas, tamas in the Sahkhya darsana are causes of the mental states of pleasure and pain. Acarya Samintabhadra has also presented a similar conception regarding the three-fold aspect of origination, destruction and permanence of things. According to the Jainas jiva is karta (doer) and bhokta (enjoyer) of the fruits of karma. It is characterised by consciousness. Upayoga is the energy and jnana and dargang are the expressions of upayoga. When the object is grasped in its generality, it is darsana and when it is grasped in its specific aspect it is jnana. In this jnana and darjana are the characteristics of jiva. Jiva is also the doer (karta). And it says 'I see' 'I hear' and 'I do'. But in the case of the Sahkhya darsana the atman is fuddha (pure), nitya (eternal) and buddha (enlightened) in rts and states, even in the empirical experiences, the atman does not really undergo all the modifications and experiences of pleasure and pains. It is reflections of the modifications of prakrti, which undergoes these modifications and the atman imagines that it is undergoing modifications. Just as rose flower if kept near a crystal, the crystal appears to be rosy, although the crystal does not have that colour. But if the atman is to experience its fruits, it must be karta also. Bhokta and karta are inter-related. In general kart rtva or activity implies freedom of action. Kart stva is of two types : 1. Adhisthana kart stva and 2. Upadana kart stva. In the Sankhya darsana, purusa is adhisthata as well as the upadana. The world is the product of praksti just as the pot is the product of clay. In the Sankhya darsana, praksti is also considered to be the agent (activity). And it means that prakrti is responsible for the variety in the world. Without the presense of the atmin, praksti cannot produce anything, although the atman or purusa itself does not do anything. But it falsely believes, it is active. In this sense, there is the sense of the

Page #550
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY appearance of the activity in the purus, but really the purusa is not active.1 Gunas are necessary for the modifications of things in the prakrti. Purusa's presence is also necessary. Gunas are of the capacities of the production (prasavadharmi) and in this sense they are karta. This is the causal meaning of the karta. Vacaspati Misra has suggested that akartrtva bhava is present in the purusa because purusa himself is not directly responsible for the production of the things of the world." In other sense purusa may be considered to be akarta because he is not directly responsible for the variegated things of the world. But in another sense, we may say that prakrti is karta, but with the presence of purusa which is responsible for the creation of the universe. When prakrti comes in the vicinity of the purusa evolution starts, just as the iron filings get disturbed and are attracted towards the magnet in the presence of the magnet. 529 The evolution of the universe therefore depends in a sense on the co-operation of the purusa and prakrti. Purusa is passive, it is the spectator, but the presence is necessary for creating the disturbance in the gunas in the prakrti. As long as the prakrti is not in the presence of purusa the gunas are in a state of equilibrated tension. The moment the prakrti comes into proximity of purusa, there is a disturbance in the gunas and the evolution starts-starting from the mahat to the panca nah ibutas. We have already discussed the twentyfive principles of evolution which is the canvas of the universe. In this sense, we can say that purusa or the atman according to the Sankhya is characterised by cetana and is both karta and bhokta. Thus we find that there are some prominent features common to both schools of philosophy although there are certain differences concerning the nature of prakrti and the characteristics of purusa. 1 Sankhya saptati, Jayamangala vyakhya Nirgunasya purusasyaprasavadharmitvadakartrtvam. 2 Aprasavadharmitvaccakarta Vacaspati Misra. 3 Rajendrasuri Smaraka Grantha, pp. 335-343,

Page #551
Jaina &Vedanta Philosophies In India, philosophic development in its various aspects has been prominent. India is the cradle of philosophic thought. Many philosophical systems have arise. Some of them coherent to each and some are contrary to each other. We have seen that India has given respect to every school of thought. Even Carvaka is considered to be a darsana. In this chapter we shall consider a comparative picture of Jaina darsana and Vedanta. ! THE PHENOMENAL WORLD According to the Jainas the universe is constituted of two fundamental principles of jiva (living substances) and ajiva (the nonliving substance). Ajiva may be considered from two points of view. That which has a form is pudgala (matter). And that which does not have a form and it includes substances like dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), akasa (space) and kala (time). These are the six substances and we have already discussed about the Jaina conception of the universe, on the basis of these dravyas. In the Vedanta darsana the universe or the phenomenal world is only an appearance (asatya) while Brahman the ultimate reality is the only real. Sri. Sankaracarya says which is always samarupa (uniform), is satya. The objects of the universe in this phenomenal world are not always uniform. They undergo constant change and modifications. Therefore, it is an appearance and unreal. The ultimate reality is the Brahman. It is one, uniform and constant. Therefore, it is real. The satya or the real is constantly

Page #552
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 531 real for all times. And that is noun nal reality (param irthika satya). From the phenomenal point of view, the phenomenal world is real. But from the noumenal as, therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world is unreal. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world can be considered to be the real from the phenomenal point of view. But things of this physical world are unreal from the noumenal point. Just as the rope appears to be the snake so also this phenomenal world appears to be real. In this sense, we cannot predicate absolute unreality to the phenomenal world nor can we predicate absolute reality. There are degress of reality and Sankara postulated the concept of the degrees of reality. F. H. Bradely followed the tradition of Sankara, in describing the degrees of reality. The appearance of the phenomenal world appears be real due to ignorance (avidya). According to the Vedanta the avidya has two functions : (i) the function of avarana (covering), and (ii) the function of viksepa (distortion). The principle of avarana may be considered to the power of avidya which created intellectual discrimination and it is the cause of this samhsara, the phenomeoal world. Due to the influence of this avarana sakti which creates intellectual discrimination, man considers himself to be the doer and the enjoyer of the pleasure and pain. Similarly, due to the power of ignorance akasa was created. From akaba comes wind, from the wind agni (fire), from the agni comes iala (water) and from jala comes prthvi (earth). In this way the subtle bodies were created from subtle elements and gross bodies were created by gross elements (sthula bhuta). From the suksma sarira (subtle body) comes the sense-organs of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell -- these are the five jnanendriyas. Speech, Dani (the hands), pada, payu, upastha-these are the five karmendrivas. Buddhi is the determining nature of antahkarana while manas is the expression and modifying sense of the antahkarana. There are three types of kogas (covers): 1. Vilnanamavakoga which includes the jnanendriyas and the buddhi. It is responsible for the experiences and the knowledge. 2. Manomayakosa which includes the sense-organs and the minis. It has the discriminating function and connotive in aspect. Pranamaya "koga includes karmendriyas and panic ovayus. This is the engergising source. The suksma sarira is the expression of the synthesis of all the three kosas.

