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Vol. XXXV, 2012
Concept of Anumana In Jainism
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of the debate, but should not be taken as a part of the sādhaka-vyakhyā by which the inferential cognition can be drown. 1. But Jaina believe that these steps are necessary for a beginner, for those
who are not convergent with technicality of logical tradition. 2. It should be remembered that the reference of ten numbered syllogism
were found in the Jaina text, which were composed far before the development of logic.
That is why, in later logical texts like, Nyayavatara, Pramanyakamala martanda, Pramānaya tattvālankāra, Pramānamimansā, Syādvādmanjari etc. we have the presentation of five-membered syllogism.
“In conclusion it may be mentioned that the Jaina philosophers adopted a practical approach to the problem keeping in uniformity with their nonabsolutist standpoint. Thus, the number of avayava depends on the caliber of the person to whom it is addressed. Accordingly it may be ten or five or three or two or even one. None of the alternatives is to be rejected.” (p.102)
As a matter of fact, the Janias are of the view that the number of steps in a proposition cannot be fixed as it depends entirely on the level of competence of the heare. Manikyanandi recognizes pratijñā and hetu as the minimum essential steps, but he concedes that other steps may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers. Hemachandra is also of the same view. Vadideva's view, however, is somewhat different. He accepts, like the Buddists, one step for the particular type of hearers and two, three, four, and five for other general hearers. But Patrasvamin's view is more important in this respect as he does not go beyond the two steps of Pratijñā and Hetu.
Thus some Jaina believe in only two - Pratijñā (proposition) and Hetu (middle term-reason). They urge in support of this theory that without accepting the pratijñā or paksa what is the use of the hetu, and for what would it be utilized Hence, they say the Udaharana is necessary and deny that Upanaya and Nigamana are conclusive factors. (Shukla, P - 242-243) For instance: (1) there is a fire on the mountain (paksa). (2) since there is smoke (hetu).
The above view of the Jainas is recorded in Buddhist literature. Both Dharmakirti and Santaraksita criticised this theory. Dharmakirti examines the Jain propositions with the following example:
