Jaina Ontology

Author(s): K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001565/1

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JAINA ONTOLOGY

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Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series
General Editor : Dalsukh Malvania
No. 31
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Dr. K. K. Dixit, M. A., Ph. D. Research Officer, L. D. Institute of Indology
AHMEDABAD-9
RI
BONGO:
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY
AHMEDABAD-9
1971

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Printed by Svami Tribhuvandas, Ramananda Printing Press, Kankaria Road, Ahmedabad and Published by Dulsukh Malvania, Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, AHMEDABAD-9
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FOREWORD
I am very happy to place before scholars Jaina Ontology' by Dr. K. K, Dixit. The work clearly and lucidly traces the development of Jaina concepts and views pertaining to not only ontology but epistemology also. Though the title of the work is Jaina Ontology', it occasionally deals with Jaina Epistemology as well because both are intimately related, and the treatment of one necessitates the treatment of the other too. Dr. Dixit has taken into account the works of both the sects, Svetāmbara and Digambara while tracing the history of various concepts. This is, thus, the first English work of its kind. It covers the period of time beginning with the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavatisūtra (5th-2nd centuries B. C.) and ending with Up. Yašovi. jaya (17th-18th centuries A. D.). In the course of his discussion the auther takes important Svetambara and Digambara texts one by one in their chronological order, analyses their contents and pinpoints their special features, methodological as well as doctrinal. He never loses the historical perspective. This work is really a good history of Jaina thought. I congratulate Dr. Dixit on his masterly analytical study of the history of Jaina thought.
I hope that this publication will be of very great value for the students of Indian culture, in general, and of Jainology, in particular,
L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-9 26th January 1971
Dalsukh Malvania
Director

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PREFACE
The following essay is devoted to a historical treatment of the Jaina speculations pertaining to the field of ontology. And what has been achieved does not deserve to be called anything more than an outline. For the topic as such is truly stupendous. Certainly the Jainas have a very old tradition of treating philosophical problems, preserved in a large number of texts - more or less important and more or less early - composed in Prakrit or Sanskrit. And the additional stumbling block in this connection is the unfortunate fact that the texts called Agamas which the present-day Svetāmbaras regard as most authoritative are dismissed as spurious by the present-day Digambaras. The truth seems to lie somewhere in between these two versions of the case. For these texts contain some of the oldest pieces of doctrinal discussions undertaken by the Jaina theoreticians and yet they are more or less replete with more or less late interpolations. Under such circumstances the task of a scientific research work is to separate out the material that is genuinely old from that which is not so. And here lies the rub. For barring insignificant exceptions the Āgamic texts as they now stand are composed in a language that is almost uniformly the same and this means that it is next to impossible to determine on the basis of linguistic peculiarities, the antiquity or otherwise of this or that from among them (and hence of the doctrines formu)ated therein). So, what remains to be done is to study the antiquity or otherwise of the concerned doctrines themselves and thence of the texts formulating these doctrines). In the present study it is this method that has been chiefly employed while tracing the historical evolution of the Jaina notions related to ontology. But this method has its own difficulties and possible pitfalls. For one thing, one applying this method must have an adequate acquaintance with the content of the standard form of the doctrine whose historical evolution one is out to delineate; then one must be in a position to convincingly argue out why a particular version of this doctrine ought to be earlier (or later) than another. I am keenly aware of my deficiencies on both these counts, particularly the first which is basic. As a matter of fact, it is precisely this why I have been able to achieve so little inspite of my best efforts. This much about the Āgamic texts. The difficulty remains essentially the same also in the case of non-Agamic texts - particularly the earlier ones; for here too the relevant chronology is a matter of heavy dispute. My own participation in this dispute has been rather implicit inasmuch as I have simply sought to ascertain as to what position the texts in question occupy vis-a-vis doctrinal evolution. In some cases this has meant taking sides in controversy as to chronological question, in some

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cases not. For example, I must concede that Kundakunda came after Umasvāti, and Samantabhadra not much before Akalanka (most probably after Mallavādı) but I need not decide whether Haribhadra or Akalanka came first — though it is certain that not much space of time separate the two. In the case of authors coming after Haribhadra and Akalanka there is no dispute at least as to the relative chronology and the fact has facilitated my task a lot. For now the reader has only to judge whether I have been able to make a correct assessment of the specific contribution made by this or that from among the authors in question towards the enrichment of the contents of Jaina philosophy. But then these authors wrote in Sanskrit and in the very mature style that was now commonly current among the Brahmins, Buddhists as well as Jainas. And to evaluate a Sanskrit text written in such a style is not after all easy. However, in this connection I have been helped in no small measure by certain Jaina texts on Logic edited and provided with illuminating Hindi introduction, notes, etc. by Pt. Sukhlalji, Pt, Dalsukhbhai Malvania and Pt. Mahendrakumar Shastry. To tell the truth, it is the editions of these texts that have introduced me not only to the world of Jaina philosophy but to the world of Indian philosophy in general. For before coming across them mine was the plight of a 'babe in the woods'. Of course, these teachers of mine are in no way responsible for the mistakes I might have committed in following the meaning of a Sanskrit text or for the interpretations that are my own novelties - may be my oddities. But I owe them graitude for what they have given me. Then let me acknowledge that even in the task of comprehending Agamic texts I have been much helped by Pt. Dalsukh Malvania's Gujarati version of Sthanānga and Samaväyānga Sūtras, a version which in fact is a total reworking of these texts from the standpoint of the needs of a modern reader. But here another very solid source of enlightenment has been Walter Schubring's Die Lehre der Jainas” which contains a masterly topicwise analysis of the contents of Āgamic texts. Lastly I must mention Frauwallner's two volumes “Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie" whose historical treatment of philosophical systems has been alınost a model for me. Frauwallner honestly admits that his chapters on Jaina philosophy are based on no much independent study but that is a different matter -- for what has proved so illuminating for me is the way he has traced the historical evolution of the Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophical speculation; (Frauwallner has yet to complete his projected four-volume history of Indian philosophy but his method in all its clarity is there to be met with in the volumes already published).
In order to be able to follow these pages one need not have a very thorough grounding in the Jaina philosophical literature but it will be better if one knows something more than what the chapter on Jainism in a

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current text books on Indian philosophy offers. The best thing will be to master the contents of the following five books of which the first three will help one in understanding the part devoted to the age of Āgamas, the last two in understanding that devoted to the Age of Logic. (i) Tattvarthasūtra of Umäsvāti (English translation by Jaini) Chapters
L-V and VIII (ii) The Doctrine of Jainas by Schubring (Translated from German)
Chapters III-V (iii) The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy (Translated from
German) by Glasenapp (iv) Syadvadamañjari of Mallisena (English translation by Thomas) (v Pramanamimāṁsā of Hemacandra (English translation by Mookherji
and Tatia)
D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad-9 15 th August 1970
K. K. Dixit

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Pages
1. The need for a Historical Perspective and Stages in the Evolution of Jaina Philosophical Speculation
1-11
1
1.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY
Three Attitudes towards the Agamic Texts Sub-grouping of the Agamic Texts and the possible line of their composition Subject-matter of the Agamic Texts and the philosophically important among them
Umāsvāti on Mokṣamarga, Samyagdarsana
and Saptatattva
Umāsvati on Anuyogadvāra, Naya, Pramāṇa Umäsvati on Jiva (and Karma)
Umasvati on Pañcastikāya, Pudgala, and Satsāmānya Periodwise classification of the philosophically important Agamic Texts
The Age of Agamas contrasted to the Age of Logic Chief Activities of the Age of Logic
The Modern Age
...
CHAPTER II
THE AGE OF AGAMAS
Its General Characteristics and its Three Stages Need for a historical approach towards the Agamic
material
...
Three stages chiefly determined on the basis of stylistic peculiarities

...
:

:
Gradual evolution of the various Anuyogadvāra lists, particularly Margaṇāsthānas, Jivasthānas, Guṇasthānas Seeds of the eight Anuyogadvaras Sat, Sankhyā, Kṣetra etc. in Prañapana...
⠀⠀⠀⠀
The contents of Prajñāpanā
The net content of the Bhagavatī list of 23 Anuyogadvaras and the corresponding passages of Tattvarthasutra The problem of Mokṣamarga, Saptatattva in Tattvartha Evolution of the content of Pramana Relative recency of the treatment of Naya, Nikṣepa and Saptabhangi
...
ཤ ཤཱ་༆ཏུ༞་གླུ་ཋ ཋ
8-9
9-10
12-87 12-31
12-13
13-14
14-16
16-17 17-18
18-21
21 22-24
24-27

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Evolution of the treatment of Paticăstikāya ... Relative recency of the treatment of Satsāmānya Evolution of the treatment of Karma Conclusion : the general subject-matter of the Āgamic
texts and absolute chronology of the Age of Āgamas ...
27-28 28-29
30
30-31
31-40
31 31-39 31-33
33 34-35 35-36 36-38
38 38-39
39 39-40
41-65
2. The First stage
Introductory (A) Bhagavatisütra
Introductory (i) Loka-aloka (ii) Pancāstikāya.cum-Kāla (iii) Pudgala (iv) Jiva ( v ) Karma (vi) Reality in general
Conclusion (B) Ācārāngasūtra (C) Dasavaikālikasūtra
(D) Sūtrakstāngasūtra 3. The second stage
Introductory (A) Prajnapanasutra
Introductory (i) Loka-aloka (ii) Pancāstikaya-cum-Samaya (iii) Pudgala (iv) Jiva
(1) General (2) Bodily Activities (3) Cognitive Activities (4) Emotive Activities (5) Conative Activities
(6) Affective Activities (v) Karma
(vi) Reality in General (B) Jivājivabhigamasutra (C) Uttarādhyayanasūtra (D) Rājaprašniyasūtra
41-62
41 41-42 42-43 43_50 50-59 50-53 54-56 56-57 57-58 58-59
59
59-61 61-62 62-63 63-64 64-65

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65-87 65-66 66–73 73–75 75-78 78-83 83-87
4. The third stage
Introductory (A) Anuyogadvārasūtra (B) Nandisātra (C) Āvašyakaniryukti (D) Satkhaņdāgama (and Kaşāyaprabhịta) (E) Tattvārt hasūtra (sabhāșya)...
CHAPTER III
THE AGE OF LOGIC 1. Its General Characteristics and its Stages
General introduction Siddhasena Mallavādi Jinabhadra Kundakunda Samantabhadra Concluding remarks about the first stage Haribhadra Akalanka Vidyānanda Prabhācandra Abhayadeva Vadideva Yašovijaya
General conclusion 2. The first stage (A) Siddhasena
(i) Anekāntavada
(ii) Pramāna (B) Mallavādi (i) General evaluation of the non-Jaina Philoso
phical views (C) Jinabhadra
(i) Anekāntavāda (ii) Pramāņa (iii) Defence of the traditional Jaina Philosophical
views (iv) General evaluation of the non-Jaina Philoso
phical views (D) Kundakunda (i) Desence of the traditional Jaina Philosuphical
views (ii) Anekantavāda
:::::::::::::::::
88-164 88-110 88-89 89-92 92-93 93-94 95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-100 101-102 102-103 103-104 104-105 105-106 106-110 110-139 110-114 110-113 113-114 114-122
114-122 122-132 122-126 127
128-129
129-132 132-135
132-134 134-135

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135-139 135-139 139-155 139-142 139-142
142 142-147
142-143 143-145 145-146
:
146-147 147-155
147-151 151-153
153
(E) Samantabhadra
(i) Anekantavāda 3. The second stage (A) Haribhadra
(i) Anekantavada (ii) General evaluation of the non-Jajna Philoso
phical views (B) Akalanka (i) Defence of the traditional Jaina Philosophical
views (ii) Anekāntavada (iii) Pramāņa (iv) General evaluation of the non-Jaina Philoso- ...
cal views (C) Vidyānanda (i) Defence of the traditional Jaina Pbilosophical
views (ii) Anekantavada (iii) Pramāņa (iv) General evaluation of the non-Jaina Philoso
phical views 4. The third stage
(A) Prabhācandra (B) Abhayadeva (C) Vadideva
(D) Yašovijaya Appendix I
A note on Sthānanga and Samavāyāngasūtra ... Appendix II
A note on the Āgamic activity carried on in the Age
of Logic Appendix III.
The Logic of Anekantavāda, its application and a
parallel with Hegel Annotations Index I
Works, Authors, etc Index II
Sanskrit and Prakrit Terms Index III
General subjects
154-155 155-164 155-157 157-158 158-160 190-164
165-666
167
168-171 173-181
183-186
187-197
198-203

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akalarkagranthat raya, Singhi Jaina Series, Bombay Anekānta jayapatākā, Gaekwar Oriental Series, Baroda Anekantavyavasthāprakarna, Jaina Granth Prakashaka Sabha, Ahmedabad Antakrddašā, Aga modaya Samiti, Bambay & Mehesana, 1920 Anuttaraupapātikadaša Agamodaya Samiti, Bambay & Mehesana, 1920 Anuyogadvāra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1924 Aptamīmāmsā, See Astasahasri Aştašati, See Aştasahasri Astasahasri, Nirnayasagar, Bombay Avasyakasutra, Rishabhdeo Kesharimal, Ratlam, 1992 (v. s.) Āvašyakaniryukti, Vijayadansuri Jain Series, Surat, 1939-41 Aupapātika, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1916 Bhagavatisūtra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana,1918-21 Bhaktaparijñā (Included in Dašprakirņaka) Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay &
Mehesana, 1927 Candraprajñapti, Identical with Suryaprajñapti Catuḥsarana, Devchand Lalbhai Series, Bombay, 1922 Dasāšruta, Manivijaygani Series, Bhavnagar, 2011 (v. s.) Dašavaikālika, Devchand Lalbhai Series, Bombay, 1918 Dhavala, See Sakhandāgama Gañadharavāda, Gujarat Vidya Sabha, Ahmedabad Ganividyā, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1927 Gommatasara, J. L. Jaini Memorial Series, Lucknow Jambudvipaprajñapti, Devchand Dalbhai Series, Bombay, 1920 Jitakalpa, Babalchand Keshavlal Modi, Ahmedabad, 1998 (v. s.) Jivājīvābhigama, Devchand Lalbhai, Bombay, 1919 Jñanabindu, Singhi Jain Series. Bombay Jñātrdharma kathā, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1980 Jayadhavala, See Kaşāyapāhuda Kalpasūtra, Jain Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar, 1919 Karmagrantha (Devendrasūri) Jain Atmanand Sabha, Bhavnagar, 1934 Kaşayaprabhịta, Bharatiya Digambar Jain Sangh, Mathura, 1944-1967 Laghīyastraya, See Akalankagranthatraya Mülācāra, Manikyachandra Jain Granthamala, Bombay, 1977 (v. s.) Nandi, Agamodya Samiti, Bombay, 1924 Nayacakra (1) Labdhisurisvara Jain Granthamala, Chhani (Baroda); (2) Jain
Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar, 1966 Nayāmộtatarangiņi, See Nayopadesa

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12
Nayarahasya, Vijayanemisüri Granthamala, Botad, 2003 (v, s.) Nayopadesa. Vijaynemisüri Granthamala, Botad, 2008-12 (v. s.) Nihnavavada See Višeşāvašyakabhāsya Nyāyakumudacandra, Manikchandra Jain Granthamala, Bombay, 1938-41 Nyāyaviniscaya, Murtidevi Jain Granthamala, Bharatiya Jnanapeeth, Kashi,
1949-1954 Pancasangraha, Murtidevi Jaina Granthmala, Bharatiya Jnanapeeth, Kashi
1960 Pañcāstikāya, Raychandra Jaina Shastra mala, Bombay, 1972 (v. s.) Pariksämukha, See Prameyakamalamārtanda. Prajñāpanā, Āgamodaya Samiti Bombay, 1918-1919 Pramānanayatattvāloka, See Syādvādaratnakara Pramāṇasangraha, See Akalankagranthatraya Prameyakamalamārtanda, Nirnayasagara, Bombay, 1941 Prašnavyākarana, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1919 Pravacanasāra, Raychandra Jain Shastramala, Bombay Rājaprašniya, Gurjar Grantharatna Kāryālaya, Ahmedabad, 1994 (v. S.) Rājavārtika, Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala, Bharatiya Jnanapeeth, Kashi,
1953-1967 Samavāyāngasūtra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1918 Samayasāra, Varni Granthamala, Varanasi, 1969 Sanmati, Jnanoday Trust, Ahmedabad Sanmatițīkā, Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad Sarvadarsanasangraha, Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona Šāstravārtāsamuccaya, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1969 Sataka, See Karmagrantha Şatkhaņdāgama, Jaina Sahitya Uddharaka Fund Karyalaya, Vidisha,
1939–58 Siddhiviniscaya, Murtidevi Jain Garanthamala, Bharatiya Jnanapeeth, Kashi,
1944 Sthānāngasūtra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1918-20 Suryaprajñapti, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1919 Sūtrakstängasutra, (Ed. P. L. Vaidya), Poona 1928 Syādvādaratnākara, Arhatamataprabhakara, Poona Tarkabhāsā (Jaina), Singhi Jaipa Series, Bombay Tattvārthasūtra, See Tattvärthabhāsya Tattvārthasūtrabhāsya with Siddhasenagņin's Tikā, Devchand Lalbhai Pus.
takoddhara Fund Series, No. 67 & 76, Surat Upāsakadašā, Aga modaya Sawiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1920 Uttarādhyayana, Jivaraj Ghe labhai Doshi, Ahmedabad, 1935 Vipākasutra, Agamodaya Samiti, Bombay & Mehesana, 1920 Visesavašyakabhäsya, Yašovijaya Jaina Granthmala, Kashi,

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THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION
Three Attitudes towards the Agamic Texts :
Forty five texts collection called Agamas are treated as basic scriptures by a section of the Jaina community-to be precise by the icon-worshipping Svetambaras. On the other hand, the aniconist Svetambaras repudiate the authority of thirteen of these texts while the Digambaras that of the whole lot. These attitudes of these three very important sub-groups of the Jainas towards these very important texts are bound to be taken into consideration by any fair-minded student of Jainism-particularly in case the student also happens to be historically minded. Of course, whether these texts are at all important is itself a matter of dispute but the fact that they are so regarded by a considerable section of the Jainas creates a prima facie case in their favour. Let us therefore acquaint ourselves in some details with the text-mass in question and then judge how far the different sub-groups of the Jainas are justified in adopting towards it the attitude they do.
Sub-grouping of the Agamic Texts and the Possible line of their composition : The forty-five Agamic texts are sub-divided into six groups as follows:
I
II
III
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
(the texts are themselves in Prakrit but it is convenient to refer to them by their Sanskrit names and so there is no harm in resorting to Sanskrit rather than Prakrit while giving the general titles of the six groups in question).
I
II
III
J.O...1

11 Angas
12 Upangas
10 Prakirṇakas
The aniconist Svetambaras repudiate the authority of all the ten Prakirnakas, two Chedasutras and one Mulasūtra; besides, they give the title Mulasūtra to two of the remaining Mulasutras and to the two Culikasutras while making one remaining Mulasütra constitute a separate group. Thus according to them the thirty two Agamic texts are sub-divided into five groups as follows:
IV 6 Chedasūtras
V
4 Mulasutras
VI 2 Culikāsūtras;
11 Angas
12 Upangas
4 Chedasutras
IV
V
4 Mulasutras
1 Avasyakasūtra

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2
JAINA ONTOLOGY
However, the tradition of naming the forty five texts in question (or, for that matter, the thirty two texts in question) as the Agamic texts and sub-dividing them in the above manner is not much old. What seems to have happened is that sometimes near about the 15th-16th Centuries A.D. (may be still later) the intellectual leadership of the Svetambara Jainas took stock of the mass of scriptural literature available to them, selected from it forty-five texts and sub-divided them in the above manner; not much after. wards the aniconists among them thought fit to repudiate the authority of thirteen of these texts and to introduce a slight change in the original scheme of subdivision. As can be legitimately surmised the aniconists must have rejected those texts which to them appeared to support iconolatory, but from the point of view of the evolution of Jaina thought the texts rejected by them deserve as serious notice as those accepted by them. [The point remains essentially valid even if the texts in question were rejected on some other ground. For, this ground is not likely to be much weighty.] Of course, the texts rejected by them are not as important as those accepted by them, for they have taken good care to repudiate only such texts as are not of basic importance. But that is not the point. What is to be noted is that we here have before our eyes a case of dismissing historically important texts on rather flimsy grounds and the fact provides a clue to the understanding of the earlier Digambara repudiation of the whole lot of Agamic literature. For it is a legitimate surmise that sometimes near about the 6th -7th Century A.D. (may be still later) the Digambara repudiated the authority of the Agamic texts available to them on the alleged ground that most of them contained something or else that went against such beliefs of theirs as that a true monk must go stark naked, that a woman cannot attain mokşa, that an omniscient person takes no meals, and so on and so forth. This however is not to deny that even from the point of view of evolution of Jaina thought the forty-five Agamic texts constitute a mixed lot for they include on the one hand texts like Catuḥsarana and Bhaktaparijňa which were composed by an author blonging to the 11th Century A.D. and on the other hand texts like Acarang asutra-prathama śrutaskandha, Sutrakṛtängasūtra-prathamašrutas kandha and early portions of Bhagavatisūtra which are all of a genuinely hoary antiquity. But that again is not the point. For what is to be noted is that in overwhelming majority of cases the material here included belongs to a date earlier than the 6th-7th Centuries A.D. while in certain very important cases it belongs to the pre-Christian Centuries. Hence for reconstructing the history of Jaina thought for the pre-Christian Centuries the only documentary material now at our disposal are Agamic texts belonging to this period while for doing the same for the early Christian Centuries the Agamic texts belonging to the period constitute an important part of our documentary material-the other part being costituted by a number of non-Agamic Svetambara texts and by a few Digambara

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INTRODUCTORY
texts. Now it may be asked as to what difference it makes to a student of Jainism if he bases himself on a text belonging to this period rather than on one belonging to that. The idea is that Jaina thought has remained what it is since times immemorial and down to our own days, a thoroughly misconceived idea indeed. For Jaina thought, like all living organism, has, in the course of its growth, assimilated ever new material and discarded the waste. In view of its all-out importance for the historian of Jainism in general and for that of Jaina philosophy in particular the matter deserves a deeper probe. Subject-matter of the Agamic Texts and the philosophically important among them :
Both Svetāmbara and Digambara maintain that twelve Angas-viz. Ācārāngasūtra, Sūtrakrtāngasūtra etc.—are their earliest and the most basic scriptural texts but even Svetāmbaras concede that one of them—viz. Dřstivāda -has been lost (i. e. faded out of memory) long ago; (hence it is that above two catalogues of Āgamic texts mention eleven rather than twelve Angas). And even if there has been no unanimity about the number, names and classification of the remaining scriptural texts a common belief has been current that there are at least a few such ones and that they are to be called Angabahya (or Ananga pravişta) scriptural texts; (Umāsvāti even uses the word Upanga where Angabāhya is to be expected). As for the final Svetambara classification of the Angabahya scriptural texts into Upāngas, Prakirņakas, Chedasūtras, Mūlasūtras and Culikāsūtras it has some justification of its own. For the six Chedasūtras are texts devoted to the problems of monastic discipline, the four Mülasūtras texts meant to educate and edify the beginner, the two Cūlikāsūtras texts laying down in an elementary form the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy; (Āvasyakasūtra included among the Mülasūtras is in fact a class by itself inasmuch as it is a collection of six recitationformulas that accompany a Jaina's daily religious service). Similarly, the twelve Upāngas are miscellaneous texts of relatively major importance while the ten Prakrinakas are miscellaneous texts of relatively minor importance. From the point of view of chronology the oldest of all are four Chedasūtras-viz. Dasāšruta, Kalpa, Vyavahāra, Nišitha—and three Mūlasūtras- viz. Āvašyakasūtra, Dasavaikalikasutra and Uttaradhyayana while two Chedasūtraz—the Mahāpišitha and Jitakalpa, one Mülasūtra-viz. Pindaniryukti and two Cūlikāsūtras-viz. Anuyogadvāra and Nandi--are more or less recent. Similarly, the twelve Upāngas are relatively old while ten Prakırnakas are more or less recent. This means that the 34 Angabahya scriptural texts are to be studied from the point of view of subject-matter, chronology as well as importance, that is to say, they are not to be studied from the point of view of subject-matter alone-as might be suggested by their current sub-division into six groups. [There has also been a custom to see a one

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
by-one correspondence between the eleven Angas and twelve Upāngas but for this there is no justification whatsoever). Even then, the question of subject-matter has to be pursued still further. The Prakırnakas and the Mūlasutras (minus Avasyaka) are mostly of the nature of so many collections of ethical exhortations but there are exceptions ; for example, Tandulavaicārika deals with the problems of physiology, Ganividyā with those of astrology, while four chapters of Uttaradhyayana (viz. 28, 33, 34, 36) and one of Dasavaikālika (viz. 4) deal with the problems of philosophy. Of the Upāngas five (collectively called Nirayavalikā) are collections of didactic stories, Süryaprajñapti and Candraprajñapti (two nominally different but identically worded texts) deal with the problems of astronomy and related mythology, Jambūdvīpaprajñapti with those of cosmogony, mythology and astronomy, Jivājivābhigama with those of cosmogony, mythology and philosophy, Prajñāpanā with those of philosophy; the material collected in Aupapātika and Rājaprašniya is thoroughly miscellaneous--but the latter text contains an important philosophical dialogue. So to complete the account, let us also have a look at the subject matter of the eleven Angas. Here again five texts-viz. Jñatrdbarmakathā, Upăsakadašā, Antakrddasa, Anuttaraupapatikadaša, Vipakašruta-are collections of didactic stories, while Prašnavyakarana (suspected to be a post 6th Century AD, work) deals with the problems of ethics. Similarly, Ācārāngasūtra and Sūtrakstāngasūtra are mostly of the nature of two collections of ethical exhortations but the first Adhyayana of the former and occasional passages of the latter come out with philosophical formulas. Lastly, Bhagavatisātra on the one hand and Sthānāngasūtra and Samaväyängasutra on the other are meant to be an encyclopedea of Jaina thought--the former in the form of a collection of full-fledged dialogues where Mahāvīra is alleged to be the chief spokesman, the latter in the form of a number-wise cataloguing of all sorts of entities. On the basis of this much information it should be possible for a student of philosophy to pick out Āgamic texts that specially concern him ; they are the relevant portions of five Angas viz. Ācāränga, Sūtrakıtānga, Sthānānga, Samavāyānga and Bhagavati-, three Upāngas viz. Rājaprašniya Jivabhigama and Prajñāpanā, two Mūlasūtras viz. Dasavaikalıka and Uttaradhyayana, two Culikāsūtras viz. Anuyogadvāra and Nandi. But the material contained in these texts requires very careful handling if the results yielded are to be really worthwhile. And in this connection the greatest danger arise from the tendency to read into an earlier text positions that came to be formulated only in later times. The question is important and deserves an independent treatment.
Umāsyāti on Moksamärga, Samyagdarsana and Saptatattva :
The students of Jaina philosophy are accustomed to form their basic notions about the subject on the basis of a reading of Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra--particularly because the text happens to enjoy the support

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INTRODUCTORY
of both the Svetambaras and Digambaras. But the positions maintained in Tattvärthasūtra have a history which should never be lost sight of. Let us consider a few instances. Tattvarthasūtra begins with a declaration to the effect that samyagdarśana (right faith), samyagjñāna (right knowledge) and samyakcäritra (right conduct)--these three factors taken together constitute mokşa. Immediately afterwards, sumyagdarśana is defined as tatlvārthaśraddhāna (faith in veritable reals) and in this connection we are told that by tattva (verity) are meant seven entities, viz. jiva (soul), ajiva (not-soul), āsrava (karmic ingression), bandha (karmic bondage), sarvara (protection against karma), nirjara (expulsion of karma), mokşa. The tradition of so positing these questions is not very old. It was an old belief that in order to attain mokṣa one must become vitaraga (one devoid of passion) and also that a vitarāga necessarily becomes sarvajña (ompiscient); again it was an old belief that truth is what the Jinas (Jaina Masters) have declared it to be. All this contained seed of the doctrine that faith in the teaching of the Jaina Masters, knowledge of this teaching, and conduct in conformity to this teaching must lead to mokşa. But the precise formulation of this doctrine took place in the atmosphere where the Brahmanical philosophers like Sankhyas and Nyāya-Vaišeșikas were arguing that jñāna alone leads to mokṣa while the Buddhists were countering them by suggesting that avid yakşaya (cessation of nescience) and trşņākşaya (cessation of worldly desire) together do the same ; as if to outdo their Brahmanical and Buddhist rivals the Jainas came out with the position that not jñāna alone, not even jñāna and caritra together, but darśana, jnana and caritra lead to mokşa. Similarly, the seven concepts jiva, ajiva, assava, bandha, samrara, nirjarā and moksa were not unknown to the old Jaina theoreticians but the view that the knowledge of these seven is what is a constituent of Mokşamārga was certainly new. The old Jaina theoreticians used to talk in terms of couples like jiva-ajiva, bandha-mokşa, þunya-papa (virtue-vice), āstava-sanvara, vedana (karmic experience)-nirjarā, and this way they would explain the details of their doctrine of karmic bondage and mokşa. But the statement that asrava is the cause of bondha while saruara and nirjara the cause of mokşa was patterned after the Buddhist way of talking in terms of duḥkha (misery) and its cause, duhkhanirodha (cessation of misery) and its cause; that is, the Jaina position in question was something like a doctrine of 'five noble truths fitted against that Buddhist doctrine of four noble truths'. And the statement that these five factors together with jiva and ajīva constitute the seven entities whose knowledge leads to mokya was patterned after the Nyāyasūtra talk of twelve prameyas (knowables) whose knowledge was similarly supposed to lead to mokşa. Certainly, the twelve prameyas in question are amalgum of ontological and ethical categories as are Umāsvāti's seven tattvas--the significant difference between the two being that latter, unlike the former, are exhaustive. Of course, even the followers of Umāsvāti had to answer the question why his list omitted punya and papa and the question was

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
answered in various ways. But the simple fact is that the doctrine of nine tattvas, viz. Umāsvāti's seven tattvas plus punya and papa did in a relatively less adequate manner precisely the same thing as was done in a relatively more adequate manner by the doctrine of seven tattvas. As a matter of fact there was also a less adequate version of the doctrine of Mokşamārga, for there were people who would submit that not darśana, jñāna and caritra alone but they along with tapa (penance) constitute Mokşamārga. Both the doctrine of nine tattvas and the doctrine of quadruple Mokşamārga are maintained in the Uttaradhyayana chapter 28 which cannot be very old precisely because it broadly shares Umāsvāti's pattern of thinking and not on these two questions alone). Of course, Umāsvāti was not the originator of his pattern of thinking-though the possibility is not ruled out that the replacement of the doctrine of nine taltvas by that of seven was his contribution. What happened is that Umāsvāti belonged to an age in which the Jaina theoreticians were making new experiment in the field of methodology --if not also in that of thought-content. This becomes still inore clear when we examine the questions taken up by Umāsvati after those preliminary ones are disposed of. Umāsvātion Anuyogadvāra, Naya, Pramāņa :
In one aphorism Umāsvāti says that things (e. g. the seven tattvas) have to be posited by way nāma (name), sthapana (configuration), dravya (formative material) and bhāva (essential form), in the second that they have to be understood by means of pramāņas (instruments of valid cognition) and nayas (expressions of partial truths), in the third that they have to be understood in terms of nirdesa (reference), svāmitva (ownership), sādhana (instrument), adhikarana (location) sthiti (duration) and vidhāna (sub-classification), in the fourth that they have to be understood in terms of sat (being), sankhyā (number), kşetra (place), sparsa (field of touch), kāla (time), antara (interval), bhāva (mode) and alpabahutva (relative numerical strength); immediately afterwards he devotes twenty five aphorisms to a treatment of pramanas and two to that of nayas. Through all this Umāsvati poses three problems with which the Jaina theoreticians of his age were seeking to grapple, viz. the problem of anuyogadvāras (points of investigation), the problem of nayas, the problem of pramānas. The problem of anuyogadvāras was in essence the problem of formulating a definite series of questions that can be readily made use of in connection with all sorts of investigations. The Jaina theoreticians must have become aware of this problem as a result of their experience in the field of investigating matters, for they must have noted that the questions they posed in connection with one investigation had a tendency to recur in connection with other investigations. Evidences are available to the effect that all the three lists of anu yogadvāras drawn up by Umāsvāti were actually in use in his times the list containing năma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhāva was most popular and had even a special name viz. Niksepa given to it), but what is noteworthy is that none

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INTRODUCTORY
--not even that of niksepas-was in use in olden times. Again, the problem of nayas was in essence the problem of classifying partial truths and this too was a problem that came to exercise the Jaina mind in Umāsväti's times. Umāsvāti speaks of seven nayas and the contemporary literature is full of references to them, but what is noteworthy is that none was known in olden times. Lastly the problem of pramāṇns was the problem of presenting a Jaina counterpart to the lists of pramānos that were being adduced on one hand by the Brahmanical philosophers like Sankhya, Vaiseșika, Naiyāyika, Mimāṁsaka and on the other by the Buddhists. In this connection Umäsväti came out with the suggestion that the traditional Jaina list of five jñānas (types of valid determinate cognition) was but a list of five pramānas. This was simply a case of giving a new name to an olá thing, but Umāsvāti did something else as well. For making use of a terminology current in the contemporary logician circles--but one unknown to the old Jainas-he maintained that mati and śruta are the paroksa type of pramānas while avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala are the pratyakşa type. Even more radical departure from the traditional view of the matter was evinced by later Jaina logicians but we are not yet concerned with that ; for just now we are interested in assessing the extent of Umāsvāti's departure from the traditional view. To sum up, the problem of anuyogadvāras and the problem of nayas were altogether new to the age of Umāsvāti while the problem of pramānas was new to his age in the form in which he presented it. But there are yet problems which Umāvsati raises and which are new to his age. Umāsvāti on Jiva (and Karma):
The second chapter of Tattvārthasūtra is devoted to an account of soul and much that is said on the subject is old stuff. But the chapter begins with a classification of the qualities of soul made in terms of the technica. lities of the karma doctrine and most of these were unknown in olden times. The eighth chapter of Tattvārtha is exclusively devoted to the karma doctrine but in that chapter Umāsvāti does not raise so many complex problems which the karma specialists of his times were raising and which were un known in olden times. So, in order to estimate the new contributions made in this field by Umāsvāti's age we will have to depend on other works which are certainly there with us. But the early aphorisms of the second chapter of Tattvārtbasūtra are clearly indicative of certain new elements introduced in this connection by Umāsvāti's age.
Umāsvāti on Pancāstikāya, Pudgala, and Satsāmānya :
Lastly let us mention the fifth chapter of Tattvārthasūtra wherein occurs an account of the five pañcâstikāyas (basic reals) in general and that of the ajīvāsti kayas (basic reals of the non-soul type) in particular (the jivāstikaya - basic real in the form of soul having been specially treated in the second chapter). This account too on the whole follows traditional lines but towards the end of the chapter

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
a rather new problem is introduced -- viz. the problem of a general definition of the real. This problem was unknown in olden times and was one which specially occurred to the Jainas as a result of watching the Buddhist-vs.Brahmin duel on the question. Umāsvāti's definition of the real viz. ut pada-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktar sat (the real is possessed of origination, destruction as well as permanence) is extremely famous but let us not forget that an extensive elaboration of the definition came from the Jainas of post-Umāsvāti age and that in Umāsvāti's age itself the idea lying at the basis of this definition was rather new to the Jaina mind, 1
Periodwise classification of the philosophically important Agamic texts :
The above way of looking at Umāsvāti's problems would certainly have made little sense had we not at our disposal certain Agamic texts that are genuinely old. As a matter of fact, it is precisely because these texts exhibit no acquaintance with the specific atmosphere of Umāsvāti's age that they are to be treated as genuinely old. For the criteria of language, style, etc. --So useful elsewhere--are not of much avail in this case. We had earlier enume. rated the Āgamic texts which contain portions that are of philosophical importance. Now let it be noted that just two of them viz. Anuyoga and Nandi belong to Umāsväti's age. This in turn means that the follwing texts contain the oldest Jaina treatment of philosophical problems :
1. Ācārāngasūtra
6. Rājaprašniyasūtra 2. Sūtrakṛtāngasūtra
7. Jivājivābhigamasūtra 3. Sthānāngasūtra
8. Prajñāpanasutra 4. Samavāyāngasutra
9. Uttaradhyayanasūtra 5. Bhagavatīsūtra
10. Dasavaikalikasūtra All these texts include parts that are remotely old and those that are relatively new but only three of them include material that is apporopriate to Umāsvāti's age. For as has already been hinted, the Uttaradhyayana chapter 28 cannot but belong to Umāsvāti's age; (its other three chapters viz. 33, 34, 36 which too contain philosophical material may well be old). Similarly, Sthānāngasūtra and Samavāyāngasūtra include material that is much new and that is because of the very nature of these texts. For as has been mentioned, these texts are of the form of a number-wise cataloguing of all sorts of entities. As such they provide the largest scope for interpolations that go undetected and, as a matter of fact, in the body of these texts very late interpolations have actually been made. This definitely proves one thing. The preservation of Āgamic texts was in the hands of persons who were in no position to prevent possible interpolations. It is not difficult to see that the first srutaskandha of Uttarādhyayana belongs to one age the second to another, the first srutaskandha of Sütrakstānga to one age the second to another, the first twenty šatakas of Bhagavati to one age the last

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INTRODUCTORY
twenty one to another. However in each of these cases both the ages in question are old enough—that is, they are older than the age of Umāsvāti. Another fortunate circumstance is that Prajñāpanā, which is one of the two most important texts for our present purpose (the other being Bhagavati) is almost-though not absolutely-free from interpolations. Thus making a close study of the genuinely old material of Bhagavati which is concentrated in its first twenty satakas we can form a clear picture of the oldest stage in the evolution of Jaina philosophical speculation, while making a close study of Prajñāpanā we can form a similar picture of the next stage. As for the remaining texts in question they contain material that can be called either “pre-Bhagavati' or 'post-Bhagavati but pre-Prajñāpanā' or 'postPrajñāpana', but in practice it might not be possible for us to draw that much fine distinction. What we can at the most say is that the philo. sophical parts of Acārānga, Sūtrakịtänga and Dasavaikālika breathe an atmosphere that is appropriate to the relatively old Bhagavati stage while those of Jivajivabhigama, Rājaprašniya, and Uttarādhyayana (minus that chapter 28) breathe an atmosphere that is appropriate to the relatively new Prjñāpanā stage. But even to say this much is to say something important. For viewing things thus we are enabled to see not only how the old style of philosophising made way for the Tattvārtha style but also how within the old style itself a relatively old sub-style made way for a relatively new sub-style. And for understanding Umāsvāti's age itself Tattvärthasūtra, even if an important document, is not an all-sufficient document. Even supplementing it by the Āgamic texts Anuyogadvāra and Nandi might not suffice ; for in this connection there are two most important texts in the field-one Svetāmbara, the other Digambara. The Svetāmbara text is Āvasyakaniryukti (particularly its Upodghāta
) while the Digambara text is Şarkhandāgama. Thus in what might be called the Age of Agamās in the history of Jaina philosophy there are to be noted three distinct stages, viz.
I The stage represented by the old parts of Bhagavati and by the philoso.
phical parts of Acārānga, Sūtrakrtānga and Dasavaikalika.
II The stage represented by Prajñāpanā (plus the new parts of Bhagavati)
and by the philosophical parts of Jiväjivābhigama, Rājaprasniya,
Uttarādhyayana (minus its chapter 28). III The stage represented by Tattvārthasūtra (plus the Uttaradhyayana chapter
( 28 ) ) and by Anuyogadvāra, Nandi, Āvašyakaniryukti, Şałkhņdagama. The Age of. Āgamas Contrasted to the Age of Logic :
To the age of Agamas is to be contrasted what might be called the Age of Logic. Its most distinctive feature is the relatively free use of logical faculties while dealing with philosophical problems. In the Svetāmbara
J.O...2

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
camp the first spokesman of the tendency of this age is Siddhasena (whose treatment of problems is semi-Agamic), the second Mallavadi (whose treat. ment of problems is purely logical); likewise, in the Digambara camp the first spokesman of the tendency of this age is Kundakunda (whose treatment of problems is semi-Agamic), the second Samantabhadra (whose treatment of problems is purely logical). A comparative study of Siddhasena and Mallavādī on one hand and Kundakunda and Samantabhadra on the other will convince any one that the former couple has a much grasp of problems than the latter; (moreover, the former couple receives powerful reinforcement from Jinabhadra who came after Mallavādī but was a SemiAgamic author like Siddhasena). But in the case of the authors that follow them the roles are just reversed-that is to say, in the case of those later authors it is the Digambaras who evince a deeper grasp of problems. Thus in the Svetambara camp Mallavadi (along with Simhasuri whose commentary on Mallavādi's Nayacakra is our only means for getting at this text) is followed first by Haribhadra and then by a long lull, while in the Digambara camp Samantabhadra is followed by a galaxy of great names like Akalanka, Vidyananda, Prabhācandra. By the time of Prabhacandra the old situation returns back, for he is the last great author belonging to the Digambara camp while the Svetambara camp yet produces three giants, viz. Abhayadeva, the author of Sanmatitarkaṇikā, Vādideva, the author of Syādvadaratnakara and Yasovijaya the last and the most acute of Jaina philosophers. Yasovijaya belonged to the 18th Century and after him begins the modern age whose problems are all its own. In the Age of Logic itself some of Agamic activity also continued-in both the Ŝvetämbara and Digambara camps. Thus in the Svatambra camp authors like Šilanka, Abhayadeva and Malayagiri wrote Sanskrit commentaries on Agamic texts while those like Śivašarmasuri and Candrarşi wrote works on Karma-doctrine; similarly, in the Digambara camp Yativṛṣabha wrote in Prakrit a commentary on Kaṣāyaprabhṛta (a minor Karma text of Umasvati's age) while Virasena wrote in Prakrit occasionally mixed with Sanskrit a commentary on Satkhaṇḍāgama and one on Kaṣāyaprabhṛta. But let us for the moment ignore Agamic activity of the Age of Logic and concentrate our attention on what undoubtedly is specific activity of this age.
sort
10
Chief Activities of the Age of Logic :
The chief endeavour of the authors of the Age of Logic was to demonstrate the validity of Anekantavāda, and in this connection they whould examine and find fault with the rival views of the Brahmanical philosophers like Sankhya, Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, Mimamsaka, Vedānti on the one hand and the Buddhist philosophers like Vaibhaṣika, Sautrāntika, Vijñānavādī, Sunyavādī on the other. The three distinct phases of this type of activity are found culminated in the writings of Mallavadi (belonging to the 5th century A.D.),

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INTRODUCTORY
11
Vidyānanda (belonging to the 8th-9th century AD.) and Yašovijaya (belonging to the 18 th century A.D.). These three authors deserve special mention not only because they belong to three distinct periods of time but also because their grasp of respective contemporary systems of Indian philosophy was most thorough possible for a Jaina. Another field in which the authors of the Age of Logic specialised was that of logic and epistemology. But in this field the real beginning was made by Akalanka who came out with a list of pramāṇas that was a good match for those of his Buddhist and various Brahmanical rivals. Akalanka's list of pramānas had no Āgamic sanction behind it (though he tried to show that it had) but such was the need of the hour that not only the subsequent Digambara authors but also the subsqeuent Svetāmbara ones accepted it without reservation (of course, the latter after some amount of initial hesitation).
The Jainas of the Modern Age - i,e, Jainas of the 19th-20th Century A.D. have inherited the rich literary legacy of the Age of Āgamas as well as the Age of Logic. But the task before them is to assimilate it so as to make it serve the needs of this age. And the fair thing that has to be done in this connection is to evaluate the legacy in question by placing it in a correct historical perspective. It is just such an evaluation that is attempted in the following pages.

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CHAPTER II
THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS I ITS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS THREE STAGES Need for a Historical Approach towards the Āgamic Material :
The earliest age in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation is to be called the Age of Āgamas simply because the Āgamas happen to be the earliest available Jaina texts and because these texts happen to contain portions dealing with philosophical problems. But to work out the characteristic features of the Jaina philosophical speculation of the Age of Āgamas is a somewhat difficult task. Of course, there are people who doubt the very authenticity of the Agamic texts, but even if this doubt is dismissed as essentially groundless there remains the question as to what must have been the precise conditions under which these text came to be composed. And this is not an idle question or a question of secondary importance. For our evalution of the philosophy of the Āgamic texts will vitally depend on our evaluation of the conditions under which these texts came to be composed. The tradition says that the twelve Anga texts were composed by the direct disciples of Mahavira basing themselves on the teaching of the Master himself and the remaining Agamic texts were composed by the Jaina teachers belonging to a more or less recent period in the case of a number of these texts the actual names of the alleged authors being given out). Now even if it is conceded that each of the eleven Anga texts now available contains a nucleus that was the work of this or that direct disciple of Mabāvīra it will be too much to concede that the description applies to the entire content of this entire body of texts. As a matter of fact, in the case of the available Anga texts just as much as in the case of the non-Anga Agamic texts an independent investigation will have to be made in order to determine as to which part of the material lying before us is relatively old and which one relatively recent. But such an investigation requires that we have at our disposal fairly probable conjecture as to the evolution of Jaina doctrines related to the questions considered in the Āgamic texts. And this creates a real difficulty. For the danger is very great that a student constructs for himself something which to bim appears to be a fairly probable conjecture as to the evolution of Jaina doctrines but which in fact is far from being so. And this initial mistake will vitiate his whole subsequent endeavour-however diligent and however stupendous. Of course, the remedy for the situation is not in giving up the historical approach-for that will only go to aggravate the malady but in

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
13
being serious about the business. Confining ourselves to our specific subjectmatter, viz. philosophy let us see how a historical attitude enables us to evaluate the relevant Agamic texts than would have been the case in the absence of such attitude.
Three Stages chiefly determined on the basis of Stylistic Peculiarities :
Of the Āgamic texts the following contain the largest mass of philosophical discussions :
1. Bhagavatisūtra (an Anga) | 2. Prajnapanasutra (an Upanga)
3-4. Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandisātra (two Culikāsūtras); and for all practical purpose the following texts—all full of philosophical discussions-can be treated as Āgamic :
1. Āvasyakaniryukti 2. Satkhandāgama 3. Tattvārthasūtra (along with the author's own Bhāsya).
It is natural to expect that the comparatively older of these texts should be less systematic in their treatment of topics while the comparatively more recent ones should be more so. And since it is the material contained in the Bhagavati that is least systematic in content as well as arrangement it is legitimate to conclude that it is this material that is chronologically oldest. Bhagavati is a huge collection of dialogues in which the same type of questions repeat themselves time and again and in many cases there seems to be no apparent reason why a question should be discussed where it has been. From the point of view of their size these dialogues are either brief (the briefest containing just two small sentences) or medium or lengthy (the lengthier containing several pages of the printed text); from the point of view of their content some of them contain such assertions as would make just no sense to a later Jaina author, some such as would be formulated differently by him, while some such as would be formulated identically by him. Also noteworthy is the fact that in good many of these dialogues the literary style adopted is lively and polemical rather than dry and dogmatic as was generally the case with later texts (and so often with Bhagavati itself ). All this makes it clear that difficult parts of the material contained in Bhagavati came from the pen of different authors belonging to different periods of time. However there yet remains the task of arranging this material in a precise chronological order. But in this considerable help should come from Prajñāpanā. For on the whole Prajñāpanā is a collection of systematically forniulated views on some 36 selected topics—each considered to be more or less important by the Jaina scholars. And in connection with each topic it will be instructive to

Page #27

14
JAINA ONTOLOGY
compare the so systematically formulated Prajñāpanā views with the more or less loosely formulated corresponding views lying scattered in the different parts of Bhagavati. But the utility of Prajñāpanā does not end there. For the Prajñāpanā treatment of topics, even if more systematic and full than the corresponding Bhagavati treatment, is certainly less systematic and full than what we come across in texts like Tattvärtha sūtra, Anuyogadvārasūtra, Nandi, Avasy akaniryukti and Sakhandāgama ; moreover, certain methodological tendencies which are so prominent a feature of these last mentioned texts are conspicuous by their absence in Prajñāpanā, and the conclusion is inevitable that these tendencies are a post-Prajñāpanā growth. Hence Prajñāpanā has to be compared with Tattvārthasütra, Anuyogadvara etc. in order to assess the latest stage of the philosophical speculation undertaken in the age of Agamas—just as it has to be compared with Bhagavati in order to assess its earliest stage. [As for the philosophical discussions--of comparatively minor importance-contained in the Agamic texts like Ācārängasūtra, Sutrakitangasūtra, Dašavaikālika. Sūtra, Uttaradhyayanasūtra, Jivajivabhigamasutra, Rajaprasniyasūtra, they have to be judged independently, and then it will be found that for some reason or other the discussions of the first three texts belong to the Bhagavati-stage, those of the last three to the Prajñāpanā-stage (those of one Chapter (28) of Uttaradhyayana to the Tattvārtha-stage.) 1
Gradual evolution of the various Anuyogadvāra lists, particularly Mārgaņāsthānas, Jivasthānas, Gunasthānas :
That with the passage of time philosophical speculation becomes more and more systematic is a universal rule, but its application has a special advantage in the case of Jaina Studies. For since the very beginning the Jaina scholars were in the habit of undertaking what might be called an 'aspect-wise consideration of questions. Thus whenever they posed before themselves a question they also enumerated a definite number of aspects under which the question was to be considered. Gradually they felt that it would be convenient if they had at their disposal several ready-made lists of aspects under which questions were likely to be considered. Several such lists are now well known to the student of Jainism - e.g.the list of 14 mārganästhānas, that of 14 jivasthānas, that of 14 gunasthānas--but what is not so well known is that these lists are the culminating point of a pretty long evolution. For example, the list of 14 märganāsthānas had a predecessor with six additional items while there was a time when this list of 20 items was itself in the process of formation. Thus in Bhagavati several times these and those items out of the 20 in question were taken up (once as many as fifteen3) but at no time was the full list put to use ; the conclusion is inevitable that the full list was yet in the process of formation. Prajñāpanā twice uses the full list of 20 items but each time an additional one, viz,

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THE AGE OF AGAMAS
15
astikaya has been inserted in between the 19th and 20th ; this insertion is outright anomalous and the anomaly deserves examination. Avašyakaniryukti uses the full list of 20 items in its proper form and since then it has been a heritage of the Svetāmbara Āgamic authors. As against this, the list of 14 items first makes its appearance in Şaikbandāgama and since then has been a heritage of the Karma-specialists, both Svetāmbara and Digambara. [However, even Digambara authors use a list of 20 items whose six additional items are mostly different from those of the Svetāmbara list of 20 items']. Similarly, the list of 14 jivasthānas was preceded by one which made no distinction between samjñi-pañcendriya and asamjñi-pañcendriya, while this itself was preceded by an altogether different one having 24 items. As a matter of fact it is the list of 24 items that is most frequently used not only in Bhagavati but also in Prajāapanā. As for the list of 12 items it makes its stray appearance in Bhagavatī5 but in Prajña pana it is used in the first chapter that is most important and in the second and third that are considerably so. The list of 14 items first makes its appearance in Satkhandagama and since then has been a heritage of all Jaina particularly the Karma-specialists among them ; (the lone appearance of the list of 14 items in Bhagavati must be a very late interpolation"). Lastly, the list of 14 gunasthānas too seems to have a history but to unravel it is somewhat difficult. The list as it stands first makes its appearance in Sakhandāgama but it might be argued that even Prajñāpanā and Bhagavati presuppose it. On close consideration the argument seems to lack weight. Certainly, Prajñāpanā is quite famalir with the concepts mithyādęsti, samyagmithyādīşti, asamyatasamyagdrsti, samyatāsmyata, pramaltasaṁyata, apramattasamyata, badarasam parāya, sūkşmasamparāya, upaśamakaṣāya, kşīņakaṣāya, sayogakevali, ayogakevali—that is, with 12 out of 14 gungsthānas. But the concepts sāsvādana-samyagdrşți and a pūrvakaraņa are here conspicuous by their absence. Certainly, the text once speaks of upašāmakabādarasamparāya, kşapakabadarasamparāya and kṣa pakasükşinasamparāya--but this does not mean that it is also familiar with the concepts upašāmaka-apurrakarana and kşapaka-apūrvakarana. Similarly, the text does always presuppose that vikalatrika (two-, three-, and four-sensed beings) can possibly possess samyaktva (though once even that is explicitly denied)--but this does not mean that it is also familar with the thesis that this samyktva is of the sāsvādana sub-type. As for Bhagavati it seems to be unfamiliar even with the concept u paśānta-kaṣāya. For example, it frequently distinguishes between irya fathikakarmabandhaka and sämparāyikakarmaband haka but never once does it divide the former into upaśäntakaṣāya and kşiņakaşāya of sub-types (nay, more than once it even explicitly says that the iryāpathikakarma-hand haka must be vyucchinnaknṣāyama word which should naturally mean kşīņakaṣāya). The lengthy discussion of the chapter 26 clearly implies familiarity with the concept upaśāntakaṣāya but this part of the text is definitely of late origin (though of course even earlier there occurs a brief

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
passage whose argument is patterned after that of this chapter 26'). Be that as it may, on the question of the evolution of the list of 14 gunasthānas the testimony of Prajñāpapa is going to be crucial. For if this text is not familiar with more than 12 guṇasthānas, then the genuinely old parts of Bhagavati too cannot be familiar with more than 12; and then it will have to be seen whether or not these genuinely old parts are familiar with the concept of upaśāntakaṣāya. To sum up, in the task of determining the comparative antiquity or otherwise of an Agamic text one convenient criterian is to see where it stands in relation to the use of the list of 14 märganāsthānas, that of 14 jīvasthānas and that of 14 gunasthānas. There is however one more such list which deserves an independent treatment in this connection and let us take it up now.
Seeds of the Eight Anuyogadyāras Sat, Sankhyā, K setra etc. in Prajnapanā :
Thus Tattvārthasūtra lays down the instruction that a subject-matter is to be investigated into under the following eight heads : sat, sankhyā, kşetra, sparsana, kala, antara, bhāva, al pabahutva. Şarkhandagama in its very important first section makes a basic use of this list. Another version of this list contains an additional item in the from of bhāga and has been made use of in Anuyogadvāra and Āvašyakaniryukti, But Prajñāpanā is unfamiliar with this list as it stands. However, a close study of the contents of Prajñāpanā makes it clear that in its different parts it does conduct discussion in terms of the different items of this list there being one exception which will be noted below. Thus the first chapter (viz. Prajñāpanāpada) which enumerates the classes constituting the animate world can be said to describe it under the head sat while the chapter twelfth (viz. Sarīrapada) which gives the number of members belonging to the different classes of the animate world can be said to describe it under the head sankhya; similarly, the chapter second (viz. Sthānapada) describes the animate world under the heads kşetra and sparsana while the chapter fourth (viz. Sthitipada) does so under the head kāla; lastly the chapter eighteenth (viz. Kāyasthitipada) implicitly describes the animate world under the head antara 10 while the chapter third (viz. Alpabahutvapada) explicitly describes it under the head al pabahutya. There is no separate description of the animate world under the head bhāga but such a description is implicitly given in connection with that under the joint heads sankhya and al pabahutva ; on the other hand, a description under the head bhāva is here conspicuous by its absence and the fact is significant. For a description under the head bhāva means a description in terms of kşaya, upašama, kşayo pasama and udaya of the relevant karmas, and the total absence of such a description in Prajñāpanā means that the advanced stage of the Karma doctrine presupposed by such a description was attained only in the post-Prajñāpanā period. Certainly, the Karma doctçine as treated in Prajñāpanā is very elementary in compa

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THE AGE OF AGAMAS
rision to the same as treated in a text like Satkhandāgama. In any case, a description of the qualities of soul in terms of kşaya, upašama, etc. of the relevant karmas is not known to Prajñāpanā and is known to Anuyogadvāra, Āvasyakaniryukti as well as Tattvārthasūtra. As for the remaining topics of investigation under consideration - viz. sat, sankhya, kşetra, etc.--the fact that they are present in Prajñāpanā but not in a systematic form proves that the importance of these topics had already begum to be realised by the Jaina authors of the period of Prajñāpanā but that. 9-item or 8-item list of the later texts was not yet drawn. As a matter of fact it can be shown that the importance of some of these topics was realised even in the times of Bhagavati.
The Contents of Prajñāpanā :
The contents of Prajñāpapā deserves a closer look not only with a view to seeing as to how the treatment of topics undertaken in this text is more systematic than that found in Bhagavati and less systematic than that found in Tattvärtha, etc. but also with a view to seeing as to which questions gradually came to occupy the centre of the Jaipa scholars' attention. Prajñāpanā consists of 36 chapters each devoted to a particular topic, but there seems to be no order so far as the arrangement of chapters is concerned. But even a cursory glance at the title-list of the text reveals that it is mostly devoted to the various aspects of the life activity-mental or physiological - of the animate beings; (as for the first four chapters whose titles do not speak for themselves it has already been noted that they respectively acquaint us with the name, the location, the numerical strength and the life-duration of the different classes constituting the animate world). It looks as if we are having before our eyes an account of jivasthānas in terms of märganāsthānas, for jīvasthānas are nothing but the names of the classes constituting the animate world while märganästhānas nothing but the various aspects of the life activity of the animate beings (that precisely is why the insertion of the item astikāya in the list of 20 is outright anomalous). Only we have to keep in mind that the author is not yet in possesion of a well-established list of jīvasthānas or a well-established list of mārganāthānas, for otherwise one chapter would have had one märganästhāna for its title while in each chapter jīvasthānas would have had been taken up one by one. But the notable thing is that even as it stands the text does somethining of the sort. In the finally established list of mārganāsthānas there is only one item-viz. sarira-standing for physiological activity but in Prañāpanā some seven or eight cbapters are devoted to these activities, and that no doubt goes to make its account more balanced than it otherwise would have been. However even then it might be asked as to how an account of just animate world can be treated as an account of the whole of reality-and certainly a text like Prajñāpanā must intend to offer us an account of the whole of reality.
J. O...3

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
To make the query more pointed let us recall that on the Jaina view (i) matter (pudgala ) is as much of a reality as souls ( jīva), (ii) the world ( loka) consists not only of matter and souls but also of a medium of motion ( dharma ), a medium of stoppage ( adharma ), a medium of location (akaśa ), a medium of occurrence (kala or addhāsamaya), (ii) the universe consists not only of the world but also of a not-world (aloka) surrounding the world. And a text which keeps silence as regards the nature of loka-aloka, that of dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kala, that of pudgala has failed to provide us with a complete picture of the Jaina world-view. By way of defence it can be said that even within the four corners of its own specific framework Prajñāpanā has found occasion to say things about loka, aloka, dharma, adharma, akaśa, kala and pudgala. As for example, in the chapter on alpa-bahutva that anomalous insertion of the item astikāya makes possible the treatment of five astikāyas and kala ; besides, the chapter separately treats pud gala. Similarly, the fifth and thirteenth chapters (viz. Višeşapada and Pariņāmapada) are devoted to a specification of the properties of souls as well as not-souls; (likewise the first chapter viz. Prajñāpañāpada enumerates the classes of souls as well as not-souls). And the tenth chapter (viz. Caramapada) so develops its content that what is mostly dealt with is the nature of loka-aloka on the one hand and pudgala on the other. Lastly, fifteenth chapter (viz. Indriyapada) incidentally (really, without any apparent reason) discusses the question whether loka, aloka, Jambūdvipa, etc, are or are not touched by dharma, adharma, akāśa, kala, etc. All this might be conceded and yet one might feel that it would have been better if independent chapters were devoted to a treatment of the nature of loka-aloka, pañcastikāya-cum-kāla, pudgala-- just as so many independent chapters are devoted to a treatment of the nature of soul,
The net content of the Bhagavati list of 23 Anuyogadvāras and the corresponding passages of Tattvārthasūtra :
So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned Bhagavati evinces comparatively more balanced attitude and it seems that a comparative neglect of the problems related to loka, aloka, pañcāstikaya-cum-kala, pudgala was a comparatively late phenomenon. Revealing in this connection is a list of topics-of-investigation to which Bhagavati resorts more than once ; (no trace of this list remains in the later texts). On two occasions this list appears as containing the following 23 items :11
(1) antarvarti akasa (=empty space lying in beween two regions of the
world) vāyu (=the layer of air occupying a part of the space lying in between two regions of the lower world)

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19
(3) ghanodadhi (=the layer of water occupying a part of the space lying
in between two regions of the lower world) (4) Prihvi (=a region of the lower world) (5) dvipa (=world-continent situated on our earth) (6) sägara (=world-occeans situated on our earth)
7) varsa (regions of a world-continent) (8) nārakādi (=the classes constituting the animate world- viz. hell
born beings' etc.) (9) astikāya (=the five basic reals) (10) samaya (=time) (11) karma ( = matter of the form of karma) (12) lesyä (za material indicative of the relative preponderance or other
wise of vices in a being) (13) dssti ( = faith) (14) darśana ( = indeterminate cogntion) (15) jñāna ( = determinate cognition) (16) sanjña ( = certain vices) (17) sarira ( = body ) (18) yoga ( = activity ) (19) upayoga ( = cognition ) (20) dravya ( - substance ) (21) pradeśa ( = the constituent units of a substance) (22) paryāya ( = the properties of a substance ) (23) addha ( = time)
On a third occasion, the tenth item samaya is deleted while in between varsa and nārokādi (i. e, 7th and 8th items there appears a new item saudharmādi (= region of the upper world)12, besides, here the list begins with the following five items which are altogether new :
(1) 18 vices from prānātipāta ( = injury to life) down to mithyādarśana
(= wrong faith acting as a piercing arrow) (2) freedom from these 18 vices (3) autpattiki-rainayiki-kārmiki-pāriņāmiki ( = four types of cognitive
dealing ) (4) avagraha-zhā-avāya-dhāraṇā (= four stages in the perceptual process) (5) utthāna-karma-bala vīrya--puruşakāra-parakrama ( = five aspects of
manly endeavour )

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
the Pro
the oric:
lanced
And on two occasions these additional five items along with the items 8th and 11th - 19th of the original list are made the basis of giving an exhaustive account of the nature of soul13. All this makes it clear that the authors of the list in question were aware that the aspects of the life-activity of a soul constitute just one set of the problems worth investigating into whereas the later authors felt that they constitute almost the sole set of such problems. For the list of 20 märganāsthānas developed out of the items 8th and 11th - 19th of the present list (all of which-minus karma-are included in the former and as regards all of which the early authors were convinced that they pertain to the life-activity of a soul-whereas for the later authors the former list whose all items are essentially similar to those in question of the latter was the be-all and end-all of all philosophical investigation). May be the anomalous insertion of astikāya in the Prajñāpanā list of 20 mārganästhānas was a harbinger of the original list of 23. Of course, the Bhagavati list of 23 is more balanced one as compared to the final list of 20 mārganästhānas, for otherwise the former has its own difficulties. For one thing, its inclusion of 7 or 8 items in the form of elements of mythological cosmography is philosophically unimportant and it would be better if these items are replaced by just one couple, viz. loka-aloka (world and not-world). Then pudgala (matter) should be an independent item. As for so many items being there which pertain to the life activity of soul it can be supposed that they are so many sub-items of one item, viz. jiva ; (in view of its special importance in the Jaina scheme of things karma should be made an independent item). Lastly, dravya, pradeśa and paryaya can be treated as three sub-items of one item, viz. satsāmānya (i. e. reality in general). Viewed thus, the following appear to be the most important topics of Jaina ontology. (1) Loka and Aloka
(4) Jiva (2) Pañcāstikāya and kāla (5) Karma (3) Pudgala
(6) Satsāmānya
It is instructive to note that in the chapters of Tattvārthasūtra these topics stand dispersed as follows:
I (1) (in its mythological aspect) in the chapters III-IV II (2), (3) and (6) in the chapter V III (4) in the chapter II
IV (5) in the chapter VIII As for the first chapter of Tattvārtha it has already been noted that it is devoted to the problems of mokşamārga, samyagdarśana, saptatattva, anuyogadvāra, pramāna and naya. In view of what has already been said about the Jaina scholar's preoccupation with the problem of topics-of-investigation

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21
21
nothing requires to be said about the problem of anuyogadvāras; but remaining problems deserve special consideration.
The Problem of Mokşamārga, Samyagdarśana, Saptatattva in Tattvārtha :
Neither Bhagavati nor Prajñāpanā raises the problem of mokşa-mārga in the way it is done in Tattvārthasūtra-that is, neither of these texts asks whether faith, knowledge or conduct, or any two of these factors, or the three of them taken together lead to mokşa. True, there is one passage in Bhagavati (and reference to it is made in another place) where it is asked whether one can attain mokșa with the help of moral conduct and asceticism alone and the answer forthcoming is that one must also become omniscient before one attains mokşa.14 This is the nearest approach to the Tattvärtha way of posing the question but it too is obviously distinct from the latter15. More generally, it is from the difficult accounts of Kevali given in Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā that we have to surmise as to what sort of personality one ought to become if one is to attain mokşa. And the most distinguishing feature of such a personality is a complete freedom from all passion-resulting in a complete freedom from all ignorance and a complete freedom from all incapacity. As for right faith and right cognition--i, e, samyagdarśana and samyagjñāna-being two constituents of mokşa-mārga it is never explicitly emphasised but is always implicitly taken for granted. For right faith means faith in the correctness of the Jaina teaching - while right cognition means cognition of this teaching, and certainly one cannot put into practice the teaching in question (and hence attain mokşa) unless one already possess right faith and right cognition thus under-- stood. Similarly, neither Bhagavati nor Prajñāpanā describes the content of samyagdarśana in the way it is done in Tattvārtha—that is, neither of these texts maintains that samyagdarśana means faith in the reality of seven entities, viz. jīva, ajīva, āstava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā and mokșa, Bhagavati does say in a general way that truth is what the Jinas have taught (tam saccam jam jinehin paveiyam 18 while the faithful is often described (and not in Bhagavati alone) as one possessing the knowledge of loka, aloka, jiva, ajiva, papa, punya, üsrava, samvara, vedana, nirjarā, bandha, mokşa. But neither the doctrine of nine tattvas (as described in Uttaradhyayana) nor the doctrine of seven tattvas (as described in Tattvārtha) is an established or basic doctrine of any of the genuinely old Āgamic texts. 17 It is true that āstava-samvara and vedana-nirjarā are two most crucial concept-couples of the Karma doctrine and as such they are further dealt with in Bhagavati, though not in Prajñāpanā but that is a different matter. What is noteworthy is that the tradition of saying either that the nine tattvas of Uttaradhyayana are the nine basic reals or that the seven basic tattvas of Tattvārtha are the seven basic reals is not very old. The problem of pramāna and that of naya are a bit more complex and let us take them one by one.

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
Evolution of the treatment of Pramāņa :
In old Agamic texts like Bhagavati and Prajñāpana the word pramana meaning right cognition (or instrument of right cognition) is used almost never. A dialogue of Bhagavati does incidentally speak of the four types of pramāņas, viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, agama1s but the passage must be a late interpolation; similarly, Prajñāpana in its account of darśanarya does speak of praṇāma and naya1 but the account of this passage too is anomalous. For nowhere else do these two texts (or any of the old Agamic texts) say a word about pramana. On the other hand, it is a usual practice of the Agamic texts to speak of the five types of jñānas, viz, mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyaya and kevala and the three types of ajñānas, viz. mati, surla and avadhi (the usual word for matijñāna being abhinibodhikajñāna and that for avadhiajñāna - vibhanga-jñāna). Anuyogadvāra once speaks of the five types of jñānas, viz. mati, śrula, etc. and another time of the four types of them viz. pratyakşa, anumana, etc.30 But this doctrine of fourfold jñānas is obviously a borrowing from the Nyaya school, for otherwise it is absolutely unknown in the Jaina Agamic tradition. It is Umasvati who first gives the name pramāṇa to the five traditional jñānas and also subdivides them into pratyakṣa and paroksa-the latter covering mati and śruta, the former avadhi, manaḥparyaya, kevala. A similar twofold division of jñānas-not-pramāņas-is to be met with in Nandisutra which in addition says that pratyakṣa-jñāna is of two types viz. indriyapratyakṣa and anindriyapratyakşa-the latter covering avadhi manaḥparyaya and kevala; (this is a confused position inasmuch as it places indriya pratyakṣa by the side of mati-jñāna rather than make it a constituent of the latter). But granting that the word pramāṇa is unknown to the old Agamic texts the question remains as to how they conceive and classify right cognition. Let us attempt an answer. Bhagavati frequently makes a distinction between chadmastha and kevalt and we are told that the former knows and sees (jānāti, pasyati) things only with the help of sense-organs while the latter does so without the help of sense-organs*2. At one place we are given the following catalogue of ten things about which it is said that in their entirety they are known and seen by a kevali alone not by a chadmastha as well :
(1) dharmastikaya
(2) adharmastikāya
(3) akasastikaya
(4) soul apart from body
(5) physical atom

(6) sound (7) smell
(8) air
(9) whether a particular person will attain omniscience or not
(10) whether a particular person will attain mokşa or not23

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
23
Again the text often speaks of persons possessing avadhijñāna and vibhanga-jñāna— the former being a case of right cognition, the latter that of wrong cognition but both being cases of extra-sensory cognition;34 and since the persons in question are chadmastha we are to understand that even a chadmastha can possibly have extra-sensory cognition. As a matter of fact, certain passages actually distinguish between the cognitive capacities of the following four types of persons :
(1) chadmastha (2) adhovadhika ( = person with an imperfect type of avadhi) (3) paramāradhika ( = person with the most perfect type of avadhi)
(4) kevalias All this makes it clear that the early Jaina theoreticians distinguished between three types of cognition, viz. (1) the sensory cognition of a non-omniscient (2) the extra-sensory cognition of a non-omniscient (3) the extra-sensory cognition of an omniscient; besides, in each case they disitnguished between two sub-types viz. (1) the visionlike cogpi. tion and (2) the cogitation-like cognition; lastly, in the first two cases they also distinguished between a true variety and a false one. It was later on that manaḥ paryāya was conceived as a type of extra-seasory cognition (possessed by a non-omniscient) having for its object what another person is now thinking of; (about this type of cognition it was thought that it has no vision-like variety or a false variety). Simultaneously, additional thought was given to the sensory cognition of a non-omniscient. Here a distinction was made between cognition based on one's own sense perception and that based on somebody else's testimony ; both were supposed to be the cases of cogitation-like cognition and both to be possibly true or false. As for sense-perception itself it was identified with visionlike cognition and divided into two types, viz. visual and non-visual. Thus came into existence the final Jaina theory of cognition with its following classification :
(1) a non-omniscient's visual sense-perception (cakşurdarśana) (2) a non-omniscient's non-visual sense perception (acakşurdarśana) (3) a non-omniscient's true cogitation-like cognition based on one's
own sense-perception (matijñāna) (4) false variety of (3) (mati-ajñāna) (5) a non-omniscient's true cogitation-like cognition based on some
body else's testimony (śrutajñāna) (6) false variety of (5) (śruta-ajñāna) (7) a non-omniscient's extra-sensory vision-like cognition of the outer
world (avadhidarśana)

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
(8) a non-omniscient's true extia-sensiory cogitation-like cognition of
the outer world (avad hijñāna) (9) false variety of (8) (vibhangajñāna) (10) a non-omniscient's true extra-sensory cogitation-like cognition of
other's inner world (manahparyāyajñāna) (11) an omniscient's extra-sensory vision-like cognition (kevala-darsana) (12) an omniscient's extra-sensory cogitation-like cognition (keralajñāna)
Now Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā give us very few details about this whole theory ; for what we mostly get there is a bare enumeration of types and sub-types. It is the later texts like Avasyakaniryukti and Nandisūtra which are more helpful in this connection. But the fact that Bhagavati brings into prominence certain aspects of the theory which are given no much importance in its final form lends support to the supposition that it was the problems connected with these aspects that first drew the Jaina theoretician's attention; and it is on this supposition that we have based our above account of the conjectured evolution of this theory.
Relative recency of the treatment of Naya, Niksepa and Saptabh angi :
Lastly, we take up the problem of naya. The doctrine of seven nayas is certainly present in Anuyogadvāra, Āvašyakaniryukti, Şakhandāgama, Tattvārthasūtra but it is conspicuous by its absence in Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā. As a matter of fact, even the broad twofold division of nayas into dravyārthikanaya and paryāyārthikanaya is almost unknown to these old Āgamic texts. True, in Bhagavati there are three dialogues of wbich the first says that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of dravya and non-eternal from that of bhāva, the second that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of dravya, non-eternal from that of paryāya, the third that a certain thing is eternal from the standpoint of avyucchittinaya, noneternal from that of vyucchittinaya and then there is a rather long dialogue in which it is said about several entities (loka, for example) that they are finite from the standpoints of dravya and kşeira, infinite from those of kala and bhāva. These dialogues deserve notice---particularly because the later authors make so much of them. But let us not forget that in the field of ontology the specific contribution of the old Āgamic texts was their masterly method of examining entities from the standpoint of dravya, kşetra, kala and bhāva and it was absolutely no part of this method to suggest that tbings must exhibit mutually contradictory features when viewed from two of these standpoints. For example, if a jar stays in existence for one day and is red throughout the duration of its existence it is equally finite from two of these standpoints of dravya and bhava--for it is a red substance so long as it is a substance called jar. Of course, it might be suggested

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that the redness of this jar is different every moment and the suggestion might be valid ; but the noteworthy thing is that it is never advanced in the Āgamic texts (the point was borrowed by the later authors and from the Buddhists). 2 6 In this connection a few words have also to be said about the doctrine of four nikṣepas and that of saptabhangi. The case of four ni kşepas is in fact a case of a particular set of anu yogadvāras and it should suffice to point out that this set - just like the set of seven nayasis unknown to the old Āgamic texts and makes its appearance only in Anuyogadvāra, Āvašyakaniryukti, Tattvārtha and Şakhaņdāgama. But the case of saptabhangi deserves some further consideration. Really speaking, the doctrine of saplabhangi is unknown not only to the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā but also to the new ones like Anuyogad. Vāra, Āvašyakaniryukti, etc; (in its unmistakably recognizable form it first appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati). Among the later authors the doctrine is current in two versions. According to one a thing is describable through the following seven propositions :
(1) It exists (from the standpoint of its own property) (2) It does not exist (from the standpoint of alien properties) (3) It is indescribable (from the standpoint of its own as well as
alien properties) (4) It exists and does not exsit (i. e. one part of it exists, another
does not) (5) It exists and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it exists, another
is indescribable) (6) It does not exist and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it does
not exist, another is indescribable) (7) It exists, does not exist and is indescribable (i. e. one part of it
exists, another does not exist, a third is indescribable) According to the other version a thing is describable through the following seven propositions :
(1) It exists (from the standpoint of its own properties) (2) It does not exist (from the standpoint of alien properties) (3) It exists and does not exist (from the two standpoints in question
applied successively) (4) It is indescribable (from the two standpoints in question applied
simultaneously) (5) It exists in the manner of (1) ) and is indescribable ( in the manner
of (4) ) J, O.., 4

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JAINA ONTOLOGY (6) It does not exist (in the manner of (2) ) and is indescribable in
the manner of (4) ) (7) It exists in the manner of (1) ), does not exist in the manner
of (2) ), and is indescribable in the manner of (4) )
[For example, the first version is adopted in Siddhasena's Sanmati, the second in Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsā).
of the second of these versions there is absolutely no trace in any Agamic text but a passage in Bhagavati comes very near developing the first 2 7. Thus it first declares that everything (e. g. an atom) is a 'self' from the standpoint of its own properties, a 'not-self' from the standpoint of alien properties, indescribable from the standpoint of both; (here is a self' can be treated as eqivalent to 'exists' and 'is a not-self' as equivalent to 'does not exist-for after all both are rather technical usages. Then it goes on to apply this principle to the cases of aggregates made up of two, three four, five and six atoms. Here new possibilities begin to emerage by virtue of the fact that the things in question are made up of parts. Thus if a thing is made up of two parts it will be possible to designate it by two features (out of the three-yiz. 'self', 'not-self', 'indescribable'), if it is made up of three parts it will be possible to designate it even by all the three features ; nay, if it is made up of four parts one feature can even belong to many parts (i, e, to more than one part), if it is made up of five parts two features can do so, if it is made up of six parts all the three features can do so. The noteworthy point is that all the seven possibilities allowed by the Saptabhangi doctrine of the Sanmati-version) are already got when the aggregate is made up of three atoms; and yet Bhagavati goes on to consider new cases with more possibilities, the maximum number 23 being reached in the case of the aggregate made up of six atoms. This clearly shows that the case with seven possibilities came to assume a special importance only in later times, Even Anuyogadvāra when it discusses a similar problem does not attach any special importance to the case with seven possibilities--there the maximum number of possibilities being 2629 ; (as a matter of fact, even in Bhagavati the maximum number of possibilities should be 26 but it has chosen to disallow 3 possibilities). Of course, the problem considered in Anuyogadvāra has a rather restricted scope and so its treatment cannot be called a further development in the direction of the final establishment of the Saptabhangi doctrine. Thus whereas Bhagavati has discussed the case of three most general features (really, those very features which appear in the finally established Saptabhangi doctrine) Anuyogadvāra discusses the case of three rather particular features, viz. ānu pūrvi ( ordered succession), anānu pūrvi ( lack of ordered succession) and avakiavya ( indescribable either way ) (anu purvī characterizing a group of units more than two in number, anānu pūrvi

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characterizing just one unit, avaktavya characterizing a group of two units). In any case, neither Bhagavati nor Anuyogadvāra lays down the principle that everything whatsoever is describable through the seven propositions of the Saptabhangi doctrine; for even on the showing of Bhagavati (whose treatment of the problem is of a more general nature) it is only an aggregate made up of more than two atoms that is so describable (an aggregate made up of two atoms being describable through six propositions and a loose atom through three).
Evolution of the treatment of Pañcāstikāya :
It can thus be seen that the problems discussed in the first chapter of Tattvärthasutra were either not treated at all or were treated differently in the old Agamic texts like Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā. But that is not the case with the problems discussed in its II, III, IV, V and VIII chapters. As a matter of fact, barring exceptions these chapters can be treated as a good summary of the corresponding discussion of the old Agamic texts. But even here these old texts themselves will have to be consulted if we are to form an idea of the doctrinal evolution concerned. Take for example the course of discussion on Pañcastikāya, In Bhagavati a large number of dialogues touch upon this or that aspect of the nature of soul and a good number of them do the same for matter, but dialogues touching upon the nature of dharma, adharma and ākāśa are few and far between. As a matter of fact, two parallel possages which seek to indicate the doctrine of five astikayas are couched in a strikingly defensive terminology. Thus in one of them Mahāvira's chief disciple Gautama, when asked to justify his belief in the existence of the five astikāyas, naively pleads that only that which exists is called by his camp an existing entity, only that which does not a non-existing entity (savvam atthibhavam atthiti vadāmo savvam natthibhavam natthili vadāmo)29; placed in a similar circumstance a staunch disciple of Mahavira named Madruka says that on the testimony of kevalt must one believe in the existence of all the five astikayas even when they are not visible to eyes-just as one believes in the existence of air, smell, fire-inside-wood, etc. even when they are not visible to eyes 30. It seems that the Jaina theoreticians first of all arrived at the notion of loka having a particular shape and size as also that of an empty aloka surrounding loka. Naturally, loka must have been supposed to be the permanent seat of the permanently existing matter and souls, but soon enough certain consideration led to the posting of three rather sophisticated concepts, viz. dharma, adharma and ākāśa-the first supposed to be the medium of motion, the second that of stoppage, the third that of location (the first two covering loka alone, the third loka as well as aloka). Thus in a dialogue of Bhagavati it is maintained that a god standing at the far end of loka cannot move about his limbs inside aloka; however, the reason given for it is not that there are no dharma and adharma in aloka but that there

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is no matter there it being supposed that matter (also soul) can move only when placed in the midst of matters 1. So originally it seemed a satisfactory argument that things from loka do not intrude into aloka simply because the latter is an empty region ; but later on it was thought fit to argue that things from loka do not intrude into aloka because the latter lacks dharma and adharma. As for ākāśa it was a natural enough concept--as is evident from its so wide a prevalence in diverse philosophical circles. On the other band, the Jaina concepts of matter and soul have many peculiarities of their own--as is to be expected in view of the fact that so much atteniton was devoted to their formulation. All this tends to suggest that the doctrine of pancāstikaya took some time to get established and the situation as it evolved historically is reflected in the pages of Bhagavati. In Prajñāpanā, on the other hand, a deliberate attempt was made to offer an account of the multifarious activities of soul in the name of offering an account of the whole of reality and this, as has already been noted, was a rather misconceived plan. However, there is partial justification even for the Prajñāpanā procedure. For a most conspicuous feature of the Jaina concept of soul is that according to it not only are insects, animals, men (along with the denizens of hells and heavens) ensouled bodies but so also are earth, water, fire, air and plants of all sorts. As a result it happens that so many questions which others discuss in connection with their treatment of matter the Jainas do in connection with their treatment of soul. Even then the fact remains that the Jainas do have a theory of pure matter and aspects of it are brought to light in Prajñāpanā itself. That is why it would have been better if this part of the discussion was here accorded a special status of its own,
Relative recency of the treatment of Satsāmānya :
We have surmised that the tradition of discussing the nature of loka and aloka, matter and soul was comparatively old, that of discussing the nature of five astikayas comparatively recent. It seems that the tradition of discussing the nature of reality in general is still more recent. As a matter of fact, this question as such is never raised in the old Āgamic texts and when Tattvārtha does raise it it comes out with an answer of which there is no trace in these old texts. Thus Tattvārtha says that the real is characterised by origination, destruction and permanence and no old Āgamic text subscribes to the position. So in the context of the old Āgamic texts the question of the nature of reality in general has to be understood somewhat differently. Let us recall that the Bhagavati list of 23 topics-of-investigation contained three items in the form of dravya, pradeśa and paryāya, and it is these that we propose to treat as the sub-items of one general item, viz. reality in general. The proposal needs elaboration. As we have seen, the Jaina theoreticians gave thought to the question as to how many types of

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things there are in the universe and they ultimately came out with the answer that there are five such types, viz. dharma, adharma, akāśa, pudgala, jiva. But soon they also gave thought to the question as to what features these things qua things have common and they came out with the answer that they are all substances (dravya), that they are all made up of parts (prade.sa)that they all possess properties (paryāya). Later on further thought was given to the question of pradeśa and it was found that the pradeśas of dharma, adharma and akaśa behave in one way, those of a soul in another way, those of a physical body in a third way. Thus one pradeśa of dharma, adharma or akāśa must exist at a different place from another such pradeśa and it must always exist where it does ; on the other hand, one pradeśa of a soul can co-exist with any number of such pradeśas and it might exist now here now there. In the case of a physical body the concerned pradeśas are its constituent atoms; like one pradeśa of a soul, one pradeśa of a physical body can co-exist with any number of such pradeśas and it might exist now here now there, but unlike the former the latter might possibly transfer itself from one physical body to another or even lie loose. In connection with these considerations it was realised that “occupying a portion of space' is also an important feature of substances ; (this was particularly obvious in the case of souls and physical bodies). Parallelly came the realisation that 'occupying a portion of time' is also an important feature of substances (this was particularly obvious in the case of physical bodies). Now 'occupying a portion of space' could be seen as equivalent to 'occupying a portion of akaśa'; but the concept occupying a portion of time' created difficulty. So time was conceived as a series of successively arising samayas each lasting for a moment; and then “occupying a portion of time was seen as equivalent to lasting for so many samayas'. Lastly some special thought was given to the problem of paryāya and it was maintained that each paryāga-physical as well as mental- bas an infinite number of degrees from the minutest upto the greatest. Thus gradually came into existence what might be called the doctrine of fourfold pradeśavāda and what might be regarded as the high watermark of abstraction in the field of old Āgamic ontological speculation. According to this doctrine a substance might have four types of pradeśas, viz.
(1) pradeśas viewed from the standpoint of substance (dravya) (2) pradeśas viewed from the standpoint of space (kşetra) (3) pradeśas viewed from the standpoint of time (kala)
(4) Pradeśas viewed from the standpoint of a property (bhāva) The first type of pradeśa means one constituent atom (and so can be had only by a physical body), the second type of pradeśa means one ākāśapradeśa, the third type of pradeśa means samaya, the fourth type of pradeśa means one degree of the property concerned.

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Evolution of the treatment of Karma :
Lastly, in view of its special importance a few additional words might be said about the Karma doctrine. This doctrine in mostly known to us through very late texts like Candrarşi's Pancasangraha, Virasena's Dhavala (a commentary on Satkhaņdāgama) and Jayadhavală (a commentary on Kaşayaprābbrta). And as found there the doctrine contains features of which there is no trace in the old Agamic texts. Earlier we had occasion to note the case of gunasthānas. Certainly, the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā seem to be unfamiliar with the later list of 14 of them, and this is so because they do not contain the later doctrine of upaśamasrent and kșa pakaśreni. For it is only in connection with this doctrine that the concept a pūrvakarana--i. e. what is now called the 8th gunasthāna-makes its appearance. Nay, Bhagavati contains a significant passage (rather a collection of passages) which cleary looks like a transition from the simple old Karma doctrine to the complex later one couched in the terminology of śreni-ārohana and all that. 32 Again, in its account of the process of korma-bandha and karma-vedana even Prajñāpanā confines itself to the eight chief types of karmas (i, e. it does not take into account the subtypes of these karmas). Āvasyakaniryukti clearly contains an account of upaśamasreni and kşa pakaśreni, Tattvarthasūtra refers to them while Şarkhand agama explicitly conducts its discussion in terms of the 14 gunasthānas (moreover, it takes into account even the sub-types of karmus). But even the Satkhandāgama account of Karma doctrine, though most advanced so far as the Agamic texts are concerned is relatively simple when compared with the corresponding account of the texts like Pancasangraha, Dhavala and Jayadhavala.
Conclusion: the general subject-matter of the Āgamic texts and absolute chronology of the Age of Agamas:
Here we close our enumeration of instances purported to show that a historical attitude enables us to evaluate the pbilosophical Agamic texts better than would have been the case in the absence of such an attitude. · In the meanwhile we have been enabled to form a clear idea of what type
of problems the Agamic texts raise, what type they do not, what type of problems the old Āgamic texts raise, what type the new ones. In one word it can be said that an investigation into the nature of loka and aloka, pancāstikāya and kala, pudgala, jiva and karma, reality in general is the chief occupation of the Āgamic texts—the discussion in later texts being more systematic and comprehensive than that in the earlier ones. On the other hand the problems of anuyogadvāra, naya, niksepa and saptabhangt are exclusively a subject-matter of the later Āgamic texts (wbile it is in these very texts that the old problem of jñāna assumes the form of

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the problem of pramāna). However, before we study in details how these problems were indicated in the various Agamic texts let us say something about the absolute chronology of the Age of Agamas. In this connection what is most important is to determine the probable date of composition of Bhagavati, Prajñāpana, Anuyogadvara, Nandi, Avasyakaniryukti, Tattvarthasutra and Satkhanḍagama. For some of these texts-e. g. Bhagavati, Avasyakaniryukti and Satkhandagama-it is almost impossible to be the work of one author and even Prajñāpana might contain enough interpolations. But Tattvärthasutra is certainly the work of Umäsvati while Anuyogadvāra and Nandi likewise seem to have got their respective authors. Now Umasvati almost certainly belonged to 3rd-4th centuries A. D. and so in view of what has already been said it is not unreasonable to suppose that the material contained in the five texts Anuyogadvāra, Nandi, Avasyakaniryukti, Tattvärthasutra and Satkhandagama was produced at some period or other during the first four or five centuries of Christian era. Similarly reasonable seems to be the supposition that the Prajñāpana material was produced at some period or other during the last two pre-Christian centuries while the Bhagavati material was produced at some period or other during the last four or five pre-Christian centuries; (certainly Bhagavati possesses not only such passages as are contemporary with Prajñāpanā but also such ones as are posterior to it-though, of course, a large number of them decidedly came before Prajñāpanā). This whole reckoning might lack desirable precision but it should prove helpful so far as it goes. For example, we can now say that the three stages of the Age of Agamas have run their course as follows:
I First Stage (5th-2nd certuries B. C.)
II The Second Stage (2nd century B. C. to 1st century A. D.) III The Third Stage (1st-6th centuries A. D.)
II THE FIRST STAGE
Introductory :
As already indicated, we intend to work out the nature of the oldest phase of Jaina philosophical speculation chiefly on the basis of Bhagavati. But Bhagavati is not a homogeneous text and so the material contained in it needs a critical analysis. This we take up first. Afterwards, we examine the relevant material of certain minor texts that seem to be equally old.
(A) BHAGAVATÏSUTRA
The dialogues collected in Bhagavati broadly fall in two groups, viz. those couched in a terminology that is either largely non-technical or technical in its own way (these being mostly small in size), those couched in a terminology that is largely technical (some of these being

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rather small some rather big in size). But in the body of the text these dialogues are arranged neither subjectwise nor lengthwise (only we can say that those collected towards the end - i. e, in chapters 21st-41st are unusually big- and, of course, couched in a higher technical terminology). Moreover, quite frequently does it happen that the question raised is answerd not directly but by guiding the reader to some particular passage in another Āgamic text (the name of the text and the location of the passage being fully given). The question naturally arises as to what is signified by all this. It can be reasonably surmised that the dialogues couched in a non-technical language are oldest in origin, those couched in a technical language but not unusually big are intermediate in origin, while the upusually big ones are latest in orign. But why should there be no order in the arrangement of the material and why
ould the reader be so often guided to other Āgamic texts? It seems that the art of conducting theoretical discussion at a purely theoretical level was mastered by the Jaina scholars only gradually. The very adoption of the dialogue style for the purpose is a proof for that. But gradually the dialogue aspect of the affair grew less and less important--though in an utterly nominal form it occasionally appears even in a text like Prajñāpanā wbich is otherwise a collection of theoretical discussions conducted at a purely theoretical level. To begin with the dialogues in question must have been more popular than technical, towards the end they became more technical than popular. And since different dialogues are from different hands it is not unlikely that a comparatively early author composed a relatively more technical dialogue while a comparatively late one a relatively more popular one. But as a general rule it must have been the case that popular dialogues predominated in the beginning, technical ones towards the end. This might also explain why the same type of questions repeat themselves again and again in the different part of the text, but may be it is partly due to the fact that the different parts of the text were composed in the different circles of Jaina scholars. First only something like the later circumstance can explain why a question appears repeatedly even in those cases where the reader is simply guided to another Āgamic text for an answer. In any case, for some reason or other it must have been felt that these questions need being raised in the different parts of the text and the reader's next curiosity is whether these questions originally followed by an independent answer, for the Āgamic texts mentioned in this connection are more or less recent-e. g. Prajñāpanā, Jivajivabhigama, Jambüdvīpaprajñapti, Aupa pātika, Rajaprašniya, Anuyogadvāra, Nandi. In view of the fact that in so many cases the original discussions have been retained even if they also appear in a later Āgamic text-and naturally appear there in a relatively more systematic and comprehensive manner-it seems reasonable to suppose that these questions have been inserted where they have been by later scholars and at a time when the concerned Agamic texts had already come into existence. Viewed in this

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light, it is the old popular dialogues of Bhagavati that prove to be of the utmost importance inasumuch as they provide us with a due key as to the considerations that originally led the Jaina theoreticians to posit their fundamental concepts. Let us see how this approach towards the text enables us to have a better understanding of the concepts of loka-aloka, pañcāstikāya-cum kala, pudgala, jiva, karma and reality in general.
(i) Loka-aloka In the field of cosmography some of the most basic Jaina positions are that loka (world) has got a particular shape, that loka is surrounded by aloka (non-world), that loka and aloka are two beginningless and endless entities. It will be interesting to study how these positions have been defended in Bhagavati. In a characteristic fashion the text repeatedly appeals to Pārsva's authority when it lays down that loka is eternal or that such is its shape (pāsena arahayā purisādanienań sāsae loe buie etc )33—which seems to indicate that the Jainas were somehow keenly aware that these traditional views of theirs were a strikingly distinct feature of their world-picture. Equally revealing is the way these and the related views are sought to be indicated, for analogies have been used in this connection in an ample measure. Thus we are told that loka lies in the midst of aloka just as an island lies in the midst of an ocean, a ship lies in the midst of waters, a hole lies in the midst of a piece of cloth, shadow lies in the midst of sunshine. 3 4 Similarly, we are told that loka and aloka are co-eternal just as a hen and an egg are (inasmuch as an egg cannot come into existence without a hen nor a hen without an egg).88 Lastly, two analogies are employed to justify the Jaina bt lief that the earth rests on water, water on air, air on sky. For we are told that a leather-pot can possibly contain air in its lower half and water in the upper half (the actual experiment being described in details) 36 while with the help of a water-filled leather-pot a man can float on water (again, the actual experiment being described in details) 3 7; the first analogy demonstrates that water can rest on air, the second that the earth can rest on water. We have already taken note of the dialogue where it has been argued that a god standing at the far end of loka cannot move about his limbs inside aloka because the latter is an empty region ; we have also surmised that these dialogues represent a stage when the concepts of dharma and adharma had not yet been posited. In any case, there is no dialogue in Bhagavati which argues that things from loka do not intrude into aloka because the latter lacks dharma and ad harma. Of course, in a number of dialogues it is described how dharma, adharma and the remaining astikāyas go to fill up loka and aloka, but that is a description of astikāy.as rather than that of loka and aloka. As for the detailed information about the composition etc. of the various regions of loka it is overwhelmingly mytho. logical in nature and we can take leave of it,
J.O..,5

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(i) Pañcāstikāya-cum-kāla .. Philosophically the most important Jaina concept is that of pañcāstikāyacum-kala and it deserves a thorough consideration. In their search for the basic types of reals Jaina scholars must have started with jiva (soul) and pudgala (matter) but the search came to an end only when three additional concepts-viz.dharma (the medium of motion), adharma (the medium of stoppage), ākasa (the medium of location-were posited. Thus came into existence the elaborated doctrine of five astikāyas. A number of Bhagavati dialogues go to testify that the early Jainas were much exercised over the fact that they had to speak of things like dharma, adharma and akaśa which were visible to dobody or as they naively put it, 'on which nobody could sit, stand, rest or lie down'. 33 They felt reassured only when it was pointed out to them that there are things like sound, smell and air which are visible to nobody and yet exist. We have already referred to the thesis that there are ten things which in their entirety are known and seen only by an omniscient person. The first eight of these are ontological categories and are (1) dharmastikāya (2) adharmāslikāya (3) akāśastikāya (4) soul apart from body (5) physical atom (6) sound (7) smell (8) air. The meaning of the catalogue was clear, viz, that basically speaking the doctrine of five astikāyas was to be accepted on faith in the omniscience of a Jaina teacher like Mahavira who had propounded it. But the details of the doctrine could well be defended on rational grounds and this is what was actually done at length. However, as regards dharma and adharma little was attempted beyond saying that they were respectively the medium of motion and that of stoppage. Only in one rare passage of Bhagavati was a catalogue drawn of the activities of the form of motion and of those of the form of stoppage-of-motion, the former included 'coming, going, speaking, blinking, mental activity, Vocal activity, bodily activity', the latter 'standing, sitting, lying down, mental concentration'39. But even here it is puzzling why the catalogue remained confined to voluntary activities undertaken by a living being-for certainly the belief is that even purely physical activities are due to dharma and adharma. On the other hand, the concept of akasa was in a way fundamental. For whenever there was the need for saying that a thing exists in spaceand there is nothing that does not exist in space--the meaning was that it exists in akasa; this is the meaning of the statement that akāśa is the receptacle of all things-- living and otherwise (āgāsatthikāe nam jivadavvāņa ya ajavadavvāņa ya bhāyaṇabhūe)* *. Lastly, the concepts of pudgala and jiva were again fundamental and obviously so, but they deserve independent treatment- each on its own account.
In this connection there also arises the question of the ontological status of time. In Bhagavatī time (its favourite word for it being addhāsamaya) is frequently mentioned along with the five astikāyas. Thus its list of ajīvas or

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ajīvadravyas always includes dharma, adharma, akaša, pudgala, addhāsamaya while its list of sarvadravyas always includes these five plus jiva. This means that five astikāyas are astikāyas as well as dravyas while addhāsamaya is dravya (and ajīvadravya at that) but po astikaya, The situation is somewhat puzzling and the simple fact seems to be that the importance of time as a basic ontological category occurred to the Jaina scholars only in the course of time- that is, at a time by which the list of five astikayas had become well established. Otherwise, there seems to be little reason why the Jainas should have one list of basic reals with five items and another one with these very items plus time. The later Ŝvetāmbara authors argue that dharma, adharma etc. are called astikāya because they are made up of co-existing units while addhāsamaya is not so called because it is made up of units of which no two ever co-exist. of this argument there is no hint in Bhagavati or any other Agamic text. Nay, there is at least one Bhagavati passage with assertions which presuppose that addhasamaya is made up of co-existing units 41-thus substantially supporting the later Digambara authors who however on their part argue that time is not an astikāya because its units even if co-existing with each other do not touch each other. It seems that in the context of the present question the later authors--Svetāmbara as well as Digambara-have sought to see a distinction which was originally not there. Be that as it may, in the ontological speculations of Bhagavati addhasamaya (i, e, time) is as fundamental a concept as akasa (i. e, space)--for everytbing whatsoever must exist not only in space but also in time.
(iii) Pagdala In Bhagavati the astikāya pudgala (matter) receives treatment in two contexts--one when matter as such is under description, the other where matter as used by a living being. In view of the widely different issues raised in the two contexts it will be better to take them up separately.
Regarding matter as such we are told that it is possessed of colour, taste, smell, touch and is available in the form of either an atom or a multiatomic aggregate. Again, aggregate might be either subtle or gross. Neither an atom nor a subtle aggregate can be subjected to a gross physical process like cutting into pieces, burning, wetting etc. 42 and neither is visible to an ordinary mortal; 4 3 moreover, of the four possible pairs of touch only two, viz. smooth-rough, hot-cold can possibly be present in either in the case of an atom only one touch from each pair is possible, in the case of a subtle aggregate even both are possible). 4 4 The number of atoms in a subtle aggregate might range from two to infinite ; on the other hand, a gross aggregate must necessarily be made of an infinite number of atoms 48. Lastly, any number of atoms---from one to infinite--can occupy one unit of space (i. e. one pradeśa of akaša) 4 8.

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These fundamental tenets of Jaina atomism have their own significance but in Bhagavatī much attention is not devoted to them as such but to certain arithmatical computations related to them, computations which in fact are simple corollaries to the tenets themselves. 47 Thus in one extremely lengthy dialogue it is shown in how many ways an aggregate made up of this or that number of atoms can break up into this or that number of parts-e. g. in how many ways a ten-atomic aggregate can break up into four parts 48. Similarly, another lenghty dialogue shows in how many ways 5 possible colours, 5 possible tastes, 2 possible smells, and 8 possible touches can exhibit themselves in an aggregate made up of this or that number of atoms. 9 Both these are cases of simple arithmatical computation but they have been treated at full length and this suggests that the atomic hypothesis as well as the arithmatical computation in question were then considered something of a novelty. In Prajñāpanā the arithmatical computations undertaken in this connection concern comparatively more important aspects of the atomic hypothesis--and this suggests that by that time the hypothesis was rather well established. But in Bhagavatí even the elementary treatment of matter in terms of the atomic hypothesis is a somewhat later phenomenon; as a matter of fact, this is one reason why one must cast doubt on the validity of the later explanation that the astikāya is so called because it is a composite made up of co-existing units. What is more probable is that dharma, ad harma, akāša, pudgala and jiva were first posited on the basis of certain independent considerations and were later conceived as made up of indivisible units.
Coming now to the question of matter as used by a living being it seems that this is the question that first engaged the attention of Jaina theoreticians (the question of atomic composition of matter being one that arose next). The first idea to occur in this connection was that a living being requires matter by way of nourishment and breathing (it being also understood that nourishment goes to build up body and sense-organs); 50 somewhat more sophisticated consideration led to the belief that a living being also requires matter by way of speech and thought. 1 In Bhagavati the question is raised on several occasions and in several ways but every time these (or some of these) turn out to be the activities that a living being is supposed to perform with the help of matter.62
(iv) Jiva A most conspicuous feature of Jaina theory of matter is that it does not view earth, water, fire and air as four basic types of matter, a most conspicuous feature of the Jaina theory of soul is that it views earth, water, fire, air and plants as one particular type of living beings. Thus in the eyes of Jaina theoreticians a glass full of water is a colony of living beings of the

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
37
water-type just as a glass full of ants is a colony of living beings of the ant-type; in both cases the beings concerned are an amalgum of a body and a soul (the ditference between them being that the former possess just one sense-organ viz. tactile, the latter three of them viz. tactile, gustatory and olfactory, Bhagavati evinces a keen awareness of the peculiarity of the Jaina position in question and hence frequently seeks to reassure the reader that the position is nevertheless valid. 58 So whenever it undertakes a detailed description of any sort of animate activity it classifies the world of living beings into five types, viz. one-sensed, two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed five-sensed (the earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plant-bodied beings constituting the first type). Generally speaking, those animate activities are of five sorts, viz. (1) bodily (2) cognitive (3) emotive (4) conative (5) affective. However, quite frequently the first and the fifth are left out of account when the general qualities of a soul are being treated-while the second alone is taken into account when the matter has to be put in one word 54. These positions and attitudes are not peculiar to Bhagavati, for they also make their appearance in later texts. But what is noteworthy is the rather unconventional form in which they appear in Bhagavati (they in fact appearing here in so many forms on so many occasions). For example, we have earlier taken note of a list of 23 topics of investigation that appears in Bhagavati. Now ten of these items were later picked out to give an exhaustive account of soul, and to them were added five more which too appear in an enlarged version of the orginal list of 23. On a closer examination it seems that the present group of ten
ems and the one of five are each selfsufficient and that their juxtaposition is sheer mechanical. Thus the first group included following items : (1) Närakiya
(6) Jñana (2) Karma
(7) Sanjña (3) Leśya
(8) Sarira (4) Drsti
(9) Yoga (5) Darśana
(10) Upayoga Of these (1), (2), (8) covered bodily activities, (5), (6), (10) cognitive ones, (3), (4), (7) emotive ones, (9) conative ones. Similarly, the second group included following items :
(1) 18 vices from prāņāti pata down to mithyadarśanasalya (2) Freedom from these 18 vices
Autpattiki, Vainayiki, Karmiki, Pariņāmiki (4) Avagraha, Tha, Avāya, Dhāraņā (5) Utihāna, Karma, Bala, Virya, Puruşakāraparakrama
Of these (1), (2) covered emotional and emotion-free) activities, (3), (4) cognitive ones, (5) conative ones. The noteworthy point is that this whole

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
way of presenting the problem is unknown to the later authors. And the case is not isolated,
(v) Karma The Karma doctrine in the form in which it appears in Bhagavati deserves serious study, for it offers us an inkling into the considerations that led to its first formulation. The idea at the root of the doctrine is that a bad act catches hold of the soul of the agent concerned and does not leave it until this agent has suffered the ill consequences of his misdeed. Revealing in this connection is the phrase "vairena sprştah" which Bhagavati frequently employs to describe the net result of some wrong done by one being to another; the being committing the wrong is touched (meaning caught hold of) by the enmity of the being who is wronged. The same phrase in its generalised form "kriyayā sprstah” is employed to describe the net result of a wrong act as such (kriyā being the word for wrong act). And in the technical language of the Karma doctrine-a language which also of. ten makes its appearance in Bhagavati--the soul of the person committing a wrong act is permeated by the coresponding karma-of-the-form-of-physical-particles. This aspect of the matter is brought out most clearly in the Bhagavati passages touching upon the problem of karma 58. On the other hand, the details of the Karma doctrine that appear here are often partly and often unrecongizable. The conclusion is inevitable that these details took time to grow and there was some stage or other when some of them stood in the form that is palpably defferent from their final standardised form. For example, a lengthy Bhagavati passage (rather collection of passages), to which reference has already been made, describes in great destails the qualifications of one who is going to attain first omniscience and then mokşa, and it is in this very connection that the later karma specialists decribe the qualifications of a kșa pakaršeni-ārohi ( incidentally of an upaśamaśreņi-arohi); but the former description is so strikingly different from the latter that it can at best be called its remote ancestors 7. And there are other similar cases though not so important. For example, Bhagavati too often speaks of a karma-type called känkșa-mohaniya but no karma-type of the name is known to the later authors; the context makes it clear that what is being described is what the later authors call darśanamohaniya and the conclusion is that there was a time when darśanamohanīya was called kankşamohantya.
(vi) Reality in General In view of its rather advanced technical nature it seems reasonable to suppose that the doctrine of dravja, pradeśa and paryāya came on the scene later than the comparatively simple doctrine of five astıkāyas, of course, it was these very five astikayas (plus time that were viewed in terms of dravja, predeśa and prayāya but that they were so viewed is signi. ficant; for thus started the process that culminated in a clear recognition of three important ontological category-couples, viz. (i) substance and pro

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
39
perty, (ii) composite and component, (iii) space and time. Thus it was rea
at whatever exists must be a substance-possessed-of-properties and that a substance can belong to any of the following types : (1) dharma, (2) adharma, (3) akaśa, (4) pud gala-paramānu, (5) pudgala-skandha (6) jiva, (7) addhāsamaya. Similarly, it was realised that almost all types of substances can in a way be treated as composites but that five different cases must be recognised in this connection: (1) Dharma, adharma and akasa are composites whose components re
main fixed in location as well as number (and they are always
the same). (2) A jiva is a composite whose components remain fixed in number
but not in location (and they are always the same). (3) A pudgala-skandha is a composite whose components remain fixed
neither in number nor in location (which means that they are not
always the same). (4) A pudgala-para nāņu is not at all a composite. (5) An addhasamaya is not at all a composite.
[Here it was also made clear that (3) was the only case where a substance had other substances for its component parts and sometimes it was felt that this was the only case where the category-couple 'composite and component' was strictly applicable).
Lastly, it was realised that whatever exists must occupy units (at least one unit) of space and units (at least one unit) of time; (of course, space cannot occupy a unit of itself, nor can time do so). In this background were developed the concepts 'unit of property' (bhāva pradeśa), 'unit of com. ponent-of-the-form-of-substance' (dravya pradeša), 'unit of space' (kşetrapradesa), 'unit of time' (kala pradeša); (the second type of unit was possible only in the case of a physical composite). All this made for a basic clarification of ontological issues and all this is somehow present in Bhagavati58, But it was a far cry from Tattvārtha type of pointed query as to the nature of reality in general, a query to which reply there came in the form "all that is real must be possessed of origination, destruction, permanence".
Here we close our critical analysis of philosophical content of Bhagavati and proceed to take up the material contained in certain minor texts that appear to be old. For certain reasons it will be convenient to consider these texts in the following order : Ācārāngasūtra, Dasavaikälikasüra, Sūtrakştāngasūtra.
(B) ĀCĀRĀNGASŪTRA Ācārängasūtra is a text almost exclusively devoted to the problems of conduct but the first adhyayana of its first srutaskandha touches upon ques

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
tions that have some philosophical bearing. And in view of the utmost sanctity attached to this part of the text it will be instructive to note what it has to say in this connection. The reader's attention is here drawn to the fact that the living beings are of six types, viz. earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied, plant-bodied and mobile-bodied. Of course no arguments are forthcoming to corroborate the contention,
40
(C) DASAVAIKĀLIKASŪTRA
Dašavaikālikasutra too is a text almost exclusively devoted to the problems of conduct but in its chapter fourth it follows the procedure of the first adhyayana of the first śrutaskandha of Acarangasutra and draws the reader's attention to the fact that the living beings are of the above-mentioned six types.
(D) SŪTRAKṚTĀNGASŪTRA
Sutrakṛtängasūtra is a text of somewhat different sort. On the whole it is meant to train up beginners on the questions of doctrine--chiefly ethical ones. As such it sometimes raises questions of a philosophical nature. Its first śrutaskandha is older than the second one (by the way, the same is the case with Acarangasūtra), and in the first śrutaskandha one occasionally comes across a bare assertion to the effect that the living beings are of six types (it thus following the pattern of the earlier mentioned portions of Acaranga and Dašavaikālika). But in the second śrutaskandha the matter has been gone into a bit more deeply. Thus its third adhyayana undertakes an elaborate description of the life-activities mainly the nourishing process- of the different types of living beings while its fourth adhayayana emphasises in the manner of the corresponding passages of Bhagavati -- that even the one-sensed beings (i.e. the earth -, water-, fire-, air-, plantbodied beings) are capable of performing immoral acts; similarly, its seventh adhyayana argues that a soul which is static-bodied in this life can become mobile-bodied in the next though these two broad classes of beings will always remain in existence. However, Sutrakṛtānga - in both its srutaskandhas -- also contains philosophical material of another type and as a matter of fact it is on account of this that the text has so often attracted the attention of the general students of Indian philosophy. Thus here we now and then come across an account of the non-Jaina philosophical doctrines like materialist, Sankhya, Vaiseṣika, Buddhist, Vedanta etc. Of course, these doctrines are seldom mentioned by name and the wording of the concerned account is often obscure; moreover, these doctrines are almost never subjected to a criticism on philosophical grounds (objections against them being raised on ethical grounds). This severely limits the importance of this part of Sutrakṛtänga for a study like the present one which is chiefly interested in tracing the evolution of the Jaina philosophical doctrines in and for themselves.

-

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
3 THE SECOND STAGE The second stage in the evolution of the age of Agamas is chiefly represented by Prajñāpanāsūtra. As has already been noted, the text is a collection of theoretical discussions conducted at a purely theoretical level and from the point of view of style this is definitely something of an advance when viewed in the backrgound of a text like Bhagavatí which is more or less tied down to the apron-strings of the dialogue style. Then there are certain minor texts which contain philosophical material and seem to have come into existence nearabout the time of Prajñāpanā. Let us therefore critically analyse first the content of Parjñāpanā and then the philosophical content of the minor texts in question.
(A) PRAJSẬPANASUTRA Prajñāpanā is divided into 36 chapters each of which is devoted to one topic but these chapters are arranged in no particular order. Moreover, even while certain parts of the text say things about loka-aloka, pañcäsati. kāya-cum-kala and pudgala no independent chapters are devoted to them and as a result it looks as if the whole discussion is related to the world of living beings. With a view to clearly seeing the advancement made by Prajñāpanā over Bhagavati in its treatment of topics it will be better if its content is analysed under the same heads as were employed while analysing the content of Bhagavati.
(i) Loka-aloka Twice does Prajñāpanā say things about loka and aloka and they are symptomatic of the dominant interests developed by the Jaina theoreticians of the period. There was no more the question of justifying a belief in the existence of loka and aloka - or that of the contents that filled them-; this existence was just taken for granted and the task was to draw simple corollaries from the supposed existence --moreover, corollaries chiefly based on the consideration that things of the universe are composites made up of units. Thus in the chapter 15th (viz. Indriyapada ) devoted to a treatment of sense-organs (and it is not at all clear why here the question is raised whether loka is or is not touched by dharma, a part of dharma, the units of dharma, by adhrama, a part of adharma, the units of adharma, by akāśa, a part of akāša, the units of akāśa, by the staticbodied being, by the mobile-bodied beings, by addhāsamaya; and the question is repeated about aloka, Jambūdvīpa and the remaining dvipas. 6 9 To appre. ciate the answers forthcoming we have to remember that x is touched by y in case x and y are co-terminus in space, x is touched by a part of y in case x and a part of y are co-terminus in space, x is touched by the units of y în case x is co-terminus with certain units of y (possibly with all of
J. 0...6

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
its units). This will cover the case of dharma, adharma and ākāša. As for the static-bodied and mobile-bodied beings x is touched by one group or the other in case its members are to be found throughout the expanse of x. Lastly, x is touched by addhāsamaya in case x happens to lie within the region called sama yakşetra ( consisting of the two innermost world-oceans along with the related two world-continents and a half ). In the other concerned passage occurring in the chapter 10th (viz. Caramapada) the issues raised are even more far-fetched. For here it is supposed that both loka and aloka are made up of a border-region and an intermediate region and the question is raised about the relative numerical strength of the dravyas lying within the border-region of loka; those lying within its intermediate region, those lying within the border-region of aloka, those lying within its intermediate region, all these dravyas taken together the prodešas lying within the border-region of loka, those lying within its intermediate region, the pradešas lying within the border-region of aloka, those lying within its intermediate region, all these pradešas taken together. The calculation forthcoming is based on the supposition that the border-region of loka as well as aloka is made up of asankhyāta dravyas and asankhyāta X asankhyāta pradeśas ( but in both cases the number being slightly bigger for aloka ):61 on the other hand, the intermediate region of loka as well as aloka is made up of just one substance while the number of pradeśas isasankhyāta X asankhyāta X asankhyāta in the case of loka and ananta in that of aloka. However, the entire discussion remains obscure on the most crucial question arising in this connection, viz. what is meant by the border region and the substances lying within it, what is meant by the intermediate region and the one substance lying within it?
(ii) Pañcāstikāya-cum-samaya About pañcāstikāya and samaya things have been said on three occas. ions but on two of them (viz. chapters I and V) there is given a bare enumeration of the items possible in one's connection, viz. jīva and 14 ajivas as follows: (1) dharma (2) a part of dharma (3) the units of dharma (4) adharma (5) a part of adharma (6) the units of adharma (1) akaša (8) a part of akāša (9) the units of akāsa (10) pudgalaskandha (2 physical aggregate ) (11) a part of pudgalaskandha (12) the units of pudgalaskandha (13) pudgala paramānu (14) addhāsamaya; 6 2 ( we had just met ten of these items in connection with our first discussion related to loka and aloka ). A more detailed discussion of the problem occurs in the chapter 3rd (viz, Alpabahutva). 63 Here the question is raised about the relative numerical strength of the following items :
(1) dharma in its capacity as substance (one or many) (2) adharma (3) akaśa

Page #56

(4) jiva (5) pudgala
THE AGE OF AGAMAS
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(6) addhasamaya
(7) dharma in its capacity as so many pradesas
(8) adharma
(9) ākāśa
(10) jiva
(11) pulgala (12) addhasamaya
(1) sarvajiva (sarva=all) (2) sarvapudgala
(3) sarva-addhasamaya
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In this connection it was
maintained that the items (1), (2) and (3) are unitary, (7) and (8) are asankhyāta, (4) is ananta times (7)-(8), 10 is asankhyāta times (4), (5) is anania times (10), (11) is asankhyāta times (5), (6) and (12) are ananta times (11), (9) is ananta times (6) and (12). It is obvious that so many suppositions have been made here but one of them deserves comment. The later Jaina theoreticians invariably treat ananta as a definite number and so it can be understood why the number of jivas or that of ākāśa pradeśas should be ananta. But then it becomes difficult to see how addhasamaya can consist of ananta units. For addhasamaya must consist of unending units, that is, of units that can be called ananta only in a non-technical sense. To make matter still more difficult of comprehension ākāśa pradeśas are supposed to be ananta times the number of addha. samaya unites; (it would have made some sense if just the opposite was the case). Be that as it may, soon afterwards we are offered the following list of items arranged in the order of numerical strength :
(4) sarvadravya
(5) sarvapradesa
(6) sarva paryāya6 +
43
Here (2) is ananta times (1), (3) ananta times (2), (4) a little more than (3), (5) anania times (4), (6) ananta times (5); (here (4) is only a little more than (3) because each addhasamaya is already a dravya so that an addition of even all the remaning dravyas would not make much difference to the number that already characterises addhasamaya). This list is noteworthy because it indicates as to what aspect of the important problem of dravya, pradeśa and paryaya was being emphasised in the times of Prajñāpanā.
(iii) Pudgala
A general information regarding pudgala is offered in the chapters 1st and 13th (viz. Prajñāpanāpada and Pariņāmapada). In the former chapter following are said to be the generic properties of pudgala: 5 colours, 5 tastes, 2 smells, 8 touches and 5 shapes; 65 in the latter chapter the following ones are added: sabda (i. e. speech), bandha (binding), gati (motion), bheda (splitting), agurulaghu (being neither-heavy-nor-light). That speech is made

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
up of physical particles is an old Jaina position and an independent chapter of Prajñāpanā (the 11th viz. Bhāṣāpada) is devoted to the problem. Under the head binding' is here described the process of atomic bondage as a result of which multi-atomic aggregates come into existence. Motion is classified into long and short (dirgha and hrasva) on the one hand and into 'touch-producing' and 'non-touch-producing' (s prsadgati and as prśadgali) on the other; the meaning of the latter classification is not clear. Under the head 'splitting' are described five ways in which a physical body might disintegrate. As for agurulaghu it characterises only certain types of physical substances (really speaking, only those ones which belong to the subtle type --- as described in Bhagavati); on the other hand, it invariably characterises all the remaining astikāyas as well as addhāsamaya.
In the chapter 5th (viz. Višeşapada) another aspect of the problem is touched upon. For here an enumeration is made of the counts on which two physical bodies might be compared with each other; and the following list of five items was drawn up in this connection :
(i) being a substance (ii) possessing pradeśas (i. e. being made up of constituent atoms) (iii) possessing a size (i. e. occupying akaša pradeśas) (iv) possessing a duration (i. e. occupying addhāsamayas) (v) possessing a property (i, e. possessing degrees of a property)
Moreover, it was laid down that there are following six ways in which two quantities x and y might differ from each other,
(i) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent
to
X
to sankhyata (ii) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent
"asankhyāta (iii) y might be more than x or less than x by an amount equivalent
to
to
ananta
(iv) y might be equivalent to
O
- Sankhvata or x X sankhyata
(v) y might be equivalent to
the or x X asankhyāta asunkhyāta
poor x X ananta
(vi) y might be equivalent to
Now two physical bodies must be equivalent to each other in respect of being a substance, for certainly each of them must be one substance. On ther other hand, it is possible for two such bodies to differ from each

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
other in respect of possessing constituent-atoms, size, duration, degree-ofa-property. In the first and fourth cases the concerned difference can exhibit all the six above-enumerated ways, but in the second and third cases two ways which involve the number ananta are not possible; this is so because a physical body can possibly be made up of ananta constituent-atoms and can possibly possess ananta degrees of a property but it cannot occupy more than asankhyata akaśa pradeśas, and cannot last for more than asankhyata samayas. 67
In the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutvapada) an account was given first
e relative numerical strength of physical bodies lying in the three regions of the world - viz, upper region, middle region, lower region and then of the relative numerical strength of physical bodies lying in ten directions of the world - viz. south, south-east, east, north-east, west, southwest, north, north-west, upper, lower. 6. But these accounts are based on so many obscure considerations and we might ignore them. Then the same question -- that is, the question of relative numerical strength was raised about the physical bodies made up of this or that number of constituentatoms, those occupying this or that number of space-units, those occupying this or that number of time-units, those possessing this or that number of units-of-a-property.9 In each case the net result was a list arranged in order. The first list had following seven items :
(1) substances made up of ananta atoms (2) atoms constituting the substances listed in (1) (3) loose atoms (4) substances made up of sankhyāta atoms. (5) atoms constituting the substances listed in (4) (6) substances made up of asankhyāta atoms (7) atoms constituting the substances listed in (6)
(Here (2) is ananta times (1), (3) ananta times (2), (4) sankhyāta times (3), (5) sankhyāta times (4), (6) asankhyāta times (5), (7) asankhyāta times (6)]. The second list had following six items:
(1) substances occupying one space-unit (2) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (1) (3) substances occupying sankhyāta space-units (4) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (3) (5) substances occupying asankhyāla space-units (6) space-units occupied by the substances listed in (5)
[ Here (1) and (2) are equal, (3) is sankhyāta times (2), (4) sankhyāla times (3), (5) asankhyāta times (4), (6) asankhyāta times (5) ). The third list was identical with the second—with "time-unit' substituted for 'space-unit'. In the case of the fourth list a distinction was

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46
JAINA ONTOLOGY
made between the properties hard-touch, soft-touch, heavy-touch, and light-touch on one hand and the remaining ones on the other. And it was laid down that the relative numerical strength of the substances possessing a degree of the latter of these properties follows the above first list while that of the substances possessing a degree of the former follows the above second list. For example, among the substances possessing the mini. mum degree of black colour least numerous are the ananta-atomic aggregates, ananta times them their constituent atoms, ananta times them loose atoms, etc. etc. Similarly, among the atoms possessing the minimum degree of hard touch least numerous are those occupying one space-unit, the same is the number of the space-units occupied by them, sankhyāta times them are the substances occupying sankhyala space-units, etc. etc.
In the chapter 10th (viz. Caramapada) the question was raised as to how the features carama, acarama and ayaktavya are exhibited by physical bodies in their capacity as atomic aggregates 70. As will become clear later on the features in question are to some extent technical concepts. But broadly speaking, a carama atom is an atom lying in the border region, an acarama atom one lying in the intermediate region, an avaktavya atom one indescribable either way. Here it was supposed that each of these features can appear single, they can appear in twos, or they can appear all together; again, it was supposed that each of these features can appear either in one part of the concerned body or in more than one part of it. Now arithma. tical computation shows that thus conceived these features can appear single in six ways, they can appear in twos in twelve ways, they can appear all together in eight ways. But let these alternatives be worked out in details so that it can be seen as to which of them are supposed impossible and what is the minimum number of atoms required to yield each possible alternative :
I Six cases of each feature appearing single : Name
Shape
Minimum Number
of atoms
(1) one carama
(2) one acara na
(3) one avaktavya
(4) many caramas
(5) many acaramas (6) many avaktavyas

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
47
II Twelve cases of the three features appearing in twos: Name
Shape Minimum Number
of Atoms
(7) one carama
- one acarama
=
5
(8) one carama
- many acaramas
ololo
(9) many caramas
- one acarama
(10) many caramas
- many acaramas
(11) one carama
- one avaktavya
lool
(12) one carama
- many avaktavyas
(13) many caramas
- one avaktavya

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
(14) many caramas
- many avaktavyas
(15) one acarama
-one avaktavya
(16) one acarama
- many avaktavyas
(17) many acaramas
- one avaktavya
(18) many acaramas
- many avaktavyas
III Eight cases of the three features appearing together :
Name
Shape
Minimum Number
of Atoms
(19) one carama
- one acarama - one avaktavya
101010
=
6
(20) one carma
one acarama many avaktvya
(21) one carama
many acaramas one avaktavya
=
7
lol
lol

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THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
(22) one carama
- many acaramas - many avaktavyas
=
8
(23) many caramas
- one acarama - one avaktavya
(24) many caramas
- one acarama - many avaktavyas
(25) many caramas
- many acaramas - one avaktavya
=
5
(26) many caramas
many acaramas many avaktavyas
0101010
Thus there are 18 possible alternatives in all, and in many of them it is obvious why an atom is given one of the designations in question but in some of them (i, e, in the alternative 7th the practice adopted is merely conventional. Moreover, the above list along with diagrams shows what is the minimum number of atoms required to yield a particular alternative. So when we recall that a space-unit can contain any number of atoms it becomes obvious that the same number of atoms can be arranged in terms of more than one of the above alternatives. The simple rule of thumb in this connection is that a given number of atoms will yield all these alter. natives whose minimum requirement is that same number of atoms or less. For example, six atoms will yield the alternatives 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26. [ Incidentally it might be noted that here we come across features which look something like those that later og
J. O...7

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50
JAINA ONTOLOGY appear in the Saptabhangi doctrine and yet the present discussion nothing to do with the doctrine in question ].
has
There are the cases (at least they are the most important such cases) where Prajñāpanā says things about matter as such. The question of matter as used by a living being should better be taken up in connection with the consideration of the nature of soul; for there a special sub-section will be devoted to the bodily activities undertaken by a living being.
(iv) Jiva
As has already been hinted, the whole of Prajñāpanā looks like a prolonged treatment of the nature of soul. Those parts of certain chapters which touch upon the problems of Loka-aloka, pañcāstikāya-cum-kala and pudgala we have already considered in some details; the six chapters dealing with the various aspects of the Karma doctrine we intend to take up separately. But barring these two text-portions it can certainly be said that the whole of Prajñāpanā says something or else about soul. It will be convenient to divide the Prajñāpapa treatment of soul into the following six parts and take them one by one for special consideration,
(1) General (2) Bodily activities (3) Cognitive activities
(4) Emotive activities (5) Conative activities (6) Affective activities
(1) General
Almost all general information that Prajñāpanā has to offer con. cerning the world of living beings is concentrated in its first five chapters that fittingly serve as an introduction to the whole text. This is to be supplemented by what is said in the important chapter 13th (viz. Pariņāmapada). The chapter 1st (viz. Prajñāpanāpada) presents an elaborate classification of the animate world (a world that naturally includes the earthbodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied, air-bodied and plant-bodied beings), the chapter 2nd (viz. Sthānapada) yields information as to which parts of the world are inhabited by this or that class of living beings, the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutvapada) does the same about the relative numerical strength of the different classes of living beings, the chapter 4th (viz. Sthitipada) does the same about the life-duration of the different classes of living beings. All these details -- dogmatic for the most part -- deserve close perusal, for one ignorant of them can make little head or tail of much that goes in the name of Āgamic ontological speculation. But specially noteworthy in this connection are certain methodological tendencies. While undertaking a classification of the living world Prajñāpanā usually speaks of 24 types arranged according to their place of residence. Thus we have :

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THE ACE OF AGAMAS (1) Nāraka (hell-born being) residing in the lower most part of: the
lower region of loka. (2-11) Ten classes of Bhavanapatideva (deva= god) residing in the upper
most part of the lower region of loka. (12-21) prthvi (earth), jala (water), agni (fire), vāyu (air), vanaspati (plant),
dvindriya (two-sensed being), trīndriya (three-sensed being), calurindriya (four-sensed being), pañcendriyatiryak (five-sensed animal), manuşya
(man) mostly residing in the lower part of the middle region of loka, (22) Vyantaradeva mostly residing in the upper part of the middle region
of loka. (23) Jyotişkadeva residing in the uppermost part of the middle region
of loka. (24) Vaimānikadeva residing in the upper region of loka.
As can easily be seen this classification has got grave mythological undertones but it is an old one inasmuch as it is usually present in Bhaga
But in the important and basic chapter 1st of Prajñāpanā a better classification appears which speaks of the following main types :
Ekendriya (one-sensed being), dvīndriya, trindriya, caturindriya, pancendriya — the last sub-divided into nāraka (hell-born being), tiryak (animal), manuşya (man) and deva (god); it is made use of in the chapters 2nd and 3rd as well and once at least it too appears in Bhagavati. This new classification also takes note of the sub-classes sūkşma (subtle) and badara (gross) (to be found only among the class ekendriya) and of the sub-classes paryapta (fully developed) and aparyāpta (partly developed) (to be found among all the five classes). It thus approaches quite near the later list of 14 jivasthanas, but in order to actually become the latter it will have to subdivide the class pañcendriya into sanjñi (possessing higher cognitive capacity) and asaññi (not possessing higher cognitive capacity) rather than into nāraka, tiryak, manuşya, deva. And on this question Prajñāpanā adopts a rather odd usage, for it speaks of the sub-classes sanni and asaññī not only in the case of tiryak and manuş ya but also in that of nāraka and deva, and unless this practice is given up the list of 14 jīvasthānas cannot emerge. Of course, when Prajñāpanā uses the words sañjña and asañiñi in its account of nāraka and deva it is not using them in their natural meaning, but its manner of thus speaking does suggest that the idea has not occurred to it that the sub-division of the class pañcendriya into saññ and asaññi is a basically important subdivision. And for our present purpose this is all that matters,
Again, in the chapter 3rd Prajñāpanā speaks of the relative numerical strength of the classes of living beings posited by it earlier. But here it alsa

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takes into account the classes got by adopting 20 other schemes of classification and these are what the later Svetambara Agamic authors call 20 mārgaṇāsthānas.1 The following are the items occurring in the list of margaṇāsthānas :
52
(1) gati (class of animate being) (2) indriya (sense-organ) (3) kaya (body)
(4) yoga (activity)
(5) veda (sexual behaviour)
(6) kaṣāya (certain vices) (7) leśya (mental temperament) (8) samyaktva (faith)
(9) jñāna (determinate cognition) (10) darśana (indeterminate cognition) (11) syṁyama (moral discipline)
(12) upayoga (cognition)
(13) aharaka (undertaking nourishment) (14) bhāṣaka (capable of speaking)
(15) parita (having one body each)
(16) paryāpta (fully developed)
(17) sūkṣma (subtle)
(18) sañjn (possessing higher cognitive capacity)
(19) bhanya (capable of attaining mokṣa)
(20) carama (capable of attaining mokṣa)
12,
(The more famous list of 14 mārgaṇāsthānas excludes the item nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 20). Of course, Prajñāpana anomalously inserts the item astikaya (rather astikay-cum-kala) in between the 19th and 20th but that has to be ignored-even if the performance is similarly repeated in the chapter 18th (viz. Kayasthitipada). Now in this part of the discussion it is only in connection with the items 1-3 that we come across what might be called the natural classification of the living world; and in this part it is only such a classification that is in place. For in order to grasp the import of the remaining items of the list much secondary information will have to be collected first. It is not unlikely that this part of the discussion is a later interpolation - i. e. an interpolation made after the list of 20 marganasthanas was finally established.
In the chapter 13th (viz. Pariņāma pada) an enumeration of the basic properties of soul has been undertaken and a list of the following ten items has been drawn up in this connection:
(1) gati; (2) indriya (3) kaşaya (4) lesya (5) yoga (6) upayoga (7) jñāna (8) darsana (samyaktva) (9) caritra (samyama) (10) veda 2. Here the 24 classes

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of living beings have been taken up one by one and each studied in terms of the 10 items in question--a procedure reminiscent of the later authors' treatment of 14 jīvasthānas in terms of 14 märgaņāsthānas. All the 10 items in question appear in the later list of 20 mārgaņāsthānas (and only one viz. upayoga is absent in the later list of 14 märganāsthānas). This confirms the supposition that in the body of Prajñāpanā the discussions conducted in terms of 20 mārgaņāsthānas are a later interpolation; for otherwise the present chapter should have spoken of 20 rather than 10 items.
Lastly, we take up the information regarding the living world contained in the chapter 5th (viz. Višeșapada) 73. Here an enumeration has been made of the counts on which two souls might be compared with each other, and the following list of eight items was drawn up in this connection :
(i) being a substance (ii) possessing pradeśas (iii) possessing a size (iv) possessing a duration (v) possessing a physical property (vi) possessing jñāna (vii) possessing ajñāna (viii) possessing darśana;
(in the item (v) the physical property concerned is the property of the body possessed by a soul).
Let us recall that the corresponding list in the case of physical bodies consisted of the first five of these items; and the present list incidentally indicates that a soul's cognitive capacities are considered to be its most characteristic capacities. Any way, two souls must be equivalent in respect of being a substance and in respect of possessing so many pradeśas, but they might differ in respect of possessing bodily size, life-duration and cognitive capacity. Again, the last difference can occur in all the six possible ways, the first two in these minus the two that involve the number ananta. But in this part of the discussion Prajñāpanā does not rest content with saying this much, for here the 24 types of living beings have been taken up one by one and in each case it has been considered as to how the remaining two types of differences occur in company with the maximum bodily size, minimum bodily size, intermediate bodily size, how they do so in company with the maximum life-ducation, minimum life-duration, intermediate life-duration, how they do so in company with the maximum cognitive capacities, minimum cognitive capacities, intermediate cognitive capacities. In this connection much information about the possible bodily size, the possible life-duration and the possible cognitive capacities of the different classes of living beings has already been presupposed).

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
(2) Bodily Activities
Several chapters of Prajñapanã are devoted to the problems related to body as such or bodily activities and we take them one by one.
(i) The chapter 12th (viz. Sarirapada) first enumerates the five types of bodies and then it takes up the 24 classes of living beings one by one in each case asking as to how many bodies of this or that type it possesses at present, how many of them it has possessed in the past; the first information is interesting because it incidentally gives us the supposed number of beings belonging to the class in question.
(ii) The chapter 21st (viz. Avagahanapada) treats the problem of bodily size. Here we are informed about the maximum and minimum bodily sizes possible in this or that class of living beings, then about the relative numerical strength of the five types of bodies, then about the relative numerical strength of the respective minimum sizes of the five types of bodies, lastly about the relative numerical strength of the respective maximum sizes of the five types of bodies.
(iii) The chapter 9th (viz. Yonipada) describes the respective birthplaces of the different classes of beings. A being's birth-place can be the mother's womb but it need not be so-for the supposition is that many classes of being (e.g. naraka, deva, ekendriya, dvindriya, trindriya, caturindriya, and even some pañcendriya do not come out of the mother's womb). We are told that a being's birth-place might be either hot or cold or mixed, either animate or inanimate or mixed, either concealed or revealed or mixed.
(iv) The chapter 7th (viz. Ucchvāsapada) describes for each class of beings the maximum interval possible between one breathing and another.
(v) The chapter 28th (viz. Āhārapada) describes for each class of being the maximum interval possible between one feeding and another. Again, a distinction has been made between pre-birth feeding, feeding through skin, feeding through mouth, feeding through sheer desire also between voluntary feeding and involuntary feeding. And we are told as to which class of beings undertakes which of these types of feeding. This chapter also deals at length with a problem which has only nominal relation with that of feeding. The supposition is that a being undertakes no feeding while in the process of transmigration from one body to the next and here we are asked about a number of properties whether they can be had by one who is undertaking no feeding; obviously, the question amounts to asking whether the properties in question can be possessed by one who is in the process of transmigration from one body to the next, a question that has nothing to do with feeding as such.

-

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55
(vi) The chapter 34th (viz, Pravicāraṇāpada) is chiefly meant to convey information about the sexual behaviour of the living beings in general and gods in particular. But the discussion is largely rambling.
(vii) The chapter 11th (viz. Bhāṣāpada) contains miscellaneous information about language but towards the end details are laid down in order to bring out that speech is physical in nature. Many of the things said here are identical with those said in the chapter on feeding-thus emphasising that speaking and feeding are two essentially identical activities. Interesting in this connection is a formula which describes the general behaviour of the physical-particles-of-the-form-of-speech when they are being received by a being; this formula is old and of a very wide use as is evident from its extremely frequent occurrence in Bhagavats and on all possible occasions - that is, on all those occasions where the process of receiving physical particles in any form whatsoever is under description. In any case, in the present chapter we are told how one, when preparing oneself for speech, receives physical-particles-of-the-form-of-speech and how one, when actually speaking, expels these particles out.
(viii) The chapter 6th (viz. Vyutkrāntipada) contains information about births and deaths taking place in the different classes of living beings. Thus in connection with each of these classes we are here given the minimum and maximum periods during which no birth takes place, again the minimum and maximum periods during which no death takes place. Then we are given the minimum and maximum numbers for beings that can simultaneously be born in one class, again the minimum and maximum numbers for beings that can simultaneously die in it. Similarly, we are told about each class of living beings as to what possible classes a member of it could have belonged to in the previous birth, again as to what possi. ble classes a member of it can belong to in the next birth.
(ix) The chapter 18th (viz. Kayasthitipada) lays down the minimum and maximum periods for which one can continuously belong to a particular class of living beings. In this chapter – just as in the chapter 3rd (viz. Alpabahutyapada) - the enquiry is conducted not only in terms of the 24 well recognized classes of living beings but also in terms of the classes yielded by 20 mārganāsthānas. And just like that earlier enquiry this too was possibly a later interpolation.
(x) The chapter 28th (Antakriyāpada) first of all tells us as to the members of which classes of living beings can possibly attain mokşa in their next birth (one must be born as a human being in order to attain mokṣa in one's this very life); then we are given the minimum and maximum numbers for such members belonging to the classes in question. Again,

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JAINA ONTOLOGY
a list of nine increasingly nobler life-activities is drawn up and we are informed as to how many of them are possible-of-achievement-in-next-birth for a member of this or that class of living beings. Lastly, about certain particularly noble personages and certain particularly auspicious things (e. g. tīrthankara=the higher authority on matters religious and spiritual), cakravartī (world conqueror), 14 cakravartiratnas (jewels in possession of a world-conqueror) we are told as to which particular classes of living beings they could possibly have belonged to in their previous birth.
These are the Prajñāpanā passages which deal with what might be called - in some sense or other – the bodily activities undertaken by a living being.
(3) Cogntive Activities Several chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to cognitive activities and we take them one by one.
(i) The chapter 15th (viz. Indriyapada) in its major parts contains information about the physical make-up of sense-organs but it also raises certain questions that are of cognitive sigoificance. Thus we are here told that the object of visual senseorgan does not touch it, that of auditory senseorgan does touch it, while that of another sense-organ "touches it and also enters it.' Then we are told about the minimum and maximum distances that can possibly lie in between a particular sense-organ and its object, then about the relative numerical strength of the minimum and maximum periods characterising the cognition had through different sense-organs. Lastly, we are told that sensory cognition is completed through the following five stages : vyañjanāvagraha (initial grasping of the object), arthāvagraha (final grasping of the object), īhā (cogitation), avāya (determination), dhāraņā (retention) (the first stage being not possible in the case of cognition had through visual sense-organ — or of that had through manas).
(ii) In the chapter 29th (viz. Upayogapada) u payoga (i. e. cognition) is subdivided into sakāra (i. e. determinate) and nirakāra (i. e. indeterminate) and we are told that the sākāra upayoga of a samyagdrsti is to jñāna, that of a mithyādīşti ajñāna (there being five types of jñāna, three of ajñāna). On the other hand, nirakāra u payoga is to be called darśana (there being four types of it). Here we are also informed as to which types of jñāna, ajñāna and darśana are possible in the different classes of living
beings.
(iii) The chapter 30th (viz. Pasyattāpada) almost repeats the basic information contained in the chapter 29th — thus suggesting that paśyatta is virtually a synonym for upayoga. But there is one difference; the lowest type of jñāna, the lowest type of ajñāna and the lowest type of darśana are

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57
not to be called paśyatta -- that is to say, four types of jñāna, two types of ajñāna and three types of darśana are to be called pasyatlā. [ It is noteworthy that the concept of paśyatta is to be found in no other Jaina text except Prajnapana. ]
(iv) The chapter 31st (viz. Sanjñipada) is of cognitive significance because it enables us to know as to which classes of beings do and which do not possess manas -- the indispensable organ of all higher type of cognition. But as has already been noted, the nārakas and devas are here called sañjni not on the basis of their possession or non-possession of manas in this life (for in this life they all possess manas) but on the basis of their possession or non-possession of nanas in their previous life.
(v) The chapter 33rd (viz. Avadhipada) is devoted to avadhi — the type of extrasensory cognition which a non-omniscient can possibly have and to which special importance had been attached since olden days. Here we are first told that närakas and devas possess innate avadhi while tiryaks and manuş yas can possibly possess acquired avadhi. Then we are told about the minimum and maximum spatial ranges of avadhi possessed by the different classes of living beings--also about the shapes had by avadhi (really shapes had by the region falling within the range of avadhi) in these different cases. Again, we are told that närakas and devas must stand within the range of their avadhi, tiryaks must stand outside it, while man. usyas can behave either way; similarly, nārakas, devas and tiryaks must have partial avadhi but manuşyas can have either partial or complete avadhi (this corresponds to the old Bhagavati distinction between adhovadhika and paramāvadhika). Lastly, we are told that avadhi can be of eight types; of these five imply a possibility of change, three its non-possibility, and it is maintained that the acquired avadhi can belong to any of these eight types while the innate avadhi to the latter three alone,
These are the Prajñāpanā passages dealing with some aspect or other of cognitive activities.
(4) Emotive Activities Several chapters of Prajñāpanā are devoted to the problems related to emotive activities and we take them one by one.
(i) The chapter 14th (viz. Kaşayapada) contains information about four basic yices (technically called kaşaya), viz, anger, pride, deceit, greed.
(ii) The chapter 8th (viz. Sanjñāpada) contains information about ten basic vices (technically called sanjñā), viz. hunger, fear, sex-instinct, acquisitive instict, anger, pride, deceit, greed, loka, ogha (the precise import of the last two being not clear.)
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(iii) The chapter 22nd (viz. Kriyāpada) contains information about kriya (meaning vicious act) classified in two ways. Both classifications con
five items and in the case of each we are told as to which of them can or must go together and which cannot, In the case of the first classification we are told that the ultimate cause of the items in question are 18 vices, viz. prāņāti pāta down to mithyadarsinaśalya, that is, those 18 vices which had so often made their appearance in Bhagavati; (of course, both the present lists of kriya also frequently appear in Bhagavatī). The chapter also contains detailed information about the type of Karmic bondage experienced by one under the influence of this or that vice enumerated in the list of 18; but that is a part of the Karma doctrine.
(iv) The chapter 17th (viz. Lesyāpada) too should be treated as containing information about emotive activities inasmuch as the presence or otherwise of this or that leśyā is vitally dependent on the presence or otherwise of these or those types of kaşāya. Here we are told as to which types of leszā are possibly present in the different classes of living beings --- in the case of each class also the relative numerical strength of the members possessing different leśyās. A good part of the chapter is devoted to a description of leśyā viewed as a physical substance.
(v) The chapter 19th (viz. Samyaktvapada) too should be treated as containing information about emotive activities inasmuch as the acquisition of samyaktva is deemed possible only when worst type of kaṣāyas are got rid of. For the rest, it should be made clear that possession of samyaktva means possession of religious faith in the Jaina doctrine. In the present chapter, a threefold distinction is made between samyagdrsti (i. e. one possessing samyaktua), mithyādrsti (i, e. one lacking samyaktva) and saiyagmithyadrsti (i. e, one partially possessing samyaktva) and about each class of living beings we are told as to which of these three types are possibly present in it,
These are the Prajñāpanā passages dealing with some aspect or other of emotive activity.
(5) Conative Activities Two chapters of Prajāpanā are devoted to the problems related to cona. tive activities and we take them one by one.
(i) The chapter 16th (viz. Prayogapada) contains information about three types of activity, viz. mental, vocal, bodily. These are divided into 15 sub-types (the first into 4, the second into 4, the third into 7) and we are told as to which of these sub-types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings.
(ii) The chapter 32nd (viz. Samyatapada) contains information about three types of morally disciplined beings, viz perfectly disciplined (saṁyata),

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imperfectly disciplined (sam, atāsamyata), undisciplined (asamyata) and we are told as to which of these types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings.
(6) Affective Activities Just one chapter of Prajnapanā (the 35th, viz. Vedanāpada) is devoted to the problems related to affective activities. Here vedanā (i. e. feeling) is variously divided into types and in each case we are told as to which of the concerned types can be possibly present in this or that class of living beings. Following are the classifications offered in this connection :
I Hot, Cold, Hot-cum-Cold II Bodily, Mental, Bodily-cum-mental III Pleasant, Painful, Pleasant-cum-painful IV Voluntary, Involuntary
V Self-conscious, Not-selfconscious Here ends our hurried survey of the cases where Prajñāpanā says things
ul. As can be seen, these cases cover a major part of the text but with a view to keeping the discussion within manageable limits we have given comparatively less prominence to the problems that have little ontological bearing
(v) Karma In Prajñāpanā 5 consescutive chapters -- viz. 23rd - 27th - are devo. ted to a treatment of the Karma doctrine while the chapter 36th (viz. Samud. ghātapada) has also to do with the same. The Prajñāpanā treatment of karma is not so important for its own sake as for the sake of the light it throws on the historical evolution of the Karma doctrine. Certainly, what Prajñāpanā says in this connection is much more systematic and comprehensive than what Bhagavati says in its corresponding passages but it is so elementary when compared with the later karma-specialists' performance on the question. Revealing in its own way is the Prajñāpanā chapter 23rd (viz. Karmaprakrti pada which is supposed to enumerate the types and sub-types of Karmas and is divided into two sections. A closer study reveals that these two sections are in fact an earlier draft and a later draft of the solution of the same problem. The second section enumerates the types and sub-types in question in a way that is the same as found in the later Karma texts, but the first section exhibits certain oddities. Most striking is this latter section's enumeration of the sub-types of nāma karmas; the list runs as follows : (1) Subianama (auspicious namakarma): istasabda (desirable sound).
istarūpa (desirable colour), istagandha (desirable smell), isţarasa (desirable taste), iştasparśa (desirable touch), istagati (desirable motion), işgasthiti (desirable stature), iştalāvanya (desirable cometiness), işta

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yaśaḥkirti (desirable fame), iştautthana-karma-bala-virya-puruşakara. parākrama (desirable preparedness, action, strength, energy, manly valour), iştasvara (desirable voice), kantasyara (beautiful voice), priyasvara (lovable voice), manojñasvara (amiable voice) (14 items
in all). (2) Asubhanāma (inauspicious nämakarma); anişta (undesirable) sabda, ani.
starūpa,.........anistasvara, akāntasvara, hinasvara, dinasvara (again 14
items in all). This list is unknown to the later Karma-specialists but Bhagavati contains passages which represent a stage when it was in the process of being formulated. Thus in one passage are enumerated ten inauspicious experiences of a nāraka and they are the first ten items of the above sub-list of aśubhanamakarma;7+ again, another passage says that a newborn babe will
certain good or bad bodily traits in case he is in possession of the corresponding good or bad karmas, and here the professed list of traits includes the last four items of the above sub-list of śubha and aśubha nämakarmas.75 Then we have to take into account the following features of the account contained in the chapters 24th-27th.
I It confines itself to the 8 basic types of karmas II It confines itself to the problems of karmabandha (karmic bondage)
and karmavedana (karmic experience). III It conducts its discussion without naming the 14 günasthanas (and
it says nothing that might presuppose the positing of 2nd and 8th
gunasthānas). Contrasted to these are the corresponding features of the later-day account, viz.
It takes in its purview not only the 8 basic types of karmas but
also the sub-types posited in each case. II It raises the problems of karma-bandha, karma-vedana (usually called
karmodaya) and karma-sattā (karmic abidance). III It explicitly conducts its discussion in terms of the 14 gunasthanas,
It is not difficult to see the direction of the advance made by the latter account over the former. As for the actual subjectmatter of the four Prajñāpanä chapters in question it is as follows: 24th Karmabardhapada
[ Ban tha of which karmas takes place along with the bandha of
this or that karma ? 1 25th Karmavedapada
[ Vedana of which karmas takes place along with the bandha of this or that karma ?1

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26th Karmavedabandha pada
Bandha of which karmas takes place along with the vedana of this
or that karma ? ] 27th Karmavedaveda pada
[ Vedana of which karmas takes place along with the vedana of this or that karma ? ]
The chapter 36th (viz. Samudghātapada) raises the problem of samudghata (massive expulsion of karma) which is a special problem related to the Karma doctrine and was in discussion since olden days. Numerous passages of Bhagavati speak of smudghata but it is noteworthy that almost always what is spoken of is marana-samudghata and this suggests that the doctrine of sevenfold samudghalas is a relatively later development; the seventh type of samudghäta viz. kevalisam dghāta constitutes a special case and was of course often mentioned in Bhagavati. Be that as it may, the present chapter of Prajñāpanā classifies samudghātas into the following seven types : (1) vedanasamudghāta (2) kaṣāyasamudghāta (3) maranasamudghāta (4) vaikriyasamudghāta (5) taijasasamudghāta (6) āhārakasamudghata (7) keyalisamudghata.76 Then we are told as to which types of samudghalas are possible in this or that class of living beings. Afterwards it is calculated as to how many times in past could this or that type of samudghata have been performed by a member of this or that class, also as to how many times in future can that be done. Similarly, it is calculated as to how many times in past could this or that type of samu tghāta have been performed by the members of this or that class all taken together, also as to haw many times in future can that be done. The chapter -- and with it the whole text -- ends with a detailed description of keyalisamudghala,
This much should enable us to form a broad picture of the salient features of the Prajñāpanā treatment of karma.
(vi) Reality in General Prajăā panā contains numerous accounts of physical bodies and a careful study of them makes it crystal clear that such a body has to be viewed
(1) as made of certain number of atoms (2) as occupying certain number of space-units (3) as occupying certain number of time-units (4) as possessing certain number of degrees-of-a-property-like.colour etc.
As a matter of fact, this way of looking at things proves most fruitful in the case of physical bodies -- though certainly one can adopt it also in the case of soul and the remaining astikayas. In the case of soul and the remaining astikāyas one has to speak of constituent units (rather than con. stituent atoms); similarly, in the case of soul the propertiesconcerned are

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cognition etc. while in the case of the remaining astikāyas they are agurulaghu (=neither-heavy--nor-light) etc.) All this is vital for a clear understand. ing of so much that Prajñāpanā contains — particularly because the text so frequently indulges in a calculation of relative numerical strength conducted in terms of dravya, pradeša, kşetra, kāla, bhāva etc. And yet the fact remains that Prajñāpanā does not raise the question of the nature of reality in general - nor does it in any other way anticipate the later Tattvārtha position that a real thing must be characterised by origination, destruction as well as permanence.
Having dealt with Prajñāpanā let us have a look at certain minor Āgamic texts which seem to be its contemporary and which contain philosophical discussions. It will be convenient to take them up in the following order : Jivājivabhigamasutra, Uttarādhyayanasūtra, Rājaprašniyasūtra.
(B) JĪVĀJIVĀBHIGAMASŪTRA One who has gone through Prajñāpanā will find little new in the philosophical parts of Jivabhigama and the text itself frequently asks the reader to complete its account with the help of the relevant Prajăāpanā passages. [Jivabhigama is really important for the very extensive account of the worldcontinents and world-oceans, contained in its chapter III, an account which looks like the interpolation of an entire text called Dvipasāgaraprajñapti within the body of Jivabhigama). What Jivābhigama does is to classify the world of living beings variously in its various chapters -- to be precise, to classify it into two types in the chapter I, into three types in the II, into four types in the III, into five types in the IV, into six types in the V, into seven types in the VI, into eight types in the VII, into nine types in the VIII. into ten types in the IX. These are all what might be called natural classifications; but in the chaper X the text goes on to undertake various two-fold classifications, various three-fold ones, various fourfold ones, and so on upto tenfold ones — this time mainly relying on the list of 24 mārganästhānas for the purpose (but towards the end reverting to natural classification). And in the case of each classification the following questions are raised :
(1) sub-classification (2) life-duration
3) period of continuous existence (4) interval (=period of continuous non-existence) (5) numerical relative strength
Now (1) is the subject matter of the Prajñāpanā chapter 1 (viz. Prajñāpanā pada), (2) the subject-matter of its chapier IV (viz. Sthitipada), (3)-(4) that of its chapter XVIII (viz. Kayasthitipada), (5) that of its chapter III (viz. Alpabahutvapada). Thus much that Jivabhigama says is already present there in the relevant portions of Prajñāpanā. But there is one notable exce. ption. In the chapter I of Jivabhigama the classes concerned -- viz. sthāvara

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(static) and trasa (mobile) (the former subdivided into prthui, jala and vanaspati, the latter into rāyu, agni, dužndriya, trindriya, caturindriya, pañcendriya) have been studied in terms of 23 items; (it is only towards the fag end of the chapter that the above mentioned 5 questions have been raised). This list of 23 items is interesting inasmuch as 13 of these items also appear in the final list 20 mārganāsthānas; but this means that the list of märganāsthānas was not yet ready when this chapter was written. On the other hand, the chapter X in the course of its extra-natural classification makes use of the list of 20 mārgaņāsthānas and this means that the list was ready by the time this chapter was written. Really, Jivabhigama seems to be a composite text with following parts:
(1) Chapters 1-1X (minus the chapter I discussion in terms of 23 items
and the chapter III account of world-continents and world-oceans) (2) The chapter I discussion in terms of 23 items (3) The chapter III account of world-continents and world-oceans (4) Chapter X
(C) UTTARĀDHYAYANASÜTRA Uttaradhyayana is a text chiefly devoted to the problems of conduct discussed at rather elementary level but in four of its chapters -- viz. 28th 33rd, 34th, 36th -- it also raises philosophical issues. Thus the chapter 36th (viz. Jivājīvavibhakti) seeks to offer a most basic account of the living and the non-living parts of the world - thus doing at an elementary level what Prajñāpanā does in its first chapter. But whereas the first chapter of Prajñā. panā contains a bare classification of the living world the present chapter of Uttaradhyayana also contains following informations about the different classes of living beings :
(1) location (2) life-duration (3) period of continuous existence (4) interval
However, these informations too are already there in Prajnapanā -- (1) in Sthānapada (2nd), (2) in Sthitipada (4th), (3) and (4) in Kāyasthitipada (18th). There is however one noteworthy point in this connection. Prajñāpanā describes the classes of living beings taking them up in the simple order ekendriya, dvīndriya, trīndriya, calurindriya, pañcendriya, but Uttarādhyayana first divides the living beings into two broad classes – viz. sthāvara and trasa --- and then sub-divides the former into three classes, viz. ' orthui, jala, vanas pti, and the latter into three classes, viz. agni, vāyu, udaratrasa (it is the class udaratrasa that includes dvindriya, trindriya, caturindriya, pañcendriya).

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As has already been noted, this procedure is adopted also in Jivabhigama (and in later times Umāsvati subscribes to it), but it was foreign to all old Agamic texts (and it remains foreign to the Digambara texts). Then there are two Uttarādhyayana chapters 33rd and 34th (viz. Karmaprakịti and Lesyā,; they too contain most elementary informations culled from the corresponding chapters of Prajñāpanā. But the Uttaradhyayana chapter 28th (viz, Mokşamārgiya) breathes a different atmosphere; to be precise it breathes the same atmosphere as does Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra. For this chapter speaks of a quadruple mokşamārga -- just as Tattvārthasūtra speaks of a triple mokşamärga; and it describes samyagdarśana as faith in the nine enti. ties, viz. jiva, ajīva, bandha, punya papa, asrava, samvara, nirjara, mokṣa just as Tattvārtha describes samyagdarśana as faith in these very entities minus punya, pā pa. Again, it defines dravya in terms of guna and paryāya just as TattvāItha does. (It can be seen that on each of these questions Tattvārtha represents a more refined position than Uttaradhyayana). Now all these three questions as posed here are unknown to the old Agamic texts. True, while describing samyagdarśana Uttaradhyayana quotes 14 verses which also occur in Prajñāpanā in the course of its account of darsanārya. But the presence of these verses is anomalous at both the places, though for different reasons. Thus once these verses speak of sarva pramāna and sarvanaya. vidhi but these concepts, even if known to the age of Umāsvāti, were unknown to the age of the old Āgamic texts. Again, at one place these verses enumerate the entities whose existence is to be believed in -- but the list contains just six items, viz. jīva, ajīva, punya, papa, āsrava, samvara; this means that these verses were composed at a time when Uttarādhyayana list of nine Tallvas was not yet finally established. That is to say, these verses were composed after Prajñāpanā but before the Uttaradhyayana chaper 28th; later on they were interpolated in the former and borrowed in the latter.
(D) RĀJAPRAŠNĪYASŪTRA The content of Rājaprašniya is pretty miscellaneous but its philosophically most important part consists of the ten sūtras (Nos. 65-74) where the Jaina monk Keší adduces a number of arguments to convince the hereticking Paesī (Pradesi) that soul is somthing different from body. Of these the most important ones are based on the consideration that soul is a real entity even if imperceptible just as so many physical things are real even if imperceptible. Towards the end of the conversation Kesi actually quotes that Bhagavati list of ten things about which it is said that in their entirety they are known and seen only by a kivali. As for the minor arguments, two are based on the consideration that post-mortem life in heaven and hell is a fact even if beings from these quarters seldom visit us on earth - there being definite factors responsible for the circumstance. Similarly, two of them are based on the consideration that even if possessed of the same soul

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when young and when old a man is capable of performing many things when young and not capable when old--the reason being that the bodily organs at the man's disposal are competent in one case and not competent in the other, Lastly, the last argument is based on the consideration that the same soul can occupy an elephant's body in this life and an ant's in another--the reason being that it is capable of expanding and contracting just like the light of a lamp. Two things are noteworthy about this whole performance, viz. (1) a basic reliance on analogies while buttressing one's case, (2) allowing the opponent a full chance to present his case. The first is the relic of old days, the second a harbinger of the days to come. For in the age of logic we will find arguments pitted against arguments (not analogies pitted againt analogies) and the opponent allowed a full chance to present his case.
4 THE THIRD STAGE
The third stage in the evolution of the age of Āgamas has certain characteristic features of its own and there are certain texts which are its characteristic product. But in terms of absolute chronology this stage partiy overlaps with what we are going to call the first stage in the evolution of the age of Logic. Roughly speaking, certain texts composed sometime during the first four or five centuries of the Christian era we are going to assign to the third stage of the age of Āgamas, and certain other texts composed sometime towards the end of the same period we are going to assign to the first stage of the Age of Logic (this stage also continuing somewhat beyond this period). And yet a difference between these two groups of texts has to be made. For the dominant subject-matte former group is the same as that of the texts of the age of Āgamas while the dominant subject-matter of the latter is the same as that of the texts of the age of Logic. For the present let us confine ourselves to the former group of texts whose chief distinguishing features are certain methodological tendencies but which also betray some growth of content. Among the chief innovations — methodological and otherwise — of the period are the following:
(1) the doctrine of anuyogadvāras in general and niksepas in particular (2) the doctrine of nayas (3) the doctrine of pramāņas (4) the massive working out of Karma doctrine. Among the chief texts of the period are the following: (1) Anuyogadvārasutra (2) Nandisutra (3) Āvasyakaniryukti J. O...9

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(4) Satkhanḍagama
(5) Tattvärthasutra (sabhāṣya)
It will be convenient to deal with these texts in the above order and this we propose to do next.
(A) ANUYOGADVĀRASŪTRA
As was hinted just above, the doctrine of anuyogadvaras was one of the innovations of the period but let it be noted that Anuyogadvārasūtra itself does not use the word anuyogadvāra in a much generalised form; and in any case, the doctrine of anuyogadvaras is not the only speciality of this text. The doctrine of niksepas was a special case of the doctrine of anuyogadvaras; but in the language of Anuyogadvarasutra the former ought to be called the doctrine of 4 nikṣepas the latter the doctrine of all possible nikṣepas. A rough English equivalent for anuyogadvara might be 'point of investigation' and the Jaina scholars of the period were certainly interested in drawing up such standing lists of points-of-investigation as could be used as and when need arose; besides, they would draw up a new such list if none among the standing ones was found suitable. For example, the following lists of anuyogadvaras are explicitly recognised in Tattvarthasūtrabhāṣya :
(i) nama, sthāpanā, dravya, bhāva
(ii) nirdeśa, svamitva, sadhana, adhikarana, sthiti, vidhana
(4)
(6)
(iii) sat, sankhyā, kṣetra, sparśana, kāla, antara, bhāva, al pabahutva (8) (iv) gati, indriya, kaya, yoga, kaṣāya, veda, leśyā, samyaktva, jñana,
darsana, caritra, ahara, upayoga
(13)
Of these, the first is the list of 4 nikşe pas and is widely used in Anuyogadvāra, Āvasyakaniryukti, Ṣatkhaṇḍagama (while in the age of Logic niksepa constitutes one of the three main topics of epistemological enquiry, the other two being pramāna and naya). On the other hand, the second list though used in Avasyakaniryukti is not of frequent occurrence. The third list, again, is used in Anuyogadvāra, Āvasyakaniryukti and Ṣatkhaṇḍāgama (in the first two with the addition of a new item, viz. bhaga). Lastly, the fourth list contains 13 of the 20 items that constitute the later Svetambar Agamic authors' list of 20 marganasthānas, a list that Occurs in Avasyakaniryukti; (these thirteen items minus one--viz. upayoga--are also 12 of the 14 items that constitute the Karma-specialists' list of 14 märgaṇāsthānas). Besides, Anuyogadvära often conducts its discussion in terms of such lists of anuyogadvāras as have for their items the four niksepas and several more (the number of additional items being different in different cases); this practice too is common to Avasyakaniryukti as well as Satkhandagama. Likewise, Anuyogadvara often conducts its discussion in terms of some altogether new list of anuyogadvaras (the word anuyogadvāra being used in one such case), a pactice shared by Avasyakaniryukti and Satkhaṇḍāgama.

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It will however be instructive to note as to what problems have been discussed in Anuyogadvāra and in precisely what manner; in any case that alone will enable us to form an idea of the content of the text. The opening part of Anuyogadvāra tends to suggest as if the text is going to be some sort of commentary on Āvašyakasūtra--rather on its first adhyayana called Samāyika. For here we are offered certain most basic informations about Āvasyakasutra, the whole concluding with the sentence: "Its first adhyayana is Sāmāyika and the following are its anuyogadvāras : upakrama, niksepa, anugama and naya."17 Then follows the text proper divided into four parts, viz. upakrama etc. but in such a manner that its almost entire bulk is devoted to upakrama. Now in the preliminary part supposed to be offering basic informations about Avašyakasūtra we get the first taste of the doctrine of 4 niksepas; for almost the entire bulk of this part is devoted to a description of three things viz, avaśyaka, śruta and skandha in terms of 4 nikşe pas. It is also interesting to note how the occasion for the discussion arises. We have been informed that Avašyakasūtra is in the form of one śrutaskandha divided into six adhyayanas (i. e. one chapter divided into six sections) and since in this statement there apparently occur three words avasyaka, śruta and skandha it is thought worthwhile to subject them to the process of description in terms of 4 nikșepas, The crucial part of the doctrine of 4 niksepas is the distinction made between a thing called by the name concerned (e.g. by name āvasyaka, śruta or skandha ) viewed from the standpoint of dravya and a thing called by the same name viewed from the standpoint of bhāva. And roughly speaking, the standpoint of drarya is the standpoint of form or external appearance, while the standpoint of bhāva is the standpoint of spirit or internal reality. Whatever else is said in this connection is to be mechanically repeated in all cases. To take the example of avasyaka this is how matters stand in relation to the four nikṣepas :
(1) nāma avaśyaka : anything arbitrarily given the name āvaśyaka. (2) sthapanā āvašyaka : any physical thing given the shape of āvaśyaka, (3) dravya āvaśyaka
(a) āgamatodravya āvasyaka : one who knows avašyaka but is not at present
exercising the concerned cognitive function. (b) noāgamatodravya āvasyaka : (i) jñāyakaśarīra : the dead body of one who had known
āvašyaka (ii) bhāvisarira : the newborn body of one who will
know avasyaka

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(4) bhāva avasyaka (a) agamatobhāva avaśyaka
(iii) tadvyatirikta :
JAINA ONTOLOGY
:

(b) noāgamatobhāva avasyaka:
avasyaka from the standpoint of former external appearance
one who knows avaśyaka and at present exercises the concerned cognitive function.
avasyaka from the standpoint of spirit or internal reality.78
8
Here whatever is said in connection with (1), (2), (3a), ( 3b (i)), (3b (ii) ), (4a) is to be mechanically repeated in all cases; new things in each case will have to be said in connection with (3b(iii)) and (4b). Thus coming to the main part of the text we expect it to conain something said by way of explaining the Sāmāyika-adhyayana of Avasyakasutra in terms of upakrama, nikşepa, anugama and naya; as a matter of fact, what we actually find there is a general account of upakrama etc.- for most part, an account of upakrama, an account which has little to do with any sort of text-explanation at all. But the plan for arranging material in this part of the text is so devised that it contains most diverse doctrinal discussions, a good part of which is related to philosophy. Thus at one place 79(122) we get a detailed classification and subclassification of the whole world of living and non-living entities (something corresponding to the Prajñāpanāpada of Prajñāpanā), at another place (142) 80 a detailed information about the number of bodies possessed by the different classes of living beings, at a third place (133) 1 detailed information about their body sizes, at a fourth place (139)8 about their life-duration (these respectively corresponding to the Sarirapada, Avagāhanāpada and Sthitipada of Prajñāpanā); similarly, at one place (144) we get detailed information about the specific qualitative features of the living entities and the non-living ones (something corresponding to the Parinamapada of Prajñā. pana); lastly, at one place (72-114) we find numerous informations about the physical aggregates made up of different number of atoms, about those occupying different number of space-units, about those occupying different number of time-units (these again having certain Prajñāpanā passages for their foundation). However, in the case of the last-mentioned account certain new features make their appearance in Anuyogadvara and they deserve consideration. Thus whereas Prajñāpana had, in each of the three cases in question, simply spoken of the relative numerical strength of the physical aggregates possessing different number of units the present passage of Anuyogadvara does something more. For one thing, the latter chooses, in each of the three cases, to divide the physical aggregates into those characterized by anupürvi, anānupūrvt and avaktavya-the first possessing more than

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two units, the second possessing one unit, the third possessing two units. Then it seeks to answer questions about those classes and sub-classes of physical aggregates in terms of nine anuyogadvāras, viz. sat, sankhyā, kşetra, sparśana, kala, antara, bhāga, bhāva, alpabahutva. At the same time, it seeks to work out the alternatives that result from it being conceded that different parts of the same physical aggregate belong to different subclasses. And in connection with answering question in terms of sat, sankhyā, etc. as also in connections with working out the alternatives in question our text considers first the position of naigama and vyavahāra nayas then that of sangraha naya, Now for naigama and vyavahāra two physical aggregates of the same description are two such aggregates whereas for sangrah, they are just one. The result is that in the case of it being conceded that different parts of a physical aggregate belong to different subclasses the total number of alternatives is 26 in the case of naigama and vyavahara but 7 in that of sangraha.
However, the question of naza has been raised also in other parts of Anuyogadvāra. Thus in connection with the description of avasyaka undertaken in terms of 4 nikșepas we are told that two cases of dravyāvašyaka are treated as two such cases by naigama and vyavahāra while they are treated as one such case by sangraha; rjusūtra on the other hand insists that there can be just one case of dravyāvašyaka; lastly, sabdanaya argues (rather the three sabdanayas argue) that dravyāvaśyaka is an impossibility because it is impossible that someone should know ävašyaka and yet not exercise the concerned cognitive function.s6 In another connection it is laid down that the designation sankha (conchshell) can possibly be attributed to three types of beings viz, (1) one who will become sankha in the next birth; (2) one who will not only become sankha in the next birth but has also accumulated the necessary äyukarma; (3) one who has not only accumulated the āyukarma in question but has also left the body of this birth and is on way to take up that of the next. Here we are told that according to naigama, vyavahāra and sangraha the designation sankha can be attributed to all the three types in question, according to rjusūtra to the last two, according to śabda to the last one 86 In a third place we are told that according to naigama, sangraha and vyavahāra a doctrinal text describes the author's own view, the rival view as also what is both, according to rjusūtra it describes only the first two of these, according to śabda only the first of these.s 7 Then there is the passage where it is laid down that according to naigama and vyavahāra the designation prasthaka (grain measuring vessel) can be attributed to a prasthaka as such, according to sangraha to the prasthaka that is actually undertaking measurements, according rjusūtra to the prasthake as also to the thing that is being measured, according to śabda either to one for whose sake prasthaka is made or to one who knows prasthaka,88 Similarly, there is the passage where it is laid down that according to naigama and vyavahāra one

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resides in a particular spot in one's house, according to sangraha in the couch on which one is seated, according to jusūtra in the space-units which one is occupying, according to śabda in oneself.: 9 Lastly, there is a passage which lays down that according to naigama pradeśas (units) belong to dharma, adharma, akaśa, jiva, pudgalaskandha, deśa (part), according to sangraha they belong to the first five of these six, according to vyavhāra one should rather say that pradeśa is five-typed, according to rjusūtra one should rather say that pradeśa might be either dharmapradeśa or adharma pradeśa, or aksāapradesa or jivapradeśa or pudgalaskandhapradeśa, according to śabda one should rather say that pradeśa is in dharma or that psadeša is dharma, that pradeśa is in adharma or that pradeśa is adharma, and so on and so forth, according to samabhirūdha one should say that pradeśa is dharma, that pradeśa is adharma and so on and so forth, according to evambhūta one should not at all speak of pradeśas inasmuch as dharma, adharma, etc. are all impartite entities. 90 All these instances of nayas make one thing clear, viz. that the seven nayas are conceived as increasing in the measure of sophistication exhibited, the following being the serial order : naigama, sangraha; vyavahāra; jusūtra, śabda, samabhirūdha, evambhūta. But the fact that naigama and vyavahāra are so often bracketed together must create difficulty, for as a result of this it is not easy to see the precise point of sophistication underlying the naya scheme. Certainly, if naigama and vyavahāra are equally sophisticated and less sophisticated than sangraha then we cannot say that sangraha is more sophisticated than naigama and uyayahāra more sophisticated than sanaraha. Then there is a particular difficulty with the three sabdanayas. Sometimes they speak on the same level as the earlier four nayas (though, of course, in a more sophisticated vein than the latter) but sometimes they speak on a different level altogether; in the latter cases we find the ear. lier four nayas speaking of the thing conceded but sabdanayas speaking of the person having a knowledge of this thing. [In these latter cases it will be more proper to call the last three nayas jñāna-nayas]. In any case, no instance discussed in Anuyogadvāra corroborates the picture of sabdanayas that is most usual with the later authors. Of course, towards the end Anuyogadvāra offers a general definition of each of the seven nayas and in the case of subdanayas we here find being said something that looks like the statement of the later authors; (in these definitions difficulties arise rather with earlier three nayas) 1. But that only confirms our basic point, for the precise difficulty is how to make tally with each other the instances of sabdanayas discussed in the body of the text and the definitions of them offered at the end of it,
Here a word might also be said about the saptabhangi doctrine vis-a-vis Anuyogadvāra. We have already seen that the text enumerates the alternatives that result in the case of naigama-vyavahāra and in the case of

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sangraha) when it is conceded that the different parts of a physical aggregate might be characterised by anupūrvi, anānupūrvi and avaktavya. In the case of naigama-vyavahāra these alternatives are 26, in that of sangraha 7. The noteworthy point is that the text makes no attempt to pinpoint the significance of the case with 7 alternatives, nor does it anywhere claim that its treatment of the feature anu pūrvī is a special case of a more fundamental doctrine-both of which it was expected to do had the saptabhangi doctrine been a well-established doctrine by its time.
In relation to the problem of pramāņa the Anuyogadvāra contribution is of no lasting value. Of course, it does not use the word pramāna in the sense of Umāsvāti and the later logicians but it does once describe as four types of jñānas what are in fact the four types of pramānas according to the Nyāya school.92 However no attempt is here made to adjust this treatment of fourfold jñāna with the traditional treatment of fivefold jñāna (taken note of in the beginning of Anuyogadvāra itself)- as was, for example, done by the later logicians like Akalanka in the case of their newly formulated list of pramānas, The result is that the Anuyogadvāra account of pratyakşa, anumāna, upamāna and āgama remains more or less of a curiosity just like its account of 7 svaras, 8 vibhaktis and 9 rasas.
The details of the Karma doctrine are on the whole left untouched in Anuyogadvära. But its treatment of the item bhāva in the list of anuyoga. dvāras sat, sankhyā etc. required something to be said in this connection. However, the text applies these anuyogadvāras to the case of physical aggregates and in that context it is deemed sufficient if these aggregates are characterised by sādi pāriņāmika. For it is in the context of describing the qualities of soul that the remaining five types of bhāva make their appearance and it is they that contain reference to the details of the Karma doctrine. But at one place (126) Anuyogadvära has created occasion for a detailed description of all the six bhāvas in question, viz. auda yika (those due to the effectuation of a karma), aupaśamika (those due to the subsidence of a karma), kṣāyika (those due to the cessation of a karma), kṣāyo pašamika (those due to the cessation-cum-subsidence of a karma), pārināmika (those natural to a soul), sārni palika (mixed). This position was not worked out in the old Āgamic texts and the Anuyogadvāra account itself is rather crude in comparision to corresponding Tattvārtha account that came later on. For example, the Anuyogadvāra list of audayika bhāvas includes aharaka, sāñiñi, sayogi, its list of kşāyika bhāras includes features resulting from the kşaya of vedaniya, ayunāma and gotra karmas. Both these are rather obscure positions.
Lastly, let us note what Anuyogadvāra has to say on the problem of guna and paryāya, The word guna was unknown to the old Āgamic texts and paryāya was their word for properties. But by the time of Anuyogadvāra

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the Jaina authors began to use both the words guna and paryāya and somehow to distinguish between them; (since there was no old tradition to be followed each author was somewhat free to work out a distinction for him. self). According to Anuyogadvāra (123)9 + guna is to stand for what paryaya stood in old Āgamic texts while paryāya is to stand for a degree exhibited by some guna or other; for example, black colour is a guna, the minimum degree (or any higher degree) of black colour a paryāya.
In the body of Anuyogadvāra all the above philosophical discussions lie scattered in a rather haphazard form-not because the text has no plan for organizing its material but because this plan has little to do with philosophy. We have already taken note of the circumstance owing to which almost the entire text turns out to be a discussion of four topics viz. u pakrama, nikşepa, anugama and naya while almost the whole of this discussion remains engaged with the first of these topics. Some details of the performance deserve notice. U pakrama is described in two alternative ways, In the first case the description proceeds under the heads nāna, stha panā, drauya, kşetra, kala, bhāva i. e, 4 nikşepas with two additional items); the description is quite brief and unimportant. In the second case the description proceeds under the heads änu pūrvi, nāma, pramāna, vaktavyata, arthadhikara and samavatāra and here almost the whole bulk is taken up by the first three. As a matter of fact, all the instances of philosophical discussion considered above come from this very part of the text covering its first three heads-one exception being the reference to the definitions of nayas inasmuch as these occur in the fourth main part of the text called Naya. Besides, this part contains discussion of certain minor philosophical problems and that of certain non-philosophical theoretical problems-e. g. problems related to grammar, poetics, music. But almost nowhere is it emphasised that this or that point of the discussion might be thus availed of in connection with the explanation of sāmāyika or in connection with the text-explanation in general. It is the heads vaktavyatā and arthadhikara which are directly related to the problems of text-explanation but they are disposed of rather summarily; similarly, certain things said in connection with the second and third main parts of the text - called Niksepa and Anugama-are directly related to the problems of text-explanation but they too are disposed of rather summarily. This entire attitude of the author of Anuyogadvāra is somewhat intriguing. For the title of the text suggests as if it is devoted to the general problems of text-explanation, its opening section suggests as if it is devoted to an explanation of Avašyakasūtra, the last sentence of the opening section suggests as if it is devoted to an explanation of the Sāmāyika-adhyayana of Āvasyakasūtra. But all this is a misleading suggestion. For the text seems to avoid-as though scrupulously--all entanglement with the problems of text-explanation. Thus it is not unlikely that the Jaina

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authors of the period did use to explain texts in terms of upakrama, nikşe pa, anugama, and naya (in this connection sub-dividing upakrama in nama, pramāna, vaktavyata, arthādhikāra and samavatāra), but Anuyogadvāra manages to give us only the vaguest idea of how this was done.
(B) NANDĪSŪTRA Nandisutra is exclusively devoted to the problem of knowledge and the composition of a text of this type was in a way symptomatic. For the period was what might be called the eve of the Age of Logic and this age received its very name from the fact that in the mind of its savants the problem of knowledge was almost upper most. Of course, the Jainas had been taking interest in the problem since olden days and we have already sought to reconstruct the earliest history of this interest. But the fact rema. ins that so many details of the Jaina theory of knowledge were even now considerably vague and Nandi seeks to bring clarity to at least some of them. Now so far as the three extra-ordinary types of cognition, viz. avadhi, manah paryāya, kevala are concerned nothing much new required to be added to the already available account but the case was different with mati and śruta. For they constitute the comparatively neglected field of in. vestigation and it was in this field that the Jainas had chiefly to contend with their rivals. Hence the special significance attached to the Nandi account of mati and śruta.
Nandi first of all divides jñāna into pratyaksa and paroksa and this was something unprecedented. Of course, Anuyogadvāra had described pratyaksa almost in the same words as Nandi but the former was working out a scheme that recognized four types of jñāna-viz. pratyakşa, anumāna, upa. iāna, āgama, a scheme which explicitly had prat yakşa for one of its constituent items. But Nandi had to work out a scheme that recognized five types of jñāna viz, mati, śruta, avadhi, manahparyāya, kevala, a scheme which did not have pratyakşa for one of its constituent items. So when Nandı maintained that jñāna is of two types viz. pratyakşa and parokşa, the former subdivided into indriya-pratyaksa and anindriya-pratyakşa, the latter subdivided into mati and sruta, there was bound to arise a difficulty. For anindriyapratyakşa included avadhi, manahparyāya, kevala and this means that in the present classification indriya-pratyaksa was a superfiuity when viewed in terms of the traditional scheme of fivefold jñāna. In any case, Nandi does not say a word as to what it understands by indriya-pralyksa - except that it is of five types corresponding to the five sense organs95. On the other hand, the Nandi account of mati — of six types corresponding to the five sense-organs and manas - is considerably illuminating. Thus it explains how the four consecutive processes avagraha, iha, avāya, dhāraņa are acco. mplished in the case of the five sense-organs and manas (dream being
J, Q...10

