Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 20

Vol. II-1996
Nyāyāvatāra....
verse nos. to exclude the mangala verse, then the nos. 2-3 can be rendered as follows, as in my own rendition of the initial verse section by Dignāga from the Tibetan version':
Nor are authorised (pramana) those like memory, and so forth, that repeatedly cognize and reduce to an endless series (anavasthā-prasanga). Direct perception is free from constructive thought (kalpanā) which adds a name, class, etc. (1,2). Its name (namely 'pratyakşa' = direct[ed] perception') is called by a sense organ (aksa) because of the unshared causes (namely prati = 'each one'). A factual base (dharmin) for multiple natures can in no case be understood from a (single)
sense organ. (1.3). Assuming that I have above the right verses from Dignāga's PS, I have reservations about whether N. A. 28 is really refuting Dignāga. On the surface, it seems so. When this verse states, "The result of pramana in the direct vision sense [= pratyaksa) is the warding off of ignorance", this is an other worldly aim that differs from the Dignāga system which argues in a mundane manner. Indeed, the N. A. 28 employs the term pramāņa in an instrumental sense, as does certain Brahmanical systems. Dignāga employs the term pramāņa in a resultative sense—the result of prameya (which I render 'sanction'). Now, when scholars or pandits employ the basic words in different, even opposite meanings, the real argument is over the use of those words. The N. A. verse 28 and Dignāga's verses I, 2-3 are really talking at 'cross-purposes'-as though to different audiences. Indeed, each of the systems of Indian philosophy has certain important terms which are employed in senses different from how those words are used in other systems or in general Indian literature. The Jainas are no exception to this practice of employing certain terms in special meanings. One could fault Dignāga if he deliberately used the term pramāņa in a resultative way in defiance of the standard usage; but, as I myself pointed out, the medieval lexicons when defining the head word Pramāna, have a number of definitions of instrumental value, thus agreeing with the instrumental use of the term, as well as definitions of resultative value, thus agreeing with the resultative use of pramāņa. For example, one of the instrumental definitions is śāstra, a technical treatise-an instrument of information; and one of the resultative definitions is maryādā, a boundary, or limitation, evidently related to pramāņa's root 'to measure'; and a boundary is clearly the result of measuring. Hence, Dignāga does not have to argue for his use of the term pramāna, any more than his rivals have to argue for their use of it. But clearly, when authors compose verses in the field of logic, employing the term pramāņa in an instrumental fashion, the verse comes out looking quite different than when