Page #553
332 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY ) PRAMANAVADA The Jainas presented the theory of anekantadrsti for understanding the infinite varieties of the universe. They said that reality is complex and substance has its infinite modes and aspects. The ekanta point of view i. e., the one-sided point of view cannot understand the complexity of the universe. The various points of view by which the universe was looked at and understood presents the pramana sastra of the Jainas. It refers to the naya and pramanu and we have already discussed this topic in detail. The Vedantin has mentioned five pramanas for the sake of understanding the noumenal and phenomenal truth : 1. pratyaksa 2. anumana, 3. upamana, 4. agama and 5. arthapatti. From a very broad point of view the Jaina conception of pramana appears to be different from that of the Vedantic conception. However, if we look at it very closely we find that there are not much discrepanceies and differencys between the praminas. They present the same sense. We have seen that the Jainas have mentioned pratyakpa and paroksz as two primanas for understanding the noumenal and the phenomenal truths. Pratyaksa is the direct knowledge. We have also seen that the terminology was adopted with modifications for the sake of consistent view of epistemology in the light of other schools of thought. Jainas used the term nijapratyaksa and sanhvyavaharika pratyaksa. According to the Jainas paroksa jnana can be classified into 1. smrti (memory), 2. pratyabhijna (recognition), 3, tarka (hypothetical reason) 4. anumana (inference) and 5. agama (testimony). Vedantin does not use the word apratyaksa or paroksa, although the pramanas--anumana, upamana, agama and arthapptti are indirect ways of cognition. Anumana and agamas are considered to be independent pramanas according to Vedanta. Jainas have classified as paroksa prainaxa. Upamana of the Vedantin is analogous to the pratyabhijna of the Jainas. The Vedantic conception of arthapatti refers to the implication involved in the perception and the consequent implication for the sake of clarification. As we find in the Mimarsakas for example, that Devadatta is getting fatter everyday although Devadatta is fasting

Page #554
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 533 during day.' We have to conclude that Devadatta is eating at night. In these forms of expression of arthapatti, there is the element of vyapti and the presence of vyapti would make it a form of inference. Therefore, the Jainas would consider it a form of inference. IDEALISM AND REALISM The Jainas have classified the philosophical theories as idealistic paramarthika) and realistic. This distinction depends upon the distinction of reality on noumenal (paramarthika) and phenomenal (vyavaharika). Consciousness and unconscious matter are the noumenal realistics. They are real and the Jainas have accepted the realities of the external world. In this sense, Jainism is realistic. And Jainism is dualistic also because there are two types of realities which are equally important and real, i.e., conscious jiva and the unconscious world emanating from pudgala. The Jainas say that to consider consciousness as unconsciousness and unconsciousness as consciousness is mithyadrsti. It is perversity of knowledge. According to the Vedanta there are three grades of reality: 1. paramarthika satya (noumenal reality) or ultimate reality, 2. vyavaharika satya is the phenomenal reality and 3. pratibhasika satya, the state of reality in the state of appearance as in the case of the experience of the real in the dream state. Brahman is the only reality and the world is an appearance. In this sense, the pure consciousness with characteristics may be ascribed to the Brahman only, and the non-living physical events as is the appearance. Right knowledge is that knowledge which knows the distinction between the real and the appearance. THE DUALISTIC-NON-DUALISTIC THEORY Jainism is a spiritualist philosophy which maintains that the atman is real and independent spiritual substance. The other systems of philosophy which accept the reality of the atman present in different way. The Vedantin has described the nature of the atman following the tradition of the upanisads. According to the Vedantin, atman is the ultimate principle and Brahman and atman are identical. The vast expanse of the universe which is unconscious is rooted in the ! ! Qun

Page #555
534 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY atman and this theory is called Caitanyadvaitavada. Contrary to this theory, there are philosophers who maintain that the ultimate substance is the unconscious matter. This is the materialist or the naturalistic theory. It is called Jadadvaitavada. But the Jainas have reconciled the contraries in the two theories and advocate the reality of both the conscious atman and the unconscious matter. Both are equally real. In this sense, it may be said that there are three currents of thought in India : 1. Atmadvaitavada which maintains the reality of the self as consciousness. 2. Jadadvaitavada, wbich maintains the reality of the physical universe and 3. Dvaitavada (dualisitc) which maintains the reality of the both. And in this sense, Jainism is dualistic because it advocates the reality and independence of spirit and matter which constitute the matter and the universe. The Jainas accept the principles of permanence and change as both real. From different point of view of substance, i.e., permanence and from the point of view of modes, change is equally real. Therefore, the Jainas formulate the triple principle of origination (utpada) destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya) as equally real. From the niscaya point of view the consicousness and the unconsciousness are the two ultimate principles. But from the vyavahara point of view the changing universe is equally real. But it should be realised that the Advaita darsana does not accept the reality of the changing universe on the same footing as the altimate reality of the Brahman. The physical world is an appearance and this appearance is due to avidya which is an expression of maya. In this sense, we can say the Jaina anekanta view bas attempted to reconcile the conflicting claims of the living and the non-living, the one and the many and permanence and change for absolute reality. The anekanta outlook gives the solution to the problems. THE PATHWAY TO REALISATION The Jainas bave presented the triple pathway to the realisation of moksa. Samyagdarsana (right intuition), samyagjnana (right knowledge) and samyagcaritra (right conduct). There is the need

Page #556
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 535 of the harmonisation of the there paths for the attainment of moksa. One alone will not do. The Vedantin, specially the advaitin, has given importance to jnana marga for self-realisation. According to this theory, the way to realisation is the realisation of the highest truth of the identity of the Brahman and the atman or as in other systems of Vedantic philosophy the oneness of the Brahman and the atman in their essential nature. Sri Ramanuja and the other Vedantins like Madhvacharya have given prominence to Bhakti marga. Ramanuja mentions prapatti. According to Vedanta, the forces of ignorance are threefold. Due to this force of ignorance, one feels that the phenomenal world is real. These three forms of ignorance are dependent on the three levels of experience the dream level, the waking state and the pure state, or the dreamless state, which is a pure state. When all the states of ignorance are removed, knowledge of the highest reality is possible and the bondage is removed. The Vedanta also mentions the triple path of sadhana of realisation. 1. sravana (listening to the scriptures) 2. manana (grasping the truth) and 3. nididhyasana (holding steadfast to the truth). Thus we find Vedania has given prominence to jnana marga in addition to the Bhakti in Ramanuja. Thus we find, there are many points of agreement between the Vedanta and the Jaina darsanas.1 1 (a) Muni Nathamalji, see-Atita ka Anavarana, (b) Muni Nathmalji 1 Jaina Darsana 1 Manana aur Mimamsa.