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are
in
considered as a case of avagraha etc, had through manas). 6 In this account avagraha really means arthavagraha, for in the case of four sense-organs, viz, touch, gustatory, olfactory and auditory arthavagraha is preceded by vyanjanavagraha; Nandi describes how yañjanavagraha takes place in the case of auditory sense-organ 97. All this gives a clear idea of the direction in which the mind of the Jaina theoreticians was moving when they were speaking of mati and its classification into avagraha, tha, avaya, dharaṇā; (obviously, here was being described a process which was described by others under the title pratyakşa- though naturally the Jaina description of the process had its own special features). At the same time Nandi speaks of four additional types of mati, viz. aut fattiki, vainayikt, kārmika, pāriņāmiki.98 The later Jainas make no particular use of this classification though in Bhagavati it not only appears but appears in the company of aragraha, ha, avaya and dharaṇa themselves. The Nandi definitions of autpattiki etc. not so much illuminating but in each case the text refers to certain stories supposed to be exemplifying the type of-mati in question; the commentaries actually recount these stories and from them it becomes clear that what is being described in this connection are the types of cognitive dealings had by people in the course of their every day life. The Nandi account of sruta is also useful in its own way. Śruta is here classified into 14 types the form of 7 pairs-with-mutually-opposite-items. The first two pairs, viz. akṣara-anakṣara, samjni-asamjn are to be explained as cases of ordinary cognition-involving-the-use-of-words, the last five pairs as cases of cognitionof-scriptures. The first two pairs deserve serious study because they give us an idea of the precise Jaina concept of śruta; (certainly, to do something like treating śruta as a case of cognition based on scriptures was an ordihave to nary practice not confined to the Jainas alone). Thus the Jainas conceive śruta in such a manner that its possession becomes possible not only in the case of men and big animals but also in that of small insects, nay, even in the case of static-bodied beings. It is instructive to note that when Nandi wants to say that even in the case of the lowest type of living beings some amount of cognitive awareness is always present (otherwise they would be no living bodies but dead bodies) it uses the word 'verbal cognitive awareness' (akṣara) rather than 'cognitive awareness' pure and simple;100 (of course verbal cognitive awareness i. e. śruta is necessarily accompanied by sensory cognitive awareness i. e. mati, but the Nandi usage is revealing). In any case śruta stands for that type of cognition which involves a reception-explicit or otherwise of some word standing for the object being cognised, and the Jaina theoreticians feel that an implicit reception of words is possible even on the part of the lowest type of living beings. Really speaking, concept 'implicit reception of words' is fraught with difficulties. Or rather the question is as to what exactly is meant when śruta is declared to involve a reception of some word standing for the object-under-cognition',
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for some sort of employment of some word standing for the object-undercognition seems to take place also in the case of mati. This and similar obscurities left standing in the Nandi account of knowledge--left particul. arly owing to the rather laconic wording of the text-- were sought to be removed by the Svetambara authors coming in the age of Logic, the long series begining with Jinabhadra and ending with Yašovijaya.
(C) ĀVAŠYAKANIRYUKTI As is indicated by its title Avašyakaniryukti is a niryukti type of commentary on Āvašyakasūtra. Towards the beginning of it--but after 77 verses dealing with the problem of knowledge have gone by-there occur three benedictory verses followed by 4 where the author promises to write niryukti on the following texts : Avasyaka, Dašavaikalika, Uttarādhyayana, Ācārānga, Sütrakstānga, Dašāšruta, Kalpasūtra, Vyavahāra, Süryaprajñapti, Rşibhāșita; then in one verse it is declared that here now follows Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received. Now Sāmāyika is the first section of Āvašyakasutra and Niryukti on it continues till the verse no. 408 (in the edition of Maladhāri Hemacandra's commentary on Višeşāvašyakabhāșya); then there should follow Niryukti on the remaining five sections of Āvasy. akasutra (but these are left untouched by Višeşāvasyakabhāsya). All this at once raises two questions : (1) why should the text abruptly begin with a treatment of knowledge to be followed by benedictory verses) ? (2) What does the author mean by saying that what he proposes to present is Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received ?
A close study of Sāmāyikaniryukti reveals that only 24 of its verses (viz. those numbering 383-406) are concerned with the actual wording of Sāmāyikasūtra while the rest are devoted to certain preliminary questions
or less remotely related to the problem of Sāmāyika. And a study of this vast mass of preliminary material suggests that it is too ill-assorted to be the composition of one author. The conclusion seems to be that in the
aniryukti part of Avasyakaniryukti the author who has promised to write Niryukti on 10 Agamic texts has simply--at least for most partcollected the traditionally received material; (the earlier 77 verses dealing with the problem of knowledge too seem to be traditionally received and they have been placed where they are only because they are too much of a misfit elsewhere). The Niryukti on the remaining sections of Avasyakasūtra and that on the remaining 9 Āgamic texts in question might well be-- at least for most part--the composition of one author. But it is the Sāma. yikaniryukti part of Āvasyakaniryukti that is philosophically most important; to be more precise, even in the Samāyikaniryukti part of Avašyaka. niryukti those verses are philosophically most important on which Jina. bhadra commented in his Višeşāvašyakabhāşya, and even in the Višeşāva. syakabhāşya those verses are philosophically most important on which

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Maladhāri Hemacandra commented. As such, this selected portion of the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvašyakaniryukti deserves a serious study and that we propose to undertake next.
The earlier 77 verses of Āvasyakaniryukti dealing with the problem of knowledge are to be studied with Nandisātra (a good number of verses are common to both) but it is on hardly few questions that the former text has more important things to say than the latter; (e.g. the Avasyakaniryukti account of avadhi is much more comprehensive than the corresponding Nandi account).
Then follow 8 verses--3 benedictory verses, 4 setting forth the programme of Niryukti-composition, one proposing to narrate Sāmāyikaniryukti as traditionally received. The content of the next 35 verses is as follows :
86 : the relation of Niryukti to Sutra 87-90 : the relation of Sūtra to Tirthankaras and Ganadharas 91-101 : the importance of knowledge-coupled-with-conduct
102 : the acquisition of scriptural knowledge (šruta) 103 - 5 : the acquisition of religious faith (samyaktva) 106 - 20 : the acquisition of couduct (caritra)
Then follows a verse that looks like a summary narration of the topics to be taken up, viz.
jiņa pavayanauppatti pavayana egatthiya vibhage ya /
dāravihi ya nayaviht vakkhānavihi ya aņuoge //1211/ And the content of the next eleven verses is as follows: 122 - 23 : the synonyms of pravacana and sutra
124 : the synonyms of anuyoga 125 - 28 : the right and wrong types of text-explanation 129 - 32 : the right and wrong types of teacher-disciple relationship
Lastly follows the main text broadly divisible into four parts : I 133–338 : the treatment of Sāmāyika under 26 heads uddeśa, nirdesa,
nirgama etc. (i.e. Sāmāyikaniryukti proper) II 339 --82 : Namaskaraniryukti (ie, treatment of Namaskāra under 11 heads
utpatti, niksepa, pada, padartha etc.) III 383-406 : Sāmāyika sūtraniryukti IV 407 - 8: jñananaya versus kriyānaya
Now here it can easily be seen that the verse 121 should properly come after the verse 86, for the versez 87-90 are plainly presenting what is mentioned as the first topic in the verse 121. As for the verses 91-120 they are saying something which rightly belongs to the main text (to be precise, to its part called Sāmāyikaniryukti proper). In all probability the verses 121,

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87-90 and 122-32 are earlier specimens of a pre-occupation with the problem of text-explanation while the verses 91-120 are the earliest specimens of a pre-occupation with the problem of Sāmāyika. Nay, within the verses 91-120 themselves 91-101 seem to contain an earlier account of Sāmāyika couched in a non-technical language while 102-20 contain a later account of the same couched in the technical terminology of the Karma doctrine. As for the main text its verses 133-338 contain a still more advanced account of Sāmāyika written at a time when the list of 26 heads uddesa, nirdesa, nirgama etc had already been formulated; (within these verses them. selves 291-320 take up the head 'Kva' but the way this treatment is con. ducted under 33 sub-heads suggests that we are here having one more altogather independent, earlier account of Sāmāyika). And may be the Namaskaraniryukti part of the main text was another independent piece of discussion which was mechanically inserted in between the Sāmāyikaniryukti proper and Sāmāyikasūtraniryukti. Lastly, the last two verses of the main text too seem to be of an independent origin and they have been imported here for no specially pressing reason.
Be that as it may, the kernel of the Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvašya. kapiryukti lies on the one hand in its verses 133-338 which treat Sāmāyika under 26 heads uddeśa, nirdesa, nirgama etc. (a treatment which we propose to call Sāmāyikaniryukti proper) and on the other hand in its verses 33982 which treat namaskāra under 11 heads utpatti, niksepa, pada, padārth etc. (a treatment which we propose to call Namaskaraniryukti). For they are two illuminating cases of how the Jaina theoreticians of the period were treating important problems in terms of anuyogadvāras, standardized or otherwise. Thus by sāmāyika are to be understood the following four things :
(1) śruta (samyak jñāna) (2) samyaktya (samyak darśana) (3) caritrācāritra
}(samyak cāritra) (4) caritra
And the list of 26 items made use of in connection with its treatment is a standardized list it already occurs in the Anuyogadvāra account of Upodghataniryuktyanugama and certainly in our text the part where it is put to application can be called upodzhāta i.e. introduction to Sāmāyika. sutraniryukti). Similarly, namaskāra is practically identical with samyagjñāna and the list of 11 items made use of in connection with its treatment is a non-standardized list. This means that we are here having before us a treatment of the important triple problem of samyagjñana, samyagdarsana, samyakcăritra in terms of a standardized list of anuyogadvāras and a treat. ment of the important single problem of samyagjñāna in terms of a nonstandardized such list. As already pointed out the remaining verses of the

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Sāmāyikaniryukti part of Āvasyakaniryukti are useful in their own respec. tive ways but certainly they are relatively less useful.
Lastly a few words about the position of Avasyakaniryukti in relation to the question of doctrinal evolution. We have noted that four distinguishing features of the third stage of the Age of Agamas are the doctrine of anuyogadvāras, the doctrine of nayas, the doctrine of pramāņas, and the massive working out of the Karma doctrine. Now as for the doctrine of anuyogadväras its frequent application is one of the most conspicuous feat. ures of Āvašyakaniryukti-nay, that of the Niryukti-type of commentaries in general. And the doctrine of nayas too finds mention in Avasyakaniryukti at several occasions. At one place the definitions of the 7 nayas are given (the verses quoted in this connection being the same as occur in Anuyogad. vāra). Here a curious sounding theory is also propounded, viz. that the seven nayas needed to be employed in former times but they need not be employed now (at the most the first three nayus need to be employed now), the reason being that in former times the Agamic texts had not been divided subjectwise as is the case now after Aryarakṣita has executed such a division. 101 The exact import of the theory is not clear But what is really im. portant is the incidental twofold division of nayas into dravyārthika and paryāyārthika. For this is an obviously logical division and as such has found so prominent a support at the hands of the authors of the Age of Logic; (certainly all this cannot be said about the sevenfold division of nayas.) Another twofold division of nayas-also somewhat important-is that into vyavahāranaya and niscayanaya; but a third such division, viz. that into jñānanaya and kriyānnya has played no important role in the development of the naya-doctrine. As for the doctrine of pramāņas Āvašyakaniryukti concedes its utility by offering a treatment of knowledge at the very outset, but the noteworthy thing is that it does not use the word pramāna or undertake a twofold division of jñāna into pralyakşa and paroksa. Lastly, as regards the Karma doctrine the text evinces clear acquaintance with the later development when it describes the process called śrutajñānaprāpti, samyaktvaprāpti and cāritra prāpti - in the last case describing upašamasteni as well as kșa pakaśreņi.
(D) ȘAȚKHAŅDĀGAMA (and KAŞAYAPRĀBHRTA) Şatkhandāgama is a very important Jaina text and for two considerably different reasons. For on the one hand it is a text regarded by the Digambaras as the oldest available containing Agamic material, while on the other hand it is doubtless the oldest available text containing a vast mass of details relating to the Karma doctrine. In both cases numerous intricate questions require clarification and let us take up the two one by one,
The Digambaras concede that their oldest scriptural texts were 12 Angas and that certain extra-Anga texts too came to enjoy the status of a

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scripture; but they go on to add that all this text-mass was gradually lost to memory -- the process continuing till 683 years after the death of Mahāvīra. By this date – so proceeds their version of the case -- the texts in question were all completely forgotten and then somehow was composed Şakhandāgama by way of salvaging at least some part of the contents of these texts. It is difficult to believe the story as it stands, for if by the time of the compostion of Satkhandāga ma the old Āgamic-texts were in fact totally forgotten then it was in the very nature of things impossible for it to salvage any part of their contents. What seems to have happened is that in the times of Satkhandāgama the Jaina authors had devised to compose such texts as would render superfluous a study of the old Agamic texts like Bhagavati, Prajñāpanā, Jivābhigama, and this was true of the Svetāmbara as well as Diga mbara authors. Thus a Svetāmbara student could feel that his theoretical needs were fully sutisfied by the texts like Anuyogadvāra, Nandi, Avašyaniryukti, Tattvārthasūtra along with Bbāsya, a Digambara student could feel that the same was done by the texts like Şakhandāgama, Kaşāyaprabhịta, Mūlācāra, Tattvārthasūtra along with Sarvärthasiddhi. The only difference - in its own way remarkable -- was that the Svetāmbara camp thought it proper also to preserve the wordings of the old Agamic texts while its Digambara counterpart refused to shoulder such a responsibility. All this accounts for the so striking a similarity that obtains between the theoretical views of the Svetāmbaras and Digambaras in spite of the fact that the former uphold and the latter repudiate the authority of the now current Agamic texts. In any case, Şarkhandāgama bears a clear imprint of being a product of the third stage of the Age of Agamas. For example, the neat employment of the doctrine of 14 mārganā. sthānas, 14 gunasthānas and 14 jīvasthanas which is so distinguishing a feature of its sections I, II, III and VI was impossible at an earlier date: the same can be said about the neat employment of the doctrine of anuyogadvaras, nikşe pas and nayas that finds place in its section IV and V.
Then we have to look at Satkhandāgama in its capacity as a karma. text. Certainly, the first thing that a reader finds striking about this masterpiece is its so much preoccupation with the details of the karma-doctrine, details of which there was no hint in the old Āgamic texts, But a closer study reveals that the Şakhandagama version of the karma-doctrine is in many ways rather elementary when compared with the one available in the later karma texts-e.g. in Dhavalā which is Virasena's commentary on Satkhandāgama itself and in Pancasangraha which is an independent karma-text by the Svetambara Candrarşi. Thus the later authors conduct their treat. ment of Karma in the form of three exactly parallel divisions entitled bandha, udaya and sattā; but the problem of satta is unknown to Şakhandāgama while its account of udaya (offered under the title vedana - an old

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word) does not run exactly parallel to that of bandha and is devoted to comparatively elementary questions. It is only in the case of bandha that Şakhandāgama has said something like the last word; for it discusses in full details not only the problem of bandha pure and simple but also that of bandha and karana (the former being a general enquiry related to karmic bondage, the latter a special enquiry related to the actual process of karmic bondage). But as regards the remaining karanas i.e. as regards sankrama, udvartanā, a pavartanā, udiraņā, upaśamana, kşapaņā, nidhatti and nikācana Şarkhandāgama is again silent.
However, even if its treatment of karma is the most striking feature of Satkhandagama karma does not constitute its sole subject-matter. Thus its
ns I (minus the cūli kas) and II are devoted to an account of soul while the huge Bandhana part of its section V (minus its small early portion which is of a miscellaneous character) is devoted to an account of matter. Again the Krti part of its section IV and the Sparsa, Karma and Prakrti parts of its section V are devoted to certain miscellaneous discussions con. ducted in terms of this or that list of anuyogadyāras. This leaves the follo. wing parts of the texts as ones devoted to an account of karma :
1) The cūlikās of the seciton I (2) Section III (3) The Vedanā part of the section IV (4) Section VI
The last cūlika of the Section I deals with a particular problem related to soul in general and some of them deal with rather minor problems rela. ted to the Karma doctrine, but four of them deal with the following major such problems :
I The classification and sub-classification of karmas (( cülika) II The enumeration of karmas whose bandha is possible in this or that
gunasthāna (II cūlika) III The maximum duration and the minimum duration of different.
karmas (III-V cũlikās)
The second of these problems is dealt with at a somewhat greater length in the section III while the same is done at a very great length in the sec. tion VI - the latter account covering not only bandha pure and simple but also bandha qua karana. The Vedanā part of the section IV deals with the problem of karma-udaya. The whole discussion is conducted in terms of 16 anuyogadvāras but the most important things have been said in connection with the anuyogadvāras dravya, kşetra, kala, bhāva; they respectively deal with the pradeśa-, avagahana-, sthiti- and anubhāga- aspects of karmodaya.
this whole way of dealing with problem of karmodaya suggests that the author has not yet mastered it. Dravya, kşetra, kala and bhāva were

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certainly 4 anuyogadvaras of very old standing but they as such were never used by the karma-specialists; and basing himself on the four anuyogadvaras (among others) the author of Satkhandagama was compelled to speak not only of the pradesa-, sthiti- and anubhaga- aspects of karmodaya (which were after all taken note of by the karma-specialists) but also of its avagahana aspect (which never attracted the attention of the karma-specialists). The last point to be noted is that three of the present anuyogadvaras, viz. dravya, kala and bhava also contain culikas in which are discussed no problems of karmodaya but those of bhandha qua karana in pradeśa-, sthiti- and anubhaga aspects respectively; (it is not difficult to see why the anuyogadvāra kṣetra to which corresponds the avagahana- aspect contains no corresponding culika).
81
to
Even this most cursory survey of the contents of Satkhaṇḍagama at once raises one question, viz. why did the author choose to write out his text in such an unsystematic form, particularly when the different parts of the text are themselves considerably systematic? The answer seems to be that the different parts of the text were written by different hands at different times and that they were mechanically joined together at some later date. The material contained in the culikas of the section I was the earliest and it was this that formed the basis for the composition of the section III at a later time; in its turn, the section III itself formed the basis for the composition of the section VI at a still later time. In between the time of composing the section III and that of composing the section VI was composed the miscellaneous material on bandha qua karana which now stands there in the form of those culikas to the Vedana part of the section IV; this miscellaneous material formed the basis for the composition of the corresponding parts of the section VI. Thus it was that the section VI came contain an elaborate account of both bandha pure and simple and the same qua karana. Simiarly, the section II contains an early account of soul and it was this that formed the basis for the composition of the section I (minus its culikās) at a later time. It is also most likely that the sections II and III were contemporary of each other and so also were the section I (minus its culikās) and VI. Sections IV and V perhaps constitute one text in the form of an exposition of six topics, viz. kṛti, vedanā, sparsa, karma, prakṛti, bandhana. They came comparatively late but not necessariy later than the sections I (minus its culikās and VI. The six topics in question have no intrinsic relation to each other and so there is no intrinsic necessity for section IV and V to go together. But as the case of Anuyogadvara suggests the Jaina authors of the period would often resort to the practice of jointly discussing several topics with no intrinsic relation to each other; as a matter of fact, the Saikhandagama treatment of the four topics kṛti, sparsa, J. O...11

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karma and praksti looks very much like a piece taken away from some spot within the body of Anuyogadvāra. Of course, these precisely are the topics whose discussion is pretty miscellaneous inasmuch as it does not naturally fall within one of the three great divisions into which the Șaikhandāgama material can easily be resolved; (these divisions can be designated Javakhanda, Karmakhanda, Pudgalakhanda. But that is not the point, For the noteworthy thing is that the two important topics vedanā and bandhana here appear in the company of four such topics as are not only not important but have no intrinsic relation to those two important topics. [Virasena suggests that the six topics in question are the first six in a list of 24 which formed the contents of a Pūrva-text. Not only that, he from his own side offers an account of the alleged remaining 18 topics - in the course of which he discusses most of those problems which had attracted the attention of the post-Satkhandāgama generations of Karma specialists. But little valuable emerges from all his For even if there was an old list of 24 topics as described by Virasena the items of this list could not have meant what Virasena takes them to mean. ] The conclusion seems to be that somebody did discuss together the six topics in question which were unrelated to each other and of which two were important, four unimportant, Hence our surmise that the sections IV and V of Şakahndāgama constitute one text and the reason why it should have come comparatively late is that it deals with the problem of karmodaya which was comparatively late to engage the attention of the Karma specialists. Be that as it may, sooner or later Şarkhandagama received its present form and with such a text at his disposal the Digambara student could afford to dispense with the old Āgamic texts like Bhagavati, Prajñāpanā, Jivabhigama. That he did dispense with them early enough is almost certain. For hardly do we find a Digambara author refering to the wording of an Agamic text - which would not have been the case if the repudiation of the current Āgamic texts was a comparatively late phenomenon.
In this connection let a few words also be said about Kaşāyaprabhta, The text is less important in itself but more so on account of its two commentaries, an earlier one by Yativrsabha and a later one by Virasena, [ The latter - the famous Jayadhavala – was left incomplete by the author and was completed by his disciple Jinasena ). In any case, the over-all value of the small Kaşāyaprabhịta is much inferior to that of the voluminous Şakhandāgama. For in Sałkhandāgama (made up of aphorisms) problems are treated in a very systematic form while looseness of form is a striking feature of Kaşāyaprabhịta (made up of verses). In the latter it often happens that the questions are just posed with no answer forthcoming; this, for example, is the case with the first six (out of fifteen) topics taken up for consideration (there is even doubt whether these are six topics —

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also whether there are fifteen topics in all). And even when questions are followed by an answer the precise import of the answer not unoften remains uncertain. The text purports to be a general treatment of the problem of mohaniyakarma (though, technically speeking, kaşāya is one subtype of one type of mohanīyakarma), but it is difficult for it - as it stands to be a composition of one author. For in the first 12 verses we are here told that the text consists of 180 verses which are thus divided into 15 topics, then allegedly follow these 180 verses (in fact 221 and 12 more) where the first two again offer a list of topics to be discussed - this list not naturally tallying with the one submitted just before. The 180 verses become 221 (plus 12) because those to be numbered 3-8 (in all six) deal with an irrelevant topic, those to be numbered 12-16 in all thirty five) with a topic not mentioned in either list-of-topics while those to be numbered 222-33 (in all twelve) are left unexplained even by the commentators; (in view of the fact that the printed text -- with Yativrşabha's commentary - starts its numbering from the twelve introductory verses we are not giving the actual serial numbers in question). But the archaism of the whole text does suggest that we are here having the oldest available specimen of describing the process called samyaktvot patti (15 verses), darśanamohanīyaksopan (5 verses), cāritramohanīya-upaśamanā (8 verses) and cāritramohanīyaksa panā (11 verses); (one verse devoted to desavirati-cum-sarvavirati is too brief to be muchinformative). These topics thus account for 143 verses of the text which constitute its crux. Of the remaining 37 verses (they come before those 143) 5 give synonyms for the names of the 4 kaşāyas, 16 describe the relative intensity of the different types of kaşāyas, 7 offer a psychological account of one under the influence of a kaşāya. These too are interesting — though not crucially important -- topics. Then remaining 9 verses (they come first of all) — out of which, as mentioned earlier, two enumerate the topics to be discussed while seven pose (without answering) six elementary questions (rather question-series) regarding mohaniyakarma. The posure of these questions, again, is revealing - on account of its simplicity.102
(E) TATTVĀRTHASŪTRA (SABHĀŞYA) In one sense Umāsvāti's Tattvarthasūtra is the crowning achievement of the age of Agamas. For its ten chapters - composed of crisp Sanskrit aph. orisms — lucidly summarize the Agamic position on different important questions related to philosophy, ethics and mythology. The chapters I, II, V and VIII touch upon the problems of philosophy, the chapters VI-X those of ethics, the chapter III - IV those of mythology. Let us confine ourselves to the chapters devoted to philosophy and there it will be found that they discuss following problems : Chapter 1
(1) Mokşamārga (1) (2) Samyagdarśana (2-3)

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Chapter II
Chapter V
JAINA ONTOLOGY
(3) Saptatattva (4)
(4) Anuyogadvāra (5, 7-8) Pramāna (6, 9-33)
(6) Naya (6, 34-35)
Jiva (1-52)
(8) Pañcāstikāya-cum-kāla (1-28, 32-36,38-39) (9) Satsāmānya (29.31,37,40-44) (10) Karma (1-26)
Chapter VIII
In this list following things are to be noted:
(a) the particular items
(b) their order
(c) space devoted to each.
A natural procedure would have been to start with the problems of the chapter V but in Umasvati's time it was the problems of the chapter I that had come to occupy the focus of the Jaina theoretician's attention. Hence his beginning his text with these problems. Now there is nothing strictly philosophical about the first three of these problems and so they need not detain us any more. But the fact that Umasvati has thought fit to write aphorisms on anuyogadvāra, pramāna and naya — and write them first of all does suggest that these were then considered to be some of the most burning philosophical problems. Also to be noted is the fact that the problem of pramāṇa is treated at such a great length. Thus even if Umāsvāti is going to tell us in the chapter II that upayoga is the essential characteristic of a soul and that upayoga is to be subdivided into 5 types of jñāna, 3 types of ajñāna, 4 types of darsana he has taken care to discuss in advance -- and discuss it under the title pramana --the problem of jñāna and the allied problems of ajñāna.
The chapter II on the whole reproduces the traditional material relating to the problem of soul but it should be instructive to note as to what questions Umasvati does raise in this connection. They are as follows:

(1) au paśamika, kṣāyika-, kṣāyopaśamika-, audayika-, pāriṇāmikabhāva (1–7) (2) upayoga (cognition) (8-9)
(3) samsari-mukta (souls in bondage and released souls) (10)
(4) samanaska-amanaska (souls in possession of manas and those not in possession of it) (11)
(5) trasa-sthavara (static-bodied and mobile-bodied souls) (12-14)
(6) indriya (sense-organ), indriyavişaya (object of a sense-organ), indriyasvamitva (possession of a sense-organ), sanjñilva (possession of sanjñā i. e. higher cognition) (15-25)
(7) vigrahagati (process of transmigration) (26-31)

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(8) yoni--cum-janma (birth-place and birth) (32-36) (9) śarīra (body) (37-49) (10) veda (sexual behaviour) (50-51) (11) apavartya-, ana pavartya-ayu (life liable to a premature expiry and
life not liable to that) (52) As has already been noted, the first of these questions was new to the age of Umāsvāti but the noteworthly thing about the rest is that they mostly relate to bodily activities.
In the chapter V the material related to pañcāstikāya-cu n-kala was almost all traditional but that related to satsāmānya was almost all new. However, here Umāsvāti's manner of arranging the material leaves something to be desired. This can at once be seen from the summary catalogue of the chapter's problems given above but more can be seen from the following details of this catalogue : I pañcāstikāya- (1) pañcâstikayasā nānya (1-6) cum-kala : (2) pradeśa (7-11)
(3) avagāhanā (size) (12-16) (4) upakara (function ) ( pañcāstikaya-cum-kala )
(17-22) (5) pudgala (23-28) (6) pudgalabandha (formation of physical aggre
gate) (32-36)
(7) kāla (38–39) II satsāmānya:
(1) sat (reality) (29) (2) nityatva (permanence) (30) (3) arpita-anar pita ( relevance and non-relev.
ance) (31) (4) dravya (substance) (37) () guna (quality) (40)
(6) parināma (property) (41-44) Thus we find that certain problems related to satsämānya are taken up in between the problems of pudgala and pudgalabandha, a thoroughly anomalous procedure. Again, the problem of kala is introduced in between two problems related to satsāmānya - and to make matter worse kala had to be somehow taken into consideration already in connection with the problem of u pakāra. However leaving aside these difficulties - which are after all of a formal character -- it can be said that Umäsväti here provides us with a dependable catalogue of the important problems that had been raised in connection with puncāstikāya-cum-kāla and pudgalı. But as for the problems related to salsämanyı Umāsvāti is one of the pioneers to raise them; (this perhaps is one reason why this part of his discussion is so loosely arranged). Thus in three consecutive aphorisms Umāsvāti deals

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with sat as characterised by ut pāda, vyaya, dhrauvya -- but it is easy to see that these three aphorisms fail to clinch the issue clearly. Similarly, the aphorism 37 defines dravja as possessed of gunı and paryāya, the aphorism 40 defines guna, while the aphorisms 41-44 describe parināma (to be understood as paryāya ); all this too lacks desirable clarity. Certainly, it was in the age of Logic that the problem of satsāmānya was made the fulcrum of all ontological speculation while Umāsvāti's text manages to give us only a foretaste of this would-be endeavour.
In the chapter VIII Umāsvāti raises certain most basic questions related to the Karma doctrine and as follows:
(1) bandhahetu (causes of karmic bondage) (1) (2) bandha (karmic bondage) (2-3) (3) bandhacatustaya (the four types of karmic bondage) (4) (4) prakrtibandha (karmic bondage from the standpoint of karma-types)
(5-14) (5) sthitibandha (karmic bondage from the standpoint of duration) (15-21) (6) anublāvabandha (karmic bondage from the standpoint of intensity
(22-24) (7) pradesabandh (karmic bondage from the standpoint of number of
karma-particles) (25) (8) śubhakarma (auspicious karmas) (26)
As has already been indicated this part of the text contains little new that was typical of the period. Only let us note that in connection with his treatment of onubhāvabandha Umāsvāti has considered the problem of samkramana (which was certainly a new problem of the period) and that of karmavedana (=karmodaya) but not at all the problem that usually goes by the name anubhagabandha or rasabandha.
Lastly, a few words about Umāsvāti's position in relation to the Āgamic texts now current. It is found that now and then Umāsvāti says tbings that go against what is said in these Agamic texts. For example, both Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā maintain that kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana cannot proceed simultaneously, but Umāsvāti holds the opposite view103; (the Digambaras will here side with Umāsvāti as against Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā). Again, both Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā (even the Uttaradhya. yana chapler 28) maintain that kala is an independent dravya but Umāsvāti says that this view is upheld only by a section of the Jaina theoreticians104; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā as against Umāsvāli). Similarly, both Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā maintain that manah. par yapti is one type of paryāpti but Umāsvāti again says that this view is upheld only by a section of the Jaina theorteicians105; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavali and Prajñāpanā as against Umāsvati — though it is to be noted that Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā always bracket manah paryāpti with bhāşāpar yāpti so that the total number of paryāptis is five even in their

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case106). Lastly, Bhagavati maintains that a soul remains anāhāraka for one samaya, two samayas or three samayas but Umāsvāti says -- and so does Prajñāpanā -- that it remains so for one samaya or two samayas107; (the Digambaras will here side with Bhagavati as against Umāsvāti and Prajñāpanā). Then there is a case that deserves somewhat detailed consideration. We have earlier taken note of a standard formula which Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā use in describing the process of the reception of pudgala-particles on the part of a soul. This formula is to be applied to all cases of pudgala-reception but it says that the particles concerned are subtle as well as gross. Now in many cases (eg. in the case of karma-reception, it is in the very nature of things impossible for the particles concerned to be gross, and so in these cases the formula creates difficulty for the later commentators. But Umāsvāti when he discusses the question in the course of his exposition of the Karma doctrine explicitly says that the particles concerned are subtle not gross108. Similarly, this formula says that the particles concer. ned are anantarāvagāha and the natural meaning of the word is “immedi. ately adjacent to the soul)'. But the later standard position requires the meaning ‘co-existent (with the soul)' and so the later commentators give this very meaning to that word Now Umāsvāti replaces the word anantarāvagāha by ekakşetrāvagaha109. [In Bhagavati itself it is once argued that the particles concerned are not anantarāvagäha but ätmakşetrāvagaha110 and Umäsväti can claim to have followed this passage of Bhagavati. But the point is that the standing formula contains the word anantarāvagaha which Umāsvāti rejects in favour of ekakşetrāvagaha). All this suggests that there were at least three wordings of the Agamic texts, viz
(1) one that is preserved in the current Āgamic texts (2) one that was available to the early Digambara authors (3) one that was available to Umāsvati.
Of course, the possibility is always there that the current Āgamic texts have experienced corruption - through inadvertance or otherwise. For example, it is quite possible that the insertion of manaḥ paryāpti in the Āgamic list of paryaptis is a later corruption; similariy, the passage which lays down that the physical particles received by a soul must be atmakşeträvagaha not ananlaravagäha must be a later interpolation. And the discrepancy between Bhagavati and Prajñāpanā on the question of anāhāra needs an explanation. Be that as it may, the fact that Umāsvāti's text could be patronized by the Svetämbaras as well as Digambaras clearly proves that the Āgamic heritage available to the two sub-sects was substantially the same. That the Digambaras too were in possession of such a heritage - moreover, a heritage almost as rich as that possessed by the Svetambaras - goes without saying; what happened is that they - unlike their Svetāmbara colleagues -- bid good-bye to the wording of this heritage after it stood incorporated in the systematic texts of later times,

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CHAPTER III
THE AGE OF LOGIC I ITS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS THREE STAGES
Like the age of Āgamas, the age of Logic too exhibits certain general characteristics and it is now time that we take due note of them. Wbat a student of the Agamic texts finds to be one of their most striking features is what might be called their closed door' atmosphere; for barring the solitary – though notable - exceptions of Sūtrakstāngasūtra none of these texts ever refers to a rival view that is known to us from other independent sousces. Truly Bhagavati often relates dialogues where somebody reports to Mahavira - 'annautthiya evam vayanti etc.' and the latter retorts ‘annautthiya jam evañ vajanti tam micchā vayanti aham puna evam vayāmi etc.' But heretics thus animadverted are mostly of the nature of the proverbial 'men of straw'; in any case, the views attributed to them are hardly ever such as can be recognized as ones upheld by some well-established nonJaina school of Indian philosophy. With particular force does this account apply to the texts belonging to the first and second stages of the age of Agamas — though it remains essentially valid even in the case of those belonging to the third stage. For in this third stage a somewhat new element relevant for our present purpose seems to have been introduced in the form of the doctrine of 7 nayas. Certainly, it can plausibly be argued that the seven nayas of the Jaina theoreticians of the period represented so many non-Jaina ways of looking at things, ways with which these theoreticians had become acquainted in the course of their day-to-day missionary work. But the argument is weak and the fact seems to be that the advocates of 7 nayas are almost as much 'men of straw as were those annautthiyas of Bhagavati. In any case, no Āgamic text ever mention a well-established non-Jaina school of philosophy as an upholder of this naya or that. Of course, this does not mean that the doctrine of 7 nayas was formulated in utter isolation from the contemporary development taking place within the field of Indian Philosophy in general. But that is not the point. For to be sure not only the doctrine of 7 nayas but all doctrines too developed by the Jainas were formulated in close relationship to the de. velopments taking place within the field of Indian philosophy in general - and how the task was executed in each period of history is to be laid bare by the historians of Jaina philosophy in particular and Indian philosophy in general. What is being emphasised is that even while developing the doctrine of 7 nayas the Agamic texts make no explicit reference to a nonJaina school of philosophy, nor can it be made out that such a reference

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is implicitly present there. A second noteworthy feature of the Agamic texts is the essentially dogmatic character of most of their formulations. In this connection again certain dialogues of Bhagavati seem to form exception. Nay, it is precisely such dialogues of Bhagavati where Mahavira is represented as buttressing his contention with the help of some argumentation that are mostly old and mostly important. Of course, the argumemtation seldom amounts to something more than offering a more or less striking analogy but that is what is to be expected in the case of such a generally old piece of theorization. The point is that barring the Bhagavati passages in question almost the entire bulk of Agamic texts is in the form of bold assertions. In the age of Logic something opposite happens on both these counts, for now we come across texts where the non-Jaina schools of philosophy are explicitly named and criticised and texts where assertions are always followed by more or less cogent arguments supporting them. Of course, the two tendencies grew gradually so that there are texts where they present themselves in an incipient form and texts where they do so in a pronouced form.
Viewed in this light the first important Svetambara texts belonging to the age of Logic are Siddhasena's Sanmati, Mallavadi's Nayacakra and Jinabhadra's Višeṣavasyakabhaṣya; the first important Digambara texts Kundakunda's Pañcastikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra and Samantabhadra's Aptamimamsa. And all these are the texts which we intend to assign to what we are going to call the first stage of the age of Logic. The second stage of the age is represented by the Ŝvetambara Haribhadra and the Digambara Akalanka and Vidyananda, the third stage by the Digambara Prabhāchandra and Svetambara Abhayadeva, Vadideva and Yasovijaya. In the case of each of these stages there arise important and rather intricate blems of evaluation, and so they have to be taken up one by one.
pro

89
-

an
In the case of the first stage the three Svetambara texts concerned, viz. Siddhasena's Sanmati, Mallavadi's Nayacakra and Jinabhadra's Višeṣāvasyakabhāṣya deserve careful consideration inasmuch as they vividly exemplifyeach in its own manner as to what was meant by the advent of the age of Logic. The most outstanding feature of Sanmati is its handling of the traditional doctrine of seven nayas; in fact, it will be no exaggeration to say that through it the text has set the pace for the whole subsequent age. In this connection Siddhasena skillfully shifted the centre of attention from the sevenfold division of nayas into naigama, sangraha etc. to their twofold division into dravyāstika and paryāyāstika. This way he sought to bring the doctrine of nayas into harmony with the dominant contemporary tendency of Jaina thought in the field of ontology. For as the example of Umāsvāti clearly indicates the Jainas of the period were defining reality as possessed J. O...12

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of origination, destruction and premanence. There was no old Āgamic tra. dition of doing so and the new tendeney doubtless grew under the shadows of the Buddhist vs. Brahmanic controversy as to the definition of reality. Thus whereas the Buddhists were maintaining that reality is ever-changing and he Brahmanical philosophers were outright opposed to their view the Jainas came out with the suggestion that reality is ever-changing and yet permanent. It was an old Jaina position that dharma, adharma, akāśa, souls and atoms are so many permanent substances but it was always conceded that all these substances possess properties that might come and go; as for the composite physical substances the position was that their constituent atoms are permanent even if they themselves must originate and perish). It was in this background that one had to understand the Bhagavati contention that an atom, a soul, a nāraka was permanent from the standpoint of dravya and transient from that of pargāya or bhāva. Of course, the contention was not a recurring theme of Bhagavats and certainly it did not mean that everything whatsoever is a permanent substance possessed of ever changing pro. perties. But in the age of Umāsvāti it became a cardinal Jaina thesis that everything whatsoever is permanent from the standpoint of dravya and everchanging from that of paryāya; (as already hinted, in the case of composite physical substances the thesis amounted to maintaining that they are permanent in so far as their constituent atoms are so while they are everchanging in so far as their own properties are so — but the hint was always there that even composite physical substances are more or less permanent substances even if not absolutely permanent ones). Thus Siddhasena in effect suggested that a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance, that it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, that it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentry properties. From this it also follows that two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are phyical substances, that they are partly alike in so far as one of them is a lump of clay the other a jar, that they are not at all alike in so far as each is a seat of its own momentary properties. Using the terminology of the doctrine of nayas Siddhasena would say that from the standpoint of sangrahanaya physical substance is just a physical substance (better still, a substance), from the standpoint of vyavahäranaya it is a lump of clay or a jar, from that of rjusütranaya it is a seat of its momentary properties. That all this was not implied in the traditional doctrine of nayas can be gathered from a perusal of the Anuyogadvāra formulation on the subject - a particularly strong argument in support of such a view being that there was yet another naya viz. naigama of which Siddhasena just took no notice. And yet Siddhasena made out as if he was only amplifying the traditional doctrine of nayas. Since on Siddhasena's showing the sangraha and vyavahāra nayas conceded that a physical substance was a more or less permanent substance while the rjusūtranaya laid

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all-out emphasis on its momentary properties he suggested that the former two nayas belong to the category drayyāstika, the last to the category paryāyāstika. [Siddhasena spoke not a word about the remaining three nayasexcept that they too belong to the category paryāyāstika whose root-naya is rjusūtra). But it is doubtful if the traditional seven nayas were meant to be thus subdivided into the categories dravyāstika and paryāyāstika, Be that as it may, the essence of the naya-doctrine was seen by Siddhasena to lie in the following two positions :
(i) a physical substance is absolutely permanent qua a physical substance, it is more or less permanent qua a lump of clay or a jar, it is absolutely transient qua a seat of its momentary properties;
(ii) two physical substances are absolutely alike in so far as both are physical substances, they are partly alike in so far as one is a lump of clay the other a jar, they are not at all alike in so far as each is a seat of its momentary properties,
Through the first of these positions the Jainas became participant in the Buddhist vs. Brahmanic controversy on the question of kşanikatyanilyalva, through the second in that on the question of sämānya-viseşa. Siddhasena's dicussion of the questions was a good model for the later authors and so he was treated as an authority in the Svetāmbara as well as Digambara camps; (however, these authors seldom followed Siddhasena's practice of completely ignoring naigamanaya and of making no more than a passing mention of the three sabdanayas).
Let us also briefly consider certain minor contributions made by. Siddhasena. Thus he takes note of the doctrine of four nikṣepas — saying that nama-, sthāpanā- and dravya-nikṣepas belong to the category dravyāstika, bhāvanikşe pa to the category of paryāyāstika; but he does nothing by way of elaborating his contention. Similarly, he lays down the seven alternative ways of describing a thing that are the subject-matter of the Saptabhangi doctrine - to be precise, of this doctrine in one of its two versions -- but his amplification of the same is contained in just one verse which, unfor. tunately, is utterly obscure in its meaning. Again, he seeks to argue against the position that guna and paryāya are two different concepts. In Umässvāti's time it was gradually becoming a fashion with the Jaina authors to distinguish between guna and paryāya but no such distinction was made in the old Agamic texts. Appealing to the authority of these texts Siddhasena makes out some sort of case in support of his view but the distinction had come to stay even if the subsequent authors were not always unanimous as to their understanding of the same. Lastly, Siddhasena argued that jñana and darśana are not two different concepts; on his view certain cases of iñana as traditionally understood are to be called jñāna as well as darśana

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while the rest are to be called jñāna but not darśana. On this question too Siddhasena was hardly followed by any subsequent author.
The value of Mallavādi's Nayacakra lies in an altogether different direction. He is reputed to have been a commentator of Sanmati but his Nayacakra betrays little specific influence of this text. For one thing, Mallavādi, unlike Siddhasena, gives recognition to naigamanaya, understands vyavahāranaya as the standpoint of non-philosophical commonsense, and treats the three sabdanayas on the equal footing with the rest. Of course, Mallavadi's real task is to offer an account of some seventeen philosophi. cal positions and treat each as a case of this or that naya, but on this question too Siddhasena had something to say. For he has told us that the Sānkhya philosophy is a case of dravyāstikanaya, the Buddhist philosophy a case of paryāyāstikanaya while the Vaiseșika philosophy a case of mechanical juxtaposition of the two. It is not much difficult to see what Siddhasena is driving at — particularly in view of the fact that he has been followed by certain later authors whose elaborate treatment of the question makes things tolerably clear. But Mallavadi's assignment of the different philosophical positions to different ngyas is all his own; the following is how it stands in a nutshell :
1 Vyavahāranaya: 1 the ritualist Mimāṁsā doctrine 2 Sangrahanaya : 2 five monistic doctrines centred on Purusa, Niyati,
Kala, Svabhāva, Bhāva 3 two dualistic doctrines one centred on Prakrti and
Puruşa the other on God and the world 4 the doctrine of the equal efficacy of puruşartha and
karma 3 Naigama : 5 the doctrine centred on dualism of dravya and
kriya
6 the Vaišeșika doctrine of six padārthas 4 Rjusūtra : 7 the Jaina doctrine of Syadvada 5 Śabda : 8 the doctrine of sabdanaya
9 the doctrine of avaktavyavāda 6 Samabhirūd ha: 10 the doctrine of aggregate-devoid-of-an-underlying
substance 7 Evarbhūta : 11 the doctrine of kşaņikavada
12 the doctrine of Sūnyavāda-cum-Vijñānavāda
Mallavadi's account of these doctrines - in each case followed by critical comments -- is most elaborate but he never argues why a doctrine is to be assigned to this or that naya; (for all practical purposes he simply does the assignment and considers his task to be over). Maybe in his time that much is sufficient, but a modern reader who has formed his notion

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-
of nayas from the later texts - and has even taken due note of the Āgamic treatment of the same -- will find it difficult to see the logic of Mallavādi's performance, at least to see it with desired clarity. Even more bewildering is Mallavādi's assignment of the above 17 doctrines to 12 categories which seem to be his own creation — at least we know of no earlier or later author who employed them. The seventeen doctrines in question arranged in a serial order are given above; the twelve categories in question similarly arranged are given below : 1 vidhih
- affirmation 2 vidhervidhih
affirmation of affirmation 3 vidhervidhiniyamam
affirmation-cum-limitation of affirmation 4 vidherniyamah
limitation of affirmation 5 vidhiniyamam
affirmation-cum-limitation 6 vidhini yamasya vidhih
affirmation of affirmation-cum-limitation 7 vidhiniyamasya vidhiniyamam
- affirmation-cum-limitation of affirma.
tion-cum-limitation 8 vidhiniyamasya niyamah - limitation of affirmation-cum-limitation 9 niyamah
- limitation 10 niyamasya vidhiḥ
- affirmation of limitation 11 niyamasya vidhiniyamam
- affirmation-cum limitation of limitation 12 niyamasya niyamah - limitation of limitation
In this connection again Mallavādi does not argue why a particular doctrine is to be assigned to this or that category; but here an additional difficulty is that unlike the seven nayas these categories are found described nowhere else.
These defects of Mallavādi's text are certainly formidable and they must have been at least partly responsible for the neglect it suffered at the hands of subsequent generations. (No later author ever quoted a specific view of Mallavādi developed in Nayacakra and the text itselt is now to be restored from Simhasūri's commentary on it). But the text deserves serious study for it is the earliest available specimen of a Jaina's thorough acqaintance with the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy, a feature absent not only in the Agamic text including Tattvārthasūtra but even in Sanmati.
Jinabhadra's Visesavašyakabhāsya is another important early text belonging to the age of Logic. Written in the form of a commentary on Āvasyakaniryukti the text does not much concern itself with the views of the rival systems of philosophy; in this sense it rather breathes the atmosphere of the age of Āgamas. However, the text is not wholly devoid of occasional references to Buddhists and Vaišeşikas and in one particular section viz. Ganadha. ravāda so many rival philosophical views e. g. ekātmavāda, bhūtacaitanya

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vada, sunyavada are criticised en masse; (it is however curious that nowhere in this text is a specific Sankhya view ever mentioned). In any case, the text is doubtless worthy of the age of Logic. For its treatment of various philosophical problems is so elaborate and so masterly that it has often served as a model to the acutest brains produced by the age of Logic. For example, Yasovijaya, the last titan of the age of Logic, in his treatment of Anekantavāda heavily depends on Sanmati on the one hand and Višeṣāva. syakaohaṣya on the other; similarly in his treatment of epistemological problems he heavily depends on Syadvādaratnākara on the one hand and Viseṣāvasyakabhaṣya on the other. Certainly, Jinabhadra's account of seven nayas, his treatment of the problem of dravyāstika vs. paryāyāstika naya and his occasional application of the Naya doctrine to certain specific cases throw ample light on this rather ticklish subiect matter of Jaina philosophical studies. On his showing sangrahanaya represents the standpoint of emphasis on the general at the cost of the particular, vyavaharanaya that of emphasis on the particular at the cost of the general while naigamanaya that of emphasis on both but conceived as mutually independent; as against all these rjusutranaya represents the stanpoint of emphasis on the momentary particular. It will be instructive to compare Jinabhadra's account of the first four nayas with Siddhasena's account of the first three (there being no naigama according to the latter). Then as against Siddhasena who just ignores three sabdanayas Jinabhadra offers a lucid account of them. It is also characteristic of Jinabhadra that he offers an account of seven nayas in one part of his text and treats the problem of dravyāstika vs. paryāyāstika in another; (of course, the occasion for doing so was provided by Avasyakaniryukti but the noteworthy thing is that Jinabhadra availed of it). It can easily be seen that the former discussion represents a comparatively early stage and the latter a comparatively late stage in the evolution of Anekantavada (Non-absolutism). An even earlier stage than the one represented by the former discussion is to be noticed in the various places where the Naya doctrine is applied to certain specific cases. Here the discussion is often conducted on the same old level as was to be seen in the case of Anuyogadvara treatment of the problem, Jinabhadra's treatment of the doctrine of four niksepas is also elaborate and illuminating but his reference to the Saptabhangi doctrine is extremely summary (covering just two verses) and fails to be informative. Similarly, Jinabhadra's treatment of epistemological problems appearing in connection with his commentary on the very first 77 verses of Avasyakaniryukti is extremely useful. For instance, here he says so many important things about the precise relationship exhibiting similarities as well as dissimilarites that obtains between mati and śruta. Lastly, also useful are two more or less massive collections of ontological discussions the more important one occurring in connection with Gaṇadharavada the less important one in connection with Nihnavavāda.
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Kundakunda is the first Digambara author who is considerably affected by the initial strivings of the age of Logic. His philosophical masterpieces are three - Pancāstikāya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasāra -- to be studied in this very order. In Pañcâstikāya he discusses the doctrine of Pancāstikāya, the doctrine of Navatattva, the doctrine of Moksa but the whole discussion starts with a treatment of the problem of drauya, guna, paryāya, and that of ut pāda, vyaya, dhrauvya, a procedure that is symptomatic. However, on the whole the level of discussion in Pañcāstikaya is comparatively elemen tary. A comparatively advanced level of discussion appears in Pravacanasāra which is divided into three sections, viz. Jñānādhikāra, Jñeyādhikara, Caritrādhikara; of these the first two raise philosophical questions of consi. rable importance. Thus in Jñāpādhikāra there occurs an ontological analysis of the cognitive, emotive and affective states of a soul — the emphasis being on the point that what happens to a soul as a results of its association with an alien element, viz. matter is not something really its own. And like Pancā. stikāya, Jñeyādhikāra begins with an important discussion on the problem of dravya, guna, paryāya and that of ut päda, vyaya, dhrauvya; the remaining section is made up of a small part treating pañcāstikaya and a large part treating soul. Here again it is emphasised that what matter does to a soul is not something essential to this soul. Now observations about the essential dissimilarities obtaining between soul and matter which occupy so much part of Pravacanasāra ( and which in a rudimentary form appear in the Moksa part of Pañcāstikāya as well ) are the solid basis on which is erected the superstructure of Samayasāra --- in a way, a unique document in the whole philosophical literature of the Jainas. Employing the terminology of vyavahāranaya and niscayayanaya Kundakunda here argues that an account of a soul in terms of what happens to it as a result of its association with matter is its account from ths standpoint of vyavahāranaya (practical standpoint) while an account of it in terms of what happens to it all by itself is its account from the standpoint of niscayanaya ( definitive standpoint ). True, distinction between vyavahāranaya and niscayanaya is as old as Bhagavati but Kundakunda's so massive a recourse to it was startling. Moreover, there was an important difference of nuance. For according to Bhagavati niscayanaya tells us all that is the case whereas vyavahāranaya tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of everyday life; as against this, Kundakunda was suggesting that vyavahā. ranaya tells us all that is the case whereas niscayanaya tells us only that part of it which is important from the standpoint of higher spiritual life. For certainly, as a Jaina Kundakunda could not maintain that nothing happens to a soul as a resul of its association with matter; he could only emphasize that what thus happens is something that is not bound to happen for ever (and hence something that is not important from the standpoint of higher

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doctrine
spiritual life ). Be that as it may, an iteresting fact of the Naya was brought to light by Kundakunda in his Samayasāra.
The last important author of what we have called the first stage of the age of Logic was the Digambara Samantabhadra whose Āptam māṁsā is a philosophical text of first-rate importance. For it was in Aptamimāṁsā that for the first time a basic use was made of the Saplahhangi doctrine in connection with formulating philosophical problems. The doctrine was somehow in the air ever since the day of Bhagavati and in Sanmati it was actually laid down in full. Even Umāsvati seems to have been acquainted with what Siddhasena says but the surmise is not beyond doubt. For in the course of his Bhāsya on the aphorism concerning arpita-anar pita Umāsvāti speaks of a fourfold division of judgment into dravyāstika, mālīkāpadāstika, utpannāstika and paryāyāstika; the meaning of the division is not much clear but while explaining the fourth item Umāsvāti says that a thing is there from the standpoint of its own properties, it is not there from the standpoint of alien properties, while it is indescribable from the standpoint of both these sets of properties, and he concludes by saying that alternatives are to be formulated on the basis of a consideration of parts. The meaning seems to be that two of the three features in question, viz. is, is-not, indescribable can appear in two different parts of a thing (and this can happen in three ways) while all three can appear in three of its parts and this can happen in just one way ). Thus together with the original three we will get seven alternatives in all, that is, the same as Siddhasena speaks of. But the possibility is not ruled out that Umāsvāti is referring not to these seven alternatives but to those 23 that had made their appearance in Bhagavati. Kundakunda too, in both Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra, summarily refers to the seven alternatives of the Saptabhangi doctrine though in both he actually quotes only the first four of them and in the former alone does he say in so many words that the alternatives are seven in all. Moreover, it is not certain whether Kundakunda conceives saptabhangi after the manner of Siddhasena or he does so after the manner of Samantabhadra. For with Samantabhadra the first two alternatives are the same as those with Siddhasena but the rest emerge differently. Thus according to the former a thing both is and is not when the standpoint of its own properties and that of the alien ones are applied successively while it is indescribable when they are applied simultaneously; as for the last three alternatives they on this view emerge when the standpoint of the fourth alternative is applied along with that of first, second and third respectively, This difference obtaining beween the two versions of Saptabhangi is noteworthy but let it be clearly recognised that it does not touch the essence of the matter. For the essence of the Saptabhangi doctrine lies in maintaining that a thing is characterised by two mutually contradictory properties at

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one and the same time. And this way of looking at things was certainly a comparatively later growth. True, even in Bhagavati a question was often answered in terms of two mutually contradictory features, for instance, when it was said that during the process of transmigration a being possesses body and also does not (the formar when taijasa and kārmaņa types of bodies are taken into consideration the latter when the remaining types), or that during the same process a being possesses sense-organs and also does not (the former when bhavendriyas are taken into consideration the latter when dravyendriyas). But these could hardly be called cases of vindicating Anekāntavāda. Some sort of a move in that direction was made in connection with formulating the doctrine of seven nayas, for here two nayas (e.g. sangraha and rjusülra) seem to have been so conceived that they take diametrically opposed stands on one and the same questions. But even the Naya doctrine as originally understood does not have it for its central feature that diametrically opposed stands be taken on one and the same question. It was only when the sevenfold division of nayas was replaced by a twofold division that the assignment of two mutually contradictory features to the same thing at the same time became a central feature of the Naya doctrine. However, the twofold division of nayas into dravyāstika and paryāyāstika was made possible by the earlier evolved tradition of difining reality as possessed of origination, destruction and permanence. Thus the real credit for sowing the seed of Anekantavada within the field of Jaina philosophical speculation goes to the present definition of reality. To be sure, change and permanence constitute the first pair of contradictory features whose joint observation all around led the Jaina theoreticians to formulate and elaborate the doctrine of Anekantavada. For starting from here they soon discovered that similarity and dissimilarity, unity and plurality, separateness and non-separateness, relatedness and non-relatedness etc. constitute other important pairs of contradictory features which characterise things no less markedly than does the pair consisting of the contra. dictory features change and permanence. A clear-cut enumeration of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda as covering these and similar phenomena of 'copresence of the opposites' is the real contribution of Aptamīmāmsā; that the text proceeds within the over-all framework of the Saptabhangi doctrine is but a question of form.
Here we close our summary perusal of the texts composed in the first stage of the age of Logic. All these texts bear, in one way or another, the stamp of being a product of an age of transition. Sanmati, Višeşāvašyakabhāsya and the writings of Kundakunda are so much permeated with the spirit of the age of Agamas that it will be advisable to characterise them as semi-Agamic texts. It is only insofar as these texts develop the doctrine
J. O...13

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of ut pāda, vyaya, dhrauvya or that of nayas - particularly, the dravyāstika and paryāyāstika that they say something appropriate to the age of Logic, For these doctrines have laid the foundations of Anekāntavāda --- which certainly is a characteristic feature of the age of Logic. In the case of Naya. cakra difficulties arise from another direction. Its mastery of the contemporary non-Jaina systems of philosophy leaves little to be desired, dut the text is no model for a criticisin of these systems undertaken from the Jaina standpoint. As a matter of fact, the text does not even claim that the systems in question have been criticised from the Jaina standpoint, for what has been presented is the criticism of an outgoing system on the part of the incoming one. Really, however, the criticism part of the text almost always contains, in an anomalous fashion, something or else which a Jaina alone could say while the rest of this part contains little to which a Jaina could take exception. But the fact remains that the criticism of the systems in question would have been somewhat different had it been offered in the name of a Jaina himself. As for Aptamīmāṁsā it gives no evidence of its author being so thorough a student of the contemporary systems of philosophy as was the author of Nayacakra, but the framework worked out here for criticising these systems proved to be a major helpful model for subsequent authors. Certainly, the task of the Jaina authors belonging to the second stage of the age of Logic was to command a Nayacakra-like mastery over the contemporary systems of philosophy and subject them to criticism mainly in terms of the model provided by Aptamīmāṁsā (partly also in an independent manner). In the Svetāmbara camp the task was undertaken by Haribhadra in his Anekāntajayapatākā, in the Digam camp by Akalanka and Vidyananda in their several masterpieces. So it is to these authors that we turn next.
Haribhadra was a polymath whose intellectual endeavour compassed an unusually large number of fields but Anekānta jayapataka was doubtless his philosophical magnum opus. The text did not receive due attention on the part of later generations (even Yašovijaya chose to write a commentary not on it but on Šāstravārtāsamuccaya which was a comparatively elementary philosophical text coming from the pen of Haribhadra). But the fault lay not so much with Anekāntajayapatākā as with theo ver-all situation that emerged historically and the question deserves a close consideration. As compared to Aptamīmāṁsā Anekantajayapatākā is a much advanced text and for the most part while arranging its material it adopts the former's model minus its essential trappings. Thus in its first four chapters it respectively deals with the following pairs of contradictory features :
(1) Existence-Non-existence (2) Permanence-Transience (3) Genaral-Particular (4) Describable-Indescribable

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THE AGE OF LOGIC [The remaining two chapters proceed in an independent manner and they respectively take up the following topics :
(5) refutation of Vijñānavāda (idealism) (6) refutation of Kşanabhangavāda (momentarism)
But as compared to Nayacakra Anekāntajayapatākā is a much poor text so far as it concerns the question of mastering the contemporary systems of philosophy; and for a Svetambara text this was definitely a sign of degeneration. Little wonder that a long gap separated Haribhadra from the next great Svetāmbara authors who wrote on philosophical topics. These authors were Abhayadeva who commented on Sanmati and Vadideva who composed Syadvadaratnākara; however even in their case inspiration and impetus came not from Haribhadra but from the Digambara authors like Prabhäcandra and his great predecessors Vidyānanda and Akalanka, Of course, Prabbacandra himself stood to Vidyānanda is somewhat the same relation as Haribhadra did to Mallavadı - in both cases the later author was an inferior genius. But that is a different question and the fact remains that in the second stage of the age of Logic - a stage covering Haribhadra, Akalanka, Vidyānanda-ideas that historically proved pregnant came not from Haribhadra but from Akalanka and Vidyānanda. It was in the third stage of the age of Logic -a stage covering Prabhacandra, Abhayadeva, Vadideva, Yašovijaya – that Svetāmbara authors once more have a clear lead over their Digambara counterparts. But that again is a different question and will be taken up in due course. For the present let us only remark that Anekānta jayapataka deserved a better tale that history meted out to it.
Akalanka was a typical product of the age of Logic and the whole range of its activities, which was philosophical through and through, carries a meaning. Thus he wrote a commentary on Tattvārthasūtra, a commentary on Āpta mimaisā, four independent texts, viz. Laghiyastraya Nyāyaviniscaya, Pramāṇasangraha, and Siddhiviniscaya, dealing with philosophical topics in general, pramāna, naya and niksepa in particular. Through his commenary on Tattvārtha, the great Tati vārtharajavārtika, Akalanka sought to present the Agamic material in a language and style befitting the age of Logic. But here there was little scope for an originality in content and Akalanka hardly made an attempt in that direction. The case was different with Aptamimārsā where content was considerably expanded by Akalanka in his commentary Astašati. This in a way announted to making good a deficiency that vitiated Āptamīmāmsā. For this text as it originally stood was rather poor in content, though brilliant in form. Lastly, in his independent writings Akalanka continued the creative philosophical activity initiated in Astašati but here the very framework within which the discussion was conducted was the author's own

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creation; and this aspect of the question is of considerable importance. For as time passed Akalanka became more and more keenly aware that the Jainas were yet without a real doctrine of pramānas. He, of course, knew that the tradition spoke of a fivefold division of jñānas; nay, in Rajavartika he had himself offered a lucid exposition of this traditional understanding of the subject. But he felt that the traditional list of 5 jñānas was no match for the lists of pramānas that were being offered by the different non-Jaina schools of Indian philosophy, e.g. by the Buddhist Nyāya, Vaiseșika and Mīmāmsā schools. So he devised a new such list for his camp and its items were as follows: pratyakşa, smrti, pratyabhijña, tarka, auumāna, agama. The chief merit of this list was that it included two items, viz. pratyakșa and anumāna which were there in almost every other nonJaina list and which were not clearly provided for in the traditional list of five jñānas. Of course, Akalanka also sought to demonstrate that the six items of his list were reducible to the five items of the traditional list. In this connection the task in essence was to show how indriya pratyakşa, smrti, pratyabhijña, tarka and anumāna were cases of matijñāna; (āgama could well be treated as a synonym for śrula while avadhi, manah paryāya and kevala treated as cases of atindriya pratyakşa). This required a thorough evaluation of the traditional concept of mati but Akalanka did nothing of the sort and mainly relied on Umāsvāti's declaration to the effect that mati, smrit, sañña, cinta and abhinibodha are anarthāntara, a declaration which itself stood in need of a critical examination. On the other hand, Akalanka thoroughly examined - and did so again and again the meaning be had decided to bestow on the six members of his list of pramānas. The result was that the Jainas came to have a well considered list of pramāņas which was a good enough match for the various non-Jaina lists then current. Besides, Akalanka almost always sought to append to his treatment of pramānas a treatment of nayas and nikṣepas but there was not much original in this latter treatment. Even then this part of Akalarka's writings has to be studied seriously and compared with the corresponding part of Jinabhadra's Višeşāvasyakabhāsya; for in both cases there was a serious attempt to give logical shape to two traditional doctrines which were not so logical to begin with. In any case, it was almost always with a view to dealing with pramāna, naya and niksepa that Akalanka undertook to compose independent texts; (Siddhiviniscaya has a somewhat broader canvas). But the discussion in these texts is not epistemological in the narrow sense of the term. For one thing, a treatment of pramāna almost involves a treatment of pramāņa-vişaya and the latter is a purely ontological enquiry; but even otherwise there are numerous occasions when a treatment of pramāna, naya or nikse pa involves a treatment of ontological problems; (as just hinted Siddhiviniscaya treats a few ontological problems quite independently as well).

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The last author belonging to the second stage of the Ag& Br Tógic was Vidyānanda. As we have seen, Akalanka had conducted his thought-experiment on three different levels and in each case he was some sort of a pioneer. But Vidyānanda had received in heritage all that Akalanka was able to achieve. So the first task before him was to integrate into one whole the different strands of Akalanka's legacy and then there was the obvious task of augmenting the riches received by way of inheritance, Vidyānanda performed these tasks by composing two immortal works, viz. Tattvārthašlokavārtika which is a commentary on Tattvārthasūtra and Astasahasri which is a commentary on Astašati ( the latter written in such a style that the whole of Astašati stands incorporated within the body of Astasahasri). [Vidyānanda is also the author of several independent texts but they are not so important]. In Astasahasrī the pattern followed was broadly the same as that in Akalanka's Astašati inasmuch as here various non-Jaina philosophical positions were subjected to criticism in terms of the model set up by Aptamīmāṁsā; (only Vidyānanda's pene. tration into the depths of problems was decidedly superior). But in Tattvā. rthašlokavārtika, the earlier and the more important work, Vidyānanda planned his whole strategy by himself. Of course, there are occasions here when Vidyānada, like Akalanka, presents the Āgamic material in a language and style befitting the age of Logic - only doing so at a deeper level - but that is not so noteworthy. What is really noteworthy is that in this text Vidyānanda creates numerous occasions when he can launch an inde. pendent criticism against various non-Jaina positions. The idea is that in these cases, unlike in Astasahasri, Vidyānanda was not bound to attack his rivals only from the standpoint of Anekāntavādo. For example, in the course of his very long introductory remarks preceding the first aphorism Vidyān. anda maintains that only a Jaina Tirthankara is in a position to undertake religious preaching that is all valid; in this connection he shows how the same is impossible on the part of an omniscient being conceived after the fashion of the Sankhyas, of God conceived after the fashion of the NyāyaVaišeşikas, of a Buddha conceived after the fashion of the Buddhists'. Immediately afterwards it is maintained that only a soul conceived after the fashion of the Jaina can receive such a religious preaching; and in this connection Vidyānanda shows how the same is impossible on the part of a soul conceived after the fashion of the Carvākas, Buddhists, Nyāya-Vaisesi. kas, Mimāṁsakas, Sankhyas?. Both these disussions are extremely rich in philosophical content and yet the occasion for them is Vidyānanda's own free creation. Again, take Vidyānanda's commentary on the aphorism listing the six Anuyogadvāras viz. nirdeśa, svāmitva, sādhana, adhikarana, sthiti, vidhana. Students of the Agamic texts know what these items mean but Vidyānanda has nothing to do with that, for he has here thought fit to criticise the following six philosophical positions ;

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( i ) that the real is indescribable (ii) that dependent is an impossible relation (iii) that causation is an impossible relation (iv) that location is an impossible relation (v) that everthing is essentially momentary (vi) that all things belong to one and the same type.
(The first five are Buddhist positions, the sixth a monist one)3. This discussion too is rich in philosophical content and the occasion for it too is almost Vidyānanda's own free creation. And the cases like these are numerous enough in Tattvārthašlokavārtika. Lastly, the problems which Akalanka had dealt with in his independent writings, viz. the problems connected with pramāņa, naya, nikșepa Vidyānanda takes up in the appropriate part of Tattvārthašlokavārtika. As has already been noted the aphorisms of Tattvārtha were explained by Akalanka on more or less traditional lines but these very aphorisms were explained by Vidyānanda in the light of the innovations introduced by Akalanka himself in the field of the treatment of pramāna, naya and nikşe pa. Certainly the discussion of pramāna, naya, miksepa occurring in Vidyānanda has a definite advantage over tha ing in Akalanka in that the latter was the first experimenter in the field the former the consummate master of the situation, Be that as it may, Tattvärthašlokavārtika and Astasahasri represent the high water-mark of philosophical speculation undertaken in the second stage of the age of Logic.
The Digambara author who followed Vidyānanda was Prabhacandra and as has already been hinted he was an inferior genius as compared to the former. This is the reason why Vidyānanda has to be treated as the last author of the second stage of the age of Logic and Prabhācandra the first Digambara author of its third stage. Vidyānanda had surveyed whole of conteroporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalanka's discoveries but he was himself possessed of a deeply penetrating insight; Prabhācandra too surveys the contemporary philosophical scene in the light of Akalanka's discoveries but his insight had its limitations. The result was that Vidyā. nanda gave us two of the most advanced philosophical texts coming from the pen of a Jaina while Prabhācandra gave us two text-books to be used by fairly gifted school-boys. Of these latter one was Nyāyakumudacandra, a commentary on Akalanka's Laghiyastraya, the other Prameyakamala. mārtanda, a commentary on Māņikyanandi's aphorisms entitled Pariksā. mukha. Pariksämukha neatly summarises Akalanka's epistemological theses and is divided into six chapters respectively dealing with pramāṇasāmānya, pratyakşa pramāņa, parokşapramāna, pramānavişaya, pramāna phala and pramānā. bhasa. Lagbiyastraya really consists of two texts, the former divided into five chapters respectively dealing with pratyakşapramāna, pramänavişaya, parokşa. bramana, āgama, naya, the latter being of the form of one chapter dealing

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with pramāṇa, naya, nikṣepa. Thus Prabhācandra based himself on two texts, one that was less systematic but written by Akalanka himself, the other that was more systematic but written by one who followed Akalanka. And in this connection he could manage to take within the purview of bis discussion a large number of philosophical problems epistemological as well as ontological; (many of the problems occur in both the texts). But cert. ainly the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry was less comprehensive than that
idyānanda and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter. As a matter of fact, a study of Prabhācandra is a good preparation for that of Vidyānanda, that it is a good preparation argues Prabhācandra's worth, that it is only a preparation argues his limitation.
Prabbäcandra was the last great Digambara author to have written on philosophical questions, and the second important author of the third stage of the age of Logic was the Svetambara Abhayadeva who wrote a volu. minous commentary on Sanmati. [Even if Abhayadeva came before Prabhacandra there is an advantage in considering him after the latter). But Abhayadeva was interested not so much in making clear the positions maintained in Sanmati as in independently treating such philosophical problems as to him appeared important. The result is that hardly a fifth part of Sanmatitika explains the wording of the original text while the rest is a miscellaneous collection of independent philosophical discussions connected in more or less far-fetched manner with some word or other of the origi
ext. Take for example the very first verse of the text. In the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva discusses -- and at great length - the following problems : 1. Prāmānya-svatastva-paratastva ( the problem whether knowledge is
self-valid or otherwise) 2. Vedāpaurşeyatyavāda (the problem of Veda being an impersonal
composition) 3. Sarvajñavāda (the problem of omniscience) 4. Isvaravāda (the problem of God) 5. Almaparimāņa (the problem of the size of soul) 6. Mokşasvarūpa (the problem of the nature of mokşa)
And yet the fact is that the wording of the verse provides ao natural occasion for all this discussion; in any case, the verse is too unimportant to warrant such an inordinately long comment. Similarly, the second verse provides no natural occasion for the extremely lengthy discussion on the problem of word-meaning relation indulged in by Abhayadeva in the course of commenting on it. Then a verse in Sanmati says that rjusūtra is the basic paryāyāstikanaya while the remaining paryāyāstıkanayas are its branches and sub-branches; in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva elabor. ately presents and criticises the philosophical standpoints upheld by the

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Sauträntikas, Yogacaras and Madhyamikas, a discussion not much relevant so far as the wording of the text is concerned. Again, another verse lays down a distinction between jñāna and darsana and in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva offers an extremely lengthy treatment of the diverse epistemological problems, a treatment hardly germane to what the text says. Lastly, in one verse it has been said that Kanada endorses the standpoint of dravyastikanaya as well as paryāyāstikanaya but he is nevetheless wrong inasmuch as he takes the two in isolation from each other; in the course of commenting on it Abhayadeva undertakes an extremely lengthy exposition-cum-criticism of the Vaiseṣika ontological positions, a discussion out of proportion to the significance of the original statement. These cover almost all the major cases where Sanmatitika undertakes an important philosophical discussion. In their own right they are all worthy of a serious attention, the only difficulty with them being that they have been offered in the name of commenting on a text with which they have little intrinsic relation; (in the process it so happens that the really important utterances of the original text stand comparatively neglected). Now in all philosophising Abhayadeva was considerably indebted to his Digambara predecessors. But it is curious to note that in his long treatment of epistemological problems Akalanka's classification of pramānas has been disposed of in just few lines; there too it is mentioned as a veiw of kecit' and contrasted to the Saiddhantika view (i.e. to the traditional view which Akalanka had virtually set aside). Be that as it may, Sanmatiika is the next Svetambara text after Nayacakra where due survey has been undertaken of the contemporary philosophical scene.
most
The process of an over-all philosophical stock-taking initiated by Abhayadeva in Sanmatitika was continued by Vadideva in Syadvādaratnakara. The formal structure of Syadvadaratnakara resembles that of Pramanner. Let us recall that meyakamalamartanda in an extremely close following Parikṣāmukha Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa is divided into six chap. ters respectively dealing with pramäṇa-sāmānya, pratyakṣapramāṇa, parokṣapramāna, pramāṇaviṣaya, pramāṇaphala, pramāṇābhasa. Syadvādaratnākara is similarly divided into eight chapters respectively dealing with pramāṇasāmānya, pratyakṣapramāṇa, paroksa pramāna (minus agama), agama pramāṇa, pramāṇavisaya, pramaṇaphala-cum-pramāņṇābhāsa, naya, vāda. Not only that, in each chapter Vadideva has first composed aphorisms closely following Parikṣāmukha and then written a commentary on them closely following Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, (to be precise Vadideva's aphorisms bear the title Pramaṇanayatativāloka while Syadvādaratnākara: is the name of his tary on the same). Now when we further recall that Parikṣāmukha is a neat summary of the whole body of Akalanka's epistemological theses then Vādideva turns out to be the first Svetambara author to have given a full
commen

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throated support to the innovations introduced by Akalanka in the field of epistemology. Thus it will be an instructive study to compare Abhayadeva's indebtedness to his great Digambara predecessors and Vadideva's indebtedness to the same. Certainly, had Vādideva not adopted the attitude he did the subsequent Svetāmbara performance in the field of philosophical specu... lation -- which in fact means the Jaina performance in the field of philoso. phical speculation undertaken in the third stage of the age of Logic - would have been markedly poorer than it actually was. Of course, there were points - though minor-on which Vadideva differed from his Digambara pedecessors and his range of enquiry was somewhat broader than that of Prabhācandra - if not also than that of Vidyānanda -- but that is a different matter. What is being emphasised is that Vadideva placed the Ŝvetāmbara camp in the direct line of advance that was being pursued by the entire Jaina camp --- which in fact means the Digambara camp - ever since the time of Akalarka, The significance of this step becomes still clearer when we consider the achievements of Yasovijaya, the last great author belonging to the age of Logic.
Yašovijaya had thoroughly mastered the rich Svetambara philosophical heritage that stood culminated in Sanmatitikā and Syadvadaratnakara. And this means that he had at his disposal also the old treatment of the problems relating to jñāna, naya, niksepa, saptabhangi and Anekantavada, a treatment presented in the texts like Anuyogadvāra, Nandi, Āvašyakaniry. ukti, Tattvārthabhāsya, Sanmati and Višeşāvašyakabhāșya. As things stand, it was not possible for the Digambara authors to pay special attention to these old texts, and so in his treatment of philosophical problems Yašovijaya was bound to proceed beyond Vadideva who had only his Digambara predecessors to fall back upon. Certainly, a unique feature of Yašovijaya's writings is a combination of the findings of the pre-Akalanka and postAkalanka phases of Jaina philosophical speculation, for the latter bis chief source being Vadideva, Of these writings the most important are three texts devoted to the problems of Anekāntavāda, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavastha and Nayopadesa and two texts devoted to the problems of epistemology, viz. Tarkabhāsā and Jňānabindu; also noteworthy are his commentary on Haribhadra's ŝastravartāsamuccaya and that on Vidyānanda's Aştasahasri. On the whole, however, Yašovijaya, like Akalanka, was at his best not in his commentaries on old Masters but in his independent texts. And like Vidyānanda, he was extremely well-versed in the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Besides he possessed a brain whose acuteness was unparallelled; (how far this was due to his devoted study of Navyanyāya is a debatable point but that he had drunk deep into the intricacies of this branch of Indian Logic is beyond doubt). All this marks Yašovijaya a higher ori.
J. O...14

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ginal phenomenon. Of course, he himself would not lay much claim to originality and in a way this will not be a case of false modesty. For indeed the chief merit of Yašovijaya's writings lies in making clear to us the meaning of the cardinal utterances — often obscurely worded and often mutually conflicting- of the old masters from the author of Anuyogadvāra down to the author of Syadvādaratnākara. But the context for his doing so is his own creation and that is something marvellously original. It is in this sense that Yašovijaya's independent writings, even if essentially of the nature of an exegesis on old text-passages, are genuinely independent; and it is in this sense that they well stand comparison with Akalanka's independent writings.
In the background of this elementary acquaintance with the authors of the age of Logic let us try to work out its general characteristics. Taken as a whole the age exhibits the following chief tendencies:
(i) to vindicate the doctrine of Anekantavada (ii) to establish a particular doctrine of pramānas (iii) to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views (iv) to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views
The first tendency was the earliest to emerge. As a matter of fact, it had made its appearance as early as the third stage of Āgamas itselfthat is to say, as soon as the doctrines of naya and nikṣepa were first formulated. In the first stage of the age of Logic these doctrines were further refined and the doctrine of Saptabhangi first formulated. With the formula. tion of the Saptab hangi doctrine the issue was finally clinched and in future it became one endeavour of all Jaina authors to demonstrate how a thing could be possessed of two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time - this demonstration amounting to a vindication of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. Things were something different with the doctrine of pramānas. Here no radical departure from the tradition was intended till as late as the time of Akalanka who himself in his Rajavartika offered just the traditional account of jñanas, to be precise, Umäsvati's slightly modified version of this account. It was in the independent writings of Akalanka that a new docrine of pramāņas was first envisaged and it soon became the doctrine acceptable to the entire Jaina camp. However, as the example of Yašovijaya vividly shows even a late Jaina author could find no difficulty in undertaking an elaborate defence of both the tradional account of jñānas and Akalanka's doctrine of pramanas. So the tendency to establish a doctrine of pramānas has to be divided into a pre-Akalarka phase and a post. Akalanka phase. As for the third tendency noted above, viz. the tendency to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical views it was certainly a most note. worthy feature of the age of Logic. But in an early author like Siddhasena

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or Kundakunda it was not much marked; (on the other hand, from Haribhadra onwards there could be found no author who did not exhibit it in considerable degree). Moreover, this tendency was seldom present in isolation; that is to say, it was usually present either in the company of the first tendency noted above or in the company of the second. As for the fourth tendency noted above, viz. the tendency to defend the traditional Jaina philosophical views, it was mostly confined to notes that were of the form of a commentary on an Agamic text, e.g. Višeşāvasyakabhāsya, RajaVārtika, Tattvārthašlokavārtika; (the third tendency appeared in the company of the fourth as well but the latter was itself rather rare). All this means that the content of the literature of the age of Logic is divisible into three parts, viz.
(i) that related to the doctrine of Anekantavāda (ii) that related to the doctrine of pramānas (iii) that related to the traditional Jaina philosophical views
And in connection with each there is to be expected an evaluation of the related non-Jaina philosophical views; (iv) besides, there are passages where an independent evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views has been undertaken. The point can be concretely illustrated with reference to the texts we have chosen to take into consideration; let us take them one by one.
1. Sannati (i) Chapter I and III : (i) Anekāntavāda (ii) Chapter II
: (ii) pramāna
2. Nayacakra (i) The whole text
; (iv) An independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views
3. Višeşāvasyakabhāşya (i) The jñāna part
: (ii) pramāna (ii) The naya-niksepa part : (i) Anekantavada (iii) Gañadharavāda and certain other passages: (iv) an independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views. (iv) Certain passages : (iii) A defence of the traditional
Jaina philosophical views 4-6. Pancāstikaya, Pravacanasāra, Samayasara (i) Pancāstikāya and Praya
canasāra (minus certain passages)
; (iii) a defence of the traditional Jaina
philosophical views

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Samayasāra plus certain passages from Pañcāsti. kāya and Pravacanasāra : (i) Anekāntavāda
7. Aptamimāmsä ( 1 ) The whole text : (i) Anekāntavāda
8. Anekantajayapatākā (i) Chapters [-IV : (i) Anekāntavāda (ii) Chapters V-VI ; (iv) An independent evaluation of the
non-Jaina philosophical views 9-14. Rājavārtika, Astašali, Laghiyastraya, Nyāyaviniscaya, Pramāņa
sangraha, Siddhiviniscaya ( i ) Rājavārtika
; (iii) A defence of the traditional
Jaina views (ii) Așțašati and the Naya
nikşe pa-part of Laghiyastraya etc.
: (i) Anekantavāda (iii) The pramāna part of
Laghiyastraya etc. : (ii) prāmāņa (iv) Certain passages of Siddbiviniscaya
(iv) An independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views. 15-16. Tattvarthaslokavārtika, Asiasahasri (i) Astasahasri and the
naya-nikşe pa part of
Tattvārthašlokavārtika : (i) Anekantavada ( li ) The pramāna part
of TattvārthašlokaVārtika
; (ii) pramāņa (iii) Certain passages of Tattvārthašlokavārtika : (iii) A defence of the traditional
Jaina views (iv) Certain passages of Tattvārthaslokavārtika : (iv) An independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views 17-18. Nyāyakumudacandra, Prameyakamalamārtanda (i) The naya-nikşe pa part
of Nyāyakumudacandra: (i) Anekantavada ( 11 ) Prameyakamalamārtanda
and the pramāņa part of Nyāyakumudacandra : (ii) pramāņa

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19. Sanmatitikā (i) The text-portions following Sanmati
(i ii) Anekāntavāda and pramāna in the manner stated above
in connection with Sanmati) (ii) The text-portions independent of Sanmati : (iv) An independent evaluation of
the non-Jaina philosophical
views
20. Syadvadaratnākara (i) The naya part
: (i) Anekāntavāda (ii) The pramāna part : (ii) pramāna 21-25. Nayarahasya, Anekantavyavastha, Nayopadesa, Tarkabhāṣā,
Jñānabindu (i) Nayarahasya, Anekānta
vyavastha, Nayopadesa : (i) Anekantavada (ii) Tarkabhāṣā, Jňānabindu : (ii) pramāņa
This, however, is the barest skeleton of the relevant information but before the necessary details are filled up let us say a few words about certain general considerations that are to be kept in view in the case of the four items in question; we take them up one by one.
(i) The doctrine of Anekantavāda was doubtless the most characteristic and most conspicuous of the Jaina philosophical views upheld during the age of Logic. In some form or other it was maintained and defended by all the authors we are going to discuss; (even Mallavadi whose text was outwardly of the form of a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philo. sophical views said a lot by way of vindicating Anekāntavāda). It is therefore necessary to take note of the precise inanner in which this or that author has made his contribution towards the development of Anekāntavāda. Some of the authors have done so through an independent exposition of the doctrines of naya, nikṣepa and saptabhang7, some through a commentary on some early author's exposition on the same; then there are occasions when an author has indicated Anekāntavāda without basing himself on the doctrines in question. In every case the attempt has been to point out that to be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time is the very nature of a real thing.
(ii) As for the doctrine of pramāņas it might first of all be noted that much that has been said in this connection has no ontological significance and will be neglected by us. It is mainly while discussing the nature of pramāņavişaya that a genuine ontological problem has been considered but here too a good part of the discussion is devoted to showing hoy a real thing is characterised by two contradictory features like permanence and

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transience, generality and particularity, etc. etc., that is, to developing an aspect of the doctrine of Anekantavada. Then there are certain ontological discussions in connection with the question as to how knowledge is related to the knowing subject on the one hand and object known on the other; in the same context are taken up questions concerning the make-up of sense-organs and concerning their mode of operation, also the question concerning the possibility or otherwise of the omniscience. Lastly, there has been a consideration of the question as to whether physical things which are alleged to be the object of knowledge do really exist; (it is a subjective idealist contention, opposed by the Jainas, that physical things do not exist).
(iii) By a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views is to be understood a defence of the Agamic philosophical views undertaken by the authors belonging to the age of Logic. In their connection we will have to neglect the authors who only commented on the old Āgamic texts, though even such authors are not entirely free from the influence exerted by the dominant tendencies of the age of Logic. To be sure, even the doctrines of naya and nikşe pa (in some sense even the doctrine of saptabhangi) are old Āgamic doctrines but in view of the special importance attached to t they have to be treated separately; similarly, a good part of the doctrine of pramāņas is of an Agamic origin and yet has to be treated separately on account of its special importance. For the rest the discussions aimed at defending the old Agamic views lie scattered in the texts of the age of Logic and do not constitute a much important part thereof.
(iv) Since texts belonging to the age of Logic are in most cases devoted either to a vindication of the doctrine of Anekāntaväda or to a development of the doctrine of pramānas or to a defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views it is in these very three contexts that they also undertake a general evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophtcal views. Very rarely has such an evaluation been undertaken in a context of some other type.
These preliminary remarks should serve to introduce the following analysis of the texts of the age of Logic; these are being taken up stagewise and authorwise (as was also earlier done when the content of these texts was subjected to a summary consideration).
II THE FIRST STAGE (A) SIDDHASENA
(i) Anekāntavāda The problems of Anekantavada have been discussed by Siddhasena in the first and third chapters of Sanmati. Interesting is his general definition of naya, for he says, there are as many views of the form of nayas as there

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are the ways of speaking, while there are as many rival (non--Jaina) tenets as there are views of the form of nayas'. (3.47). Just before he has remarked : 'A well presented view of the form of naya only lends support to the Agamic doctrines while the same, if ill presented, destroys both (i.e. itself as well as its rival)' (3.46). And this is how he concludes : 'Kapila's philosophy is a statement of the dravyāstika viewpoint while Buddha's that of the pary. āyāstika. As for Kaņāda, his doctrine, even if supported by both viewpoints is false inasmuch as each here gives primacy to itself and is independent of the other'. (3.48-49). These utterances give a nice clue to the atmosphere in which the doctrine of nayas was first formulated and then underwent development. For it seems that the Jaina theoreticians of the period had somehow come to the conclusion that the so many non-Jaina philosophical views are just so many one sided expressions of truth and that their task simply was to point out how this or that philosophical view was actually a one-sided expression of truth. On the face of it, the task was rather unwieldy. For the philosophical views of a school deal with so many aspects of truth and so the first thing to do is to enumerate the aspects under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. For example, there is an aspect of temporality and evaluated under it one one sided view is that things ever remain the same and another that they become different. In the language of Siddhasena the former is dravyāstikanaya while an instance of it is Sānkhya philosophy, the latter is paryāyāstikanaya while an instance of it is Buddhist philosophy. Now leaving aside the consideration that the designation dravyästikanaya might well apply to the Sankhya doctrine of puruşa but not to the allied doctrine of praksti the fact remains that temporality is not the only aspect under which philosophical views are to be evaluated. Now the traditional doctrine of nayas speak not of two nayas, viz dravyāstika and paryāyāstika but of seven nayas, viz, noigama, sangraha, vyavahāra, rjusūtra, sāmprata, samabhirūdha, evaibhūta; and in this connection, Siddhasena. simply ignores naigama while submitting that sangraha is suddhadrayāstikanaya, vyavahāra asuddhadravyāstikanaya, rjusutra the basic paryāyāstika, sām prata etc. the derivative paryāyāstikanayas (1.4-5). This tends to suggest that the traditional doctrine of nayas took into consideration just the aspect of temporality. However, let us notice another trend of Siddhasena's thought. For he distinguishes between vyanjanaparyaya and arthaparyāya, the former meaning something like general and hence 'nameable characteristic', the latter particular hence unnameable characteristic.' Thus according to him a thing in so for as it is called by a name is similar to all the things called by the same name while in so for as it is a unique thing it is unna meable (3.5.). This implies that views can also be evaluated under the aspect of kinship - where one one-sided view will be that a thing is absolutely similar to another thing, another that it is absolutely dissimilar to the latter. Therefore, Siddhasena might also speak of a twofold division of nayas into vyañjana paryāya and

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arthaparyaya while submitting that sangraha is śuddhavyaħjana paryāya, vyavahāra aśuddhavyanjanaparyāya, ṛjusūtra the basic arthaparyāyanaya, samprata etc. the derivative arthaparyayanayas. This will tend to suggest that the traditional doctrine of nayas also took into consideration the aspect of kinship. Now even granting that Siddhasena will say all this which is doubtful inasmuch as the only twofold division of nayas he allows for is that into dravyastika and paryāyāstika the fact remains that the precise import of the traditional doctrine of nayas is pretty obscure. In any case Siddhasena's actual silence about naigama and his virtual silence about the three sabdanayas make it difficult for us to make out as to how he viewed the traditional doctrine taken in its totality. Again, the way Siddhasena speaks in details of dravyāstikanaya and paryāyāstikanaya makes it certain that the only aspect he took into consideration in this connection was the aspect of temporality. He actually says; 'There is no paryaya without dravya; certainly, the triplet origination, permanence, destruction constitutes the defining characteristic of dravya (better, of sat )' (1.12). Now the distinction of dravya and paryaya is certainly very old and deeper consideration of it must have led to the definition of sat as a permanent dravya possessed of ever changing paryayas; this, in turn must have led to Siddhasena's twofold division of nayas into dravyastika and paryāyāstika. But the original doctrine of seven nayas seems to have been too heterogeneous to be amenable to a clear-cut division of this sort. However, even if not literally loyal to the spirit of the traditional doctrine of nayas Siddhasena makes an important contribution to the doctrine of Anekantavāda inasmuch as he concretely applies it to a most fundamental pair of contradictory features, viz. permanence and transience. Thus the idea that a thing, even while undergoing continuous change, somehow retains its identity all the while is explained by him through the illustration of an adult person who, though no more a child, is ashamed of his misdeeds of childhood and who, though not yet an old man, takes measures to ensure happy prospects in his old age. (1.43-46).
-
On the question of niksepa Siddhasena says little and something not much important. For he only tells us (1.6) that the first three niksepas, viz. nama, sthapana, dravya belong to dravyastika, while the last, viz. bhava belongs to paryāyāstika, a statement which, unless further amplified, means little. Similarly, on the question of Saptabhangt Siddhasena says little and something quite obscure. For after laying down the seven constituent statements of Saptabhangt ( in one of its two versions) he says (1.41): Thus in arthaparyaya there is the way of speaking with seven alternatives while in vyanjanaparaya there is savikal pa and nirvikalpa'. The meaning of the statement is not at all clear. However, Siddhasena evinces clear awareness of one use to which the saptabhangi doctrine was put by later authors, viz. to demo

6

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nstrate the general co-presence of contradictory features in one and the same thing. Thus elsewhere he argues that body and soul are neither absol. utely identical nor absolutely different from each other ( 1.47-50 ), that religious teaching has for its constituents hetuvada and agamavāda (3.43-45), that exclusive reliance on Jñana and exclusive reliance on Krivā are two one-sided views (3.68 ), and so on and so forth. True, Siddhasena does not connect these positions of his with the Saptabhangi doctrine but that is a different matter. For that only shows that the tendency to a universal applicion of Anekāntavāda had made its appearance early enough, even if neither the traditional doctrine of seven nayas nor the division of nayas into dravyāstika and paryāyāstika was in a position to do full justice to this tendency. Lastly, there is anoher noteworthy thing this time a case of omission-about Siddhasena's vindication of Anekant väda. He seldom takes into consideration the relevant views upheld by the non-Jain philosophical schools. The most conspicuous was his statement to which reference has already been made and in which he calls the Sankhya view a case of dravyasikanaya, the Buddhist view a case of paryayastika view, the Vaišeṣika view a case of mechanical mixture of the two. But even here the statement has been left un-amplified. Certainly, the whole of Sanmati gives the impression of being a document addressed to an orthodox Jaina who is however open to Siddhasena's pleading for fresh thinking on this or that question.
(ii) Pramāņa
The second chapter of Sanmati raises epistemological issues but in a rather narrow context, viz. in the cotext of the question whether an omniscient person has jñāna and darśana simultaneously. The traditional Agamic position was that he does so alternatively but certain recent authors had come to hold the other alternative; Siddhasena, opposing both, came out with the suggestion that in the case of an omniscient person jñāna and darsana mean one and the same thing. In this connection he based himself on the general consideration that jñana and darśana are not at all two things but that certain cases of iñana are also the cases of darsana while certain other cases of jñāna are no cases of darsana. What Siddhasena needed therefore was a proper definition of darsana and the following is how he formulated it: "That jñāna is darśana whose object does not come into contact with a sense organ or is not at all an object of sensory cognition; however, this object should not be a future object or anything of the sort to be cognized through inference" (2.25). Since on Jaina view eye is the only sense-organ that does not come into contact with its object this definition amounted to saying that visual perception and mental perception are cases of jñana as well as darśana while non-visual sensory perception and inference are cases of jñāna but not J. O...15

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of darsana. Here Siddhasena also explains how the avadhi and kevala types of cognition belong to the former group, the manaḥparyaya and śruta types of cognition the latter groups. All this envolves a radical departure from traditional views and is also interesting, but since it has little ontological bearing we take leave of it.
(B) MALLAVĀDĪ
(1) General Evaluation of the non-Jain Philosophical views
Mallavadi's Nayacakra is an important text, not only for the students of Jaina philosophy but also for those of Indian philosophy in general. For even if a convinced Jaina Mallavadi was an extremely thorough student of contemporary systems of Indian philosophy, a qualification few Jaina authors before and after him exhibit in as good a measure as he does. Unfortunately however his text has not come down to us in its original form and what we have to content ourselves with is a restoration made from the commentary of one Simhasuri, who, of couse, seems to have known his task fairly well. Not much time perhaps elapsed between Mallavādi and Simhasuri, for just like the former the latter too is well acquainted with Dinnaga but has heard of no Dharmakirti; (in the case of Simhasuri silence about Dharmakirti can possibly be due to the fact that he was commenting on a per-Dharmakirti text but the probability rather is that he himself came before Dharmakirti ). Even then the difference between Mallavādī's own text and this text as restored from Simhasuri's commentary is obvious. However, our text is so unique that even a not completely satisfactory restoration of it ought to be a veritable boon to the students of Indian philosophy. And the following is wherein lies its uniqueness.
Nayacakra is written in the form of a marathon debate taking place between some seventeen disputants where the incoming one criticises the outgoing one before presenting his own case. Among themselves these disputants exhaust almost all the most representative systems that dominated the contemporary philosophical scene. And the style of the text is throughout advanced scholarly. All this goes to make Nayacakra a wothy predecessor of Sarvadarsanasangraha, to be precise, a 5th- 6th century A. D. version of Sarvadarsanasangraha, which is doubtless more scholarly than Sarvadarsanasńgraha and, unlike it, is dovoted to both an exposition and criticism of the philosophical systems under consideration. Then let us add to it the circumstance that the 5th-6th centuries A.D. are the period from which not very many philosophical texts have come down to us so that Nayacakra representation of a system can well be treated as a brief but solid cotemporary text devoted to this system. Thus in view of the all-out inportance of Mallavadi's performance it will be advisable for us to look at the contents of Nayacakra, briefly and chapterwise; (in order to give a concrete idea of

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the procedure adopted throughout the text the first chapter is being summarised somewhat in details ).
Chapter 1 The standpoint adopted in this chapter can be called the standpoint of "anti-philosophy.' Naturally it has no predecessor against whom to level criticism but its nature being what it is it too finds no difficullty in starting with a criticism of certain philosophical positions. Thus declaring himself to be a spokesman of worldly commonsense the advocate of the standpoint in question initiates his case as follows: “ A thing is as people take it to be. Since it makes no sense to treat sāmānya and višeşa either as a thing's own content or as a content alien to this thing it is improper for the doctrinal texts to demarcate themselves from it ( Commentary : from popular standpoint, that is to say )» (p.ll ). The idea is that it is a mistake to regard either sāmānya or viseşa as either essential to a thing or as superimposed on it from outside; that sämänya is essential to a thing is a Sankhya position, that viseșa is essential to it a Buddhist position, that both sāmānya and višeşa are imposed on a thing from outside is a Vaišeșika position. Here the noteworthy thing is that the present disputant's criticism against the positions in question is essentially the same as that of a Jaina, even if the former is a confessed enemy of all philosophising as the latter most certainly is not. After finishing with these positions the disputant takes up the question of causal relationship and begins by saying: “ How does it concern us whether there is a cause or there is an effect? Who can put an end to vadas (i.e. doctrinal views)"? (34-35). And it is interesting to note how Simhasüri comments on the statement; thus he says, "The same...... disputant avers : who can put an end to vādas, that is to say, to ekāntavādas (i.e, one-sided views)? In other words, Simhasüri finds little difficulty in interpreting the present disputant's anti-vāda position as Jaina's anti-ekantavāda position. And this is how the present disputant polemises against causal determination : " There is no
ness about the presence or otherwise of the effect in the cause. For the effect is present or absent when the cause is present; again, it is present or absent when the cause is absent.” (36). Here again he is having in mind the Sankhya position according to which the effect is present in the cause and the Buddhist-cum-Vaiseșika position according to which it is absent there. The net outcome ot the whole discussion conducted so far is as
" Let it therefore be understood that a doctrinal text yields no such result as stands over and above the popular usage; so it is useless to compose doctrinal texts with such a purpose in view. Of course, a doctrinal text might be of use in telling us that one who desires such and such a reward ought to perform such and such an act" ( 44-45 ). Here a hint is given to the effect that present disputant is some kind of Mimāṁsā realist, an impression to be confirmed when the next disputant criticises

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this one. Then follows the contention, elaboratly defended, that if ordinary perception is not accorded a final authority any number of nonsensical propositions can be sought to be proved ( 46 ). Finally, there is a long refutation of Dinnāga's theory of perception with a view to proving that ordinary preception has nothing to do with the same as conceived by Dinnāga. In this connection there occurs a criticisin of the position that many physical things can well be the object of one single perceptionin the course of which it is said : “ This will mean seeking refuge with the Lord of Doctrinal views, and we have no quarrel with him. For he is certainly the Lord of the whole world. He comes to the rescue of a worldelement wben it is on the verge of disappearance. As for how it means seeking refuge with him, it is because the rūpāyalana (physical aggregate) has been admitted to be of a multiple nature" ( 83 ). This criticism over there is a brief submission to the effect that similar difficulties arise in connection with the Sārkhya and Vaišeșika theories of perception, the reason being that ordinary perception reveals reality to be unlike what these theories maintain, just as it reveals it to be unlike what Dinnāga theory maintains.
Chapter II . This chapter contains a representation of five advaitavādas, viz. purşādvaitavāda, niyati.advaitavāda, kaladvaitavāda, svabhāvādvaitavāda, bhāvādvaitavāda, - where the next one criticises the earlier one; as for puruṣādvaitavāda it starts with a criticism of the standpoint of the earlier chapter, the sum and substance of it being that knowledge is required even in order to understand a Vedic injunction like · agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmiņ' (= one desirous of heaven ought to perform the yajña named Agnihotra ). The point is brought home by raising difficulties against many posssible interpretations of the injunction on question and finally pointing out: “ Moreover, as a result of thus accepting what is got after removing ever new anomalies the recourse is taken to cogitations-of-a-human-origin just as it is done in the case of an ontological doctrine such as a one-sided acceptance of sāmānya or the like.” ( 149 ) This part of the criticism is not philosophically much important but a really important discussion ensues when asatkāryavāda is refuted and (satkāryavāda ) maintained ( 160 ff ). It is not important how the rival is maneouvred into maintaining asatkāryavāda but the present asatkāryavāda vs. satkäryavāda controvesry is a prototype for many forthcoming controversies touching upon the same subject. In all these controversies the Satkāryavādı argues that if the effect is absent there before its production why it should not behave like a sky-flower, that is why it should ever be produced at all; on the other hand, the Asatkāryavādi argues that if the effiect is present there before its production why it should not behave like the cause, that is, why it should not be present there for all to see. Then begins a representation of puruşādvaitavāda proper where the central proposition is that all

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phenomenon must be one of the four possible states of the sole world-cause purușa, viz. deep sleep, dream, wakefulness, the fourth state (absolute wakefulness). Niyati-advaitavada criticises puruşa-advaitavada on the ground that a person only too often undergoes suffering - which means that he is not a free agent but an agent pre-determined in a particular fashion. Kāladvaitavāda criticises niyati-advaitavāda on the ground that even a pre-determined event cannot occur except at a particular time, Svabhāva-advaitavada criticises kālādvaitavādı on the ground that even for an event to occur at a particular time the things involved in it must have a paricular nature of their own. Lastly, thāvādraitavāda criticises svabhāva-vāda on the ground that there are no diffierent things to have a particular nature of their own but just one thing behaving in the way it does.
Chapter III In this chapter there appear two doctrines, viz. the Sankhya doctrine of praksti and puruşa and the Vaišeșika (rather unnamed) doctrine of the divine creator and the created world. The chapter begins with a polemic against puruşādvaitavāda (a polemic to be extended to the remaining advaitavādas), the central point of the criticism being that on the advaitavāda position it is difficult to envisage a relation between the posited sole world-cause and its various states. Then follows a brief representation of the Sankhya position according to which praksti undergoes multifarious transformations to yield the things of the world while purușa enjoys these things without undergoing any kind of transformations. In its turn this Sankhya position is elaborately criticised by the Advaitavādi, thus forming an exception to the rule that in Nayacakra a position is criticised by its immediate successor, The point of criticism is interesting, viz, that sattva, rajas and tamis cannot behave as they do without each other's help - which, in turn, means that they cannot but be essentially identical with other. Lastly comes the advocate of divine creation who too criticises Sānkhya for its position that the passive puruşa guides the activities of praksti, his own position being that an active God guides the activities of the things of the world.
Chapter IV
This chapter contains a representation of the doctrine that puruşa and its karmas are two all-sufficient factors to account for the multiplicity of world phenomena. Hence it begins with a criticism of the theistic position on the ground that God has no necessary role to play in the happenings of the world. Later on the chapter also contains a criticism of the doctrine that the purusa's endeavours and no karmas account for the multiplicity of world-phenomena as also of the doctrine that karmas and no puruşa's endeavours accout for the same.

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Chapter V This chapter contains a representation of the position that dravya and kriya are two absolutely distinct factors in world-phenomena. Hence it begins with a general criticism of the earlier theories which had spoken as if the posited world-cause and its states are somehow one with each other. According to this position dravya is that world-factor which ever remains absolutely the same while kriya that which becomes different every next moment.
Chapter VI
This Chapter contains a representation of the Vaiseșika view and it begins with a criticism of the earlier view on the ground that a dravya absolutely untouched by kriya is a non-entity, for such a dravya cannot exbibit the three essential characteristics of a real entity, viz. origination, destruction and permanence. At the end of this criticism satkāryavāda is refuted and asatkāryavāda maintained, it being understood that the earlier view somehow involves satkāryavada. In this connection an interesting distinction is made ( p. 597 ) between absolute non-existence (atyanta asattva) and conditional non-existence ( saviseșana asattva) and it is argued that it is only an absolutely non-existent thing that never comes into existence while a conditionally non-existent thing comes into existence when appropriate conditions are available.
Chapter VII
This chapter contains a criticism of the Vaišeșika position, made from the standpoint of syadvada. The chapter begins with the elaborate criticism of asatkaryavāda and ends with an elaborate criticism of sat padarthavāda; In between the two there occurs a positive defence of syādvadas.
Chapter VIII
The chapter contains a representation of what the Jaina theoreticians call śabdanaya. It begins with a brief criticism of the view that abhava is as much a constituent of the real as is bhāva, a view maintained by syadvāda; (on the present disputant's view bhava alone constitutes the real). But its criticism is directed against several other doctrines viz.
(i) The doctrine of primacy of name (the nāmanikṣe pavāda) (ii) The doctrine of primacy of word (Bhartphari) (iil) The doctrine of impartite word-meaning ( of Vasurāta, the preceptor
of Bharthari ) (iv) The doctrine of primacy of configuration (of the sthāpanānikṣepavāda) (v) The doctrine of demarcation ( of Dinnāga ).

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On his own part the sabdanayavādi maintains that the meaning of a word consists of both the general and the particular, with emphasis on the particular
Chapter IX This chapter contains a representation of what might be called avaktavyavada. It begins with a criticism of sabdanayavāda on the ground that no relation can be envisaged to obtain between the general and the particular, just as no relation can be envisaged to obtain between fuel and fire. In the course of argument this thesis is extended to all possible relationship.
Chapter X This chapter contains a representation of what might be called rūpādisamudayavāda, that is, of the view that the real is but a conglomeration of qualities-devoid-of-an-abiding-substance. It begins with a criticism of avaktavyavada on the ground that a real avaktavyavāda must be absolutely speechless, a self-defeating position. Towards the end of the chapter (p. 1076 ) it is maintained that a real undergoes no origination or destruction of any sort,
Chapter XI This chapter contains a representation of what might be called kşanikavāda. It begins with a citicism of rūpadisamudayavada on the ground that an entity that undergoes no origination or destruction is a non-entity. In the course of argument the thesis is maintained that all destruction of a thing is causeless and that this is why this thing must necessarily be momentary.
Chapter XII This chapter contains a represntation of sūnyavāda; that is, of the position that things of the world are essenceless ( niņsvabhāva ). It begins with a criticism of kşanikavāda on the ground that an alleged kșanika entity must first come into existence before it is associated with a kşana but that in that case it ceases to be a kşanika entity. Towards the end of the chapter (p. 1150) it is suggested that it will also do if things of the world are called not essenceless but something of the nature of consciousness on the ground that they are necessarily objects of consciousness. So the doctrine of the chapter can also be called vijnanavāda.
Chapter XIII This chapter brings forth no new doctrine but contains puruşadyaitavadt's criticism of Sünyavada on the ground that to say anything about things of
world is to say something about their essence, that is, that the doctrine of essencelessness is an impossible doctrine. As for Vijñānavāda it is said that correctly conceived it ought to be identical with puruşādvaitavada.

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Chapter XIV
This chapter too brings forth no new doctrine but simply says that the old circle of criticism and counter-criticism can now repeat itself and that the repetition itself can go on for ever. The conclusion to be drawn is that the doctrines earlier set forth will lead one nowhere when taken in isolation, for in that case a rival will never be late to appear on the scene; on the other hand, these doctrines become important instruments of discovery when they join hands with each other as is the case when syadvādī Jaina weilds them.
This roughest outline of the contents of Nayacakra does no justice to the powerful array of arguments marshalled by Mallavadi on behalf of these so many doctrines in the relevant parts of his text. But it should suffiice for our present purpose. For it can now easily be seen that the doctrines in question are all more or less influential doctrines of Mallavadi's times. Certainly, the doctrines of niyati, kāla and svabhāva were at least as old as Svetasvatara Upanisad, the doctrine of puruṣādvaitavāda (with no tinge of mayāvāda) was the culmination point of the Upanisadic speculation, while the doctrine of bhāvādvaitavada (with its strong tinge of māyādvāda) represented that trend of post-Upanisadic Brahmanical speculation which ultimately led to the formulation of māyāvāda at the hands of Gauḍapāda, Sankara and their disciples. Similarly, Sankhya and Vaiseṣika were two systems that dominated the Brahmin's philosophical speculation for the pretty long period of time - the former in the immediate post-Upanisadic era, the latter sometimes afterwards. And Dinnaga doubtless ushered in a real revolution in the Buddhist philosophical camp, a revolution for which the ground was prepared by the Abhidharmika speculations on the one hand and the Sunyavāda-Vijñānavāda speculations on the other. Lastly, a pre-occupation with the problems of grammar was leading certain thinkers in the direction of formulating philosophical positions of a far-reaching type; of these positions the most wellknown and perhaps the most daring - was that of Bhartṛhari but the position maintained in the chapter V of Nayacakra seems to be another such position. A close study of Nayacakra leaves no doubt that Mallavadi was thoroughly acquainted with all these most important contemporary tendencies of Indian philosophy.
But when all is said and done it remains to be pointed out that it would have been better if Mallavadi wrote his text in the form of a uniform exposition-cum-criticism of the philosophical systems in question -not in the form of one system criticising another and then presenting its own case. Of course, it is well known to the students of Indian philosophy that much criticism that is here usually levelled against a system is common criticism that can be shared by all who choose to criticise this system; even then there are always parts of such criticism that can be levelled by one author

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but not at all by another. In the case of Mallavadi's text too we find that much criticism that is here levelled by one system against another is such as can be levelled against it by any other system. And even in the remaining part of his presentation of such mutual criticism Mallavadi is almost always careful not to put into a disputant's mouth something which he as a matter of fact would not say, but there are exceptions of one particular kind. For, now and then Mallavadi will make a disputant plead quietly to charge that he is embracing the Jaina position in connection with the ques. tion under consideration --- something which this disputant will never in fact do. ( Remember how the disputant of the first chapter appealed to the authority of the Lord of Doctrinal views, meaning of course the Jaina doctrine of syadvada9 ). Hence it is that it would have been better if MallaVadi gave us his exposition of a philosophical system and his criticism of it; (that would have meant some change - extremely insignificant, on the whole - in the criticism part of the text as it now stands but it would have been definitely more honest).
This is about all that can be said about the solid contribution of Mallavādi's Nayacakra but a debatable point remains to be raised. For in the twelve chapters of his text Mallavadı has not only given us critical exposition of some seventeen philosophical systems but he has also thought fit to assign these systems to the traditional seven nayas and to the twelve categories vidhi, vidhi -vidhi, etc. On the face of it this part of his endeavour deserves equally -- if not more — serious attention; for an average student of Jaina philosophy will be most interested in knowing what a titan like Mallavadi has to say by way of evaluating the non-Jaina philosophical systems in terms of the doctrine of Anekāntavāda as traditionally developed. However, such a student is bound to be disappointed inasmuch as Mallavādi has treated this question in a most perfunctory fashion. Thus at the fag end of each chapter he raises the question as to which of the seven traditional nayas would accomodate the system (or systems) dealt with in it. In each case the answer forthcoming is extremely brief; in fact, it virtually amounts to a mere naming of the naya concerned, for what then follows is a terse particular etymology of the word dravya in the case of the first six chapters and and that of the word paryaya in the case of the last six (it being understood that the three nayas covered in the first six chapters are dravyāstikanaya while the four coverd in the last six are paryayastikanaya). And in most cases whatever little is said makes little sense precisely because it seems to have little relation to what we otherwise know about seven nayas. Not that the accounts of these nayas available elsewhere are free from difficulties, but they certainly give us a fairly clear idea of what sort of considerations were raised in connection with elaborating the
J. 0...16

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concept of this or that naya. And these considerations lose almost all meaning in the context of Mallavādi's text. Essentially the same sort of difficulty arises in connection with those twelve categories. Here again somewhere in the course of the exposition (or expositions contained in a chapter it is summarily given out why the chapter is supposed to be devoted to this or that category, say, vidhi or vidhi-vidhi. Here again the statement is too brief to be enlightening. And since these twelve categories are in all probability Mallavādi's own novelty we do not even have a chance to check up his statements against the corresponding accounts available elsewhere. So as things stand it is difficult to make out why Mallavadi assigns this or that system to this or that from among his twelve categories, just as it is difficult to make out why he assigns it to this or that from among the traditional seven nayas. It seems that this circumstance had no little share in determining the historical fate of Mallavādi's text. In those medieval times a philosophical text would get due publicity only in case it satisfied some felt intellectual need of the religious sect to which it belonged and the Jaina sect did then felt the need for having a critical exposition of the contemporary philosophical systems, preferably expositions couched in terms of the doctrine of seven nayas, Mallavādi came out with a masterly critical expo. sition of the contemporary philosophical systems but it was not conducted in terms of the doctrine of seven nayas; what is worse, he sought to create the impression that it was actually thus conducted. Subsequent generations perhaps felt that they were too incompetent to fathom Mallavādi's logic (otherwise they should be able to see how the master had made use of the doctrine of seven nayas). The result was that they kept on declaring that Mallavādi was the greatest of logicians (anu Mallavādinaṁ tarkikaḥ as Hemacandra pithily remarked) and yet kept on ignoring his text. This explains why no later author, not even the great Yašovijaya who had made for his personal use a copy of Simhasūri's text which is happily with us, made any explicit reference to Mallavādi's characteristic views as developed in his magnum opus.
(C) JINABHADRA
(i) Anekāntavāda
In his Višeşāvasyakabbāşya Jinabhadra makes extremely useful contribution to Jaina philosophy in general and the Jaina doctrine of Anekantavada in particular. Towards the end of the text there occur following verses helpful to an understanding of the naya doctrine :
(1) The general, the particular, the just born, the actual alone, that which is different when a different word is used, that which conforms to the meaning of the word used these are what are stated by sangraha etc.

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(2) These are to be reduced to the couple dravyāstika and paryāyāstika as also to the remaining such couples; again, these couples are to be reduced to each other.
(3) According to dravyāstika the real is dravya, according to paryāyāstika it is paryāya; according to arpitanaya it is the particular, according to anar pitanaya it is the general.
(4) Vyavahāra which follows the popular usage says that the black bee (bhramara) is black, niscaya which states the ultimate truth says that it possesses all the five colours.
(5) Or vyavahāra follows the view upheld by some one naya — not all the views upheld by the nayas taken in their totality; niscaya, on the other hand, follows the views upheld by all the nayas -- which means it follows the ultimate truth.
(6) Jħānanaya says that everything depends on jñāna while kriya is useless; kriyānaya says that everything depends on kriya. The correct position is to accept both.” (3586-91)
These verses are fairly indicative of the various directions in which the Jaina mind moved in the course of developing the doctrine of nayas. What is particularly noteworthy in this connection is that the doctrine of seven nayas (here to be called the doctrine of six nayas, naigama being absent) represents just one of these directions. Of course, it is also here recommended that the different classifications of nayas are to be reduced to each other but in view of the fact that the different classifications are based on different considerations the task does not seem to be easy. For example, if sangrahanaya emphasises the general and vyavahāranaya the particular the former can be called anar pitanya the latter ar pitanaya; similarly, if juSūtranaya emphasises the state of being just born (i. e, being immediately present) it can be called paryāyastikanaya. But it will not be easy to reduce sangraha, vyavahāra and rjusūtra either to the couple dravyāstika-paryayastika or to the couple añarpita-arpita. And the three sabadanayas seem to be based on considerations that have little to do with either couple. Similarly, different are considerations lying at the basis of the couple vyavahāranayaniscayanaya (in both its versions) and the couple jñānanaya-kriyānaya. This should become clear from a close examination of Jinabhadra's own detailed account of seven nayas, that of the couple dravyāstika-paryāyāstika and that of the couple vyavahära-niscaya which occur in the different parts of his text - the first in v. 2180-2274, the second in vv. 414-26. Besides, there are occasions when the doctrine of seven nayas is applied to different specific cases and here we often come across statements based on an altogether different understanding of this or that from among the seven nayas. The whole situation is somewhat reminiscent of the old anuyogadvāra but the

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important thing is that in Višeşāvasyakabhāsya there has been a neat cry. stallisation of what might be called the chief account of seven nayas. As a matter of fact this chief account of seven nayas the account of dravyāstikaparyāyāstika and the account of vyavahāra-niscaya are Jinabhadra's real contribution to the doctrine of nayas. Let us consider these three one by one.
(i) On Jinabhadra's showing naigama, sangraha and vyavahara differ from each other on account of their different attitudes as to the question of the ontological status of generality and particularity. Thus according to naigama generality and particularity differ from each other as also from the thing they characterise, according to sangraha generality is real but particularity false, according to vyavahāra particularity is real but generality false. [On an alternative understanding of vyavahāra it becomes identical with vyavahara of the couple vyavahāra-niscaya but let us ignore that ]. In the case of nai gama we are even told that Kanada's philosophy is an instance of it but Jinabhadra does not seem to have in mind any particular philosophy as an instance of sangraha or vyavahāra. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra's account of naigama is virtually a Vaišeșika account of samanya and visesa but it is difficult to think of a philosophical school which would endorse his account of sangraha or yyavahāra. For instance, the advocate of sangraha maintains that tree (i, e. tree in general) is real but mango (i.e, mango-tree ) is false while the advocate of vyavahara maintains the opposite position; but no philosopher ever maintained either of these positions. As for rjusūtranaya it, according to Jinabhadra, admits the sole reality of what is immediately present and what is one's own. Now so far as it concerned the admission of the sole reality of what is immediately present this certainly looks like a Buddhist position even if Jinabhadra makes no assertion to that effect. Lastly, take the three sabdanayas, viz. sabda, samabhirūdha, evambhūta. It is somewhat difficult to see what distinguishes sabda from rjusūtra. Jinabhadra offers three alternatives in this connection, viz.
(a) Rjusūtra accepts all the four nikşepas but sabda accepts bhäva-niksepa;
(hence it was said that the subject-matter of sabda-naya is the
actual alone'). (b) Both rjusūtra and sabda admit the sole reality of what is immedia
tely present but the latter views it as described in terms of one of the constituent propositions of the Saptabhangi doctrine.
(c) Rjusūtra maintains that a word with a different gender, tense, etc.
is the same word but sabda maintains that it is a different word.
Here is what distinguishes samabhirūdha from sabda : according to the latter a thing described by a word is the same as that described by one of its synonyms, accordingly to the former a thing described by a word is

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different from that described by one of its synonyms. And here is what distinguishes evambhūta from samabhirūdha : according to the latter a thing is described by a word even in case it does not correspond to the description yielded by the etymology of this word, according to the former a thing is described by a word only in case it corresponds to the description yielded by the etymology of this word,
(li) On Jinabhadra's showing dravyāstika maintains that the continuously existing substance is real, its successively emerging properties fals while paryāyāstika maintains that the successively emerging properties are real the continuously existing substance false. This description broadly corresponds to that of sangraha and vyavahāra, it being conducted in terms of dravya and paryāya whereas the latter was conducted in terms of sämänya and višeşa. Again it is difficult to think of a philosophical school that will answer to Jinabhadra's description of drav yastika but the Buddhist can well be treated as an advocate of paryāyāstika; (as a matter of fact, paryāyāstika of this account is virtually identical with rjusūtra included among the seven nayas).
(iii) Lastly, on Jinabhadra's showing niscayanaya maintains that an act is done only when it is being done at present while vyavahāra-naya maintains that it is done only when the process of doing it is over. For instance, vyavahāranaya would say that a jar is produced when the process of producing it is over whereas niscayanaya would say that throughout the period of this process different things are produced at different moments (jar being produced at the last moment.) As thus understood niscayanaya turns out to be virtually identical with rjusūtranaya; (as a matter of fact when Jinabhadra in his account of the first nihnava presents a defence of rjusūtranaya he borrows so many crucially important verses from the present account of niscayanaya). However, this version of vyavahara-niscaya is different from both versions referred to earlier. For earlier we were told that for yyavahāra the black bee is black while for niscaya it is possessed of all the five colours; again, we were there told that vyavahāra defends some one of the possible nayas whereas niscaya defends all of them. Now the former of these has been presented as an alternative understanding of vyavahāranaya included among the seven nayas. As for the latter it too somehow comes to view when at the conclusion of the account of seven nayas it is suggested that the relation between one of the seven naya and the seven taken together is the same as that between śruta etc, and kevala; the idea is that one of the seven nayas cognizes in part what the seven nayas cognize in its totality just as mati, śruta, avadhi or manahparyāya cognizes in part what kevala cognizes in its totality.
These may be regarded as Jinabhadra's central formulation on the question of naya; (the rest which are of a miscellangous character may be

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ignored.) But how to evaluate them is a task. As can be easily seen Jinabhadra has brought within the purview of his discussion the following four problems :
(1) The problem of the general and the particular
(2) The problem of the continuous substance and its ever-emerging properties
(3) The problems of word-meaning
(4) The problem of practical truth and ultimate truth
Of these the first two are philosophically most important, for they were destined to provide the firm foundation on which the doctrine of Anekantavada was to be built. As for the problems of word-meaning it never assumed a very important significance in the context of Jaina philosophicai speculations while the prablem of practical truth and ultimate truth proved to be important in one particular sense. For the Jaina theoreticians were bound to maintain that the various non-Jaina philosophies are so many partial expressions of truth while Jaina philosophy is a complete expression of the same, and in this connection the conceptual couple vyavahara-niscaya in one of its versions was abviously of use. Be that as it may, Jinabhadra's treatment of the problems of sāmānya-viseṣa and dravya-paryaya is most crucial to his treatment of the problem of naya.
As for the doctrine of nikşepas Jinabhadra was thoroughly conversant with the niceties of the rather cumbresome piece of speculation. This is evident from his discussion of mangala occurring at the very beginning of his text; (what is here said about nāma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhāva is later tacitly assumed whenever the occasion arises). But towards the end of this discussion Jinabhadra suggests alternative definitions of nama, sthapana, dravya, bhava, definitions which are philosophically most enlightening. Here are his words. "Or nama is the name of a thing, sthapana its configuration, dravya its cause, while bhava is its self in the form of an effect" (60). Not only that, he then goes on to describe, at some length, four one-sided views which respectively, emphasise the importance of nāma, sthāpanā, dravya and bhava as thus understood. And this is how he begins his critical comments against these views: "The nayas thus quarrel with each other on the basis of a false dogmatism while the Jaina doctrine which comprehends all the nayas is absolutely free from fault." (72). Thus Jinabhadra makes the doctrine of niksepas serve the same purpose as the doctrine of nayas, that is, the purpose of categorising and assessing one-sided philosophical views. He actually says: "Whatever thing is there in the world is possessed of four features (viz. nāma, sthāpanā, dravya, bhāva)" (73); again, "these four features are to be attributed to everything just like the three features origination, etc. (i.e. origination, destruction, permanence)" (74).

