Jaina Ontology

SR No.: 001565
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: K K Dixit
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 1971
Total Pages: 222
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Canon, & Agam
File Size: 15 MB

Page 48

THE AGE OF ĀGAMAS
ajīvadravyas always includes dharma, adharma, akaša, pudgala, addhāsamaya while its list of sarvadravyas always includes these five plus jiva. This means that five astikāyas are astikāyas as well as dravyas while addhāsamaya is dravya (and ajīvadravya at that) but po astikaya, The situation is somewhat puzzling and the simple fact seems to be that the importance of time as a basic ontological category occurred to the Jaina scholars only in the course of time- that is, at a time by which the list of five astikayas had become well established. Otherwise, there seems to be little reason why the Jainas should have one list of basic reals with five items and another one with these very items plus time. The later Ŝvetāmbara authors argue that dharma, adharma etc. are called astikāya because they are made up of co-existing units while addhāsamaya is not so called because it is made up of units of which no two ever co-exist. of this argument there is no hint in Bhagavati or any other Agamic text. Nay, there is at least one Bhagavati passage with assertions which presuppose that addhasamaya is made up of co-existing units 41-thus substantially supporting the later Digambara authors who however on their part argue that time is not an astikāya because its units even if co-existing with each other do not touch each other. It seems that in the context of the present question the later authors--Svetāmbara as well as Digambara-have sought to see a distinction which was originally not there. Be that as it may, in the ontological speculations of Bhagavati addhasamaya (i, e, time) is as fundamental a concept as akasa (i. e, space)--for everytbing whatsoever must exist not only in space but also in time.
(iii) Pagdala In Bhagavati the astikāya pudgala (matter) receives treatment in two contexts--one when matter as such is under description, the other where matter as used by a living being. In view of the widely different issues raised in the two contexts it will be better to take them up separately.
Regarding matter as such we are told that it is possessed of colour, taste, smell, touch and is available in the form of either an atom or a multiatomic aggregate. Again, aggregate might be either subtle or gross. Neither an atom nor a subtle aggregate can be subjected to a gross physical process like cutting into pieces, burning, wetting etc. 42 and neither is visible to an ordinary mortal; 4 3 moreover, of the four possible pairs of touch only two, viz. smooth-rough, hot-cold can possibly be present in either in the case of an atom only one touch from each pair is possible, in the case of a subtle aggregate even both are possible). 4 4 The number of atoms in a subtle aggregate might range from two to infinite ; on the other hand, a gross aggregate must necessarily be made of an infinite number of atoms 48. Lastly, any number of atoms---from one to infinite--can occupy one unit of space (i. e. one pradeśa of akaša) 4 8.