Mahavira Jain Vidyalay Suvarna Mahotsav Granth Part 1

Author(s): Mahavir Jain Vidyalaya Mumbai
Publisher: Mahavir Jain Vidyalay

Page 466

JAINA AND SAMKHYA-YOGA THEORIES OF PARIŅĀMA : 5
Jaina. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Pariņāma. For him, all reality (Sat) has the characteristic of utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jiva and the Ajīva must possess this characteristic.
Next, the Sāmkhya regards the transforming Prakệti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Prakrti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Sāmkhya phraseology, called Tattväntara-Pariņāma; while the subsequent parināma is called Dharma-Laksana-Avastha Parināma. For the Jaina, it was not necessary to have Tattvāntara-Pariņāma because he starts with the five or six tattväntaras as fundamental and underived entities.
The Jaina is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jivas, he assumes four underived Ajīva categories, viz., Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the Parināmas of Jivas, all material phenomena from the Pariņāmas of Pudgala——consisting of infinite atoms; while Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa make possible the movement (gati), staticity (sthiti) and occupation (avagaha) respectively of Jiva and Pudgala.
As just said, the essential difference between the Sāmkhya and the Jaina lies in the fact that the principle of Pariņāma is not applied to Purusas by the Sāṁkhya, while the Jaina would apply it both to Jīvas and Ajīvas. From this difference ensue various differences of views between the Samkhya and the Jaina.
The denial of Parināma in the Puruşas has made it highly difficult for the Samkhya to relate them to the changing Praksti and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world-phenomena. In fact, Prakrti, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such Puruşas whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of Prakyti teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity with sentient beings.
Another consequence of this assumption is that jñāna, bhoga, bandha, mokşa, etc., which appear as of Puruşa, become really so many transformations of Prakrti. Puruşa is never bound and, therefore, has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of Prakyti. Thus, in Samkhya, truly speaking, bandha and mokşa, are the transformations of Prakrti.
The above difficulties do not confront the Jaina. The application of Pariņāma to Jivas enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., Jiva