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(ii) Pramāņa Jinabhadra's treatment of pramānas is thoroughly Agamic in the sense that it preceded Akalanka's treatment of the same. For Akalanka gave an entirely new turn to the whole discussion so much so that on the question of pramānas it seems somewhat odd to think of Jin abhadra as a predecessor of Akalanka. [By way of contrast, let us note that on the question of Anekantavada Jinabhadra is certainly a worthy predecessor of Akalarka). However, Jinabhadra's treatment of pramāṇas is also not thoroughly Agamic inasmuch as it is based on a logical consideration of the issuess involved. As a matter of fact, Jinabhadra's treatment of pramānas and Akalanka's treatment of the same have to be viewed as two co-ordinate growths of the age of Logic, the former working within the traditional framework the latter working within a framework that better conformed to the fashion of the period. Of course, Jinabhadra himself implicitly makes some sort of distinction between a treatment of pramānas and a treatment of jnanas, for whenever he speaks of pramānas he speaks of pratyakşa, anumāna and agama while he never assigns the epithet pramāna to mati, śruta, etc. This means that Jinabhadra too was somehow aware of the demands of the fashion of the period but he deemed it improper to replace an account of mati, śruta, etc. by that of pratyakşa, anumāna, āgama. The result was that his references to pratyakşa, anumāna and ägama (all called pramāna) remained incidental while his really significant epistemological discussion centred around the treatment of mati, śruta, etc (all called jñāna). To put it in a nut-shell Jinabhadra's problem in this field was to show how the traditional concept of mati and śruta account for the whole range of ordinary cognition. For mati seemed to be identical with determinate perception and śruta identical with scriptural knowledge. Even extending the meaning of śruta so as to bring under it all cases of the acquisition of a knowledge of word-meaning there remained inference to be accounted for and the problem of inference was in a way the key problem of the age of Logic. As if in order to meet this difficulty Jinabhadra extended the meaning of mati, for in his eyes it was no more just determinate perception but also included all post-perceptual consideration of the nature of the object perceived. For he contended that what was a paya in determinate perception became avagraha in the first stage of further consideration, what was a pāya in this first stage became avagraha in the second stage, what was a pāya in the second stage became avagraha in the third, and so on till deemed necessary (v. 285). And certainly Jinabhadra's endeavour is comparable to Akalanka's much better known innovations according to which smộti, pratybhijñā, tarka and anumāna were inserted in between mati understood as determinate perception and śruta understood as scriptural knowledge. However, Jinabhadra's treatment of jnanas hardly raises any ontological issues of vital importance and we therefore proceed with the matter no further.

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(iii) Defence of the traditional Jaina philosopbical views In Višeşāvaśyakabhāşya a massive collection of ontological speculations occurs at two places -- one the section called Ganadharavada and the other the section called Nihnavavada. But in view of the total character of the contents of these sections it will be more reasonable to consider them under the next head 'A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina Philosophical Views'. On the other hand, some amount of ontological material lies scattered in the different parts of the text and a part of it may be treated as a defence of the traditional Jaina views; (on the whole this does not amount to much and in the case what we get is not a systematic exposition of the Jaina philosophical views, but it will be useful if we take note of it in the present part of our discussion on Višeşāvasyakabhāşya). For example, somewhere towards its beginning Avasyakaniryukti briefly refers to the process called samyaktvasreni, upasamaśreni and kşapakaśreni and Jinabhadra comments on the original by undertaking a fairly lengthy description of these processes. 10 Similarly, in Namaskaraniryukti Siddha has been mentioned as one of the five objects of veneration and in this connection a brief reference has been made to the process called kevalisamudghata and sailesikaraña and the state called siddi; here too Jinabhadra comments by way of dilating upon these processes and this state11 (incidentally considering in all its ramifica. tions the question whether a kevali has jñāna and darśana simultaneously or alternately).12 Again, some useful discussion occurs in Upodghātaniryukti under the heads kala, kārana and laksana. Thus in the course of his account of kala Jinabhadra variously emphasises that kala is not an inde pendent substance but just a characterising feature of other substances, though on that account it might itself be called a substance in a figurativeis sense. Here we also find discussed an important question related to the karma doctrine, viz. how is it possible to get rid of a karma even before the time that is due for its expiry ?14 Again, in his account of kārana Jinabhadra classifies it in four ways, viz. (1) Karaña of the form of the same substance (as kārya) and karana
not of this form
Nimittakarana and naimittikakārana (3) Samavāyikarana and asamavāyikarana (4) Karty-, karma-, karana-, sam pradana-, apadana-, and adhikarana
karanalo
And two things are noteworthy about the discussion on laksana. First, the sub-head Sāmānyalaksana has been divided into two types, viz. arpita and anar pita, the latter standing for similar features the former for the dissimilar ones;16 (let us recall that Jinabhadra has once spoken of anarpitanaya and ar pitanaya just as he usually speaks of dravyastikanaya and

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paryayāstikanaya. Secondly, under the sub-head Utpadavagamalakşaņa Jinabhadra discusses how a thing is characterised by origination and destruction at one and the same time.17 Lastly, another substantial discussion of ontological problems, to be precise, of those centred around the notion of karaņa (doing) occurs in connection with the explanation of the word karomi in the Sāmāyikasūtra-niryukti-part of the text.18
(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical Views
In Višeşāvasyakabhāşya an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views occurs in two rather peculiar context; (for the rest the text hardly ever takes note of a rival philosophical position, the exception being a few stray references to the Vaišeșikas and Buddhists). For at one place the situation has been so contrived that Mahavira seeks to convince his eleven would-be ganadharas one by one by arguing against eleven non-Jaina views one by one, this preaching constituting the celebrated Ganadharavada, 19 At anothr place are described seven (plus one) heresies alleged to have arisen within the Jaina Church in the course of time, these heresies being called nihnava and each involving an acceptance of some non-Jaina position or the other.2 0 The case of nihnvas is more interesting though the Višeşāvasyakabhāsya material related to them is less rich in content. For with the Svetāmbara Jaina nihnavas are almost as much of a recognised institution as are the seven nayas with all Jainas; (the Digambara Jainas know of no nihnavas and as a matter of fact the alleged advocates of the eighth nihnava are the Digambaras themselves. The noteworthy thing is that most of the nihnavas have to do with ontological matters; thus
(1) the first nihnava maintains that an act is done not when it is being done at present but when the process of doing it is over;
(2) the second nihnava maintains that it is only the last constituent unit of a soul that is to be called soul - and not also its remaining constistuent units;
(3) the third nihnava maintains that a mook should do no honours to anyone for everyone can possibly be a god in disguise (while it is sin for a monk to do honours to a god);
(4) the fourth nihnava maintains that a thing lasts for not more than one moment;
(5) the fifth nihnava maintains that one can possibly experience two pieces of cognition at one and the same time;
(6) the sixth nihnava maintains that things of the world are broadly divisible not into two classes, viz. jiva and ajtva but into three, viz. jiva, ajiva and nojiva;
J. O...17

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(7) the seventh nihnava maintains two positions, viz. (a) that karma touches a soul just superficially but does not penetrate it so as to get linked to its each and every constituent unit, (b) that one's moral vows should refer to a period of unlimited duration (and not to a period of life-long duration, say);
(8) the eighth nihnava maintains that a monk should go stark naked.
As can already be seen it is only the third nihnava, eighth nihnava and one part of the seventh nihnava which do not pertain ontological matters. Now Jinabhadra ably presents the standpoint of each nihnana and then criticises it from the Jaina standpoint. In this connection one thing is noteworthy. Most of the positions constituting a nihnava are unknown to us from other sources and the tradition might be right that these traditions represented minor deviations of certain Jaina theoreticians themselves. But the first, fourth and sixth nihnavas deserve some further thought. The view criticised by the first nihnava is frequently maintained view of Bhagavati viz, that an act is done only when it is being done at present; (as a matter of fact the view is defended in the very first dialogue of Bhagavati). But Jinabhadra treats it as a view upheld by rjusūtranaya and this means that according to him it is only a partially correct view. On the other hand, a reading of the relevant passages of Bhagavati teaves one in no doubt that the text considers the view in question to be a totally correct view. The simple fact is that Bhagavati had not yet learnt to speak in the language of partial vs. total truth, a language characteristic of the naya doctrine. Jinabhadra himself roundly admits it when in his treatment of the problem of vyavahāra vs. niscayanaya he makes the niscayanaya maintain the same view as was criticised by the first nihnava, For to say that this was a view upheld by niscayanaya virtually amounted to saying that it was a totally correct view. But this would look like making an undue concession to the Buddhist and the balance seems to have been struck by criticising the fourth nihnava. For the fourth nihnava is too abviously a Buddhist position and Jinabhadra almost says it in so many words. Thus in his criticism of the first nihnava Jinabhadra concedes the element of truth contained in the Buddhist position while in his criticism of the foruth nihnava he takes exception to the element of untruth contained therein. The difficulty connected with the sixth nihnava is of another type. The central contention of this nihnava is that a full-fledged living being is jiva while a part separated from it is no-juva; for instance, a whole lizard (of-the-type-Iguana) is jīva while its chucked off tail is no-jiva. As against this Jinabhadra maintains that a living being is jīva, an inanimate thing is ajiva, a part separated from an inanimate thing is no-ajiva--but no-jiva is just a synonym for ajiva. This is not much important. But the noteworthy thing is that Jinabhadra somehow connects the present nihnava with the Vaiseșika school; for we are told

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that the advocate of this nihnava was defeated when the following 36 items were examined under the four heads jiva, ajiva, no-jiva, no-ajiva :
(1) 9 dravyas (2) 17 gunas (3) 5 karmas
131
(4) satta, samanya, samanya-viseşa (3 items) (5) višeşa (6) samavāya
These are certainly Vaiseṣika categories but it is difficult to make out what the nihnava in question has to do with the Vaiseṣika school. It seems that historical references made in connection with the seven (or eight) nihnavas are not literally true. In this connection it will be instructive to recall an obscure historical reference made in connection with the doctrine of
seven nayas. For following Avasyaka-niryukti Jinabhadra says that the doctrine of seven nayas was well applicable in former times when each scriptural passage was to be explained as a passage dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters but that is ceased to be the case (at the most the first three nayas are now applicable) when different scriptural texts began to be explained as texts dealing with ethical, didactic, cosmographic and philosophical matters, a statement which, as it stands, makes little sense. It seems that a pre-occupation with the problem of partial truth led to the formulation of the doctrine of seven nayas as well as the doctrine of seven (or eight) nihnavas while the historical references made in connection with both are somehow of the nature of an after-thought.

In Gaṇadharavada Jinabhadra has found it possible to discuss certain philosophical questions of most fundamental importance -in each case pre senting the standpoint of a rival and counterposing against it the corresponding Jaina standpoint. Some of these rivals are clearly recognizable as advocates of certain well-known schools of Indian philosophy. For example in the first discussion (as already hinted, there are eleven in all) which seeks to prove the existence of soul and in the third which seeks to disprove that consciousness is a property of physical elements the rival concerned is the materialist. However, in the former discussion there also occurs an incidental refutation of the doctrine of one soul - which must have been the doctrine advocated by certain Upanisadic circles. Again, in the fourth discussion the rival is represented as denying the reality of physical elements and this means that he ought to be a Vijñānavādi Buddhist, But Jinabhadra's charge against him is that if he is ready to deny the reality of so palpable a thing as physical elements then he should also deny the reality of consciousness which is after all something subtle; this way the rival is reduced to the position of a Ŝunyavādi Buddhist and tackled as such. In the second discussion, the rival is opposed to the doctrine of karma in general and its Jaina version in particular; in the first capacity he must be a materialist, in the second capacity he could be a believer in the doctrine of karma

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but no Jaina. Here four discussions in a way constitute the cream of Ganadharavada though important things have been said also in the case of the remaining seven which treat the following topics :
(5) Refutation of the doctrine that the next life is similar to this one. (6) Proof for worldly bondage and release from it (7) Proof for the existence of devas (8) Proof for the existence of närakas (9) Proof for the existence of good karmas and bad (10) Proof for the next life (11) Proof for the release from worldly bondge
As can be seen, these are no philosophical questions of fundamental importance and the discussion related to them frequently borrows verses after verses from the earlier part. Broadly speaking, these seven discussions can be said to pertain to the problem of handha-mokşa, a problem which is a continuation of the problem of karma touched upon in the second discussion. Thus what Jinabhadra essentially does in Ganadharavāda is :
(1) to demonstrate that soul exists (I and III) 2) to demonstrate that physical elements exist (IV)
(3) to demonstrate that karma exists (II, V-XI) (Of course, the second item is not so much a demonstration of existence of physical elements as refutation of Sünyavāda).
(D) KUNDAKUNDA (i) Defence of the Traditional Jaina pbilosopbical views In the case of Kundakunda it will be advisable first to dispose of his treatment of the traditional Jaina philosophical views -- not only because such a treatment is not a characteristic activity of the age of Logic but also because it is not a characteristic activity of Kundakunda himself. For Kundakunda deserves attention chiefly because of the special trend of thought he developed in his Samayasāra, a text which markedly deviates from the usual manner of Jaina's presentation of his philosophical views. But before writing Samayasāra Kundakunda wrote Pancāstikaya and Pravacanasāra and in these texts he stands much close to the orthodox positions. Thus in Pancāstikāya he gives an account of five astikayas, nine tattvas, and mokşa, and this can even serve as a handy introduction to the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy. Similarly, in Pravacanasāra he discusses on a some. what advanced level certain particular problems related to cognitions, emotions, affections, etc. and those related to soul, physical elements and the like; this discussion, again, is considerably illuminating. All this is traditional material in the strict sense of the phrase but in both Pancāstikaya and Pravacanasāra Kundakunda also discusses the problem of dravya, guna, paryaya and that of ut pada, vyaya, dhrauvya, two problems which had come

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to the forefront relatively late. These problems too Kundakunda treats in a commendable fashion. These sides of Kundakunda's endeavour are to be kept in mind if we are to properly evaluate the performance he put up in Samayasāra. For they make one thing clear, viz. that Kundakunda was well acquainted with the traditional Jaina philosophical views and also with the tendency towards Anekāntavāda that had lately emerged. And yet he also thought it proper to tread a somewhat new path on which he virtually remained a lone traveller. But let us try to be fair to Kundakunda. For what was his running theme in Samayasāra had already found accasional expression in Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra; not only that, it had found expression there in a form that would not sound particularly jarring to an average Jaina ear. This means that Kundakunda's innovation somehow had its roots in the traditinal world-thought.
Thus in Samayasāra Kundakunda was going to emphasize that what happens to a soul on account of its association with matter is nothing essential to the nature of soul. The question was touched upon in Pancastikāya vv, 60-69 which seek to throw light on the mutual relationship obtaining between a soul conceived as a spiritual entity and a karma conceived as a physical entity. Here already Kundakunda had come out with the idea that a soul is the main cause (karta) of what happens to itself and an occasioning cause (nimitta) of what happens to a karma while a karma is similarly the main cause what happens to itself and an occasioning cause of what happens to a soul. Again, here in w. 154-59 it was clearly laid down that all inflow of karma - good or bad -- is something alien to a soul while jñāna and darśana are alone what are essential to it; in this connection it was pointedly made out (vv. 160-61) that samyaktva, jñāna, cāritra are mokşamarga only from the practical standpoint while the real mokşamārga consists of just jñāna and darśna - that is, of those two essential properties to a soul. Similarly, in Pravacanasāra-jñeyadhikara vv. 92-93 it was declared that a soul does nothing to karmic matter while in 68-70 that it does nothing to the matter of the form of body, manas or speech (the idea being that whatever it does it does to itself). Lastly, in Pravacanasāra-jñānādhikāra vv. 56-58 it was argued that knowledge had with the help of sense-organs is parokșa (lit. had through something alien to itself) while in v. 76 that pleasure had with the help of sense-organs is actually pain. All this contained the standpoint of Samayasāra in a germ form and was yet not much far from the traditional standpoint. For it was after all a traditional position that a soul's association with matter is something accidental and that therefore the account of a soul's own nature must contain no reference to matter. But the tradition also emphasized that a worldly soul is such a soul precisely because of its association with matter and that therefore the account of a worldly soul must contain reference to

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matter. As a matter of fact, Kundakunda's own treatment of ontological problems in Pañcastikaya and Pravacanasara took due note of this aspect of the situation; for in these texts what he was chiefly interested in offering was an account of the worldly souls and the inanimate surrounding in which they find themselves. Even Kundakunda's assertion that a soul is the chief cause of itself and an occasioning cause of karma while a karma is the chief cause of itself and an occasioning cause of a soul was not out of tune with the traditional teaching. For some sort of distinction between material cause and accessory cause is always legitimate to make even if there was no explicit tradition of doing so, and Kunda. kunda's chief cause and occasioning cause are virtual synonyms for material cause and accessory cause respectively. Nay, even the tradition of referring to sense-organs as something alien to a soul was slowly emerging. For that alone will explain why the Jaina theoreticians had begun to call sense-perception a paroksa type of cognition. Certainly, Kundakunda was not the first or only Jaina author to define the paroksa type of cognition as the type of cognition had through instruments alien to a soul (say, through sense-organs). It was only when Kundakunda, in Pravacanasara, came out with the thesis that a soul does nothing to karmic matter or to matter of the form of body, manas or speech that he sounded unorthodox. Apparently, the master Kundakunda was here going back on his own earlier view that a soul and a karma are each other's occasioning cause. In any case, a thesis like this constitute's Kundakunda's transition-point in his journey away from the traditional stand-point and towards the standpoint of Samayasara.
JAINA ONTOLOGY
(ii) Anekantavāda
are
In Samayasara too Kundakunda for once (vv. 86-90) repeated his old view that a soul and a karma are each other's occasioning cause. But here his emphasis was on the point that they are so only from the practhe tical standpoint whereas from definitive standpoint each of them is its own chief cause. For the rest the whole of this text is a talk of a standing harangue against all relationship between a soul and a matter. Towards the very beginning (v. 13) we told that the practical standpoint is the standpoint of untruth while definitive standpoint is the standpoint of truth so that even to concede that from the practical standpoint a soul and matter do enter into mutual relationship amounts to saying that they in fact do nothing of the sort. What Kunda. kunda does is simply to take up numerous positions that were traditionas to the ally maintained nature of a soul and deny them outright and jñāna are always emphasising, explicitly or otherwise, that darsana alone what characterise a soul. Thus he declares: "I am purely of the form of darsana and jñana, an entity ever incorporeal; even an iota of another

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135 thing does not belong to me” (43). And one of the first things that are denied of a soul is its being characterised by jñana, darśna, cāritra, a hallowed traditional position. The cogniser (soul)”, says Kundakunda, is said to possess jñāna, darśana, caritra but in fact it is a pure cogniser possessed of neither inana, nor darśana nor cāritra" (7). [This was said also in Pancāstikāya in a passage already referred to), Elsewhere (vv. 55-60) a long list of features is denied of a soul; it begins with colour, smell, taste, touch and ends with jirasthānas and gunasthanas. Once (350-51) it is argued that to say that a soul creates for itself a body of one of the six types (viz. the five sthāvara types and one trasa type) is like saying that Vişnu creates the world. These utterances are typical of Samayasāra and sufficient to disturb an average Jaina reader. Not that such a reader is unaccostomed to the talk of a distinction between vyavahāranaya and niscayanaya but he expects niscayanaya to be a fuller description of reality than vyayahāranaya whereas Kundakunda seems to adopt the opposite mode of argumentation. For instance, the whole truth about a soul is that in its worldly state it is associated with matter while in its state of mokşa it is free from it; this should be called an account of soul from the standpoint of niscayanaya, As against it either part of this total proposition should be called an account of a soul from the standpoint of vyavahāranaya, Kundakunda, on the other hand, would say that the former of these parts is an account of a soul from the standpoint of vyavaharanaya and the latter that from the standpoint of
anaya. But as Jinabhadra's case should make it clear it was possible to view the distinction between niscayanaya and vyavahāranaya in more ways than one and so the procedure adopted by Kundakunda was not outright impermissible. What was really un-Jaina-like was Kundakunda's thinly veiled insinuation that the standpoint of vyavahāranaya is a totally false standpoint. To be sure, it should be impossible for a Jaina to concede that a soul enters into no relation whatsoever with matter; all that he can allow is that this relation is liable to cease altogether. Be that as it may, Kundakunda's Samayasara certainly adds a new dimension to the discussion concerning the problem of vyavahāra vs. niscayanaya and that is its contribution to the doctrine of Anekantavada.
(E) SAMANTABHADRA
(i) Anekāntavāda Samantabhadra's Aptamimāṁsā deserves a special mention in an account of the history of Jaina philosophy for more reasons than one. For one thing it had the good fortune of being commented on by such stalwarts as Akalanka and Vidyananda, the touch of whose pen might convert even rubbish into gold. But the text itself was meritorious inasmuch as the fundamentals of Anekantavada had found in it a most clear-cut formula

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tion - one solid reason why it recommended itself to Akalanka and Vidyananda. Siddhasena and Jinabhadra had doubtless developed numerous elements of Anekāntavāda but they chose to work within the framework of the doctrine of nayas which had obvious limitations. To be sure, these authors also saw to it that this doctrine be so understood that its contribution to Anekāntavāda should be maximum possible, but that did not conpensate for the basic deficiencies vitiating the original doctrine itself. Moreover, these authors did not make serious or sustained efforts to evaluate from the standpoint of Anekantavāda the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. Even Mallavadi whose study of these contemporary systems was remarkably thorough did not care to evaluate them from the standpoint of Anekantavāda. True, he now and then did criticise a philosophical position from the standpoint of Anekāntavāda but that was not his constant practice. What is worse, he gave the impression that what he was above all doing was to evaluate selected philosophical systems from the stand. point of Anekantavāda even if this evaluation was conducted wit framework of the doctrine of seven nayas and that of twelve categories, viz. vidhi, vidhividhi etc. But as we have already seen, this was not the case and whatever Mallavadi did in this connection was done in a most perfunctory fashion. The situation undergoes as refreshingly welcome change with the advent of Samantabhadra with his Aptamimāṁsā.
Samantabhadra had a clear consciousness of what constitutes the cen. tral contention of the doctrine of Anekantavāda, viz. that a thing must be characterised by two mutually contradictory features at one and the same time. He also realised that the doctrine was applicable rather universally: that is to say, he felt that taking any thing and any feature at random it could be shown that this thing is characterised by this feature as also by the concerned contradictory feature. In order to vindicate his position Samantabhadra examined the following ten pairs of contradictory features :
(i) existence and non-existence (ii) oneness and separateness (iii) permanence and transience (iv) difference between cause and effect, substance and property, etc.'
and identity between cause and effect, substance and property etc.' (v) 'relativity of substance-property relationship' and non-relativity
of substance-property relationship. (vi) 'reliance on reason' and 'reliance on scripture' (vii) 'pan-internalism' and 'pan-externalism (viii) reliance on faith' and 'reliance on endeavour' (ix injury done to other a sin, pleasure given to other a virtue' and
injury done to oneself a virtue, pleasure given to oneself a sin’

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(x) 'ignorance leading to worldly bondage' and 'ignorance leading to mokşa'
Of these (viii)-(x) pertain to the field of ethics, (vi) to that of epistemology, the rest to that of ontology. Confining ourselves to Samantabhadra's treatment of the ontological pairs let us note that he always first considers two onesided views and then offers a synthesis of the two this synthesis constituting the Jaina view of the matter. Of the two one-sided views one bases itself on one member of the given pair of contradictory features, the other on the other. Thus the following six pairs of mutually contradictory views are here constituted in all
I (i) Only positive entities exist and no negative ones
(ii) Only negative entities exist and no positive ones II (i) All things are absolutely one with each other
(ii) All things are absolutely separate from each other III (i) Everything is absolutely permanent
(ii) Everything is absolutely transient
IV (i) A cause is absolutely different from its effect, a substance
V
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from its properties, and so on and so forth
(ii) A cause is absolutely identical with its effect, a substance with its properties and so on and so forth
(i) The properties of a substance are absolutely dependent on their substance
(ii) The properties of a substance are absolutely independent of their substance
VI (i) Whatever exists exists in the form of a mental happening
(ii) Whatever exists exists in the form of an outward happening Against each of these one-sided views Samantabhadra urges more or less penetrating difficulties but he never names the advocate of a view under consideration. However, in some cases the identity of the rival is unmistakable. For example, the advocate of II (ii), III (ii), IV (ii), V (i) must be a Sautrāntika Buddhist, that of VI (i) a Vijñānavādi Buddhist, that of IV (i), V (ii) a Nyaya-Vaiseșika. The advocate of I (ii) is a nihilist, that of II (i) a monist. The advocate of VI (ii) might be a Mimamsaka according to whom all cognition is valid. The view I (i) might be attributed to all those schools which deny the reality of non-existence' and the view III (i) to a school insofar as it posits an absolutely unchanging entity e. g. to Sankhya insofar as it posits purusas. The variety of Sainantabhadra's field of investigation is really remarkable and it gives him ample opportunity to test his own anekantavad conviction against so many more or less influential philosophical doctrines of his times. And even if Samantabhadra's treatment of problems lacked due thoroughness it had the unique advantage of being J. O...18

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conducted within an extremely neat framework. Little wonder this framework became model for subsequent generations of Jaina philosophers - of philosophers whose grasp of problems was deeper than Samantabhadra's own.
Another aspect of Samantabhadra's performance also deserves notice. He apparently attaches ut most importance to the Saptabhangi doctrine and in fact makes it the starting point of his investigation. The form in which he presents the doctrine first appears in Aptamimāṁsā and is different from that in which it appears in Siddhasena's Sanmati. Attention has already been drawn towards this circumstance and the fact is not much important. What is noteworthy is Samantabhadra's attributing the name 'naya' to each of the seven alternative propositions of this Saptabhangt doctrine. Similarly noteworthy is his attributing the name "Syadvada' to the totality of these propositions. Samantabhadra submits that one difference between the omniscient person's cognition on the one hand and Syāduada and Naya on the other is that the former comprehends everything simultaneously the latter do so successively (v. 101). Similarly, he submits that even if both Syādvada and the omniscient person's cognition comprehend eveything the former is a case of mediate cognition, the latter that of immediate cognition (v. 105). All this is indicative of certain undercurrents of the Jaina thought of the period. That naya is a partial expression of truth was a comparatively old idea, but by naya were to be undersood the seven nayas naigama, sangraha etc. or the two nayas dravyāstika, paryāyāstika or the two nayas vyayahāra, niscaya; on the other hand, the Saptabhangi doctrine had come to the fore-front in comparatively recent times and there were no tradition of associating with it the name 'naya'. Again, Syadvāda could be treated as a synonym for Anekāntavāda and the mere fact that the constituent propositions of the Saptabhangi doctrine used the word 'syāt was no sufficient ground for identifying Syadvāda with this doctrine. It was perhaps thought that since the Saptabhangi doctrine enables us to express the whole of truth and since Syadvada (=Anekāntavada) represents the whole of the truth the Sabtabhangi doctrine (rather the various possible Saptabhangi schemes taken in their totality) should be treated as the same thing as Syadvada. Then a distinction was made between the immediate knowledge of the whole truth which an omniscient person possesses and the various Sa ptabhangt schemes through which this knowledge is given expression to, Using these Saptabhangt schemes one after another and using the constituent propositions of one Saptabhangt scheme one after another even an ordinary mortal can gain a knowledge of the whole of truth. Hence it was declared that an omniscient person knows the whole of truth immediately and simultaneously while an ordinary mortal knows it mediately and successively. Lastly, there seems to have developed a tradition of identifying pramäna whith the whole of truth and naya with a part of it. And the present part of

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Aptamimamsa somehow contributed towards an understanding of the import of this tradition. For Syadvada as here described is virtually identical with śrutajnana (Jaina scripture) and at least from Umasvati onwards the five jñānas began to be called five pramānas. So appealing to the Aptamimāmsā passages under consideration (where the word pramana too occurs incidentally) it could be argued that a naya is a part of the pramana called śruta. However, the tradition of identifying naya with partial truth and pramana with total truth seems to be older than Umasvati who was the first to call the five traditional jñānas by the name 'pramana'. But it is difficult to imagine how the tradition was originally understood.
3 THE SECOND STAGE
(A) HARIBHADRA
(i) Anekantavāda
Haribhadra's Anekāntajayapataka is one of the earlier works in which certain non-Jaina philosophical positions have been extensively evaluated from a typical Jaina standpoint. The authors like Siddhasena and Jinabhadra had not cared much to evaluate the non-Jaina philosophical positions, an author like Mallavadi had not cared much to evaluate them from a typical Jaina standpoint, while an author like Samantabhadra who had evaluated the non-Jaina philosophical positions from typical Jaina standpoint had done so on a rather elementary level. This is not to deny the respective historical roles of the great predecessors of Haribhadra but the points just made have to be noted if Haribhadra's own historical role is to be estimated correctly. In his Anekantajayapataka Haribhadra is chiefly interested in vindicating the validity of Anekantavāda and his strategy is worth examination, for that might also provide a clue to the general working of the Jaina mind of his times. In the first four chapters of his text Haribhadra chooses four topics in connection with which it is possible to adopt two one-sided views, and after a preliminary criticism of these views he develops the Jaina view on the question in such a manner that it proves to be a synthesis of those earlier criticised one-sided views. Essentially the same thing had been done by Samantabhadra in his Aptamimāmsā but Anekantajayapatākā repeats the performance on a much more advanced level. The four topics considered by Haribhadra are as follows:
(i) Existence-Nonexistence
(ii) Permanence-Transience (iii) General-Particular
(iv) Describable-Indescribable
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The first two of these topics had been dealt with by Samantabhadra under the same title, the third under a different one (viz. Oneness

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Separateness), while the fourth was bound to crop up in the course of his discussion inasınuch as the general framework for it was provided by the Saptabhangi doctrine. But Haribhadra's treatment of the topics in question had its own unigue features. For one thing, Haribhadra so developed his argument that he had a lot to say about the Buddhist positions as formulated in the camp of Dharmakirti. As a matter of fact, Dharmakirtians are almost the oply recognisable rivals of note whom Haribhadra seeks to cri. ticise. Thus in the third discussion - which is most extensive - Haribhadra throughout criticises Dharmakīrti and in the end positively defends the concerned Jaina view; (in this connection he just incidentally and most brieflyp. 274 — dissociates himself from the Nyāya-Vaišeșika view on the question). Similarly, Dharmakīrtians are the advocates of transience in the second discussion and those of indescribability in the fourth; (in the fourth discussion the advocates of describability are the Sabadadvaitavādins). [in the first discussion there is a single non-Jaina rival who seeks to demonstrate the incompatibility of existence and non-existence but he is not recognisable; similarly, in the second discussion the advocate of permanence is not recog. nisable). Even in the last two chapters of Anekāatajayapatākä which do not proceed with the framework of Anekāotavada the non-Jaina rivals of Haribhadra are Dharmakīrtians, for here the fifth chapter is exclusively devoted to a refutation of Vijñānavada, the sixth almost exclusively to a refutation of Kșanikavāda. It looks as if the Jainas of the period were competing with the Brahmins in their anti-Buddhist crusade. Thus one chief endeavour of the contemporary Nyāya-Vaišeșikas and Mīmāmsakas was to cross swords with Dharmakirtians and the Jaipas followed their practice. On one important question the Jainas were absolutely one with the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas and Mimāmsakas, for all the three were uncompromising critics of Vijñānavada (=idealism) and defenders of Bahyarthavāda (=realism). So on this question they could legitimately and freely borrow from each other's arsenal of arguments. But on the next most important question, viz, the question of criticising Kşanikavāda (momentarism) the position was not so simple. For Kșunikavāda was the Buddhist theory of reality in general and Nyāya-Vaiseșika and Mimāṁsaka were deadly opposed to it, but they have no alternative theory of reality in general. The Jainas, on the other hand, had come to develop their own theory of reality in general. Now this Jaina theory of reality in general conceded the element of truth in Kşanikavāda inasmuch as the former maintained that the properties of a substance change every moment even if this substance itself lasts for a longer or shorter period in one sense it lasts for ever). Thus if the Jainas were opposed to Kșanikavada of the Buddhists they were also opposed to the other extreme position which could be called Kütasthanityutuavāda. But in those times there was no philosophical school worth the name which could be called an advocate of Kutasthanityatvavada and so the Jainas could not much concentrate their

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attack on it; as a result, it tended to appear as if they were less vehement in their criticism of Kūtasthanityatvavāda than in that of Kşanikasada. A real balance could be maintained only after Advaitavedanta with its advocacy of Kuțasthanityatvavāda - appeared on the scene in full force — but in Haribhadra's time that day was somewhat far off. That is why in Anekāntajay apataka we have just a passing criticism of Kufasthanityatvavada (in chapter II) and repeated criticism of Kșanikavāda (in chapters II and VI). Another historical circumstance also deserves consideration in this connection. Dharmakirtians would conduct a good part of their ontological discussion with the framework of epistemological problems. For instance, they would argue that a particular is real and a universal false inasmuch as perception reveals the former and not the laiter. And since Haribhadra takes into consideration this total argument of the Buddhists his third chapter which is devoted to the problem of the general vs. the particular is most often dealing with epistemological matters; (and in spite of its vast bulk the chapter is unbalanced inasmuch as it contains no more than an inci. dental reference to the view that represents the other extreme, viz. the Nyāya. Vaišeșika view). In the fourth chapter which is devoted to the problem of describability vs. indescribability the Buddhist case deals with purely epistemological matters the Sabdadvaitavādin's case with epistemologicalcum-ontological one).
Keeping this historical background in mind it will be found that the first chapter of Anekāntajayapatākā, even not much big, is of a most funda. mental importance. For here Haribhadra first enumerates all the objections in answer to which the six chapters of his text are written and then answers the first objection. This objection relates to the problem of existence vs. non-existence and consists in urging that existence and non-existence cannot characterise a thing at one and the same time. To be sure, this is the most fundamental objection against the doctrine of Anekāntavāda and has been treated as such by Haribhadra. Haribhadra's simple answer to it is that a thing exists as a particular substance, as occupying a particular position in space, as lasting for a particular period of time, as possessing a particular set of properties while it does not exist as any other substance, as occupying any other position in space, as lasting for any other period of time, as possessing any other set of properties - which, in turn, means that it is characterised by existence in its former capacity and by non-existence in the latter. Now this sort of formulation the Jaina theore. ticians had been making ever since the days of Bhagavati which had de. clared that a thing is a 'self from the standpoint of its own properties and
Aot-self' from that of the alien ones and on the face of it it seems to be a trivial formulation. But the new thing about it is that in the age of Logic it led the Jaina theoreticians to propound the general doctrine of what

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might be called the co-presence of the opposites'. For example, it led them to examine how a thing is both permanent and transient, how it is both general and particular, how it is both describable and indescribable -- the three enquiries which Haribhadra respectively undertakes in the second, third and fourth chapters of Anekāntajayapatākā. And these are just three instances for the different authors sought to apply the doctrine in question in different fields and thus enriched it to the extent of their capacity. Not everything that was said in this connection was a profound truth but there is little doubt about the basic soundness of the general approach adopted by the Jainas. For certainly, the idea of the co-presence of the opposites is a higbly productive idea in the field of all theoretical research.
(ii) A General Evaluation of the Non.Jaina Philosophical views
In view of what has already been said the fifth chapter of Anekānta. jayapatākā alone deserves to be examined under the present head. For the sixth chapter mostly undertakes a refutation of kşanikavāda and so can be treated as a continuation of the refutation of the same undertaken in the . second chapter. The subject-matter of the fifth chapter is a refutation of Vijñanavāda. Here Haribhadra first meets the objection raised by the rival against the existence of atoms and the composite budies made up of them. In this connection we are enabled to see how the Jaina notions of an atom and a composite body differ from the corresponding Nyāya -Vaiseșika notions. Having finished this enquiry Haribhadra undertakes an elaborate refu. tation of the Vijñānavadins' own world-outlook, that is, idealism.
(B) AKALANKA
(i) Defence of the Traditional Jaida pbilosophical views : Akalanka occupies a very iinportant place among the authors belonging to the age of Logic. As a matter of fact, in a way it was he who was really responsible for the full-fledged advent of this age in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation. For he was the first to have a clear awareness of the rather exacting requirements presented by it. In this age a Jaina author was expected to be well conversant with the contemporary system of Indian philosophy and be in a position to evaluate them, particularly from the standpoint of Anekantavāda. To a greater or lesser extent this was the case with Akalanka's predecessors belonging to this age and Haribhadra had come very near accomplishing what Akalanka in fact did. For Haribhadra did evaluate, particularly from the standpoint of Anekantavada, the contemporary pon Jaina systems, particularly the Buddhist. But Haribhadra did not realize the significance of the Jainas having their own doctrine of pramānas that might rival those of Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaišeşika, Mimāṁsakas, etc. And for an author living in the age Haribhadra did this meant a less

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than adequate assessment of the needs of the times. From the fact that Akalanka was followed by a series of brilliant scholars who continued his work whereas Haribhadra was somewhat unfortunate in this respect it can be surmised that the conditions responsible for the unfoldment of the specific tendencies of the age of Logic were riper in the Digambara camp than in the Svetāmbara. Be that as it may, Akalanka came out not only with an evaluation of the contemporary philosophical systems but also with a doctrine of pramānas typical of Jainas. He did all this in his commentary called Astašati on Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṁsā and in his four independept writings, viz. Laghiyastraya (composed of Pramāņa-nayapraveša and Pravacanapravesa), Nyāyaviniscaya, Pramāṇasangraha and Siddhiviniscaya. In these works Akalanka undertook a defence of Anekantavāda, a developmen of the doctrine of pramānas and an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views. It will be instructive to learn the details of his performance. But before we do that let us take note of the fact that Akalanka also wrote a commentary called Tattvārtharajavārtika on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra. Essentially speaking this work belongs to the class of such ones as conti. nued Āgamic activity in the age of Logic. For in spite of its occasional noticing of the non-Jaina philosophical views and its conspicuous tendency to appeal — in season and out of it - to the doctrine of Anekāntavāda it is in no way a text representative of the age of Logic. We therefore need not proceed with it any further and it will be enough to record that of Akalanka's writings this alone deserves to be considered under the head Defence of the traditional Jaina philosophical views.' In the case of his remaining writings it is not possible to bring any one of them under one of general heads. Thus Astašati undertakes a defence of Anekāntavāda within the framework provided by Samantabhadra in Aptamīmāṁsā while Laghiya. straya, Nyāyaviniscaya and Pramanasangraha are devoted to the problems of pramāna, naya and niksepa – which in essence means the problems of pramāna as well as Anekantavada; on the other hand, Siddhiviniscaya undertakes an independent treatment of twelve miscellaneous topics - some ontological, the rest pertaining to pramāna, naya, niksepa. And in all these writings maximum attempt is made to incidentally evaluate the non-Jaina philosopbical views. Yet it should be possible to study the cantent of these writings under our selected heads, viz.
(i) Anekantavada (ii) Pramāna (iii) On evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views This we propose to do next.
(ü) Anekāntavāda As is to be expected Akalanka's most clear-cut and concentrated enunciation and defence of Anekantavada occurs in his Astasatı. For here he

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has been able to express himself in one stretch on some of the most fundamental philosophical views centring around the admission or otherwise of two contradictory features, e. g. existence-and-non-existence, one. ness-and-separateness, permanence-and-transience, 'identity between cause and effect, substance and properties, parts and whole' and difference between cause and effect, substance and properties, parts and whole'. But even in his other writings he loses no opportunity to criticise various one-sided ontological positions and defend the corresponding Jaina positions. Taken together these discussions of Akalanka constitute the first most comprehensive and mature vindication of Anekantavāda; for in them he has taken into consideration the rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary writings of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist. And by his time these schools — particularly the Buddhist – had reached almost the acme of perfection. Akalarka was particularly bitter against the Buddhist doctrine of Kșanikavāda because in his eyes it was a monumental case of one-sided emphasis on transience at the cost of permanence. Similarly, he was critical of the Buddhist contention that no two reals share any feature in common. Then there were certain minor points of dispute - e. g. the Buddhist instance that a substance is nothing apart from its properties, a whole nothing apart from its parts.23 Of course, on the question of the universal and particulars, the substance and properties, the whole and parts Akalanka had to argue not only against the Buddhist one-sidedness but also against its Nyāya-Vaiseșikas opposite - for the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas would submit that a universal is an entity absolutely independent of the particular falling under it, a substance an entity absolutely independent of the properties characterising it, a whole an entity absolutely independent of the parts constituting it.28 As for Sankhya Akalanka felt that it suffered from both one-sided emphasis on permanence and one-sided emphasis on transience inasmuch it on the one hand maintained that the transformations of Prakyti are transitory and on the other that an effect is always present there that is, it is present there even before and after it appears to be present there) 34. On the other hand the doctrine of Brahma which, logically speaking, is the polar opposite of the Buddhist doctrine of Kșanikavāda does not much engage Akalanka's attention even if he at times refers to it in the passingas, a circumstance that suggests that the doctrine of Brahma was not yet the mighty force it later on became. As for Akalanka's mode of demonstrating his anekāntavadı theses he would usually argue either that perception reveals a thing to be a 'unity of opposites' or that inference does so; 38 (hence the usual occurrence of such a demonstration either in connection with the treatment of perception or in connection with the treatment of inference). Thus in hundred and one ways does Akalanka say that what we see all around us is neither change-without-permanence nor permanence-without-change 7

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but change-in-permanence, an essentially sound utterance. Similarly, in hundred and one ways does he argue that causal efficiency is possible neither in a thing that changes without remaining permanent nor in a thing that remains permanent without changing but in a thing that remains permanent while changing, 28 an essentially sound argument.
Then a point of historical interest in connection with Akalanka's vindication of Anekāntavāda. Akalanka has thought fit to devote considerable attention to an elaboration of the traditional doctrines of naya and niksepa. Particularly noteworthy is his treatment of nayas in Pravacanapravesa, Pramānanayapraveśa and Siddhiviniscaya, his treatment of nikse pas in Pravacana pravesa and Siddhiviniscaya? 9. Of course, these treatments are nothing as compared to Akalanka's extensively elaborate treatment of pramānas, but even then they are of utmost value as indicative of the author's link with the past. On the questions of naya Akalanka says so many important things that are comparable to the corresponding utterances of Siddhasena and Jinabhadra - though on certain minor points he differs from the latter (as the latter differ among themselves). Thus Akalanka's usual account of vyavahāranaya is different from that of Jinabhadra and his usual account of naigamanaya is broader than that of the latter. Moreover, Akalanka is more serious than both Siddhasena and Jinabhadra about attributing the different nayas — rather different nayābhāsas (pseudonayas) - to the different non--Jaina philosophical schools. For example, when he puts Nyāya-Vaišeșika and Sankhya schools under naigamābhāsa, Brahmavāda under sangrahābhāsa, Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavada under vyavahārabhasa, Kşanikavāda under rjusūtrabhāsa he throws interesting sidelights on his understanding of the nayas in question as well as the philosophical schools in question.
(iii) Pramāņa On the question of pramānas Akalanka's greatest contribution was his coming out with the idea that following are the six pramānas according to Jainas : pratyakşa, smộti, pratyabhijña, tarka, anumāna, agama. Of these six pratyakşa, anumāna and āgama were alreay admitted to be independent pramāṇas by so many of the non-Jaina schools but Akalanka was the first to accord the status of an independent pramāņa to smrti, pratyabhijña and tarka. The Buddhists bad held that neither smộti nor pratyabhijña is a pramāna while the Nyaya-Vaiseșikas and Mimāmsakas had retorted that smrti is certainly no pramāņa but pratyabhijñā is a case of perception. As for tarka the very idea of it was almost unknown to others and the later Jainas stressed the point while finding fault with the rival doctrines of pramānas. According to Akalanka tarka is the specific instrument of arriving at vyāpti (i. e, the relation of invariable concomitance) and his followers taunted
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JAINA ONTOLOGY their rivals that they had no right to speak of inference when they had not developed anything like the Jaina notion of tarka. Be that as it may, by his way of putting forth a definite list of pramānas Akalanka gave birth to what might rightly be called the Jaina school of Logic. For this list Akalanka was apparently indebted to Umāsvāti who had declared that mati, smsti, sanjña, cinta, abhinibodha are anarthantora. Following the tradition, Umāsvāti had also spoken of avadhi, manah paryaya and kevala as three types of extra-sensory perception and he had spoken of śruta as scriptural knowledge. Akalanka pondered over all this and finally maintained that mati stands for sensory (also mental) perception, avadhi, manahparyāya and kevala for extra-sensory perception - so that the four together consitute the pramāna called pratyakşa; again, he retained Umāsvāti's smặti, identified his sañjna with pratyabhijñā, his cintā with tarka, his abhinibodha with anumāna, his śruta with āgama and thus arrived at his own above list of six pramānas. But in the course of his quest Akalarka vacillated not a little on certain secondary questions. Thus in Pravacana-praveša he identified mati with indriya-pratyakşa; avadhi, manaḥparyāya and kevala with atindriya-pratyakşa while smrti, pratyabhijñā, tarka and anumana with anindriya-pratyakşa; thus śruta or agama being the only type of parokşajñāna. 50 This most faulty classification seems to have been the earliest. In Pramānanayapravesa on the cther hand Akalanka identified mati with indriyapratyaksa and anindriya-pratyakşa, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala with atīndriyapratyakşa, at the same time maintaining that smrti, pratyabhijña, tarka and anumāna are mati before the employment of words and śruta after it:31 (on śruta or agama he here retained his old understanding). This was the better classification than the earlier one. Lastly in Nyāyaviniscaya and Pramāṇasangraha Akalanka retained the latter understanding of indriya. pratyakşa, anindriya pratyakşa, atındriyapratyakșa (and the old understanding of śruta or agama) but in the first text he went on to add that smsli, pratyabhijñāna, tarka and anumāna are types of śrutajñāngsa, in the second that they are types of parokşajñana3 3 (without further elaborating the point). These two classifications were an improvement on the second - the latter being better. All this was indicative of Akalanka's endeavour to equate his six pramānas with mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ paryāya, kevala on the one hand, with pratyakşajñāna and porokşajñana on the other. The later authors gave up the former part of endeavour and simply maintained that sensory (also mental) perception and the three types of extra-sensory perception are pratyaksajñāna while smộti, pratyabhijña, tarka, anumäna and āgama are paroks ajñāna. However, Akalanka's treatment of pramānas as such contains little that is of ontological signification and so it is time we take leave of it.
(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina Philosophical Views
We have already noted how Akalanka while vindicating Anekāntavada took into consideration the rival philosophical views. But even otherwise he

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has frequently found occasion to undertake examination of such views. Thus time and again does Akalanka criticise Vijñānavada and Ŝünyavāda (usually in the course of his treatment of perception). 34 Similarly, in Siddhiviniscaya in the course of his treatment of sabda he twice criticises Sphoțavādas 5 while here as well as elsewhere he several times criticises Bhūtacaitanyavāda36; in Siddhiviniscaya Nyâya-Vaišeșika doctrines of God and soul and the Sānkhya doctrines of soul and Prakti37 are also subjected to an independent criticism. Lastly, Akalanka frequently takes exception to the Mimāṁsaka's defence of Vedapauruśeyatyavādas 8 and his criticism of Sarvajñatāvāda; 8 9 on his part Akalanka seeks to demonstrate that Vedas with no author to compose them are an impossibility while omniscience on the part of a Jaina tirthankara (really, on the part of anyone standing on the eve of mokşa) is a plain possibility.
This summary review of the various facets of Akalanka's intellectual performance should enable us to form an idea of his great role in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation. Of course, in so many things that he did he was a pioneer and faced the problems that confront a pioneer. Most noteworthy in this connection was his attempt at creating a Jaina doctrine of pramānas and certainly he spent the best part of his labour working around this problem. Always keeping Dharmakirti before his eyes
- not only as a rival but also as a model — Akalanka succeeded in formulating a body of tenets that well deserve the title Jaina Logic'. In all this his predecessors had provided Akalanka with no ready-made material to fall back upon; nay, certain positions traditionally maintained on the question created more or less serious difficulties for him, difficulties which he sought to obviate as best he could. Akalanka came after Dinnāga and Dharmakirti and in essence be alone did for the Jainas what they together had done for the Buddhists. But this late arrival on the scene of the father of Jaina Logic was bound to affect the fate of the Jaina camp. Akalanka's writings fail not only to be as systematic as is desirable but also to be as comprehensive in scope as is desirable. To be sure, Akalanka took note of almost all the serious rivals whom the Jainas of the period faced and he was also correct in choosing the direction from which to attack them, but the resulting engagements were of the nature of skirmishes rather than hard-fought battles. This deficiency of Akalarka was made good in an adequate measure by his worthy successor Vidyānanda whom we consider next.
(C) VIDYANANDA
(i) A Defence of the Traditional Jaina philosophical views
Vidyānanda is the last of the great Digambara philosophical triad of the age of Logic, his predecessors being Samantabhadra and Akalanka.

