Source Book in Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 001263
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Devendramuni
Publisher: Tarak Guru Jain Granthalay
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 590
Language: English
Classification: Book_English & Philosophy
File Size: 10 MB

Page 398

A SOURCE-BOOK IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
377
karmas are destroyed simultaneously. When there is no succession of time in the destruction of jñānāvarniya and darśanāvarṇīya karmas there is no possibility of the successive presentation of the kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana. They have to be presented simultaneously. And also because there is no distinction in the upayoga, although upayoga expresses itself in the anākāra and sākāra forms. In the case of the kevalin state there is no distinction between darśana and jñāna. And to consider darśana and jñāna as distinct would raise some other difficulties. If the kevalin is to know everything at one moment of experience, then for all times he will be knowing everything. In that case, his knowiedge would not be perfect because he would go on knowing and experiencing. In that case, how can it be omniscient. But in the case of omniscience, knowledge and experience are perfect and one. And there would we no distinction between jñāna and darsana. Jñāna is determinate (savikalpa) and darśana is indeterminate (nirvikalpa). This kind of distinction between the determinate and indeterminate cognition is not be found when the kārmic matter obscuring knowledge and intuition are destroyed.2 As long as there is perfect, not but imperfect expression of upayoga there would be distinction between determinate and indeterminate cognition. But when upayoga is perfectly and fully expressed, there would be no distinction of this type. One more difficulty would be that darśana (intuition) would be without the element of jñāna. But in the case of jñāna, the element of darśana is involved.3 In the case of the kevalin when be gets omniscient knowledge, then darśana again would not be possible because darśana is not involved with jñāna although jñāna involves darśana. Therefore, the successive cognition of darśana and jñāna in the case of the perfect knowledge would not be possible. The Digambara tradition accepts the simultaneous cognition of darśana and jñāna. But in the Svetāmbara tradition there are three streams of thought : (a) successive cognition of the two, (b) simultaneous cognition and (c) non-difference of darśana and
1 2 3
Sanmati prakarana 2, 10 Sanmati prakarana 2, 11. Ibid. 2; 22.