Mahavira Jain Vidyalay Suvarna Mahotsav Granth Part 1

Author(s): Mahavir Jain Vidyalaya Mumbai
Publisher: Mahavir Jain Vidyalay

Page 548

NATURE OF TIME : 87
cessantly without the help of any other substance (time). Thus substances transform themselves by themselves into their respective modes. An independent Time substance is not required to assist other substances in their transformation or change.104
In fact, I see no logic in positing Time as an independent substance. We can account for all the concerned usages with the help of the modes of the five substances. The argument that the case of Time is on par with Dharma and Adharma is not sound. Dharma and Adharma are, of course, posited to account for motion and inertia respectively. But motion and inertia of a substance are not eternal. Sometimes we find a substance in motion and sometimes we find it at rest. This suggests that there must be some condition of motion and inertia over and above the substance itself. And hence the Jainas posited Dharma and Adharma as conditions or media of motion and inertia. Those who posit Time as an independent substance do so to account for mainly the minute changes. But according to the Jainas such changes are eternal-without beginning and end. Hence it is illogical to posit a causal condition to account for it. What is eternal-beginningless and endless-has no cause whatsoever. Again, the argument that without Time the order of the world could not be explained; that in its absence, the seed, the sprout and the fruit would emerge simultaneously--is also very weak. The order of the universe is firmly based on the principle of causality. Time is superfluous. The description of Time as atomic seems metaphorical. Each and every material atom could be called time-atom. And this very well explains the scriptural statements regarding the absence of its spatial extension (apraneši).105 The conception of time-atom is vitiated by many contingencies. If Time is accepted as an independent substance why is it not conceived as one continuous whole like Dharma, Adharma and Akāśa? Again, Time is posited to account for the minute changes in other substances, but what would account for the changes in Time substance itself ? If it be said that the modification of time-atom is natural and hence requires no other causal condition, the same logic should be applied to explain the modification of other substances. If some other auxiliary cause is posited to explain changes in time-atom, it would involve infinite regress. Hence, this view of an independent atomic Time substance seems to be very weak and unsound.
104 Darsana aur Cintana, pp. 331-332. 105 This point of criticism is found in the works of concerned
Svetāmbara thinkers. See Dravyānuyogatarkaņā, X. 18-19.