Page #557
Legacy of Jaina Philosophy to the World of Thought Jainism has occupied an important place in ancient thought. It has made significant contributions to the stream of Indian thought. What we call Indian philosophy, or Indian culture is a long flow and the synthesis of the two streams of thought, the Vedic and the Sramana current of thought coming together and harmoniously synthesising into each other. We find that Jainism has contributed immensely to the development of the Indian view of life. The Jainas have given equal emphasis on reason and state. We find the same type of emphasis in other systems of Indian philosophy. Sankara gives importance to both reason and intuition. Jainism may be considered from the point of view of its metaphysical structure and also of its emphasis on ethical values. The foundational principles of ethical structure would be anekanta, while the moral fibre is expressed and based on the all-pervading principle of ahimsa (non-violence). The Jaina contribution to the Indian philosophical thought may be considered to be anekanta, ahimsa and aparigraha. These constitute the perennial philosophy of Jainism. The concept of ahimsa is to be found in other systems of Indian philosophy, but the systematic study of ahimsa as of theory and the way of life is presented by the Jainas in their all-pervading principle of ahimsa. Ahimsa is the highest principle of conduct. Therefore, Jainas have called it as paramodharmah. It appears that the Jaina theory of ahimsa as a moral injunction has been a pre-aryan principle which was later assimilated in the aryan way of life. The Jainas made

Page #558
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 537 non-violence as the most fundamental principle of religious life. They made a systematic analysis of the principles almost to the point of making it a perfect science. All other moral injunctions were subordinated to ahimsa.1 The Jaina theory of ahimsa is based on the analytic conception of the universe. Jainism is dualistic and Jainas believe in the plurality of the jivas. From the practical point of view, the jivas have also been classified into various types on the basis of different principles like the sense-organs, and the life forces possessed by them. Ahimsa is non-injury or non-violence to any living individual or any life-force of the individual by the three yogas, activity, and trikarana. We are not to injure a living being, however, small it may be or a life-force of an organism, directly with our own hands, by causing someone to do so on our behalf or by giving consent someone else to do injuries. We are asked not to injure a living being physically or in speech or in mind. We should not speak about injuries nor should harbour any thoughts of injuring any living being. In the Tattvarthasutra, himsa is defined as injury (violence) caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred. The consequence of violating the principle of ahighsa is misery in the world and in the next world. He who commits violence is always afflicted and agitated. He is actuated by animosity. He suffers physical and mental torture in this world". After death, he is reborne taking a despicable life. The Jaina conception of ahimsa has influenced the lives of many great votaries of ahimsa. Gandhiji socialised the spiritual principle of ahimsa. Gandhiji. said, 'I believe in loving my enemies. I believe in non-violence as the only remedy opened to the Hindus and Muslims, I believe in the power of suffering to melt the stoniest heart." Though the doctrine of ahimsa 1 Kalghatgi (T.G.): Jaina View of Life, p. 164. 2 Tattvarthasutra VII, 8. 3 Sarvarthasiddhi VIII, 5-9 4 Ibid 5 Young India, Dec. 1920-Love and Hate-1922.

Page #559
538 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY is negative yet it has a positive content. It is not mere abstinence to injury to life. It is love. Himsa causes destruction of life and des tuction of one's own personality. It lowers the personality of man, Gandhiji said "non-violence is the law of our species and violence is the law of the brute".1 Non-violence would be panacea for the ills of life. It would bring lasting peace to us. The Jaina conception of non-violence as an ethical principle has permitted the entire structure of the Jaina ethics and the way of life. Other codes of conduct and vratas like satya, asteya, brahmacarya and aparigraha are all geared to the promotion of the practice of non-violence as much rigorously as possible and as far as possible according to the functions of the individual in society, be an ascetic (muni) or a citizen (sravaka). All other virtues are expressions of ahimsa. Therefore, it is said that Jainism advocates the universality of the principle of non-violence-'ahimsa paramodharmah'. For instance, the individual is a social being and he has to aim at social betterment if self culture is to be pursued. The Jaina ethics has both the eyes of the individual as well as the social betterment. It envisages an individual as a social being, in as much as the individual depends on society for his intellectual, moral and material gains. Even the ascetic is incapable of transgressing this basic principle of individual and social justice. The adoption of ahimsa and other virtues can be seen to be expressed in the aparigraha also. The Jaina view of aparigraha may be presented in the context of modern society in three cardinal principles 1 1. Desireless, 2. nonpossession and 3. develop an attitude of non-attachment towards the possession. An ascetic or a religious fanatic may be desireless but it may be out of a sense of superiority and out of arrogance of virtue, these are not the ideals of society. We should develop an healthy attitude of renunciation and non-attachment which would bring in us a confident calm in our daily life. They adopt the practice of aparigraha as a social virtue based on the spiritual principle of non 1 Romain Rolland-Mahatma Gandhi, p. 48

Page #560
A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 539 attachment. It would foster spontaneous socialism in an age when we are trying to force upon people the socialistic pattern of society without the spiritual basis of non-attachment. Anekanta is the intellectual expression of ahimsa. Anekanta forbids to be dogmatic and fanatic and agressively insist upon expressing our attitude. Anekanta says that reality is complex. It can be looked at from different points of view and each point of view gives a picture of reality which is at once true but partial. But to insist that the particular point of view and the picture of reality are the only true picture would be dogmatic, and i, e., ekanta. Jainas wanted to avoid the aggressively dogmatic outlook towards looking at things. They have adopted a synoptic point of view which gives the comprehensive picture of reality in which all other aspects of reality are woven into a synthetic hold. The anekanta is an attitude of mind. It is the foundational principle. Nayavada expresses the point of view. It is psychological while syadvada is the logical expression of nayavada formulated in propositional forms. We have said that anekanta is the basic principle, nayadada is analytic and syadvada is synthetic. We have also considered the importance of syadvada in the back-ground of the criticisms offered against it, by philosophers like Sankara, Ramanuja and some of the modern philosophers. These philosophers as we are aware, have considered syodvada as a formulation of doubt and uncertainty. First, because, syadvada mentions seven-fold predications of affirmation, negation and inexpressibility. And secondly, because, the word syat indicates the attitude of doubt as it means 'perhaps', but we have seen that syat does not mean "perhaps', it does not connote the expression of 'doubt,' the statement made in every predication is a certain statement but predicated from a particular point of view. All the propositional forms present the pictures of reality from the different points of view and syadvada presents the synthetic picture or more aptly a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science is slowly leaning towards the appreciation of syadvada as a methodology of multi-valued logic for the solution of problems wbich are metaphysicoscientific. Physicists have begun to realise that syadvada as multi

