Nirgrantha-2

Author(s): M A Dhaky, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

Page 19

Alex Wayman
Nirgrantha
for others'. That is why in the Dignāga-Dharmakirti system 'inference for oneself' must precede 'inference for others'. Dignāga was probably not the first one to make such a division and in that order, but he should be given credit for making this division and with the necessary logical qualifications. Now the Nyāyāvatāra, k. 10, indicates its way of discriminating the two kinds of inference :
svaniscayavād-anyeşāṁ niscayotpādanam budhaiḥ parārtham mānam ādhyātam vākyam tad-upacärataḥ 11 Like the conviction in oneself, the arousal of conviction in others, is called by the wise the standard for others, and
that assertion, in the sense of a metaphorical transfer. We notice the agreement with Dignāga that 'inference for oneself 'should precede ‘inference for others'. However, the verse's metaphorical attribution (upacara) to 'inference for others' seems to be a failed attempt to appear 'sparkling and so at least the composition of this verse agrees with Dhaky's somewhat negative evaluation of this N. A. as a work of Jaina literature. We pass the N. A. k. 13 :
Sādhyāvinābhuvo hetor-vaco yat pratipadakam parārtham-anumānam tat pakşādivacanātmakam || A demonstrative statement of a reason that applies to the thesis and which mentions first the locus (paksa)-is
Inference for others. Here the N. A. does better. This minimal statement—by avoiding explicit mention of an external example-agrees with 'inner pervasion'. And it specifically mentions the paksa, going on in N. A. 14 and 15 to insist upon it as essential. So far the N. A. does not disagree with Dignāga. Let us go to N. A. k. 28, which, as a literal statement, disagrees with Dignāga (here, my own translation) :
Pramāṇasya phalam sākṣād-ajñānavinivartanam kevalasya sukhopekşe śesasyädānahānadhīh || The result of pramāņa in the direct vision sense is the warding off of ignorance. Bliss and equanimity are the (result of the) kevala (absolute kind). The cognition of accepting and rejecting is the (result of the) remainder (conventional kind).
In Dhaky's article this verse is held to refute k. 1.23 of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. I take this number k. 1.23 to be a printer's mistake for k. 1.2-38. If we take the
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