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It is fe in the EYRI. Had it not been 80, the inference would not have been justified.--"agi fasiqua sa va 4: get räcalenta queengeza9-2019 ORTAzaha fina "-Panjikā.
pl. 4. 7. &langar att &c.The fantou here meant is each P.15 1.10art, that is, the differentiatiog term is the definition of 92%.
Thus, 'afaa uff' (N. Pr.) excludes the ta which is ofte
and is therefore पक्षाभास. II. 11-12. प्रसिद्धविशेषणविशिष्टतया &c-विशिष्ट that is विशेष्य should be also प्रसिद्ध
(Would it not be better to read searahor in l. 12. ?). Thus, we have three cases all of which have been explained in the Pafijikā by means of illustrations : (1) auftragene. 9. EGR are sfat ana nafa; for, the Buddhist
__denies the existence of आत्मन् though not of चैतन्य. (2) salasiq e.g. aur niej sfa faarit rez sla; for the Sāmkhya
(better to say, the Mimāmsaka ) denies the faaligte of ra,
though not ts itself. (3) arhaat (both-Pase and fastant) e. g. diar ale afat
सुखादिसमवायिकारणमात्मेति; for the Buddhist denies both the existence of आत्मन् and its character of being the समवायिकारण
of ga, gan etc. (Paõjikā 44 & ). RI... AT F -&c. '1997' is there to make it possible for P.15 1 12 अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्त to be brought within the scope of Inference. 'स्वयम् '
etc. " i. e. arrear "--the get" aFiRET ENTRIE.” f141. Fufiunt &c.-(1) Aal -the siddhānta or thesis which P. 44.b. is accepted by all schools of thought. Thus, all agree that there
are certain ATMB, such as 1874, by which certain things can be proved, 6.9. water is a liquid etc. (2) aantal pathe siddhāpts of each school, which others refuse to accept. For example, the Sāmkhyas bold that all is eternal, the Buddhists that all is non-eternal, and the Jainas that all in both eternal and non-eternal, which are thus the safegna of each of these schools, and not a halhere, that is, one accepted by all. (3) otagi the basic siddhānta which when proved carries