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Samantabhadra had clinched the most crucial point that the Jainas of this age had to elaborate, viz. the all-out importance of Anekāntavāda as the central criterion for evaluating the contemporary non-Jaina philoso systems. He had also offered valuable hints as to the lines on which the systems like Buddhist, Sankhya, Nyāya-Vaišeșika had to be assailed. But he heardly went beyond offering mere hints. Akalanka continued what Samantabhadra had begun and so he was in a position to enter into a larger number of details than was the case with the latter. But even Akalanka had his limitations. Moreover, he devoted a good part of his energy to formulating the Jaina doctrine of pramānas, a doctrine that was to fill up a glaring lacuna vitiating the Jaina thought-world. The result was that even Akalanka's was not an all-round battle against possible rivals. The credit for waging such a battle goes to Vidyānanda who had thoroughly mastered both the contemporary systems of philosophy and the legacy left by Akalanka. Certainly, in some sense Vidyānanda's Tattvārthaslokavārtika and Astasa. hasri represent the biggest achievement of the Jaina camp in the field of philosophical speculation. But the precise meaning of this statement has to be grasped.
Since long were the Jaina theoreticians comparing and contrasting their own ideological convictions with those of their rivals, but in the beginning the task must have proved pretty uphill, For the entire body of Jaina tenets was couched in a technical terminology that was almost untranslatable into one that would be comprehensive to others. It was in Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra that the problems were for the first time so posed that a comparison of the Jaina solution of them with its non-Jaina counterparts became somewhat easy. But even Umāsvāti can be said to have taken only first steps in this connection. For neither Tattvārthasūtra nor even Umā. svāti's Bhāşya on it ever enters into a comparison of the Jaina and nonJaina views. Of course, there seems to have been another tradition which was more thoroughgoing in this matter and which stood culminated in Mallavādi's Nayacakra, but for some reason or other Mallavādi's example could not be followed by his successors and his performance remained something of the nature of an isolated adventure. But it was not entirely so. For the Jainas of the period somehow grew convinced that Anekantavāda was to be their central philosophical tenet and this conviction came out in bolder relief in Mallavadi than in Umāsvāti. Samantabhadra was the real spiritual heir of Mallavadi even if he worked on a nuch less ambitious scale than the latter. For Samantabhadra busied himself with a basic evaluation of the most important of the contemporary philosophical systems and this was something essentially in the fashion of Mallavādi. But Samantabhadra was much more thorough-going than Mallavādi so far as viewing things from an anekatanvadı standpoint was concerned. These two facts taken

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together go to prove that Samantabhadra was ready with a better answer than Mallavadi to the theoretical queries of the Jainas of the time. Of course, sociohistorical circumstances too must have been playing their role, for otherwise Mallavadi supplemented by Haribhadra, if not the former alone, could have proved to be a good match for Samantabhadra and as a result the brilliant achievements of Akalanka and Vidyananda could have had a Svetambara counterpart. But that was not to be and the real progress in the field of philosophical speculation was now made in the Digambara camp and not in the Svetambara.
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Akalanka wrote a commentary not only on Aptamimāmsā but also on Tattvarthasutra and that is symptomatic. For this way Akalańka sought to meet his rivals not only on the specific ground provided by Anekantavāda but also on a more general one. But Akalanka's encounter with the Jaina systems in the course of his commentary on Tattvärthasutra was of a very superficial nature. It was rather in his independent writings mostly devoted to the epistemological problems that Akalanka seriously challenged his rivals. But even here the ensuing engagement lacked the sweep of a Mallavadi. To be sure, a new Mallavādi appeared not in the form of Akalanka but in that of Vidyananda who wrote a commentary called Tattvarthaslokavārtika on Tattvarthasutra and a sub-commentary called Aṣṭasahasri on Akalanka's commentary on Aptamimāmsā. In Aṣṭasahasri Vidyananda remained confined to the framework devised by Samantabhadra and scrupulously followed by Akalanka, but even here his examination of the rival philosophical views, as also his presentation of the corresponding Jaina views, was extremely thorough. It was, however, in Tattvarthaslokavārtika that Vidyananda so developed his argument that he could do full justice to the multifarious sides of the Jaina vs. non-Jaina duel on philosophical questions. Thus in this text he logically argued - and at length - in support of the traditional Jaina philosophical views, in support of the doctrine of Anekantavada, in support of the doctrine of pramāņas worked out by Akalanka, in each case incidentally coming out with an evaluation of various non-Jaina philosophical views. Of course, there are cases when Vidyanada's incidental reference to a non-Jaina view seems to be farfetched but even here his examination of the view referred to is as searching as elsewhere. But such cases are not very many and on the whole his references to non-Jaina views are strikingly illuminating. For instance, Vidyananda's commentary on the first aphorism of Umasvati is preceded by a long introductory discussion in the course of which the Buddhist, Sankhya and Nyaya-Vaiseṣika views on the question of the supreme religious preaching are examined in details. This part of the discussion throws interesting side-light on the historical circumstance under which the Jaina doctrine of mokşamarga was first formulated. We know that the old Agamic texts did

non

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not raise the problem of mokşamārga in the manner of Umāsvāti and we know that near about this time of Umāsvāti the Buddhist. Sänkhy Nyāya-Vaiseșika schools were disputing among themselves as to the nature of mokşamärga. In this disputation the questions boiled down to determining as to how many and which are the constituents of mokşamärga, a procedure essentially similar to that adopted by Umāsvati in this connection. Now Umäsväti himself does not refer to the Buddhist, Sankhya, Nyāya-Vaiseșika etc. in the course of his discussion on mokşamärga but his commentators like Pujyapāda and Akalanka began to do so. It was however left for Vidyānanda to bring the process to a culminating point by undertaking consideration of the whole question; (to be precise, the present part of Vidyānanda's discussion manages to take into consideration only the Sankhya and Buddhist views on mokşamārga - a rather different aspect of the matter being touched upon in the case of Nyāya-Vaišeşika"). Similarly, in the course of his explanation of the seven tattvas Vidyānanda emphasizes that five of them, vìz, bandha, āsrava, samvara, nirjara, and mokşa are supposed to stand for bandha and bandhakāraṇa, mokşa and moksakārana, +1 an emphasis which again is illuminating. For the tradition of putting together these five elements and them alone is not very old and Vidyānanda's mode of arguing clearly suggests that it was supposed to counterblast to the Buddhist talk of duhkha and duhkhahetu, duhkhanirodha and duhkhanirodhahetu. Lastly Vidyānanda argues that the Jaina list of seven tattvas, viz. the five just mentioned plus jīva and ajiva represents an all-comprehensive enumeration of the reals which is not the case, say, with the Nyāya list of sixteen padārthas or the Vaiseșika list of six padarthast 2. This shows that some need formulating a list of a definite number of tattvas was felt by way of competing against systems like Nyāya, Vaišeșika etc., a circumstance that partly explains why a list like this does not appear in the old Agamic texts. But let us be clear about one point. Vidyananda himself would not believe that the doctrines in question originated in the circumstances surmised by us, for he must have been of the view that they are eternal. Again, being a Digambara he would not care to see where the available Agamic texts stood vis-a-vis these doctrines. But all this does not affect our point; nay, it rather confirms it. For it shows the direction in which a logician of Vidyananda's calibre would move when looking for the non-Jaina views comparable to the Jaina doctrines in questions. And on the basis of an independent study it can be shown that these views came into existence at a particular period in the history of Indian philosophy; then the absence of the Jaina doctrines in question in the old Agamic texts would prove that these texts were composed at a period when these non-Jaina views had not yet come iuto existence at least, at a period when they had not yet attracted the attention of the Jaina theoreticians. Be that as it may, Vidyananda's Tattvarthašlokavārtika is the maturest and

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THE AGE OF LOGIC most comprehensive text useful for undertaking a t b tattve study of the. Jaina and non-Saina views on the most burning pinto gdiputat Guesdons. We know that in its chapters II, V and VIII Tattvārthasūtra mostly presents a defence of the traditional Jaina views and the corresponding parts of Tattvārthašlokavārtika too are on the whole free from controversies against rivals. This is so because such controversies have already been entered into in the course of commenting on the chapter I, for otherwise one can easily imagine how Vidyānanda would have argued against this or that rival in this or that part of these later chapters. But even as they stand these chapters of Tattvarthaslokavārtika deserve serious study. For they are written in a language that a logician of the period - and so also a modern student who specialises in that period - would find most easy to follow; (the process of so putting things had already started in Akalanka - to some extent in Pūjyapada even - but it found its consummation in Vidyānanda). However, Vidyānanda's real services were in the field of Anekantavāda, the doctrine of pramānas and an evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views; and these we take up next.
(ii) Anekāntavāda Naturally, Vidyānanda's most outstanding treatment of Anekāntavāda came in Aştasahasrī. For in this work he undertook a detailed examination of certain one-sided views on certain most burning philosophical questions. And here these views are clearly identifiable as those upheld by certain well-known schools of Indian philosophy. A note-worthy new addition in this connection was the doctrine of Brahmavāda which had already been taken note of by Akalanka but was subjected to an elaborate criticism for the first time by Vidyānanda. Till the time of Akalanka Buddhists were treated as the main rivals by the Jaina scholars and in a way Vidyānanda too continued the tradition. For Buddhism remains the largest single target of his criticism. But Vidyānanda also took into serious consideration his various non-Buddhist rivals. Thus he frequently criticised Brahmavāda on the basis of an independent study made of it by himself and almost as frequently pointed out to the Vijñānavādi and Sunyavādi Buddhists that so far as their repudiation of the reality of the empirical world was concerned they were being one with the Brahmavadi Vedandist. 43 Similarly, his criticism of Sankhya, Nyāya-Vaiseșika, Mīmāmsā, Sabdadvaitavāda, Tattvopaplavavāda, Bhūtacaitanyavāda was based on a study that was thoroughest possible. All this makes Vidyānanda's studies in Anekāntavāda – for the most part preserved in Astasahasri – a most solid Jaina contribution to the treasure-house of philosophy. Anekāntavāda is a much misunderstood doctrine and its defence at the hands of incompetent persons only makes matters worse. But Vidyānanda's competence was of the higher order and

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so his elaboration of the essentials of Anekantavada deserves serious study by those who harbour genuine misgivings against this typical Jaina philosophical doctrine. Certainly, the doctrine took its rise in the atmosphere surcharged by the Buddist vs. Brahmin controversies as to the nature of change and the ontological status of universals. For these provided two of the most conspicuous fields for the application of Anekantavada, fields of which there was little inkling in the old Agamic texts. Thus it was no regular theme of Agamic discussions as to what it means when we say that a thing undergoes change or when we say that two things share a feature in common. But in course of time the Buddhists tended to argue that a thing becomes altogether different every next moment and they were criticised by the Brahmanical philosophers like Nyaya-Vaiseṣikas and Mimām. sakas; similarly these Brahmanical philosophers tended to argue that an universal is an independent entity standing over and above the particulars subsumed under it and they were criticised by the Buddhists. This precisely was the period when the Jainas began to talk of dravyārthikanaya and paryayarthikanaya the former diametrically opposed to Buddhist momentarism, the latter identical with it; similarly this was the period when the doctrine of seven nayas was so explained that the first three nayas came to mean an advocacy of the mechanical juxtaposition of universals and particulars, an advocacy of the reality of universals at the cost of particulars, an advocacy of the reality of particulars at the cost of universals. Soon afterwards the Buddhist and the various Brahmanical schools were made an independent subject of study and it was shown how this or that from among them represented the standpoint of this or that naya. In the begining the result of the endeavour was rather crude but with the passage of time much refinement was introduced therein, And the process of refinement reaches its pinnacle in Vidyananda who has given us not only a critique of the one-sided views pertaining to the problems like that of change and permanence, that of universals and particulars but also an exposition of the traditional doctrines of naya and nikṣepa, doctrines which played a significant role in the evolution of Anekantavada. Vidyananda's account of nayas and nikṣe pas occurs in his commentary on the relevant aphorisms of Umāsvāti but his critique of the one-sided views in question occurs in both Aştasahasri and Tattvarthaslokavārtika, for in the latter text too Vidyananda has so argued his case that occasions for such a critique are created rather frequently. For instance while dealing with the item sthiti in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to the Anuyogadvāras, nirdeśa, svāmitva etc. Vidyananda undertakes a criticism of Kṣaṇabhangavāda, in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to nikṣepas he repudiates the Buddhist thesis on universals,45 while in the course of his commentary on the aphorism related to pramana and naya he takes exception to Buddhist contention that a composite is nothing over

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and above its component parts46. And these instances are not isolated, for the whole of Tattvarthašlokavārtika is strewn with criticisms directed against rival philosophical views and good many of them pursue the theme Anekantavada.
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(iii) Pramāņa
Umāsvati's text devotes a good part of its first chapter to the problem of pramānas and so the corresponding part of Tattvarthaslokavārtika had naturally a lot to say on the question. But the way the discussion is conducted by Vidyananda is masterly. As a matter of fact, it is this part of Tattvarthaslokavārtika that really enables us to form an idea of the full extent of Akalanka's achievements in the field of epistemology. For in this field Akalanka himself was ever making experiments, so to say; more. over, he had to use his independent writings on epistemology also for the purpose of undertaking ontological discussion of all sorts. All this resulted in many crucial concepts having remained neglected or but poorly developed in Akalanka. But Vidyananda was in a more favourable position inasmuch as he had Akalanka's net findings for his starting point. Thus he ably developed the logic of these findings and gave us a reliable picture of what was soon going to become the doctrine of pramanas acceptable to whole Jaina camp. Here again he took detailed notice of rival positions related to the questions under consideration. Thus on the question as to what constitutes pramāṇa Vidyānanda examined the Buddhist and Nyaya-Vaiseṣika positions, on the question as to how cognition itself is cognised he examined the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika and Mimamsa positions; similarly, on the questions of defining pramāna he examined the Buddhist and Mimamsa positions while on the question of classifying pramaņas he examined the Buddhist, Nyaya. Vaiseṣika and Mimamsa positions. Again, he undertook a positive defence of Akalanka's list of pramānas and sought to demonstrate that it alone was free from both omissions and superfluities; similarly, he evaluated the content of each and every pramaņas posited by Akalanka. Certainly, many if not most of these questions had been touched upon by Akalanka himself but Vidyananda's treatment of them was extremely elaborate. Of course, Akalanka's epistemological texts were commented upon by others before as well as after Vidyananda; (e. g. Anantavirya who commented on Siddhiviniscaya came before Vidyananda, while Prabhacandra who ented on Laghiyastraya and Vadiraja who commented on Nyaya-viniscaya came after him). And yet it is Vidyananda who deserves to be called the commentator of Akalanka's epistemological texts even if he formally commented on none of them. For it is his treatment of the problem that deserves to be considered a creative continuation of Akalanka's findings. However, since it on the whole falls outside the purview of ontological discussions we proceed with it no further.
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(iv) A General Evaluation of the non-Jaina philosophical views
We have already noted that Vidyananda was a thorough student of the contemporary systems of Indian philosophy. As a matter of fact, what is most conspicuous about his treatment of problems is to a great extent the result of his acquaintance with these systems; (the other factors responsible for it are Vidyananda's mastery over the traditional Jaina views and his remarkably keen insight). But we have already referred to Vidyananda's encounter with the rival philosophical views that took place in connection with the elaboration of Anekantavāda and the doctrine of pramāņas. What remains to be spoken of is his miscellaneous evaluation of the rival views. The remarkable thing is that the cases of such miscellaneous evaluation are abundant, not a surprising fact when we keep in mind Vidyananda's versatility. As has already been hinted, so far as repudiating the reality of the empirical world is concerned Vidyananda found essential kinship between the Vijñānavādī and Sunyavādi Buddhists and the Brahmavādī Vedāntists. On numerous occasions he has separately criticised the three views in question and that proves his acquaintance with the niceties exhibited by each. And yet he bracketed them togather for a good reason. Thus while criticising Vijñānavāda Vidyānanda argues that a tenet like this, that is, a tenet repudiating the reality of the physical world can be defended only at the expense of all logic and that this makes it a bedfellow of Sunyavāda (and Tattvo paplavavāda) with its open aversion for all logic; the argument can easily be extended to cover a system like Brahmavāda, Again, Vidyananda undertakes an elaborate criticism of the Nyaya-Vaišeṣika doctrine of God47 and the Mimamsa doctrine of Vedapauruşeyatvavāda, 48 two doctrines that were respectively characteristic of the systems in question. At the same time, Vidyananda undertakes an elaborate defence of the Jaina thesis on the possibility of omniscience,49 a defence intended to repel the Mimamsaka's criticism on this count. Lastly, Vidyananda criticises at length the materialist doctrine of Bhutacaitanyavada50 which too was a fit target of all these philosophers who believed in the reality of soul, mokşa, etc. As a matter of fact, there is hardly a contemporary philosophical school whose most characteristic philosophical views Vidyananda does not criticise -- and at length in some part or other of his Tattvarthaslokavārtika; and here lies the lasting value of this text.
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With Vidyananda comes to an end the second stage of Logic and the fact needs being estimated soberly. For Vidyananda was not only the last representative of the stage in question he was also its most learned representative. Certainly, it is in his writings that this memorable period in the history of Indian philosophy stands reflected in an adequate manner. Those who came before him made way for him and in this sense they did what nobody else did, but it was he who really proved equal to the task of the

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hour. However, Vidyānanda was not followed – at least not in immediate future -- by authors who surpassed him in sweep or depth of insight. In the Digambara camp there now came Prabhācandra who was a diligent student of Akalanka and Vidyānanda and wrote useful commentaries, one on Akalanka another on another author. In the Svetāmbara camp there came Abhayadeva who, making ample use of the material provided by his Digambasa predecessors, wrote a commentary on Sanmati; he was followed by Vadideva who, leaning heavily on Prabhacandra and through him on Akalanka and Vidyānanda, wrote Syādvādaratnakara. All these authors we will meet in the third stage of the age of Logic and all of them are more or less significant. But none was a genius of the type of Vidyānanda. But even this third stage was to produce a great author who did in his times what Vidyānanda did in his. It was the Svetāmbara Yašovijaya, the last name in the age of Logic. The individual achievements of these four authors of the third stage of the age of Logic we propose to study next.
4. THE THIRD STAGE
(A) PRABHĀCANDRA The post-Vidyānanda phase in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation bears certaia specific marks of its own, The Digambaras were now no more in ascendency while the Svetārnbaras were now once more in ascendency. On the other hand, for Indian philosophy as a whole the era of new creative advance was now almost at an end. The reasons responsible for this complex situation remain to be investigated into, but a few things can be said even now. The gradual collapse of Hindu rule all over the country by Muslim rule was one reason why Indian philosophy as a whole entered the period of relative decline. Another reason for the same must have been the gradual disappearance from the scene of the Buddhists whose ever bolder speculations had since long been providing the Brahmin scholars of all hue with food for thought. Then the specific stimulation that now emerged within the Jaina camp has to be accounted for, Thus in this period the Digambaras who were chiefly concentrated in the southern part of the country gradually grew weaker in face of the opposition, violent and otherwise, they had to encounter from the side of their Hindu rivals. Contrariwise, the Svetambaras who were chiefly concentrated in the western part of the country somehow found the current atmosphere more congenial for advance and made signi. ficant advance. This explains why the last titan among Digambara philosophers was Vidyānanda but a fairly long stretch of time divides him from Yašo vijaya, the last titan among Svetāmbara philosophers. Again, this explains why the Digambara Prabhācandra who followed Vidyanada was a lesser author than the latter, also why Abhayadeva who was the first great Ŝvetāmbara philosopher of the period was followed by Vādideva who was a

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greater author than he while Vadideva was followed by Yasovijaya who was a greater author than both Abhayadeva and Vadideva. Be that as it may, what we call the third stage of the age of Logic in the history of Jaina
losophical speculation produced Prabhācandra among the Digambaras, Abhayadeva, Vadideva and Yašovijaya among the Svetambaras. We take 1 up these authors one by one.
Prabhācandra is the author of two fairly long commentaries on two fairly important texts. One of these texts is Akalanka's Laghiyastraya, the other Manikyanandin's Pariksāmukha. Now Laghiyastraya, inspite of its title, is a collection of two works which are the earliest among Akalanka's independent writings. And as we know Akalanka only gradually reached clarity on the questions of epistemology which is the central subject-matter of his independent writings. This means that in the form of Laghiyastraya Prabhācandra had before him a rather raw work on epistemology, even if a work coming from the pen of Akalanka. In this respect Parīksāmukha was just the opposite of Laghiyastraya, for the former lucidly and systema. tically summarises Akalanka's final epistemological findings as perfected by his followers like Anantavirya and Vidyānanda. However, the programme of Prabhacandra being what it was this difference in character between two works he chose to comment on was rather immaterial. For he had made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times. And an occasion for such a discussion was not difficult to find out -- not only in the Parikşāmukha but also in the rather'unsystematic Laghiyastraya. The result is that barring exceptions the same questions are discussed in Nyāyakumudacandra, the commentary on Laghīyastaya, and Prameyakamalamārtanda, the commentary on Parīksāmukha. Two things are noteworthy in this connection : first, that most of these questions had been discussed also by Vidyānanda; secondly, that Prabhācandra's level of discussion is decidedly less advanced than that of Vidyānanda. Of course, two questions are somewhat new in Prabhācandra. Thus in Nyāyakumudacandra there occurs a detailed refutation of the six Vaišeșika padarthas and the sixteen Nyāya padārthas, the former which is more important being repeated in Prameyakamalamārtanda; (in Vidyānanda such a refutation was just hinted at). Similarly, in both Nyāyakumudacandra and Prameyakamalamārtanda there occurs a detailed treatment of the theories of error maintained by diverse philosophical schools; (Vidyananda is unfamiliar with this problem). For the rest what Prabhācandra says in connection with his treatment of this or that problem had already been said by Vidyānanda most tersely and precisely and as a matter of fact Prabhācandra's writings should serve as a good introduction to those of Vidyānanda; (Prabhācandra's writings have the advantage that they contain one discussion at one place).

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In the body of Prabhācandra's writings the above discussions are loosely joined to what is directly said by way of commenting on the text concerned. This is particularly true of Nyāyakumudacandra which was supposed to throw light on Akalarka's difficult (often obscure) utterances but which did not do much of the sort. A glaring example is Prabhācandra's commentary on Akalanka's famous verse 'jñānam adyan matiḥ sanjñā cinta cābhinibodhikam etc'. Here 'matih' was a wrong reading for smrti'. (Vidyānanda has the correct reading) and yet Prabhācandra had no difficulty in commenting on it and in the course of it in attributing an arbitrary meaning to the phrase "jñānam adyam'.51 As a matter of fact, the part of Nyāyakumudacandra directly explaining the meaning of Laghiyastraya is a very small part of the whole. Of course, to some extent the same sort of high-handedness was exhibited by Vidyananda while commenting on Tattvārthasutra, but then Tattvārthasūtra was after all an old work and on the whole Vidyānanda's comments were true to the spirit of the original text. In any case, Nyāyakumudacandra is to be studied not so much for the sake of light it throws on Akalanka's words as for that of the independent philosophical discussions it incorporates. As a matter of fact, this feature distinguishes Nyāyakumudacandra from the commentaries on other works of Akalanka composed by other authors. These latter too contain a lot of incidental discussion but it is less systematic; similarly, their authors evince great keenness to get at the meaning of Akalanka's words - one reason for it being that the works they commented on were definitely more difficult than Laghiyastraya. As for Pariksämukha its wording was crystal clear in its import, though in the course of commenting on even it Prabhācandra had to employ some ingenuity while introducing this or that piece of independent philosophical discussions. But that again is not an important point. For Prameyakamalamārtanda is virtually a collection of certain independent philosophical discussions Prabhācandra has chosen to undertake and from that point of view it matters little as to which of them occupies which part of the text.
(B) ABHAYADEVA Abhayadeva was the first Svetāmbara author who seriously realised the need for doing something that might stand comparison to the performance of his great Digambara predecessors. The striking point is that the realisation did not occur to an earlier Ŝvetāmbara author but let us not pursue it further. Abhayadeva in essence did to Siddhasena's Sanmati what Prabhacandra did to Akalanka's Laghiyastraya, viz. to use the original text as a pretext for undertaking certain independent philosophical discussions. That is why Abhayadeva, like Prabhācandra, has not much to say by way of explaining the words of the original text. But a difference that obtains between the two cases is worth noting. Akalanka was recent author who

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had himself done much to mould the thinking of the contemporary Jaina authors interested in pbilosophical problems. Thus most of the questions that Prabhācandra takes up for discussion had come to the notice of Akalanka in practically the same form in which they did to the notice of Prabhācandra. But Siddhasena was a pretty old author to whom philosophical questions did not occur in the same form in which they did to Abhayadeva. As a matter of fact, Abhayadeva broadly shared with Prabhacandra the general framework in which to arrange his philosophical cogitations and yet he chose to express himself by way of commenting on Sanmati. The result is that the distance separating the atmosphere of Sanmatitikā from that of Sanmati is greater than that separating the atmosphere of Nyāyakumudacandra from that of Laghiyastraya. For the rest most of the discussions that occur in Sanmatiļīkā also do in Nyāyakumudacandra (and Prameyakamalamārtanda) and what remains to be done is to see what new points Abhayadeva raises in connection with them. One thing, however, is noteworthy and that about Abhayadeva's epistemological discussions. At one place Abhayadeva creates an occasion for an elaborate treatment of epistemological problems but here he makes almost no use of Akalanka's specific innovations, e.g. his classification of pramäņas. This naturally is a conspicuous difference between Abhayadeva and Prabhācandra, for the latter is a more enthusiastic exponent of Akalanka's new contributions in the field of epistemology. Of course, in his criticism of the Buuddist, Nyāyavaiseșika, Mimāṁsā and Sankhya positions as also in his defencc of a traditional position such as that the visual sense-organ cognises its object without coming in contact with it Abhayadeva has much in common with Prabhācandra. Abhayadeva concludes his discussion by referring to Gandhahasti (i. e. Siddhasena) whose commentary on the relevant aphorisms of Umāsvāti is supposed to convey all necessary basic information on the subject - thus suggesting that Siddhasena is for him what Akalarka is for Prabhācandra52. In any case Abhayadeva's Sanmativika is the first Ŝvetāmbara text in which the post-Dharmakirti philosophical scene of the country is subjected to an extensive survey and criticism from the Jaina standpoint. And that is symptomatic, for it signifies that the Svetāmbaras were now eager to outcome the lag that separated them from the Digabambaras whose ideas on the subject were most upto date. But even Abhayadeva can be said to have taken only the first step in this direction, even if this step was considerably big. For the author who so argued his case that almost no. thing remained to distinguish him from his Digambara camp-followers was Vadideva whom we consider next.
(C) VĀDIDEVA Vadideva wrote his Syadvādaratnākara consciously and closely imitating Prameyakamalamārtanda of Prabhācandra. As we have noted Prameyakam.

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alamārtanda was a commentary on Parikṣāmukha which in its turn was a systematic summary in an aphoristic form of the whole of Akalanka's teaching on the questions of epistemology. Vadideva himself wrote the corresponding aphorisms, calling them Pramānanayatattvaloka, and of course the commentary thereon, calling it Syadvādaratnakara. This stylistic similarity between Prameyakamalamārtanda and Syadvādaratnakara is as significant as was between Nyāyakumudacandra and Sanmatitikā. For it indicates that the Svetambaras were now not content with a piecemeal borrowing of the contemporary Digambara achievements in the field of philosophy. And that is of immense value. For as a result of a performance like that of Vadideva the whole of the Jaina camp could now speak an essentially identical language on the questions of philosophy. Of course Vadideva had studied not only Prabhācandra but also Vidyānanda as is evident from his borrowing of certain discussions directly from Vidyānanda. Moreover, he had made an independent study of important non-Jaina philosophies as is evident from his frequent quoting from them directly. As a result of a close study of Syādvādaratnakara it should be possible to determine as to how far the unique features of this text owe their origin to a reading of Prabhācandra, how far to that of Vidyānanda and how far to that of non-Jaina philosophers. But that will be a secondary piece of research work. For the most striking thing in this connection is the essential identity of the general framework used by Prameyaka malamārtanda and Syadvadaratnākara for arranging their respective materials. And not only that, even the materials in question are essentially identical. The result was that from now onwards there was going to be no discrepancy between a Svetāmbara author and his Digambara counter-part so far as their consideration of the contemporary philosophical problems was concerned. As has already been hinted now was the period when the Digambaras were a comparatively declining sub-sect of the Jainas while the Svetāmbaras a comparatively rising sub-sect. Hence Vadideva's wholesale borrowing of the Digambara philosophical achieveme opened the possibility of their enrichment in an atmosphere that was con. genial for such an enrichment. This was more or less evident in the case of all svetāmbara authors coming after Vadideva but it was most evident in that of Yasovijaya, the last of them. For through a mere study of Syadvā. daratnākara Yašovijaya was in a position to get at whatever there was of value in the Digambara masterpieces of the preceding centuries. Of course Yašovijaya was not content with just what Syadvādaratnākara provided him. For he also made an independent and thorough study of the pre-Vadideva Ŝvetāmbara authors, the series going as far back as the author of Apuyo. gadvarasūtra. This enabled him to incorporate in his writings a discussion of even such questions as were important and were discussed in early texts but were absent in Syādvādaratnākara simply because the Digambaras had no tradition of taking them up. But all this is a different matter. For what

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is to be noted is the great role of Syadvadaratnakara as the first Svetām. bara masterpiece to assimilate all that was of value in the philosophical discussions of the Digambaras of the preceding few centuries.
(D) YAŜOVIJAYA
Yašovijaya is the last great author of the third stage of the age of Logic and with him ends the history of Jaina philosophical speculation, For he belonged to the 17th-18th Centuries and he was followed by no great author till our times when modern Jaina scholars with a new situation to face appeared on the scene. Now circumstances so developed that Yašovijaya was in a position to do full justice to the theoretical problems faced by the Jainas in his times. For one thing he was born among the Ŝvetambaras who were a sub-sect of the Jainas that was then on comparative ascendancy. As a result Yašovijaya felt enthused enough to master in their entirety the philosophical problems of his age. A most conspicuous new phenomena of this age was Navya-Nyāya and Yašovijaya thoroughly acquainted himself with it. Another new phenomenon was the marked success of the Sankarite school of Brahmavada and Yašovijaya thought worth while to grasp the logic of its positions as well. The Buddhists were now physically absent from the scene but the Jainas had a rich tradition of arguing against them; this tradition which stood finally expressed in Syādvādaratnakara was available to Yašovijaya and he made a diligent study of it. As for Sankhya it was a spent force since long but Yašovijaya was in intelligent possession of whatever Jaina tradition there was of criti. cising the tenets upheld by this very old Brahmanical school of philosophy, Finally, the Mimāṁsakas were there in the field with their dogmatic and philosophical positions which they had been defending since pretty long time; Yašovijaya was adequately conversant with these as well. Of course, it goes without saying that Yasovijaya had studied all the great Ŝvetambara authors from the oldest down to the latest, also the most important from among the great Digambara authors. Yašovijaya's writings, huge in number and most diverse in content, are a standing testimony to this multi-faced character of his intellectual equipment. Added to it be the fact that he himself possessed an extremely sharp mind which could easily pick out essentials from among a mass of sundry details. All this makes his argu. ment in support of the Jaina case an immensely profound and highly illuminating performance. We have already decided to concentrate our attention on three of his writings devoted to the problems of Anekāntavāda, viz. Nayarahasya, Anekantavyavastha and Nayopadesa and two of them devoted to the epistemological problems, Tarkabhāṣā and Jñānabindu. For students of Jaina ontology the former set of texts is much more useful than the latter and we take that first.

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In the course of his defence of Anekāntavāda Yašovijaya heavily depends on the old texts like Anuyogadvāra, Āvasyakaniryukti, Tattvarthasūtra (sabhāsya) Sanmati and Viseșāvašyakabhāşya, to a considerable extent also on Sanmatitika and Syädvadaratnākara. As a matter of fact, his one endeavour is to offer such an account of naya, niksepa and saptabhangi as should be consistent not only with itself but also with the texts in question taken together. The project was certainly ambitious inasmuch as these texts were composed by authors equipped with different intellectual capacities and living under different conditions. Naturally, therefore, Yasovijaya had his moments of doubt and vacillation but on the whole he managed to fulfil his ambition to a much greater extent than a lesser author could have done For instance, Anuyogadvāra gave him an account of nayas in which a succeeding naya was conceived as somehow more refined than the preceding one but this account was not formulated in terms of the doctrine of universals and particulars; on the other hand, Sanmati and Višeşāvašyakabhasya (particularly the latter) would categorise nayas on the basis of their stand on the question of universals and particulars. Yasovijaya did his best to combine into one the essentials of these two rather mutually divergent accounts. Thus according to an example cited in Anuyogadvāra the naiga. manaya gives the name "prasthaka' to a prasthaka as it stands while the sangrahanaya gives this name to it only when it is actually undertaking measurement-of-grain this being the specific function of a prasthaka); on the other hand, Viseşāvasyakabhāşya argues that the naigamanaya posits the reality of both universals and particulars while the sangrahanaya posits the reality of universals at the cost of particulars. Keeping all this in mind Yasovijaya suggests that the essence of sangraha lies in the renunciation of particulars or in the renunciation of lack of refinement', 53 the former alternative doing justice to the Višeşāvasyakabhāsya account, the latter to the Anuyogadvārı account. Again, the doctrine of Saptab hangi was available to Yasovijaya in two versions - in the version of Sanmati directly and in that of Aptamimāṁsā through Syadvādaratnākara. In his treatment of the question, therefore, he usually follows the first version while frequent enough also lending support to the second.54 As a matter of fact, through Syadva. daratnākara Yašovijaya came in contact with many notions which were current only among the Digambaras, but by treating this text as basically authoritative Yasovijaya gave these notions a due place in his repository of ideas that was otherwise for the most part drawn from the Svetāmbara sources. For instance, the Syādvādaratnakara account of naigamanaya is based on Vidyananda's account of it given in Tattvarthaslokavārtika but no earlier Svetambara text is familiar with the same; Yasovijaya was in a good position to make use of this account along with the corresponding account available to him from old Svetāmbara texts.55 As for the Digambara notions
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not come down to him through Syadvadaratnakara Yasovijaya was often critical of them. For instance, he frequently criticises Kundakunda's distinction between yavaharanaya and niscayanaya as applied to the account of soul.56 Thus Kundakunda argues that from the standpoint of niscayanaya only that soul is to be called jiva which possesses just the most essential property of soul, viz. congnitive capacity; this means that according to him only a released soul is to be called jiva from the standpoint of niscayanaya. On the other hand Yasovijaya argues that from the standpoint of niscayanaya only that soul is to be called jiva which is leading an embodied life; this means that according to him only an embodied soul is to be called jiva from the standpoint of niscayanaya. Both positions have logic in their support but the noteworthy thing is that Yasovijaya criticises Kundakunda because the latter was supported by no Svetambara author. Be that as it may, Yasovijaya's treatment of naya, nikṣepa and saptabhangi is a most welcome aid to the study of the old Svetambara authors' treatment of the same. However, Yasovijaya was not only a faithful reporter of the past, he was also a creative interpreter of this past in the light of the current situation. And the current situation being powerfully moulded by the thought-currents emanating from the Navya-Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta circles. This means that among the Jainas only an author as well equipped as Yasovijaya was in a position to cope with the tasks of the hour. Yasovijaya could at once see where the Jaina notions coincided rather tended to do so - with certain Navya-Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta notions and he would never be slow to point it out in a language that was always pointed and precise. For example, it was an old Jaina position that a thing exists from the standpoint of its own properties while it does not exist from the standpoint of the alien properties. This was an odd sounding position but it constituted the heart of the Anekantavada doctrine and so the generations of Jaina scholars defended it as best they could. But in Navya-Nyaya circles a position similar to the present one began to be maintained. Thus they would speak of a thing's absence "limited" by a property not belonging to it,' e.g. 'a jar's absence "limited" by cloth-ness (patatvavadhikaghaṭābhāva)'; and it was given out that such an absence of a thing exists even at a place where the thing itself exists. Yasovijaya aptly pointed out that this amounted to endorsing the Jaina position that a thing as viewed from the standpoint of the alien properties does not exist (i. e. is absent) even at a place where it is seen to exist, it being the case that at this place it exists only as viewed from the standpoint of its own properties.57 And there were other such cases, though not of such basic importance. For instance the Navyanaiyayikas would argue that variegated colour is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical juxtaposition of the constituent colours; Yasovijaya pointed out that in a similar fashion the unity of opposites spoken of by the Jaina is a type sui generis and not just a mechanical

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juxtaposition of the opposites concerned.58 As a matter of fact, a close observer could not fail to see that there was some sort of basic similarity between the Jaina's traditional preoccupation with the problem of 'standpoint and the Navyanaiyāyika's current preoccupation with the problem of 'auncchedakata'; both were meant to ensure that no ambiguities remain attached to what one says. Of course, in both cases one might feel that the thinkers concerned are being rather unduly cautious but that they are evincing an identical attitude is unmistakable. In any case, Yašovijaya was as through a student of Navya-nyāya as that of the traditional Jaina positions and this one fact is sufficient to make his treatment of Anekāntavāda unique performance. Moreover, this treatment based as it is on texts as old as Anuyogadvāra is important also from the stand point of historical evolution. Nor that there are no cases when one feels that even Yašovijaya has failed to get at the meaning of an old text-passage; but such cases are not very many and even here it is almost always difficult to suggest a more plausible alternative to what Yašovijaya says59. Again, it is not the case that Yašovijaya himself sees things in a correct historical perspective but that is a different question. Take for example, his treatment of that intriguing Āvašyakaniryukti statement according to which the doctrine of nayas was well applicable in olden days when scriptural texts were not classified subjectwise but it is not so applicable now at the most the first three nayas are applicable now) after Aryarakṣita has executed such a classification, Yašovijaya dilates upon this point in the course of emphasising the subtlety of the naya doctrine and his thesis is that in olden days the students of scriptural texts were intelligent enough to follow the standpoint of all the seven nayas but that they are now too dull to do that at the most they can now follow the standpoint of the first three nayas which are not as subtle as the remaining four).60 To historically minded student of Jaina philosophy Yašovijaya's thesis will make just no sense. But then i perhaps be too much to expect in an old Indian author — even in an author as recent as Yašovijaya – a due sense of historical perspective. Nevertheless, Yasovijaya will be our best guide in grasping the logic of a Jaina philosophical position. However, here again there is a snag. For Yašo. vijaya's discussions are most often replete with the technical terminology of Navya-nyāya, a terminology not easy to master. But fortunately, Nayarahasya, Anekāntavyavasthā (minus the portion dealing with Vaišeșika), Nayopadeša (plus some part of its auto-commentary called Nayāmộtatarangini) are all relatively free from Navyanyāya terminology; (it is the Anekantavyavastha part dealing with Vaiseșika and a large part of Nayāmstatarangini which are incomprehensible without an adequate grounding in Navyanyāya terminology). Anekāntavyavasthä contains not only a discussion of naya, nikse pa and saptabhangi but also a connected critique of the Vaisesika, Advaita -Vedanta, Sankhya and Buddhist standpoints respectively exemplify

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the naigama, sangraha, vyavahara and rjusutra nayas. In Nayamṛtatarangini we get a connected critique of Advaita-vedanta alone61 but on a number of questions - more or less fundamental - the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika positions have been here examined in details; (even momentarism, the basic Buddhist doctrine, here comes in for criticism at due place), 62 It is these incidental but in their own way important and in any case most elaborate - discussions that constitute the most difficult part of Nayamṛtatarangini and this means that even this text in the parts directly explanatory of the original is comparatively easy of comprehension. A thorough perusal of these texts should go a long way towards dispelling much misconception that prevails regarding Jaina philosophy in general and the doctrine of Anekāntavada in particular.
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As has alreday been hinted, Tarkabhāṣa and Jñanabindu, Yasovijaya's writings on epistemology, do not contain much that has a decisive bearing on ontological questions. For these texts are devoted to a specific discussion of the problems of epistemology and logic. Only we have to note that in Tarkabhāṣa Yasovijaya so develops his argument that he has been able to incorporate in it not only what Akalanka has said in this connection but also what Jinabhadra has said, Moreover, along with pramana this text also deals with naya and nikṣepa, and these latter two topics are definitely a part of the discussion on Anekantavāda. In Jñānabindu, on the other hand, the epistemological problems have been dealt with exclusively on the model of Jinabhadra, But even here we get a brief incidental discussion of pramanasvatastoaparatastva63 and a detailed incidental critique of certain positions maintained by Advaitavedanta64, a performance that is independently Yasovijaya's own. Finally, in this text Yasovijaya discusses a problem on which Jinabhadra and Siddhasena take two diametrically opposite positions, viz. the problem whether kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana proceed simultaneously or alternately. The noteworthy point is that Yasovijaya here undertakes a detailed defence of Siddhasena's side of the case, without at all considering Jinabhadra's point of view65.

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APPENDIX I
A NOTE ON STHĀNANGA AND SAMAVĀYANGA SÜTRA
Sthānanga and Samavāyānga are respectively counted as the third and fourth Anga-texts and hence are two of the most authoritative texts laying down the fundamentals of Jaina doctrine. However, barring negligible exception these texts discuss no problems but simply narrate as to what things are one in number, what things are two in number and so on and so forth, Sthänānga taking within its purview the numbers one to ten and Samavayānga the numbers one to one koţikoțisāgaropama (hence a slight repetition of the former's subject-matter in the latter). Now as things stood it was always possible and most easy to insert new material in the body of these texts and so the fact that a doctrine has found mention here is no proof that it is as old as some other standing nearby. (As for the concluding portion of Samavāyānga coming after the number one koţikoți sāgaropama has been dealt with it does not even fit within the general framework of the text and is thoroughly miscellaneous).
What seems to have happened is that the tradition of grouping things according to their number began early enough, so early as to justify the inclusion of two texts devoted to the problem among the eleven (or twelve) treated as most authoritative. And certainly texts like these were meant for an advanced student's use who would test with their help whether and how far he had been able to master the problems of doctrine. Veiwed in this capacity our texts must have been of no mean value. But they are important even otherwise. For the very fact that these texts have been able to carry out their specific task rather well speaks enough for the systematic character of the doctrines they were out to summarise. Thus they tell us most vital things about the Jaina view on the problems of the philosophy, ethics and mythology, (by the way, on those of astronomy, physiology, medi. cine and general culture). Indeed by the time these texts were finally compiled the Jainas had come to espouse certain very definite notions as to the problems in question and here we have these notions in a nut-shell. However, all this notwithstanding it will be pointless to base on these texts a study of how these notions evolved in the course of time.
What has to be done is to make an independent study of how the Jaina doctrinal views evolved historically and then see if Sthānānga and Samavā. Yanga throw some side-light on the same. Thus if certain views are proved to be a later growth and find mention here it will be possible to locate on the time-scale the relevant text-portions; similarly, if such views find no mention here the fact will again be of value though from a different angle.

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Take for exampie, the case of fourteen juvasthanas, fourteen gunasthanas, fourteen (or twenty) marganasthanas. In Samavayanga fourteen jivasthānas are mentioned under the title bhutagrama, fourteen gunasthanas under an obscure longish title while fourteen or (twenty) mārgaṇāsthānas are not mentioned at all. Again, the seven alternatives of the Saptabhangi doctrine are mentioned neither in Sthānanga nor in Samaväyānga; similarly, while seven nayas are mentioned in Sthānānga, four niksepas are mentioned neither in Sthānānga nor in Samavayang. Lastly in the case of comparatively large numbers Samavāyānga often refers to the karmas whose bandha takes place in this or that gunasthana and this pre-supposes the application of the doctrine of karma-bandha not only to the basic karma types but also to their sub-types. These and such facts have to be studied carefully and legitimate conclusions drawn therefrom.
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APPENDIX II
A NOTE ON THE ĀGAMIC ACTIVITY CARRIED
ON IN THE AGE OF LOGIC As we shall see, the main tendency of the age of Logic was considerably different from that of the age of Agamas but some sort of Agamic activity was carried on even in the age of Lɔgic. For one thing, a series of authors beginning from Haribhadra and coming upto Abhayadeva, Malayagiri, Maladhāri Hemacandra wrote Sanskrit commentaries on the Agamic texts. These authors invariably and admittedly fell back upon the old Prakrit commentaries available to them, from which they often qoute more or less lengthy passages. Thus they sought to remain loyal not only to the original words of the old Āgamic texts but also to the words of the old Prakrit commentaries. But these Āgamic texts and these Prakrit commentaries belonged to two different stages of doctrinal evolution while the Sanskrit commentators themselves belonged to a third such stage. This fact has to be clearly kept in mind by a modern student if he is not to lose sight of historical perspectives. And to make his task easy, some important Prakrit commentaries on the Agamic texts are available in full. We have already taken note of Avašyakaniryukti and Viseşāvašyakabhāşya; but there are other Niryuktis and there are other Curņis from which those related to the philosophically important Āgamic texts have to be selected and made use of. The Digambaras naturally had no Āgmic text to comment on but they did justice to Sakhandāgama and Kaşāyaprābhịta by writing on them those three commentaries mentioned earlier (one on the former two on the latter); Yativisabha's commentary is in pure Prakrit but Virasena and Jinasen while mainly employing Prakrit occasionally resort to Sanskrit. This was the chief Agamic activity carried on in the age of Logic. But to the same category belongs the tendency to compose Karma-texts. Within the Svetāmbara camp the karma doctrine was fully developed and systematised in Sivašarmasüri's Sataka and Karmaprakệti and some anonymous author's Saptatika but the high water-mark of the endeavour came in Candrarşi's Pancasangraha whose study renders superfluous a study of its three predecessors. And the character of Satkhandāgama and Kaşāyaprabhịta being what it is the Digambara counterpart of Pancasangraha are those three commentaries on these very texts. What was written after Pancasangraha in the Svetāmbara camp and after the commentaries in question in the Digambara is of the natuare of school-boy's text-books. With Svetāmbaras they are what they call four old Karmagranthas (by four different authors) and what they call five new Karmagranths (by Devendrasūri); with the Digambaras they are Nemicandra's Gommatasara, Amitagati's Sanskrit Pancasangraha. This whole Karma literature too has to be consulted and made use of.

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APPENDIX III THE LOGIC OF ANEKĀNTAVĀDA, ITS APPLICATION
AND A PARALLEL WITH HEGEL The most specific and important philosophical contribution of the Jaina authors belonging to the age of Logic is their doctrine of Anekantavada. It will therefore be useful if we have at our disposal a clear idea of the logic lying at the basis of this doctrine. To put it in a nutshell Anekāntavāda consists in maintaining that everything is characterised by mutually contradictory properties. But this thesis unless amplified is bound to give rise to misgivings. So let us attempt an amplification.
When we say that a thing S is characterised by property P what we really mean is that this thing is characterised by this property under certain specific conditions; now this logically entails the corollary that the thing in question is not characterised by the property in question when placed outside the conditions in question. This gives us the quintessence of the logic of Anekāntavāda. Here all that we need to be convinced of is that a thing is characterised by a property only under certain specific conditions. The conviction is easier for certain persons than for others but it should be impossible for none. Really, to say that a thing is characterised by a property P is to say that it behaves in a particular fashion when placed under certain specific conditions. And to say that a thing behaves in a particular fashion when placed under certain specific conditions is equivalent to saying that it does not behave in this fashion when placed outside these conditions; but the two statements are not identical. The statements are equivalent because whenever the first is true the second also is true, but they are not identical because they describe different aspects of the situation.
To conclude, there is a perfect sense in which the statements 'S is P' and 'S is not-P are both true; moreover, the information conveyed by one of these statements is different from that conveyed by the other. That is to say, what Anekāntayāda upholds is neither something self-contradictory nor something self-repetetive.
This basic logic of Anekantavada was applied by the Jaina authors to ihe most burning philosophical questions of the age and the result was certain important corollaries that constitute the major and most important part of literature devoted to Anekanlavada. These questions related to the following five problems,
(i) that of change and permanence (ii) that of similarity and dissimilarty

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(iii) that of identity and difference between a substance and its properties (v) that of identity and difference between a cause and its effect
In relation to each of these problems two mutually opposed extreme positions were actually maintained by certain historically evolved schools of Indian philosophy. But the Jaina authors were not so much bound to consider the historicity of a position like that. For convinced of the validity af the basic logic of Anekantavāda they could at once proceed to examine the specific conditions under which this position was tenable. For instance, on the question of change and permanence one extreme position was maintained by the Buddhists and it was done early enough; on the other hand, the other extreme position was maintained by the Advaita Vedāntist and it was done late enough. Yet since very beginning the Jaina authors were placing forward cansiderations that would define the conditions under which these two extreme positions would have been one like that maintained by the Buddhists and the other like that maintained by the Advita Vedāntists. Yet historically speaking the parties in dispute here were the Buddhists on the one hand and the Nyāya--Vaišeşikas (and Mimāṁsakas) on the other. Hence so far as the question of recognising the reality of similarity was concerned the Jainas sided with the Nyāya-Vaiseșikas (and Mimamsakas) as against the Buddhists but they criticised the former themselves for maintaining that the factor reponsible for similarity is something over and above the things similar. Thus this controversy got related to that which was being waged around the question of identity and difference between a substance and its properties. For the Jainas argued that the factor respo. sible for similarity is but a property of the things similar and therefore identical with as well as different from these things, just as each and every property of these things is identical with as wells as different from these things. On the broader question of properties in general the two extreme positions were again those of the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas, for the former maintained that the properties of a substance are nothing over and above this substance and the latter that they are something over and above it. Here the Jainas actually developed their position in the light of these historically developed positions. The same was the case with the controversy waged around the question of identity and difference between a whole and its part — for here again the Buddhists maintained that a whole is nothing over and above its parts and the Nyaya-Vaiseșikas that it is something over and above them. The question of cause and effect could be viewed in two ways. In one case the parts could be treated as the cause of the whole they go to constitute, and in this case the question of cause and effect would reduce itself to the earlier question of whole and parts. In the other case. an effect could be treated as something immediately following its cause and.
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JAINA ONTOLOGY
the Buddhist would maintain that an effect thus understood is absolutely different from its cause. The position opposed to it will be that an effect thus understood is absolutely identical with its cause but such a position will be logically committed to repudiate the reality of temporal succession itself. Now Advaita Vedanta will answer this description all right and so the controversy in question viewed in this light will reduce itself to that waged around the question of change and permanence. Be that as it may, the Jaina discussion on these so many questions has to be studied on the one hand in the light of logical possibilities open in each case and on the other hand in the light of the historical realities evolved in each case.
The situation which thus prevailed in the Jaina camp in the age of Logic bears, in certain important respects, a striking resemblance to the Hegelian phenomenon of European philosophy. Hegel made familiar the idea that in ways numerous things of the world harbour within their bosom elements that are mutually contradictory. This is the root thesis of the celebrated Hegelian dialectics. In his Logic Hegel sought to demonstrate how all the basic categories of human thought involve a synthesis of mutually contradictory aspects. In this connection his procedure was to “deduce" a higher category from the lower ones and thus to show that the former united within its content mutually contradictory aspects derived from the latter. The validity of the details of Hegel's performance is open to grave doubt but in any case he has been able to say a good number of illuminating things about some of the most important categories of human thought. The student of Jainism should find particularly interesting Hegel's treatment of the following categories :
1 Being (which comprises being', 'not-bing' and becoming) 2 Determinate Being 3 Being-for-self 4 Identity and Difference (which includes "likeness and unlikeness') 5 Existence 6 Thing (which includes the thing and its properties') 7 Relation (which includes the whole and the parts') 8 Substance and Accidents 9 Cause and Effect 10 Reciprocity
Here the categories 1-3 belong to the sub-section Quality' of the section “Being'; similarly the categories 4-6 belong to the sub-section Essence as the Ground of Existence', 7 to the sub-section Appearance' and 8-10 to the sub-section Actuality of the section 'Essence'. Also interesting is Hegel's

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APPENDIX III
171
attempt to interpret the historically evolved systems of European philosophy in terms of the categories formulated by him in his Logic. Here again his procedure was somewhat akin to that of the Jainas, for he considered himself to stand in relation to the systems in question almost exactly as the Jainas considered themselves to stand in relation to the historically evolved systems of Indian philosophy. In both cases it often happened that history did not produce -- or did not produce in time what logic needed. For instance, in Hegel's eyes 'becoming' was a more complete category than being' and yet Hereclitus, the representative of the former category, came earlier than Parmenides, the representative of the latter; (it waz something like Advaitavedānta not appearing on the scene simultaneously with Sautrantika Buddhism).

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Page #186

ANNOTATIONS
[Numbers given in brackets refer to pages ]
(Chapter I & II ) (8) As will be evident soon, the evaluation of the contents of Tattvär
tbasūtra here sketched is crucial for the views propounded in the present essay. As such, elements of it will appear now and then throughout the enquiry and the reader is advised to take special note of them. Almost all the question here raised (minus the one on anuyogadvāra) are once more discussed on pp. 21-30, the question of anuyogadvāra baving already been disposed of
on pp. 14-17. 2 (14) Really speaking, these three lists are well known only to those
students of Jainism who have taken special interest in what is called the Jaina Karma literature. For it is here that a basic use has been made of these lists. The present essay itself evinces only general interst in Karma literature but the lists in question are here mentioned because they represent the most outstanding case of formulating such standardised lists. Even then the reader will get some additional information about märganāsthānas on pp. 51-52,
about jwasthānas on pp. 50-51, about gunasthānas on p. 30, 3 (14) 257 b 4 (15) The reference is here to the list used by Virasena in the post
script to his commentary on Şarkhandāgama-Jivakhanda-Satpada (Il volume of the printed text in sixteen volumes) — also by
Nemicandra in his Gommațasāra-Jivakāņda, 5 (15) 328 b 6 (15) 852 b 7 (15) 1599 a 8 (15) 291 a; also elsewhere. 9 (16) 383 b (16) Really speaking, an account of kāyasthiti implies an account of
antara only in those cases where the thing described is divided into just two classes, for then kāyasthiti of one is antara of the other. Hence it is that an explicit recognition of the problem of antara and its application to the cases of things with more than two classes is a more advanced stage of speculation - to be met
with in Jivajivabhigama rather than Prajñāpanā. 11 (18) 80 b, 95 b 12 (19) 571 a

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114
JAINA ONTOLOGY
13 (20) 723 b, 777 a 14 (21) 66 a 15 (21) In this connection the Bhagavati passage occurring on pp. 418b
419a is also worth noting. For here the question is raised about the eligibility to attain mokşa in the case of persons who exercise superior, medium or inferior jñāna, darśana or cãritra. But the interesting point is that for each the range of possibilities here extends from so many heavenly (or human) births upto the attainment of mokşa. The passage must have been composed at a time when the doctrine of triple mokşamärga was already formulated but it was not sharply demarketed from the doctrines
of heavenly births etc. 16 (21) 54 b 17 (21) Thus Sūtrakřtānga 2-5 and Aupapātikasūtra 34 enumerate entities
whose existence is to be believed in and both catalogues contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine tattvas. Similarly, Sūtrakstānga 2.2 and Bhagavati 134b enumerate entities whose existence a community of the faithful believed in and both catalogues again contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine tattvas. The fact that all these catalogues contain all the items enumerated in the list of nine tattvas and yet add certain more to them proves that the list in question had not yet assumed a special
status, 18 (22) 221 b 19 (22) 179 a 20 (22) Sutras 1 and 144 21 (22) Sutras 2-5 and 24
2) 216 a, 223 b 23 (22) 342 a 24 (23) 191a, 433 a, 517 a, 552 a 25 (23) 657 a, 754 b (25) Even saying that the properties of a substance must be transi
tory - not momentary - would not obviate the difficulty, for then one might well ask as to why it should be so. And in any case, there remains the question as to what is meant by the statement that everything is eternal from the standpoint of substance. Not that even this puzzling question cannot be answered. But the fact that this and the allied questions are not discussed in any old Āgamic text suggests that they came to the forefront rather late. Be that as it may, the doctrine of seven nayas is con
spicuous by its absence in the old Āgamic texts. 27 (26) 592 b 28 (26) Satras 76 and 92

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ANNOTATIONS
175
29 (27) 324 a 30 (27) 750 b 31 (28) 717 b 32 (30) 430 a_437a 33 (33) 248 a 34 (33) 78 b 35 (33) 80 b (33) 81 a
81 b (34) "eyaṁsi.........cakkiya kei āsaittae vā cifthittae vā nisiittie va tuiffittie
va" - 615 b (34) 608 a 40 (34) 608 a 41 (35) Really, these are two consecutive passages (609 a, 613 a) - each
containing an assertion of the type in question. 42 (35) 232 b 43 (35) 754 b 44 (35) 748 b 45 (35) Ibid 46 (35) "je davvao sa padese se khettao siya sa padese siya apadese" - 240 b. 47 (36) E. g. 233 a, 233 b, 420 b 48 (36) 561 a 49 (36) 778 a 50 (36) Numerous Bhagavati passages refer - in passing or in details -
to the phenomena of nourishment and breathing. E. g. 19 a, 23 a, 24 b, 26 a, 39 a, 84 b, 109 a, 109 b, 252 b, 299 b, 491 b,
604 b, 616 b, 719 b, 743 b. 51 (36) 621 a, 622 b 52 (36) For most comprehensive list of physical (= bodily) functions see
608 b, 856 a. 53 (37) 109 a, 762 b, 59 b 54 (37) E. guvaogalakkhane nan jive i.e. cognition is the essential chara
cteristic of a soul - 149 a. 55 (38) Eor both 'vairena sprştaand “kriyayā sprştah'.
8) E. g 13 a, 16 b, 24 b, 25 b, 26 a, 34 a, 52 a, 53 a, 57 b, 79 b,
82 b, 101 b, 250 a, 253 a, 556 a, 655 a, 701 b, 704 b, 767 b. Really, the passage in question offers the strongest support to the supposition that the details of the Karma doctrine as worked out in the later Karma-texts took some time to get finalised. But to enter into a discussion of these details lies outside the purview of the present essay,
57
(38) Really,
I
PABA5

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176
58 (39) For the essentials of the doctrine of dravya-, kṣetra-, kāla-, bhāva, pradesa see 240 a. Additional clarification on certain points can be had from 609 a and 613 b (already referred to in connection with the treatment of time). But the doctrine is pre-supposed in a good number of other passages as well.
JAINA ONTOLOGY
59 (41) 928 b
60 (42) 708 b
61 (42) The Jaina theoreticians have devised a special system of enume. ration. Its basic units are samkhyata, asamkhyāta and ananta. Samkhyāta covers the lowest quantities but even asaṁkhyāta begins at a high enough stage; ananta begins at a stage higher still but even the region of ananta has an end. This much information should suffice for our present purpose.
62 (42) 18 b, 581 a (both for ajwa)
63 (42) 414 b
64 (43) 422 b
65 (43) 23 a
66 (43) 876 b
67 (45) 583 a
68 (45) 457 a
69 (45) 461 a
70 (46) 712 b
71 (52) 356 b
72 (52) 865 a
73 (53) 528 b
74 (60) 642 b
75 (60) 89 a
76 (61) Samudghata is conceived as a process in which a large quantity of Karmic physical particles are expelled at one go. As here enumerated, the first type of samudghata involves the expulsion of vedaniya-karma, the second that of kaşaya-karma, the third that of ayuş-karma, the fourth that of vaikriyaśartra-nāmakarma, the fifth that of taijasaśarīra-nāmakarma, the sixth that of aharakasarira-namakarma. The seventh type is a special operation which a person undertakes when he is on the eve of attaining mokṣa but his vedaniya-, nāma-, and gotra-karmas happen to be of greater duration than his ayuş-karma. The operation results in the equating of the duration of the former three types of karma to that of ayuş-karma. This much information should suffice for our present purpose. 77 (67) Sutra 1-59
78
(68) Sutra 8-27

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79 (68) Sutra 122 80 (68) Sutra 142 81 (68) Sutra 133 82 (68) Sutra 139
83 (68) Sutra 144 84 (68) Sutra 72–114
85 (69) Sutra 14
86 (69) Sutra 146
ANNOTATIONS
87 (69) Sutra 147
88 (69) Sutra 145
89 (70) Ibid
90 (70) Ibid 91 (70) Sūtra 152
92 (71) Sutra 144
93 (71) Sutra 126 94 (72) Sutra 123 95 (73) Sutra 4 96 (74) Sutra 35 97 (74) Ibid
98 (74) Sutra 26
99 (74) Sutra 38-39
100 (74) Savvajwvāṇaṁpi ya ṇam akkharassa anamtabhago niccugghadio citthai / jai puna so'vi avarijjā teņa jivo ajtvattam pāvijja / Sutra 42 101 (78) vv. 227-34
J. O...23
102 (83) One more Digambara text needs mention in this connection. It is Mūlācāra attributed to one Vattakera. It is a miscellaneous collection of twelve discussions conducted at a rather elementary level and mostly devoted to ethical matters but at two places it undertakes an elaborate exposition of philosophical views. [In this respect the text reminds one of the very old Sutrakṛtānga and not the so old Uttaradhyayana ]. Thus its fifth chapter, viz Pañcacaradhikara has a section, viz, Darsanācara in the course of which there has been given a fairly lengthy description of nine tattvas. Again its twelfth chapter, viz. Paryäptyadhikara is wholly devoted to a philosophical discussion. It proceeds somewhat like Prajñāpana inasmuch as it takes up for treatment some seventeen topics rather at random but it is definitely a late literary piece because it evinces full acquaintance with 14 guṇasthānas, 14 jtvasthanas, 14 märgaṇāsthānas the topic sthāna in fact being an exposition of these very three subjects. Nevertheless, Muladeserves to be studied in the company of Prajñāpanā,
cara

177

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178
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Jivājivābhigama and Uttaradhyayana and then it will be easy to see how both the Svetambara and Digambara were in actual possession of the same Agamic heritage. [It is not unlikely that like Şatkhandāgama Mūlācāra too is not a composition of one author but a collection of texts written by different authors at different periods. But that will only go to enhance the value of
its content which mostly seem to be old enough). 103 (86) Bhagavati 755 b
Pra jñāpana 1558 b
Tattvārtha I, p. 110 86) Tattvārtha I, p. 429 (the corresponding Bhagavats and Prajñāpanā
position being too obvious to need reference). 105 (86) II, p. 161 106 (87) Bhagavati 159 a
Prajnapana 1533 a 107 (87) Bhagavati 287 a
Prajnapana 1175 a
Tattvārtha I, p. 187 108 (87) II, p. 176 109 (87) II, p. 176 110 (87) 286 a
(Chapter III) 1 (101) I, 146,210 2 (101) I, 212-368 3 (102) I, 516-583 4 (103) 1.5 5 (104) 2.1 6 (104) 3.49 7 (104) p. 553 8 (118) This chapter deserves study specially because it almost through
out argues from the Jaipa standpoint. It is only towards its end that the speaker adopts a tone more appropriate to a Sautrāntika Bhuddhist - perhaps thus preparing the way for the chapter being declared to be a vindication of rjusūtranaya. Another speciality of the chapter is that it develops certain Vaišeșika positions which are unknown to the later texts. For instance, the Vaišeşika here argues that an effect exists in its cause even prior to its production but that it is then called absent there because it has not yet been associated with sattā -- an example of things which exist without being associated with satta being sämänya, višeşa,
samavāya. (p. 624, 625). 9 (121) Other such cases occur on pp. 598, 786, 1046, 1057, 1114

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10 (128) 1175-1346 11 (128) 3030-3188
12 (128) 3089-3135
13 (129) 2027-26, 2032-33
14 (128) 2021-62
15 (128) 2097-2118
16 (128) 2153-2154
17 (129) 2164-2171
18 (129) 3300-3437
19 (129) 1549-2024
20 (129) 2300-2609
ANNOTATIONS
21 (131) 2275-2297
22 (144) E. g. Siddhiviniscaya 1.9
23 (144) A clearest exposition of this view is to be found in Akalanka's account of naigamabhasa and ṛjusūtrabhasa-the former criticising the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika, the latter the Buddhist. The account (to which reference will be made later on) occurs in Pravacanapravesa, Pramaṇanayapravesa as well as Siddhiviniscaya.
24 (145) Aṣṭasati on Āptamīmāmsā verse 13,
25 (144) Akalanka's most typical references to Brahmavada occur in his account of sangrahanayabhasa. Besides, a passage like Nyayaviniscaya verse 76 refers to it.
26 (144) adhyakṣalingataḥ siddham anekātmakam astu sat |
-Nyayaviniscaya v. 150
27 (144) E. g. Nyayaviniscaya v. 117
28 (145) E. g. Nyayaviniscaya vv. 344 etc. Pramaṇasangraha vv. 40 etc. Siddhiviniscaya 6. 22
29 (145) For the Pravacanapravesa account of naya Laghiyastraya vv. 62-72,
For its account of niksepa
ibid vv. 73-75.
For the Pramananayapravesa account of naya Laghiyastraya vv. 30-50
For the Siddhiviniscaya account of naya chapter X and XI,
For its account of niksepa chapter XII
30 (146) Laghiyastraya v. 61 31 (146) Ibid v. 10
32 (146) Nyayaviniscaya v. 469
33 (146) Pramāṇasangraha v. 2

179

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N
180
JAINA ONTOLOGY 34 (147) E. g. Nyāyaviniscaya v v. 50-100 35 (147) 9. 38–43;
11. 4-5 36 (147) Siddhiviniscaya 4. 13-14
Nyāyaviniscaya vv. 225-229 37 (147) Nyaya-Vaišeșika God in Siddhivinišcaya 7. 12
Nyāya-Vaišesika Soul in Siddhiviniscaya 4. 15 Sānkhya
Soul in Siddhiviniscaya 4. 15-19 Sankhya Prakrti in Siddhiviniscaya 4, 20-21 38 (147) Siddhiviniscaya 7. 28-29
Nyāyaviniscaya vv. 416-21 39 (147) Siddhiviniscaya Chapter VIII;
Nyāyaviniscaya vv. 406-15 40 (150) For Sáňkhya I, 150-59;
For Buddhism I, 178-210. 41 (150) II, 117; II, 120-21 42 (150) For Nyāya II, 159-61
For Vaiseșika II, 161-62 43 (151) A close study of the following Tattvārthaslokavārtika passages
will be instructive :
I, 206-10; 271-86; 600_30;
II, 125-43. The relevant Aştasahasrı passages -- not only on this subject but
on most others as well -- can be detected without much difficulty. 44 (152) II, 573-81 45 (152) II, 175-93 46 (153) II, 324_60 47 (154) V, 400-88 48 (154) III, 609-32 49 (154) IV, 73-93 50 (154) I, 212-60 51 (157) Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 403. For Vidyānanda's reading Tattvārtha
slokavārtika III, 634 52 (158) Of course, Abbayadeva here speaks of Siddhasena etc. but that
does not materially alter the point: (Gandhahasti was a name
under which Siddhasena was often referred to by later authors). 53 (161) sangrahaś ca višeşavinirmoko'śuddhavişa yavinirmokaś ca ityādir yatha
sambhavam upadeyaḥ, Nayarahasya p. 89 54 (161) For the Sanmati version Nayarahasya p. 117; for the Aptami
māmsā version Nayāmrtatarangini on v. 6 (where Syadvadaratnākara is actually quoted). Anekantavyavastha II, 243 makes use of both versions.

