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JAINA ONTOLOGY
transience, generality and particularity, etc. etc., that is, to developing an aspect of the doctrine of Anekantavada. Then there are certain ontological discussions in connection with the question as to how knowledge is related to the knowing subject on the one hand and object known on the other; in the same context are taken up questions concerning the make-up of sense-organs and concerning their mode of operation, also the question concerning the possibility or otherwise of the omniscience. Lastly, there has been a consideration of the question as to whether physical things which are alleged to be the object of knowledge do really exist; (it is a subjective idealist contention, opposed by the Jainas, that physical things do not exist).
(iii) By a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views is to be understood a defence of the Agamic philosophical views undertaken by the authors belonging to the age of Logic. In their connection we will have to neglect the authors who only commented on the old Āgamic texts, though even such authors are not entirely free from the influence exerted by the dominant tendencies of the age of Logic. To be sure, even the doctrines of naya and nikşe pa (in some sense even the doctrine of saptabhangi) are old Āgamic doctrines but in view of the special importance attached to t they have to be treated separately; similarly, a good part of the doctrine of pramāņas is of an Agamic origin and yet has to be treated separately on account of its special importance. For the rest the discussions aimed at defending the old Agamic views lie scattered in the texts of the age of Logic and do not constitute a much important part thereof.
(iv) Since texts belonging to the age of Logic are in most cases devoted either to a vindication of the doctrine of Anekāntaväda or to a development of the doctrine of pramānas or to a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views it is in these very three contexts that they also undertake a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophtcal views. Very rarely has such an evaluation been undertaken in a context of some other type.
These preliminary remarks should serve to introduce the following analysis of the texts of the age of Logic; these are being taken up stagewise and authorwise (as was also earlier done when the content of these texts was subjected to a summary consideration).
II THE FIRST STAGE (A) SIDDHASENA
(i) Anekāntavāda The problems of Anekantavada have been discussed by Siddhasena in the first and third chapters of Sanmati. Interesting is his general definition of naya, for he says, there are as many views of the form of nayas as there
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