Page #561
540 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY valued logic and methodology which can solve many different problems of quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Similarly, eminent statisticians and biologists like Mehelnobis and J. B. S. Haldane have shown, the methodology of multi-valued logic as expressed in the syadvada would be very useful in the study of theory of probability and the genetic evolution. The metaphysical structure of Jainism is based in its formulation of the six-fold distinction of dravya like jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma, akasa and kala. We have already seen that the cosmic. principles of dharma and adharma and akasa and kala have been scientifically analysed like the Jainas. It is the special contribution of the Jainas in their analysis of the distinction of akasa into lokakasa and alokakasa. Similarly, the Jainas have made a significant contribution to the theory of time by pointing out that time (kala) is monodimensional and therefore is not an astikaya. Similarly, the Jaina theory of atomism has its own significant contribution in the analysis of the nature of atom. The Vaisesikas distinguished between different types of atoms like the earth atoms, water and fire atoms, but the Jainas have not made qualitative atoms. That atoms can be distinguished in their combinations in forming the objects. The same atoms can form water or earth etc. Democrates comes nearer to the Jaina theory in this conception. The Jainas have also made significant contribution in their analysis of the theory of knowledge and their doctrine of karma. Knowledge for the Jainas is self-illuminating. Pramanas were distinguished into pratyaksa and paroksa, but pratyaksu was that form of knowledge which the soul gets directly without the medium of sense-organs, they consider that sense-organs are impediments in the way of the soul for getting clear knowledge. Knowledge received through the sense-organs was considered to be paroksa, but later with a view to accommodating the use of other Indian philosophers and with a view to avoiding academic chaos in understanding the problems of epistemology, the Jainas adopted the phrase of nijapratyaksa, for the first and sarvyavaharika pratyak sa for the knowledge arising out of the senseorgans and the contact of the mind.

Page #562
A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 541 : The Jaina theory of karma is unique because Jainas have given a methodical and scientific analysis of the doctrine of karma. The Jiva due to its activity attracts karmic particles which are material in nature and these karmic particles envelope the soul and obscure knowledge, intuition and activity. This obscuration brings bondage (bandha). The way to the spiritual salvation is to remove karma and the removal of the karma has to pass through stages. We have first, to stop the fresh influx of karma, i. e., called sarvara and then the annihilation of karma i. e., already accumulated by various means like suppression of the karmic effect or destruction of karma. This is nirjara; and once all the kar nas are removed, we reach the highest state of perfection. We have so far given a brief resume of the essential features of the Jaina contribution, to the development of the Indian thought. The essential features of Jaina philosophy, we may call the perennial philosophy of the Jainas. The Jaina view of life is realistic-empiricist coupled with pragmatic outlook. It is not a quietistic optimism, it advocates a struggle towards perfection and the pathway towards the realisation of the highest end of perfection. In this sense, the Jaina Weltanschauung is meliostic.

Page #563

Page #564
PART VI APPENDICES 1. REFERENCE BOOKS INDEX 2. INDEX OF TECHNICAL TERMS 3, JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE AND AUTHORS

Page #565

Page #566
Anyayogavyavacchedadvatrimsika Abhidharmadipa and its notes (tippana) Abhidharmakosa Anuyogadvara Adhyatmasara Anguttaranikaya APPENDIX I Reference Books Index Astaka prakarana Abhidhana Cintamani kcsa Anuyogadvara (Punyavijayaji) Astasati Astasahasri Anyayogavyavacchedika Ashok Ke Phool (Dr. Hazari Prasad Dvivedi) Amar Bharati-(Sanmati Jnanapitha, Agra) Avagyaka niryukti Atmamimamsa (Pt. Dalsukh Malavania) Acaranga niryukti Agamasara Agamayuga ka Jaina Darsana (Pt. Dalsukh Malvania) Avasyaka Haribhadriyavrtti Apta Mimamsa Acaranga Avasyaka Malayagiri vrtti Alapapadd hati

Page #567
546 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 'savasyopanisad Uttaradhyayana sutra Uttaradhyayana : Ek Parisilana Uttaradhyayana Bshadvsiti Uvavai Upayahsdaya Rsabhadeva : Ek Parisilana Rgveda Aitareya Upanisad Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Kathopadisad Kausitaki Upanisd Kautiliya Arthasastra Cosmology Kenopanisad Karmagrantha Kathavatthu Kalpa sutra (Devendra Muni) Gita Ganadharavada (Pt. Dalsukh Malvania) Gommatasara (Nemicandra Siddhantacakravarti) Gautama Sutra Caraka Samhita Candraprabhacaritram Candraprajnapti Chandogyopanisad Jaina Dargana (Dr. Mohanlal Mehta) Jaina Darganika Sahitya ka Simhavalokana (Dr. Dalsukh Malvania) Jaina Dharma and Darsana (Dr. Mohanlal Mehta) Jaina Dars ina : Manana aur Mimamsa (Muni Nathmal) Jaina Darsana--Dr. Mahendrakumar Jivabhigama Sutra Jaina Darsana aur Adhunika Vijnana Jaina Dharma me Tapa : Svarupa aui Vislesana--Sri Marudhara Kesariji Meharaj Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva Jaina Sutras (Dr. Herman Jacobi)

Page #568
* Jaina Darsana ke Maulika Tattva (Muni Nathmalji) Tattvanusasana Tattvasangrahapanjika Tarkabhasa Tattvartha-Srutasagariya vrtti Tattvarthabhasya tika Tattvartha sutra Taittiriya Upanisad Tattvasangraha ki babirartha pariksa Tejobindu Upanisad Tandulaveyaliya Tarka sangraha Tattvartha sutra-Sarvarthasiddhi Tattvartha sutra-Rajavartika Tattvartha Sutra-Slokavartika Tattvartha Sutra-Pt. Sukhlalji Tattvarthabhasya-Haribhadriya vrtti Taittiriya aranyaka Tattvartha Sutra-Siddhaseniya tika Tattvarthasara (Amrtacandra Suri, Ganesha Granthamala) APPENDIX I Dighanikaya The Philosophy of Space and Time, Introduction Dravya-guna-paryaya rasa Dravyasangraha Darsana aur Cintana-Pt. Sukhlalji Dvadasanupreksa Dasasrutaskandha Dasavaikalika niryukti Dravyanuyoga tarkana Dvatrimsika (Amitagati) Dharma sangrahani, Malayagirivrtti Dharmabhyudayam Dharmasangraha Dhavala Dhammapada Prasad 547 Varni

