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THE AGE OF LOGIC
135 thing does not belong to me” (43). And one of the first things that are denied of a soul is its being characterised by jñana, darśna, cāritra, a hallowed traditional position. The cogniser (soul)”, says Kundakunda, is said to possess jñāna, darśana, caritra but in fact it is a pure cogniser possessed of neither inana, nor darśana nor cāritra" (7). [This was said also in Pancāstikāya in a passage already referred to), Elsewhere (vv. 55-60) a long list of features is denied of a soul; it begins with colour, smell, taste, touch and ends with jirasthānas and gunasthanas. Once (350-51) it is argued that to say that a soul creates for itself a body of one of the six types (viz. the five sthāvara types and one trasa type) is like saying that Vişnu creates the world. These utterances are typical of Samayasāra and sufficient to disturb an average Jaina reader. Not that such a reader is unaccostomed to the talk of a distinction between vyavahāranaya and niscayanaya but he expects niscayanaya to be a fuller description of reality than vyayahāranaya whereas Kundakunda seems to adopt the opposite mode of argumentation. For instance, the whole truth about a soul is that in its worldly state it is associated with matter while in its state of mokşa it is free from it; this should be called an account of soul from the standpoint of niscayanaya, As against it either part of this total proposition should be called an account of a soul from the standpoint of vyavahāranaya, Kundakunda, on the other hand, would say that the former of these parts is an account of a soul from the standpoint of vyavaharanaya and the latter that from the standpoint of
anaya. But as Jinabhadra's case should make it clear it was possible to view the distinction between niscayanaya and vyavahāranaya in more ways than one and so the procedure adopted by Kundakunda was not outright impermissible. What was really un-Jaina-like was Kundakunda's thinly veiled insinuation that the standpoint of vyavahāranaya is a totally false standpoint. To be sure, it should be impossible for a Jaina to concede that a soul enters into no relation whatsoever with matter; all that he can allow is that this relation is liable to cease altogether. Be that as it may, Kundakunda's Samayasara certainly adds a new dimension to the discussion concerning the problem of vyavahāra vs. niscayanaya and that is its contribution to the doctrine of Anekantavada.
(E) SAMANTABHADRA
(i) Anekāntavāda Samantabhadra's Aptamimāṁsā deserves a special mention in an account of the history of Jaina philosophy for more reasons than one. For one thing it had the good fortune of being commented on by such stalwarts as Akalanka and Vidyananda, the touch of whose pen might convert even rubbish into gold. But the text itself was meritorious inasmuch as the fundamentals of Anekantavada had found in it a most clear-cut formula
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