Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
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nothing requires to be said about the problem of anuyogadvāras; but remaining problems deserve special consideration.
The Problem of Mokşamārga, Samyagdarśana, Saptatattva in Tattvārtha :
Neither Bhagavati nor Prajñāpanā raises the problem of mokşa-mārga in the way it is done in Tattvārthasūtra-that is, neither of these texts asks whether faith, knowledge or conduct, or any two of these factors, or the three of them taken together lead to mokşa. True, there is one passage in Bhagavati (and reference to it is made in another place) where it is asked whether one can attain mokșa with the help of moral conduct and asceticism alone and the answer forthcoming is that one must also become omniscient before one attains mokşa.14 This is the nearest approach to the Tattvärtha way of posing the question but it too is obviously distinct from the latter15. More generally, it is from the difficult accounts of Kevali given in Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā that we have to surmise as to what sort of personality one ought to become if one is to attain mokşa. And the most distinguishing feature of such a personality is a complete freedom from all passion-resulting in a complete freedom from all ignorance and a complete freedom from all incapacity. As for right faith and right cognition--i, e, samyagdarśana and samyagjñāna-being two constituents of mokşa-mārga it is never explicitly emphasised but is always implicitly taken for granted. For right faith means faith in the correctness of the Jaina teaching - while right cognition means cognition of this teaching, and certainly one cannot put into practice the teaching in question (and hence attain mokşa) unless one already possess right faith and right cognition thus under-- stood. Similarly, neither Bhagavati nor Prajñāpanā describes the content of samyagdarśana in the way it is done in Tattvārtha—that is, neither of these texts maintains that samyagdarśana means faith in the reality of seven entities, viz. jīva, ajīva, āstava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā and mokșa, Bhagavati does say in a general way that truth is what the Jinas have taught (tam saccam jam jinehin paveiyam 18 while the faithful is often described (and not in Bhagavati alone) as one possessing the knowledge of loka, aloka, jiva, ajiva, papa, punya, üsrava, samvara, vedana, nirjarā, bandha, mokşa. But neither the doctrine of nine tattvas (as described in Uttaradhyayana) nor the doctrine of seven tattvas (as described in Tattvārtha) is an established or basic doctrine of any of the genuinely old Āgamic texts. 17 It is true that āstava-samvara and vedana-nirjarā are two most crucial concept-couples of the Karma doctrine and as such they are further dealt with in Bhagavati, though not in Prajñāpanā but that is a different matter. What is noteworthy is that the tradition of saying either that the nine tattvas of Uttaradhyayana are the nine basic reals or that the seven basic tattvas of Tattvārtha are the seven basic reals is not very old. The problem of pramāna and that of naya are a bit more complex and let us take them one by one.