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THE AGE OF LOGIC
different from that described by one of its synonyms. And here is what distinguishes evambhūta from samabhirūdha : according to the latter a thing is described by a word even in case it does not correspond to the description yielded by the etymology of this word, according to the former a thing is described by a word only in case it corresponds to the description yielded by the etymology of this word,
(li) On Jinabhadra's showing dravyāstika maintains that the continuously existing substance is real, its successively emerging properties fals while paryāyāstika maintains that the successively emerging properties are real the continuously existing substance false. This description broadly corresponds to that of sangraha and vyavahāra, it being conducted in terms of dravya and paryāya whereas the latter was conducted in terms of sämänya and višeşa. Again it is difficult to think of a philosophical school that will answer to Jinabhadra's description of drav yastika but the Buddhist can well be treated as an advocate of paryāyāstika; (as a matter of fact, paryāyāstika of this account is virtually identical with rjusūtra included among the seven nayas).
(iii) Lastly, on Jinabhadra's showing niscayanaya maintains that an act is done only when it is being done at present while vyavahāra-naya maintains that it is done only when the process of doing it is over. For instance, vyavahāranaya would say that a jar is produced when the process of producing it is over whereas niscayanaya would say that throughout the period of this process different things are produced at different moments (jar being produced at the last moment.) As thus understood niscayanaya turns out to be virtually identical with rjusūtranaya; (as a matter of fact when Jinabhadra in his account of the first nihnava presents a defence of rjusūtranaya he borrows so many crucially important verses from the present account of niscayanaya). However, this version of vyavahara-niscaya is different from both versions referred to earlier. For earlier we were told that for yyavahāra the black bee is black while for niscaya it is possessed of all the five colours; again, we were there told that vyavahāra defends some one of the possible nayas whereas niscaya defends all of them. Now the former of these has been presented as an alternative understanding of vyavahāranaya included among the seven nayas. As for the latter it too somehow comes to view when at the conclusion of the account of seven nayas it is suggested that the relation between one of the seven naya and the seven taken together is the same as that between śruta etc, and kevala; the idea is that one of the seven nayas cognizes in part what the seven nayas cognize in its totality just as mati, śruta, avadhi or manahparyāya cognizes in part what kevala cognizes in its totality.
These may be regarded as Jinabhadra's central formulation on the question of naya; (the rest which are of a miscellangous character may be
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