Page #569
548 Dharma aur Darsana (Devendra Muni) Dharma ane Darsana (Devendra Muni) Navatattva prakarana mula Navatattva vicara mula Navatattva vicara (Sri Bhavasagara) Navatattva vicarasaroddhara Navatattva prakarana (Sri Devagupta Suri) Navatattvasara prakarana (Ancalika Jayasekhara Suri) Navatattvasara Navatattva bhasya Navatattva balavabodha (Harsavardhanagani) Navatattva balavabodha (Sri Parsvacandragani) Navatattva balavabodha (Kulaka) Navatattvarasa-Sri Rsabhadasa (-Sri Bhavasagara) (-Sri Saubhagya Sundara) 33 Navatattva Joda (Sri Vijayadana Suri) Navatattva stavana (Sri Bhagya Vijayaji) (Sri Viveka Vijayaji) "" "" A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Navatattva Chappai (Sri Kamalasekhara) 13 95 Nyayamanjari Nyayasutra Nyayavartika Nyayavatara Niscayad vatrimsika Nyayakarikavali Nayacakrasara (Sri Saubhagya Sundara) (Sri Vardhamana Muni) (Lumpaka Muni) Nyayakosa Nandisutra (Punya Vijayaji. M. Edited) Nyayabindu Nyayabhasya Niyamasara

Page #570
APPBNDIX 1 549 Nyayaviniscaya commentary Nyayamanjari Navatattvasahitya sangraha Nyayopadega Nayarahasya Nayakarnika Nyayakumudacandra Nayopadesa Nyayavatara tika (Siddharsigapi) Pravacana sara Pancastikayasara Prajitapana Pramanavartika Prajitapana vstti Praso opanigad Prasastapada bbagya Pancastikaya & Pancastikaya vstti Pafcadhyayi Pascimi darsana (Dr. Divanchand) Pratikramana sutravstti (Acarya Nami) Pancastikaya-Amrtacandrasuri ksta Samaya Vyakhya Pancastikaya-Jayasena vpiti Pindaniryukti Pancagaka satika vivarana Pariksamukha Pramananayatattvaloka Pramananayatattvaratdavatarika Pramanamimamsa Pramana nirnaya Paramatmaprakasa Pascasangraha Physics and Philosophy (Burner Hoisburg : From Yuclid to Edington) Brahmajala sutta Brabmasiddhi Bauddha Darsana aur Vedanta-Dr. C. D. Sharma Baudhhadarsana (Baladeva Upadhyaya)

Page #571
550 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Bhagavati Bharatiya Tattvavidya (Pt. Sukhlalji) Bharatiya Samskrti Bhagavana Mahavira : Ek Anugilana-(Devendra Muni) Bhagavana Aristanemi aur Karmayogi Srkrigna: Ek Anucintana (Devendra Muni) Munidvaya Abhinandana Grantha Majjhimanikaya Mimamsaslokavartika Madhyamika karika Mundaka Upanisad Maitreyi Upanisad Mandukyopanisad Mulacara vrtti (Vasunandi) Maitrayani Aranyaka Matharakarika Muni Hazarimal Smrti Grantha Milinda Prasna Mahabharata Yoga Sastra Yukti Sneha Prapurani Siddhanta Candrika Yoga Darsana Yogadarsana bhasya Yogadarsana tattva vaisaradi Yogadarsana Sarasvati tika Loka prakasa Laghiyastraya Visvadarsana ki Ruparekha (Pt. Vijayamuni) Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Visuddhimaggo Vrhadnayacakra Vigesavasyaka bhasya Vedanta sukti manjari Vaisesika sutra Vijnana ki Ruparekha Vrhannavatattva

Page #572
APPENDIX I 551 Visesavasyaka bhasya vrtti Sarvadarganasangraha Siddhiviniscyaya cika (Akalanka) Saptatattva prakarana (Hemachandra Suri) Samayasara (Kundakunda) Sanmati prakarana tika Syadvada ratnakara Siddhiviniscyaya Samyukta nikaya Sankhyatattva kaumudi Sankhya sutra Sthananga-Samavayanga Svarupa aur Sambodhana Sankhya pravacana Sutrakstanga vTtti Sanmati tarka Sthananga & Sthananga--Abhayadeva vytti Sahitya aur sarsksti (Devendra Muni) Samacari sataka Sarvarthasiddhi Syadvadamanjari Sutrakstanga Sutrakstanga niryukti Sankhyakarika Satapatha Brahmana Svetasvataropanisad Sabdakal padruma kosa santasudharasa Sastradipika santieatakan Sivagita Saddarsana samuccaya Satkhandagama Sri Bhasya Ramanuja Hariyamsa purana Haribhadriyavasyaka tippana

Page #573
APPENDIX II Index of Technical Terms Akarmabhumi-The world where there is no activity like agricul ture, writing...etc. like-fasting, celibacy, sleeping on the floor Akamanirjar a-It refers to the removal of karmic particles by actions etc., not voluntarily but out of compulsion as in the case of a man who is imprisoned and who has to undergo these hardships. tgurulaghu-It refers to the absence of the two characteristics of heaviness and lightness. Agurulaghuguna-It is the characteristic which expresses neither the lightness nor the heaviness as in the case of the characteristics of the soul. It is infinite in character. Ajiva-Non-living substance. Ajnana-Ignorance due to the perversity of attitude which arises due to the rise of jnanavaraniya karma, Anu-An atom. Atyantabhava-Absolute negation; for example, the sky flower or the son of barren women or horns of a rabbit. Addhasamaya- It refers to time or the indivisible part of time. Adharma --The unrighteous attitude which is responsible for the downfall of the soul in the spiritual path. Adharmadravya - Principle of rest. Adhigama-Sense experience of the objects. Adholoka-The lower world. Adhruvabandha-The bondage of the kar nic matter of a soul in the cases where there is the possibility of the non-bondage of the karmic matter and the consequent freedom from bondage.

Page #574
APPENDIX II $53 Adhruvabandhini-It refers to the psychic attitude by which there is the possibility of bondage or there may not be any bondage of any karma. Adhruvodaya - The rise of the satavedaniya karma etc., on subsequent Occasions due to the non-destructions of the previous dispositions. Ananta - Endless or infinite. For instance, kevalajnana is ananta. Anantavirya-Infinite energy of the soul. Anantanubandhi - It is a process by which samyagdarsana is withheld and if the right knowledge has already arisen it vanishes. It is an endless series of the expressions of passions (kasaya) or emotional states. Ana pavartantya-It refers to the exhaustion of ayukarma as per schedule without any decrese in the duration or intensity. The ayukarma of this life is determined due to the previous karma needs to be completely exhausted. Inabhigrahita mithyatva - Mithyatva is the perversity of attitude which arises due to wrong teaching and due to the clinging of wrong teaching. Anakaropayoga-Indeterminate upayoga i. e. darganopayoga. Anabhigrahika mithyatva-This is the perversity of attitude which arises due to the belief that all other views and theories are * equally true. Anikacita-It is contary to nikacita in which the processes of utkarsana (increase), apakarsana (decrease) and sankramana (transformation) of karmic matter are possible. Anekanta--The many-sided approach to reality. Antaraya Karma Karma which determines and obstructs the inherent energy of the soul. For instance, it obstructs the activity of giving alms etc. Antyasuksma--The ultimate subtlety which is to be found in the atom. Antyasthula-Ultimate vastness for graspness. This refers to the entire cosmos and the matter of the cosmos. Apakarxana-Decrease in the intensity of the karmic effect. Apavartana-It is the transformation or the decrease in the states and intensities of the effects of bondage.