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ANNOTATIONS
181
55 (161) Thus Anekantavayavasthā I, p. 59 says about naigama : trividho
hy ayam akarādāy udāhriyate etc. ; (akara = Syadvadaratnākara). 56 (162) Nayarahasya p. 134
Nayopadeša w. 48-52, v. 80
Anekāntavyavastha II, 191 57 (162) patadigatais tvaktrāņādibhiḥ paraparyayair asadbhävenārpito'kumbho
bhanyate, kumbhe kumbhatvanavacchedakadharmāvacchinnakumbhatva. sattvāt / Nayarahasya p. 118
The implicit reference to the Navya-Nyāya position in que
stion is here all too obvious. 58 (163) yathā naiyāyikair istā citre' nekaikarūpadhiḥ /
naya-pramānabhedena sarvatraiva tathā'rhatah || Nayopadesa v. 7 59 (163) A good example of Yašovijaya's vacillation in his attempt to get
at the meaning of that obscure Sanmati verse “evam sattaviyappo vayana paho' etc. He undertakes it twice - once in Anekāntavya. vasthā II, 246 and then in Nayāmộtataramgiņi on v. 6-but the
difficulty concerned remains essentially unresolved. 60 (163) Nayopadeša v. 79; Anekāntavyavastha II, 195. 61 (164) Nayāmrtatarangini on v. 110 62 (164) Nayāmặtatarangiņi on v. 16 63 (164) pp. 11 etc. 64 (164) pp. 23 etc. 65 (164) pp. 33 etc.

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Page #196

INDEX I
WORKS, AUTHORS, ETC.
Abhayadeva 10, 89, 99, 103-105, 155-158, 167, 180 Acarangasūtra 2-4, 8, 9, 14, 3940, 75,
Advaitavedanta 141, 162-164, 170,
171
Agama 1, 2, Aharapada 54
Akalanka 10, 11, 71, 89, 98-106, 127, 135, 136, 142-151, 153, 155-159, 164, 179
Alpabahutvapada 42, 45, 50, 62 Amitagati 167
Anantavirya 153, 156
Anga 1, 3, 4, 12, 78
Anekantajayapatākā 98, 99, 108,
139-142
Anekantavādi 137
Anekantavyavastha 105, 109, 160,
163, 180, 181
Antakṛddašā 4
Antakriyapada 55 Anuttaraupapatikadašā 4
Anuyogadvara 3, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 24-27, 31, 32, 65-73, 79, 81, 82, 94, 105, 106, 159, 161, 163
Aptamimāmsā 26, 89, 96-99, 101, 108, 135-139, 143, 149, 161, 179, 180
Aryarakṣita 78, 163,
Aṣṭasahasri 101, 102, 105, 108, 148, 149, 151, 152
Aṣtasati 99, 101, 108, 143, 179
Aupapātika 4, 32, 174 Avadhipada 57 Avagahanapada 68

Avasyakaniryukti 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 30, 31, 65, 66, 7578, 79, 93, 94, 105, 128, 131, 161, 163, 167 Avasyakasutra 3, 4, 67, 68, 72, 75 Bhagavatisūtra 2, 4, 8,9, 13-18, 20-22,
24-28, 30-41, 44, 51, 55, 5761, 64, 74, 79, 82, 86-90, 95-97, 130, 141, 174, 175, 178 Bhaktaparijna 2
Bhartṛhari 118, 120 Bhāṣāpada 44, 55 Buddha 101, 111
Candraprajñapti 4
Candrarși 10, 30, 79, 167 Caramapada 42, 46 Cārvāka 101
Catuḥ sarana 2
Chedasutra 1, 3
Culikāsutra 1, 3, Dasasruta 3, 75,
Dašavaikālika 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 39-40,
75,
Devendrasuri 167
Dharmakirti 114, 140, 147 Dhavala 30, 79
Digambara 2, 3, 5, 9-11, 15, 35, 64, 78, 79, 82, 86, 87, 89, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102-105, 129, 143, 149, 150, 155-161, 167, 177, 178
Dinnaga 114, 116, 118, 120, 147 Drṣtivada 3,
Dvipasagaraprajñapti 62
Gaṇadharavada 93, 94, 128, 129,
131
Gandhahasti 158, 180 -

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184
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Gaṇividyā 4 Gaudapăda 120 Gautama 27 Gommațasāra 167, 173 Haribhadra 10. 89. 98. 99. 105, 107.
139–143, 149, 167 Hegel 170, 171 Hemacandra 122 Hemacandra (Maladhāri) 75, 76, 167 Hereclitus 171 Indriyapada 41, 56 Jambūdvipa 41 Jambūdvīpaprajñapti 4, 32 Jinabhadra 75, 89, 93, 94, 100, 122
132, 135, 136, 139, 145, 164 Jinasena 167 Jitakalpa 3 Jivājivabhigama 4, 8, 9, 14, 32, 62
64, 79, 82, 173, 178 Jivajivavibhakti 63 Jñānabindu 105, 109, 160, 164 Jñātrdharmakathā 4 Jayadhavalā 30 Kalpa 3 Kalpasūtra 75 Kaņāda 104, 111, 124 Kapila 111 Karmabandhapada 60, 61 Karmagrantha 167 Karmaprakrti 64, 167 Karraprakstipada 59 Kramavedapada 60, 61 Kaşāyapada 57 Kaşāyaprabhỉta 10, 30, 78, 82, 83,
167, Kāyasthitipada 52, 55, 62, 63 Kesi 64 Kriyāpada 58 Kundakunda 10, 89, 95-97, 107,
132-135, 162 Laghiyasıraya 99, 102, 108, 143, 153,
156-158, 179
Lesyā (-adhyayana) 64 Lesya pada 58 Madhyamika 104 Madruka 27 Mahānišitha 3 Mahavira 4, 12, 27, 34, 79, 88,
89, 129 Malayagiri 10, 167 Mallavāai 10, 89, 92, 93, 99, 101,
114-122, 136, 139, 148, 149 Mānikyanandi 102, 156 Mimāṁsā 10, 100, 115, 151, 153,
154, 158 Mimāmsaka 7, 101, 137, 140, 142,
145, 147, 152, 160, 169 Mokşamārgiya 64 Mūlācāra 79, 177, 178 Mülasūtra 1, 3, 4 Naiyāyika 7, Namaskāra-niryukti 76, 77, 128 Nandi 3, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 24, 30,
32, 65, 73–76, 79, 105, Navyanaiyāyika 162, 163 Navyanyāya 105, 160, 162, 163, 181 Nayacakra 10, 89, 92, 93, 98, 99,
104, 107, 114-122, 148 Nayāmộtatarangiņi 163, 164, 180, 181 Nayarahasya 105, 109, 160, 163,
180, 181 Nayopadeša 105, 109, 160, 163, 181 Nemicandra 167, 173 Nihnavavāda 94, 128 Nirayāvalika 4 Nisītha 3 Nyāyakumudacandra 102, 108, 156–
159, 180 Nyāya 22, 71, 100, 150, 156, 180 Nyāya-Vaišeșika 5, 10, 101, 137,
140-142, 144, 145, 147-154, 158
164, 169, 179, 180 Nyāyaviniscaya 99, 108, 143, 146,
153, 179, 180

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Paesi (Pradesi) 64 Pañcasangraha 30, 79, 167
Pañcāstikaya 89, 95, 96, 107, 132-135 Parikṣāmukha 102, 104, 156, 157, 159 Pariņāmapada 43, 50, 52, 68
Parmenides 171
Parsva 33
Pasyattapada 56 Pindaniryukti 3
Prabhacandra 10, 89, 99, 102, 103, 105, 153, 155-157, 158, 159 Prajñāpanā 4, 8, 9, 1318, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30-32, 36, 4164, 68, 79, 82, 86, 87, 173, 177, 178
Prajñāpanāpada 43, 50, 62, 68 Prakirṇaka 1, 3, 4 Pramaṇanayatattvāloka 159
Pramanasangraha 99, 108, 143, 146,
179
INDEX I
Prameyakamalamātraṇḍa 102, 104, 108, 156-159
Prasnavyakaraṇa 4
Pravacanasara 89, 95, 96, 107, 132134
Pravicarapada 55 Prayogapada 58
Pujyapada 150, 151
Puruṣādvaitavadi 119
Purva 82
Rajaprasniya 4, 8, 9, 14, 32, 62,
64-65,
Rajavartika 106-108
Rṣibhāṣita 75
Sabdanayavādi 119, 140, 141
Samantabhadra 10, 26, 89, 96, 135. 139, 143, 147
Samavāyāngasūtra 4, 8, 165-166 Samayasara 89, 95, 96, 107, 132-135 Sāmāyika (-adhyayana) 67, 72 Sāmāyika-niryukti 75-78
J. O...24

Samudghatapada 59, 61 Samyaktvapada 58 Samyatapada 58 Sanjñāpada 57 Sanjñipada 57 Sankara 120
Sankhya 5, 7, 10, 40, 92, 94, 101, 111, 113, 115-117, 120, 137, 144, 145, 147-151, 158, 160, 163, 180
Sanmati 25, 26, 89, 92-94, 96, 97,
99, 103, 105, 107, 110, 113, 138, 155, 157, 158, 161, 180, 181 Sanmatikā 10, 103-105, 109, 158, 159, 161
Saptatika 167 Sarirapada 54, 68
Sarvadarsanasangraha 114 Sastravārtāsamuccaya 98, 105 Ŝataka 167
185
Şatkhandagama 9, 10, 13-17, 24, 25, 30, 31, 66, 78-83, 167, 173, 178 Sautrāntika 10, 104, 137, 171, 178 Siddhasena 10, 25, 26, 89-92, 94,
96, 106, 110-114, 136, 138, 139, 145, 157, 158, 164, 180 Siddhiviniscaya 99, 100, 108, 143, 145, 147, 153, 179, 180 Ŝilanka 10
Simbasuri 10, 93, 114, 115, 122 Ŝivašarmasuri 10, 167
Sthānangasūtra 4, 8, 165-166
Sthanapada 50, 63
Sthitipada 62, 63, 68
Sunyavāda 92, 94, 119, 120, 132, 145,
147
Sunyavādi 10, 131, 151, 154 Suryaprajñapti 4, 75 Sutrakṛtāngasūtra 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 14, 39, 75, 88, 174, 177 Svetambara 1-3, 5, 9-11, 15, 35, 52,

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186
JAINA ONTOLOGY 66. 75. 79. 87, 89, 91, 98, 99, Vaibhāșika 10 103-105, 129, 143, 149, 155- Vaiseșika 7, 40, 92, 93, 100, 104, 162, 167, 168
113, 115-117, 120, 124, 129, Svetāsvatara-upanişad 120
130, 150, 156, 163, 178, 180 Syadvadaratnākara 10, 94, 99, 104- Vasurāta 118
106, 109, 155, 158-162, 180, Vattakera 177 181
Veda 147 Tandulavaicārika 4
Vedanapada 59 Tarkabhāṣā 105, 109, 160, 164
Vedānta 40 Tattvārthara javārtika 99, 100, 143 Vedānti 10 Tattvārthašlokavārtika 101, 102, 107, Vidyānanda 10, 11, 89, 98, 99, 101108, 148-154, 161, 180
103, 105, 135, 136, 156, 157, 159, Tattvārthasūtra 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 14
180 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, Vijñānavāda 92, 99, 119, 120, 140, 28, 30, 31, 39, 62, 64, 66, 71, 142, 145, 147, 154 79, 83-87, 93, 99, 101, 102, 143, Vijñānavādi 10, 131, 137, 151, 154
148, 149, 151, 157, 161, 173, 178 Vipākašruta 4 Tattvārthasūtrabhāsya 66, 96, 105, Virasena 30, 79, 82, 167, 173 148, 161
Visesapada 44, 53 Ucchvāsapada 54
Višeşāvašyakabhāşya 75, 89, 93, 94, Umāsvāti 3–9, 22, 31, 64, 71, 83-87, 97, 100, 105, 107, 122-132, 161, 89, 96, 100, 106, 139, 143, 146,
167 148-150, 152, 153, 158
Vişnu 135 Upānga 1, 3, 4,
Vyavahārasūtra 3, 75 Upāsakadašā 4
Vyutkrāntipada 55 Upayogapada 56
Yasovijaya 10, 11, 75 89, 94, 98, Upodghataniryukti 128
99, 105, 106, 122, 155, 156, 159, Uttarādhyayana 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 21, 160-164, 181 62-64, 75, 86, 177, 178 .
Yativrsabha 10, 83, 167 Vadideva 10, 89, 99, 104, 105, 155, Yogācāra 104 156, 158-160
Yonipada 54 Vadiraja 153

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INDEX II
SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT TERMS
Abhāva 118 Abhinibodha 100, 146 Abhinibodhika jnana 22, 157 Acarama 46, 47, 48, 49 Acakşudarsana (a non-omniscient's
Don-visual sense perception) 23 Addhā (time) 19 Addhasamaya (medium of occurre
nce) 18, 34, 35, 39, 41-44 Adharma (medium of stoppage) 18,
22, 27-29, 33–36, 39, 41-43,
70, 90 Adharmāstikāya 22 Adhikarana (location) 6, 66, 101 Adhikarana-Kāraņa 128 Ādhovadhika (person with an imper
fect type of avadhi) 23, 57 Advaitavāda 116-117 Āgama 9-12, 22, 71, 73, 100, 102,
104, 127, 145, 146 Āgamapramāņa 104 Agamato bhāva-āvašyaka (one who
knows āvašyaka and at present exercises the concerned cognitive
function) 68 Āgamato dravya āvašyaka (one who
knows āvašyaka but is not at present exercising the concerned
cognitive function) 67 Āgamavāda 113 Agni (fire) 51, 63 Agurulaghu (neither-heavy-nor-light)
43, 44, 62 Ahāra 66 Abaraka (undertaking nourishment)
52, 71 Ābārakasamudghata 61
Ābārakasariranāmakarma 176 Ajiva (not-soul) 5, 21, 34, 42, 64,
129, 131, 150 Ajivastikāya (basic reals of the non
soul type) 7 Ajñāna 22, 53, 56, 57, 84 Akasa (medium of location) 18, 22,
27-29, 34-36, 39, 41-43, 70, 90 Akasa-pradesa 29, 43-45 Akkhara 177 Aksara (verbal cognitive awareness)
74 Aloka (Not-world) 18, 20, 21, 27,
28, 30, 33, 41, 42, 50 Alpabahutva (relative numerical
strength) 6, 16, 55, 66, 69 Amanaska (souls not in possession of
manas) 84 Anahāra 87 Apāhāraka 87 Anaksara (sruta) 74 Ananta 42-46, 53, 176 Anantarāvagaha (immediately adjacent to) 87 Anantarāvagāha (co-existent) 87 Anānuçürvi (lack of ordered succe
ssion) 26, 68, 71 Anapavartaniya-ayu (life not liable
to premature expiry) 85 Anarpita (non-relevance) 85, 96, 128 Anarpitanaya 123, 128 Anarthāntara 100, 146 Anekantavada (Non-absolutism) 10,
94, 97, 98, 101, 105-113, 121 - 127, 133, 145, 148, 149, 151
154, 160-164, 168-171 Angapravişta 3

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188
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Angabāhya 3, Anindriya-pratyaksa 22, 73, 146 Aạnautthiyā (heretics) 88 Antara (interval) 6, 16, 66, 69, 173 Antarvartı ākāsa (empty space lying
in between two regions of the
world) 18 Anubbāga 80, 81 Anubbāgabandha 86 Anubhavabandha (karmic bondage
from the stand-point of inten
sity) 86 Anugama 67, 68, 72, 73, Anumāna 22, 71, 73, 100, 127, 145,
146 Anupūrvi (ordered succession) 26,
68, 71-73 Anuyogadvara (point of investiga
tion) 6, 7, 16, 18, 20, 21, 25, 30, 65-67, 69, 71, 76-81, 84,
101, 123, 152, 173 Apadana-kāraņa 128 Aparyāpta (partly developed) 51 Apavartapā 80 Apavartaniya-ayu (life liable to pre.
mature expiry) 85 Apāya 127 Apramattasamyata 15 Apūrvakaraṇa 15, 30 Arpita (relevance) 85, 96, 128 Arpitanaya 123, 128 Arthadhikāra 72, 73 Arthaparyāya (unnameable chara
cteristic) 111, 112 Arthāvagraha (final grasping of the
object) 56, 74 Asamavāyikarana 128 Asaṁkhyāta 42-45, 176 Asamyatasamyagdrsti 15 Asamyata (undisciplined) 59 Asanji (not possessing higher cogni.
tive capacity) 51
Asanjñi-pañcendriya 15 Asañji (-Śruta) 74 Asatkāryavāda 116, 118 Āsrava (karmic ingression) 5, 21, 64,
150 Astikāya (the fve basic reals) 14,
17-20, 27, 28, 33-36, 38, 44, 52,
61, 62, 132 Asubhanāma (inauspicious nama
karma) 60 Asuddha-dravyāstikanaya 111 Asuddha vyanjanaparyāya 112 Atindriyapratyakşa 100, 146 Ātmakşetrāvagāha 87 Ātmaparimāņa (the problem of the
size of soul) 103 Atyanta-asattva (absolute Non-exi
stence) 118 Audayika bhāva (the state due to the
effectuation of karma) 71, 84 Aupasamika-bhāva (the state due to
the subsidence of karma) 71,
84
Autpattiki mati 19, 37, 74 Avadhidaršana (a non-omniscient's
extra-sensory vision-like cogni
tion of outer world) 23 Avadhijñāna (a non-omniscient's true
extra-sensory cogitation-like cognition of the outer world) 7, 22,
23, 57, 73, 75, 100, 114, 125, 146 Avagahanā (size) 80, 81, 85 Avagraha 19, 37, 73, 74, 127 Avaktavya indescribable) 26, 27,
46–49, 68, 71 Avaktavyavāda 92, 119 Avacchedakatā 163 Āvašyaka 67-69 Avāya (determination) 19, 37, 56, 73,
74 Avidyaksaya (cessation of nescience)

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INDEX II
Avyucchittinaya 24 Ayogakevali 15 Ayukarma 69 Ayunāmakarma 71 Ayus-karma 176 Badara (gross) 51 Bādarasamparāya 15 Bāhyārthavāda (realism) 140 Bala (strength) 19, 37, 60 Bandha (karmic bondage - Binding)
5, 21, 43, 60, 61, 64, 79-81, 86,
132, 150, 166, Bandhana 81, 82 Bandhacatustaya (four types of kar
mic bondage) 86 Bandha-hetu or- kāraṇa (cause of
karmic bondage) 86, 150 Bhaga 19, 66, 69 Bhāsaka (capable of speaking) 52 Bhāṣāparyāpti 86 Bhāva (essential form, mode, pro
perty) 6, 16, 24, 29, 62, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 80, 81, 90, 92, 112,
118, 126 Bhava āvasyaka 68 Bhavadyaitavada 116, 117, 120 Bhavanapatideva 51 Bhāva-niksepa 91, 124 Bhävapradesa (unit of property) 39,
176 Bhavendriya 97 Bhavišarıra (the newborm body of
one who will know avasyaka)
67 Bhavya (capable of attaining moksa)
52 Bheda (splitting) 43 Bhutacaitanyavāda 93, 147, 151, 154 Bhūtagrāma 166 Brahman 144 Brahmavada 145, 151, 154, 160 179 Cakravarti (world-conqueror) 56
Cakravartiratnas (14) (jewels in poss
ession of a world-conqueror) 56 Cakşudarsana (a non-omeniscient's
visual sense perception) 23 Carama 46, 47, 48, 49 Carama (capable of attaining mokşa)
52 Caritra (conduct) 5, 6, 52, 66, 76,
77, 133, 135, 174 Caritrācāritra 77 Caritramohaniya-ksapaņā 83 Caritramohaniya-upasamanā 83 Caritraprāpti 78 Caturindriya (four-sensed being)
51, 54, 63 Chadmastha 22, 23 Cinta 100, 146, 157 Darsana (faith) 5, 6, 174 Darsana (indeterminate cognition) 19.
37, 52, 53, 56, 57, 66, 84, 91,
92, 104, 113, 114, 128, 133-135 Darsanamohaniya 38 Darsanamohaniyakşapaņā 83 Darsanārya 22, 64 Dešavirati 83 Deva (god) 51, 54, 57, 132 Dhāraņā (retention) 19, 37, 56, 73,
74 Dharma or Dharmāstikaya (medium
of motion) 18, 22, 27-29, 33-36,
39, 41-43, 70, 90 Dhrauvya (permanence) 8, 86, 95, 98,
132 Dirgha 44 Dravya (formative material, substance)
6, 19, 20, 24, 28, 29, 38, 42, 43, 62, 64, 66, 67, 72, 80, 81, 85, 86, 90, 92, 95, 112, 118, 121, 123,
125, 126, 131, 132 Dravya āvašyaka 67, 69 Dravyaniksepa 91 Dravyapradesa (unit of component
of-the-form-of-substance) 39, 176

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190
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Dravyārthikanaya 24, 78 Dravyāstika 89, 91, 92, 94, 96-98,
104, 111-113, 121, 123-125, 128,
138, 152 Dravyendriya 97 Dşsti (faith) 19, 37 Duhkha (misery) 5, 150 Duh khakārana 150 Duḥkhanirodha 150 Duh khanirodhahetu 150 Dvindriya (two-sensed being) 51, 54,
63 Dvipa (world-continent situated on
our earth) 19, 41 Ekakşetravagaha 87 Ekantavāda (one-sided view) 115 Ekātmavāda 93 Ekendriya (one-sensed being) 51,
63 Evambhūta 70, 92, 111, 124, 125 Ganadhara 76, 129 Gati (class of animate being) 52, 66 Gati (motion) 43 Ghanodadhi (the layer of water occu
pying a part of the space lying in between two regions of the
lower world) 19 Gotrakarma 71, 176 Guņa (quality) 64, 71, 72, 85, 86,
91, 95, 131, 132 Guņasthāna 14-16, 30, 60, 79, 80,
135, 166, 173, 177 Hetuvāda 113 ībā (cogitation) 19, 37, 56, 73, 74 Indriya (sense-organ) 52, 66, 84 Indriya-pratyaksa 22, 73, 100, 146 Indriya-svār itva (possession of a
sense-organ) 84 Indriya-vişaya (object of a sense or
gan) 84 Iryāpathikakarmabandhaka 15 Istagandha (desirable smell) 59
Istagati (disirable motion) 59 Istalāvanya (desirable comeliness) 59 Istarasa (desirable taste) 59 Iştarüpa (desirable colour) 59 Işțasabda (desirable sound) 59 Işłasparsa (desirable touch) 59 İştasthiti (desirable stature) 59 İştasvara (desirable voice) 60 Işta-utthana (desirable preparedness)
60 Iştayasahkirti (desirable fame) 60 Isvaravada (the problem of God)
103 Jambudvīpa 18 Janma (birth) 85 Jala (water) 51, 63 Jiva (soul) 5, 18, 20, 21, 29, 30,
33–39, 42, 43, 50–59, 64, 70,
84, 129-131, 150, 162, 177 Jivasthāna 14-17, 51, 53, 79, 135,
166, 173, 177 Jivāstikāya (basic real in the form
of soul) 7 Jñāna (determinate cognition) 5, 6,
7, 19, 22, 30, 37, 52, 53, 56, 57, 66, 71, 73, 78, 84, 91, 92, 100, 104-106, 113, 123, 127,
128, 133-135, 139, 157, 174 Jñānanaya 76, 78, 123 Jñāyakasarira (the dead body of the
one who had known avasyaka)
67 Jyotiskadeva 51 Kala (medium of occurrence - Time)
6, 16, 18, 20, 24, 29, 30, 33, 34, 41, 50, 52, 62, 66, 69, 72,
80, 81, 84-86, 92, 120, 128 Kālādvaitavada 116, 117 Kālapradesa (unit of time) 39, 176 Kānkşa-mohaniya 38 Kāntasvara (beautiful voice) 60 Karaņa 80, 81

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INDEX II
191
Karaña (doing) 129 Kāraņa 128 Karana-kāraņa 128 Karma (matter of the form of karma)
16, 19, 20, 30, 33, 37, 38, 59– 61, 71, 79-82, 84, 92, 128, 130
134, 166 Karma-bandha (Karmic bondage)
30, 60, 166 Karma-kāraņa 128 Kārmaņa 97 Karma--sattā (karmic abidance) 60 Karma-udaya 80, 81 Karma-vedana (karmic experience)
30, 60, 86 Kārmiki (mati) 19, 37, 74 Karmodaya 60, 82, 86 Karomi 129 Kartā (main cause) 133 Kartřkārana 128 Kārya 128 Kaşāya (certain vices) 52, 57, 58, 66,
Kşanabhangavāda 99, 152 Kşanikatva 91 Kṣaṇikavāda (momentarism) 92, 119,
140-142, 144, 145 Kșapaka-apūrvakarņa 15 Kșapakabadarasamparāya 15 Kșapakasreņi 30, 78, 128 Kșapakašreņi-ārohi 38 Ksapakasūkşmasamparāya 15 Kșapaņā 80 Ksaya 16, 17 Kṣāyika-bhāva (state due to the
cessation of karma) 71, 84 Kşayopašama 16 Kṣāyopašamika-bhāva (state due to
the cessation-cum-subsidence of
karma) 71, 84 Kşetra (place, space) 6, 16, 17, 24,
29, 62, 66, 69, 72, 80 Kșetrapradeša (unit of space) 39,
176 Kşīņakaṣāya 15 Kūtasthanityatvavāda 140, 141, Lakşaņa 128 Lesyā (a material indicative of the
relative preponderance or otherwise of vices in a being; mental
temperament) 19, 37, 52, 58, 66 Loka (world) 18, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28,
30, 33, 41, 42, 50, 51 Loka-sañja 57 Manahparyāpti 86, 87 Manahparyāyajñāna (a non-omnisci
ent's true extrasensory cogitation-like cognition of other's inner world) 7, 22, 23, 73, 100,
114, 125, 146 Manas (indispensable organ of all
higher type of cognition) 57, 73,
74, 133, 134 Mangala 126 Manojñasvara (amiable voice) 60
83
Kaşāya-karma 176 Kaşāyasamudghata 61 Kaya 66 Kaya (body) 52, Kāyasthiti 173 Kevaladarsana (an omniscient's exrasensory vision-like cognition) 24, 86,
164 Kevalajñāna (an omniscient's extra
sensory cogitation-like cognition) 7, 22, 24, 73, 86, 100, 114, 125,
146, 164 Kevali 21-23, 27, 64, 128 Kevalisamudghāta 61, 128 Kriyā 38, 58, 92, 113, 118, 123 Kriyānaya 76, 78, 123 Kriyayā sprstah 38, 175 Křti 81 Kșaņa 119

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192
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Manusya (man) 51, 57 Marana-samudghata 61 Märgaņāsthāna 14, 16, 17, 20, 52,
53, 55, 62, 63, 66, 79, 166, 173,
177 Matih 157 Matijñāna (a non-omniscient's true
cogitation-like cognition based on one's own sense-perception, sensory cognitive awareness) 7, 22, 23, 73–75, 94, 100, 125, 127, 146, 157 autpattiki 74, vainayiki 74, kār
miki 74, pāriņāmiki 74 Mātrkāpadāstika 96 Māyāvāda 120 Mithyadarsana 19 Mithyādarsanašalya (wrong faith
acting as a piercing arrow) 37, 58 Mithyādņsti (one lacking samyaktva)
15, 58, Mohaniyakarma 83 Mokșa 5, 21, 22, 38, 55, 64, 95, 132,
135, 137, 147, 150, 154, 174,
176 Mokşakāraṇa 150 Mokşamärga 6, 20, 21, 64, 83, 133,
149, 150, 174 Mokşasvarüpa (the problem of the
nature of mokşa) 103 Mukta (released soul) 84 Naigamanaya 69-71, 76, 77, 89-92,
94, 111, 112, 123, 124, 181 Naigamābhāsa 145, 179 Naigama-pradesa 70 Naimittikakāraņa 128 Nama 6, 66, 72, 73, 112, 126 Nama āvasyaka (anything arbitrarily
given the name 'āvasyaka') 67 Nama-karma 59, 176 Nama-niksepa 91 Namanikşepavada (The doctrine of
primacy of name) 118
Namaskāra 76, 77 Nāraka (hell-born being) 51, 54, 57,
60, 90, 132 . Naraka adi (the classes constituting
the animate world, viz. 'hell-born
beings' etc.) 19 Nārakıya 37 Navatattva 95 Naya (expression of partial truth) 6,
7, 20-22, 24, 25, 30, 65-70, 72, 73, 78, 79, 84, 88-100, 102106, 109-113, 121-126, 128131, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143,
145, 152, 161-164, 174, 179-181 Nayabhāsa (pseudo-naya) 145 Nidhatti 80 Nihnava (heretic) 125, 129-131 Niḥsvabhāva (essenceless) 119 Nikācana 80 Nikșepa 6, 7, 24, 25, 30, 65-69, 72,
73, 76, 77, 79, 91, 94, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 110, 112, 124, 126, 143, 145, 152,
161-164, 166, 179 Nimitta(-kārana) (occasioning cause)
128, 133 Nirakāra indeterminate) 56 Nirdesa (reference) 6, 66, 76, 77,
101, 152 Nirjarā (expulsion of karma) 5, 21
64, 150 Nirvikalpa 112 Niscayanaya (definitive standpoint)
78, 95, 123–126, 130, 135, 138,
162 Nityatva (permanence) 85, 91 Niyama (limitation) 93 Niyati 92, 120 Niyati-advaitavāda 116, 117, Noagamato bhāva āvašyaka (avasyaka from the stand-point of spirit
internal reality) 68

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INDEX II
193
Pradesa-bandha (karmic bondage
from the stand-point of pum
ber of karma particles) 86 Pradešavāda 29 Prakrti 81, 82, 92, 111, 117, 144,
147, 180 Prakrtibandha (karmic bondage from
the standpoint of karma-types) 86 Pramāna(valid cognition or instrument
of valid cognition 6, 7, 11, 2022, 66, 71-73, 78, 84, 99, 100, 102-104, 106-110, 113, 114, 127,
181
Noagamato dravya avasyaka 67 Noajvia 130, 131 Nojiva 129-131 Nyaya 22 Oghar sanjñā 57 Pada 76, 77 Padārtha 76, 77, 92, 150, 156 Pañcāstikaya (basic reals) 7, 18, 20,
27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 41-43, 50,
84, 85, 95 Pañcāstikāyasāmānya 85 Pancendriya 51, 54, 63 Pancendriya-tiryak (five-sensed ani.
mal) 51 Papa (vice). 5, 6, 21, 64 Parakrama 19 Paramävadhika (person with the
most perfect type of avadhi)
23, 57 Pariņāma (property) 85 Pariņāmika-bhāva (state natural to
a soul) 71, 84 Pariņāmikimati 19, 37, 74 Paritta (having one body each) 52 Paroksa 7, 22, 73, 78, 102, 104, 134,
146 Paryäpta (fully developed) 51, 52 Paryāpti 86, 87, Paryāya (the properties of a sub
stance) 19, 20, 24, 28, 38, 43, 64, 71, 72, 86, 90, 91, 95, 112,
121, 125, 126, 132 Paryāyārthikanaya 24, 78 Paryāyāstikanaya 89, 91, 92, 94, 96
98, 103, 104, 111-113, 121, 123
125, 129 Pasyatta 56, 57 Patatvävadhikaghatābhāva ('a jar's
absence "limited” by clothness)
162 Pradesa (the constituent units of a
substance) 19, 20, 28, 29, 38, 42-44, 53, 62, 70, 80, 81, 85 J. 0...25
Pramāņābhāsa 102, 10+ Pramāņaphala 102, 104, Pramānasämänya 102, 104 Pramānasvatastva-paratastva 164 Pramāņavişaya 100, 102, 104, 109 Prāmānya-svatastva-paratastva (the
problem whether knowledge is self
valid or otherwise) 103 Pramattasamyata 15 Prameya (knowable) 5 Praņātipata (injury to life) 19, 37, 38 Prasthaka (grain-measuring vessel) 69 Pratyabhijñā 100, 127, 145, 146 Pratya kșa 7, 22, 71, 73, 74, 78, 100,
102, 104, 127, 145, 146 Pravacana 76 Priyasvara (lovable voice) 60 Pșthvi 19, 51, 63 Pudgala (matter) 7, 18, 20, 29, 30, 33
36, 41, 43-50, 86 Pudgalabandha (formation of physical
aggregates) 85 Pudgalaparamāņu 39, 42 Pudgalaskandha (physical aggregate)
39, 42, 70 Punya (virtue) 5, 6, 21, 64 Puruşa 92, 111, 117, 137 Purusādvaitavada 116, 117, 120 Puruşakara 19

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194
Puruṣakaraparakrama (manly valour)
37, 60 Puruṣārtha 92
Rajas 117
Rasa 71
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Rasabandha 86
Ṛjusūtra 69, 70, 90-92, 94, 103, 111, 112, 123, 125, 130, 164, 178 Ṛjusütrabhasa 145, 179 Rupadisamudayavada (the view that
the real is but a conglomeration of qualities devoid-of-an-abiding substance) 119
Rūpayatana (physical aggregate) 116 Sabda 43, 124, 147
Sabdadvaitavada 151
Ŝabdanaya 69, 70, 91, 92, 94, 112, 118, 123
Sabdanayavada 119
Sadhana 6, 66, 101 Sādi pārināmika 71
Sagara (world-oceans situated on our earth) 19
Ŝailesikarana 128
Sākāra (determinate) 56
Samabhiruḍha 70, 92, 111, 124, 125 Samanaska (souls in possession of manas) 84
Samanya (generality) 91, 115, 124, 126, 131, 178 Samanya.viseṣa 131 Samavatāra 72, 73
Samavaya 131, 178
Samavay ikaraṇa 128
Samaya (time, moment) 19, 29, 42, 43, 45, 87
Samayakṣetra 42
Samayika 72, 75-77
Samkhyata 44-46, 176
Samoipatika (mixed) 71 Samparayikakarmabandhaka 15 Sampradana-kāraṇa 128

Samprata 111, 112 Samsari (soul in bondage) 84 Samudghata (massive expulsion of karma) 61, 176
Samvara (protection against karma) 5, 21, 64, 150
Samy agdarsana (right faith) 5, 20, 21, 64, 77, 83
Samyagdṛṣṭi (one possessing samyaktva) 56, 58 Samyagjñāna (right knowledge) 5, 21, 77
Samyagmithyaḍrsti (one partially possessing samyaktva) 15, 58 Samyak-caritra (right conduct) 5, 77 Samyaktva (religious faith) 15, 52, 58 66, 76, 77, 133 Samyaktvaprapti 78 Samyaktvasreni 128 Samyaktvotpatti 83
Samyama (moral discipline) 52 Samyata (perfectly disciplined being) 58 Samyatasamyata (imperfectly disciplined being) 15, 59
Sangrahanaya 69-71, 89, 90, 92, 94, 111, 112, 122, 124, 125, 138, 161, 164, 180
Sangrahanayābhāsa 145, 179 Sanjña (certain vices) 19, 37, 57, 100, 146, 157
Sañjñi (possessing higher cognitive capacity) 51, 52, 57, 71 Samjni-pañcendriya 15
Sañjñ (śruta) 74
Sanjňitva (possession of sañjñā i. e. higher cognition) 84
Sankhya (number) 6, 16, 17, 66, 69,
71
Sankrama 80
Sankramaņa 86
Saptabhangi 24-27, 30, 50, 70, 71, 91,

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94, 96, 97, 105, 106, 109, 110, 112, 113, 124, 138, 140, 161, 162, 166, 180
Saptatattva 20, 84
Sarira (body) 17, 19, 37, 85 Sarva-addhasamaya 43
Sarvadravya 35, 43 Sarvajiva 43
Sarvajña (omniscient) 5
Sarvajñavāda (the problem of omni
science) 103, 147
Sarvanayavidhi 64 Sarva paryaya 43 Sarvapradesa 43 Sarvapramāņa 64 Sarvapudgala 43
Sarvavirati 83
Sasvadana-samyagdṛṣṭi 15
Sat (being, real, reality) 6, 8, 16, 17, 66, 69, 71, 85, 86, 112 Satkāryavāda 116, 118 Satpadarthavada 118 Satsamanya (general definition of the real) 7, 8, 20, 28, 84-86
Satta 79, 131, 178 Sattva 117
INDEX II
Saudharma-ādi (region of the upper world) 19 Savikalpa 112
Saviseṣaṇa-asattva (conditional Non
existence) 118
Sayogakevalı 15 Sayogi 71
Siddha 128
Skandha 67
Smrti 100, 127, 145, 146, 157 Sparsa 6, 81
Sparśana 16, 66, 69
Sphotavada 147
Ŝreņi-arohana 30
Srutajñāna (a non-omniscient's true cogitation-like cognition based on

195
somebody else's testimony. Jaina scripture) 23, 139, 146 Sruta (Scriptural knowledge) 7, 22, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 94, 100, 114, 125, 127, 139, 146
Srutajñānaprapti 78
Sthapana (configuration) 6, 66, 72, 91, 112, 126
Sthapana
avasyaka (any physical thing given the shape of avasyaka) 67
Sthapananikṣepavada (the doctrine of primacy of configuration) 118 Sthavara (static-bodied souls) 62, 63, 84, 135
Sthiti (duration) 6, 66, 80, 81, 101, 152
Sthitibandha (karmic bondage from the stand-point of duration) 86 Subhakarma (auspicious karmas) 86 Subhanama (auspicious namakarma) 59 Suddha-dravyastikanaya 111 Suddhavyañjanaparyaya 112 Sūkṣma (subtle) 51, 52 Sūkṣmasamparāya 15
Sunyavada (the position that things of the world are essenceless) 92, 94, 119, 132
Svabhava 92, 120
Svabhāvādvaitavada 116, 117
Svamitva (ownership) 6, 66, 101, 152 Svara 71
Syādvāda 92, 118, 121, 138
Syadvādi 120
'Syat' 138
Tadvyatirikta (avasyaka from the stand. point of former external appearance) 68
Taijasa 97 Taijasasamudghāta 61
Taijasa sariranamakarma 176 Tamas 117

Page #209

63
196
JAINA ONTOLOGY Tapa (penance) 6
Utpatti 76, 77 Tarka 100, 127, 145, 146
Utthāna 19, 37 Tattva (verity, category) 5, 21, 64, 132, Vada 104, 115 150, 174, 177
Vaikriyasamudgbata 61 Tattvārthasraddhāna (faith in veritable Vaikriya-sarira-nāmakarma 176 reals) 5
Vaimānikadeva 51 Tattvopaplava 151
Vainayikī (mati) 19, 37, 14 Tattvopaplavavāda 151, 154
Vaireņa sprstaḥ 38, 175 Tirthankara (the higher authority on Vaktavyatā 72, 73 matters religious and spiritual)
Vanaspati (plant) 51, 63 56, 76, 101, 147
Varsa (regions of a world-continent) Tiryak (animal) 51, 57
19 Trasa (mobile-bodied souls) 63, 84, Vāyu 51, 63 135
Vayu (the layer of air occupying a Trindriya (three-sensed being) 51, 54 part of the space lying in bet.
ween two regions of the lower Trşnākşaya (cessation of worldly
world) 18 desire) 5
Veda (sexual behaviour) 52, 66, 85
Vedana (karmic experience) 5, 21, 60, Udaratrasa (it is class udaratrasa that includes dvindriya, trindriya,
62 caturindrya, pancendriya) 63
Vedanā 59, 79, 81, 82
Vedanasamudghata 61 Udaya 16, 79
Vedaniya-karma 71, 176 Uddesa 76, 77
Vedāpaurseyatvavada (the problem of Udiranā 80
Veda being an impersonal compoUdvartana 80
sition) 103, 147, 154 Upakāra (function) 85
Vibhakti 71 Upakrma 67, 68, 72, 73
Vibhangajñāna 23 Upamāna 22, 71, 73
Vidhāna 6, 66, 101 Upašama 16, 17
Vigrahagati (process of transmigration) Upašāmaka-apuravakaraña 15 Upašāmakabādarasamparāya 15
Vidhi (affirmation) 93, 121, 122, 136 Upašamakasāya 15
Vidhi-vidhi 121, 122, 136 Upasamanā 80
Vijñānavāda (idealism) 92, 99, 120, Upasamašreņi 30, 78, 128
140, 142, 145, 147, 154 Upasamašreņi-ārohi 38
Vikala-trika (two-, three-, four-sensed Upašānta-kaņāya 15, 16,
beings) 15 Upayoga (cognition) 19, 37, 52, 56, Virya (energy) 19, 37, 60 66, 84, sakāra- 56, nirakära- 56
Višeșa (particularity) 91, 115, 124, 126, Upodghāta 77
131, 178 Utpada (origination) 8, 86, 95, 98, Vitarāga (one devoid of passion) 5 132
Vyanjanaparyāya (nameable characte. Utpannāstika 96
ristic) 111, 112
84

Page #210

INDEX II
Vya janavagraha (initial grasping of the object) 56, 74 Vyantaradeva 51
Vyapti (the relation of invariable concomitance) 145
Vyavaharabhasa 145
Vyavaharanaya (practical stand-point) 69-71, 78, 90, 92, 94, 95, 111,

112, 123-126, 130, 135, 138, 145, 162, 164
197
Vyaya (destruction) 8, 86, 95, 98, 132 Vyucchinnakaṣaya 15
Vyucchittinaya 24
Yoga (activity) 19, 37, 52, 66 Yoni (Birth-place) 54, 85

Page #211

INDEX III
GENERAL SUBJECTS Absence of a thing 162
Animate activities, five sorts of 37 Accidents 170
Abimate world 50 Acquisitive instinct, 57
Anti-Buddhist crusade 140 Act 38, 129, 130
Anti-ekantavada position 115 Activities, three types of 58, bodily Anti-philosophy, standpoint of 115
37, 50, 54-56, 85, cognitive 50, 56- Appearance 170 57, emotive 50, 57-58, conative Arithmatical computation 36, 46 50, 58-59, affective 37, 50, 59, Astrology 4 animate 37, mental 34, physical Astronomy 4, 165 34, voluntary 34
Atom 22, 26, 27, 29, 34-36, 45-49, 61, Actuality 170
68, 90, 142, acarama 46, avaktavya Advaitavadas, five 116
46 Advaita Vedāntist 169
Atomic bondage 44 Affection 132
Atomism 36 Affective state 95
Auditory senseorgan 56, 74 Āgamic, activity 143, heritage 87, 178,
Avacchedakata, problem of 163 texts 22, 25-29, 71, 79, 82,
Becoming 170, 171 86, 91, 150, 152, 174, authenticity Being 170, 171 12, authority 79; corruption 87; Being-for-self 170
features 88-89; three wordings 87 Binding 44 Age of Agamas 88, three stages of 9, Birth 55
innovations of the third stage of 65 Birth-place 54 Age of Logic 65, 66, 73, 75, 78, 86, Black colour 46
āgamic activities carried on in 167; Body-size 54, 68 characteristic features of 98, gene- Bodily functions, list of 175 ral characteristics of 106,
Body 36, 37, 68, 97, 113, 133-135, Aggregate 26, 27, 35, 36, 44, 46, 71
compoiste 142, five types of 54 Aggregate-devoid-of-an-underlying-sub- Bondage 132, 137, atomic 44, karmic
stance 92 Air 22, 27, 28, 33, 34, 36
Border region 42 Air-bodied 37, 40, 50
Brahmanical philosophers 152 Analogy 33, 65, 89
Brahmin 8, 140, 155 Anekāntavāda, Logic of, 168-171, its Brahmavādi Vedāntist 151, 154 parallel with Hegel 168-171
Breathing 36, 54 Anger 57
Buddhism 180 Aniconist 1, 2
Buddhist 5, 7, 8, 11, 25, 40, 90, 91, Animal 28, 74
93, 100-102, 111, 113, 115, 125,
80

Page #212

INDEX III
199
129-131, 137, 140-142, 144, 145, 148–155, 158, 160, 163, 164, 169,
170, 178, 179 Buddhist philosophy 92 Carama atom 46 Category 5, 93, 121, 131, 136, 170 Causal efficiency 145 Causation 102 Cause 115, 116, 136, 137, 144, 169,
170, 178, accessory 134, chief 134,
material 134, occasioning 134 Change 97, 112, 144, 145, 152, 168-170 Classification, of living entities 20,
schemes of 52, of nonliving entites
68
Cogniser 135 Cognition 56, 129, 132, 134; based on
one's own sense perception 23; based on somebody else's testimony 23, cogitationlike 23, determinate 56, extra-ordinary 73, extrasensory 23, indeterminate 57, invoIving use of words 74, of scriptures 74, right 21-23, sensory 23, 56,
113, visionlike 23, wrong 23 Cognitive activity 37, 50, 56, 57 Cognitive awareness 74 Cognitive capacity 53, 162 Cognitive dealings 74; four types of 19 Cognitive state 95 Colour 35, 36, 43, 125, 135 Commonsense, worldly 115 Composite 39, 90, 152 Component 39 Conative activity 37, 50, 58, 59 Concentration 34 Conduct 63, prubicms of 40-41 Consciousness 131 Contradictory features 24, 97 Creator, Divine 117 Cosmogony 4 Cosmography, Mythological 20
Death 55 Deceit 57 Definitive standpoint 134 Demarcation, The doctrine of 118 Dependent (relation) 102 Describable 98, 139, 142 Destruction 39, 90, 97, 112, 118, 119,
126, 129 Determinate Being 170 Dharmakīrtians 140-141 Dialogue 13, 27, 31 Difference 169, 170 Directions, ten 45 Dissimilarity 168 Doctrines (17) 92-93 Dream 73, 117 Duration 44, 53Earth 28, 33, 36, 64 Earth-bodied 37, 40, 50 Effect 115, 116, 136, 137, 144, 169,
170, 178 Element, physical 131, 132 Emotion 132 Emotive activities 37, 50, 57-58 Emotive state 95 Endeavour 117, 136, five aspects of
19 Entity 119, absolutely unchanging 137,
momentary (kşaņika) 119, negative
137, positive 137, seven 5 Enumeration, system of 176 Epistemological problems 94, 104 Epistemology 137 Error, theories of 156 Essence 170 Ethical doctrine 40 Ethical exhortation 4 Ethics 83, 137, 165 European philosophy 170, systems
of 171 Existence 98, 136, 139-141, 144, 170 Extra-Anga texts 78

Page #213

200
Extra-sensory cognition 57 Eye 113
Faith 21, 136
Fear 57
Feature, common 144, contradictory 109, 112, 113, 136
Feeding 55, pre-birth 54, through skin 54, through mouth 54, through sheer desire 54
Fire 28, 36
Fire-bodied 37, 40, 50
Fire-inside-wood 27
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Five-sensed 37
Four-sensed 37
General 98, 119, 123, 126, 139
Generality 110, 124
God 27, 92, 101, 117, 147, 154, 180
Grammar 72
Greed 57
Hard-touch 46
Heaven 28, 64 Heavy-touch 46
Hell 28, 64
Heretics 88
Hunger 57
Iconolatory 1
Idealism 142
Identity 169, 170
Ignoranee 137,
Immoral acts 40
Indescribability 140, 41
Indescribable 25, 26, 96, 98, 102, 139, 140, 142
Indian philosopy 93, 171, reasons for an end of its creative advance 155
Inference 113, 127, 144 Injury 136
Insect, 28, 74
Instinct, acquisitive 57 Intermediate region 42
Interpotation 8, 9, 15, 22, 31, 52, 53,
55, 62, 64, 87

Interval (period of coutinuous nonexistence) of living beings 62, 63 Items, fifteen 14, twelve 15, twenty 14, 15, thirty six 131
Jaina Church 129
Jaina karma literature 173
Jaina teachers 12
Jaina thought 3 Judgment 96
Karma 117, duration of 80, types of
60
Karma doctrine 7, 16, 21, 30, 38, 50, 58-61, 65, 71, 77-80, 86, 67 128, 131, 167, 175
Karma literature 167 Karma-reception 87 Karma specialist 7, 15, 38, 59, 60, 66, 81, 82
Karma texts 79, 167, 175 Karmic bondage 58
Karmic matter 133
'Karomi', explanation of, 129
Kinship, aspect of, 111
Knowledge 73, 75, 76, 127, 133 coupled-with-conduct 76, scriptural 127, 146
Language 55 Life, next 132
Life-activities 17, 40, 56 Life-duration 50, 62, 63, 68 Light-touch 46
Living beings 50, 62, five types of 37 location of 63, six types of 40, twenty four types or classes of 54, 55
Living entities, classification of 20, 68, specific qualitative features of 68
Location 102, of living beings 63 Lower region 45, 51
Man 28, 74 Materialist 131

Page #214

INDEX III Matter 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 50, 80, Ontological analysis "1" ------ 95, 133, 134, 137
Ontological category-couples 38, 39 Medicine 165
Ontological problems 100 Medium of Motion 34
Ontology 137 Medium of Stoppage 34
Opposites, co-presence of 142, unity Mental happening 137
of 162 Methodological tendencies 50, 64 Origination 39, 90, 97, 112, 118, 119, Middle region 45, 51
126, 129 Mimāṁsā doctrine 92
Outward happening 137 Moksa, eligibility to attain 174
Pain 133 Mobile-bodied 40, 41, 42
Pan-externalism 136 Momentarism 164
Pan-internalism 136 Momentary 102
Partial truth 138 Monk 2, 129, 130
Particular 98, 119, 123, 126, 139, 141, Motion 27, 34, 41
144, 152, 161 Music 72
Particularity 110, 124 Mythology 4. 83, 165
Perception 141, 144, 145, 147, deterNew-born babe 60
minate 127, Digoāga's theory of Non-Anga Āgamic texts 12
116, extra-sensory 146, mental Non-entity 119
113, 146, non-visual sensory 113, Non-existence 98, 136, 137, 139-141
ordinary 116, Sānkhya theory of 144, absolute 118, conditional 118
116, sense-134, Vaiseșika theory Non-Jaina Philosophical doctrines 40
of 116, visual 113 Non-Jaina philosphical positions 101
Perceptual process, four types of 19 Non-Jaina philosophical views, gene- Period of continuous existence, of ral evaluation of, 106-110, 114
living beings, 62, 63 122, 129-132, 142, 143, 146 Permanence 39, 90, 91, 97, 98, 109, Non-Jaina schools of philosophy 88
112, 118, 126, 136, 137, 139, 89, 98, 100
140, 142, 144, 145, 168-170 Non-living entities, specific qualitative
Philosophical positions 92, six 101, features of 68, classification of 68
102 Non-omniscient 23, 57
Philosophical problems 94 Not-being 170
Philosophical scene, post-Dharmakirti Nourishment 36
158 Numerical strength 42, 43
Philosophical views 93 Omniscience 22, 38, 110, 147, 154 Philosophy 4, 83, 165, systems of 99 Omniscient 2, 21, 23, 34, 101, 113, 138 Physical aggregate 68, 69, 71 One 137
Physical body 29, 44-46 53, 61 Oneness 136, 139, 144
Physical particles 55 One-sepsed 37, 40
Physical property 53 One soul 131
Physical substance 44,91 J. O...26

Page #215

202
JAINA ONTOLOGY
Physical things 110 Physiology 4, 165 Plant 28, 36 Plant-bodied 37, 40, 50 Pleasure 133, 136
Poetics 72 - Popular usage 115, 123
Practical standpoint 133, 134 Prajñāpanā, contents of 17, style of
13-14 Pramāņas, lists of 100, four types
of 22 Pre-determined event 117 Pride 57 Property 25, 29, 38, 39, 44, 46, 61,
71, 90, 91, 96, 125, 126, 136, 137, 140, 141, 144, 169, 170, 174 degrees of 61, mutually contradi
ctory 168, physical 53 Pudgala, generic properties of 43,-par
ticles 87 Quality 170 Real 39, 102, 119, definition of 8 Reality 33, 38, 39, 61, 62, 89, 97,
124, Buddhist theory of 140, defnition of 90, Jaina theory of 140,
nature of 28 Reason 136 Reciprocity 170 Relation 102, 117, 119. 170 Relationship 136 Relative numerical strength 45, 46,
50, 51, 54, 62, 68 Release 132 Religious preaching 101, 149 Sankarite school, of Brahmavāda 160 Saptabhangi doctrine, two versions
25-26, 180 Scripture 74, 79, 136 Scriptural texts 131, 163 Sense-organ 36, 37, 41, 56, 73, 74,
110, 133, 134, auditory 56, 74, visual 56, 158
Separatenss 136, 137, 140, 144 Sex-instinct 57 Sexual behaviour 55 Shape 43 Similarity 168, 169 Sin 136 Size 44, 53 Sleep 117 Smell 22, 27, 34-36, 43, 135 Soft-touch 46 Soul 7, 17, 20, 22, 27-29, 34, 36-38,
40,50–59, 61, 64, 65, 80, 81, 84, 87, 90, 95, 113, 129-135, 147, 154, 162, 180, properties of 52,
175, states of 95 Sound 22, 34 Space 29, 35, 39 Space-unit 45, 46, 49, 61, 68 Speculation, Abhidharmika, 120, Bra
hmin 120, Upanişadic 120 Speech 36, 43, 55, 133, 134 Splitting 44 Standpoint, of form 67, of spirit 67
problem of 163, Statements, equivalent 168, identical
168 Static-bodied 40-41, 42, 74 Stoppage-of-motion 34 Stories, didactic 4 Substance 29, 38, 39, 42, 44-46, 53,
90, 125, 126, 128, 136, 137, 140
141, 144, 169, 170, 174 Suffering 117 Syadvāda, positive defence of 118 Taste 35, 36, 43, 135 Tattvas, seven 6, nine 6 Teacher-disciple relationship 76 Temporality, aspect of 111, 112 Temporal succession 170 Text-explanation 76 Theorization 89 Thing 41, 129, 170

Page #216

INDEX III
203
Thought 36 Three-sensed 37 Time 29, 38, 39, 117, ontological
status of 34, 35,-unit 45, 61, 68 Topics (36) 13 Topics-of-investigation 18, 20, 28, 37 Touch 35, 36, 43, 135 Traditional Jaina philosophical views,
defence of 106-110, 128, 129,
132-134, 142, 147-151 Transformations 117 Transience 90, 91, 98, 110, 112, 136,
137, 139, 140, 142, 144 Transmigration 97, process of 54 Truth 5, aspects of 111, five noble 5,
four noble 5, partial 130, 131, practical 126, total 130, ultimate
123, 126, whole 138 Two-sensed 37 Unit-of-a-property 45 Universal 141, 144, 152, 161 Upanişadic circles 131
Upper region 45, 51 Vriegated colour 162 Vedic injunction 116 Vices 19, 37, 57, 58 Views, contradictory 137 Vijñānavāda (idealism) 92, 99, 120, 110, 142, 145, 147, 154 Virtue 136 Vows, moral 130 Wakefulness 117, absolute 117 Water 28, 33, 36,-bodied 37, 40, 50 Whole 144 Woman 2 Womb 54 Word 124, 125, doctrine of primacy
of 118, implicit reception of 74 Word-meaning 126, 127, doctrine of
impartite 118 World 63, 92, 154,-cause 116, 118,
-continents 62-63, created 117, --ocean 62-63, parts of 50, -phenomena 117-118

Page #217

ERRATA
Line
Page 10
37
16
18
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For whould from extra-sensiory synyama parita pancendriya womb). instict kivalı kriyānnya Āvašyaniryukti sousces theo ver-all so for as anoher cotext (satkāryavāda) issuess siddi Buddist
111 113 113 116
127 128
158

Page #218

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लिया जायगा । ३. वर्ष भर (१ अप्रैल से ३१ मार्च) में ५,००० रु० या इससे अधिक की पुस्तकें खरीदने
पर नियम १ में उल्लिखित कमीशन के अतिरिक्त ५ प्रतिशत अधिक और १०,००० रु. या इससे अधिक की पुस्तकें खरीदने पर १० प्रतिशत अधिक कमीशन वर्ष के अन्त में दिया जायगा। इस कमीशन की रकम नगद नहीं दी जायगी किन्तु आगामी वर्ष के
बिल या बिलों में से काट दी जायगी । ४. बिल भेजने के बाद एक मास की अवधि में पेमेन्ट हो जाना चाहिए ।

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