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The Problems of Ethics and Karma
illustrations by way of explaining as to how a good karma yields a good fruit an evil karma an evil fruit. Besides, here there are also other stray references to good karmas by the side of evil ones 20. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a good majority of the Bhagayant dialogues dealing with the karma-doctrine makes plainer sepse if the notion is set aside that there are good karmas by the side of evil ones. And in view of what we have above said about the probable origin of the Jaina karma-doctrine it should be normal to expect that originally it posited only evil karmas. Certainly, if it is kriya (meaning in a narrow sense an act of violence, in a broad sense ad evil act as such) that gives rise to karma karma must be something necessarily evil. Two striking examples should make it clear how the concept of karma as something necessarily evil makes for a better com. prehension of the relevant Bhagavatt passages. Thus we are told that a well-behaved monk reduces the number of the constituent-particles of his karmas, their intensity, their duration, their tightness while an evil-acting monk augments all these four;21 this statement is much easy to follow if it is presupposed that all karmas are necessarily evil. Similarly, we are told that a particular amount of experiencing of karmic fruit on the part of a hellish being annihilates a smaller number of karmas than the same on the part of a well-behaved monk;22 this statement too is much easy to follow if it is presupposed that all karmas are necessarily evil. Even the latter-day commentators tell us that in these statements the word 'karma' should stand for evil karma ; in all probability these statements originated at a period when the concept of good karma had not been posited at all. Perbaps, the concept of good karma was first posited in connection with a treatment of the ideal monk's conduct. For it seems to have been realized that since all actions give rise to karma the ideal monk's conduct too must give rise to karma. But the difficulty is that a worldly being's action gives rise to karmas which yield fruit at a more or less distant future while it is the very essence of a monk's being that he accumulates no karmas which might yield fruit in future ; so the thesis was propounded hat the karmas generated by an ideal monk's action are got rid of as soon Is they are generated. And since a worldly being's action giving rise to arma was technically called kriya an ideal monk's action giving rise to arma too was called kriya-though of a new type technically termed tryzathikt kriya, 28 This was certainly a radical amendment introduced in the loctrine of kriya ; for uptil now a kriya was understood to be necessarily
for a n evil act. Even so, the fact that no third type of kriya standing ordly being's good action--and supposed to generate good karmas-was osited tends to confirm the surmise that the concept of tryāpat hikr kriya as formulated at a time when the doctrine of kriya was yet open to mendment while the concept of good karma generated by a worldly being's Dod action was formulated at a later period when the doctrine of kriya