Page #575
- 554 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Apavartana sankramana-It is the process of the reduction of the experience and the effects of the karmic intensities. Aparartya--- It is the premature realisation of the ayukarma as in the case of death by accident or poisoning. Apratipati-It is a form of avadhijnana (clairvoyance) which lasts upto the kevalajnana (ompiscience). Apratyakhyana kasaya--It refers to the kasayas or passions which inhibit the expression of right conduct of a house holder i. e., fravaka. Abadhakala-It is the duration of time from the bondage of the karma to the rise of the karmic effect. Abhigrahita-It is the mithyatva or perversity of belief which is acquired due to the teaching of others. Arupi-Formless matter. It has no characteristics of sabda (sound), rupa (form), rasa (taste), gandha (smell) and sparsa (touch). Arthanaya--It is that point of view or naya which is different from vyanjana and is distinguished from the other characteristics like gender, number, time and agency. Arihavagraha-It is determinate concessional stage in which there is the awareness of the sensation. Ardhamagadhi bhasa-It is the ancient language spoken half the part of the Magadbadesa and it included the 18 dialects. Aloka-It is space beyond the world. It is the limitless space. Avagraha-It is a sensational stage of experience. Avasthita (dravya)-It refers to the substance like pudgala which has a determinate space points, dharma, adharma, lokakasa and jiva have infinite number of space points while pudgala and alokakasa have endless space points. These substances never go beyond their space points hence they are called avasthita. Avaya (apaya)-It refers to the stage of perceptual experience (indriya pratyaksa). It is perceptual judgement. Aviorahagati-Direct movement of soul. Vigraha means obstruction or uneven direction. The jiva in its movement gets uneven direction due to certain obstructions and that is called vigrahagati. Contrary to this is direct movement, it is called rjugati. So the direct movement of jiva for one samaya is also mentioned as avigrahagati.

Page #576
APPENDIX 555 Avipaka nirjara-It refers to the karmic matter which arises prema turely due to certain spiritual efforts and the karma is destroyed, just as a mango fruit is prematurely ripened by artificial methods. Astikaya-It refers to the five substances, they are--jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and akasa, because the space points of these substances signify the collective nature or they are in collection. Akasa-It is space. It accomodates the substances like jiva, dharma, adharma, pudgala and kala. Agama--It is testimony of an authority who is pure and perfect. It is aptavacana. Abadhakala--It refers to the duration of time between the bondage of the karma and the fruition of the karma i. e., the potential state of the karmic effect. Abhigrahika--It is the state of mind which is dogmatic and which affirms that a particular view is right and all others are wrong. It is the form of mithyatva (dogmatic assertion). Indriya-Sense-organs through which sense-experience is possible, due to the contact of the sense-organs and the manas. Tryapathakriya-Trya means yoga (activity). The karmic flow which is accrued due to one type of activity is called Iryapathakarma and activity is called iryapathakriya. I svara--The perfect soul which has attained kevalajnana and which has reached the highest stage of perfection is called isvara. Tha- It is a stage of sensation. It may be called associative inte gration by which the stimulations are received and organised. Uccagotra--It is the state of the individual existence in this life with reference to his position, society, his power, form and other status in social life. This high state of social existence is attained due to the good karmas. Udirana--Udirana is that process by which the karmic matter of long duration and fruition power are brought in udayavalika so that they can be experienced soon. Udvartana--It is the increase in the duration and intensity of experience of karma.

Page #577
556 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Udvartanakarana-To increase the intensity of the karmas which are beyond udayavalika. Upakaranendriya-These are the material sense-organs of the body, which are helpful in perception. For example, a man sees by the help of cornea, so cornea is upakaranendriya. Upayoga-It refers to the energy of the soul which is responsible for the knowledge and intuition (jnana and darsana). Rjusutranaya-It is the point of view of the momentary present. The Buddhist point of view is an example of rjusutranaya. Ekatva pratyabhijnana-It is recognition in which perceptual judgement and the recollection are synthesised. In this form of experience we recognise an object as the one which has been experienced or seen in the past and say it is the "same". Evambhutanaya-It is the point of view which refers to the sabdanaya and it refers to the functional use of the term. Aud trikasarira-It refers to the gross body because 'udara' means gross. Audayika bhava-It is the state of mind with reference to the effective state originating from the rise of the karmic matter. Karma-It is the technical term which refers to the after effect of reactivity. The Jaina theory of karma explains karma in terms of karmic particles and makes distinction in the karma as of eight types. Similarly, the karmic effect may be wholesome or may be bad. Jainas have given a scientific theory of karma. Kasaya-It arises due to karmic influx. The kasayas are the root cause of birth and death that is cycle of trans migation. Karmana Sarira-It is the karmic body and is very subtle and is responsible for the various karmic effects. Kala (Time)-The Jaina theory of kala gives a realistic picture of kala as an independent category. It is mono-dimensional and therefore it is not an astikaya. Kevalajnana-Omniscient perfect knowledge. Kevala darsana-Omniscient intuitive knowledge. Ksaya-Destruction of karma. Chaamastha-Chadma means jnanavarana and darsanavarana karma. The jiva who lives in the state of these two karmas is chadmastha.

Page #578
AThPENDIX II 557 Jina-One who has conquered the feelings of attachment and aversion and all the four types of passions. He is free from 18 types of defects. Tapa (Austerity)-- They are meant to destroy the eight types of karma. Taijasa sarira--In modern technology it can be called as Electric body. Trasa nama-Trasa nama karma refers to the rise of the karma by which the two to five-sensed organisms are born. Dargana-It refers to the belief or faith. Dik-It refers to direction in space. Drstivada--The twefth holy scripture (anga) of Jainas. In it the elements with their modes etc., were vividly described. Dravya (Substance)-It is the shelter of attributes and modes. It has origination, destruction and permanence. It is eternal. Dravya niksepa--It is the understanding of the nature of the object from the point of view of substance based on the dialectical considerations. Dravyastika naya--It is the point of view of substance. Dvesa--Hatred, krodha-anger, mana--egoity, arati-dislike and bhaya fear are expressions of dvesa. Dharma dravya-Dharme as substance, it is the principle of motion. Dharana (Retention)--It is condition of recollection also: It is an element in avagraha. Dhrauvyam-It refers to the duration or permanence of the aspect of the substance. Naya-A point of view. Naraka- The nether world where hellish beings reside. Nama niksepa--It refers to the understanding of a thing by mean of its name, i. e., proper names without reference to their nature: It is the dia lectical process. Nikacita--It is a state of karmic particles in which there is neither increase nor decrease in the intensity of the karmic effect. Nor is there transformation of karmic process. Nik gepa--It is a dialectical process wbich presents ihe various aspects

Page #579
568 A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY for understanding the nature of the things through the point of view of substance, dravya. its qualities and proper name etc. Nigoda-The particular state of jiva is nigoda, in which it may reside for infinite period of time. Nidhatta--It is the state of condition (karmic) in which the increase or decrease of the intensity of the karma is determined by the capacity of the karmic condition. It does not refer to the rise (udaya) or any other karmic state. Niyativada--Determinism as a theory. Nirjara-It is a process of the removal of the accumulated karmas. Nirvana--Freedom from bondage of the worldly existence, Niscaya naya--The noumenal point of view. Nica gotra--The lower and miserable state of an individual with reference to its individual and social status. Naigama naya-The point of view which has a purpose or an end. Noindriya pratyaksam It is the form of pratyaksa which is due to the noindriya i. e. mind, without the help of the sense-organs. Nyasa-It is a method of knowing the nature of a thing from various points of view. It is also called niksepa. Paryuyarthika nayam-The point of view of modes. Palyopama-It is a measure of time by the Jaina standards. Papa--Demerit. Pindaprakrti--The aggregate of the many sub-types of karma: Pudgala-Matter. Lesya-A specific theory of the Jainas wl ich says that the soul gets colour due to radiation from various activities. Vyapti-It is a foundational principle of inference. It refers to the universal relation between the middle term and the major term. Subhanama--The nama karma which brings auspicious bodily organs, sweet melidious sound, fame etc., to an individual. Sankramana-Transformation of one form of the sub-type of karma into another form of sub-type of the same karmu. Sarjna-Instincts. It refers to the instinctive urges of all animais including even the heavenly beings regarding hunger, fear, sex urge and the instinct of possession.

Page #580
APPENDIX II 5$9 SarjniJiva which possesses samjna., i, e, mind, by the help of it, they can learn, think, understand etc. , Sanghata-It is the aggregate of the particles. The atomic aggregate. Sarhvara-- It is a process to stop the influx of the new karmas. Sarhanana-It is a state of the bondage due to the rise of certain types of karma: It refers to the bones of the body. Sor-It is a reality which refers to the origination, the destruction and the permanence of the state of a thing. I Samiti (control)--A form of moral rule which refers to the control of movement, control of speech and control of niksepana, etc. Suksma (subtle)-It neither causes hinderance to others, nor other things can hinder it. Sthapana niksepa-It is the dialecticalgform of understanding the nature of a thing by the recognition of the present state. Sthavara--It refers to the stationery souls like sthavara jivas, the earth and water-bodied beings, plant... ...etc. Syadvada-It is the theory of seven-fold predications to express the comprehensive nature of the things. It is the special contribution of the Jainas to the world thought. Svadhyaya-It is the self-study or the study of holy scriptures meant to promote the spiritual realisation of the self.

Page #581
Jaina Philosophical Literature and Authors SWETAMBARA AND DIGAMBARA Author Abhayadeva Abhayatilaka Ajitasena Ajnatakartrka APPENDIX III Time V. 11th cen. V. 14th cen. Work Sanmatitika Pancaprastha nyayatarka vyakhya Tarkanyaya sutra tika Nyayalahkara vrtti Nyayamanidipika (Prameya ratnamala tika) Saddarsana Slokavartikatippani1 Saddarsanaprapanca1 Prameya ratnamalalaghuvrtti1 Arthavyanjanaparyaya-vicara1 Svamatasthapana1 Srstivada pariksa1 Saptabhangi1 Sanmatitarka1 Sabdakhandavyakhyana1 Pramanasiddhi1 Pramanapadartha1 Paramatakhandana1 Nyayabhuta1 Nayasangraha1 Nayalaksana1 Nyayapramanabhedi1

Page #582
APPENDIX III 561 Author Time Akalankadeva V. 7th cen. Work Nyayapradipikal Pramananaya prabandhal Pramanalaksanal Matakhandanavadal Visegavadai Laghiyasiraya (svopajsavstti sahita) Nyayaviniscaya Pramana sangraha Siddhiviniscaya (svopajnavrtti sahita) Tattvartharajavartika Astagati (Aptamimarsa ki vrtti) Samayapariksa? Nyayadipavaliviveka Brhatsarvajnasidahil Laghusarvajnasiddhi Jivasiddhi cika Vyatireka dvatrimsika (Not available) Prameyaratnamala (pariksamukha tika) Prameya rainakara Amarakirti Amstananda Muni Anantakirti V. 10th cen. Ananda suri Anantavirya V. 12th cen. Siddhiviniscaya tika Nayo padesa tika Asadhara V. 13th cen. Anantavirya (vrddha) v. 9th cen. BhavaprabhasOri V. 18th cen. Bhavasena traividha V. 12-13 cen. Bhuvansundara suri V. 15th cen. Visvatattvaprakaga Parabrahmotthapana (In Jaina grantha-granthakara) Laghu-mahavidyavidambana (...do...) Sad trirhaatjalpa sanksepa Utpadadi siddhi satika V. 17th cen. V. 13th cen. Bhavavijaya Candrasena Cirukirti Panlitacarya Prameya ratnalankargi

Page #583
+362 Author Devaratna Devabhadra suri Devanandi Devaprabha Devasena Dharmabhigana Gunaratna Haribhadra Hemacandra Jagannatha Jayasimha suri Jinadeya Jinapati suri Jinesvara suri Tatey Role Jnanacandra Khandanakanda Kumaranandi A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Work Time b- V. 17th cen. V. 12th cen: V. 6th cen. V. 13th cen. 990 V. V. 15th cen. V. 15th cen. V. 8th cen. V. 12th cen. V. s. 1703 V. 15th cen. V. 13th cen. V. 11th cen. V. 15th cen. V. 8th cen, Nyaya ratnavali (In Jaina grantha-granthakara) Nyayavatara tippana Sara sangraha Jalpanirnaya Pramana prakasa Brhatsarvajnasiddhi1 Nyayadipika Saddarsana samuccya ki tarkarahasya dipika Anekanta jayapataka (with commentary) Anekantavada pravesa Saddarsana samuccaya Sastravarta samuccya (with A commentary) Nyayapravesa tika Dharmasangrahani Lokatattva nirnaya Anekanta praghatta (In Jaina grantha-granthakara) Tattva tarahgini (... do..) Pramana mimamsa Anyayogavyavacchedadva trimsatika Kevalibhuktinirakarana1 Ratnakaravatarika tippana Karunya kalika1 Vadasthala1 Sanmati tika, Prabhalaksya satika : Ratnakaravatarika tippana Tattvadipika1 Vadanaya

