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THE AGE OF LOGIC
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phenomenon must be one of the four possible states of the sole world-cause purușa, viz. deep sleep, dream, wakefulness, the fourth state (absolute wakefulness). Niyati-advaitavada criticises puruşa-advaitavada on the ground that a person only too often undergoes suffering - which means that he is not a free agent but an agent pre-determined in a particular fashion. Kāladvaitavāda criticises niyati-advaitavāda on the ground that even a pre-determined event cannot occur except at a particular time, Svabhāva-advaitavada criticises kālādvaitavādı on the ground that even for an event to occur at a particular time the things involved in it must have a paricular nature of their own. Lastly, thāvādraitavāda criticises svabhāva-vāda on the ground that there are no diffierent things to have a particular nature of their own but just one thing behaving in the way it does.
Chapter III In this chapter there appear two doctrines, viz. the Sankhya doctrine of praksti and puruşa and the Vaišeșika (rather unnamed) doctrine of the divine creator and the created world. The chapter begins with a polemic against puruşādvaitavāda (a polemic to be extended to the remaining advaitavādas), the central point of the criticism being that on the advaitavāda position it is difficult to envisage a relation between the posited sole world-cause and its various states. Then follows a brief representation of the Sankhya position according to which praksti undergoes multifarious transformations to yield the things of the world while purușa enjoys these things without undergoing any kind of transformations. In its turn this Sankhya position is elaborately criticised by the Advaitavādi, thus forming an exception to the rule that in Nayacakra a position is criticised by its immediate successor, The point of criticism is interesting, viz, that sattva, rajas and tamis cannot behave as they do without each other's help - which, in turn, means that they cannot but be essentially identical with other. Lastly comes the advocate of divine creation who too criticises Sānkhya for its position that the passive puruşa guides the activities of praksti, his own position being that an active God guides the activities of the things of the world.
Chapter IV
This chapter contains a representation of the doctrine that puruşa and its karmas are two all-sufficient factors to account for the multiplicity of world phenomena. Hence it begins with a criticism of the theistic position on the ground that God has no necessary role to play in the happenings of the world. Later on the chapter also contains a criticism of the doctrine that the purusa's endeavours and no karmas account for the multiplicity of world-phenomena as also of the doctrine that karmas and no puruşa's endeavours accout for the same.
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