Page #584
APPENDIX It 563 Author Time Laghu Samitabhadra V. 13th cen. MaHadhavala V. 1lth cen. Malayagiri V. 13th cen. Mallavadi do Mallavadi V. 6th cen. V. 14th cen. Mallisena Manikanta Magikyanandi Mayacandra V. 1lth cen. V. 19th cen. Merutunga Municandra suri V. 15th cen. V. 12th cen. V. 13th cen. Naracandra suri Narendrasena Nemicandra Padmavijayagani Work "Astasahasri-tippai: 15 Dravyasvabhava prakasa Dharmasangrahani fika Dharmottara tippanaka (with Pt. Dalsukhbhai) Nayacakra Sanmatitarka tika Syadvada manjari Nyayaratna Pariksamukha Jnanakriyavada (in Jaina Grantha-Granthakara) Saddarsana nirnaya? Anekanta jayapataka vstti tippana Nyayakandali tika? Pramana-prameya kalikai Pravacana pariksa Tarkasangraha phakkika (In Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Kevala Mukti prakarana Trilaksanaka darsana Prameyakamalamartanda (pariksamukhatika) Nyayakumudacandra (laghiyastrayatika) Paramatajhanjhamila Vadasthala2 Tattvaniscaya? Vyatireka dvatritsika Syadvada karikas Ratnakaravatarika panjika Saddarsana samuccaya Nyayakandali panjika? Syadvada ranavatarika V. 19th cen. Palya kirti Patrakesari Prabhacandra V. 9th cen. V. 6th cen. V. 11th cen. V. 13th cen. Pradyumna suri Pravarakirti Ramacandra suri Rajagekbara V. 13th cen: V. 15th cen. Ratnaprabha suri y . 13th cen,

Page #585
564 A SOURCB-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Author Rddhisagara Time V. 20th cen. Sadhuvijaya V. 16th cen. Sakatayana Samantabhadra V. 4-5 cen. V. 11th cen. santi suri (Purpatallagacchiya) Satyaraja V, 16th cen. santisena santivarpi subhacandra Work Nirnaya prabhakara (le Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Vadavijaya prakarana : (... do ...) Strimukti prakarana Aptamilanh se Brhatsvayambhustotra Jivasiddhi Nyayavataravartika. savstti Jalpamanjari (In Jaina Grantha: Granthakara) Prameya ratnakaraa Prameyakanthika (pariksamukhavrtti) Sarsayavadana vidarana Saddarsanapramana prameya sangraha Pariksamukha vrtiil Nyayavatara-tika Darsana ratnakara (In Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Nyayavatara Dvatrinsika Sanmati tarka Syadvado panisad Sandarsana tika Nyaya pravesa Haribhadra vrtti panjika Nyayamakaranda vivecanal Tarkabhasavartika (in Jai. na Grantha. Granthakara) Syadvdad mala Nyayadipavali tika Subbacandra deva Siddhargi Siddhantasara V. 10th cen. V. 16th cen. V. Sth cen. Siddhasena Divakara Somadeva Soma tilaka Sricandra suri V. 11th cen, V. s 1392 V. 12th cen. Subhaprakasa Subhavijaya V. 17th cen, Sukhaprakaga Muni

Page #586
APPENDIX III 565 Author Time Sumati V. 6th cen: Umasvami V. 3rd cen. V. 3rd cen. Umasvati Vadibhasimha v. 8th cen. Vadideva suriy Vadiraja suri . 12th cen. v. 11th cen. Vajranandi Vasunandi Vidyananda' Work Sanmatitarka tikali Sumati saptaka Tattvartha sutra Tattvarthasutra svopajna bhasya Syadvadasiddhi Navapadartha niscaya Pramananayatattvalokalahkara Syadvada ratnakara Nyaya viniscaya vivarana Pramana nirnaya Pramanagrantha 1 Atmamimarsa vrtti Astasahasri Aptapariksa Pramanapariksa Patra pariksa Satyasasana pariksa Tattvarthasslokavartika Vidyananda mahodaya Saptabhangitarangini Sad trimsadjalpa sarksepai Jaina sapta padarthi Pramana vadartha (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Syadvada muktavali) Vadartha nirupana (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) V. 10-11 cen. Vimaladasa Vinaya vijaya Yasastava sagara V. 17th cen. V. 18th cen.

Page #587
566 Author Yasovijaya (upadhyaya) A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY Time V. 17th cen. Work Anekanta pravesa Astasahasri vivarana, Anekantavyavastha Atmakhyati (in Grantha Granthakara) Bhasa rahasya Devadharmapariksa Dharma pariksa Dravyaloka vivarana Dravya paryaya yukti (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Dvatrimsat dvatrimsatika Gurutattva viniscaya Jnanabindu (In Navya saili) Jnanarnava Jaina Jainatarkabhasa (in Jaina Mangalavada Grantha and Granthakara) Nyaya bindu Nyayakhanda khadya (navy saili) Nyayaloka ( do) Naya rahasya Nayapradipa Nayopadesa Pramana rahasya (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Sastravartasamuccaya Siddhanta manjari tika (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Siddhanta tarka pariskara (-do) Syadvada manjusa (com mentary on syadvada manjari (--do--)

Page #588
Author APPENDIX II Time Work Tattvaloka vivarana (-do-) Trisutryaloka (-do-) Utpadavyayadhrauyasiddhi Note These books are available in different bhandaras. "Not published, 567 tika Vadamaharnava (in Jaina Grantha Granthakara) Vadamala (-do-) Vedanta nirnaya (-do-) Vidhivada (-do )

Page #589
Infe bha a A a i ht k kh pU P iI u U Lao tth S nr 50 for ai g SCHEME OF PRONUNCIATION 1uur 1 g. Cg s bor D. s gh dh b bh m ph b bh m h h ( havai) (h..vai) i VOWELS s lR e ai CONSONANTS e ai 0 au au au cu C pU t U o bho (aM) 5 ks y i ch 5 th r tru tr 15 j Cand du d b 1 jJa jo (a:): in n jh n to men dh n dh n v V, W

Page #590
Shri Devendra Muni Shastri. the author of this voluminous work is a Jaina monk of higher order. He is a great thinker and reputed scholar of the various branches of literature -philosophy, logic, religion, metaphysics etc. He has written more than 60 books. This voluminous work is Jaina weltanschauung-the outlook on world philosophy. Philosophy is a deep insight It enables man to know the noumenal and phenomenal nature of the things. It discloses the mystery of the sufferings of mundane soul and shows the way to get rid of them. So, the philosophy is called a 'Divine Eye . ENSEN M This book will also prove a Divine Eye for you.